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Working Paper

## Causal Misperceptions of the Part-Time Pay Gap

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# Causal Misperceptions of the Part-Time Pay Gap

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Discussion Paper No. 372

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# Causal Misperceptions of the Part-Time Pay Gap

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## Abstract

This paper studies if workers infer from correlation about causal effects in the context of the part-time wage penalty. Differences in hourly pay between full-time and part-time workers are strongly driven by worker selection and systematic sorting. Ignoring these selection effects can lead to biased expectations about the consequences of working part-time on wages ('selection neglect bias'). Based on representative survey data from Germany, I document substantial misperceptions of the part-time wage gap. Workers strongly overestimate how much part-time workers in their occupation earn per hour, whereas they are approximately informed of mean full-time wage rates. Consistent with selection neglect, those who perceive large hourly pay differences between full-time and part-time workers also predict large changes in hourly wages when a given worker switches between full-time and part-time employment. Causal analyses using a survey experiment reveal that providing information about the raw part-time pay gap increases expectations about the full-time wage premium by factor 1.7, suggesting that individuals draw causal conclusions from observed correlations. De-biasing respondents by informing them about the influence of worker characteristics on observed pay gaps mitigates selection neglect. Subjective beliefs about the part-time/full-time wage gap are predictive of planned and actual transitions between full-time and part-time employment, necessitating the prevention of causal misperceptions.

**Key words:** part-time pay gap, wage expectations, selection neglect, causal misperceptions

**JEL classification:** J31; D83; D84

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# 1 Introduction

Many developed countries have advanced access to flexible working arrangements since the 1990s, often by easing the transition between full-time and part-time employment through statutory rules (Hegewisch et al. 2009). However, actual take up of part-time employment remains strongly gendered: One in four women in the OECD worked part-time in 2021, but fewer than one in ten men.<sup>1</sup> One reason explaining the gap between availability and take up of part-time work is the negative stigma associated with part-time employment (‘flexibility stigma’, see Chung 2020, Williams et al. 2013). Workers associate part-time work with negative career outcomes, including lower chances of promotion (Chung 2020), as well as short-term (Schrenker 2022) and long-term wage penalties (Boneva et al. 2021).

In this paper, I study if workers form expectations about the consequences of working part-time based on misguided causal inference. Previous research shows that individuals often struggle to distinguish between correlation and causation.<sup>2</sup> Causal misperceptions can result in behavioral distortions (Spiegler 2020a), and agents who confuse correlation and causation can be systematically fooled (Horz & Kocak 2022, Spiegler 2020b). One particular challenge when inferring from correlational information is the presence of data selection. Individuals may neglect that they only observe a selective sample when they observe the outcomes of other individuals (‘selection neglect bias’), which can lead to biased expectations about their own outcomes (e.g. Jehiel 2018, Koehler & Mercer 2009, Barron et al. 2019, López-Pérez et al. 2022).

In the context of part-time employment, individuals may try to learn about the consequences of working part-time by observing the career outcomes of other part-time employed workers. However, part-time and full-time workers differ substantially in their characteristics, as well as labor force attachment and work experience (e.g. Blundell et al. 2016, Fernández-Kranz et al. 2015), so observable differences in pay between part-time workers and full-time workers are strongly driven by worker selection and systematic sorting (e.g. Manning & Petrongolo 2008, Fernández-Kranz & Rodríguez-Planas 2011). Existing research documents large raw gaps in pay between full-time and part-time workers in the range of 20 to 30 percent (see Schrenker 2022, for an overview), whereas estimates of selection-corrected part-time wage penalties are usually much smaller (e.g. Manning & Petrongolo 2008, Schrenker 2022, Paul 2016, Aaronson & French 2004, Hirsch 2005, Matteazzi et al. 2014, Gallego-Granados 2019). Hence, workers who infer from observed pay gaps about the consequences of switching between full-time and part-time work may substantially overestimate the true penalty or premium of working different hours, which may lead to suboptimal labor supply choices.

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<sup>1</sup>OECD (2022), Part-time employment rate (indicator). doi: 10.1787/f2ad596c-en (Accessed on 15 November 2022)

<sup>2</sup>For example, individuals expect higher chances of winning the lottery when purchasing lottery tickets in a ‘lucky store’ that previously sold a winning ticket (Guryan & Kearney 2008).

To examine if workers wrongly draw causal conclusions from average full-time/part-time pay gaps, I ask three research questions. First, do workers believe full-time and part-time workers earn different hourly wage rates? Second, what is the perceived causal effect of switching between full-time and part-time employment for a given worker? Third, how do perceived causal effects relate to perceived raw gaps in pay between full-time and part-time workers, and do beliefs reflect selection neglect?

To answer these questions, I implement a survey module combined with an information experiment in the Innovation Sample of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP-IS) between 2016 and 2019. The SOEP-IS is an annual panel survey representative of German households with high quality data collection and face-to-face interviewing. I obtain  $N=1,362$  responses from 369 individuals in the non-experimental part of the survey. The experiment is implemented in a separate subsample of the SOEP-IS in Wave 2019, with  $N=1,425$  participants.

