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**Working Paper**

## Aid reimagined: Results from an elite survey on perceptions of progress, capacity, and development cooperation

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WIDER Working Paper 2023/36

# **Aid reimaged: results from an elite survey on perceptions of progress, capacity, and development cooperation**

Ana Horigoshi and Samantha Custer\*

February 2023

In partnership with



**Abstract:** Development effectiveness is an ever-growing concern for development partners. Particularly in a world of increasing budget constraints and trade-offs, it is crucial for development partners to maximize the results of any development intervention. While the importance of a locally-led approach is well established, an essential step to achieve this objective has been neglected, reliable data on local perceptions. Seeking to fill this gap, this paper assesses the results of AidData’s 2020 Listening to Leaders Survey looking into leaders’ perceptions of progress against developmental goals, the perceived capacity constraints that may be hindering progress, and the potential role for international actors to support local actors in achieving their goals.

**Key words:** elite survey, development cooperation, foreign assistance

**JEL classification:** C83, F63, O10

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This research study is released in connection with the [International Research Conference on the Effectiveness of Development Cooperation](#), jointly organized by UNU-WIDER, the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC), and the European Commission (DG INTPA) on 17–18 November 2022 in Brussels, Belgium.

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## 1 Introduction

The effectiveness of foreign aid—and more broadly development cooperation—has long been questioned in the development community. Since the early 2000s the development economics literature has tried to prove or disprove a causal relationship between aid and a multitude of outcomes including but not limited to economic growth, education levels, and health outcomes. At best economists have found inconclusive results and at worst paradoxical ones.

As the research in the topic evolved, the link between foreign aid and economic growth at an aggregate level remained elusive. However, it became clear that the key to finding this link lies, at least partially, in ensuring that aid supply matches aid demand. Consequently, the policy discussion also brought emphasis to the recipient side with all four High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness—Rome in 2002, Paris in 2005, Accra in 2008, and Busan in 2011—mentioning country ownership of its developmental priorities as a critical aspect for aid effectiveness. Nevertheless, there is still a dearth of understanding on how to match aid supply and demand to improve aid effectiveness.

A large part of this endeavor consists in properly incorporating local leaders and their views into the design and implementation of development interventions. In an effort to fill this gap in existing research and policy efforts, once every three years AidData conducts its Listening to Leaders (LTL) Survey to learn from and amplify the invaluable insights of a diverse cross-section of public, private, and civil society leaders.

The 2020 wave of the LTL survey<sup>1</sup> centered on three questions that aim to pinpoint how development partners can adapt their strategies and assistance to help countries plan, fund, and implement solutions to their own development challenges: (1) How do leaders assess progress in advancing their national development goals; (2) What key constraints do leaders see as hindering progress in achieving their goals; and (3) How can international actors best support locally-led development. This paper is largely drawn upon the report *Aid reimagined: How can foreign assistance support locally-led development?* (Custer et al. 2022).

This remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 details the survey’s methodology, Section 3 presents the results, and Section 4 concludes.

## 2 Survey methodology

The 2020 wave of LTL was fielded between June and September 2020 (Custer et al. 2021) with 84,000 individuals successfully receiving our email invitation, 6,807 participating (a response rate of 8.1 per cent) and 3,812 survey respondents (56 per cent) completing the entire survey.<sup>2</sup> It is worth noting that individual-level participation rates to email surveys and elite surveys tend to be lower than that of household surveys. We mitigate potential bias in our surveys in three ways: (1) developing a robust sampling frame of individuals who represent our target population of interest to ensure there is a large enough set of final respondents to facilitate this analysis; (2) collecting data to monitor the demographics of those who receive an invitation versus those who respond

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<sup>1</sup> The Listening to Leaders survey is fielded every three years and was previously conducted in 2014 and 2017. For previous reports on the results of these surveys, see Custer et al (2015), Custer et al (2018), and Custer et al (2021).

<sup>2</sup> Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix B show the breakdown of members in the sampling frame; survey recipients (or those individuals to whom we successfully emailed our survey invitation); and survey respondents.

to the survey to assess representativeness; and (3) using non-response weights when computing aggregate statistics from the survey results. This section details these efforts.

## 2.1 Defining the population of interest

Although the true global population of development policy-makers and practitioners is unobservable, we took painstaking efforts to identify a well-defined and observable population of interest. We define this population of interest as: those individuals who are knowledgeable about the formulation and implementation of government policies and programmes in low- and lower-middle income countries at any point between 2016 and 2020. We further break down this population of interest into six stakeholder groups: (i) officials from host government agencies; (ii) representatives of development partners operating in-country; (iii) leaders of civil society organizations and non-governmental organizations; (iv) leaders of private sector companies; (v) independent experts from universities, think tanks, and media;<sup>3</sup> and (vi) national-level parliamentarians.<sup>4</sup> For a detailed mapping of the sampling frame inclusion criteria, see Table A3 in Appendix C.

## 2.2 Creating the sampling frame

The cornerstone of AidData’s Listening to Leaders sampling frame is the construction and application of Institutional Position Maps (IPMs) to identify the relevant organization types under each stakeholder group, as well as the key positions at the mid- and senior-level within each organization type to inform subsequent contact searching.

Our research team first identified a list of ideal-type organizations for the six stakeholder groups across all countries that discharge functions relevant to our questions of interest. For the six stakeholder groups in the 2020 LTL sampling frame, we identified 67 ideal-type organizations, each of which was assigned a numeric code. For example, this included 33 organization types for the host government stakeholder (executive branch) group such as a Ministry of Finance, a Supreme Audit Institution, and a National Statistical Office.

We then created customized IPMs for each country which identify functionally equivalent country-specific institutions and positions which can be mapped back to the unified list of ideal-type organizations using a common set of organization codes. The use of IPMs allows us to accommodate each country’s unique set of institutions and leadership positions, while still facilitating cross-country comparability through the use of systematic inclusion criteria. An example IPM has been provided in Table A4, Appendix C.

Next, our research team searched for the names, titles, and contact information for individuals who held mid- and senior-level positions identified in IPMs at any time between 2016 and 2020. We identified the contact information of potential survey participants using publicly available resources, such as organizational websites and directories, international conference records, Who’s Who International, and public profiles on LinkedIn, Facebook, and Twitter. Variability in the degree to which individuals’ contact information is publicly available can result in an unbalanced

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<sup>3</sup> The independent experts stakeholder group was revised between the 2017 and 2020 waves of the survey. Now the group focuses on in-country experts, such as professors at universities, scholars at think tanks, and journalists.

<sup>4</sup> Parliamentarians were included for the first time in the 2020 wave. The process of institution position mapping was expanded to capture information about legislative bodies in each of the countries in the sampling frame. We identified the type of legislative bodies in place (e.g., unicameral, bicameral), the term start and end dates for current members of the body, and the type of political system (to understand the role the legislative body has in that specific country).

sampling frame. To mitigate this potential bias, our research team employed a quota system to find an ideal number of contacts for each institution type in the IPM. These quotas helped ensure that the sampling frame included contacts for each institution type, as opposed to being skewed towards one type of institution.

