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WIDER Working Paper 2023/124

Barriers or catalysts? Traditional institutions and social mobility in rural India

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Abstract: We examine how village-level social group dominance affects the educational and occupational mobility of minority and other social groups in rural India across multiple generations. We distinguish between upper caste and own-group dominance and examine the mechanisms underpinning inequality in mobility outcomes. We find inequality in upward educational mobility to have significantly narrowed over time, with Scheduled Castes doing better in upper caste- and own-dominated villages, while Scheduled Tribes and Muslims do worse in own-dominated villages. In contrast, for occupational mobility we find no evidence of minority groups catching up with upper castes; Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are particularly disadvantaged, but Scheduled Castes, again, do comparatively better in their own-dominated villages. Exploring the mechanisms that explain the relationships between land dominance regimes and mobility, we find that a combination of agroecological and natural resource base and social cohesion of villages underpins the differences observed more than public goods provision. Our findings suggest a new pattern of inequality where historically disadvantaged groups appear less able to convert educational gains into labour market and occupational progress.

Key words: educational mobility, occupational mobility, caste, land dominance regimes, India

JEL classification: J62, J71, O12

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1 Introduction

Traditional institutions can play an important role in low-income countries, either by facilitating the transformation of economies and societies when markets function imperfectly, or by impeding economic and social progress. In the Indian context, the caste system is one such traditional institution that remains ubiquitous in contemporary settings (Bayly 1999; Shah et al. 2017). A large literature has examined the beneficial role of caste networks in providing insurance, jobs, and credit for their members when markets are thin or fail (see Munshi 2019). At the same time, individuals of lower caste (LC) background have faced significant disadvantage in accessing education and jobs, due to caste-based discrimination (Banerjee and Knight 1985; Jodhka and Newman 2007; Thorat and Attewell 2007). Though the Government of India has enacted far-reaching affirmative action programmes for historically disadvantaged castes and tribes, and both educational and occupational mobility have improved for these groups over time (Asher et al. 2023; Hnatkovska et al. 2012, 2013), significant inequalities in their educational and occupational attainment remain (Kundu and Sen 2023). Muslims, who have been behind ineconomic and educational status, have slipped further and experienced lower upward mobility due to residential segregation and other discrimination (Asher et al. 2023; Fazal et al. 2023; Jaffrelot and Gayer 2012).

In this paper we examine the role of traditional village institutions in facilitating or impeding educational and occupational mobility.¹ In particular, we assess whether the mobility prospects of individuals belonging to minority and other social groups are affected by the dominance and relative economic and social power that upper castes (UCs) and their own social groups are able to wield within the villages and thus the neighbourhoods they reside.

Our paper contributes to the emerging literature on the effects of neighbourhoods, especially on their impact on social mobility (Ananat and Washington 2009; Chetty and Hendren 2018a,b; Cutler et al. 2008; Kling et al. 2007). While the influential Becker and Tomes (1979) model highlights the role of parental endowments for intergenerational mobility, neighbourhoods and communities also matter. Chetty et al.'s (2018a; 2018b; 2014) pioneering research on social mobility in the United States finds that the likelihood that a child born into a family in the lowest quintile of the national income distribution will make it into the top quintile, varies starkly by location. The maps displaying such geographical upward mobility contrasts have inspired similar, data-intensive efforts to identify 'lands' or 'pockets' of opportunity in India (Asher et al. 2023) and within and across African countries (Alesina et al. 2021): both studies find compelling spatial variation in educational mobility. With regard to explanations, Chetty et al. (2014) conclude that high-mobility areas 'tend to have less residential segregation, less income inequality, better primary schools, greater social capital, and more stable families'.

Notwithstanding the impressive facets of Chetty et al. (2014) and other recent work, little is known about how the lack of information, of necessary support, and less obvious enablers and plausibly powerful hurdles within village neighbourhoods affect intergenerational mobility.

In addition to the literature on neighbourhood effects, our paper also contributes to the rich sociological and economics literature on caste institutions in India (Anderson 2011; Anderson et al. 2015; Borooah 2012; Coffey et al. 2019; Deshpande 2011; Munshi and Rosenzweig 2006, 2016; Thorat and Neuman 2012). Specifically, and following Srinivas (1959) and Iversen et al. (2014), we argue that in villages

¹ We study educational and occupational mobility rather than income mobility because the survey questionnaire used in our data source—the Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS)—asks the head of the household about their father's educational and occupational attainment. This reflects that a question on paternal income would be highly problematic, both because of the recall challenge and because of the general difficulty in obtaining reliable income estimates in economies with large agrarian and informal sectors (Asher et al. 2023; Iversen et al. 2019).

dominated by UCs, individuals from other caste, ethnic, or religious groups may face a positive 'proximity effect' (e.g. Sethi and Somanathan 2010) as UC villages—by leveraging influential political networks (e.g. Banerjee and Somanathan 2007)—may have been able to secure better access to schooling and other local public goods. At the same time, individuals of other caste, ethnic, or religious groups living in UC-dominated villages may face a negative 'oppression effect' through education or labour market discrimination that impedes their social mobility prospects. UC-dominated villages may also be less socially cohesive and have higher levels of village conflict and fragmentation, eroding trust and introducing inefficiencies in water (e.g. Anderson 2011) and other local markets. Such frictions are likely to further reduce intergenerational mobility within the village, including among UCs.

At the same time, individuals from disadvantaged social groups who live in villages dominated by their own group (own-dominated villages) may benefit from a positive 'enclave effect' because greater social cohesion facilitates collective action and improves the capacity to politically organize to secure access to infrastructure such as paved roads and electricity, but also because they face less discrimination in schools or the labour market. 'Enclave effects' can also be negative if villages dominated by the social group in question are locationally disadvantaged, with more limited access to schools and village infrastructure. Group culture may also enter the frame: regressive gender norms may, for example, delay educational progress more strongly for Muslim women living in Muslim-dominated villages than for Muslim women resident in other village communities (Luke 2021).

We study educational and occupational mobility for three generations of males residing in UC-dominated and own-dominated villages, relative to villages which are not dominated by UCs or by the social group the grandparent–father–son triad belongs to.² In addition to upward and downward educational and occupational mobility, we also examine the mechanisms through which proximity, oppression, and enclave effects may manifest themselves, including through the provision of schooling, other village public goods, village social cohesion and conflict, favourable agroecological conditions, and other locational factors.

We use a nationally representative dataset (the IHDS 2011–12) that asks heads of households about their fathers' main occupation and educational attainment. One important advantage is that this dataset is multi-generational, which enables us to study the long-term effects of village institutions on intergenerational mobility across three generations. The IHDS has both individual-level data, which allows us to construct mobility measures at that level, and village-level data, which contains detailed information on village social composition and land distribution, from which we obtain information about the economic and social dominance of different social groups. We work with over 17,928 grandfather–father–son triads spanning 1,326 villages, which enables us to follow three generations from 1913 to 2012, a period which saw dramatic social, economic, and political change in rural India.

Our findings may be summarized as follows: we observe considerable educational mobility and (much) greater educational than occupational mobility across the three generations. On educational mobility, we find a significant catch-up in the recent generation for Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs), but less so for Muslims. This reinforces other findings of considerable educational progress (Asher et al. 2023; Hnatkovska et al. 2012) but also speaks to contemporary concerns about a failure to make the most of a more educated labour force. Further accentuating this concern, while downward educational mobility is rare, downward occupational mobility, mainly from farming to agricultural labour, is frequent. Further, as the maps in Figures A3 and A4 in the Appendix demonstrate, the extent to

 $^{^2}$ We restrict our focus to male members from the IHDS data for two reasons. First, women in India typically relocate to their husband's household after marriage, so the household-level information on adult women will almost exclusively comprise unmarried daughters and wives; for the latter, information about their native household is not available. There is thus a selection bias and missing data problem here that cannot be easily resolved. Second, the question on the grandparent in the IHDS does not ask about the grandmother's education and occupation, only about the grandfather's.

which educational mobility translates into occupational mobility varies notably not only across regions and states but also across social groups. Overall, these findings point to a new pattern of inequality where historically disadvantaged groups appear to be less able to convert educational mobility gains into corresponding occupational and labour market progress.

On the role of village dominance in the educational mobility of SCs, we find that the importance of the village neighbourhood has reduced over time. While observing positive proximity and own-enclave effects for grandfather–father (G1–G2) pairs, enclave effects remain but are of a smaller order of magnitude for father–son (G2–G3) pairs. For Muslims, we find a strongly negative enclave effect that persists over time. For STs, a strongly negative enclave effect is more pronounced for G2–G3 pairs. For these two groups, we find no evidence of proximity effects. For Other Backward Classes (OBCs) there are no enclave effects, but a negative UC-dominance effect for some empirical specifications.

On downward mobility, which we interpret as capturing vulnerability, the main overall findings are that there are similarities across social groups for educational downward mobility, but stark contrasts for downward occupational mobility: for the latter, SCs and STs are at significantly higher risk, which largely persists across generations. On the effects of village dominance, the younger generation of SCs are less at risk in own-dominated villages, while STs and Muslims are more at risk in own-dominated villages. For G1–G2 pairs, SCs were more and OBCs less likely to experience downward educational mobility in UC-dominated villages.

On mechanisms, and starting with simple regressions (Tables A7–A10), we find that other than OBCdominated villages, UC-dominated villages have better educational infrastructure, especially with regard to secondary Government Schools. The infrastructure advantages of UC-dominated villages are more pronounced for electricity and water, but are also observed for road-type infrastructure, compared to OBC-, Muslim- and ST-dominated villages. On locational factors and considering remoteness (distance to town or district headquarters), only ST-dominated villages are at a significant disadvantage compared to UC-dominated villages. UC-dominated villages are more likely to be located in favourable agroecological zones than are OBC- and ST-dominated villages. While consistent with the observed proximity advantages, these are simply correlations between village regimes and the availability of different types of infrastructure. We also find that living in separate hamlets is more likely in UC- and OBC-dominated villages.

When disentangling mechanisms for education and occupation mobility further, we provide a corrective to received wisdom by suggesting that a combination of village location in a favourable agroecological zone, social cohesion, and, to a lesser extent, other locational advantages—rather than infrastructure and other public goods—are the main determinants of enclave and proximity advantages. We find that location in a favourable agroecological zone underpins positive enclave and proximity effects for SCs, STs, and Muslims, but is negative for OBC enclaves. School and village infrastructure does not play a role except for Muslims.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sections 2 and 3 elaborate on the conceptual and theoretical anchoring and present and discuss the main data source. Section 4 covers interpretations of dominance and alternative mobility measures, and presents descriptive statistics. Sections 5 and 6 motivate and lay out the empirical specifications and present our results. Section 8 sums up and concludes the article's contributions.

2 Conceptual and theoretical anchoring

The following analysis is informed by concepts of caste dominance and fragmentation, expanding on theoretical arguments in, among others, Sethi and Somanathan (2010), Iversen et al. (2014), and Baner-

jee and Somanathan (2007). Drawing on the pioneering work of Srinivas (1966) and following Anderson (2011) Iversen et al. (2014), and Sethi and Somanathan (2010), our entry point is the concept of (upper) caste dominance where dominance may be either resource- or population-based.

For an individual of SC (Dalit) background, it is instructive to consider the net effect of living in a UC-dominated village as the sum of a positive proximity effect and a negative oppression effect. A proximity advantage may result from the political networks that Brahmins and other members of the UCs can mobilize, and the favourable access to village-level public goods that this may result in, echoing Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) and Sethi and Somanathan (2010). For the same individual, there are also potential negative oppression effects resulting from different forms of discrimination encountered when resident in a UC-dominated village.

At the outset, we hypothesize that the net effect on the social mobility prospects of a person of Dalit background may depend on the type of mobility considered, since proximity and oppression effects are likely to have different manifestations across institutional and activity domains. For educational mobility, a proximity advantage may result from access to and a positive quality of schools effect or from a Sanskritization or upper caste emulation-type educational aspiration effect, which could occur if the village has UC members in or with tertiary education or working in prestigious non-farm and other jobs. Unlike a private labour market, interaction and behaviour within schools is moderated by teachers—who are public servants—which could reduce discrimination and oppression effects. However, as work by Nambissan (2010) and others has shown, discrimination by teachers and insults and bullying by UC peers may be quite common. In addition, LC students may confront negative stereotypes when they interact with higher-caste students in the classroom (Hoff and Pandey 2006).

For occupational mobility and non-farm jobs, a UC proximity advantage may be less straightforward: while political and other networks may help to stimulate local investments, proximity to trader and other business community castes could be a more important determinant of occupational mobility prospects: in employment relations, the risk of adverse oppression effects—in hiring and in day-to-day interactions—may also be more pronounced. Further, as argued by Anderson (2011), social distance between LCs and UCs in UC-dominated villages may lead to a breakdown in trading opportunities in markets, including the market for irrigation water, resulting in lower agricultural incomes for LC groups, and hence fewer resources for them to move out of farming-related activities.

We also consider what Iversen et al. (2014) term own-enclave effects. For a village dominated by a minority group, the net own-enclave effect can be thought of as the sum of positive and negative enclave effects, which, again, could operate differently for educational and occupational mobility and for different social groups. For educational mobility, educational aspirations may be limited by the absence of suitable role models, while the access to and quality of education and schools may be limited by weak collective political leverage (Bailwal and Paul 2021; Krishna 2013; Mani and Riley 2021). At the same time, the risk of caste-based humiliation in school should be filtered out. Here, culture may also enter the frame: regressive gender norms may, for example, delay educational progress more strongly for Muslim women living in Muslim-dominated villages than for Muslim women in other village communities (Luke 2021).