In the non-experimental part of the survey, I elicit workers' beliefs about the mean hourly wage rate earned by full-time workers in their occupation, as well as the mean hourly wage rate earned by part-time workers in their occupation. I use these measures to quantify respondents' beliefs about the perceived difference in hourly pay between full-time and part-time workers. Furthermore, I measure workers' beliefs about the causal part-time wage penalty. I define the causal part-time penalty as the change in hourly pay that a given worker experiences when switching between full-time and part-time employment. Specifically, I ask respondents to consider a hypothetical scenario of switching between working 40 hours per week and 20 hours per week, *ceteris paribus*, and then provide an estimate of the expected change in hourly wage rates associated with this transition. Respondents provide three different estimates for the hypothetical scenario: i) the predicted wage change for an average full-time worker in their occupation switching to a part-time position; ii) the predicted wage change for an average part-time worker in their occupation switching to full-time; and iii) respondents' self-expected wage change when switching between full- and part-time employment, which depends on the current employment status of the respondent (full- or part-time). The non-experimental survey data allow me to quantify the perceived raw difference in hourly pay between full-time and part-time workers, as well as the perceived causal effect of switching between full- and part-time work. To study selection neglect, I analyze descriptively whether workers distinguish between correlation and causation by examining whether they expect causal effects that are quantitatively similar to the raw wage gap they believe exists between full-time and part-time workers. To test for selection neglect more formally, I further design and implement an information experiment, described next.

To causally estimate if workers infer from average pay gaps about the causal part-time penalty, I further conduct an information experiment in a separate subsample of the GSOEP. The experiment consists of two treatment groups who receive different information, and one control group that receives no information. Participants are allocated to one of the three groups with

equal probability based on random assignment. The first treatment group receives information about the average gap in hourly pay between full-time workers and part-time workers in the German population. I elicit self-beliefs about the causal part-time penalty post treatment, using the same survey instrument as in the non-experimental questionnaire, and exploit the experimentally induced variation in beliefs between the first treatment group and the control group to analyze if individuals draw causal conclusions from correlational information.

I further use the experimental design to study the role of de-biasing and to test whether selection neglect persists when individuals are informed of the data generating process (DGP), as shown in some laboratory settings (Barron et al. 2019) but not others (López-Pérez et al. 2022). To this end, I provide the second treatment group with an alternative information treatment that also reports the average pay gap between full-time and part-time workers, but additionally educates subjects about the selection mechanism driving the observed wage gap. Specifically, the second information treatment points out that observed pay gaps between full-time and part-time workers can largely be explained by differences in work experience.

Finally, I analyze some behavioral implications of worker beliefs about part-time pay. Exploiting the longitudinal dimension of the SOEP-IS, I study descriptively how worker beliefs relate to planned and realized transitions between full-time and part-time employment.

The empirical analyses generate five main findings (described in detail below). First, respondents underestimate the difference in hourly wage rates between full-time and part-time workers in their occupation. Second, workers predict small causal wage penalties for a given worker switching between full- and part-time employment. Third, perceived raw and causal wage gaps are significantly correlated. Fourth, providing correlational information strongly affects beliefs about causal effects. Fifth, de-biasing effectively reduces selection neglect. Taken together, the results provide empirical evidence of causal misperceptions in the context of the part-time wage penalty. Although individuals do not naïvely equate average pay gaps with causal effects, they seem to account only insufficiently for worker selection. In addition, I show that beliefs about part-time pay gaps are predictive of labor supply choices, necessitating the prevention of causal misperceptions to avoid behavioral distortions.

Comparing perceived average wage rates with measures of actual hourly wages in respondents' occupation reveals that workers systematically underestimate differences in hourly pay between full-time and part-time workers.<sup>3</sup> While subjects only moderately overestimate the average wages of full-time workers (by 2.67 percent on average,  $SD=30.66$ ), they strongly overestimate average part-time wage rates, with a mean bias of 9.26 percent ( $SD = 35.49$ ). As a result, workers underestimate raw wage gaps between full-time workers and part-time workers in their occupation by 6.49 percentage points, or about 50 percent, on average ( $SD = 14.0$ ). These

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<sup>3</sup>Measures of actual occupational average wage rates are obtained from an additional data set, the *Verdienststrukturerhebung* (VSE) 2018, the only large scale data set in Germany with information on earnings and working hours (see Section 3.5.1 for details).

findings confirm existing empirical evidence on earnings misperceptions in the context of the German labor market, such as persistent biases in beliefs about occupation median monthly salaries documented by [Jaeger et al. \(2021\)](#), further adding that individuals are particularly misinformed about the salaries of part-time workers.

When asked to predict the causal effect of switching employment states on their own hourly wages, respondents report moderate expected part-time penalties of 3.4 percent on average. Variation in self-beliefs is substantial ( $SD = 11.9$ ). Part-time workers expect stronger wage gains from switching to full-time (6.9 percent,  $SE = 1.3$ ) compared to the wage losses from switching to part-time expected by full-time workers (1.6 percent,  $SE = 0.9$ ).