By clearly defining a population of interest and constructing a master sampling frame that was stratified by country, stakeholder group, and institution type, we managed to overcome one of the most vexing challenges associated with expert panels and opinion leader surveys: the absence of detailed demographic data and the inability to assess the representativeness of findings at various levels. The stratification of our master sampling frame by country, stakeholder group, and institution type makes it possible to generate granular elite survey data that can be published at varying levels of disaggregation without compromising participant confidentiality. It also enables analysis of the factors that influence participation rates, as well as the underlying sources of response bias.

The 2020 LTL Survey was fielded in a set of 141 low- and middle-income countries and semi-autonomous territories<sup>5</sup> (see Figure 1). Ultimately, of the approximately 100,000 individuals who met our inclusion criteria in the sampling frame, we were able to identify and successfully send a survey invitation to roughly 84,000 of those individuals.

Figure 1: Sampling frame coverage



Source: Custer et al. (2022).

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<sup>5</sup> Previous waves covered 126 countries and semi-autonomous territories.

### **2.3 Developing and testing the questionnaire**

The design and evaluation of the questions was guided by best practices in survey methodology set out by scholars such as Weisberg (2005), Dillman et al. (2009), and Groves et al. (2009), and the research team sought input from a cross-section of international development scholars and practitioners, survey experts, and core funding partners to set priorities regarding the most promising lines of inquiry and effective ways to structure questions for the final analysis.

The 2020 questionnaire was developed with the following steps. AidData staff first assessed the performance of the prior survey instrument from 2017, including completion rates, respondent attrition at various stages of the survey, item non-response, and any questions that proved difficult to interpret or less useful in generating insights to speak to our broader research questions of interest. Our research team then identified preliminary research questions of interest to guide the overall survey development process and sought input from potential funding partners and other external actors interested in the survey results.

Using this input, we refined and finalized our research questions of interest and built out the main blocks (or modules) of the survey questionnaire and specific questions. We drew upon questions and response options from prior survey waves when possible and in other cases designed new questions. Once we had developed a draft version of the questionnaire, we identified a set of external experts with experience working with large-scale surveys to review and give feedback on our instrument. We also sought input from the partners who contributed funding to the 2020 survey wave.

Following these consultations, the research team updated the survey instrument and programmed it in Qualtrics (a software programme for conducting online surveys). We then identified a set of pre-testers to take the survey using the Qualtrics platform via a personalized hyperlink and give feedback on both the questionnaire design and the online user interface. Pre-testers could either provide feedback to question prompts or via a cognitive interview. These pre-testers included AidData personnel outside of the research team along with external individuals who were broadly illustrative of the stakeholder groups to whom we would field the survey. After the pre-testing round, the research team finalized the English version of the questionnaire and had official translations produced in five additional languages: French, Spanish, Portuguese, Russian, and Arabic.

### **2.4 Fielding the survey**

The 2020 LTL Survey was fielded between 25 June and 16 September 2020, guided by best practices in survey methodology such as the Weisberg (2005) total survey error approach and the Dillman et al. (2009) tailored design methods.<sup>6</sup> The survey implementation process closely adhered to the approach used in previous waves; however, there were two differences in how the survey was administered in 2020 as compared to 2014 and 2017.

First, we sought to systematically test the efficacy of including a pre-notification to improve the likelihood of response. The use of pre-notifications has proven helpful in past survey research in boosting response rates, particularly if the organization fielding the survey is unfamiliar to a desired respondent (Dillman et al. 2014; Robinson and Leonard 2019). We randomly assigned sampling

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<sup>6</sup> The survey was administered under the direction of Principal Investigator Samantha Custer and Co-Principal Investigator Rodney Knight, in compliance with the standards set out by the William & Mary Institutional Review Board's Protection of Human Subjects Committee (PHSC). Protocol number: #PHSC-2020-02-17-14072-mcheng01.

frame members to receive or not a pre-notification one week prior to receiving a link to the survey. We found that receiving a prenotification was associated with a higher likelihood of response.

Second, due to the size of the sampling frame and the limitations of the software used, Qualtrics, we had to stagger the fielding of the survey. While previously the sampling frame contacts were grouped by time zone to receive the survey invitation at a certain time of the day, in the 2020 wave the timing of first contact with survey respondents varied to a greater extent across the sampling frame.<sup>7</sup>

Survey recipients were sent a tailored email invitation to participate that included a unique link to the online questionnaire. Over the course of the survey administration period, survey recipients received up to three different automated electronic reminders.<sup>8</sup> Survey participants were able to take the survey in one of six different languages: English, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Russian, and Arabic.

## **2.5 Weighting scheme**

The response rate to the 2020 LTL Survey was 8.1 per cent. In light of this imperfect information about the representativeness of our sample vis-à-vis the sampling frame (i.e. the population of interest), we use a weighting scheme of non-response weights to account for unit non-response (or survey non-response) and to mitigate the potential for bias in our results.

To generate the non-response weights, we took the following steps. First, we estimated the probability of survey response using a logistic regression. For all members of our sampling frame, we have information on their gender, country, institution types (e.g., finance ministry, anti-corruption agency, supreme audit institution), and stakeholder group (e.g., host government officials, development partners), and whether we pre-notified the member of the upcoming survey. We used all these predictors to estimate the probability of survey response for each member of the sampling frame (as each factor was significant in predicting survey response). Then, we took the inverse of the estimated probability and capped it at two standard deviations from the mean to arrive at the final non-response weights used for our analysis.

## **3 Results**

This section presents the main results from the survey separated into three subsections which refer to each of the three central questions we approach with the survey: (1) How do leaders assess progress in advancing their national development goals; (2) What key constraints do leaders see as hindering progress in achieving their goals; and (3) How can international actors best support locally-led development.

### **3.1 Progress**

This subsection approaches leaders' assessments of progress and the current state of development in their countries. Specifically, survey respondents were asked the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with statements about seven aspects of development progress in their countries: (i) an

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<sup>7</sup> For example, the first batch of contacts received invitations on 25 June, while the last batch did not receive theirs until 20 July. The survey closed to the first batch of invitees on 2 September and the final group on 18 September 2020.

<sup>8</sup> The day and time of the reminders were varied to maximize the response rate.




open and accountable government (Accountability); (ii) enough jobs to keep the workforce productively employed (Jobs); (iii) consistent delivery of basic public services (Services); (iv) development policies inclusive of all social groups (Inclusion); (v) a stable macroeconomic environment to foster sustainable economic growth (Macroeconomics); (vi) a favourable business environment for the private sector (Business); and (vii) basic physical security (Security). Below we present the main findings from these questions:

*Insufficient jobs and lack of government accountability are chronic sources of discontent worldwide, but are most acutely felt in Africa and the Middle East.*

Almost 80 per cent of respondents disagreed that their country generated enough jobs to keep the local workforce productively employed (Figure 2). Lack of accountability was a second source of concern: 50 per cent of leaders surveyed disagreed that their countries had an open and accountable government.

