

Démurger, Sylvie; Khelifa, Siwar; Rey, Béatrice

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
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# Rural-urban migration as a risk coping strategy: The role of income differentials

**Sylvie Démurger, Siwar Khelifa and Béatrice Rey**

# Rural-urban migration as a risk coping strategy: The role of income differentials

Sylvie Démurger\*      Siwar Khelifa<sup>†</sup>      Béatrice Rey<sup>‡</sup>

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## Abstract

This paper investigates how rural-urban income differentials interact with the risk coping motive to shape households' migration behavior. Using a model of migration behavior under agricultural income risk, our theoretical results suggest that while income differentials remain crucial in determining the migration decision, they are additionally determined by the agricultural income risk the household is facing. Empirical findings on Chinese farm households indicate that the incidence of migration as a risk coping mechanism is lower for households with a negative expected urban-to-rural income difference. Moreover, we find that, when these households care about the human capital of their children, their marginal utility of income increases as the educational performance of their children deteriorates, implying that, when migration is used as a risk coping strategy, households with lower educational performance of children may be more likely to send a parent for migration. This result also suggests that the best specification of the utility function to consider for these households is the non-separability between the household's earnings and their children's human capital.

**JEL Codes:** D81, J13, J31, J61, O15, O53, R23

**Keywords:** labor migration, aggregate risk, income differential, China.

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\*ENS de Lyon, CNRS, Institut d'Asie Orientale (IAO), 15 parvis René Descartes, Lyon, F-69007, France; IZA, Bonn, Germany. Email: sylvie.demurger@cnrs.fr.

<sup>†</sup>Univ Lyon, Université Lumière Lyon 2, GATE UMR5824, F-69130 Ecully, France. Email: khelifa@gate.cnrs.fr.

<sup>‡</sup>Univ Lyon, Université Lumière Lyon 2, GATE UMR5824, F-69130 Ecully, France. Email: beatrice.reyfournier@univ-lyon2.fr.

# 1 Introduction

In developing countries where formal insurance and credit markets are imperfect, absent, or inaccessible, rural households faced with high variability of income must adopt various strategies to insure against income risks. Self-insurance mechanisms include, *inter alia*, informal risk-sharing arrangements among households of the same region, and temporary migration to urban areas. Regarding the latter, the New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) has hypothesized that migration can be used as a household strategy not only to maximize expected earnings, but also to reduce risks and overcome constraints associated with market failures, notably in credit and insurance (Stark and Levhari, 1982; Stark and Taylor, 1991). Yet, the empirical literature that investigates the effects of income risk at the place of origin on migration behavior reports mixed evidence. Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) and Dillon et al. (2011) find evidence in support of the NELM in India and northern Nigeria, respectively, while Jalan and Ravallion (2001) and Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016) show that greater rural income risks inhibit migration to urban areas in China and India, respectively.<sup>1</sup>

Why wouldn't some rural households rely on migration despite being faced with an income risk? In the case of China in the mid-1980s, Jalan and Ravallion (2001) explain their finding by the way rural land is managed. Chinese rural households are denied private ownership of agricultural land and are only granted land-use rights through contracts, according to criteria such as the household's labor force. Under these circumstances, the migration of some household members generates a risk of land expropriation. It is therefore possible that when agricultural household income is risky, the incentive to secure the allocated land increases, and hence decreases the probability to migrate. In a similar vein, Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016) suggest that what drives a low migration probability, even in the presence of income risk, is the fear of households that in the case of migration of one of their members, the loss in the informal network insurance exceeds the income gain.<sup>2</sup>

These studies are proposing that migration behavior under risk is mainly explained by one main opportunity cost, the loss of land or the loss of informal risk-sharing transfers, which may reduce income differentials, and therefore migration probabilities.<sup>3</sup> Yet, this may not be the only explanation for the negative relationship between income risk and

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<sup>1</sup>Measures of household income risk used in these studies include temperature-related variability interacted with household land holdings to form an idiosyncratic measure of agricultural income risk (Dillon et al., 2011), rainfall variance interacted with households' landholdings to predict each household's variance in profits (Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989), the variance of the estimated innovation errors from the household-specific income process (Jalan and Ravallion, 2001), and the coefficient of variation of the household income (Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2016).

<sup>2</sup>Morten (2019) shows that introducing risk sharing for households indeed reduces migration by 37 percentage points in rural India. The context that she considers is, however, different. Households respond ex-post to realized income shocks and not ex-ante to income risk. She suggests that this result can be explained by the fact that households, in the case of a realized income shock, would be net recipients of risk-sharing transfers, and therefore, they would consider post-transfer income differentials.

<sup>3</sup>Since Todaro (1969), expected income differential, accounting for the probability of employment, has long been shown to be a prime determinant of rural-to-urban migration, which drives the rural labor force towards urban labor markets.

migration. Another explanation may lie in the households' preference for keeping the certain resources they have in their place of origin (land, informal risk-sharing transfers) against risky resources from migration, even with positive income differentials. Hence, in a risky context, whether income differentials affect migration decision or not becomes unclear.

To investigate this question, we build a theoretical model where rural farm households make migration decision under an aggregate income risk, meaning that informal risk-sharing arrangements offer little to no protection.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, relying on both the theoretical literature on migration (Dustmann, 2003; Dustmann and Görlach, 2016; Myerson, 2017) and available empirical evidence of the negative impact of income risk on children's outcomes (Jensen, 2000; Maccini and Yang, 2009; Björkman-Nyqvist, 2013), we take into account the possibility that parents have altruistic motives towards their offspring and we conjecture that migration is used not only to diversify income sources but also to protect, at least in part, against children's human capital reductions. We therefore consider that the rural household's welfare depends not only on his income but also on his children's human capital and future welfare.

Given the definition we take for the household's utility function, our model also allows to test the dependence of the shape of the household's utility function, with respect to income, on the child's human capital status, i.e. how the marginal utility of income changes when the level of the child's human capital increases. This measure, which we will refer to as the state dependence, may have implications for a number of important economic behaviors in the presence of children, such as the optimal level of savings or migration decisions.<sup>5</sup> If households anticipate, for example, that their children will undergo decreases in their stock of human capital (such as becoming sick), they may reallocate their earnings (e.g. through saving) across the child's human capital states before the expected changes in the child's human capital occur, so that they hold higher resources when income's marginal utility is highest. Also, when households know that their wealth level will increase (e.g. through a bequest from family members outside of the household), they may, for example, adjust the timing of the parent's migration across wealth states, so that the child undergoes the negative effects of the parent's migration when the marginal utility of the child's human capital is the lowest. The level of saving and the time of the parent's migration in these two examples will, therefore, depend on whether the marginal utility of income (the child's human capital) increases or decreases in the period where the level of the child's human capital (income) changes. Therefore, even a low amount of state dependence may have a significant impact on different economic behaviors, hence the importance of understanding its relevance. However, no study, to our knowledge, has ever empirically investigated whether the shape of the utility function

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<sup>4</sup>Our focus on aggregate income risk stems from climate change that increases income risks for rural households, by increasing, for example, rainfall variance and temperature fluctuations (Pachauri and Reisinger, 2008).

<sup>5</sup>We refer to it as the state dependence since it is describing the dependence of the household's utility function on the possible child's human capital states, high or low.

depends on the child’s human capital stock level, making the sign of this dependence, if any, an ambiguous issue.

The setting of our empirical testing is rural areas in China, where labor migration has increased dramatically fast since the mid-1990s. Between 2000 and 2020, the size of the “floating” population has increased by 274 million people, to reach a total of 376 million people in 2020 (Cheng and Duan, 2021). As the *hukou* system in China, which relates each citizen to her place of birth, entitles differential access to welfare benefits between local and non-local residents, as well as between urban and rural residents, migrants tend to leave (part of) their family behind in their place of origin, resulting in an estimated 69 million “left-behind” children in 2015 (UNICEF, 2018). We use a cross-sectional household survey for the year 2008 that we combine with county rainfall data to construct the aggregate measure of the agricultural income risk. Furthermore, in order to account for the non-randomness and the selectivity of migration, we employ an empirical framework based on a switching regression model with endogenous switching that was first adopted by Nakosteen and Zimmer (1980) in the context of migration.

The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it contributes to the literature on the determinants of migration by exploring the effectiveness of migration as a risk coping strategy in the absence of informal risk-sharing arrangements. We particularly investigate the role of income differentials in determining the migration decision under risk. This exercise explicitly demonstrates that a negative expected urban-to-rural income difference, in the case of an aggregate income risk, decreases the probability of migration as a risk coping strategy, compared to a situation where the expected income differential is positive. We also show that this effect diminishes with higher levels of income differential. This result is policy-relevant. Households with a negative income differential may resort to other unwanted strategies to mitigate the risk. Particularly, it has been shown that, in the absence of migration opportunities, households may store unproductive forms of wealth as a precaution against risk. In the case of Chinese rural households, this precautionary wealth may go up to 15% of their savings (Giles and Yoo, 2007). This self-insurance mechanism may decrease the household welfare as it limits the available resources for consumption and investment in health and education, or for any other agricultural investment. Such strategy may even reinforce poverty traps for the poorer households. It can also lead to larger problems when precautionary wealth is kept away from formal financial institutions, such as negative effects for intermediation and macroeconomic growth (Giles and Yoo, 2007). It is therefore important to consider the role of income differentials in determining the ability of households to use migration to adapt to aggregate risks, and to design policies that can effectively reduce their vulnerability to these risks.

Second, this paper also fits into the theoretical body of literature on children’s human capital investment. In the context that we consider in this paper, we find evidence that the marginal utility of the household income increases as the child’s human capital deteriorates. The best specification of the utility function to consider for these households

is, therefore, the non-separability between the households' earnings and their children's human capital. More precisely, the household's preferences would be best captured when considering the monetary equivalent of the child's human capital status instead of its measured value. Moreover, this result suggests that, in the case of an agricultural income risk, each additional monetary unit is more desirable when children have lower school test scores. In a migration context, we can therefore expect that if the income differential is positive and the household is faced with an income risk, parents with children who are poorly performing at school may be more likely to migrate, compared to parents with better performing children.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the theoretical model underlying the analysis. Section 3 outlines the empirical model and our strategy for testing the different effects, and Section 4 describes our data. Section 5 provides the main results of the empirical analysis with robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.

## 2 Theoretical model

We consider a rural household with at least one child. The household's main activity is farming his own land, and when faced with a yield risk, the household is offered the option to send a parent for migration. Indeed, under the assumption of absent, incomplete or inaccessible credit and insurance markets, migration can be used as a self-insurance mechanism, as it reduces the consequences of the occurrence of the income risk.<sup>6</sup>

The literature on investment in children's human capital shows that parental preferences depend, in addition to their own consumption, on the well-being of their children (e.g. Becker et al., 2018). This interest in children's human capital can be driven simply by an altruistic concern for the future well-being of the offspring (inter-generational altruism), a desire to preserve or to improve a family's social status, or as a way to secure support at older age (Behrman et al., 1995). As migration may be related to the two main types of investment in children, time and monetary, we introduce the child's human capital into the household's utility function, and assume that the household cares about both his income and his child's human capital. The household preferences are, therefore, modeled by a bivariate utility function,  $u(y, z)$ , where  $y$  is the household's income from farm production and other off-farm activities, and  $z$  is the household's child human capital.