For occupational mobility, the net enclave effect also remains uncertain. The economic and political power of the minority group in villages where they dominate should lead to less exploitation of these groups in rural labour markets and better access to more lucrative non-farm jobs (Dasgupta and Pal 2021; Himanshu 2020), thereby promoting occupational mobility. On the other hand, if these villages are locationally or infrastructurally disadvantaged—for example, situated far away or have poor road connections to urban growth centres or market towns, or are located in agroecologically disadvantaged areas, with few prospects for agricultural growth (Palmer-Jones and Sen 2003)—occupational mobility prospects may be limited.

In Table 1 we outline the possible mechanisms by which proximity, oppression, and enclave effects may be manifested within UC- and own-dominated villages, separately for educational and occupational mobility. Proximity effects and oppression effects are likely to be present in UC-dominated villages, and are hypothesized to have positive and negative effects, respectively, though the precise mechanisms at play may be different for educational and occupational mobility. Enclave effects are likely to be present in own-dominated villages, and are hypothesized to comprise both positive and negative effects, making the net effect ambiguous.

We next discuss data, variable construction, and empirical methodology.

Type of effect	Where present?	Effect on mobility	Educational mobility	Occupational mobility
Proximity effect	UC-dominated villages	Positive	Presence of good-quality schoolsAspirational and role model effects	Aspirational and role model effectsBetter village infrastructure
Oppression effect	UC-dominated villages	Negative	 Discrimination by UC teachers Negative stereotypes More village conflict and less social cohesion 	 Labour market discrimination More village conflict and less social cohesion
Enclave effect	Own-dominated villages	Ambiguous	 Lack of role models (-ve) Lack of good schools (-ve) Less discrimination in schools (+ve) 	 Less labour market discrimination (+ve) More social cohesion and less conflict (+ve) Locational and infrastructural disad- vantage (-ve)

Table 1: Effects on mobility in different village types

Note: own-dominated village is where the dominant group is SC, ST, OBC, or Muslim; +ve: positive effect on educational/occupational mobility; -ve: negative effect on educational/occupational mobility. Source: authors' compilation.

3 Data

We take advantage of a well-known and unique household panel dataset for rural India collected by the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) on behalf of the University of Maryland. The Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS) is a nationally representative survey of households across India; the first two rounds covered 2004–05 (IHDS-1) and 2011–12 (IHDS-2). IHDS-1 covered 41,554 households and IHDS-2 covered 42,152 households, with 85 per cent of households in IHDS-1 resurveyed in IHDS-2. Households lost to attrition in urban and rural blocks of north-eastern states were verified by NCAER monitoring teams: replacement households included in IHDS-2. IHDS-2 makes it possible to track inequality and social mobility over a more extensive time period and contains information not only about co-residents in a given household but also about non-resident (former) household members. We use IHDS-2 data in our analysis in this paper.

The IHDS data provide detailed information on education and occupation of the male head of household and his co-resident sons that is needed for any intergenerational mobility estimation. In addition, there is a separate module in the IHDS for household family members who have migrated, where information on the education and occupation of the non-resident family member, along with information on his relationship with the head of the household, is provided. This module facilitates a near-complete specification of all grandfather–father–son triads, thus facilitating multi-generational mobility analysis.³

3.1 Data construction

We focus on intergenerational mobility among male household members in rural India. More specifically, we estimate intergenerational mobility for grandfather–father and father–son pairings, namely the household head's father (G1), household head (G2), and the household head's resident and non-resident sons (G3). From now onward, we describe these as the grandfather's and father's generation (G1–G2) and father's and son's generation (G2–G3). Figure 1 showcases the grandfather–father–son links that we investigate. The primary node represents the household head's father, or G1. G1 may have more than one son, the household head and the household head's resident and non-resident siblings, represented by the secondary nodes generation 2 head (G2 Head), generation 2 resident siblings (G2 RS), and generation 2 non-resident siblings (G2 NRS). The household head may have sons who are co-resident and/or who are non-resident. The tertiary nodes stemming from the household head represent the generation 3 resident sons (G3 RS) and generation 3 non-resident sons (G3 NRS).

Our data provide us with 17,928 observations of grandfather–father–son triads, of which 3,663 observations are G1–G2 Head–G3 NRS triads in rural India. Our data include information about the resident household head as well as non-resident household heads or the household head's husband in the case of non-resident husbands of female heads. To identify the non-resident husbands with female heads, we use the non-resident family member roster. We used an age cutoff of 18 years for G3, as by then most sons have completed their schooling. For G2, we used an age cutoff of 36 years. We are interested in understanding the impact of local social group dominance on mobility. For this, we need information on the composition of the population by social groups or/and the distribution of land by social groups in the local area. Such information is collected by IHDS, but only for rural areas. We thus restrict our analysis to rural areas.



Note: we focus on the grandfather–father–son triads. In this generation tree, G1 is the father of the household head (the grandfather), G2 Head is the household head (the father). RS and NRS refer to resident and non-resident siblings, respectively. The black arrowed line highlights the relationships that we investigate, while the dashed red line highlights the family nodes we exclude from the study.

Source: reproduced from Kundu and Sen (2023), with permission.

³ The only missing information would be for non-resident family members where education and occupation information is not available, and the information about the sons of G2 non-resident siblings if they are not residing in the primary household.

4 Interpreting dominance and measuring mobility

We investigate the relationship between village dominance by a particular social group and the intergenerational mobility of members of each group of interest. Srinivas (1966) interpreted a caste as dominant 'if it owns a sizeable amount of the arable land locally available'. This is slightly vague and as Srinivas duly recognizes, strength in numbers could also account for or reinforce dominance: a caste group could thus be argued to be village-dominant if it owns most of the village land, owns more land than any other group, if their members form a majority, or it is the group with the largest share of the village population. As discussed by Anderson (2011), some, including Dumont (1970), argue that the economic power secured by dominant land ownership is the only credible measure of dominance. We thus, also following Anderson (2011) and Iversen et al. (2014), use land ownership as our main indicator of village dominance. At the same time, and as addressed in our descriptive statistics discussion later, we observe a high degree of correlation between different measures of village land and population dominance.

Following Alesina et al. (2021), we use a transparent and simple measure defining upward intergenerational mobility as a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the educational or occupational attainment of a son exceeds the attainment of his father. We consider mobility across three generations: between G1 and G2 and between G2 and G3. For education, if the years of education of the son (parent) exceeds that of the parent (grandparent), these individuals are interpreted to have experienced upward mobility. We choose years of education over categorical divisions as years of education provide more granular information on education than level of education.⁴

To categorize occupation, we draw on Iversen et al. (2019). The ordering of occupations follows the hierarchical scale proposed by Armstrong (1972), with Category 6 (professionals) having the highest socio-economic status (SES) and Category 1 (agricultural and other manual labourers) having the lowest SES.⁵ Occupational mobility is defined similarly to education mobility. If the individual is working in an occupation higher on the SES ladder than his father, he is classified as upwardly mobile.

A limitation of measuring mobility purely as a move up the educational/occupational ladder is that this fails to account for the regular downward mobility that occurs in low-income settings, which can be consequential for individuals who descend into poverty (Iversen et al. 2019). Therefore, we complement our measure of upward mobility with a measure of downward mobility, which we also define as a binary variable equal to 1 if the educational/occupational level of the father (son) is lower than that of the grandfather (father), and 0 otherwise.

4.1 Dominance and mobility patterns

We first present some descriptive statistics to provide context on village dominance and mobility across the country. Figure A1 presents maps showing the share of land held by social groups across districts in India. This is based on data from villages in each district that were included in the survey sample: these are not representative at the district level. As can be gauged from the first two maps, UCs and even more so OBCs, on average, own higher shares of land in most districts. SCs have higher land shares in only a

⁴ Also, when years of education is used along with a continuous mobility measure, as we do in our robustness exercise, it helps quantify education differences more accurately as compared to education levels. In addition, we ran our analysis using education levels and the results are qualitatively similar (results available on request).

⁵ The ordered list of categories for lowest to highest is: (1) agricultural and other manual labourers, including construction workers, (2) non-agricultural lower-status vocational occupations, (3) non-agricultural higher-status vocational occupations, (4) farmers, (5) clerical, and (6) professionals. For more details on the classification and its limitations, see section 3.2 in Kundu and Sen (2023). As part of the robustness exercise, we also test alternative orderings of occupation categories that also yield qualitatively similar results (results available on request).

few districts, which are scattered across the country. ST dominance in land holdings is concentrated in central and eastern Indian districts: STs own very little land in other parts of India.

We find a high correlation between the social groups that land-dominate and population-dominate a village (Figure 2). When a village is population-dominated by OBCs and UCs, they are highly likely to also be land-dominated by the same social group. About 45 per cent of villages are population-dominated by OBCs, and among these more than 80 per cent of villages are also land-dominated by OBCs. For SCs, this relationship is weaker. Less than 30 per cent of the villages that are population-dominated by SCs (about 10 per cent of all villages) are also land-dominated by SCs. In ST and Muslim population-dominated villages, the population-dominant group tends to be land-dominant in about 80 percent of cases. There are not many villages where Muslim and ST households dominate with respect to population, but where they do, they are also significant landowners. Almost all villages population-dominated by UCs are also land-dominated by UCs.⁶

At an individual level, a majority of individuals belonging to a social group live in villages that are land-dominated by the same group, except for SCs (Figure 3). OBCs represent a little less than 40 per cent of the population, and about 70 per cent of them live in OBC land-dominated villages. This pattern is similar for other groups except SCs. About 25 per cent of the population in rural India are SCs, but only a little more than 10 per cent of them live in villages land-dominated by SCs.



Figure 2: Proportion of land- and population-dominated villages by social group

Note: this figure displays a spine plot illustrating the distribution of land dominance by social groups and population dominance at the village level. The *y*-axis represents the percentage of land dominance by each social group. The lower *x*-axis shows the population-dominant social groups, and the upper *x*-axis shows the percentage of each population-dominant social group. Source: authors' compilation based on IHDS 2011–12 data.

⁶ Figure A2 presents the land shares by social groups across states in India. We see that while OBCs and UCs dominate land shares in most states in India, there are exceptions. For example, in Jammu and Kashmir and West Bengal, Muslims own a considerable amount of land, and in Orissa, Jharkhand, and Chhattisgarh, STs own a large share of the land. In general, SCs do not have large land ownership in most states in India.

Figure 3: Proportion of households by social group and village regime



Note: this figure displays a spine plot illustrating the distribution of land dominance by social groups at the household level. The y-axis represents the percentage of land dominance by each social group. The lower x-axis shows the households that belong to various social groups, and the upper x-axis shows the percentage of each social group in the population. Source: authors' compilation based on IHDS 2011–12 data.

We present Sankey graphs of educational and occupational mobility across the three generations in Figures 4 and $5.^7$ We see considerably more educational mobility than occupational mobility across the three generations in India, echoing Asher et al. (2023) and Kundu and Sen (2023). More strikingly, we find significant downward occupational mobility (driven in large part by a high movement from farmers to agricultural labour) compared to educational mobility, which is generally upward.

By land dominance regimes, we see more upward educational mobility for SCs and UCs in their owndominated villages, but the reverse for OBCs, STs, and Muslims for the G1–G2 pairs. In G2–G3 pairs (second panel) for education upward mobility we do not see a discernible difference in mobility in owndominated vs. other villages (Figure 6). For occupational mobility, there is more upward mobility for all groups in own-dominated villages in G1–G2 pairs, while in G2–G3 pairs this holds only for SCs and UCs. Overall, upward (downward) mobility in education is higher (lower) than occupation mobility in both generations. In G2–G3 pairs, upward education mobility is substantially higher for both owndominated and other villages, while the increase in occupation upward mobility is small. Downward mobility also has generally decreased for both education and occupation over the generations.

⁷ Figures A3 and A4 present all-India maps of upward educational and occupational mobility, with individual-level data agregated to the district level, and Figures B2.1 to B2.4 present bivariate maps of education/occupational mobility and land dominance regimes for generation pairs G1–G2 (grandfather–father) and G2–G3 (father–son).





Note: this Sankey diagram illustrates the transitions in education levels across grandfather, father, and son (G1–G2–G3). Source: authors' compilation based on IHDS 2011–12 data.



Figure 5: Sankey occupational mobility patterns

Note: this Sankey diagram illustrates the transitions in occupational categories between grandfather, father, and son (G1-G2-G3).



Figure 6: Educational and occupational mobility by land dominance (G1-G2 and G2-G3)

Note: we focus on the upward/downward educational and occupational mobility by land dominance among different social groups for grandfather–father (G1–G2) and father–son (G2–G3) pairs. 1 = the social group is land-dominant, otherwise 0. Higher values indicate higher upward/downward mobility.

Source: authors' compilation based on IHDS 2011-12 data.

5 Empirical specifications

To analyse the impact of village dominance on mobility, we estimate the equation below:

$$Y_{jsvl} = \alpha_0 + \alpha S_{jsvl} + \lambda G_{jsvl} + \theta (S_{svl} \times G_{jsvl}) + \beta_1 (S_{svl} \times DS_v) + \beta_2 (S_{svl} \times G_{jsvl} \times DS_v) + \gamma_1 (S_{jsvl} \times DUC_v) + \gamma_2 (S_{jsvl} \times G_{jsvl} \times DUC_v) + \mu X_{jsvl} + \varphi_l + \varepsilon_{jsvl}$$

$$\forall \quad 0 < s \leq 4$$

$$(1)$$

where *j* is the generation pair for which mobility is calculated (j = 1 for grandfather–father pair, j = 2 for father–son pair). Y_{jsvl} is the mobility measure for the generation pair *j* belonging to social group *s* from village *v* and state *l*.

 S_{jvs} is the social group dummy (SC, ST, OBC, Muslim, UC) indicating the social identity of the household. G_{ij} is the generation pair dummy which takes the value 1 for generation pair j = 2 and 0 for generation pair j = 1. $S_{ijs} \times G_{ij}$ is the interaction term—indicating how the average impact of the social group identity of the household differs by the generation pair.