I further show that perceived causal wage penalties correlate significantly with perceived raw gaps in pay between full-time and part-time workers. Part-time workers who believe full-time workers in their occupation earn much higher wage rates than part-time workers also expect large wage premiums from switching to full-time employment. Likewise, full-time workers perceiving larger raw wage gaps expect larger part-time penalties, although the association is less pronounced. Coefficient estimates of the elasticity between perceived raw and causal gaps is 0.82 for part-time workers and 0.39 for full-time workers. Hence, part-time workers' expectations about the full-time premium almost mirror perceived raw wage gaps, whereas full-time workers differentiate somewhat more between average pay gaps and causal wage penalties. Notably, the associations remain robust when including, as an additional covariate, different proxies of the occupational part-time wage gap adjusted for worker characteristics, thereby explicitly conditioning on between-occupation differences in the treatment effect of part-time work on wages.

While these findings are suggestive of selection neglect, one might alternatively conjecture that workers who expect stronger causal wage penalties for part-time work have private information about their employer's compensation schemes or their own productivity. A similar concern arises with heterogeneous rewards for full-time work by gender ([Hirsch 2005](#), [Aaronson & French 2004](#)) or by occupational position ([Fernández-Kranz & Rodríguez-Planas 2011](#)). To address this concern, I use alternative measures of the perceived causal effect based on predicted wage gains and losses for an average worker, allowing me to abstract from the role of private signals. On average, subjects predict a causal part-time wage penalty of 3.3 percent for a typical full-time worker in their occupation ( $SE = 0.5$ ) and a full-time wage premium of 5.6 percent ( $SE = 0.7$ ) for an average part-time worker. Relating these alternative estimates with perceived average pay gaps yields very similar results as those obtained from worker self-beliefs, with estimated slopes of 0.36-0.57 for an average full-time worker and 0.71-0.88 for an average part-time worker.

Taken together, the non-experimental analyses provide empirical evidence suggestive of moderate selection neglect bias. Although there is no one-to-one mapping between perceived raw and causal wage gaps, the link is positive and of notable size. A part-time worker who believes

that full-time workers earn 30 percent more than part-time workers, on average, also expects a full-time wage premium close to 30 percent. However, it is important to note that these associations are purely correlational and may be driven by joint unobserved correlates of worker beliefs (also see [Bertrand & Mullainathan 2001](#)).

Estimates based on the information experiment provide additional causal evidence of causal misperceptions. Relative to the control group, individuals who receive correlational information about the average part-time wage gap in the population increase expectations about the causal wage penalty by factor 1.7 (+ 3.49 p.p.,  $p < 0.01$ ), with an effect size equivalent to one fourth of the control group standard deviation. I find heterogeneous treatment effects by gender and by employment sector, with men and private sector employees reacting more strongly to the correlation treatment. Furthermore, I find that the de-biasing treatment effectively reduces selection neglect. Respondents do not significantly react to the correlational information when they simultaneously receive information about the selection mechanism explaining the influence of work experience on raw wage gaps. Although de-biasing does not fully eliminate the effect of the correlation treatment, providing information about the selection rule substantially reduces and renders insignificant the effect of the correlation treatment (+1.29 p.p.,  $p > 0.1$ ). Consistent with work by [López-Pérez et al. \(2022\)](#) showcasing that individuals account for selection effects when they have strong evidence about the DGP, I find that educating individuals about selection effects seems to be effective in mitigating causal misperceptions in the context of the part-time wage penalty.

Finally, I show that beliefs about the part-time penalty are predictive of planned and actual switching between full-time and part-time employment, in line with evidence from [Mueller et al. \(2021\)](#), [Boneva et al. \(2021\)](#), and [Wiswall & Zafar \(2021\)](#), who find that perceptions predict choices. Using data on stated intentions to switch employment states within the next three years, I find that individuals perceiving larger part-time wage gaps also report a lower willingness to switch between full-time and part-time employment. Part-time workers who predict larger full-time wage gains report a 1.77 percentage points higher intention to move to full-time, whereas full-time workers overestimating raw wage differentials report a -0.4 percentage points lower subjective probability to switch to part-time. Similarly, data on realized transitions confirms a positive (albeit weak) link between the perceived returns to part-time work and actual job switching. In sum, worker beliefs and beliefs-biases appear to have behavioral implications, although it must be cautioned that I do not establish a causal link between expectations and actions.

This project contributes to several strands of literatures. Firstly, it adds to existing work on causal misperceptions and selection neglect. In contrast to previous work by [Jehiel \(2018\)](#), [Koehler & Mercer \(2009\)](#), [Barron et al. \(2019\)](#), [Spiegler \(2020a\)](#), and [López-Pérez et al. \(2022\)](#), this paper uses representative survey data to study selection neglect outside laboratory and theoretical settings. Building on the framework developed by [Barron et al. \(2019\)](#), this paper



tests several hypotheses from selection neglect theory in a relevant labor market context, the part-time wage penalty. In contrast to [Barron et al. \(2019\)](#), but in line with [López-Pérez et al. \(2022\)](#), I find that individuals who are informed of the underlying selection rule do not exhibit selection neglect bias, thereby affirming a role for de-biasing interventions.