We consider the following standard assumptions:

**Assumption 1** (i)  $u$  is twice differentiable,<sup>7</sup> (ii) The marginal utilities with respect to each argument are strictly positive ( $u^{(1,0)} > 0$  and  $u^{(0,1)} > 0$ ), (iii) The utility function  $u$  is strictly concave in each argument ( $u^{(2,0)} < 0$ ,  $u^{(0,2)} < 0$  and  $u^{(2,0)}u^{(0,2)} - (u^{(1,1)})^2 > 0$ ).

<sup>6</sup>Ehrlich and Becker (1972) showed that the insurance market and self-insurance are substitutes.

<sup>7</sup>The partial and the cross-derivatives  $u^{(k_1, k_2)}$  of a utility function  $u$  with two arguments  $x_1$  and  $x_2$  are given by the following expression:  $\frac{\partial^{k_1+k_2} u(x_1, x_2)}{\partial x_1^{k_1} \partial x_2^{k_2}}$ ,  $\forall k_1 = 0, 1, 2, \forall k_2 = 0, 1, 2$ .

Assumption 1(*iii*) implies both a preference for “smoothing” and aversion towards an income risk and a child human capital risk. However, we do not impose any restriction on how the shape of the household’s utility function with respect to income changes with the child’s human capital level, i.e. the sign of the cross-second derivative of  $u$ . In fact, without empirical grounding, it is difficult to choose which of the three possible cases:  $u^{(1,1)} < 0$ ,  $u^{(1,1)} = 0$  and  $u^{(1,1)} > 0$ , better describes the household’s preferences.<sup>8</sup>

On the one hand, the household’s marginal utility of income could increase as the child’s human capital deteriorates ( $u^{(1,1)} < 0$ ). As illustrated in Panel A of Figure 1, in this situation, the drop in utility, following a child’s human capital shock, is smaller at higher levels of income. Hence, the difference in utility, between a situation with high and a situation with low child human capital levels, reduces with income. In this case, a higher level of the child’s human capital (wealth) reduces the detrimental effect of a reduction in wealth (the child’s human capital). In other words, income and the child’s human capital might behave as substitutes in the household’s utility function.<sup>9</sup> Indeed, if for example, preparing for retirement becomes more costly due to the reduced expected financial support from the child (with a lower human capital), a household with a low child’s human capital might feel that money is more useful at the margin because it can be used as a substitute for higher child’s human capital in order to prepare for retirement. Equivalently, a household with a low level of income might feel that each additional unit of the child’s human capital is more enjoyable because it may increase the household’s life satisfaction as he expects a higher inter-generational mobility.

On the other hand, decreasing the child’s human capital could decrease the marginal utility of income for the household ( $u^{(1,1)} > 0$ ). Panel B of Figure 1 shows that, in this situation, a deterioration in the child’s human capital causes a larger decline in utility for households with higher income than for those with lower income. Therefore, this case can be described as an increasing difference in the utility between the two child’s human capital states, when income increases. Such a household might decide that a low child’s human capital makes money less valuable, because there is high complementarity between income and the child’s human capital status. For instance, many leisure activities consumed as a household —such as traveling— are complements to good health of the child.

Last, it is also standard practice in theoretical models of parental investment in children to assume that the shape of the utility function does not vary with the child’s human

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
<sup>8</sup>The sign of this cross-derivative may also be referred to as the income-child human capital correlation attitude of the household, following the previous literature. The concept of correlation attitude was first introduced by Richard (1975), and further examined by Epstein and Tanny (1980) in a setting where the utility functions’ arguments consist of consumption levels in two consecutive periods. Later theoretical economic decision studies have mainly considered correlation attitudes of decision-makers defined over their consumption and their health status, when studying various questions including savings, health and portfolio decisions (Bleichrodt et al., 2003; Eeckhoudt et al., 2007; Crainich et al., 2017; Liu and Menegatti, 2019).

<sup>9</sup>Note that the preference for a higher wealth is not driven by any motive to finance improvements in the child’s human capital. Rather, it is motivated by a preference to hold a substitute that compensates for a possibly deteriorating child’s human capital.




Figure 1 – State-dependent household’s utility functions

(a) Panel A: marginal utility increases with a decrease in the child’s human capital (CHC)



(b) Panel B: marginal utility decreases with a decrease in the child’s human capital (CHC)



capital ( $u^{(1,1)} = 0$ ) (Becker et al., 2018).<sup>10</sup> This assumption has also been adopted in a number of theoretical models studying migration decision (Dustmann, 2003; Myerson, 2017). Under this hypothesis, the household's marginal utility of income does not change following changes in the child's stock of human capital.

We assume that the household is exposed to an agricultural risk in the form of a crop failure with probability  $p$  ( $0 < p < 1$ ). This risk induces two types of loss, a monetary one ( $D_y$ , with  $D_y > 0$ ) and a non-monetary one on the child's human capital ( $D_z$ , with  $D_z > 0$ ). Facing an agricultural risk, the household would opt for farming and investment decisions that are the least sensitive to the risk, and therefore less profitable, making the household income lower (Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1992).<sup>11</sup> Regarding the non-monetary loss, the negative effect on the child's human capital is twofold. First, out of fear of having an even lower income if the risk is realized, households may reduce their expenditure on education or their consumption of nutritious food, health care and leisure. Second, financial difficulties may induce an economic pressure for the household members, causing a state of emotional distress and potential conflicts that could negatively affect the parent-child relationship, and therefore the child's human capital (Conger et al., 1999).

The household's utility is thus given by

$$U_0 = pu(y_0 - D_y, z_0 - D_z) + (1 - p)u(y_0, z_0). \quad (1)$$

If the household decides to send a parent for migration, two effects will be at play, for both the household income and the child's human capital. First, the loss of the household's labor force to migration decreases his cropping income. We denote this decrease by  $\delta_y$  (with  $\delta_y > 0$ ). However, the money sent back by the migrant parent helps alleviating the previous negative effect, directly by increasing per capita income and indirectly by stimulating crop production (Lucas, 1987; Rozelle et al., 1999). We denote this effect by  $\Delta_y$  (with  $\Delta_y > 0$ ).

Second, the inflow of remittances from the migrant parent may allow children left behind to have access to better nutritious food and better health care as well as to support their education. Remittances may also be used in a way that decreases the need for children engagement in household activities, initially induced by the absence of the migrating parent. These effects are aggregated into  $\Delta_z$  (with  $\Delta_z > 0$ ). However, the loss of parental time and family disruption may also mean less attention, supervision and care, and less study and leisure hours for the child left behind, inducing an adverse effect

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<sup>10</sup>This assumption is not explicitly expressed, but instead it is assumed that the parental utility function is additively separable, which is consistent with this assumption. See Appendix A.1 for details about the relationship between the sign of  $u^{(1,1)}$  and the functional form of utility function  $u$ .

<sup>11</sup>In an economy where insurance and credit markets are imperfect, absent, or inaccessible, the household may rely on various informal coping strategies to alleviate the effects of financial uncertainty (Townsend, 1994; Udry, 1994). While these mechanisms may be effective against idiosyncratic shocks, they are unlikely to provide much insurance when faced with an aggregate income risk because of high spatial correlation (Fafchamps, 1992; Udry, 1994). Other geographical areas that are not affected by the risk may provide little or no help due to enforcement problems and information asymmetries (Morduch, 2005). Such strategies are, therefore, unable to prevent a decrease in the household income.

on the different child outcomes.<sup>12</sup> We denote this negative effect by  $\delta_z$  (with  $\delta_z > 0$ ). Furthermore, we make the following assumptions:

**Assumption 2** *The amount of remittances is “state-dependent”:*  $\Delta_y = \Delta_y^{1-p}$  in the good state of nature (no damage) and  $\Delta_y = \Delta_y^p$  in the bad state of nature (damage state), with  $\Delta_y^p > \Delta_y^{1-p}$ .

This assumption, which is in accordance with the NELM theory, means that the amount of remittances is higher in the bad state of nature: under the altruistic motive for remittances, migrants send more money to their families with riskier incomes (Roberts and Morris, 2003).

**Assumption 3** *The benefits to the child’s human capital from remittances are “state-dependent”:*  $\Delta_z = \Delta_z^{1-p}$  in the good state of nature and  $\Delta_z = \Delta_z^p$  in the bad state of nature, with  $\Delta_z^p > \Delta_z^{1-p}$ .

As more remittances are sent in the bad state of nature, it is expected that they induce a higher beneficial effect on the child’s human capital. Evidence shows that increases in income have positive effects on children’s outcomes (Mayer, 2002).

**Assumption 4** *In the good state of nature, the migrant parent’s absence is totally compensated by the remittances sent back home i.e.  $\Delta_y^{1-p} = \delta_y$  and  $\Delta_z^{1-p} = \delta_z$ .*

Empirical studies provide evidence for the positive net effect of migration and remittances on the household income (Taylor and Lopez-Feldman, 2010) and on the child’s human capital (Macours and Vakis, 2010; Azzarri and Zezza, 2011). However, for simplicity and as we are only interested in the case with agricultural income risk, we assume that, in case of no risk, benefits directly and indirectly related to remittances are equal to the losses underwent by the child due to the absence of the migrant parent.

It follows that the household’s utility in case of migration is given by

$$U_1 = pu(y_0 - D_y + \hat{\Delta}_y, z_0 - D_z + \hat{\Delta}_z) + (1 - p)u(y_0, z_0) \quad (2)$$

where  $\hat{\Delta}_y = \Delta_y^p - \delta_y$  (with  $\hat{\Delta}_y > 0$  by assumptions 1 and 3) and  $\hat{\Delta}_z = \Delta_z^p - \delta_z$  (with  $\hat{\Delta}_z > 0$  by assumptions 3 and 4).

Migration occurs if and only if  $U_1 - U_0 \geq \alpha$  where  $\alpha$  is the psychological cost of migration.<sup>13</sup> In order to simplify notations, we pose  $Y_0 = y_0 - D_y$  and  $Z_0 = z_0 - D_z$ . Therefore, migration will rationally occur whenever

$$\Delta U = u(Y_0 + \hat{\Delta}_y, Z_0 + \hat{\Delta}_z) - u(Y_0, Z_0) \geq \hat{\alpha} \quad (3)$$

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<sup>12</sup>See Antman (2013) and Askarov and Doucouliagos (2020) for a review.