Figure 2: Leaders' perceptions of their country's development



Note: percentage of respondents overall that agree, disagree, or neither agree nor disagree with each statement about their country's development progress. Respondents were asked to identify the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with 7 different statements about their country between 2016 and 2020. Respondents used a 3-point Likert scale to report their response (agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree). They could also select prefer not to say; those responses are excluded.

Source: Custer et al. (2022).

Leaders were then asked to select the three statements with which they disagreed the most. We found that leader discontent with the state of jobs in their countries is fairly widespread regardless of geography, though it is most strongly felt in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regions, according to 49 and 43 per cent of leaders, respectively (Figure 3). Although East Asia and the Pacific (EAP) and Europe and Central Asia (ECA) had relatively lower levels of reported dissatisfaction, one third or more of leaders still disagreed with the statement that their country generated enough jobs. Notably, EAP and ECA have fewer low-income countries compared to other regions,<sup>9</sup> which may correspond with a higher ability to generate

<sup>9</sup> For example, the EAP region has only 1 out of 23 countries classified as low-income according to the World Bank Group classification in 2020, compared to SSA where 23 of the region's 48 countries are considered low-income.

economic opportunities and jobs for their citizens. Leaders worldwide were similarly uniform in their disagreement that their countries had an open and accountable government, according to a quarter or more of leaders in each region. Once again, discontent about limited accountability was most pronounced in SSA and MENA.

There were a few outliers, however, which indicate specialized areas of concern in different regions. Respondents from Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) were much more dissatisfied (35 per cent) with public service delivery than all other regions. This may be a symptom of persistent income inequality in the region as opposed to insufficient resources, since the majority of LAC countries are classified as upper middle-income status. Respondents from ECA and MENA reported less satisfaction with the business climate (25 and 26 per cent, respectively) compared with other regions, despite relatively strong performance in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index.<sup>10</sup>

Figure 3: Leaders who disagree that their country made progress in a given policy area, by geographic region

	Mean	East Asia & Pacific (EAP)	Europe & Central Asia (ECA)	Latin America & Caribbean (LAC)	Middle East and North Africa (MENA)	South Asia (SAS)	Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
Sufficient Jobs	42%	33%	36%	41%	43%	38%	49%
Government Accountability	29%	24%	27%	27%	34%	27%	31%
Macroeconomic Stability	22%	17%	12%	24%	18%	16%	30%
Service Delivery	19%	15%	7%	35%	14%	14%	19%
Business Climate	18%	14%	25%	17%	26%	18%	16%
Social Inclusion	14%	12%	12%	19%	18%	12%	13%
Physical Security	13%	13%	16%	10%	18%	14%	13%

Note: respondents were asked to identify the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with 7 different statements about their country between 2016 and 2020. Respondents used a 3-point Likert scale to report their response (agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree). They could also select prefer not to say; those responses are excluded from this graphic. This visual only shows the percentage of respondents by region who said they disagreed that their country had made progress.

Source: Custer et al. (2022).


<sup>10</sup> ECA is the region with the highest Ease of Doing Business score, after the OECD’s high-income countries. As a region, MENA comes only behind OECD countries, ECA, and EAP, but ranks ahead of LAC, SSA, and SAS.

*Government officials are more optimistic, but leaders' perceptions of progress largely track with objective measures of political legitimacy and technocratic governance.*

Government officials and parliamentarians consistently viewed their country's development more positively than non-government or development partner counterparts (Figure 4).<sup>11</sup> Their attitudes were most divergent when it came to government accountability and the business environment—with non-government and development partners being far more pessimistic than those in government in these areas.

The cause for those divergent views is unclear. It is possible that government officials have greater visibility on early efforts or policies to solve a problem that would make them more optimistic regarding the potential for future progress. Alternatively, this could be more of a self-preservation instinct on the part of government actors that may feel they would pay a greater cost for acknowledging less than stellar progress.<sup>12</sup> In fact, we do find that government officials are more reluctant than other respondents to disclose their opinions on their country's level of progress, choosing 'prefer not to say' at a higher rate than other stakeholder groups.<sup>13</sup> Respondents of all stakeholder groups are more hesitant to share their views of their country's progress on government accountability and basic public services, perhaps an indication that they consider these aspects of development to be particularly sensitive topics.


Figure 4: Leaders' perceptions of their country's level of development, by stakeholder group



<sup>11</sup> We compared how government officials and parliamentarians (government) assess their country's development relative to domestic civil society and private sector leaders (non-government) and the local representatives of development partners. We tested this with a logit model on the likelihood of a respondent agreeing with a positively framed statement on the progress of a certain development area, based on demographic characteristics (years of experience, gender, stakeholder group, policy area of expertise, and region). The default is development partners, and we find a positive and statistically significant coefficient for government officials in all sectors except for Basic public services.

<sup>12</sup> For example, a potential non-sampling error is the threat of disclosure which corresponds to the risks and potential costs to respondents of honestly reporting their answers (Tourangeau and Yan 2007, as cited in Calvo et al. 2019). With the inclusion of 'prefer not to say', we minimize this error and can learn from those who choose that response option.

<sup>13</sup> We test for this with a simple logit model on the likelihood of a respondent choosing 'prefer not to say' when asked their opinion on a positively framed statement on the progress of a certain development. The independent variables are a series of demographic characteristics (e.g., years of experience, gender, stakeholder group, policy area of expertise, region). The default is development partners, and we find a positive and statistically significant coefficient for government officials in all sectors except for Social inclusivity. The fact that government officials choose this option more often suggests that respondents perceive these questions as sensitive and that their stakeholder group affects the cost-benefit calculation to decide whether to answer a question or not. These results are presented in Appendix D



Note: respondents were asked to identify the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with 7 different statements about their country between 2016 and 2020. Respondents used a 3-point Likert scale to report their response (agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree). They could also select prefer not to say; these responses are excluded. These visuals show the percentage of respondents by stakeholder group that agree, disagree, or neither agree nor disagree with 7 statements of development progress in their countries.

Source: Custer et al. (2022).

Acknowledging that there may be additional factors that shape leaders' views of development progress, we examined their responses to understand whether they systematically varied on the basis of other individual demographic attributes (e.g., gender, years of experience), but we did not find an observable difference in the results.<sup>14</sup> Instead, it appears that country characteristics, such as political legitimacy and technocratic governance, play a bigger role in perceptions of progress.

Leaders' subjective responses based upon their lived experiences also appear to largely track with various objective measures of their country's technocratic governance. Respondents from countries with objectively higher levels of development, better equipped bureaucracies, and lower social inequality (quantified by industry-standard measures) report stronger progress on development outcomes. By contrast, leaders from fragile states report lower levels of progress, particularly in basic service delivery. These results reinforce the concern that poor governance and persistent fragility can become 'traps' that stymie progress and enmesh countries in a low-growth equilibrium from which it is hard to escape (Collier 2008; Andrimihaja et al. 2011).