This paper also contributes to a broad literature documenting systematic biases in beliefs about labor market outcomes (e.g. [Jaeger et al. 2021](#), [Wiswall & Zafar 2015a](#), [Mueller et al. 2021](#), [Drahs et al. 2018](#), [Schneider 2020](#)), as well as existing work on earnings misperceptions. A large literature documents substantial misperceptions with respect to the average earnings of direct colleagues ([Cullen & Perez-Truglia 2022](#)), average occupational salaries ([Jaeger et al. 2021](#), [Wiswall & Zafar 2015b](#)), as well as misperceptions about wage gaps by gender ([Briel et al. 2021](#), [Settele 2019](#)), by education ([Wiswall & Zafar 2015a](#)), and by seniority ([Cullen & Perez-Truglia 2022](#)). With respect to part-time employment, empirical evidence remains scarce. [Boneva et al. \(2021\)](#), [Schrenker \(2022\)](#) and [Blesch et al. \(2021\)](#) analyze beliefs about the short- and long-run returns to part-time employment, but none of the existing studies measure misperceptions about the differences in hourly wage rates between full-time and part-time workers. I contribute to this literature by quantifying the beliefs-biases about existing part-time wage differentials, extending previous evidence on salary misperceptions in the context of the German labor market ([Jaeger et al. 2021](#)).

More generally, this paper also adds to a longstanding literature studying social comparisons (e.g. [Cullen & Perez-Truglia 2022](#), [Card et al. 2012](#), [Fliessbach et al. 2007](#), [Godechot & Senik 2015](#), [Baumann et al. 2019](#)), as well as sociological work on the ‘flexibility stigma’ ([Chung 2020](#), [Williams et al. 2013](#), e.g.). By showing that workers’ beliefs about the consequences of working part-time can originate in misguided social comparisons, I highlight that it is important to not only document beliefs, but to better understand whether fears about the career costs of part-time work are warranted and how they can be mitigated.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides background information about part-time wage gaps in Germany. Section 3 presents the conceptual framework and the empirical design. Section 4 contains results from the non-experimental analyses, Section 5 presents results from the information experiment. In Section 6, I analyze the behavioral implications of worker beliefs and Section 7 concludes.

## 2 Background

This section provides empirical estimates of part-time wage gaps and describes the selection of workers into part-time employment in the German context. The Online Appendix contains additional information about the institutional context.

There exists a sizeable gap in mean hourly pay between full-time workers and part-time workers

of 0.22 log points that mostly reflects compositional differences between workers in full-time and part-time employment (Table 1).<sup>4</sup>

**Table 1:** Part-Time Wage Gaps and Differences in Worker Characteristics

	Overall			Men			Women		
	FT	PT	Diff.	FT	PT	Diff.	FT	PT	Diff.
Log hourly wage	2.987	2.768	0.219	3.024	2.735	0.290	2.902	2.777	0.126
Highest education (percent)									
<i>No degree</i>	7.3	11.5	-4.1	7.7	18.1	-10.4	6.5	10.0	-3.5
<i>Vocational</i>	62.8	66.3	-3.4	62.4	53.1	9.3	63.7	69.2	-5.5
<i>Upper vocational</i>	5.6	2.8	2.9	6.9	4.4	2.5	2.9	2.4	0.5
<i>Bachelor</i>	4.6	2.9	1.7	3.7	4.0	-0.3	6.5	2.6	3.8
<i>Masters</i>	18.6	15.8	2.8	18.1	18.8	-0.7	19.6	15.2	4.4
<i>PhD</i>	1.1	0.8	0.3	1.1	1.6	-0.4	0.9	0.6	0.3
Tenure (years)	11.6	10.8	0.8	11.7	7.5	4.2	11.4	11.6	-0.2
Managerial position (percent)	6.5	1.8	4.7	7.4	2.9	4.4	4.6	1.5	3.1
Temporary contract (percent)	12.5	17.8	-5.2	11.6	24.1	-12.5	14.7	16.1	-1.4

*Notes.* VSE 2018. Cells contain weighted sample means for full-time (FT) and part-time (PT) workers and differences in means (Diff). All differences are statistically significant at the 95% level. Sample excludes workers in marginal employment (*Minijobs*).

In comparison to full-time workers, part-time workers have lower educational attainment and lower tenure at the firm, they are more likely to have a temporary contract and hold managerial positions less frequently. Among men, there is a noteworthy positive selection of university educated workers into part-time employment, but part-time workers are also more likely to have no completed degree, with larger differences for men (10.4pp) than for women (3.5pp). The extent to which part-time and full-time workers differ in their characteristics and, hence, hourly pay, varies strongly across occupations (see Table A.7 in the Appendix), with pay gaps being larger in occupations with strong worker and job segmentation (Figures A.4a - A.4c). A large literature shows that adjusting for occupation, worker and job characteristics substantially reduces the part-time pay gap; most previous studies document only small selectivity-adjusted part-time penalties of about five percent.<sup>5</sup>

### 3 Research Design

This section describes the conceptual framework, the survey instruments, the experimental set-up, and the data. The Online Appendix contains additional details.