<sup>13</sup>We call it a psychological cost because it is measured in expected utility terms.

where  $\hat{\alpha} = \frac{\alpha}{p}$  is the adjusted cost of migration. Following Rey and Rochet (2004), we assume that  $\hat{\alpha}$  can be decomposed as follows:  $\hat{\alpha} = \alpha(X) + \epsilon$ , where  $X$  is a vector of variables that affect the migration cost and  $\epsilon$  is a random variable such that  $\epsilon \sim N(0, 1)$  and of cumulative distribution function  $F$ . Using a Taylor expansion of order 2 to approximate the utility function around  $(Y_0, Z_0)$ , the probability of migration,  $q (= p(\Delta U \geq \hat{\alpha}))$ , can thus be approximated as:<sup>14</sup>

$$q \sim F[\beta_1 \hat{\Delta}_y + \beta_2 \hat{\Delta}_y^2 + \beta_3 \hat{\Delta}_z + \beta_4 \hat{\Delta}_z^2 + \beta_5 \hat{\Delta}_y \hat{\Delta}_z - \alpha(X)] \quad (4)$$

where  $\beta_1 = u^{(1,0)}$ ,  $\beta_2 = \frac{1}{2}u^{(2,0)}$ ,  $\beta_3 = u^{(0,1)}$ ,  $\beta_4 = \frac{1}{2}u^{(0,2)}$ ,  $\beta_5 = u^{(1,1)}$ , and  $\alpha(X)$  is a function of variables related to the pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of migration.  $\hat{\Delta}_y$  and  $\hat{\Delta}_z$  are respectively the income differential, defined as the difference in income between a situation where the household has a migrant in the urban labor market ( $Y_0 + \hat{\Delta}_y$ ) and a situation where all household members stay in the rural labor market ( $Y_0$ ), and the child's human capital differential, defined as the difference in the child's human capital from having a migrant parent ( $Z_0 + \hat{\Delta}_z$ ) versus not having one ( $Z_0$ ).

Eq. (4) shows that in the presence of agricultural income risk ( $p$ ), both income differential  $\hat{\Delta}_y$  and the child's human capital differential  $\hat{\Delta}_z$  affect the migration decision of the household. Given the assumption of non-satiation of the household (Assumption 1(ii)),  $\beta_1$  should be positive: in the case of an agricultural income risk, decreasing the household income differential should decrease the probability of the parent's migration. Similarly,  $\beta_3$  should be positive: in the case of an agricultural income risk, decreasing the child's human capital differential should decrease the probability to send a parent for migration. Moreover, given Assumption 1(iii),  $\beta_2$  should be negative: an inverse U-shaped relationship should exist between the household income differential and the probability to send a parent for migration, in the case of an agricultural income risk. Similarly,  $\beta_4$  should be negative: an inverse U-shaped relationship should exist between the child's human capital differential and the probability to send a parent for migration, in the case of an agricultural income risk. Finally, the sign of  $\beta_5$  reflects how the marginal utility of the household's income changes with respect to the household's child human capital, in the case of an agricultural income risk. Given the scarcity of theoretical and empirical works on this measure, the determination of its sign remains a pure empirical question.

### 3 Empirical model and econometric strategy

#### 3.1 Empirical model

In order to investigate the decision to migrate, given by Eq. (4), we consider the continuous latent variable  $Mig_i^*$ , such that if  $Mig_i^* > 0$ , household  $i$  would send a parent for migration. We get the following empirical model:

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<sup>14</sup>See details in Appendix A.2.

$$\begin{aligned}
Mig_i^* = & \beta_1(y_{1i} - y_{0i}) + \beta_2(y_{1i} - y_{0i})^2 + \beta_3(z_{1i} - z_{0i}) + \beta_4(z_{1i} - z_{0i})^2 \\
& + \beta_5(y_{1i} - y_{0i})(z_{1i} - z_{0i}) + \beta_6 H_i + u_i
\end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

We define  $Mig_i$  as a binary variable such that  $Mig_i = 1$  if  $Mig_i^* > 0$  and  $Mig_i = 0$  otherwise.  $(y_{1i} - y_{0i})$  and  $(z_{1i} - z_{0i})$  are the differences in the household income and in the child's human capital, from having a migrant parent *versus* not having one in the case of an income risk, for each household  $i$ , respectively. The migration costs are related to a set of observable household human capital and demographic characteristics,  $H_i$ , found to be important in the empirical literature and unobservable factors included in the equation's error term,  $u_i$ .

Our primary objective is to estimate the structural migration equation (5). However, we cannot observe direct measures of the household income and of the child's human capital for migrant households, had they not had a migrant parent, and for non-migrant households, had they had a migrant parent. To overcome this issue, we introduce into Eq. (5) fitted values of the household income and of the child's human capital variables, resulting from an OLS estimation of the household income and the child's human capital equations defined below.

Suppose that  $y_{mivc}$  is the log of the total household income for household  $i$  living in village  $v$  in county  $c$ , with a non-migrant parent for  $m = 0$  or a migrant parent for  $m = 1$ , such that:

$$y_{mivc} = \gamma_m J_{mi} + \theta_m \sigma_c + \phi_m S_v + \epsilon_{mivc} \tag{6}$$

where  $J_{mi}$  is a vector of household productive assets, including demographic, human capital and physical capital characteristics, and access to financial services. Demographic variables expected to affect the household income include the household size, the ratio of workers to the household size and whether the household is male headed. To control for differences in human capital attributes across households, a measure for the level of schooling is included. Physical capital characteristics include land size, the part of land that is irrigated and the logarithm of the household house value as a measure of wealth. To net for provision of risk-coping instruments, we further include indicators for whether the household has access to formal (financial organizations) and informal (private lenders) credit, as measures of the household access to financial services.  $\sigma_c$  is the aggregate county-level measure of income risk, measured by the coefficient of variation of rainfall, for each household living in county  $c$  (defined in Section 4). Following previous literature on the determinants of income for rural Chinese households (Taylor et al., 2003; Du et al., 2005), we further control for location characteristics,  $S_v$  at the village level  $v$ , which allows to account for the differences in economic conditions across villages. These include variables describing agricultural infrastructure and services provided by the village: indicators for whether the village has a unified irrigation system, mechanical farming services, a unified prevention and control of pests and diseases system, and whether it has a service of unified purchase of production materials. Finally, indicators of whether the village is located in

east, center or west of China are further included.

Similarly, suppose that  $z_{mivc}$  is the outcome of household  $i$ 's child living in village  $v$  in county  $c$ , with a non-migrant parent for  $m = 0$  or a migrant parent for  $m = 1$ , such that:

$$z_{mivc} = \alpha_m K_{mi} + \tau_m \sigma_c + \psi_m S_v + \kappa_p + \eta_{mivc} \quad (7)$$

where  $K_{mi}$  is a vector, for each household  $i$ , of the child's individual characteristics, parents' educational attainment, and other household characteristics. Individual characteristics include the age, gender and an indicator for being the eldest among siblings. According to the literature, in rural China, oldest children usually bear more responsibilities in the household, especially for girls (Hu, 2012). Also, following other studies investigating the determinants of educational outcomes of rural children in China (e.g. Brown and Park, 2002), we control for the number of siblings to capture competition for resources. To control for differing household characteristics, the number of male and female adults and an indicator for the presence of an elderly in the household are included. These variables account for the presence of caregivers for the children during the parent's migration. Also, together with the land size variable, they control for the labor demand for household and farming activities. We also include the logarithm of the household house value as a measure of wealth.<sup>15</sup>  $\sigma_c$  is the aggregate measure of income risk, for each household living in county  $c$ . Following Meng and Yamauchi (2017), we also control for village-level characteristics ( $S_v$  including an indicator for whether the village has a primary school), and province fixed effects ( $\kappa_p$ ). The definition of all the variables used in the estimations is provided in Table 5, Appendix C.

### 3.2 Econometric strategy

Equations (5)-(7) constitute the basic structural form of our model. The main issue with the above procedure is that estimating the household income and the child's human capital equations using OLS yields biased results because households are not randomly assigned to migration status, and therefore, the income and the child's human capital observed for each category of migrants are truncated non-random samples. To address this, we take a three-step estimation procedure, which includes a switching regression model with endogenous switching and a structural decision equation (Nakosteen and Zimmer, 1980). We first correct for truncation and selection bias by adopting the Heckman and Lee two-step procedure and we produce the correct fitted values of the household income and of the child's human capital variables.<sup>16</sup> We then estimate Eq. (5) by maximum likelihood

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<sup>15</sup>We do not include the household per capita income or the remittance variables here. We cannot construct a counterfactual of remittances for stayers, had they migrated, and we worry that the household income and the child's human capital are jointly determined by some household characteristics that we do not observe. To overcome such problems and capture the income effect, we introduce the logarithm of the household house value.

<sup>16</sup>Note that in what follows, we may refer to the income and the child's human capital equations as the outcome equations.

probit techniques.

A reduced form of the migration equation is obtained by substituting the household income and the child's human capital equations into Eq. (5). The procedure suggests to correct the income and the child's human capital equations by introducing the appropriate selectivity variables,  $\hat{\lambda}_m$  (with  $m = 0, 1$ ), and jointly normal zero mean error terms,  $\zeta_j$  (with  $j = 1, 2, 3, 4$ ), as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
y_{0i} &= \gamma_0 J_{0i} + \gamma'_0 \hat{\lambda}_{0i} + \theta_0 \sigma_c + \phi_0 S_v + \zeta_{1i}, \\
y_{1i} &= \gamma_1 J_{1i} + \gamma'_1 \hat{\lambda}_{1i} + \theta_1 \sigma_c + \phi_1 S_v + \zeta_{2i}, \\
z_{0i} &= \alpha_0 K_{0i} + \alpha'_0 \hat{\lambda}_{0i} + \tau_0 \sigma_c + \psi_0 S_v + \kappa_p + \zeta_{3i}, \\
z_{1i} &= \alpha_1 K_{1i} + \alpha'_1 \hat{\lambda}_{1i} + \tau_1 \sigma_c + \psi_1 S_v + \kappa_p + \zeta_{4i}.
\end{aligned} \tag{8}$$

Estimating these equations using OLS produces consistent results (Heckman, 1976).  $\gamma'_0$  ( $\alpha'_0$ ) and  $\gamma'_1$  ( $\alpha'_1$ ) are the covariances between the reduced form of the migration equation's error term and  $\epsilon_{0ivc}$  ( $\eta_{0ivc}$ ) and between the reduced form of the migration equation's error and  $\epsilon_{1ivc}$  ( $\eta_{1ivc}$ ), respectively. These covariances support the presence of truncation and non-random sampling if they are statistically different from zero. Their signs also allow to get relevant information about the earnings and the children's test scores of migrating and non-migrating households. They determine whether the households' unobserved characteristics are positively or negatively correlated with the income levels and the children's test scores. For example, a statistically significant and negative estimate for  $\gamma'_1$  implies that a negative selection may have occurred. This means that households that get below-average incomes when they have a migrant parent have an above-average propensity to send a parent for migration. In other words, this indicates that households with a migrant earn less with the migrating parent than households without a migrant could have earned had they had a migrant parent. Similarly, a negative and significant estimate for  $\alpha'_1$  suggests that households that get below-average test scores of children when they have a migrant parent have an above-average propensity to send a parent for migration. In other words, children's test scores from a household with a migrant parent are worse than what the scores for similar children without a migrant parent would have been had they had a migrant parent. As error terms of households residing in the same county may be correlated, we cluster standard errors at the county level. We also compute them using a bootstrap procedure that accounts for the variation resulting from the estimated Inverse Mills Ratios  $\hat{\lambda}_m$  ( $m = 0, 1$ ) (IMR). Finally, we can form consistent predictors for  $y_{0i}$ ,  $y_{1i}$ ,  $z_{0i}$  and  $z_{1i}$  and introduce them in the structural migration equation (5). The resulting estimates of the  $\beta$ 's should be consistent, while coefficient standard errors are bootstrapped to account for the use of the generated income and child's human capital differentials.