 DS_{ν} represents the land dominance by a social group in village ν . Dominance is a binary measure that is 1 for the social group owning the largest share of land in the village, and 0 otherwise. As a robustness test, we also define dominance as the share of the land holding of the social group owning most land in the village, to account for the extent of dominance.

 β_1 is the differential change in Y for social group s when they stay in their own-dominated villages (DS_v) . β_2 represents how the impact of living in one's own group-dominated village changes in the father–son generation (G2–G3). These two terms give us the net enclave effect—the impact of staying in a village dominated by one's own group for the G2–G3 generation. Correspondingly, γ_1 indicates the impact of staying in UC-dominated villages (DUC_v) for social group *s*. γ_2 represents the change in this impact for the father–son generation (G2–G3).

X is a vector of individual and household controls. It includes the education and occupation of the older generation in each pair, household demographics,⁸ and whether the household owns land or not. φ_l corresponds to the state fixed effects (FE) and ε_{isvl} represents the error term.

To investigate the mechanisms behind the enclave and proximity effect, we modify this model in two ways:

$$Y_{jsvl} = \alpha_0 + \lambda G_{jsvl} + \beta_1 DS_v + \beta_2 (G_{jsvl} \times DS_v) + \gamma_1 DUC_v + \gamma_2 (G_{jsvl} \times DUC_v) + \delta M_v + \theta_1 (M_v \times DS_v) + \theta_2 (M_v \times DUC_v) + \mu X_{isvl} + \varphi_l + \varepsilon_{isvl}$$
(2)

We run separate regressions for each social group to allow the mechanisms to vary by social group. We also extend the basic model to include mechanisms that we have identified based on theoretical and descriptive analysis (M_v) and interactions of mechanisms with own and UC dominance $(M_v \times DS_v)$ and $M_v \times DUC_v$. The coefficients on these independent variables will capture the overall impact of the mechanism and the impact of the mechanisms in own- and UC-dominated villages. The other controls are the same as used in Equation 1.

6 Results

In this section, we present our main results followed by discussions of robustness tests.

6.1 Village dominance and mobility

We first discuss the results from estimating Equation 1 for upward mobility, before moving on to downward mobility. Our main results on upward educational and occupational mobility are presented in Table 2. UCs are the base group in Table 2, with columns (1)–(3) containing intergenerational educational and columns (3)–(6) intergenerational occupational mobility results with different sets of fixed and random effects and covariate controls. Column (1) presents the results for educational mobility, with base education included, no household controls, no state fixed effects, and no household random effects. Column (2) includes household controls and state fixed effects, and in column (3) we include household random effects. We follow the same sequence for occupational mobility in columns (4)–(6). In Figure 7, we present the coefplot estimates for upward educational mobility and occupational mobility (corresponding to Table 2, columns 3 and 6 respectively).

Upward education mobility

We discuss the results for educational mobility (columns (1)–(3) in Table 2). The first four rows show the overall mobility of OBC, SC, ST, and Muslim grandfather–father pairs relative to UCs. It is evident that educational mobility was significantly lower in all social groups compared to UCs. The sizes of the negative coefficients are about equal for SCs and STs (between -0.24 and -0.30), which is upwards of 2.5 times the size of the OBC coefficient (-0.08 to -0.11), with Muslims falling somewhere in between.

⁸ The demographic variables include the size of the household, number of adults, elderly and children by gender, and number of married men and women. See note to regression results Tables for other controls.

The next five rows show the results for educational mobility for the G2–G3 pair. This captures the change in educational mobility over the three generations. We also assess whether there has been a catch-up or divergence in educational mobility for SC, ST, OBC, and Muslim individuals over time relative to UCs by interacting the G2–G3 variable with each of the dummies for the four social groups in turn. We find a significant improvement in educational mobility in the father–son pair, as compared to the grandfather–father pair. This is not surprising in light of the large-scale expansion of schooling in India over the last decades. Notably, we see that SCs, STs, and OBCs show signs of catching up with UC individuals over time—the coefficients in the interaction term between the G2–G3 pair and the dummy variables for these three social groups are positive and significant. In contrast, we see no evidence of catch-up in educational mobility for Muslims over the generations.

We now consider the effects of village dominance, starting with social groups living in own-dominated villages. We find that SCs living in SC-dominated villages did much better (roughly halving the disadvantage), with the interaction term between whether the individual belongs to the SC group and the dummy for SC land dominance positive and significant at the 1 per cent level. In contrast, STs and Muslims experienced lower upward educational mobility when living in own-dominated villages, with the relevant interaction terms negative and significant at the 1 per cent level. This indicates that the net enclave effect is positive for SCs but negative for Muslims and STs. There are no observable enclave effects for OBCs.

Looking at the effects of village dominance for individuals from different social groups in UC-dominated villages, it is noteworthy that SCs had significantly higher educational mobility, with the interaction term between the dummies for person belonging to an SC group and UC land dominance positive and significant. There is some evidence that OBCs living in UC-dominated villages do worse in educational mobility but these results are not consistent across columns (1)–(3). For other groups, there are no consistent, significant differences.

Figure 7: Coefplot for educational and occupational upward mobility - all generation pairs



Note: The coefplot displays the comprehensive educational and occupational mobility model, corresponding to columns (3) and (6) in Table 2, encompassing all generational pairs for upward mobility in education and occupation.

	Education	n years upwa	rd mobility	Occupation upward mobility		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Social groups (Base:UPP)						
SC	-0.268***	-0.237***	-0.287***	-0.141***	-0.122***	-0.130***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
ST	-0.254***	-0.250***	-0.302***	-0.138***	-0.114***	-0.120***
0.50	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
OBC	-0.081	-0.075	-0.116	-0.064****	-0.054	-0.055
MUS	(0.016) _0.163***	(0.017) _0 152***	(0.017) _0.202***	(0.015)	0.015)	-0.002
MOO	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.023)
G2G3	0.228***	0.246***	0.317***	0.069***	0.077***	0.078***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
SC imes G2G3	0.171***	0.168***	0.164***	-0.015	-0.015	-0.019
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
ST imes G2G3	0.203***	0.181***	0.163***	-0.034	-0.045	-0.055*
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
OBC imes G2G3	0.047**	0.048**	0.058***	0.039	0.041*	0.033
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)
MUS $ imes$ G2G3	0.037	0.032	0.011	-0.096***	-0.097***	-0.095***
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Living in own-dominated villages	0 100***	0 101***	0 1 0 7 * * *	0.050***	0.041**	0.045**
SC × DSC	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.010)	(0.020)	(0.020)
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)
31 × 031	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.027	(0.020	(0.025)
	(0.023)	0.004	0.010	0.008	0.021*	0.020
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
MUS imes DMUS	-0.113***	-0.119***	-0.114***	-0.016	-0.031	-0.029
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)
$UPP \times DUPP$	0.031**	0.007	-0.012	-0.003	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
$\text{SC} \times \text{DSC} \times \text{G2G3}$	-0.075**	-0.080**	-0.075**	0.006	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.038)
$ST \times DST \times G2G3$	-0.065*	-0.055	-0.055*	0.004	0.016	0.013
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
$OBC \times DOBC \times G2G3$	-0.000	-0.004	-0.006	-0.037	-0.042*	-0.038*
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)
MUS × DMUS × G2G3	0.021	0.025	0.011	0.028	0.021	0.026
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.040)
UFF & DUFF & G2G3	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.002
Living in LIC-dominated villages	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)
SC × DUPP	0.078***	0.042**	0.037**	0.026**	0.009	0.008
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)
ST imes DUPP	-0.030	-0.033	-0.033	-0.032	-0.018	-0.020
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
$OBC \times DUPP$	-0.040**	-0.031*	-0.026	0.018	0.025	0.022
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)
$MUS \times DUPP$	-0.049	-0.006	0.004	-0.046	-0.027	-0.027
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
$SC \times DUPP \times G2G3$	-0.061**	-0.066***	-0.064***	0.037	0.036	0.034
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)
$51 \times DUPP \times G2G3$	-0.013	0.002	-0.008	0.047	0.051	0.062
	(0.001) _0.003	(0.049) _0.005	(0.047) _0.010	(UCU.U) **000 0_	(0.049) _0.071***	(0.048) _0.070***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0 027)	(0.027)
MUS $ imes$ DUPP $ imes$ G2G3	0.028	0.007	0.009	0.018	0.023	0.025
	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0,060)	(0.061)	(0.060)
	(· ····,	(· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		((()
Base education	Yes	Yes	Yes	No V	No Mara	No No -
Dase occupation	INO No	INO Voc	INO Voc	YES	res	res
State EE	No	Vee	Vee	No	Vee	Vee
Household BE	No	No	Yee	No	No	Yee
Observations	33.699	33.072	33.072	25.602	25.021	25.021

Are enclave, proximity, and oppression effects weakening over time? To examine this, we consider the interactions between dummies for social groups, own-/UC-dominance, and the G2–G3 pair. We find that the enclave effect is weakening for SCs and STs, with the interaction terms negative and statistically significant. This is an interesting finding as there has been a slow and steady catch-up in school infrastructure and road availability for SC- and ST-dominated villages compared to villages dominated by other groups over the period 1991–2011 (see Table B1.1, which is obtained from the Population Censuses). This suggests that factors other than school and village infrastructure may explain the weakening enclave effect for SCs and STs.

Upward occupational mobility

We now discuss the results on upward occupational mobility (columns (4)–(6) of Table 2). Starting with the first four rows, similar but smaller-scale disadvantages than for educational mobility are observed for SCs, STs, and OBCs across the three specifications. The negative coefficient sizes for SCs and STs are 2–2.5 times that of OBCs. Notice, also, that there is no initial occupational mobility disadvantage for Muslims relative to UCs. Further, in contrast to the educational mobility observations, there is no evidence of an occupational mobility catch-up for SCs, STs, and OBCs relative to UCs. Finally, for Muslims we find that an occupational mobility disadvantage relative to UCs has opened up over the three generations.

We next assess the effects of village dominance on occupational mobility. Similar to upward educational mobility, SCs living in SC-dominated villages had higher occupational mobility. For all other groups there is no consistent evidence of positive enclave effects. We also do not find any evidence of proximity/oppression effects for SCs, STs, OBCs, and Muslims. For occupational mobility we find no consistent and significant impact of living in UC-dominated villages. With respect to the changes in the effects of living in own- or UC-dominated villages over the three generations, we do not find evidence of any noticeable differences for the G2–G3 pair compared to the G1–G2 pair, except for OBCs, where enclave and proximity effects have both turned negative over time.

Downward mobility

Finally, we consider downward mobility to capture the vulnerability of individuals from different social groups (Table 3). Columns (1)–(6) of Table 3 follow the same structure as Table 2. Starting with downward educational mobility, we find that other social groups are more likely to experience downward educational mobility than are members of the UCs. Here, differences in downward educational mobility coefficients across OBCs, SCs, STs, and Muslims are much less pronounced, in the 0.032–0.040, 0.015–0.025, 0.029–0.044, and 0.037–0.05 ranges, respectively. When considering changes over time, there is a notable general reduction in downward educational mobility (G2–G3 coefficient). This reduction is much less pronounced for SCs. In spite of this general reduction over time, the initial social group differences in vulnerability to downward educational mobility otherwise remain the same: for enclave and UC proximity and oppression effects, the only difference is the higher downward educational mobility among SCs and lower downward educational mobility among OBCs in UC-dominated villages; for G2–G3 there is a notable reduction in downward educational mobility for SCs in own enclaves; we also observe increases in downward educational mobility over time for STs and Muslims in their own enclaves.

	Education	years downwa	ard mobility	Occupation downward mobility		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Social groups (Base I IPP)						
SC	0.025***	0.014*	0.015*	0.200***	0.179***	0.212***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)
ST	0.044***	0.029***	0.029***	0.217***	0.179***	0.204***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
OBC	0.040***	0.032***	0.032***	0.099***	0.079***	0.094***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)
MUS	0.050***	0.037***	0.037***	0.088***	0.074***	0.099***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)
G2G3	-0.065***	-0.075***	-0.076***	0.010	0.050***	0.068***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)
$SC \times G2G3$	(0.014)	0.046	0.046	-0.036	-0.039	-0.051
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
ST × G2G3	(0.000	0.016	(0.017)	-0.039	-0.044	-0.046
$OBC \times G2G3$	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	_0.031)	-0.033	(0.031) _0.042*
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)
MUS \times G2G3	0.020	0.024	0.024	0.028	0.020	0.014
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Living in own-dominated villages	(0.0.0)	(0.010)	(01010)	(0.000)	(0.020)	(0.020)
SC × DSC	0.007	0.009	0.009	-0.018	-0.021	-0.034*
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)
ST imes DST	-0.009	-0.011	-0.011	0.005	-0.005	-0.016
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
$OBC \times DOBC$	-0.010	-0.010	-0.010	0.007	0.013	0.009
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
$MUS \times DMUS$	-0.020	-0.016	-0.016	0.020	0.001	-0.007
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
$UPP \times DUPP$	0.004	0.012	0.012	-0.024	-0.027*	-0.025
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)
SC imes DSC imes G2G3	-0.053***	-0.054***	-0.054***	-0.028	-0.035	-0.027
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.032)
ST imes DST imes G2G3	0.052***	0.049**	0.049***	-0.012	-0.016	0.001
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.035)
$OBC \times DOBC \times G2G3$	0.013	0.012	0.012	0.005	0.006	0.014
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)
$MUS \times DMUS \times G2G3$	0.046	0.049	0.049	0.017	0.026	0.032
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.038)
UPP × DUPP × G2G3	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006	-0.019	-0.012	-0.015
Living in LIC dominated villages	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.022)
	0.015**	0 026***	0.026***	0.004	0.013	0.014
	(0.007)	(0.020	(0.020	(0.004	(0.013)	(0.014)
	-0.010	0.001	0.001	-0.064**	-0.038	-0.034
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)
$OBC \times DUPP$	-0.016*	-0.018**	-0.018**	0.006	0.024	0.027
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
MUS imes DUPP	0.009	-0.002	-0.002	0.002	-0.015	-0.018
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.033)
${ m SC} imes { m DUPP} imes { m G2G3}$	-0.012	-0.010	-0.010	-0.024	-0.031	-0.033
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)
ST imes DUPP imes G2G3	0.024	0.011	0.012	0.071	0.062	0.048
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.052)
OBC imes DUPP imes G2G3	0.019	0.024	0.024	0.016	0.019	0.017
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)
$\rm MUS \times \rm DUPP \times G2G3$	0.007	0.010	0.010	0.033	0.023	0.022
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.053)
Base education	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Base occupation	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Household controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
State FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Household RE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	33,699	33,072	33,072	25,602	25,021	25,021

Turning to downward occupational mobility, a similar overall picture with one noteworthy difference emerges. This difference relates to the overall likelihood of downward occupational mobility being high in general and about twice as high for individuals of SC and ST background as for OBCs and Muslims; this resonates with suggestive findings from Iversen et al. (2019). When considering changes over time, we observe a general increase in downward occupational mobility vulnerability that is notably lower for SCs and possibly also for OBCs. There is also an indication of lower vulnerability among SCs living in own enclaves, but no effects of UC dominance. Unlike upward mobility—and somewhat counter-intuitively—with the exception of one weakly significant SC coefficient, we find no enclave advantage with regard to preventing such descents; this appears to indicate that the jati-based insurance networks which feature prominently in the development economics literature have not been effective in preventing occupational descent. Another interesting observation is that there is no additional vulnerability penalty from living in a UC-dominated village.