*Most often leaders' views did not vary greatly based upon their development partners, but those who worked with multilaterals and the PRC were more optimistic.*


We also examined whether respondents' views of progress appeared to vary on the basis of the development partners with whom they worked. We considered various possibilities, including differences between those who worked with bilateral versus multilateral partners, members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee versus South-South Cooperation providers, as well as those who did and did not work with specific bilateral actors. Most often the differences were

<sup>14</sup> Gender equality in public administration correlates with key indicators of performance, such as the delivery of basic public services (McKinsey & Company and UNDP 2017). This indicates that women are likely more engaged with these activities.

not consequential,<sup>15</sup> but in some cases there were areas of divergence in views that appeared to cut along the lines of the partners with whom leaders worked. The two most noteworthy examples are in comparing leaders who did and did not work with multilateral organizations, as well as the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Some of the largest divergence in attitudes appeared between leaders who reportedly worked closely with multilateral organizations (defined in our survey as a respondent who said they had received advice or assistance from one or more multilateral organizations between 2016 and 2020) and those who did not (Figure 5).<sup>16</sup> Respondents who worked with one or more multilateral development partners more frequently agreed that their country had made progress across all seven areas of development policy, but the difference was largest when it came to government accountability (+14 percentage points), macroeconomic stability (+10 percentage points), and business climate (+9 percentage points).

Figure 5: Leaders’ perceptions of progress, by whether they received advice or assistance from multilaterals



Note: as described in Figure 2, respondents were asked to identify the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with 7 different statements about their country between 2016 and 2020. This figure breaks these responses into two cohorts: those who reported receiving advice or assistance from at least one multilateral organization between 2016 and 2020 (Multilateral) and those that did not (No Multilateral).

Source: Custer et al. (2022).


<sup>15</sup> For example, there did not appear to be a substantial difference in attitudes between leaders who worked with the United States or at least one member of the Development Assistance Committee and those that did not work with these development partners.

<sup>16</sup> Respondents were asked two questions: (i) ‘Of the following intergovernmental organizations, development banks, and private foundations, which, if any, provided [you] with advice or assistance to support this initiative?’; and (ii) ‘Of the following foreign embassies and bilateral agencies, which, if any, provided [you] with advice or assistance to support this initiative?’ Multilaterals in the context of the survey included relevant agencies within the United Nations system, the Bretton Woods institutions (e.g., the World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund), regional international finance institutions, etc. Respondents could also write in responses.

Similarly, large differences in attitudes between leaders that received advice or assistance from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) versus those who did not are also noteworthy and, in some ways, challenge conventional wisdom. As we observed with multilaterals, leaders who worked with the PRC also tended to agree that their country was making progress across all seven areas of development policy at higher rates than their peers. The most divergent results were in three areas: respondents who worked with the PRC were more likely to agree that their country had made progress on government accountability (+16 percentage points), physical security (+14 percentage points), and social inclusion (+9 percentage points) than those that did not (Figure 6).

These findings are counterintuitive in several respects. The PRC has attracted criticism for the opacity of its overseas development programmes (Gelpern et al. 2021),<sup>17</sup> raising concerns that its financing may create perverse conditions for local corruption (Horigoshi et al. 2022).<sup>18</sup> The Chinese government’s traditional emphasis has been on hard infrastructure projects (Malik et al. 2021), rather than those emphasizing basic rights or human development (Horigoshi et al. 2022),<sup>19</sup> and its treatment of ethnic minorities at home has received substantial negative press. Meanwhile, scholars have raised the possibility that Chinese state-directed financing could facilitate a diffusion of authoritarian norms that may indirectly worsen human security in the face of government repression (Gehring et al. 2022).


Figure 6: Leaders’ perceptions of progress, by whether they received advice or assistance from China



<sup>17</sup> This includes tying funding to the use of Chinese firms without open procurement processes, discouraging disclosure of lending terms, and sourcing project ideas directly from political leaders, rather than working through established bureaucracies and vetting processes.

<sup>18</sup> In a 2022 AidData survey of African leaders, roughly half of respondents felt the PRC’s support for development projects had worsened corruption in their countries (Horigoshi et al. 2022). The survey included leaders from both North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa.

<sup>19</sup> In the same 2022 AidData survey of African leaders, over 45 per cent of respondents saw the PRC as their preferred partner when it came to hard infrastructure projects in areas such as energy, transport, and telecommunications (Horigoshi et al. 2022). Comparatively, they were less likely to turn to the PRC for support in the softer sides of development (e.g., governance, rule of law, health, education, social protection).



Note: as described in Figure 2, respondents were asked to identify the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with 7 different statements about their country between 2016 and 2020. This figure breaks these responses into two cohorts: those who reported receiving advice or assistance from China between 2016 and 2020 (China) and those that did not (No China).

Source: Custer et al. (2022).

### 3.2 Capacity


In this subsection, we take a deeper look at how leaders think about the key constraints that hinder their country’s progress across the same seven areas of development: government accountability, job creation, service delivery, social inclusion, macroeconomic policy, business climate, and physical security. Building upon their assessments of the state of development in their country, we asked respondents to identify the areas in which they were most dissatisfied and select from the following reasons as to why they felt more progress had not been made: (i) This is not a priority in national plans; (ii) This is a national priority, but there are insufficient resources for reforms; (iii) This is a national priority, resources are sufficient, but reforms have not been implemented well. Below are the main findings.

*Insufficient resources and poor implementation create unfunded mandates, habitually undercutting progress against named priorities.*

The majority of leaders do not view lack of prioritization as the most important hurdle they need to overcome to advance reforms in any of the seven areas of development (Figure 7). Instead, respondents were most likely to select either insufficient resources or poor implementation of reforms as their top explanation for the lack of progress. Nevertheless, there are two areas in which the lack of prioritization could be more important: roughly one-third of respondents selected this as a key constraint when it came to promoting an open and accountable government (36 per cent) and social inclusion (33 per cent).



Figure 7: Leaders' reasons for perceived lack of development progress



Note: respondents who stated that their country had made insufficient progress in a given policy area were asked a follow-on question why this was the case and had the option to choose between 3 responses: insufficient resources, lack of prioritization, and poor reform implementation. This visual shows the percentage of respondents who selected each of these 3 reasons to explain the lack of progress disaggregated by policy area.


Source: Custer et al. (2022).

On issues of economic development (e.g., jobs, business climate, macroeconomic policy), leaders routinely selected insufficient resources as their greatest challenge over poor implementation or lack of prioritization, regardless of region or income level. Similarly, the insight that a lack of prioritization was more of a concern for government accountability and social inclusion than other areas of reform also held true across regions (Figure 8). Leaders from LAC countries were most adamant about this lack of prioritization—an unexpected finding in a region which boasts a high number of active members of the Open Government Partnership.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>20</sup> This comes as a surprise, as 16 of the 25 surveyed LAC countries are active members of the Open Government Partnership. As a member, each government is required to submit an action plan with civil society that specifies concrete commitments to improving openness and accountability in government. These may suggest that leaders want to see more prioritization in this policy area outside of this partnership, or that sufficient prioritization in this field looks different from OGP membership and efforts.