### 3.3 Identification

The household income and the child’s human capital equations on the one hand, and the migration equation on the other hand, have a large set of variables in common. Even though we can assume that our model is technically identified through the non-linearity of the IMR, there is still a risk that the income and the child’s human capital equations would yield fragile results if insufficient non-linearity occurs (Puhani, 2000). To avoid a collinearity problem in the second stage of the estimation, it is recommended to have at least one observed variable that affects why households may choose to participate in migration but does not have any influence on our outcome equations.

Two variables are used to satisfy the exclusion restriction. The first variable measures the past village-level migration network, through the proportion of migrant individuals from the same village in 2005.<sup>17</sup> Historical migration networks have been used by a number of papers as an instrument for the migration variable, to investigate the effects of migration on the household income (Taylor et al., 2003) as well as on the child outcomes (Meyerhoefer and Chen, 2011). These papers argue that previous migrants from the same village form a network in the destination areas, which helps reducing the migration costs and risks, and provides more information, contacts and support for households back home, thus facilitating their migration, without having any direct effects on the household’s income or on children’s outcomes. The second variable is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the village organized and helps village residents to find jobs outside the village in 2008, and 0 otherwise. Its rationale is similar to having a historical network of migrants that facilitates migration and lowers its costs. Therefore, we expect that these two variables have a positive effect on the household decision to send a migrant in the first step of the Heckman and Lee procedure, but are not significantly correlated to the error terms of the outcome equations in the second step. Still, these two variables may also reflect unobserved factors of the local economy, and therefore, may be correlated with the current levels of the community development in each village. Thus, they could affect the current household income or children’s outcomes. To limit this issue, we control for some public facilities at the village level that may indirectly be related to our outcome variables.

## 4 Data description

We use the 2009 Rural Household Survey (RHS) from the Rural Urban Migration in China (RUMiC) project (henceforth RUMiC-RHS), conducted between March and June of 2009 to collect information from 2008.<sup>18</sup> The RUMiC-RHS inspected the situation of 8,000

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<sup>17</sup>Unfortunately, we do not have information about the village population in 2005, so we use that of 2007 to compute the ratio of migrant individuals in each village (assuming that the village population did not vary much in 2 years).

<sup>18</sup>The RUMiC project, which started in 2008, includes yearly surveys on rural, urban, and migrant households. We use the second wave of the RUMiC-RHS since some variables that are important for



rural households from 800 villages in 82 counties and nine provinces: Hebei, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Guangdong from eastern China; Anhui, Henan, and Hubei from central China; Chongqing and Sichuan from western China. A wide range of individual and household level variables is covered by this survey, including not only the demographic, social and economic information, but also records of the migration history, household income and children human capital variables, particularly important for our empirical testing. A detailed village survey is also carried out along the household survey.

Following China National Bureau of Statistics' definition, we consider as a migrant worker, any person who lived at least six months outside the local countryside in 2008, for work or business purposes.<sup>19</sup> Both within and outside the county of origin movements are considered. Regarding household income, the total net income includes wages from local off-farm activities, net income from family agricultural and non-agricultural activities, net property income and net transfer income (including remittances). Parents or guardians were also asked to report their children's Chinese and mathematics scores from the final exams of the last school term.<sup>20</sup> We use these scores as measures of the child's human capital and we compute, for each household, either the mean of all children's test scores, or, in two alternative specifications, the test score of the oldest or the youngest child, in each household. Following Meng and Yamauchi (2017), we use normalized test scores, defined as the actual test score divided by the full score applied in the child's school and multiplied by 100. Meng and Yamauchi (2017) argue that there are no differences in the textbooks used in schools of the same province or prefecture. Therefore, we follow them and introduce province fixed effects when studying the determinants of children's test scores in order to account for possible inconsistencies across schools from different provinces.<sup>21</sup> We measure agricultural income risk through county-level rainfall variation and use the ratio of the standard deviation and the mean of rainfall during the months of March to October, computed over 52 years of monthly rainfall data (January 1960 - December 2012) for different weather stations across China.<sup>22</sup> We collected the data from

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our analysis were only collected from this wave. These variables include the children's school test scores and land size. Furthermore, in order to avoid a simultaneity bias and to account for the fact that the migration decision was made in the preceding year, we include the lags of most of our variables from the previous year's survey.

<sup>19</sup>The 2008 financial crisis deeply impacted the Chinese urban labor market, thus raising the concern that the migration decision and the return rate of migrants might have also been affected. Yet, the actual onset of the negative consequences of the crisis started at the end of 2008, so that we can confidently expect that any negative effect should be on those who decided to migrate at the end of 2008 or on the migration duration of those who migrated before the crisis, resulting in them to be counted as non-migrant in our framework. Moreover, we do not expect the economic crisis to have strong effects on the migration decision in our survey because we are not interested in the potential migrants deciding their migration by the end of 2008. Recall that we define as migrant any person with a migration duration of at least 6 months in that year.

<sup>20</sup>In China, schools usually send report cards to parents and require that they are returned with the parents' signatures (Zhao, 2015; Meng and Yamauchi, 2017). This suggests that parents or guardians who report this information are very likely to be aware of their child's school results.

<sup>21</sup>Exams from schools of different counties within a province may still present some differences, which cannot be controlled for here.

<sup>22</sup>The variability of rainfall distribution has been captured by either the variance (Giles and Yoo, 2007), the standard deviation (Paxson, 1992) or the rainfall coefficient of variation (Rose, 2001). It is better

the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) Global Summary Of the Month (GSOM) precipitation data, which contains monthly summaries computed from stations in the Global Historical Climatology Network (GHCN)-Daily dataset.<sup>23</sup> About 94% of the data is originally collected at China’s National Meteorological Information Center and has received thorough quality checks. In addition to monthly precipitation records, the latitude and longitude of each station’s location is included in the data. We rely on this location information to match each county represented in the RUMiC-RHS survey to the nearest weather station.<sup>24</sup> The rainfall data we use exhibit variability across counties as well as within counties over the years.

We make a number of restrictions on the initial sample in order to conduct our empirical analysis, with a focus on agricultural households with children. First, we restrict the sample to rural households with a farming activity and we drop households with no agricultural land and/or no member working in agriculture in 2008. We also exclude households that do not have any member in the labor force<sup>25</sup> and those that do not have at least a child aged between 6 and 15 or a child aged between 16 and 22 and at school. We further drop households with within-county migrants who worked in the agricultural sector, resulting in a sample of 3,711 households. Dropping households with missing values for their total net income and those whose migrants do not send remittances leads to a sample of 3,464 households. In addition, we exclude households whose children have missing information about their test scores and whose children dropped out of school in 2008, which reduces the sample to 2,884 households.<sup>26</sup> Keeping households where one or both parents migrate further restricts the sample to 2,507 households, while keeping households where only one parent migrates reduces the final sample to 2,268 households.

Table 6 Panel (a) in Appendix D checks whether the final sample of 2,268 households, where only one parent can be a migrant, is random. To do so, we focus on the 3,711 households that can potentially be covered in our analysis and compare those who are included with those who are not in the final sample. Results of estimating a dummy variable indicating whether the household is covered in our sample on a vector of household-level variables, controlling for provincial fixed effects, suggest few significant differences. First,

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to rely on the coefficient of variation as a measure of the riskiness of the environment since, unlike the variance and the standard deviation, this measure is not sensitive to scaling (Rose, 2001). See Appendix B for details about the choice of the period of March to October.

<sup>23</sup>This dataset is more complete and up-to-date than the GHCN-Monthly version 2 precipitation dataset. The data are available at <https://gis.ncdc.noaa.gov/maps/ncei/cdo/monthly>.

<sup>24</sup>The number of weather stations changed over time, so in some cases, we linked more than one station to the same county.

<sup>25</sup>We define members in the labor force as individuals aged between 16 and 65 (not retired) or more than 65 but still working, who do not have any physical disability that affects their work capabilities, and are not currently at school.

<sup>26</sup>According to the Compulsory Education Law in China, children must attend school for at least 9 years, starting typically at the age of six until the age of fifteen. For this reason, the reported rate of school drop-outs for those aged between 6 and 15 is very low. Considering the full sample of RUMiC-RHS (2009), among children that should have been in high school (aged between 15 and 18), around 35% reported working a full time job. Among children that should have been in college (aged between 19 and 22), 69% reported having job.

as expected, the number of migrants is lower in the sample we are using, since we focus on households with only one migrating parent. Similarly, even though the difference is very small, the income of the households included in our sample seems to be higher. We also find statistically significant differences in some of the regressors. Particularly, included households in the final sample seem to be smaller and have fewer members in the labor force. We control, in all estimations, for any differences that might arise from these observed characteristics (household size and labor ratio). In a further step, we also check whether the children used in our final sample are comparable to the children that can be potentially covered in our analysis. Table 6 Panel (b) shows that, while there is no statistically significant differences in the Chinese test scores between those included in our sample and those who are not, there exists a difference in the math test scores. However, this difference is very small in magnitude, and may be due to the above difference in income levels between the included households and those excluded. There also exists some statistically significant differences in the explanatory variables (of the test scores equations), but we control for these differences in our regressions.

As agriculture is the main activity for most households in rural China, when faced with a risk on the agricultural output, these households may consider different strategies to reduce this riskiness. Table 7 in Appendix D shows that those who send a parent for migration have a lower access to formal credit, compared to households without a migrant parent. This difficulty to secure loans may be explained by the fewer assets to offer as a collateral for credits. Indeed, the average value of their house is much lower than that of households without a migrant parent. The latter may also suggest that they hold a lower level of precautionary wealth in the form of liquidity or assets to be used when faced with an agricultural risk. This idea is further supported by information in Table 8. Households with a migrant parent have a much lower income from property or from local off-farm activities. Table 7 also shows that these households have a lower percentage of their land irrigated, which suggests a higher dependence on rainfall irrigation, and hence a higher exposure to the agricultural risk. Moreover, the fact that these households have a higher proportion of children aged between 0 and 15 may further motivate the use of migration to protect against the income risk. This is because the human capital development of younger children may be more vulnerable to the consequences of income risks. All the factors above motivate the use of migration by the households to hedge against an income risk.