Summing up, we find inequality in upward educational mobility to have significantly narrowed over time, with SCs doing better in UC- and own-dominated villages, while STs and Muslims do worse in own-dominated villages. In contrast, for occupational mobility, we find no evidence of minority groups catching up with UCs, while SCs again do better in own-dominated villages. While minority groups were more vulnerable to downward educational mobility in the past, there has been an overall reduction in downward educational mobility with comparatively small differences persisting. However, minority groups, and especially SCs, continue to be much more likely to experience downward occupational mobility. Overall, these findings point to a new pattern of inequality where historically disadvantaged groups appear less able to convert educational gains into labour market and occupational progress.

6.2 Robustness tests

In this section we present a series of robustness tests of our main results on the relationship between village land dominance by social group and educational/occupational mobility. We first use a continuous mobility measure, where the measure is the difference between the grandparent–father/parent–son years of education and occupational ranks (using the ranks/categories described in Section 4). In contrast to the binary land dominance measure used in Tables 2 and 3, which does not quantify the extent of upward and downward mobility, this simple continuous measure allows for the mobility measure to vary from -14 to +14 for education and -5 to +5 for occupation. Thus, the mobility measure takes a higher value if the son's years of education are higher for the same level of parental education. We present the results for upward mobility in Table A1.⁹ We obtain broadly similar results with this continuous measure as with the binary measure, with SCs showing higher upward educational mobility in both own-dominated and UC-dominated villages (though the evidence on the latter is weaker than for the binary measure). STs and Muslims show lower educational mobility in own-dominated villages. For occupational mobility, we do not find clear evidence of enclave and proximity/oppression effects, as in the case of the binary measure.

Second, we replace the binary measure with continuous shares of land dominance. This means that the larger the proportion of land owned by a social group, the stronger is their land dominance.¹⁰ We present the results for upward mobility in Table A2. There are some differences for the binary and continuous land dominance measures. SCs experience positive enclave effects in both educational and occupational mobility. STs and Muslims both face negative enclave effects in educational mobility

⁹ We obtain qualitatively similar results for downward mobility using a continuous mobility measure as with the binary measure (results available on request).

¹⁰ Figure A5 shows that the mean land shares of the dominant group range between around 50 per cent (SC-dominant villages) and 70 per cent (Muslim-dominant villages). Therefore, when a particular social group is dominant in a village, it usually holds a large proportion of the land in the village. This suggests that a binary measure of land dominance is a more suitable measure than continuous land dominance in our case.

(with no discernible effects for occupational mobility). We also see that Muslims—for the continuous land dominance measure—experience negative oppression effects in UC-dominated villages. All other results broadly remain the same across village regimes.

Third, we address the concern that individuals who left the village some years ago may not have experienced enclave/proximity/oppression effects in the same way as those who stayed behind. Therefore, we confine the sample only to resident siblings (in our case, 3.4 per cent of the G2 group are non-resident and 20.4 per cent of the G3 group are non-resident). The results for upward mobility are presented in Table A3. The results are very similar to those in Table 2.

Fourth, we address the concern that households that have moved into the village recently may not have experienced enclave/proximity/oppression effects to the same degree as a household that has lived in the village over three generations. We confine the sample only to households that have resided for at least 25 years.¹¹ The results are in Table A4 and are, again, very similar to those in Table 2.

Finally, we examine whether our results are sensitive to the truncation of the rural sample, where we drop G2 parents with an age younger than 36 years. We run Solon-type mobility regressions where we regress G2 education/occupation on G1 education/occupation for the rural sample with and without the age cutoffs (see Solon 2018). The results are presented in Table A5. The coefficients on G2 education/occupation (the intergenerational regression coefficients) are very similar for the two samples, suggesting that the age cutoff does not make a material difference to our results.

7 Mechanisms

Through what mechanisms may village dominance affect mobility? We first present descriptive statistics covering information on a variety of school, electricity, water, road, and other village infrastructure variables, on location, and on indicators of social cohesion. We estimate simple regressions of village dominance regime on each of these variables to investigate whether, as influential research on public goods access suggests (Banerjee and Somanathan 2007), non-UC-dominated villages are disadvantaged relative to UC-dominated villages. While these results are suggestive and of interest in their own right, they do not provide evidence about the determinants of educational and occupational mobility. To make further progress, we present models of education and occupation mobility where candidate key mechanisms are interacted with the village regime variables.

7.1 Descriptive analysis

Table A6 presents descriptives on various measures of infrastructure, location, and social cohesion, and Tables A7–A10 present simple correlational regressions of public goods on village dominance regimes. To start with, SC-, ST-, and Muslim-dominated villages are less likely to have middle schools than are UC- and OBC-dominated villages. ST- and Muslim-dominated villages are also less likely to have a government secondary school. Overall, OBC-dominated villages are slightly advantaged in terms of school infrastructure (Table A7).

We next consider other infrastructure known to be crucial for development, such as electricity, piped water, and roads (Table A8). We observe significantly lower access to electricity among households in OBC-, SC-, ST-, and Muslim-dominated villages compared to villages dominated by UCs. There are also notable differences in the access to piped water as the main source of drinking water, where the dis-

¹¹ Note that only 2.4 per cent of our sample has resided in their present village for less than 25 years, suggesting very little in-migration to villages in India.

advantage of ST- and Muslim-dominated villages is particularly pronounced; there is also a statistically weaker and smaller SC disadvantage. Turning to transport and road infrastructure, ST- and Muslim-dominated villages are less likely to have bus services and access to pucca (non-mud) roads.

On locational factors, ST-dominated villages, unsurprisingly, appear particularly disadvantaged as they are furthest away from pucca roads, towns, and district headquarters. ST- and OBC-dominated villages are also significantly more likely to be located in unfavourable agroecological zones compared to UC-dominated villages: Muslim-dominated villages are likely to be located in favourable agroecological zones (Table A9).

We next consider indicators of the social fabric, cohesion, and frictions within village communities. We start by examining the prevalence of residential segregation—with social groups living in separate hamlets—across village regime types. We first note that villages dominated by SCs, STs, and Muslims are much less likely to have residential segregation than OBC- and UC-dominated villages. For the other social fabric indicators, which are discrimination of children in schools and village and jati conflicts self-reported by households, ST-dominated villages appear to be significantly worse affected in all three cases. For the two conflict indicators, households in Muslim-dominated villages report fewer village and jati conflicts (Table A10).

While the data for our analysis are from IHDS 2011–12, cleavages in public goods access existed even 40 years ago and were more prominent then. Using census data from 1971 and 1991, Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) document disadvantage in public goods for areas that were dominated by non-UCs. Bailwal and Paul (2021) use 2001 and 2011 census data to show that SC/ST population-dominated villages are less likely to have secondary schools than non-SC/ST-dominated villages. Taking this further and using census data from 1991, 2001, and 2011, we find that gaps in access to public goods exist throughout the period, but have narrowed over time (Table B1.1). Census data over time show that SC and ST population-dominated villages are less likely to have access to schools and roads than are villages dominated by other groups. Even in urban India there is evidence of residential segregation by social groups (Jamil 2014; Mehta 1969; Singh et al. 2019; Thorat et al. 2015) and that UC-dominated neighbourhoods have greater access to public services compared to Muslim and LC-dominated neighbourhoods (Adukia et al. 2022; Bharathi et al. 2022). As discussed, a favoured explanation for these gaps is that the political networks and leverage of UCs might be expected to affect the extent and quality of village infrastructure, including the access to different educational institutions (Banerjee and Somanathan 2007).

7.2 Village dominance, mechanisms, and mobility

As our simple regressions show, there are considerable public goods advantages from residing in UCdominated villages. While interesting, important, and supportive of influential hypotheses about the underpinnings of proximity advantages, these regressions do not answer questions about the mechanisms that affect intergenerational mobility. To disentangle these mechanisms, we expand the main specifications by interacting each of the possible mechanisms of interest with village regime, but now in separate regressions for each social group: mechanisms of interest are gradually introduced in Tables A11–A18.

Mechanisms of educational mobility

Starting with educational mobility (Tables A11–A14), we first register the strongly significant G2–G3 coefficient for all social groups as well as the notably larger coefficient for SC and ST households. This points to considerable mobility progress especially for SC and ST groups. The results also confirm the effects of living in own enclaves and UC-dominated villages and changes in these over time. For SCs,

for both, a weakening over time is observed. For STs, in notable contrast, the negative enclave effect becomes more pronounced over time.

To disentangle the mechanisms affecting intergenerational educational mobility, we consider how the own- and UC-dominance coefficients respond to the introduction of each of the mechanisms of interest and then the full model specification results in column (10). We find that positive own-enclave effects on educational mobility are associated with favourable agroecological conditions for SCs, and even more strongly for Muslims. For STs, a negative overall effect of favourable agroecological conditions is less pronounced in ST enclaves. For OBCs, we observe a negative enclave effect of favourable agroecological conditions. In UC-dominated villages there is a strong positive effect of favourable agroecological conditions for STs and Muslims, but no effect for SCs and OBCs. The public goods mechanism, which is favoured in the literature, is represented by school and other village infrastructure. For education infrastructure there are no consistent enclave or proximity effects, except for a negative enclave effect for Muslims. For other village infrastructure, there are no discernible effects for SCs, STs, and OBCs, but a positive own-enclave effect for Muslims.

For the social cohesion variables, there are notable correlations between separate hamlets, jati or village conflicts, and intergenerational educational mobility. For SCs, it is separate hamlets that matter: while the general effect is positive, educational mobility in SC enclaves with separate hamlets is much lower than in other SC enclaves. A similar but much smaller effect is observed for SCs in UC-dominated villages with separate hamlets. For STs, we observe a negative general effect of jati conflict that turns positive in UC-dominated villages. For OBCs, there are no relevant effects of the social cohesion variables. For Muslims, separate hamlets and jati conflict both matter. While the general effect of separate hamlets is negative, this turns positive for UC-dominated villages.

Mechanisms of occupational mobility

Turning to intergenerational occupational mobility, we first register the notable improvement over time (G2–G3 coefficient) for SCs and OBCs and the lack of similar progress for STs and Muslims. Another important observation is that none of the own- and UC-dominance coefficients are significant for any social group in the full model (Tables A15–A18)

For all groups, the mechanism results are weaker and indicative. For SCs, distance to town in UCdominated villages has a negative effect on occupational mobility: similarly, while jati conflict has a counter-intuitive positive effect on SC mobility in general, the effect turns negative in UC-dominated villages (Table A15). For STs, none of the mechanisms considered make a significant difference (Table A16). For OBC households, there is a weak, counter-intuitive negative effect of living in favourable agroecological zones (Table A17). For OBC and Muslim households, there is also a negative effect of distance to town from residing in an own enclave. For Muslims, as for educational mobility, we observe a negative effect of jati conflict, which turns positive within own enclaves (Table A18).

These results provide an important corrective to received wisdom suggesting that a combination of village location in a favourable agroecological zone, social cohesion, and to a lesser extent other locational advantage—rather than infrastructure and other public goods—are the main determinants of enclave and proximity effects. We find that location in favourable agroecological zones underpins positive enclave and proximity effects for SCs, STs, and Muslims, but is negative for OBC enclaves. School and village infrastructure do not appear to affect mobility, except for Muslims.

8 Conclusion

We use a unique dataset to investigate how traditional institutions (caste and religious group dominance) affect intergenerational educational and occupational mobility in rural India and whether the effects of these institutions may have weakened over time. Agriculture is still the main occupation around which village life revolves and, as a sizeable economic and sociological literature attests, ownership of land is critical in determining who holds power in village communities. At the same time, discrimination and divisions exist in village societies along caste and religious identities. Drawing on early conceptual work by Srinivas (1966), more recent theoretical contributions (Sethi and Somanathan 2010), and empirical research (Anderson 2011; Banerjee and Somanathan 2007; Iversen et al. 2014), we investigate whether and how land dominance by any particular social group within a village has affected individual prospects for better educational and occupational attainment than their parents. This is crucial for understanding how traditional institutions at the community level impact a key long-term outcome like social mobility. We thus go beyond the standard analysis in the literature, which looks at how mobility differs by individual social identity to also investigate the impact of dominance of a social group on mobility.