<sup>4</sup>The empirical estimates in this section are based on VSE and GSOEP data, described in Section 3.5.1

<sup>5</sup>For example, see Paul (2016), Schrenker (2022), Gallego-Granados (2019), Stürmer-Heiber & Schneider (2022), Wolf (2002) for estimates of the selectivity-corrected part-time penalty in Germany, Manning & Petrongolo (2008), Connolly & Gregory (2008), Ermisch & Wright (1993) for the UK, Fernández-Kranz et al. (2015), Fernández-Kranz & Rodríguez-Planas (2011) for Spain, and Hirsch (2005), Aaronson & French (2004), Blank (1990) for the US. For an extensive review of the previous theoretical and empirical literature see Schrenker (2022).

### 3.1 Conceptual Framework

To conceptualize how workers form beliefs about wages when switching between full-time and part-time work, assume worker  $i \in \{1, \dots, N\}$  currently works either full-time (FT) or part-time (PT), the two states of the world are subsequently denoted by  $s \in \{FT, PT\}$ . Adopting the potential outcome model (POM) developed by [Neyman \(1923\)](#) and [Rubin \(1974\)](#), there are two potential outcomes for each worker  $i$ ,

$$Y_{s,i} = \begin{cases} Y_{FT,i} \\ Y_{PT,i} \end{cases}$$

where  $Y_{s,i}$  denotes the gross hourly wage worker  $i$  would earn in full-time and in part-time employment, respectively. Typically, the Neyman-Rubin-POM is used to describe the missing data problem researchers face when estimating the average causal treatment effect,  $E[Y_{FT,i} - Y_{PT,i}]$ , as only one potential outcome is observed for each worker. Here, I propose that the worker faces a similar missing data problem because she also observes only one potential outcome given her state  $s_i$ ,  $Y_{s,i|s_i=s}$ ,

		Potential outcome	
		$Y_{FT,i}$	$Y_{PT,i}$
State	$s_i = FT$	✓	✗
	$s_i = PT$	✗	✓

and, hence, must form beliefs about the counterfactual outcome,  $\tilde{Y}_{s,i|s_i \neq s}$ , if she wants to infer the causal effect of switching between the states,

$$\tilde{E}[Y_{FT,i} - Y_{PT,i}|s_i] = \begin{cases} Y_{s,i|s_i=s} - \tilde{Y}_{s,i|s_i \neq s} & \text{if } s_i = FT \\ \tilde{Y}_{s,i|s_i=s} - Y_{s,i|s_i \neq s} & \text{if } s_i = PT. \end{cases}$$

Analogous to researchers who utilize group differences in average outcomes of individuals in the different states to solve the missing data problem, worker  $i$  may try to infer the effect of switching states on wages from observing the average outcomes of other individuals. Formalizing this idea, and adapting the theoretical framework proposed by [Barron et al. \(2019\)](#), worker  $i$  infers the causal effect of switching between full- and part-time work based on observing the following two signals:

1. a private signal,  $\rho_i = Y_{s,i|s_i=s} + \eta_i$ , and
2. a group signal,  $\gamma_i = \bar{Y}_{FT,R_i} - \bar{Y}_{PT,R_i}$ ,

where  $Y_{s,i|s_i=s}$  is the worker's current factual outcome,  $\eta_i$  is an individual-specific unobserved component, and  $\gamma_i$  denotes the difference in average full-time and part-time outcomes,  $\bar{Y}_{FT,R_i}$  and  $\bar{Y}_{PT,R_i}$ , in a reference group the worker may observe, denoted by  $R_i$ .

Based on a weighted combination of the two signals, worker beliefs about the causal effect of switching between full-time and part-time employment are described by

$$\tilde{E}[Y_{FT,i} - Y_{PT,i}|s_i] = \eta + \psi (\bar{Y}_{FT,R_i} - \bar{Y}_{PT,R_i}) + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where  $\eta$  is the weight on the private signal,  $\psi$  is the weight on the group signal, and  $\epsilon_i$  is an individual-specific randomly distributed error term. Note that for  $\eta = 0$ , workers anchor beliefs about the counterfactual outcome at their current factual outcome,  $Y_{s,i}|s_i=s$ . Also note that a positive weight  $\psi$  on the group signal does not automatically indicate beliefs-biases. A standard decomposition shows that the group signal reflects a mixture of selection bias and the true treatment effect of part-time work on wages, the causal average treatment effect on the treated (ATT):

$$\bar{Y}_{FT} - \bar{Y}_{PT} = \underbrace{E[Y_{FT,i} - Y_{PT,i}|FT]}_{\text{ATT}} + \underbrace{E[Y_{PT,i}|FT] - E[Y_{PT,i}|PT]}_{\text{Selection Bias (SB)}}$$

Unless the causal ATT in workers' reference group is zero, workers may legitimately view the group signal as a somewhat noisy indicator of the true part-time wage effect. To study if individuals overreact to the group signal and extrapolate from selection bias, it is important to condition on a proxy of the selectivity-corrected part-time wage gap<sup>6</sup>

$$\tilde{E}[Y_{FT,i} - Y_{PT,i}|s_i] = \eta + \psi (\bar{Y}_{FT,R_i} - \bar{Y}_{PT,R_i}) + \rho (A\hat{T}T_{R_i}) + \epsilon_i \quad (2)$$

where  $\psi = 1$  benchmarks full selection neglect, that is, a one-to-one mapping of perceived causal and average part-time wage gaps, conditional on true differences in pay between part-time and full-time workers.