Furthermore, Table 8 shows that migration allows to increase households' income with remittances. However, incomes from farming activities seem to be lower in migrant households compared to households with no migrants. This difference suggests that either these households are already poorer than the non-migrant households, or that migration is negatively influencing farming outcomes. The later hypothesis may be explained by the fact that, with migration, less labor will be allocated to farming activities. Given these opposing effects, when making a decision, households may have expected either higher or

lower household income with the migration of one of their members. Moreover, Table 9 also shows that children from households with a migrant parent have lower test scores. This suggests that migration is negatively associated with children’s education. However, given the possible positive effects from remittances on children’s education, when making a decision, households may have expected either higher or lower children’s test scores with the migration of the parent. However, it is not clear from the descriptive statistics how expected income differentials and child human capital differentials affect the migration decision in the presence of riskiness. In what follows, we try to empirically examine these questions.

## 5 Empirical results

### 5.1 Structural equation of migration

#### 5.1.1 Theoretical assumptions’ testing

Our baseline estimates of the structural form of the household decision to send a parent for migration, as presented by Eq. (5), are shown in Table 1. The table provides estimated coefficients and bootstrapped standard errors, using different specifications. In our benchmark specification, presented in columns (1) and (2), the mean of the predicted school test scores for all children of each household is used to build the child’s human capital differential variable. In columns (3) to (6), we use two alternative ways to deal with the child’s human capital variable, by considering the human capital of either the eldest (columns (3) and (4)) or the youngest (columns (5) and (6)) child among the household’s children, for each household.<sup>27</sup> We also use two separate measures of the child’s human capital variable. The first relies on math scores (columns (1), (3) and (5)) and the second on Chinese scores (columns (2), (4) and (6)).

Panel A, where only one parent is a migrant, confirms the predictions of the theoretical model. Of particular interest is the estimated coefficient on the expected income differential, which is positive and significant. This result shows that when households face an agricultural income risk and use migration as a coping strategy, the income differential remains a significant determinant of the migration decision. Particularly, a negative expected income differential decreases the probability to migrate for households that face an income risk. This is consistent with the preference of households to hold higher levels of wealth ( $u^{(1,0)} > 0$ ), hence they are more likely to send a parent for migration as a direct response to higher income differentials. However, the effect significantly decreases with

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<sup>27</sup>In our preferred sample where only one parent may be a migrant, around 70% of households have only one child aged between 6 and 22 (at school), 25% have two children and almost 5% have three or four children. For simplicity, in the different specifications where we use the mean of test scores of all children in the same household or the test score of the oldest or the youngest child in the household, we estimate equations (7) using all children in each household. We then compute the predicted values of test scores and the mean of each household’s children’s test scores, or we keep the test score of the oldest or the youngest child in each household, depending on the specification we are interested in.

Table 1 – Estimates of the structural model of migration

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	<i>Math</i>	<i>Chinese</i>	<i>Math</i>	<i>Chinese</i>	<i>Math</i>	<i>Chinese</i>
Panel A. Only one parent is a migrant						
<i>Expected changes</i>						
Income differential	1.976**	1.870***	1.776**	1.631**	2.201***	2.074***
	(0.805)	(0.681)	(0.788)	(0.692)	(0.804)	(0.653)
Income differential <sup>2</sup>	-3.733***	-4.689***	-3.731***	-4.608***	-3.697***	-4.657***
	(1.279)	(1.693)	(1.281)	(1.739)	(1.273)	(1.624)
Child human capital differential	0.124**	0.282***	0.128**	0.279***	0.127**	0.284***
	(0.053)	(0.037)	(0.050)	(0.038)	(0.053)	(0.034)
Child human capital differential <sup>2</sup>	-0.004	-0.013***	-0.003	-0.012***	-0.004	-0.013***
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Interaction	-0.084	-0.184*	-0.100	-0.214**	-0.063	-0.151
	(0.080)	(0.100)	(0.077)	(0.101)	(0.082)	(0.098)
Observations	1,767	1,767	1,767	1,767	1,767	1,767
Panel B. At least one parent is a migrant						
<i>Expected changes</i>						
Income differential	0.793	0.028	0.820	-0.047	0.912	0.152
	(0.697)	(0.495)	(0.689)	(0.502)	(0.678)	(0.476)
Income differential <sup>2</sup>	-2.092**	-2.753***	-2.055**	-2.802***	-2.242***	-2.640***
	(0.833)	(0.748)	(0.812)	(0.744)	(0.844)	(0.747)
Child human capital differential	-0.369***	0.017	-0.323***	0.024	-0.406***	0.011
	(0.060)	(0.037)	(0.057)	(0.037)	(0.059)	(0.036)
Child human capital differential <sup>2</sup>	-0.003	-0.018***	-0.000	-0.017***	-0.005	-0.018***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Interaction	-0.125	-0.146**	-0.116	-0.149**	-0.107	-0.136*
	(0.085)	(0.073)	(0.081)	(0.072)	(0.085)	(0.072)
Observations	1,951	1,951	1,951	1,951	1,951	1,951
Household Characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Network variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

*Notes:* The dependent variable is, in panel A, a dummy variable that equals 1 if only one parent is a migrant and 0 otherwise. In panel B, it equals 1 if one or the two parents are migrants. Columns (1), (3) and (5) use math test scores as the measure of child human capital, while Columns (2), (4) and (6) use Chinese test scores. In Columns (1) and (2), we use the average of test scores of children in the same household, while we use in Columns (3) and (4), the test score of the oldest child in the household, and in Columns (5) and (6), the test score of the youngest child in the household. The interaction variable refers to the interaction term between the income differential and the child human capital differential. All regressions control for household characteristics (irrigated land size, mean household age, mean age squared, mean schooling, gender ratio, labor ratio, household size, the number of preschool and schooled children) and network variables (share of village migrants from 2005 and indicator for whether the village helps in finding jobs at the destination). Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

higher levels of income differential, as indicated by the negative and significant coefficient for the square of income differential. This result suggests that households make their migration decision depending on the level of the income differential they are expecting. Focusing on the sample where only one parent is a migrant, the effect of income differentials starts decreasing when the expected income of the household with a migrant parent is around 1.3 their expected income when they do not have a migrant parent.<sup>28</sup> A higher expected income differential may be due to a higher level of remittances compared to the reduction in the household income due to the absence of the parent. If the purpose of the migration is to diversify income against risk, there may exist a threshold indicating the level of household income sufficient to protect against riskiness. Hence after such threshold, households may gain less from migration, and thus the increase in the probability of migration, following increases in the income differential, will be lower. This is also consistent with the “smoothing” preference of the household. The marginal utility of wealth decreases if the income differentials increase, i.e. each additional unit of income differential brings less satisfaction when the income differential is already high, compared to when it is initially low ( $u^{(2,0)} < 0$ ). Hence, the increase in the probability of migration will be lower at higher levels of income differentials. Similarly, coefficients on the child’s human capital differential and its square are statistically significant at conventional levels and of expected signs. Hence, households also care about the human capital of their children, which implies that economic incentives are not the only determinants of migration in China when households face an income risk.

Another key parameter is the interaction between the expected income differential and the expected child’s human capital differential. Table 1 shows suggestive evidence that it is negative. It is significant at the conventional levels only with Chinese score as a measure for the child’s human capital. In the context we consider in this paper, the negative sign provides evidence for a decrease in the marginal utility of income following an increase in the child’s human capital level ( $u^{(1,1)} < 0$ ). In other words, when faced with an income risk and when migration is used as a coping strategy, the household gets a higher satisfaction from each additional monetary unit he earns if the human capital of his children is lower. Furthermore, as explained in Appendix A.1, this result also allows to draw conclusions about which functional form of the household utility best describes the households’ income-child human capital trade-off choices. In this context, our negative estimate of  $u^{(1,1)}$  implies that the non-separability between the household’s earnings and the child’s human capital is to be considered. More precisely, the household’s preferences would be best captured when considering the monetary equivalent of the child’s human capital status instead of its measured value.

Panel B of Table 1 reports estimations for a sample where one or two parents may be migrants. Even though such a sample makes the expected income and child human capital

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<sup>28</sup>Given our definition of the income differential variable, we apply the exponential function to identify the turning point in the curve of the income differential variable. The reported turning points are computed using math test scores as a measure of the child human capital levels.

differentials less precisely fitted, we still see persistent statistically significant estimates for some variables. These estimates particularly confirm our findings on the nonlinearity of the income differential effects and on the interaction term of income differential and the child’s human capital differential. However, we see unexpected negative significant effects for the child human capital differentials.<sup>29</sup>

### 5.1.2 Other determinants of the migration decision

Table 10 in Appendix E displays the details of the structural migration estimation, using the sample where only one parent may be a migrant.<sup>30</sup> With regard to household-level controls, most covariates are significant and have the expected signs. First, in line with Giles and Mu (2007), we find that the probability to send a parent for migration decreases with the average education level of the household. This is not surprising as the majority of rural migrants in China occupy manual jobs that local residents are unwilling to take in the destination areas (Meng, 2012).<sup>31</sup> Hence, better educated rural households may rely on strategies other than migration to diversify their income (by getting better local job opportunities for instance). Second, we find a significantly negative effect of the household irrigated land size on the probability to send a parent for migration. This is not surprising, as irrigation may already constitute one of coping-strategies to hedge against climate variability, hence decreasing the need for migration. Third, our estimates show that for our sample of rural households with children and where only one parent migrates, older households are more likely to send a parent for migration and that the relationship is quadratic, which confirms findings from studies looking at the individual migration decision in China (Giles and Mu, 2007; Dustmann et al., 2020). As far as the household size and composition are concerned, our estimates suggest that larger households are less likely to send a parent for migration. This may suggest that, in the particular migration of parents, households with many members in the labor force may prioritize migration

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<sup>29</sup>In a further step, as the compulsory education covers only 9 years of primary and middle school education, we also re-estimate our main results in Panel A of Table 1 while restricting our sample to households with children aged between 6 and 15, in order to account for potential bias from the high level of drop outs after the age of 15. Results remain the same in terms of signs and significance, except for the child human capital variable which becomes negative. Results are omitted for simplicity, but available upon request.