Theoretically, we distinguish between UC and own-group dominance and examine the mechanisms underpinning inequality in mobility outcomes. We find inequality in upward educational mobility to have significantly narrowed over time, with SCs doing better in UC- and own-dominated villages, while STs and Muslims have done worse in own-dominated villages. In contrast, for occupational mobility we observe considerable progress for SCs and OBCs, but not for STs and Muslims, and no evidence of minority groups catching up with UCs; SCs, again, do better in own-dominated villages.

While received wisdom (e.g. Banerjee and Somanathan 2007) suggests that UC-dominated villages are at a considerable advantage with regard to public goods, we find this to depend on the infrastructure in question: while differences in educational infrastructure access appear to have narrowed, notable differences in electricity, piped water, and transport and road infrastructure remain. At the same time, these do not appear to be the key drivers of the intergenerational mobility disparities observed: for educational mobility it is instead combinations of the agroecological and natural resource base, the social cohesion variables, and, to a lesser extent, location that underpin these differences. For occupational mobility, since the effects of UC and own dominance are already much weaker, the mechanism regressions provide few additional insights. Finally, we study vulnerability to downward educational and occupational mobility. We first register that minority groups were more vulnerable to downward educational and occupational mobility in the past, with disparities in downward occupational mobility being particularly pronounced and much higher for SCs and STs. While there has been an overall reduction in downward educational mobility, and even more so for SCs in own enclaves, downward occupational mobility has become more common for other groups. At the same time, minority groups, especially SCs and STs, continue to be much more likely to experience downward occupational mobility. Overall, these findings point to a new pattern of inequality where historically disadvantaged groups appear less able to convert educational gains into labour market and occupational progress.

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Appendix

Figure A1: Share of land owned by social groups





st

.5 - .75 .4 - .5 .3 - .4 .25 - .3

2 - 25



Figure A2: Land share by social groups across states

Source: authors' compilation based on IHDS 2011-12 data.

Figure A3: Upward educational mobility G1–G2 and G2–G3



Note: we focus on the educational mobility of the grandfather–father (G1–G2) pair and the father–son (G2–G3) pair. Source: authors' compilation based on IHDS 2011–12 data.

Figure A4: Upward occupational mobility G1-G2 and G2-G3



Note: we focus on the occupational mobility of the grandfather–father (G1–G2) pair and the father–son (G2–G3) pair. Source: authors' compilation based on IHDS 2011–12 data.

Figure A5: Land share of land-dominant group



Table A1: Education and occupation mobilit	y regression:	continuous mobility	measure for all	generation pairs
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	Educ	ation years m	obility	Occupation mobility		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Social groups (Base:UPP)						
SC	-2.329***	-2.104***	-2.607***	-0.927***	-0.819***	-1.000***
	(0.137)	(0.139)	(0.145)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.058)
ST	-2.477***	-2.276***	-2.803***	-0.996***	-0.822***	-0.956***
	(0.172)	(0.171)	(0.178)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.072)
OBC	-0.946***	-0.855***	-1.257***	-0.446***	-0.364***	-0.427***
	(0.141)	(0.142)	(0.151)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.063)
MUS	-1.762***	-1.697***	-2.206***	-0.269***	-0.223**	-0.353***
C0C0	0.202)	0.200)	2 410***	0.016***	0.120*	0.076
0203	(0.156)	(0.153)	(0.138)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.078)
$SC \times G2G3$	1.508***	1.488***	1.338***	-0.005	-0.003	-0.000
	(0.217)	(0.211)	(0.190)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.092)
ST imes G2G3	1.856***	1.629***	1.401***	-0.021	-0.040	-0.097
	(0.272)	(0.266)	(0.249)	(0.122)	(0.121)	(0.118)
OBC imes G2G3	0.455**	0.453**	0.552***	0.142	0.157*	0.108
	(0.198)	(0.194)	(0.178)	(0.094)	(0.093)	(0.090)
$MUS \times G2G3$	0.247	0.190	-0.020	-0.324***	-0.350***	-0.284**
	(0.260)	(0.259)	(0.231)	(0.124)	(0.123)	(0.116)
Living in own-dominated villages						
$SC \times DSC$	0.901***	0.957***	1.010***	0.140*	0.117	0.194**
	(0.197)	(0.202)	(0.200)	(0.001)	(0.063)	(0.063)
ST × DST	-0.385** (0.185)	-0.323* (0.184)	-0.375** (0.188)	0.033	0.051 (0.077)	0.109 (0.077)
	0.070	0.050	0 109	0.007	0.017	0.025
	(0.122)	(0.123)	(0.127)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.023
$MUS \times DMUS$	-0.624***	-0.632***	-0.603***	-0.042	-0.079	-0.040
	(0.221)	(0.226)	(0.233)	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.097)
$UPP \times DUPP$	0.425***	0.176	-0.019	0.067	0.050	0.048
	(0.131)	(0.135)	(0.142)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.056)
$\text{SC} \times \text{DSC} \times \text{G2G3}$	-0.530*	-0.573*	-0.426	0.139	0.137	0.144
	(0.317)	(0.311)	(0.284)	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.132)
$\text{ST} \times \text{DST} \times \text{G2G3}$	-0.750**	-0.626*	-0.734**	0.072	0.114	0.028
000 0000 0000	(0.334)	(0.326)	(0.303)	(0.141)	(0.140)	(0.135)
$OBC \times DOBC \times G2G3$	-0.032 (0.186)	-0.032 (0.184)	-0.110 (0.165)	-0.102 (0.087)	-0.124 (0.087)	-0.110 (0.082)
	_0 203	_0 238	_0 381	-0.053	_0.051	_0.068
	(0.348)	(0.344)	(0.311)	(0.160)	(0.157)	(0.149)
UPP $ imes$ DUPP $ imes$ G2G3	-0.306	-0.259	-0.061	0.009	-0.007	-0.011
	(0.195)	(0.192)	(0.172)	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.087)
Living in UC-dominated villages						
SC imes DUPP	0.528***	0.216	0.176	0.060	-0.026	-0.036
	(0.134)	(0.136)	(0.139)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.052)
$ST\timesDUPP$	-0.142	-0.296	-0.288	0.090	0.035	0.004
	(0.285)	(0.276)	(0.281)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.107)
$OBC\timesDUPP$	-0.019	-0.010	0.040	0.051	0.030	-0.004
	(0.149)	(0.151)	(0.156)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.064)
$MUS \times DUPP$	-0.544*	-0.094	0.022	-0.103	-0.030	-0.019
	(0.322)	0.700***	(0.320)	(0.150)	(0.132)	0.100*
SC × DUPP × G2G3	(0.229)	(0.224)	(0.203)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.089)
	_0.346	_0.053	_0.087	0.007	0.054	0 155
UT A DUFF A GZGO	(0.499)	(0.478)	(0.450)	(0.198)	(0.198)	(0.192)
OBC imes DUPP imes G2G3	-0.355	-0.334	-0.468**	-0.216**	-0.235**	-0.208**
	(0.224)	(0.221)	(0.199)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.098)
$\rm MUS \times \rm DUPP \times G2G3$	-0.369	-0.529	-0.549	-0.036	0.031	0.036
	(0.480)	(0.467)	(0.418)	(0.220)	(0.221)	(0.209)
Base education	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Base occupation	No	No Vo	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	NO	Yes	Yes	NO	res Yes	res Yes
Household RE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	33,699	33,072	33,072	25,602	25,021	25,021

	education	n years upwar	rd mobility	Occupa	ation upward	mobility
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Social groups (Base:UPP)						
SC	-0.238***	-0.225***	-0.277***	-0.131***	-0.122***	-0.130*
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013
ST	-0.256***	-0.256***	-0.308***	-0.143***	-0.117***	-0.123*
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015
OBC	-0.099***	-0.088***	-0.126***	-0.053***	-0.040***	-0.042*
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012
MUS	-0.188***	-0.164***	-0.210***	0.003	0.006	0.001
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018
32G3	0.220***	0.238***	0.308***	0.049***	0.056***	0.057*
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017
$SC \times G2G3$	0.157***	0.151***	0.147***	0.023	0.022	0.017
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021
$ST \times G2G3$	0.196***	0.179***	0.160***	0.001	-0.010	-0.01
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026
$OBC \times G2G3$	0.036**	0.036**	0.046***	0.026	0.026	0.010
OBO X GEGO	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020
	0.045*	0.026	0.017	0.002***	0.001***	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
W03 × 6263	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.027
iving in own dominated villages	(0.0_0)	(0.0_0)	(0.0_0)	(***=*)	(***=*)	(0.0-1
iving in own-dominated villages						
$SC \times DSC$	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.001**	0.001**	0.001*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000
ST imes DST	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	0.000*	0.000*	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000
$OBC\timesDOBC$	-0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000
$\text{MUS} \times \text{DMUS}$	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.000	-0.000*	-0.00
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000
$UPP\timesDUPP$	0.000**	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.00
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000
$\rm SC \times DSC \times G2G3$	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.000	-0.001	-0.00
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001
ST imes DST imes G2G3	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.00
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000
$OBC \times DOBC \times G2G3$	0.000**	0.000*	0.000*	-0.000	-0.000	-0.00
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000
MUS \times DMUS \times G2G3	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001*	0.001	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000
	_0.000	_0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000
iving in LIC dominated villages	()	()	()	()	()	(
Living in UC-dominated villages						
SC × DUPP	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.004	0.001	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004
ST imes DUPP	-0.010***	-0.011***	-0.011***	-0.001***	-0.001**	-0.00
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000
$OBC \times DUPP$	0.003***	0.003**	0.003**	0.004***	0.002	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001
$\text{MUS} \times \text{DUPP}$	-0.014***	-0.015***	-0.016***	-0.008***	-0.007***	-0.007
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002
$\text{SC} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{G2G3}$	-0.007	-0.006	-0.006	0.001	0.003	0.004
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008
$\mathrm{ST} \times \mathrm{DUPP} \times \mathrm{G2G3}$	0.015***	0.015***	0.014***	0.005	0.005	0.005
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005
OBC imes DUPP imes G2G3	-0.003	-0.004*	-0.003	-0.002	-0.001	-0.00
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002
MUS $ imes$ DUPP $ imes$ G2G3	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000
Base education	Vac	Vac	Var	No	No	No
Base occupation	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
lousehold controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
State FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Household RE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	33,699	33,072	33,072	25,602	25,021	25,021

Table A3: Education a	nd occupation	upward mobility	regression:	only	residents
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	Education	n years upwai	rd mobility	Occupation upward r		mobility	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Social groups (Base:LIPP)							
500 (2000) (2000) (7)	0.066***	0.005***	0.004***	0 105***	0 100***	0 100***	
30	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
ST	_0.540***	_0 250***	_0 301***		_0 110***	_0 119***	
31	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	
OBC	0 078***	_0.073***	_0 11/***	_0.056***	0 052***	_0.054***	
000	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	
MUS	0 162***	0 151***	0.200***	0.015	0.001	0.009	
MOS	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	
6363	0.210***	0.026***	0.205***	0.022*	0.027	0.020	
6265	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.033	(0.027	(0.030	
SC × C2C2	0 179***	0 170***	0.160***	0.004	0.006	0.009	
30 × 0203	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	
	0.107***	0.190***	0.160***	0.042	0.044	0.056*	
31 × 6265	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)	
	0.020	0.024	0.051**	0.010	0.014	0.005	
080 × 6263	(0.029	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	
	0.049	0.042	0.015	0.079**	0.079**	0.076**	
1003 × 0203	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	
Living in own-dominated villages							
SC imes DSC	0.136***	0.120***	0.125***	0.051***	0.039*	0.045**	
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	
ST imes DST	-0.069***	-0.072***	-0.077***	0.018	0.018	0.022	
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	
$OBC \times DOBC$	-0.016	0.002	0.009	0.003	0.017	0.017	
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	
$MUS \times DMUS$	-0.124***	-0.121***	-0.118***	-0.019	-0.037	-0.035	
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	
$UPP \times DUPP$	0.028*	0.006	-0.013	-0.003	-0.009	-0.008	
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
$SC \times DSC \times G2G3$	-0.096***	-0.100***	-0.100***	-0.003	-0.006	-0.008	
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	
ST imes DST imes G2G3	-0.054	-0.049	-0.048	0.007	0.009	0.002	
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	
$OBC \times DOBC \times G2G3$	0.019	0.012	-0.000	-0.011	-0.017	-0.012	
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)	
$MUS \times DMUS \times G2G3$	0.041	0.027	0.023	0.042	0.028	0.038	
	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.042)	
$UPP\timesDUPP\timesG2G3$	-0.035	-0.033	-0.006	0.007	0.007	0.005	
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	
Living in UC-dominated villages							
SC imes DUPP	0.075***	0.040**	0.036**	0.027**	0.007	0.006	
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
ST imes DUPP	-0.032	-0.033	-0.034	-0.036	-0.023	-0.023	
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	
$OBC \times DUPP$	-0.045**	-0.034*	-0.028	0.011	0.019	0.016	
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	
$MUS \times DUPP$	-0.032	-0.007	0.001	-0.047	-0.025	-0.026	
	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	
$\rm SC \times \rm DUPP \times G2G3$	-0.065**	-0.074***	-0.072***	0.029	0.032	0.024	
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)	
$\mathrm{ST} \times \mathrm{DUPP} \times \mathrm{G2G3}$	-0.012	0.002	-0.006	0.023	0.028	0.038	
	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.047)	
$OBC\timesDUPP\timesG2G3$	0.021	0.013	-0.005	-0.037	-0.040	-0.039	
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	
$\rm MUS \times \rm DUPP \times G2G3$	0.001	-0.010	0.005	0.028	0.028	0.033	
	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.054)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.062)	
Base education	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	
Base occupation	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	
State FE	NO No	res Yes	Yes	NO No	res Yes	Yes Yes	
Household RE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	
Observations	29,961	29,961	29,961	23,195	23,195	23,195	