Figure 8: Leaders' reasons for lack of progress, by geographic region



Note: respondents were asked to identify the most important reason why they disagreed with a statement about their country's development between 2016 and 2020. The graphic shows the percentage of respondents, by geographic region, who selected a given reason for the lack of progress in each of the 7 areas of development policy.

Source: Custer et al. (2022).

*Leaders see high levels of corruption as a binding constraint with far-reaching consequences—not only affecting resourcing, but also priorities and implementation.*

In a follow-on question, we asked respondents to identify what they saw as the root causes underlying the symptoms they identified as impediments to reform—insufficient resources (Figure 9), poor implementation (Figure 10), or lack of prioritization (Figure 11). One reason is top-of-mind for leaders: high levels of corruption. This single explanation was almost always the most selected root cause leaders gave for the lack of progress, chosen by between 44 and 79 per cent of respondents, regardless of the area of development policy under consideration or the impediments they previously identified. Relatedly, leaders also frequently identified poor financial management

as another important binding constraint, particularly in contributing to insufficient resources (43 to 55 per cent) and poor implementation (22 to 44 per cent).

Figure 9: Leaders' reasons why there are insufficient resources for reforms across seven development priorities

	Poor Tax Laws	Poor Tax Enforcement	High Levels of Corruption	Political Instability	Poor Financial Management	Unprofitable for Private Sector	Access to International Capital	Other
Business Climate	21%	31%	50%	46%	51%	27%	17%	15%
Government Accountability	13%	35%	78%	48%	56%	12%	9%	8%
Macroeconomic Stability	23%	38%	58%	25%	55%	30%	9%	11%
Physical Security	14%	28%	46%	38%	43%	32%	15%	15%
Service Delivery	22%	28%	63%	36%	50%	21%	6%	14%
Social Inclusion	30%	34%	49%	23%	53%	38%	6%	17%
Sufficient Jobs	24%	33%	44%	37%	44%	35%	10%	17%

Note: for respondents who selected 'insufficient resources for reform' as their explanation for the lack of development progress, respondents were asked a follow-up question to identify why they thought this was the case. Respondents could select their top 3 answers from a list of 7 key constraints, as well as another (write-in) option. This graphic shows the percentage of respondents who selected a given constraint as responsible for insufficient resources for reforms across 7 areas of development policy.

Source: Custer et al. (2022).

Taken together, these results reinforce the hypothesis that insufficient resources may be more of a challenge of misallocation of resources, either by design (in the case of corruption) or as an oversight (in the case of poor financial management). If anything, this finding underscores the importance of public financial management and anti-corruption programmes which build technical capacity and political will within governments and non-governmental watchdogs to support responsible use of public funds.

Beyond issues of responsible financial management, societal norms and group dynamics also appear to have an outsized impact on the lack of reform progress. Lack of government commitment to do more was another popular root cause to explain the poor implementation (Figure 10) and lack of prioritization of reforms (Figure 11) in national plans (chosen by between 35 and 61 per cent of respondents). Yet, leaders also recognize that those outside of government can have an outsized impact on reform.

Figure 10: Leaders' reasons why reforms have not been implemented well across seven development priorities

	Lack of Government Commitment	Lack of Government Capacity	High Level of Corruption	Political Instability	Poor Financial Management	Socio-cultural Norms	Insufficient Non-government Pressure	Too Much Non-government Resistance	Government Can't Pass Legislation	Insufficient Data/Evidence	Other
Business Climate	36%	32%	52%	35%	34%	10%	18%	9%	17%	14%	8%
Government Accountability	51%	26%	79%	20%	29%	14%	24%	2%	19%	7%	6%
Macroeconomic Stability	46%	31%	64%	13%	44%	16%	13%	3%	16%	15%	8%
Physical Security	44%	30%	53%	26%	26%	16%	12%	6%	19%	17%	13%
Service Delivery	47%	29%	61%	20%	22%	25%	15%	3%	18%	11%	10%
Social Inclusion	45%	32%	47%	12%	32%	33%	24%	7%	15%	18%	7%
Sufficient Jobs	35%	39%	44%	26%	32%	15%	19%	7%	18%	16%	13%

Note: for those respondents who selected 'this is a national priority, resources are sufficient, but reforms have not been implemented well' for the lack of development progress, respondents were asked a follow-up question to identify why they thought this was the case. Respondents could select their top 3 answers from a list of 10 key constraints, as well as another (write-in) option. The graphic shows the percentage of respondents who selected a given constraint as explaining why reforms have not been implemented well in each of the 7 areas of development policy.

Source: Custer et al. (2022).

Figure 11: Leaders' reasons why a development area is not a priority in national plans

	Lack of Government Commitment	Lack of Government Capacity	High Level of Corruption	Political Instability	Socio-cultural Norms	Insufficient Non-government Pressure	Too Much Non-government Resistance	Government Can't Pass Legislation	Insufficient Data/Evidence	Other
Business Climate	40%	42%	64%	31%	8%	27%	15%	14%	13%	12%
Government Accountability	61%	25%	75%	18%	14%	28%	2%	18%	7%	13%
Macroeconomic Stability	60%	28%	66%	14%	9%	25%	3%	16%	10%	17%
Physical Security	39%	19%	54%	37%	27%	33%	12%	16%	8%	19%
Service Delivery	56%	40%	58%	21%	16%	18%	4%	18%	13%	21%
Social Inclusion	60%	32%	42%	11%	38%	31%	4%	16%	16%	13%
Sufficient Jobs	41%	36%	61%	36%	10%	23%	5%	23%	14%	11%

Note: for those respondents who selected 'not a priority in national plans' as their explanation for the lack of development progress, respondents were asked a follow-up question to identify why they thought this was the case. Respondents could select their top 3 answers from a list of 9 key constraints, as well as another (write-in) option. The graphic shows the percentage of respondents who selected a given constraint as explaining why national plans did not identify reforms as a priority in each of the 7 areas of development policy.

Source: Custer et al. (2022).

*Leaders say capacity gaps are most acute among political appointees and emphasize people over structural concerns, except when it comes to local governments.*

For roughly one third of respondents, on average, lack of government capacity is a perennial concern and root cause affecting lack of prioritization or poor implementation of policy reforms. They also cited domestic resource mobilization as a challenge, particularly the design and enforcement of tax laws, selected by 21 and 32 per cent of respondents. Although it may be tempting to view capacity as more an issue related to career civil servants and remedied through traditional civil service reform efforts, leaders instead pointed to lack of capacity among political appointees at much higher rates than any other government actor. Over 80 per cent of respondents viewed political appointee capacity as a binding constraint when it came to prioritizing agenda items within national development strategies, and 70 per cent said this was also a factor in the poor implementation of reforms.

Although there are myriad capacity shortfalls to consider, leaders tended to emphasize the importance of people over structural, systems, or technological gaps. They identified a dearth of general leadership and management acumen as a cross-cutting issue, selected by between 34 and 60 per cent of respondents depending upon the government actor in question (Figure 12). Personnel management was also specifically identified as a concern by roughly one third of leaders, on average. Perhaps consistent with the observation that leaders from federalized systems of government were more dissatisfied with their country's development progress, respondents identified stronger systems and organizational capacity as being somewhat more important for

local levels of government. This makes sense in light of the increased demands placed upon local authorities when responsibilities for front-line service delivery are devolved from the central to subnational level without adequate attention to building local capacity.