**Heterogeneous treatment effects** Workers may rationally expect part-time wage effects below or above the  $ATT_{R_i}$  if treatment effects are heterogeneous within worker reference groups and workers have private information. However, while not at the individual level, on average a discrepancy in beliefs and  $ATTs$  indicates beliefs-biases even when treatment effects are heterogeneous. In addition, I utilize various survey instruments to elicit worker beliefs, specifically addressing the issue of heterogeneous treatment effects. To preview, I measure worker beliefs about the causal impact of switching between full-time and part-time work not only on the respondent's own wages, but on the wages of an average worker in their reference group transitioning between part-time and full-time employment, thereby abstracting from private information. I also analyze the asymmetry in beliefs about the wage effect of switching from full-

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<sup>6</sup>An alternative representation is to net out the ATT from the group signal and only measure the elasticity with respect to the portion of the group signal attributable to selection bias.

to part-time and from part-time to full-time as an additional dimension of effect heterogeneity.

The next Section 3.2 describes the survey instruments to elicit worker beliefs. The Online Appendix contains an additional classification of workers into different belief types.

### 3.2 Belief Elicitation: Survey Instruments

I measure worker self-beliefs about counterfactual wage offers  $\tilde{Y}_{s,i|s_i \neq s}$  in part-time employment (if the worker currently works full-time) or in full-time employment (if they currently work part-time), using the following survey question:

**Q1.** *Imagine you switch to a part-time (full-time) job from now on, working 20 (40) hours per week. Please only consider part-time (full-time) jobs that you could carry out with your qualification. Which gross hourly wage do you expect to earn when working part-time (full-time) at 20 (40) hours per week?*

The question fixes counterfactual weekly hours at 20 and 40 hours, respectively, to limit variability in subjective definitions of part-time or full-time work. Individuals report their expected counterfactual wage offer in Euros, based on an open-ended elicitation. To benchmark workers' beliefs about their factual wage,  $Y_{s,i|s_i=s}$ , I provide survey participants with an estimate of their current hourly wage *prior to eliciting beliefs about the counterfactual situation*, utilizing the responses regarding gross monthly pay and contractually agreed working hours they provided earlier in the survey (see Section B.1). The question prompts respondents to consider only comparable jobs in the counterfactual scenario by fixing qualification requirements. Based on individuals' factual wage,  $Y_{s,i|s_i=s}$ , and their perceived counterfactual wage offer,  $\tilde{Y}_{s,i|s_i \neq s}$ , I construct worker self-beliefs about the causal part-time wage effect,  $\tilde{E}[Y_{FT,i} - Y_{PT,i}|s_i]$ .

I measure worker beliefs about the average wage level among full-time workers in their reference group,  $\tilde{Y}_{FT,R_i}$  with the following question:

**Q2.** *What do you think is the gross hourly wage of an average full-time worker in your occupation?*

Again, to provide them with a benchmark, workers are reminded of their own current hourly wage prior to receiving the question.

Correspondingly, I elicit beliefs about the average wage level among part-time workers,  $\tilde{Y}_{PT,R_i}$ :

**Q3.** *What do you think is the gross hourly wage of an average part-time worker in your occupation?*

The questions on average wage levels explicitly fix the reference group by referring to workers in the respondent's current occupation, thereby allowing me to construct empirical proxies of the true occupational wage levels in full-time and in part-time employment and assess beliefs-biases

(Section 3.4).<sup>7</sup> Workers in the same occupation also represent a plausible and relevant reference group because respondents may consider switching employers when thinking of transitioning between full-time and part-time employment, whereas it is less likely (albeit possible) that they anticipate moving to an entirely new occupation.

Finally, to address the concern of private information in the presence of heterogeneous treatment effects, I measure beliefs about the causal part-time wage effect,  $\tilde{E}[Y_{FT,i} - Y_{PT,i}|s_i]$ , in an alternative way. Specifically, I elicit beliefs about the counterfactual wage offer when switching between part-time and full-time work,  $\tilde{Y}_{s,i|s_i \neq s}$ , not only for the respondent herself, but also for an average worker in their reference group, utilizing the following two questions:

**Q4.** *Now imagine that an average full-time worker in your occupation, who currently earns [X] Euros per hour, moves to a part-time position. Which gross hourly wage do you expect for this worker in part-time?*

**Q5.** *Now imagine that an average part-time worker in your occupation, who currently earns [Y] Euros per hour, moves to a full-time position. Which gross hourly wage do you expect for this worker in full-time?*

Note that  $X$  and  $Y$  are individual-specific responses to questions Q2 and Q3, respectively, and are subsequently used as measures of the factual wages,  $Y_{s,i|s_i=s}$ , when constructing  $\tilde{E}[Y_{FT,i} - Y_{PT,i}|s_i]$ . While private information - such as knowledge of firm-specific reward schemes - may generate rational deviations from average treatment effects in respondents' self-beliefs (Q1), private signals should not impact rational beliefs about the average causal effect in the occupation (Q2-Q5). In addition, these questions allow me to study if individuals predict asymmetric wage responses between shifting from full-time to part-time and from part-time to full-time. By cross-randomizing the order of questions Q4 and Q5, I can also analyze consistency bias in response behavior.