<sup>30</sup>All household characteristics are that of 2007, the year preceding the migration year, except for the land size variable. Land size information were not reported in 2007, hence the use of the 2008 data for this variable. Considering the sample used in Table 10, only 9% of the households reported that their land has been adjusted in the last 5 years. Unfortunately, we cannot have more precise information about whether the changes happened between 2007 and 2008 or before 2007. This is important as the household land may decrease following the migration of one of his members. As a robustness check, re-estimating our models on a sample that drops households that had their land adjusted in the last 5 years, yields similar results (available from the authors upon request).

<sup>31</sup>Around 42% of migrants surveyed in the 2009 RUMiC-RHS work in the manufacturing industry while around 19% of them in the construction industry and around 11% in the services industry.

of members with no children.<sup>32,33</sup> However, we also find that the presence of children increases the probability of migration of a parent. This may be explained by the additional economic responsibilities, for parents, related to more children in the household. Moreover, children, particularly older ones, may be a source of labor both for domestic and farming activities, replacing in part the absence of the migrating parent (Chang et al., 2011), hence explaining the estimated positive coefficient. Finally, in line with other studies (e.g., Rozelle et al., 1999; Taylor et al., 2003; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007), we find that network variables, in terms of the share of migrants from the same village and the assistance of the village in finding work outside of the village, are positively associated with the migration probability.

## 5.2 The income and child's human capital equations

Although the income and the child's human capital equations are incidental in getting consistent estimates of the structural migration equation, they deserve to be presented. Table 2 and Table 3 show the estimates for these equations corrected for potential sample selection bias. Overall, the coefficients exhibit the expected signs.<sup>34</sup>

As assumed in the theoretical model, we find that an increase in the variance of weather conditions is statistically significantly associated with a lower income of agricultural households. Particularly, facing riskier distributions of rainfall is associated with a decrease in the overall income of households with no migrants in 2008 by more than 8%, while when the household has a migrant parent the associated reduction is only 6%. This may be explained by different reasons. The aggregate nature of the income risk may influence the households' strategies to cope with this risk. As explained by Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1992) and Rose (2001), to minimize risk, households may change their ex-ante crop production choices so that they are less sensitive to weather variability, preventing them from achieving their maximum output potential and hence making their yield less profitable. The results suggest that households facing riskier distributions of weather may be adopting more costly measures within production to reduce risk. They also support the assumption that rural households have very limited access to the different forms of insurance. However, the difference in the magnitude of the effect between migrant and non-migrant households is consistent with the NELM theory stating that migration is used as a means of risk diversification. Even though the income of migrant households decreases with the risk ( $\Delta_y^p - \delta_y - D_y < 0$ ), the magnitude of this decrease is smaller than that of non-migrant households ( $D_y > 0$ ). Migration allows, therefore, to reduce the inefficiency due to risk mitigation, either because households are more mo-

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<sup>32</sup>We find a positive correlation between the household size and the number of adult members, in a household, that are on the labor market.

<sup>33</sup>Giles and Mu (2007) also explains that a higher number of siblings of the prospective migrant may suggest a larger local network and hence a systematic access to local opportunities. This effect may be strong enough to demotivate migration, compared to the effect of a larger household size allowing to participate in the migrant labor market.

<sup>34</sup>All explanatory variables are that of 2008.



tivated to make more risky production decisions or because of the received remittances, but may not fully compensate for shortfalls in the profits. Similarly, we find that a higher degree of uncertainty in the distribution of rainfall induces a decrease in the children's math test scores, even though the estimates are not statistically significant. This result may be explained by different reasons. First, effects may be lagging, while our measures may not reflect the immediate consequences of changes in the resource allocations within the household. Test scores reflect the ability to learn and memorize, hence may capture longer-term educational skills, and less the short-term changes in education and health investments over the current year. Moreover, we find evidence suggesting that the marginal utility of child human capital increases when income is expected to decrease. This may imply that children's stock of human capital becomes more valuable with the income risk, hence demotivating any disinvestment in children.<sup>35</sup>

As far as other covariates are concerned, more educated households, larger households, households with comparatively larger labor force and wealthier households all have higher income. Access to formal credit through banks or credit unions significantly increases the household's income only for non-migrant households. Some services provided at the village level also significantly allow to achieve higher incomes, particularly when the village provides a unified drainage and irrigation system or a united production material purchasing service. The significant and positive coefficients on the regional dummies suggest that households living in eastern and central regions earn substantially higher incomes compared to those living in western regions.

Moreover, males with no migrant parent and wealthier children whose parents are migrants get lower scores. However, children with no siblings, compared to those with siblings, those with more educated parents and those with a migrant parent but with more female adults in the household have higher scores. Children with a higher number of male adults in the household, and whose parent is a migrant, score, on the other hand, lower on school tests. Children's age is negatively and statistically associated with the standardized test scores. This may be the result of the increasing difficulty of the curriculum with grades and with education level, or simply a reflection of different grading systems adopted by different school levels. This is because middle and high schools may set the full mark at 100 or more while in primary schools, the highest score is only 100. Hence, differentiating students' abilities through the tests is more emphasized at higher grades. To account for the fact that some children of different ages may be in the same grade, we re-estimated, in a further step, the different equations, for the case of one migrating parent, while controlling for the children's grade instead.<sup>36</sup> Overall, results lead to the same conclusions suggested in the previous section.<sup>37</sup>

Finally, the coefficients of the selection variables,  $\hat{\lambda}_0$  and  $\hat{\lambda}_1$ , do not enter significantly

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<sup>35</sup>Using the samples where one or the two parents are migrants and where any household member is a migrant, we find similar results for the risk variable.

<sup>36</sup>The reason why the grade variable is not used in the main analysis is the higher number of missing values compared to the age variable.

<sup>37</sup>Results are omitted for simplicity, but available upon request.

Table 2 – Estimates of the household income corrected for sample selection bias

	Household income	
	(1) Non-migrant households	(2) Migrant households
<i>Household characteristics</i>		
Mean schooling	0.056*** (0.010)	0.037** (0.015)
Male headed	0.144 (0.103)	-0.153 (0.099)
Household size	0.073*** (0.017)	0.104*** (0.025)
Labor ratio	0.005*** (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)
<i>Physical capital</i>		
Irrigated land	0.000 (0.008)	0.013 (0.010)
House value	0.088*** (0.019)	0.051** (0.025)
<i>Institutional assets</i>		
Access to formal credit	0.139*** (0.046)	-0.095 (0.065)
Access to informal credit	0.076 (0.058)	0.047 (0.120)
<i>Risk variables</i>		
Rainfall Coefficient of Variation (Mar-Oct)	-0.084** (0.034)	-0.061** (0.031)
<i>Selectivity variables</i>		
Inverse Mills ratio	-0.015 (0.193)	0.051 (0.164)
<i>Village characteristics</i>		
Unified irrigation system	0.128** (0.064)	0.043 (0.091)
Furrow machine	0.150 (0.107)	-0.004 (0.171)
Plant disease prevention and treatment	0.001 (0.086)	-0.043 (0.134)
United purchasing service	-0.036 (0.118)	0.323* (0.166)
East	0.368*** (0.091)	0.268** (0.136)
Center	0.227** (0.093)	0.159 (0.153)
Observations	1979	402

*Notes:* The sample where only one parent can be a migrant is used here. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the household total net income, for the sub-sample of households without a migrant parent in Column (1) and for the sub-sample of households with a migrant parent in Column (2). Bootstrapped standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the county level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table 3 – Estimates of the child human capital corrected for sample selection bias

	Math score		Chinese score	
	(1) Non-migrant households	(2) Migrant households	(3) Non-migrant households	(4) Migrant households
<i>Child characteristics</i>				
Age	-0.696*** (0.074)	-0.826*** (0.227)	-0.636*** (0.093)	-0.761*** (0.226)
Male	-0.675 (0.467)	0.323 (1.525)	-1.785*** (0.435)	-1.112 (1.167)
Eldest Child	0.741 (0.681)	-0.300 (1.634)	0.312 (0.637)	-0.945 (1.467)
No sibling	0.061 (0.726)	3.106 (2.212)	-0.355 (0.778)	1.185 (1.556)
<i>Parents characteristics</i>				
Parents' years of schooling	0.742*** (0.190)	1.523*** (0.402)	1.090*** (0.207)	1.922*** (0.525)
<i>Household characteristics</i>				
Number of female adults (>15)	0.428 (0.577)	1.733 (2.001)	-0.660 (0.831)	2.478* (1.376)
Number of male adults (>15)	0.287 (0.456)	-1.668 (1.868)	-0.365 (0.451)	-2.851** (1.444)
Eldery (>60)	0.077 (0.678)	0.994 (1.580)	1.028 (0.689)	1.453 (1.278)
House value	0.387 (0.356)	-0.704 (0.566)	0.199 (0.320)	-1.040** (0.528)
<i>Risk variables</i>				
Rainfall Coefficient of Variation (Mar-Oct)	-0.504 (0.760)	-0.426 (1.195)	-0.540 (0.742)	-0.124 (1.089)
<i>Village characteristics</i>				
Primary school in the village	0.127 (0.926)	-0.133 (2.293)	-0.545 (0.799)	-1.141 (2.150)
<i>Selectivity variables</i>				
Inverse Mills ratio	3.131 (3.565)	5.000 (4.018)	0.513 (3.387)	4.593 (3.886)
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1972	400	1969	401

*Notes:* The sample where only one parent can be a migrant is used here. The dependent variable is the math score, for the sub-sample of households without a migrant parent in Column (1) and for the sub-sample of households with a migrant parent in Column (2), and the Chinese score, for the sub-sample of households without a migrant parent in Column (3) and for the sub-sample of households with a migrant parent in Column (4). Bootstrapped standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the county level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

in the households' income regressions. Each of the migrant and non-migrant household income equations' errors seem to be uncorrelated with the error of the reduced-form migration model. This means that income regressions do not seem to suffer from the problem of selection on unobservable characteristics. This could be due, in the migrant household income equation, to the fact that most households are particularly engaged in agricultural activities, there is, therefore, little expected difference that may be due to unobserved abilities. Moreover, rural migrants in Chinese cities may be stigmatized into certain types of jobs and cannot negotiate their wages based on their particular unobserved characteristics, leading to standardised wage offers which do not reflect unobserved factors like motivation or ability. As a result, the differences in incomes between households with a migrant and those with no migrant may not be explained by factors beyond their observable attributes. Similar finding has been reported in related studies.<sup>38</sup>

Similarly, the coefficients of the selection variables in the test scores equations, for those with and without a migrant parent, also fall short of statistical significance. The insignificance of the unobservable effects, in the case of households with a migrant parent, can be interpreted as an evidence that those with migrant parents do not self-select with respect to their children's unobserved abilities that determine test scores.