Table A4:	Education	and occupation	upward mobili	ty regression:	all generation	pairs-only HH	l in villages	more than
25 years								

	Education	n years upwai	rd mobility	Occupation upward mo		mobility
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	(1)	(=)	(0)	(+)	(0)	(0)
Social groups (Base:UPP)						
SC	-0.264***	-0.236***	-0.286***	-0.137***	-0.121***	-0.128***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
ST	-0.251***	-0.250***	-0.301***	-0.133***	-0.111***	-0.117***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
OBC	-0.078*** (0.017)	-0.075*** (0.017)	-0.115***	-0.060***	-0.051***	-0.052***
MUS	-0.167***	-0.154***	-0.202***	0.014	0.010	0.005
G2G3	(0.023) 0.234***	(0.025) 0.250***	0.320***	0.076***	0.082***	0.083***
$SC \times G2G3$	0.167***	0.165***	0.162***	-0.020	(0.019) 0.019	-0.023
ST imes G2G3	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)
	0.197***	0.177***	0.158***	0.041	0.050*	0.059**
OBC imes G2G3	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
	0.045**	0.049**	0.058***	0.036	0.038	0.031
MUS $ imes$ G2G3	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
	0.036	0.027	0.006	0.104***	0.104***	0.103***
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Living in own-dominated villages						
$SC\timesDSC$	0.145***	0.126***	0.133***	0.058***	0.046**	0.050**
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
$ST\timesDST$	-0.064**	-0.066***	-0.071***	0.027	0.027	0.029*
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
$OBC\timesDOBC$	-0.015	0.005	0.011	0.008	0.021	0.020
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
$\text{MUS} \times \text{DMUS}$	-0.105***	-0.117***	-0.113***	-0.024	-0.042*	-0.040
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
$UPP\timesDUPP$	0.040***	0.015	-0.004	0.001	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)
$\text{SC}\times\text{DSC}\times\text{G2G3}$	-0.083**	-0.087**	-0.082***	0.001	-0.008	-0.006
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.038)
$\text{ST} \times \text{DST} \times \text{G2G3}$	-0.067*	-0.056	-0.055*	0.006	0.017	0.014
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
$OBC\timesDOBC\timesG2G3$	-0.002	-0.006	-0.009	-0.040*	-0.044*	-0.041*
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
$\rm MUS \times DMUS \times G2G3$	0.015	0.024	0.009	0.038	0.033	0.038
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
$UPP\timesDUPP\timesG2G3$	-0.039*	-0.035*	-0.006	0.004	0.002	0.000
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Living in UC-dominated villages						
SC × DUPP	0.080***	0.042**	0.039**	0.029**	0.011	0.010
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)
$ST \times DUPP$	-0.035	-0.037	-0.039	-0.034	-0.021	-0.022
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)
$OBC\timesDUPP$	-0.040**	-0.030*	-0.026	0.017	0.025	0.022
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)
$MUS\timesDUPP$	-0.054	-0.013	-0.002	-0.044	-0.026	-0.026
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.036)
$\text{SC} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{G2G3}$	-0.061**	-0.066***	-0.063***	0.035	0.035	0.033
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)
$\mathrm{ST}\times\mathrm{DUPP}\times\mathrm{G2G3}$	-0.015	0.001	-0.005	0.054	0.058	0.068
	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.049)
$OBC\timesDUPP\timesG2G3$	-0.007 (0.025)	-0.009 (0.025)	-0.014 (0.023)	-0.071** (0.028)	-0.073*** (0.027)	-0.071*** (0.027)
$\rm MUS \times \rm DUPP \times G2G3$	0.042 (0.056)	0.021 (0.056)	0.015 (0.052)	0.027 (0.062)	0.030 (0.062)	0.032 (0.062)
Base education	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Base occupation	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Household controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
State FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Household RE	No	No	Yes	No	No 24 521	Yes

Table A5: Intergenerational occupational and educational mobility

Table A5. Intergenerational occupational and educational mobility								
	Rural sample	e no age cutoff	Rural samp	le age cutoff				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)				
	G2 occ.	G2 edu.	G2 occ.	G2 edu.				
Gen 1 occ.	0.370***		0.386***					
	(0.00703)		(0.00798)					
Gen 1 edu.		0.543***		0.564***				
		(0.00878)		(0.0103)				
Constant	1.383***	2.124***	1.434***	2.019***				
	(0.0218)	(0.0190)	(0.0256)	(0.0212)				
N	21,222	24,271	16,987	19,857				

Note: standard errors in parentheses clustered at the household level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: authors' compilation based on IHDS 2011-12 data.

Table A6: Village characteristics by dominance groups (IHDS)

	SC	ST	OBC	Muslim	UC	Total
School infrastructure						
Primary school in village	0.98	0.98	0.99	0.99	0.98	0.98
Middle school in village	0.61	0.65	0.78	0.63	0.74	0.74
Secondary school in village	0.33	0.27	0.37	0.23	0.37	0.35
Higher secondary school in village	0.18	0.12	0.14	0.11	0.17	0.15
PCA of education facilities	-0.13	-0.51	0.12	-0.18	0.07	0.02
Village infrastructure						
Fraction of households with electricity	0.72	0.74	0.77	0.66	0.82	0.77
Most common source of drinking water: piped	0.39	0.31	0.49	0.24	0.52	0.46
Bus stop in village	0.70	0.51	0.64	0.41	0.65	0.62
Village accessible by pucca road	0.86	0.78	0.89	0.79	0.90	0.88
Distance to pucca road (km)	0.51	1.98	0.34	0.91	0.45	0.58
Access to usable road in monsoon	0.81	0.77	0.85	0.74	0.83	0.82
PCA of village Infrastructure	0.04	-1.14	-0.10	-0.72	0.45	-0.01
Location						
Distance to nearest town (km)	14.21	22.36	13.29	10.54	12.57	13.76
Distance to district headquarters (km)	43.81	57.39	45.11	37.89	43.90	45.31
Favourable Agroecological zone	0.75	0.25	0.47	0.92	0.81	0.61
Social cohesion						
Separate hamlets	0.42	0.47	0.67	0.48	0.69	0.64
Teacher favouritism towards jatis	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.10	0.06	0.09
Village conflict	0.37	0.57	0.45	0.39	0.45	0.45
Jati conflict	0.35	0.59	0.45	0.41	0.45	0.45

Notes: social cohesion descriptive uses IHDS household-level data. School infrastructure, village infrastructure, and location descriptive uses IHDS village-level data.

	Pri. govt school	Mid. govt school	Sec. govt school	PCA education
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Land-dominant group (base: UPP)				
SC	0.007	-0.124**	-0.037	-0.203
	(0.017)	(0.061)	(0.067)	(0.266)
ST	-0.000	-0.085*	-0.098 ^{**}	-0.584***
	(0.013)	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.197)
OBC	0.017**	0.046*	0.001	0.048
	(0.008)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.118)
MUS	0.012	-0.104**	-0.139 ^{**}	-0.253
	(0.015)	(0.052)	(0.057)	(0.236)
Observations	1,282	1,281	1,280	1,170

Note: standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Source: authors' compilation based on IHDS 2011-12 data.

Table A8: Regression: village infrastructure								
l	Electricity	Piped water	Bus stop	Pu				
	(1)	(2)	(3)					

	Electricity	Piped water	Bus stop	Pucca road	Dist. to pucca road	Moonsoon road	PCA infra
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Land-dominant	group (base:	UPP)					
SC	-10.839***	-0.135*	0.057	-0.038	0.061	-0.022	-0.410
	(3.844)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.046)	(0.396)	(0.053)	(0.268)
ST	-8.504***	-0.207***	-0.133***	-0.121***	1.527 ^{***}	-0.060	-1.597***
	(2.809)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.034)	(0.289)	(0.039)	(0.206)
OBC	-5.922***	-0.030	-0.005	-0.005	-0.110	0.017	-0.558***
	(1.726)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.178)	(0.024)	(0.117)
MUS	-16.641***	-0.277***	-0.231***	-0.105***	0.467	-0.085*	-1.169***
	(3.300)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.039)	(0.338)	(0.046)	(0.237)
Observations	1,276	1,281	1,281	1,281	1,280	1,280	1,093

Note: standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Source: authors' compilation based on IHDS 2011-12 data.

Table A9: Regression: locational factors

	Distance to town	Distance to district HQ	Favourable agroecological zone
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Land-dominant group (base: UPP)			
SC	1.642	-0.091	-0.059
	(1.532)	(4.557)	(0.068)
ST	9.783 ^{***}	13.494***	-0.559***
	(1.108)	(3.330)	(0.053)
OBC	0.713	1.214	-0.340***
	(0.683)	(2.043)	(0.031)
MUS	-2.029	-6.008	0.108*
	(1.305)	(3.892)	(0.057)
Observations	1,273	1,280	1,016

Note: standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

	Separate hamlet	Child discrimination	Village conflict	Jati conflict
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Social groups (Base: UPP)				
SC	-0.271***	0.019*	0.009	-0.000
	(0.067)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)
ST	-0.219***	0.075***	0.052***	0.056***
	(0.050)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.012)
OBC	-0.020	0.031***	0.011	-0.004
	(0.030)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
MUS	-0.213***	0.040***	-0.023*	-0.039***
	(0.060)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Observations	1,255	7,036	25,306	25,299

Table A10: Regression: social cohesion

Note: standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Table A11: Mechanisms of education upw	ard mobility: SC households
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				Ed	ucation years	upward mob	lity			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
G2G3	0.399*** (0.016)	0.426*** (0.016)	0.500*** (0.015)	0.495*** (0.017)	0.507*** (0.016)	0.520*** (0.015)	0.502*** (0.015)	0.501*** (0.015)	0.501*** (0.015)	0.508*** (0.018)
Living in own-dominated villages										
$SC\timesDSC$	0.138*** (0.024)	0.111*** (0.026)	0.120 ^{***} (0.027)	0.034 (0.038)	0.138 ^{***} (0.031)	0.122*** (0.030)	0.113 ^{***} (0.035)	0.178 ^{***} (0.032)	0.133*** (0.032)	0.152* (0.089)
$\text{SC} \times \text{DSC} \times \text{G2G3}$	-0.079** (0.034)	-0.081** (0.034)	-0.071** (0.031)	-0.078** (0.033)	-0.085** (0.034)	-0.085** (0.033)	-0.067** (0.031)	-0.072** (0.031)	-0.070** (0.031)	-0.097** (0.040)
Living in UC-dominated villages										
$SC\timesDUPP$	0.080 ^{***} (0.017)	0.026 (0.018)	0.017 (0.019)	0.004 (0.034)	0.014 (0.020)	0.031 (0.020)	0.019 (0.026)	0.050* (0.027)	0.013 (0.022)	0.047 (0.052)
$\text{SC} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{G2G3}$	-0.065*** (0.024)	-0.073*** (0.024)	-0.065*** (0.022)	-0.060** (0.024)	-0.061*** (0.023)	-0.077*** (0.022)	-0.065*** (0.022)	-0.065*** (0.022)	-0.063*** (0.022)	-0.062** (0.026)
Fav ag eco zoneone				0.055** (0.027)						0.030 (0.032)
$\text{SC}\times\text{DSC}\times\text{fav}$ ag eco zone				0.141*** (0.045)						0.153** (0.065)
$\text{SC} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{fav}$ ag eco zone				0.019 (0.038)						0.048 (0.043)
PCA village infrastructure					0.020 ^{***} (0.007)					0.014* (0.008)
$\text{SC} \times \text{DSC} \times \text{PCA}$ village infra					0.013 (0.017)					0.004 (0.028)
$\text{SC} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{PCA}$ village infra					0.016* (0.009)					0.011 (0.011)
PCA education						0.007 (0.006)				0.006 (0.007)
$\text{SC}\times\text{DSC}\times\text{PCA}$ education						0.005 (0.015)				0.023 (0.021)
$\text{SC} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{PCA}$ education						0.007 (0.008)				0.009 (0.009)
Distance to town							-0.001 (0.001)			-0.001 (0.001)
$\text{SC}\times\text{DSC}\times\text{distance}$ to town							0.000 (0.002)			0.000 (0.003)
$\text{SC} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{Distance}$ to Town							-0.000 (0.001)			-0.001 (0.002)
Separate hamlet for groups/jatis								0.055*** (0.019)		0.059** (0.025)
$\text{SC} \times \text{DSC} \times \text{separate hamlets}$								-0.122*** (0.042)		-0.170** (0.068)
$\text{SC} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{separate hamlets}$								-0.050* (0.029)		-0.074** (0.036)
Jati conflict									-0.016 (0.018)	-0.029 (0.024)
$\text{SC} \times \text{DSC} \times \text{jati conflict}$									-0.043 (0.041)	-0.102 (0.064)
$\text{SC} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{jati conflict}$									0.005 (0.027)	0.003 (0.034)
Base education	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dase occupation	NO No	INO Yes	INO Yes	INO Yes	INO Yes	INO Yes	ino Yes	INO Yes	INO Yes	N0 Yes
State FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Household RE	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,303	7,161	7,161	6,1/6	6,097	b,490	7.093	7,145	7,148	4,840