Figure 12: What types of capacity do leaders think government actors lack most?

	Systems	Workload	Personnel	Structural	Organizational	Role	Leadership or Management	Technological	Other
Political Appointees	35%	8%	42%	24%	29%	34%	60%	13%	2%
Civil Servants (National)	38%	17%	44%	25%	34%	27%	49%	24%	2%
Local Government	44%	8%	41%	28%	41%	21%	49%	26%	1%
Parliamentarians	35%	7%	43%	26%	24%	36%	52%	15%	4%
Judiciary	51%	18%	39%	31%	26%	21%	34%	18%	5%
Other	45%	8%	28%	36%	23%	23%	50%	12%	13%

Note: for those respondents who selected that the government lacks capacity to support reforms as a key constraint to the lack of development progress, respondents were asked a follow-up question to identify what type of capacity each government actor lacked. Respondents could select their top 3 answers from a list of 8 dimensions of capacity, as well as another (write-in) option. The graphic shows the percentage of respondents who selected a given capacity gap by government actor.

Source: Custer et al. (2022).

### 3.3 Cooperation

In this subsection, we turn to answer the question that motivated this research. How can international actors best support locally-led development? Bilateral aid agencies, multilateral development banks, international non-governmental organizations, and multinational corporations have numerous ways in which they can come alongside countries in the Global South to advance reforms. But not all of these modalities may be equally effective in overcoming constraints or as responsive to what leaders say they need to achieve their goals. We asked respondents to make recommendations for where international actors could make the most constructive difference in seven areas of development policy. They could select from the following response options:

- Provide financial support (e.g., grants, loans) (Financing)
- Provide training to local staff (e.g., providing relevant knowledge or skills) (Training)
- Provide advice or input on the design of programmes and/or policies (Design)
- Provide advice or input on implementation of programmes and/or policies (Implementation)
- Mobilize domestic actors to exert pressure on the government or other relevant parties (Domestic Pressure)
- Mobilize international actors to exert pressure on the government or other relevant parties (External Pressure)

- Raise awareness of the issue among individuals or organizations best positioned to take action (Awareness Raising)
- None: This is a domestic problem and domestic actors need to solve it (No Role)

*International actors should adapt assistance to fit leaders' diagnosis of key constraints: financing to crowd-in resources, advocacy to mobilize pressure, expertise to improve implementation.*

Most leaders agreed that there was a role for international actors to play in supporting their country's progress across all seven areas of development policy (Figure 13). Only a small minority (between 3 and 9 per cent) said that a given policy area was strictly a domestic problem for countries to solve on their own. Roughly 40 per cent of leaders, on average, said their countries would benefit from a variety of contributions from international actors in supporting reforms, including financing, technical assistance on both design and implementation of programmes or policies, training, and awareness-raising. But leaders also felt that the optimal role for international actors varied on the basis of the problem domestic reformers were trying to solve and their diagnoses of the key constraints to progress.

Figure 13: Leaders' preferred role for international actors, by development policy area

	Mobilize domestic pressure	Mobilize international pressure	Provide design advice	Provide financial support	Provide implementation advice	Provide training to locals	Raise awareness among those able to take action	No role, this is a domestic problem	Other (please specify)
Business Climate	25%	31%	42%	49%	41%	38%	34%	4%	4%
Government Accountability	39%	50%	28%	26%	29%	32%	40%	9%	7%
Macroeconomic Stability	27%	29%	41%	46%	41%	44%	37%	4%	3%
Physical Security	24%	25%	40%	41%	41%	39%	37%	7%	5%
Service Delivery	27%	35%	37%	35%	39%	40%	40%	4%	5%
Social Inclusion	31%	36%	41%	39%	39%	39%	43%	3%	4%
Sufficient Jobs	20%	18%	43%	53%	40%	46%	34%	6%	7%

Note: respondents were asked about which roles international actors were best positioned to play in supporting reforms in 7 areas of development policy. The graphic shows the percentage of respondents who selected a given type of support from an international actor. Respondents could select up to 7 response options in each policy area.

Source: Custer et al. (2022).

In areas where respondents felt that the root issue was lack of prioritization, such as government accountability and social inclusion, there was greater interest in seeing international actors take an advocacy role in mobilizing domestic (31-39 per cent) or international actors (36-50 per cent) to exert pressure on those blocking reforms. Strikingly, although leaders welcomed financing in many areas, they were least enthusiastic about this form of support when it came to strengthening government accountability (26 per cent). This could be a reflection of their concerns regarding corruption, as external funding may create perverse incentives for wealth-maximizing officials to game the system with impunity.

Comparatively, demand for external financing was far higher in areas where respondents felt that the root issue was insufficient resources, such as macroeconomic policy (46 per cent) or jobs (53 per cent). Understandably, there was less appetite for international actors to play an advocacy role in areas where there was already a groundswell of domestic support for reforms. Finally, leaders placed a relatively higher premium on accessing international expertise via training or technical advice in areas such as service delivery, where they felt that poor implementation was the major factor undercutting reforms.

## 4 Conclusion

If international actors—from bilateral aid agencies and multilateral development banks to private philanthropies and multinational corporations—are to live up to their rhetoric of supporting locally-led development, they must learn to see from the perspectives of their counterparts in the Global South. The 2020 LTL Survey drew upon the experiences of nearly 7,000 public, private, and civil society leaders at the forefront of pushing forward reforms in 141 countries to answer three critical questions. How do leaders assess progress in advancing their national development goals (Progress)? What key constraints do leaders see as hindering progress in achieving their goals (Capacity)? How can international actors best support locally-led development (Cooperation)?

In Progress, we identified sufficient jobs and government accountability as two policy areas in which leaders were most dissatisfied with their country's progress. Although officials were somewhat more optimistic, the lived experiences of our leaders largely tracked with objective country characteristics, increasing the likelihood that their impressions are based upon a realistic assessment of progress in their countries.

In Capacity, we highlighted that leaders pinpointed corruption and poor financial management as contributing to misallocation of resources. Lack of capacity, particularly among political appointees, inhibited effective implementation of reforms. Leaders argued that greater leadership acumen and personnel management was necessary across the board, but that local governments would also benefit from better organizational and structural capacity.

In Cooperation, we demonstrated that there is clearly demand for assistance of various types, but the optimal role for international actors appears to vary on the basis of the key constraints leaders have identified in a given policy area. Mobilizing domestic or international pressure is welcome when lack of prioritization is the primary challenge (e.g., government accountability, social inclusion). Demand for external financing was higher when leaders felt the root issue was insufficient resources (e.g., macroeconomic policy, jobs). They were most interested in accessing international expertise via training or technical advice in areas where poor implementation was the major constraint (e.g., service delivery).

This paper provides an initial step in filling the gap in the literature to better understand the 'demand side' of development cooperation. Further efforts in this direction are needed to ensure that donors' efforts are optimized, and recipient countries can make the most of what they receive.