## 6 Conclusion

In this paper, we investigate the ability of rural households to adapt to aggregate risk using migration. We particularly explore how income differentials interact with the risk coping motive to shape the final migration decision. Understanding such effects are relevant for policy making in light of the recent increasing problems of climate change. To do so, we have established a model of migration behavior under agricultural income risk, where the rural household's utility depends on their income and their children's human capital. We show, theoretically, that when migration is used as a coping strategy, the household's likelihood to migrate still depends on the household income differential, however, differently from their traditional definition, expected income differentials are now additionally determined by the agricultural income risk the household is facing. We estimated this model using data from China, and employed a switching regression model with endogenous switching in order to account for the possibility that the rural-to-urban migration may be a self-selection mechanism. We show that the incidence of migration as a risk coping strategy is relatively higher for households with a positive expected income differential, compared to those with a negative one. However, this effect diminishes with higher levels of income differential. Our results suggest that part of households with negative expected income differentials may fail to optimally cope with aggregate income

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<sup>38</sup>Zhu (2002), for example, studying rural-to-urban migration in China, found non-significant coefficients on the selection variables in the case of female migrant and non-migrant samples and in the male migrant sample. Bellak et al. (2014), studying labor migration from Armenia to Russia, also reported non-significant coefficients on the selection variables of both migrants and non-migrants.

risks, which may reinforce poverty and inequalities among rural households. Hence the need for policies that reduce vulnerabilities of these households to aggregate risks.

Our model also allows to test how the marginal utility of income changes with child human capital levels, where the school test scores are used as a measure of the child human capital. In the context considered here, we find evidence for a decrease in the household's marginal utility of income following an increase in the child's human capital level. This result suggests that, considering the framework that we assume in this paper, the best specification of the utility function to consider is the non-separability between the household's earnings and the household's children's human capital. More precisely, the child human capital should be modeled as its monetary equivalent in the household's utility function instead of its measured value. This result also means that, in the case of an agricultural income risk, each additional monetary unit is more enjoyable when children's school test scores are lower. We can, therefore, expect that, if income differential is positive and migration is used as a risk coping strategy, households with lower test scores of children may be more likely to send a parent for migration, compared to households with higher test scores of children.

Our findings raise some interesting questions for future research. We performed our analysis using an aggregate measure of the income riskiness; however, it would be interesting to explore whether idiosyncratic measures of the household income risk have the same effects. Examples of these measures include the variance of the household income (Carroll, 1994; Carroll and Samwick, 1998), the variance of the residuals in the household income regression (Jalan and Ravallion, 2001; Guariglia and Rossi, 2002), or the subjective measures of income uncertainty (e.g., Guiso et al., 2002; Lusardi, 1997). Our paper is also a first step in looking at how changes in the child human capital level affects the marginal utility of income. We do so using data from rural China and the school test scores as a measure of the child human capital. Further research is needed to validate these results using different samples of children and adopting different measures of the child human capital, notably health measures.

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# Appendices

## A Theoretical model

### A.1 Functional forms of the utility function

How the household's marginal utility of income changes with the child's human capital level allows to determine which functional form of the utility function should be used.

If  $u^{(1,1)} = 0$ , then the additive separability between the household's earnings and the child's human capital should be assumed ( $u(y, z) = \mu(y) + \nu(z)$  with  $\mu' > 0$ ,  $\mu'' < 0$ ,  $\nu' > 0$  and  $\nu'' < 0$ ).<sup>39</sup>

If  $u^{(1,1)} < 0$ , we are assuming the non-separable form of the utility function ( $u(y, z) = \mu(y + f(z))$  with  $\mu' > 0$ ,  $\mu'' < 0$ ,  $f' > 0$  and  $f'' < 0$ , where  $f(z)$  is the monetary equivalent of the child's human capital level  $z$ ).

Finally, if  $u^{(1,1)} > 0$ , we can then consider the multiplicative separability between the household's earnings and the child's human capital ( $u(y, Z) = \mu(y)\nu(Z)$  with  $\mu' > 0$ ,  $\mu'' < 0$ ,  $\nu' > 0$  and  $\nu'' < 0$ ).

### A.2 Probability of migration

Using a Taylor expansion of order 2 around  $(Y_0, Z_0)$ , we obtain:

$$u(Y_0 + \hat{\Delta}_y, Z_0 + \hat{\Delta}_z) \sim u(Y_0, Z_0) + \hat{\Delta}_y u^{(1,0)}(Y_0, Z_0) + \hat{\Delta}_z u^{(0,1)}(Y_0, Z_0) + \frac{1}{2}(\hat{\Delta}_y)^2 u^{(2,0)}(Y_0, Z_0) + \frac{1}{2}(\hat{\Delta}_z)^2 u^{(0,2)}(Y_0, Z_0) + \hat{\Delta}_y \hat{\Delta}_z u^{(1,1)}(Y_0, Z_0).$$

Using our assumptions,  $\Delta U$  (i.e.  $u(Y_0 + \hat{\Delta}_y, Z_0 + \hat{\Delta}_z) - u(Y_0, Z_0)$ ) can be approximated by

$$\Delta U \sim \hat{\Delta}_y u^{(1,0)} + \hat{\Delta}_z u^{(0,1)} + \frac{1}{2}(\hat{\Delta}_y)^2 u^{(2,0)} + \frac{1}{2}(\hat{\Delta}_z)^2 u^{(0,2)} + \hat{\Delta}_y \hat{\Delta}_z u^{(1,1)}.$$

The probability of migration,  $q$  is such that :

$$q = p(\Delta U \geq \hat{\alpha})$$

$$\Leftrightarrow q = p(\epsilon \leq -\beta_0 X + \Delta U)$$

$$\Leftrightarrow q = F[-\beta_0 X + \Delta U]$$

$$\Leftrightarrow q = F[\beta_1 \hat{\Delta}_y + \beta_2 \hat{\Delta}_y^2 + \beta_3 \hat{\Delta}_z + \beta_4 \hat{\Delta}_z^2 + \beta_5 \hat{\Delta}_y \hat{\Delta}_z - \beta_6 X]$$

$$\text{with } \beta_1 = u^{(1,0)}, \beta_2 = \frac{1}{2}u^{(2,0)}, \beta_3 = u^{(0,1)}, \beta_4 = \frac{1}{2}u^{(0,2)}, \beta_5 = u^{(1,1)}.$$

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<sup>39</sup> $\nu(z)$  can be written as  $\delta v(Z)$  where  $\delta$  is a parameter that refers to the household's degree of altruism toward the child.

## B Rainfall and agriculture in China

There are two types of farming in China: rain-fed farming which depends only on natural rainfall, and irrigated farming where irrigation water is used in addition to the rainwater. For the latter, rainwater contributes to more than half of the needed water. Hence, in 2007 about 57% of the total available water for agricultural use in China was from rainfall while only about 43% was from irrigation water. Breaking down these values for the different regions of China shows that, except for the Northwest areas, more than 50% of agricultural water used in all regions comes from precipitation. Part of this is also linked to the fact that farmers usually do not fully benefit from the irrigation water supplied to them. According to a report by the Ministry of Water Resources, up to 55% of irrigation water is wasted during delivery before reaching its final point.

Given the large dependence of agricultural production to rainfall water, droughts are among the biggest problems for agricultural production in China, especially in areas with limited irrigation systems such as the North-East and the North-West. Droughts unavoidably result in considerable reductions of the grain production, up to 150 million kg per year. Corn production, for instance, can be reduced to as much as 20-50% of potential yield when comparing wet and drought years (Peng, 2011). As a result, optimal yields highly depend on the distribution of precipitation and the available soil moisture during the growth, flowering and filling stages of crops (Zheng and Newman, 1986).

Table 4 highlights the most important crops for each of the surveyed provinces and shows that the main crops to consider are rice, wheat, corn, soybeans and tubers. Rice is the most prevalent grain crop in China. It can be grown as a single or a double-season cropping system. The major region which produces rice is Southern China, including six of the provinces in our sample (Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Hubei, Guangdong and Sichuan). These provinces account for about 40% of China's production of rice. Winter wheat, which accounts for more than 90% of the total wheat production in China, is mainly grown in Northeastern China, including 5 of the provinces in this study (Hebei, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan and Hubei). These provinces account for about 53% of the wheat production of the country. Finally, corn is mainly planted in North, Central and hilly South-West China. It is a major crop in one of our provinces: Hebei that produces about 10% of the total country corn production. Since Hebei is a Northeastern region, the main corn production is a spring corn.<sup>40</sup>

According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), water is needed more for grown crops than for crops that were just planted.<sup>41</sup> The water need at planting stage is evaluated at 50% of the crop water need during the mid-season stage. It starts to increase during the crop development stage and reaches its maximum at the beginning of the mid-

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<sup>40</sup>The percentages that appear in this paragraph are based on the China Statistical Yearbook (2007)

<sup>41</sup><http://www.fao.org/docrep/s2022e/s2022e02.htmTopOfPage>.

Table 4 – The Highest production of grain crops for each province

Province	Highest production	Second highest production
Hebei	Corn	Wheat
Jiangsu	Rice	Wheat
Zhejiang	Rice	Soybeans
Anhui	Rice	Wheat
Henan	Wheat	Corn
Hubei	Rice	Wheat
Guangdong	Rice	Tubers
Chongqing	Tubers	Rice
Sichuan	Rice	Tubers

*Source:* China Statistical Yearbook 2007 (Values for 2006).

season stage. For the dry harvested crops that we consider in this study, the water need is minimal during the late season stage when crops mature and are harvested). Relying on this information, we determine for each major crop in our study the most important months for crop production in the surveyed areas. We infer that March, April and May are important months for winter wheat, April, May and June for early rice, August, September and October for late rice, June, July and August for single rice, corn and soybeans. It follows that rainfall for March-October is the most important in determining the success of the different important crops in the provinces considered in our sample. Moreover, soil moisture is crucial during the growing season, in order to get an optimal crop. It is available as stored water in the soil or by instant rainfall (Al-Kaisi et al., 2012). The moisture and temperature sensitive months for the different crops we consider (April-September) are included in this period of March-October.