In addition to these core questions, I implement an information experiment, described next. A full description of the survey modules used for additional sensitivity analyses is presented in the Online Appendix.

### 3.3 Information Experiment

To study if workers draw causal conclusions from correlational data, I implement an additional information experiment in the beliefs survey. In the experiment, I provide a random subset of respondents with information about the raw average wage gap between full-time workers and part-time workers. I then elicit worker self-beliefs about counterfactual wage offers, using the same survey instrument as presented previously, and utilize the experimentally induced

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<sup>7</sup>Alternatively, the question could have prompted workers to think of employees within the same firm, in this case, assessing beliefs-biases would require matched employer-employee data.

variation to analyze if workers pay attention to correlational information when forming beliefs about the causal part-time wage penalty.

The experimental design allows me to (i) remove existing information barriers that arise in real markets due to pay intransparency; (ii) avoid the identification challenges posed by omitted variable bias when interpreting the relationship between average pay gaps and worker beliefs (also see [Bertrand & Mullainathan \(2001\)](#)); and (iii) test if educating respondents about the role of selection effects mitigates selection neglect (de-biasing).

### 3.3.1 Experimental Set-up and Hypotheses

The survey experiment involves two alternative information treatments that are assigned to two distinct treatment groups. An additional control group receives no information treatment. Respondents are allocated to one of the three groups with equal probability based on random assignment. All participants first receive an estimate of their current hourly wage to benchmark their beliefs (see Section 3.2 and Section B.1). The control group then directly reports self-beliefs about counterfactual wage offers, based on the survey instrument Q1 presented in Section 3.2. The two treatment groups also report self-beliefs, but only after receiving one of the two information treatments described below.

The first treatment provides purely correlational information about the average wage differential between full- and part-time workers in Germany:

**Treatment T1. (Correlation treatment)**

*“Research shows that average part-time working employees in Germany earn about 20 percent less per hour than average full-time working employees earn per hour.”*

The second treatment also provides information about the raw correlation, but additionally contains an explanatory sentence educating respondents about the data-generating process (DGP), i.e. the role of selection effects in driving the correlation:

**Treatment T2. (Correlation treatment + De-biasing)**

*“Research shows that average part-time working employees in Germany earn about 20 percent less per hour than average full-time working employees earn per hour. However, this wage differential can mostly be explained by the fact that full-time working employees have more work experience on average.”*

**Hypotheses** I use the experimentally induced variation in beliefs between individuals receiving the pure correlation treatment (T1) and individuals belonging to the control group to test if individuals adjust beliefs towards the provided correlational benchmark, as hypothesized by selection neglect theory ([Barron et al. 2019](#)). Likewise, I use random variation in beliefs between the control group and individuals receiving the combined correlation/de-biasing treatment (T2) to test for selection neglect when individuals are informed about the underlying data

generating process (DGP). Correspondingly, I exploit the variation in beliefs between the two treatment groups T1 and T2 to study the effectiveness of de-biasing.

### 3.4 Empirical Benchmarks

To measure biases in beliefs, I construct the empirical equivalents of  $\gamma_i = \bar{Y}_{FT,R_i} - \bar{Y}_{PT,R_i}$ , the average part-time wage gap in the worker’s occupation, and of the  $ATT_{R_i}$ , the true wage effect of switching between full-and part-time work conditional on occupation. Arguing that worker beliefs should match these empirical benchmarks rests on certain assumptions, which I spell out below. I follow Jäger et al. (2021), who point out that specifying objective benchmarks for worker beliefs is ‘notoriously challenging’, in utilizing and comparing several available proxies, described below and in the Online Appendix.

**Raw occupational wage gaps** I proxy  $\gamma_i$  by measuring the raw part-time wage gap as the log difference in gross hourly wages between full-time workers and part-time workers in worker  $i$ ’s occupation. Occupation is defined based on 3-digit KldB codes using the German Classification of Occupations 2010 (*Klassifikation der Berufe, KldB*) which is tailored to capture particular features of the German labor market (see Section D.1 for details and examples). I use the German *Verdienststrukturerhebung* (VSE) for precise estimates of  $\gamma_i$  by occupation, denoting the empirical estimates by  $\hat{\gamma}_i$  (see Section ?? for more information about the VSE data).

**Corrected occupational wage gaps** To proxy the true  $ATT_{R_i}$  in worker  $i$ ’s occupation, I decompose  $\hat{\gamma}_i$  into two parts, using standard Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition: (i) a portion that is explained by selection effects, such as differences in the characteristics of workers selecting into full-time and part-time jobs; and (ii) a portion that is unexplained by differences in worker characteristics, capturing differences in the returns between full-time and part-time work. I run this decomposition separately for each 3-digit occupation cell, again using VSE data, and utilize the resulting empirical estimates of the residualized wage gap to proxy the  $ATT_{R_i}$  at the occupational level.<sup>8</sup> There are two major caveats with this approach. First, there might be heterogeneous effects of part-time work on wages even within occupation groups. For instance, effects might differ by gender or by worker age, thereby compromising the suitability of these estimates as a benchmark for worker self-beliefs about the causal effect, as discussed previously. Second, the decomposition relies on selection on observables, which can generate biased estimates of the  $ATT_{R_i}$  if workers select into part-time and full-time employment based on unobservable characteristics. The VSE data lack the panel dimension required for more elaborate modeling of the selection mechanism. I discuss alternative measures of the  $ATT_{R_i}$