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## Appendix A: Stakeholder groups, regions, and development policy domains

Stakeholder groups: Our research team identified a list of ideal-type organizations for the six stakeholder groups across all countries that discharge functions relevant to our questions of interest. Respondents selected their organization type in response to the following question: ‘It is our understanding that you worked [in country] between 2016 and 2020. During this period, which type of organization did you work with for the longest?’ They could choose one from a list of the following options: (1) Government Agency, Ministry or Office; (2) Parliament; (3) Development Partner; (4) Non-Governmental Organization or Civil Society Organization; (5) Private Sector; (6) University, Think Tank or Media; (7) I did not work for one of these types of organizations between 2016 and 2020; or (8) I mostly worked in a different country between 2016 and 2020.

Geographic distribution: Based on the World Bank’s June 2020 classification, this includes: 29 low-income countries, 50 lower-middle income countries, 55 upper-middle income countries, and 3 countries that recently graduated to high-income status. In addition, the 2020 Listening to Leaders Survey also includes 5 semi-autonomous regions: Puntland, Kurdistan, Palestine, Somaliland, and Zanzibar. In our analysis, we collapse country-level responses into 6 larger regional groups: East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South Asia (SA), and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).

Development policy domain: Respondents selected their development policy domain in response to the following question: ‘While holding this position, what were your primary areas of focus? (If you worked across multiple areas, please select one area you are most familiar with.)’ Respondents could select from a fixed list of options, including: (1) agriculture, fishing, and forestry; (2) economic policy; (3) education; (4) energy and mining; (5) environment and natural resource management; (6) finance; (7) health; (8) human development and gender; (9) industry, trade and services; (10) information and communications; (11) labor market policy and programs; (12) nutrition and food security; (13) private sector development; (14) good governance and rule of law; (15) public sector management; (16) rural development; (17) social development and protection; (18) trade; (19) transportation; (20) urban development; (21) water, sewerage and waste management; (22) foreign policy; (23) other.

## Appendix B: Stakeholder and regional compositions

Table A1: Sampling frame, survey recipients, and survey respondents, by stakeholder group

Stakeholder group	Members of the sampling frame	Survey recipients	Survey respondents
Government	45594 (45.57%)	36918 (43.9%)	2959 (43.47%)
Parliament	13474 (13.47%)	11485 (13.66%)	360 (5.29%)
Development partner	21270 (21.26%)	19250 (22.89%)	889 (13.06%)
NGO/CSO	10162 (10.16%)	8607 (10.24%)	1287 (18.91%)
Private sector	3515 (3.51%)	2948 (3.51%)	374 (5.49%)
University/Think tank	5766 (5.76%)	4881 (5.8%)	672 (9.87%)
	265 (0.26%)	1 (0%)	266 (3.91%)
Total	100046	84090	6807

Table A2: Sampling frame, survey recipients, and survey respondents, by region

World Bank region classification	Members of the sampling frame	Survey recipients	Survey respondents
East Asia & Pacific	14505 (14.5%)	11388 (13.54%)	910 (13.37%)
Europe & Central Asia	17704 (17.7%)	14840 (17.65%)	1184 (17.39%)
Latin America & Caribbean	18292 (18.28%)	16351 (19.44%)	1341 (19.7%)
Middle East & North Africa	8071 (8.07%)	6551 (7.79%)	454 (6.67%)
South Asia	10104 (10.1%)	8626 (10.26%)	612 (8.99%)
Sub-Saharan Africa	31106 (31.09%)	26334 (31.32%)	2297 (33.74%)
	264 (0.26%)	NA	9 (0.13%)

## Appendix C: Inclusion criteria by stakeholder group

Table A3: Inclusion criteria by stakeholder group

Stakeholder group	Org type	Institution type	Ideal-typical positions
1	1	Ministry of Finance/Economy	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Chief of Staff, Special Assistant to the Minister, Senior Advisor, Chief Economist, Accountant General, Deputy Accountant General, Head of Department (e.g. Tax, Customs, Budget, Debt Management, Public Procurement, Internal Audit, Public Investment, External Finance, Research and Policy Analysis, Public Enterprise Reform)
1	2	Ministry of Planning/National Planning Commission	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Director General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Chief Economist, Head of Department (e.g. External Finance and International Cooperation, Monitoring and Evaluation, Policy and Research)
1	3	Ministry of Foreign Affairs/International Cooperation	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Chief of Staff, Special Assistant to the Minister, Senior Advisor, Head of Department (e.g. North America, Europe, IFIs, United Nations, International Organizations, External Finance, Research and Policy Analysis)
1	4	Ministry of Health	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Chief Public Health Officer, Head of Department (e.g. Primary Health Care, Health Systems Reform, Epidemiology and Immunization, Research and Policy Analysis, Monitoring and Evaluation, HIV/AIDS, Malaria); Focal Point for National Health Accounts
1	5	Ministry of Education	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department (e.g. Early Childhood Education, Primary Education, Secondary Education, Tertiary Education), EFA National Coordinator, UNESCO Representative

1	6	Ministry of Industry/Trade/Commerce/Competitiveness	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, WTO Accession Focal Point; Head of Department (e.g. Customs, Business Environment Reform Unit); Director of Commerce, Director of Industry
1	7	Ministry of Public Service/Public Administration	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department
1	8	Ministry of Labor/Social Security/Social Welfare/Social Protection	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department
1	9	Ministry of Natural Resources/Environment	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department (e.g. Monitoring and Evaluation, Research and Policy Analysis), UNFCCC Designated National Authority, CBD National Contact, GEF Political Focal Point, GEF Operational Focal Point
1	10	Ministry of Energy/Oil/Mineral Resources	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department, National EITI Focal Point; Member of EITI Steering Committee
1	11	Ministry of Lands/Property Registrar	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department, Property Registrar, Deputy Property Registrar
1	12	Ministry of Justice/ Office of the Attorney General	Minister, Deputy Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisors, Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Prosecutor General/Chief Prosecutor, Solicitor General
1	13	Ministry of Family/Gender	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department
1	14	Ministry of Agriculture/Rural Development/Food Security	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department
1	15	Ministry of Public Works/Transport	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department

1	16	Ministry of Interior	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department (e.g. Economic and Financial Crimes, Criminal Investigations, Anti-Human Trafficking)
1	17	National Statistical Agency	Director General, Deputy Director General, Senior Advisor
1	18	Investment Promotion Agency	Head of the Agency, Deputy Head of the Agency, Senior Advisor
1	19	Independent Human Rights Commission/Office of the Ombudsman	Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Senior Advisor, Ombudsman, Deputy Ombudsman, Head of Department
1	20	Independent Electoral Institution	Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Senior Advisor, Director of Elections, Deputy Director of Elections
1	21	Central Bank	Governor, Vice Governor, Head of Operations, Head of Department (e.g. Operations, Research and Policy Analysis) Department, Senior Advisors
1	22	Supreme Audit Institution	Auditor/Inspector General, Deputy Auditor/Inspector General, Comptroller, Head of the Court of Account, Deputy Head of the Court of Account, Member of the Public Accounts Committee, Senior Advisor
1	23	Public Procurement Agency	Head of Agency; Deputy Head of Agency, Senior Advisor
1	24	Anti-Corruption Agency/Ministry/Commission/Council/Task Force	Minister, Deputy Minister, Executive Director, Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Senior Adviser, Head of Department (e.g. Investigations, Corruption Prevention and Education, Income and Asset Verification, Financial Intelligence and Anti-Money Laundering)
1	25	Civil Service Agency/Commission	Head of Agency; Deputy Head of Agency, Department Head, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor
1	27	Aid Effectiveness and Coordination Units/Directorates	Head of Unit/Directorate; Senior Advisors