Table A12: Mechanisms o	of education upward	I mobility: ST	households
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				Ed	ucation year	s upward mot	oility			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
G2G3	0.419 ^{***} (0.025)	0.419 ^{***} (0.026)	0.499*** (0.024)	0.496*** (0.027)	0.508*** (0.027)	0.522*** (0.026)	0.501*** (0.024)	0.512*** (0.024)	0.499*** (0.024)	0.514*** (0.034)
$ST\timesDST$	-0.065*** (0.025)	-0.049* (0.026)	-0.057** (0.027)	-0.068** (0.034)	-0.029 (0.037)	-0.070* (0.038)	-0.104*** (0.039)	-0.018 (0.038)	-0.088** (0.036)	-0.100 (0.082)
$\mathrm{ST}\times\mathrm{DST}\times\mathrm{G2G3}$	-0.065* (0.037)	-0.056 (0.036)	-0.059* (0.033)	-0.070* (0.036)	-0.066* (0.038)	-0.085** (0.036)	-0.059* (0.033)	-0.080** (0.034)	-0.058* (0.033)	-0.125*** (0.045)
$ST\timesDUPP$	-0.037 (0.037)	-0.009 (0.039)	0.001 (0.040)	-0.146** (0.064)	-0.031 (0.044)	-0.025 (0.042)	0.050 (0.059)	0.107* (0.059)	-0.028 (0.050)	-0.283* (0.148)
$\mathrm{ST} \times \mathrm{DUPP} \times \mathrm{G2G3}$	0.006 (0.052)	0.014 (0.051)	-0.006 (0.047)	0.012 (0.057)	-0.023 (0.052)	-0.029 (0.049)	-0.001 (0.047)	-0.022 (0.047)	-0.006 (0.047)	-0.024 (0.067)
Fav ag eco zone				-0.167*** (0.059)						-0.291*** (0.072)
$\mathrm{ST} \times \mathrm{DST} \times \mathrm{fav}$ ag eco zone				0.067 (0.053)						0.196 ^{***} (0.068)
$\mathrm{ST} \times \mathrm{DUPP} \times \mathrm{fav}$ ag eco zone				0.252*** (0.079)						0.431*** (0.105)
PCA village infrastructure					0.040*** (0.011)					0.021 (0.014)
$\text{ST} \times \text{DST} \times \text{PCA}$ village infra					-0.001 (0.017)					0.031 (0.022)
$\mathrm{ST} \times \mathrm{DUPP} \times \mathrm{PCA}$ village infra					-0.045* (0.024)					0.010 (0.036)
PCA education						0.031*** (0.011)				0.015 (0.013)
$\text{ST}\times\text{DST}\times\text{PCA}$ education						-0.026 (0.029)				-0.016 (0.034)
$\text{ST} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{PCA education}$						-0.078*** (0.029)				-0.012 (0.047)
Distance to town							-0.002 (0.001)			-0.001 (0.002)
$\mathrm{ST} \times \mathrm{DST} \times \mathrm{distance}$ to town							0.003 (0.002)			0.002 (0.003)
$\mathrm{ST} \times \mathrm{DUPP} \times \mathrm{distance}$ to town							-0.004 (0.004)			-0.001 (0.006)
Separate hamlet for groups/jatis								0.021 (0.031)		0.007 (0.044)
$\mathrm{ST} \times \mathrm{DST} \times \mathrm{separate}$ hamlets								-0.037 (0.045)		-0.026 (0.062)
$\mathrm{ST} \times \mathrm{DUPP} \times \mathrm{separate\ hamlets}$								-0.150** (0.065)		-0.166* (0.099)
Jati conflict									-0.006 (0.031)	-0.068* (0.041)
$\mathrm{ST} \times \mathrm{DST} \times \mathrm{jati} \text{ conflict}$									0.056 (0.043)	0.072 (0.062)
$\text{ST} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{jati conflict}$									0.059 (0.063)	0.312*** (0.092)
Base education	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Base occupation	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
HOUSENDIA CONTROIS	INO No	res	res	res	res	res	res	res	res	res
Household BE	No	No	Vee	Vee	Yee	Vee	Vee	Vee	Vee	Yee
Observations	3,042	3,016	3,016	2,520	2,313	2,579	3,001	2,840	3,014	1,652

Table A13: Mechanisms of education upward mobility regression: OBC households

	Education years upward mobility									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
G2G3	0.298*** (0.021)	0.317*** (0.021)	0.387*** (0.019)	0.397*** (0.022)	0.387*** (0.021)	0.383*** (0.021)	0.388*** (0.019)	0.383*** (0.019)	0.387*** (0.019)	0.405*** (0.025)
$OBC\timesDOBC$	-0.002 (0.017)	0.007 (0.017)	0.007 (0.017)	0.060** (0.024)	0.006 (0.019)	0.000 (0.019)	0.029 (0.024)	-0.019 (0.023)	0.002 (0.021)	0.052 (0.049)
$OBC\timesDOBC\timesG2G3$	-0.018 (0.023)	-0.021 (0.023)	-0.014 (0.021)	-0.024 (0.024)	-0.015 (0.023)	-0.011 (0.022)	-0.014 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.021)	-0.014 (0.021)	-0.029 (0.027)
$OBC\timesDUPP$	-0.026 (0.019)	-0.028 (0.020)	-0.028 (0.020)	0.015 (0.034)	-0.022 (0.022)	-0.037* (0.022)	0.020 (0.029)	-0.057* (0.030)	-0.023 (0.024)	-0.013 (0.062)
$OBC\timesDUPP\timesG2G3$	-0.019 (0.027)	-0.024 (0.027)	-0.018 (0.024)	-0.033 (0.027)	-0.014 (0.027)	-0.005 (0.026)	-0.017 (0.024)	-0.015 (0.025)	-0.018 (0.024)	-0.030 (0.031)
Fav ag eco zone				0.117*** (0.032)						0.074* (0.040)
$OBC\timesDOBC\timesfav$ ag eco zone				-0.115*** (0.032)						-0.097** (0.039)
$OBC\timesDUPP\timesfav$ ag eco zone				-0.093** (0.039)						-0.024 (0.047)
PCA village infrastructure					0.011 (0.008)					0.013 (0.011)
$OBC \times DOBC \times PCA \text{ village infra}$					0.023*** (0.009)					0.018 (0.012)
$\text{OBC} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{PCA}$ village infra					0.012 (0.009)					0.006 (0.013)
PCA education						0.002 (0.010)				-0.003 (0.015)
$OBC\timesDOBC\timesPCA$ education						0.010 (0.010)				0.010 (0.015)
$OBC\timesDUPP\timesPCA$ education						0.001 (0.011)				0.002 (0.015)
Distance to Town							0.001 (0.001)			0.002 (0.001)
$\text{OBC}\times\text{DOBC}\times\text{distance}$ to town							-0.002 (0.001)			-0.002 (0.002)
$OBC\timesDUPP\timesdistance$ to town							-0.004** (0.002)			-0.003 (0.002)
Separate hamlet for groups/jatis								-0.035 (0.024)		-0.049 (0.037)
$OBC \times DOBC \times separate \ hamlets$								0.045* (0.027)		0.041 (0.039)
$OBC \times DUPP \times separate \ hamlets$								0.048 (0.034)		0.077* (0.045)
Jati conflict									-0.027 (0.025)	-0.010 (0.034)
$OBC\timesDOBC\timesjati\ conflict$									0.007 (0.027)	-0.000 (0.037)
$OBC\timesDUPP\timesjati\ conflict$									-0.012 (0.031)	-0.052 (0.041)
Base education Base occupation Household controls State FE Household RE Observations	Yes No No No 12,464	Yes No Yes Yes No 12,245	Yes No Yes Yes Yes 12,245	Yes No Yes Yes Yes 9.950	Yes No Yes Yes Yes 10,464	Yes No Yes Yes Yes 11,147	Yes No Yes Yes Yes 12,217	Yes No Yes Yes Yes 12,156	Yes No Yes Yes Yes 12,232	Yes No Yes Yes Yes 7.810

Table A14:	Mechanisms of	education	upward	mobility:	Muslim	households

	Education years upward mobility									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
G2G3	0.272*** (0.030)	0.282*** (0.030)	0.335*** (0.029)	0.308*** (0.035)	0.331*** (0.032)	0.325*** (0.030)	0.336*** (0.029)	0.337*** (0.029)	0.332*** (0.029)	0.289*** (0.041)
$MUS \times DMUS$	-0.108*** (0.026)	-0.063** (0.029)	-0.049 (0.030)	-0.213*** (0.070)	0.002 (0.036)	-0.053* (0.032)	-0.051 (0.041)	-0.051 (0.038)	-0.086** (0.034)	-0.783*** (0.170)
$\rm MUS \times DMUS \times G2G3$	0.015 (0.039)	0.020 (0.039)	0.003 (0.037)	0.022 (0.043)	-0.016 (0.042)	0.043 (0.039)	0.003 (0.037)	-0.017 (0.039)	0.006 (0.037)	0.002 (0.054)
$MUS\timesDUPP$	-0.047 (0.038)	0.015 (0.039)	0.020 (0.040)	-0.005 (0.080)	0.017 (0.046)	0.018 (0.041)	-0.028 (0.054)	-0.006 (0.055)	0.017 (0.048)	-0.400*** (0.131)
$\rm MUS \times \rm DUPP \times G2G3$	0.010 (0.056)	-0.005 (0.055)	0.001 (0.051)	0.020 (0.058)	0.017 (0.057)	0.010 (0.053)	-0.001 (0.051)	0.001 (0.051)	0.004 (0.051)	0.062 (0.066)
Fav ag-eco zone				-0.053 (0.075)						-0.139 (0.104)
$\text{MUS}\times\text{DMUS}\times\text{fav}$ ag-eco zone				0.164 ^{**} (0.073)						0.601*** (0.153)
$\text{MUS} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{fav}$ ag-eco zone				0.040 (0.084)						0.252** (0.111)
PCA village infrastructure					0.012 (0.012)					0.001 (0.020)
$\text{MUS} \times \text{DMUS} \times \text{PCA}$ village infra					0.027* (0.014)					0.092 ^{***} (0.029)
$\text{MUS} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{PCA}$ village infra					0.009 (0.023)					0.017 (0.034)
PCA education						0.014 (0.009)				0.009 (0.011)
$\text{MUS} \times \text{DMUS} \times \text{PCA}$ education						-0.010 (0.015)				-0.086*** (0.030)
$\text{MUS} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{PCA}$ education						-0.011 (0.014)				-0.013 (0.018)
Distance to town							-0.003** (0.002)			-0.007*** (0.002)
$\text{MUS}\times\text{DMUS}\times\text{distance}$ to town							-0.001 (0.002)			0.011*** (0.004)
$\text{MUS} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{distance}$ to town							0.004 (0.003)			0.008** (0.004)
Separate hamlet for groups/jatis								-0.054 (0.035)		-0.124*** (0.047)
$\text{MUS} \times \text{DMUS} \times \text{separate hamlets}$								0.014 (0.047)		0.101 (0.064)
$\text{MUS} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{separate hamlets}$								0.046 (0.062)		0.209** (0.084)
Jati conflict									-0.081** (0.034)	-0.185*** (0.047)
$\text{MUS} \times \text{DMUS} \times \text{jati conflict}$									0.096** (0.045)	0.208*** (0.062)
$\text{MUS} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{jati conflict}$									-0.004 (0.060)	0.016 (0.080)
Base education	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Base occupation	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
State FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Household RE	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,332	3,248	3,248	2,744	2,489	2,868	3,237	2,857	3,245	1,639

	Occupation upward mobility									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
G2G3	0.060*** (0.016)	0.062*** (0.017)	0.060*** (0.017)	0.050*** (0.018)	0.059*** (0.019)	0.061*** (0.018)	0.060*** (0.017)	0.059*** (0.017)	0.059*** (0.017)	0.050** (0.021)
Living in own-dominated villages										
$SC \times DSC$	0.042** (0.019)	0.025 (0.021)	0.027 (0.021)	-0.009 (0.033)	0.024 (0.023)	0.029 (0.024)	0.028 (0.029)	0.047* (0.026)	0.062** (0.024)	0.032 (0.078)
$\text{SC} \times \text{DSC} \times \text{G2G3}$	0.013 (0.040)	0.005 (0.039)	0.006 (0.039)	0.022 (0.041)	0.028 (0.045)	0.012 (0.042)	0.012 (0.039)	-0.002 (0.039)	0.009 (0.039)	0.052 (0.052)
Living in UC-dominated villages										
$SC\timesDUPP$	0.027** (0.013)	0.006 (0.015)	0.006 (0.015)	-0.026 (0.028)	-0.002 (0.016)	0.002 (0.016)	0.029 (0.022)	0.023 (0.022)	0.033* (0.019)	0.063 (0.044)
$\text{SC} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{G2G3}$	0.035 (0.026)	0.034 (0.026)	0.033 (0.026)	0.038 (0.028)	0.043 (0.028)	0.038 (0.027)	0.032 (0.026)	0.032 (0.026)	0.033 (0.026)	0.041 (0.031)
Fav ag eco zone				0.012 (0.023)						0.002 (0.027)
$\text{SC}\times\text{DSC}\times\text{fav}$ ag eco zone				0.066* (0.040)						0.080 (0.060)
$\text{SC}\times\text{DUPP}\times\text{fav}$ ag eco zone				0.050 (0.031)						0.043 (0.036)
PCA village infrastructure					0.011** (0.005)					0.004 (0.007)
$\text{SC} \times \text{DSC} \times \text{PCA}$ village infra					0.008 (0.014)					0.007 (0.021)
$\text{SC} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{PCA}$ village infra					0.007 (0.008)					0.004 (0.009)
PCA education						0.004 (0.005)				0.001 (0.006)
$\text{SC} \times \text{DSC} \times \text{PCA}$ education						0.007 (0.013)				0.018 (0.016)
$\text{SC} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{PCA}$ education						0.009 (0.008)				0.016* (0.009)
Distance to town							-0.000 (0.001)			0.000 (0.001)
$\text{SC} \times \text{DSC} \times \text{Distance}$ to town							-0.000 (0.001)			0.001 (0.002)
$\text{SC}\times\text{DUPP}\times\text{Distance}$ to town							-0.002 (0.001)			-0.003** (0.002)
Separate hamlet for groups/jatis								0.005 (0.016)		0.011 (0.020)
$\text{SC} \times \text{DSC} \times \text{separate hamlets}$								-0.045 (0.035)		-0.068 (0.057)
$\text{SC} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{separate hamlets}$								-0.024 (0.025)		-0.028 (0.032)
Jati conflict									0.037** (0.015)	0.033* (0.020)
$\text{SC} \times \text{DSC} \times \text{jati conflict}$									-0.089** (0.037)	-0.067 (0.060)
$\text{SC} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{jati conflict}$									-0.061** (0.024)	-0.058* (0.030)
Base education	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Base occupation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	No	Yes								
Household RE	No	No	Yes							
Observations	5,725	5,593	5,593	4,881	4,709	5,028	5,541	5,582	5,585	3,763