## C Definition of variables

Table 5 – Definition of variables

Variable name	Definition
<i>Household characteristics</i>	
Migrant parent	1 = household has a migrant parent
Number of migrants	Number of household members migrating
Household income	Logarithm of the total household income
Income differential	Expected difference in log of household income between migrant household and non-migrant household, when faced with income risk
Child human capital differential	Expected difference in child human capital between migrant household and non-migrant household, when faced with income risk
Mean age	Average age of the household labor force members
Mean schooling	Average years of education of the household labor force members
Male headed	1 = household head is male
Household size	Number of household members (including migrants)
Ethnic household	1 = household belongs to an ethnic minority
Number of children	Number of (dependent) children
Number of female adults (>15)	Number of household females aged > 15
Number of male adults (>15)	Number of household males aged > 15
Gender ratio	Ratio of males over the household labor force
Labor ratio	Ratio of the household labor force over the household size
Elderly (>60)	Number of household members over 60 years
Land size	Household farm land size
Irrigated land	Household effective irrigation area
House value	Estimated market present value of self-owned housing
Access to formal credit	1 = household applied for a loan from financial organizations, or did not but guessed would be approved if they did
Access to informal credit	1 = household borrowed money from private lenders, or did not but guessed would be able to if they did
<i>Child characteristics</i>	
Math score	Standardized mathematics' final exam score of the last school term
Chinese score	Standardized Chinese's final exam score of the last school term
Age	Child's age
Male	1 = the child is male
Eldest Child	1 = the child is the eldest among siblings
No sibling	1 = the child has no siblings (0 = one or more siblings)
Parents' years of schooling	The average years of education of the child's parents
<i>Village characteristics</i>	
Primary school in the village	1 = village has a standard six-grade primary school, other kind of primary school or a teaching spot
Unified irrigation system	1 = village provides a unified drainage and irrigation system
Furrow machine	1 = village provides a furrow machine
Plant disease prevention and treatment	1 = village implements united plant diseases and insect prevention and treatment
United purchasing service	1 = village provides a united production material purchasing service
Share of village migrant (2005)	Number of village labor migrants in 2005 over the village population in 2007
Village Labor out	1 = village organizes job finding outside the village in 2008
<i>Regional characteristics</i>	
East	1 = household lives in Hebei, Jiangsu, Zhejiang or Guangdong
Center	1 = household lives in Henan, Hubei or Anhui
West	1 = household lives in Chongqing municipality or Sichuan
<i>Risk variables</i>	
Rainfall Coefficient of Variation (Mar-Oct)	The ratio of the standard deviation and the mean of rainfall during the months of March to October of 2008

## D Attrition bias and summary statistics

Table 6 – Testing for attrition bias

(b) Final sample-child level

(a) Final sample-household level		(b) Final sample-child level	
	Included		Included
Number of migrants	-0.309*** (0.007)	Migrant Parent	-0.311*** (0.011)
Household income	0.041*** (0.010)	Chinese score	-0.000 (0.001)
Mean Age	0.000 (0.001)	Math score	0.002** (0.001)
Mean schooling (2007)	-0.005 (0.003)	Number of siblings	-0.065*** (0.013)
Male headed	0.013 (0.030)	Age	0.003 (0.002)
Household size	-0.035*** (0.007)	Male	-0.004 (0.012)
Number of children	0.025 (0.018)	Eldest Child	0.068*** (0.014)
Gender ratio	0.000 (0.001)	Parents' years of schooling	0.006* (0.003)
Labor ratio	-0.003*** (0.001)	Number of female adults (>15)	-0.052*** (0.013)
Land size	0.000 (0.001)	Number of male adults (>15)	-0.084*** (0.014)
Irrigated land	0.000 (0.000)	Male headed	0.025 (0.028)
House value	-0.007 (0.005)	Household size	-0.005 (0.013)
Province fixed effects	Yes	Gender ratio	0.002** (0.001)
Observations	3652	Labor ratio	-0.007*** (0.000)
		Land size	0.006*** (0.001)
		Irrigated land	0.000 (0.000)
		House value	-0.003 (0.005)
		Eldery (>60)	0.024** (0.011)
		Province fixed effects	Yes
		Observations	4061

*Notes:* “Included”=1 if the household is included in our final sample (observations are households) Average marginal effects are reported. Regressors are defined in Table 5. Standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

*Notes:* “Included”=1 if the child is included in our final sample (observations are children from households in our final sample). Average marginal effects are reported. Regressors are defined in Table 5. Standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table 7 – Summary statistics by migration status, 2008

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Household characteristics</i>				
Household size 08	4.15 (1.09)	4.14 (1.10)	4.23 (1.05)	-0.09
Mean Age 08	41.39 (6.70)	41.42 (6.82)	41.24 (6.09)	0.19
Mean schooling (2008)	7.32 (2.02)	7.36 (2.05)	7.08 (1.88)	0.29**
Male headed	0.96 (0.19)	0.96 (0.19)	0.95 (0.22)	0.01
Gender ratio (2008)	49.48 (10.99)	49.31 (11.35)	50.32 (8.99)	-1.01
% of females aged >16	37.35 (13.22)	37.73 (13.34)	35.48 (12.49)	2.25***
% of males aged >16	36.19 (13.96)	36.33 (14.02)	35.51 (13.66)	0.83
Labor ratio (2008)	60.40 (12.43)	60.66 (12.48)	59.13 (12.14)	1.52**
Ethnic household	0.08 (0.27)	0.08 (0.27)	0.08 (0.28)	-0.00
Number of children	1.53 (0.66)	1.52 (0.67)	1.60 (0.64)	-0.08**
Household members aged >=60	0.32 (0.61)	0.30 (0.59)	0.38 (0.68)	-0.08**
Land size	4.57 (5.12)	4.59 (5.41)	4.46 (3.37)	0.12
% irrigated of the land	75.17 (33.92)	75.73 (34.06)	72.52 (33.14)	3.21*
House value	77743 (181477)	83525 (195946)	49166 (70646)	34359***
Access to formal credit	0.80 (0.40)	0.80 (0.40)	0.78 (0.41)	0.02
Access to informal credit	0.92 (0.26)	0.92 (0.26)	0.92 (0.27)	0.00
<i>Regional characteristics</i>				
East	0.45 (0.50)	0.46 (0.50)	0.37 (0.48)	0.09***
Center	0.37 (0.48)	0.37 (0.48)	0.37 (0.48)	-0.00
West	0.18 (0.39)	0.17 (0.37)	0.25 (0.44)	-0.08***
Observations	2268	1888	380	2268

*Notes:* This table reports means of household and regional characteristics of all households (Column (1)), households with no migrants (column (2)) and households with one migrating parent (Column (3)). *Mu* is the Chinese measurement of land. 1 Hectare = 15 *Mu*. This table uses the sample where only one parent may be a migrant. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Column (4) tests for differences in means between the two types of households. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .



Table 8 – Summary statistics by migration status - Income variables, 2008

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Total net income	22950 (17818)	23588 (17896)	19778 (17098)	3811***
Net income from wages	10164 (12515)	9667 (11590)	12632 (16148)	-2964***
<i>of which:</i> Net wage income from local off-farm	5696 (9527)	6459 (10100)	1906 (4212)	4554***
<i>of which:</i> Net wage income from migrants	3386 (8373)	1967 (4773)	10436 (15686)	-8469***
Net income from family farm operation	7888 (13406)	8396 (14489)	5363 (4703)	3033***
Net income from family off-farm operation	3322 (9279)	3851 (9957)	690 (3615)	3161***
Net property income	587 (2253)	670 (2431)	174 (862)	496***
Net transfer income	990 (2622)	1004 (2623)	919 (2622)	85
Observations	2268	1888	380	2268

*Notes:* This table reports means of income components of all households (Column (1)), of households with no migrants (column (2)) and of households with one migrating parent (Column (3)). This table uses the sample where only one parent may be a migrant. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Column (4) tests for differences in means between the two types of households. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table 9 – Summary statistics by migration status - Child characteristics, 2008

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Math score	81.17 (12.32)	81.42 (12.09)	79.93 (13.35)	1.49**
Chinese score	79.47 (12.33)	79.69 (12.29)	78.42 (12.48)	1.27**
Age	13.24 (3.90)	13.32 (3.93)	12.83 (3.69)	0.50***
Male	0.53 (0.50)	0.53 (0.50)	0.53 (0.50)	0.01
Number of siblings	0.89 (0.85)	0.90 (0.88)	0.82 (0.69)	0.08*
Mother's years of schooling	7.28 (2.23)	7.33 (2.23)	7.03 (2.20)	0.30***
Father's years of schooling	8.23 (2.15)	8.27 (2.20)	8.06 (1.84)	0.21**
Number hours studying	9.09 (6.71)	9.22 (6.84)	8.49 (6.09)	0.73*
Observations	3061	2544	517	3061

*Notes:* This table reports means of child characteristics of all households (Column (1)), of households with no migrants (column (2)) and of households with one migrating parent (Column (3)). This table uses all children from each household in the sample where only one parent may be a migrant. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Column (4) tests for differences in means between the two types of households. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

## E Estimates of the structural model of migration

Table 10 – Estimates of the structural model of migration: full specification

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Expected changes</i>						
Income differential	1.976** (0.805)	1.870*** (0.681)	1.776** (0.788)	1.631** (0.692)	2.201*** (0.804)	2.074*** (0.653)
Income differential <sup>2</sup>	-3.733*** (1.279)	-4.689*** (1.693)	-3.731*** (1.281)	-4.608*** (1.739)	-3.697*** (1.273)	-4.657*** (1.624)
Child human capital differential	0.124** (0.053)	0.282*** (0.037)	0.128** (0.050)	0.279*** (0.038)	0.127** (0.053)	0.284*** (0.034)
Child human capital differential <sup>2</sup>	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.013*** (0.004)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.013*** (0.003)
Interaction	-0.084 (0.080)	-0.184* (0.100)	-0.100 (0.077)	-0.214** (0.101)	-0.063 (0.082)	-0.151 (0.098)
<i>Household characteristics</i>						
Irrigated land	-0.048*** (0.012)	-0.043** (0.018)	-0.046*** (0.012)	-0.040** (0.017)	-0.050*** (0.012)	-0.047** (0.019)
Mean Age	0.133** (0.067)	0.056 (0.081)	0.145** (0.067)	0.087 (0.081)	0.116* (0.067)	0.024 (0.080)
Mean age <sup>2</sup>	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
Mean schooling	-0.096*** (0.025)	-0.318*** (0.045)	-0.093*** (0.024)	-0.312*** (0.043)	-0.094*** (0.025)	-0.310*** (0.045)
Gender ratio	0.021*** (0.004)	0.061*** (0.010)	0.021*** (0.004)	0.059*** (0.010)	0.021*** (0.004)	0.062*** (0.010)
Labor ratio	0.004 (0.006)	0.018* (0.009)	0.003 (0.006)	0.015 (0.009)	0.005 (0.006)	0.021** (0.010)
Household size	-0.200*** (0.056)	-0.600*** (0.095)	-0.208*** (0.055)	-0.612*** (0.092)	-0.190*** (0.056)	-0.570*** (0.097)
Number of children	0.273** (0.126)	0.603*** (0.201)	0.341*** (0.126)	0.739*** (0.200)	0.206 (0.126)	0.469** (0.204)
<i>Network</i>						
Share of village migrant (2005)	0.367* (0.204)	0.822*** (0.224)	0.371* (0.202)	0.808*** (0.223)	0.372* (0.203)	0.827*** (0.221)
Village Labor out	0.420*** (0.107)	0.760*** (0.144)	0.428*** (0.107)	0.767*** (0.139)	0.411*** (0.107)	0.747*** (0.148)
Observations	1767	1767	1767	1767	1767	1767

*Notes:* This table reports regression coefficients from 6 separate regressions, using the sample where only one parent is a migrant. See notes to Table 1.