1	28	Office of President/Prime Minister	President, Prime Minister, Cabinet Secretary, Secretary General of Government, Minister without Portfolio, Charge de Mission, Chef de Service, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor
1	28	Office of President/Prime Minister	Vice President, Secretary General, Minister without Portfolio, Charge de Mission, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor
1	29	Office of the Vice President	Vice President, Secretary General, Minister without Portfolio, Charge de Mission, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor
1	30	Embassy officials stationed in the United States	Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, First Secretary/Counselor, Second Secretary/Counselor, Third Secretary/Counselor, Senior Advisor
1	31	Embassy officials stationed at the United Nations in New York or Geneva	Ambassador and Permanent Representative, Deputy Permanent Representative, First Secretary/Counselor, Second Secretary/Counselor, Third Secretary/Counselor, Senior Advisors
1	32	Business Registration Office	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor
2	34	U.S. Embassy Staff	Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, Political/Econ Chief, Political Officer, Economic Officer
2	35	USAID	Mission Director, Deputy Mission Director, Office Director, Senior Advisor, Program Officer
2	36	MCC	Resident Country Director, Deputy Resident Country Director, Program Officer
2	37	State Department Headquarters	Assistant Secretary, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office Director, Desk Officer
2	38	World Bank	Country Director, Country Manager, Lead Economist, Sector Specialist, Desk Economist
2	39	IMF	Resident Representative, Lead Economist, Special Advisor to the Government, Desk Economist

2	40	ADB	Country Director, Lead Economist, Sector Specialist
2	43	European Commission	Head of the EC Delegation, Project Director, Adviser
2	44	UN Funds, Programmes, and Specialized Agencies	Country Director, Resident Representative, Deputy Resident Representative, Project Manager, Lead Economist, Adviser, Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General; Deputy Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General
2	45	WHO	Country Representative
2	46	UNESCO	Country Representative
2	47	Japan Embassy/JICA/JBIC	JICA Country Representative; JBIC Country Representative
2	49	Australian Embassy/DFAT	N/A
2	50	UK Embassy/DFID	UK Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, DFID Country Director, DFID Senior Economist UK Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, DFID Country Director, DFID Senior Economist
2	51	German Embassy/ GIZ/KFW	Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, GTZ Country Director, KFW Country Director, Project Director
2	52	French Embassy/AFD	Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, AFD Country Director, Project Director
2	54	Other Non-USG Embassy and Donor Representatives	N/A
3	57	Anti-corruption and transparency NGOs	Executive Director, Country Director, Program Manager, and Country Expert
3	58	Democracy and Human Rights NGOs (e.g. health, education)	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Project Director
3	59	Social Sector NGOs (e.g. health, education)	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Project Director



3	60	Environmental NGOs	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Project Director
3	61	Independent Journalist Associations	Executive Director, Secretary General
3	62	National Coalition/Consortium/Association of NGOs	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor
4	55	Chambers of Commerce	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor
4	56	Commercial Associations	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor
5	63	Local Think Tanks	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Researcher, Department Head, Project Director
5	64	Local Universities	Rector, Department Chair, Professor
5	65	Local Media	President, Journalist, Researcher
5	66	Former Institution Employees	N/A
6	67	Legislative Body	President, Chairman, Deputy Chairman, Members

Table A4: Example of country-specific IPM for Afghanistan

Country ID	Stakeholder group	Org type	Org code	Institution type	Name
1	1	1	1a	Ministry of Finance/Economy	the Ministry of Finance
1	1	1	1b	Ministry of Finance/Economy	the Ministry of Economy
1	1	2	2a	Ministry of Planning/National Planning Commission	the Afghanistan National Development Strategy Secretariat
1	1	2	2b	Ministry of Planning/National Planning Commission	the Afghanistan National Development Strategy Unit
1	1	3	3a	Ministry of Foreign Affairs/International Cooperation	the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1	1	3	3b	Ministry of Foreign Affairs/International Cooperation	the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission
1	1	4	4a	Ministry of Health	the Ministry of Public Health
1	1	5	5a	Ministry of Education	the Ministry of Education
1	1	5	5b	Ministry of Education	the Ministry of Higher Education
1	1	5	5c	Ministry of Education	the Committee on Education and Skills Policy
1	1	6	6a	Ministry of Industry/Trade/Commerce/Competitiveness	the Ministry of Commerce and Industry
1	1	7	7a	Ministry of Public Service/Public Administration	the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission

1	1	8	8a	Ministry of Labor/Social Security/Social Welfare/Social Protection	the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs, and Disabled
1	1	9	9a	Ministry of Natural Resources/Environment	the National Environmental Protection Agency
1	1	10	10a	Ministry of Energy/Oil/Mineral Resources	the Ministry of Energy and Water
1	1	10	10b	Ministry of Energy/Oil/Mineral Resources	the Ministry of Mines
1	1	11	11a	Ministry of Lands/Property Registrar	the Afghan Geodetic and Cartographic Head Office
1	1	11	11b	Ministry of Lands/Property Registrar	the Afghanistan Land Authority

## Appendix D: Logit analysis of ‘prefer not to say’

### Results – Prefer not to say

<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Prefer not to say transparenc y (1)	jobs (2)	macro (3)	equity (4)	busines s (5)	security (6)	services (7)
Government agency, ministry or office	0.786*** (0.264)	0.369 (0.435)	1.058* (0.599)	0.458 (0.335)	1.027** (0.409)	1.070** (0.429)	1.030*** (0.307)
Observations	3,321	3,149	3,216	3,153	3,157	3,127	3,139
Log likelihood	-386.638	-	-	-	-	-	-
Akaike inf. crit.	815.276	352.309	298.353	561.375	473.854	471.837	760.097
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01							

### Results – Agree

<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Agree transparency (1)	jobs (2)	macro (3)	equity (4)	business (5)	security (6)	services (7)
Government agency, ministry or office	0.992*** (0.117)	0.864*** (0.204)	0.528*** (0.108)	0.521*** (0.106)	0.278*** (0.108)	0.473*** (0.109)	0.011 (0.104)
Observations	3,581	3,581	3,581	3,581	3,581	3,581	3,581
Log likelihood	-1,387.878	-	-	-	-	-	-
Akaike inf. crit.	2,817.756	1,372.651	2,965.102	2,995.486	2,902.883	3,002.687	2,984.173
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01							