				0	ccupation L	pward mol	oility			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
G2G3	0.039 (0.024)	0.033 (0.025)	0.033 (0.025)	0.024 (0.027)	0.024 (0.030)	0.020 (0.028)	0.029 (0.025)	0.032 (0.026)	0.034 (0.025)	0.000 (0.034)
$ST\timesDST$	0.018 (0.017)	0.024 (0.018)	0.024 (0.018)	0.029 (0.023)	0.035 (0.027)	0.041 (0.026)	0.033 (0.027)	0.044* (0.026)	0.041 (0.026)	0.060 (0.062)
$\text{ST} \times \text{DST} \times \text{G2G3}$	0.013 (0.033)	0.024 (0.033)	0.024 (0.033)	0.026 (0.035)	0.033 (0.039)	0.048 (0.036)	0.027 (0.033)	0.035 (0.034)	0.022 (0.033)	0.063 (0.045)
$ST \times DUPP$	-0.025 (0.027)	-0.004 (0.028)	-0.004 (0.028)	-0.034 (0.041)	-0.029 (0.032)	-0.000 (0.031)	0.041 (0.041)	0.063 (0.050)	0.035 (0.036)	-0.024 (0.096)
$\text{ST} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{G2G3}$	0.043 (0.051)	0.054 (0.050)	0.054 (0.050)	0.084 (0.062)	0.065 (0.055)	0.072 (0.051)	0.065 (0.051)	0.051 (0.050)	0.052 (0.050)	0.119 [*] (0.070)
Fav ag eco zone				0.051 (0.041)						0.053 (0.051)
$\text{ST} \times \text{DST} \times \text{fav}$ ag eco zone				-0.011 (0.038)						-0.050 (0.051)
$\mathrm{ST} \times \mathrm{DUPP} \times \mathrm{fav}$ ag eco zone				0.027 (0.057)						0.112 (0.080)
PCA village infrastructure					0.020** (0.009)					0.022 (0.014)
$\text{ST} \times \text{DST} \times \text{PCA}$ village infra					-0.005 (0.012)					-0.000 (0.016)
$\text{ST} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{PCA}$ village infra					-0.012 (0.017)					0.003 (0.029)
PCA education						0.013 (0.009)				0.000 (0.013)
$\text{ST} \times \text{DST} \times \text{PCA}$ education						0.014 (0.019)				0.020 (0.021)
$\text{ST} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{PCA}$ education						0.007 (0.024)				0.039 (0.041)
Distance to town							0.000 (0.001)			-0.000 (0.002)
$\mathrm{ST} \times \mathrm{DST} \times \mathrm{distance}$ to town							-0.001 (0.001)			0.002 (0.002)
$\text{ST} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{distance}$ to town							-0.003 (0.002)			-0.003 (0.004)
Separate hamlet for groups/jatis								0.015 (0.024)		-0.015 (0.037)
$\text{ST} \times \text{DST} \times \text{separate hamlets}$								-0.039 (0.031)		0.013 (0.046)
$\text{ST} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{separate hamlets}$								-0.102* (0.057)		-0.030 (0.075)
Jati conflict									0.012 (0.024)	0.057 (0.035)
$ST \times DST \times jati \ conflict$									-0.029 (0.031)	-0.077 (0.048)
$ST \times DUPP \times jati conflict$									-0.083* (0.048)	-0.008 (0.068)
Base education	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Base occupation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Household RE	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2.495	2.469	2.469	2.0/6	1.894	2.11/	2.454	2.341	2.40/	1.3/4

	Occupation upward mobility									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
G2G3	0.093*** (0.024)	0.105*** (0.024)	0.100 ^{***} (0.024)	0.057** (0.026)	0.102*** (0.027)	0.082*** (0.025)	0.099*** (0.024)	0.099*** (0.024)	0.100 ^{***} (0.024)	0.078 ^{**} (0.031)
$OBC\timesDOBC$	-0.008 (0.014)	0.008 (0.014)	0.009 (0.014)	-0.015 (0.019)	0.014 (0.016)	0.003 (0.016)	0.032 (0.021)	0.002 (0.020)	0.006 (0.018)	0.043 (0.039)
$OBC\timesDOBC\timesG2G3$	-0.026 (0.026)	-0.032 (0.026)	-0.030 (0.026)	0.008 (0.028)	-0.026 (0.029)	-0.015 (0.027)	-0.030 (0.026)	-0.029 (0.026)	-0.030 (0.026)	-0.010 (0.033)
$OBC\timesDUPP$	0.001 (0.017)	0.004 (0.017)	0.004 (0.017)	-0.023 (0.029)	0.007 (0.019)	0.003 (0.019)	0.015 (0.025)	0.016 (0.028)	-0.004 (0.022)	0.041 (0.053)
$OBC\timesDUPP\timesG2G3$	-0.053* (0.030)	-0.059** (0.030)	-0.059** (0.030)	-0.020 (0.033)	-0.072** (0.033)	-0.046 (0.031)	-0.059** (0.030)	-0.058* (0.030)	-0.058** (0.030)	-0.046 (0.038)
Fav ag eco zone				-0.039 (0.028)						-0.057* (0.034)
$OBC\timesDOBC\timesfav$ ag eco zone				0.026 (0.028)						0.040 (0.033)
$OBC\timesDUPP\timesfav$ ag eco zone				0.019 (0.035)						0.015 (0.042)
PCA village infrastructure					0.013 (0.008)					0.013 (0.010)
$OBC\timesDOBC\timesPCA\text{ village infra}$					0.006 (0.008)					-0.004 (0.011)
$OBC \times DUPP \times PCA \text{ village infra}$					-0.004 (0.009)					-0.015 (0.012)
PCA education						0.001 (0.010)				0.006 (0.013)
$OBC\timesDOBC\timesPCA$ education						0.011 (0.010)				0.006 (0.014)
$OBC \times DUPP \times PCA \text{ education}$						0.011 (0.011)				0.011 (0.014)
Distance to town							0.001 (0.001)			0.002 (0.001)
$OBC\timesDOBC\timesdistance$ to town							-0.002 (0.001)			-0.003* (0.001)
$OBC\timesDUPP\timesdistance$ to town							-0.001 (0.001)			-0.002 (0.002)
Separate hamlet for groups/jatis								-0.007 (0.022)		0.026 (0.032)
$OBC\timesDOBC\timesseparate$ hamlets								0.009 (0.024)		-0.033 (0.034)
$OBC\timesDUPP\timesseparate$ hamlets								-0.015 (0.032)		-0.039 (0.040)
Jati conflict									-0.010 (0.022)	-0.014 (0.029)
$OBC\timesDOBC\timesjati\ conflict$									0.005 (0.023)	-0.006 (0.032)
$OBC \times DUPP \times jati \ conflict$									0.016 (0.028)	0.030 (0.036)
Base education	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Base occupation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Household controls	No N-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Household RF	No	No	Yee	Yee	Yee	Yee	Yee	Yee	Yee	Yee
Observations	9,524	9,326	9,326	7,697	7,953	8,492	9,306	9,261	9,317	6,034

Table A18: Mechani	isms of occupatior	upward mobility:	Muslim households
14010 / 1101 1110011411		. apna a	

					Occupatior	n ipward mo	obility			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
G2G3	-0.018 (0.032)	-0.008 (0.032)	-0.012 (0.032)	-0.022 (0.038)	-0.004 (0.035)	-0.007 (0.033)	-0.012 (0.032)	-0.011 (0.032)	-0.018 (0.031)	-0.007 (0.044)
$MUS\timesDMUS$	-0.021 (0.024)	-0.006 (0.027)	-0.002 (0.027)	-0.033 (0.069)	-0.003 (0.035)	0.001 (0.030)	0.038 (0.038)	0.011 (0.034)	-0.041 (0.031)	0.197 (0.179)
$\rm MUS \times \rm DMUS \times \rm G2G3$	0.035 (0.041)	0.018 (0.040)	0.031 (0.040)	0.033 (0.045)	-0.004 (0.045)	0.025 (0.042)	0.031 (0.040)	0.021 (0.042)	0.038 (0.039)	-0.029 (0.055)
$MUS\timesDUPP$	-0.042 (0.034)	0.001 (0.037)	-0.003 (0.037)	0.100 (0.109)	0.005 (0.043)	-0.000 (0.038)	0.003 (0.053)	-0.014 (0.049)	0.011 (0.045)	0.120 (0.153)
$\rm MUS \times \rm DUPP \times G2G3$	-0.001 (0.059)	0.016 (0.059)	0.014 (0.059)	-0.003 (0.067)	0.005 (0.065)	0.006 (0.061)	0.014 (0.059)	0.013 (0.059)	0.030 (0.058)	-0.000 (0.075)
Fav ag eco zone				-0.069 (0.078)						0.056 (0.111)
$\text{MUS}\times\text{DMUS}\times\text{fav}$ ag eco zone				0.039 (0.071)						-0.145 (0.158)
$\rm MUS \times \rm DUPP \times fav$ ag eco zone				-0.106 (0.114)						-0.120 (0.141)
PCA village infrastructure					0.020* (0.012)					0.032 (0.020)
$\text{MUS} \times \text{DMUS} \times \text{PCA}$ village infra					-0.010 (0.014)					-0.034 (0.026)
$\text{MUS} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{PCA}$ village infra					0.021 (0.024)					-0.015 (0.033)
PCA education						0.024** (0.010)				0.016 (0.011)
$\text{MUS} \times \text{DMUS} \times \text{PCA}$ education						-0.012 (0.016)				0.004 (0.026)
$\text{MUS} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{PCA}$ education						0.001 (0.015)				0.002 (0.017)
Distance to town							0.002 (0.002)			0.002 (0.002)
$\text{MUS}\times\text{DMUS}\times\text{Distance}$ to town							-0.004 (0.002)			-0.008 ^{**} (0.004)
$\rm MUS \times \rm DUPP \times distance$ to town							-0.001 (0.003)			-0.002 (0.003)
Separate hamlet for groups/jatis								-0.015 (0.033)		-0.018 (0.045)
$\rm MUS \times \rm DMUS \times separate hamlets$								0.006 (0.044)		-0.031 (0.059)
$\rm MUS \times \rm DUPP \times separate hamlets$								0.025 (0.061)		0.014 (0.078)
Jati conflict									-0.090*** (0.032)	-0.096** (0.045)
$\text{MUS} \times \text{DMUS} \times \text{jati conflict}$									0.101** (0.041)	0.121** (0.058)
$\text{MUS} \times \text{DUPP} \times \text{jati conflict}$									-0.054 (0.059)	-0.079 (0.074)
Base education Base occupation Household controls State FE Household RE Observations	No Yes No No 2 456	No Yes Yes No 2 373	No Yes Yes Yes 2 373	No Yes Yes Yes Yes 2 023	No Yes Yes Yes Yes	No Yes Yes Yes 2 085	No Yes Yes Yes Yes 2 366	No Yes Yes Yes 2,107	No Yes Yes Yes Yes 2 370	No Yes Yes Yes Yes

Appendix B1

	SC	ST	Others	Total
Census 1991				
Proportion of literate	0.30	0.21	0.35	0.32
Primary school	0.61	0.73	0.78	0.76
Middle school	0.10	0.17	0.28	0.25
Secondary school	0.04	0.05	0.12	0.10
Senior secondary school	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02
College	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Tar road	0.37	0.24	0.47	0.43
Census 2001				
Proportion of literate	0.46	0.35	0.49	0.46
Primary school	0.70	0.76	0.80	0.79
Middle school	0.16	0.17	0.31	0.27
Secondary school	0.05	0.05	0.13	0.11
Senior secondary school	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.03
College	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01
Tar road	0.52	0.35	0.58	0.53
Census 2011				
Proportion of literate	0.57	0.47	0.60	0.57
Primary school	0.76	0.83	0.84	0.83
Middle school	0.31	0.33	0.49	0.44
Secondary school	0.11	0.10	0.21	0.18
Senior secondary school	0.05	0.03	0.09	0.07
College	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.01
Tar road	0.58	0.50	0.66	0.62

Table B1.1: Village characteristics by population dominance regime from census

Source: authors' compilation based on SHRUG data (Asher

et al. 2021; Population Census of India 2011).

Appendix B2: Educational/occupational mobility and land dominance: bivariate maps

Figure B2.1: Education and land dominance bivariate map



Upward mobility for g1g2

Note: we focus on the educational mobility and land dominance of the grandfather (G1) and father (G2) pairs. Source: authors' compilation based on IHDS 2011-12 data.

Figure B2.2: Education and land dominance bivariate map





Upward mobility for g2g3

Note: we focus on the educational mobility and land dominance of the father (G2) and son (G3) pairs. Source: authors' compilation based on IHDS 2011–12 data.





Upward mobility for g1g2

Note: we focus on the upward occupational mobility and land dominance of the grandfather (G1) and father (G2) pairs. Source: authors' compilation based on IHDS 2011–12 data.

Figure B2.4: Occupational and land dominance bivariate map





Upward mobility for g2g3

Note: we focus on the occupational mobility and land dominance of the father (G2) and son (G3) pairs. Source: authors' compilation based on IHDS 2011–12 data.