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<sup>8</sup>In the decomposition, I residualize the raw wage differential between full-time and part-time workers based on compositional differences in education, age, tenure, gender, region (east/west), contract type (permanent/temporary), managerial responsibility, firm size, sector (public/private), minimum wage branch, female share and union coverage.



based on different data in the Online Appendix.<sup>9</sup> However, given that I compute the  $ATT_{R_i}$  for a particular occupation conditional on having selected into this occupation, much of the unobserved selection into part-time employment is implicitly accounted for due to strong occupational segregation between part-time and full-time workers, such as the selection of workers favoring part-time employment into part-time compatible occupations (also see [Adda et al. \(2017\)](#)).

## 3.5 Data and Samples

I measure beliefs about part-time wage effects for a representative sample of German workers by integrating the questions described in Section 3.2 and the information experiment into the Innovation Sample of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). I further use the *Verdienststrukturerhebung* (VSE) collected by the Federal Statistical Office to construct the empirical benchmarks described in Section 3.4.

### 3.5.1 Data

**GSOEP Innovation Sample (SOEP-IS)** The SOEP-IS is a broad annual panel study representative of private households in Germany. Survey design and field work mirror that of the core GSOEP: participating households are initially selected based on multi-stage random sampling with regional clustering and interviews are conducted face-to-face using computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI). Beyond featuring similar survey administration, the SOEP-IS also shares a sizeable part of the questionnaire with the core GSOEP and achieves similarly high response rates averaging at 84 percent ([Zweck & Glemser 2020](#)). In addition, the SOEP-IS accommodates further innovative modules that are designed by the research community and must pass a competitive review process. I design and implement the questions presented in Section 3.2, as well as the information experiment, in different SOEP-IS modules between 2016-2019. Excluding the experiment, I collect responses of 1,362 observations from 369 individuals. The survey experiment is implemented in Wave 2019 of the SOEP-IS, using a different subsample of the SOEP-IS to rule out overlap with related questions from previous waves. For both treatment groups, interviewers read out the content of the information treatment to the respondents in face-to-face interviews. The experiment contains 1,425 observations (462 control, 457 treatment I, 506 treatment II). Item non-response on the main beliefs questions is between 6 and 22 percent. Sample conditions are described in Section 3.5.2.

**Verdienststrukturerhebung (VSE)** The VSE is a survey of German firms collected in 4-year intervals by the German Federal Statistical Office and contains pay-roll record information of 1.01 million employees from 71,000 firms. Firms are selected using stratified sampling by

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<sup>9</sup>In the Online Appendix, I discuss two alternative approaches of measuring corrected part-time penalties, utilizing the wage changes following observed switches between full-time and part-time employment in longitudinal data, as well as the linear wage mandate in public sector occupations. The results presented in this paper are robust to alternative measures of the corrected part-time wage gap.

federal state. For public sector employers, the information is directly gathered from the *Personalstandsstatistik*, a database covering the universe of employees in the public sector. For private sector firms, participation in the survey is mandatory, resulting in high representativeness. Firms submit responses through an electronic transmission system. The reporting basis for the 2018 wave is the month of April. The VSE contains exact information on employees' gross earnings and working hours obtained from payroll records that I use to construct precise measures of part-time wage gaps. In addition, the VSE contains a large set of employee characteristics, including education, age, gender, tenure and occupational position, as well as linked establishment characteristics such as union coverage, branch and sector. I utilize this information to adjust average wage differentials between full- and part-time workers for worker selection into part-time employment and job segmentation, again by occupation, using decomposition analysis (see Section 3.4).

Worker beliefs from the SOEP-IS and occupational part-time wage gaps from the VSE are matched based on *KldB* occupation codes (match rate based on 3-digit *KldB* for the SOEP-IS sample is 98.2 percent).

### 3.5.2 Sample and Descriptive Statistics

The sample consists of workers in full-time or part-time employment. I further restrict the sample to exclude workers in marginal employment (*Minijobs*), in self-employment, in military or community service, or in training. Pensioners and individuals above age 65 are dropped. I deflate all monetary variables, including worker beliefs, to 2018 values using the consumer price index and trim them at the bottom 2% and the top 2% of the distribution. In the experimental analysis, I further drop individuals with missing or invalid responses in weekly hours or in actual or expected wages. After these restrictions, the experimental estimation sample consists of 900 individuals (286 control, 275 treatment T1, 339 treatment T2). Table A.1 in the Online Appendix reports descriptive statistics for the main sample and the experimental sample. Table A.2 presents the raw and restricted sample sizes for the experimental sample and Table A.3 shows summary statistics separately by randomization status.

## 4 Beliefs about Part-Time Pay Gaps

This Section documents workers' beliefs about full-time and part-time wage rates and shows how the perceived returns to full-time work covary with beliefs about average wage gaps. Section 5 presents estimates based on the information experiment. The Online Appendix contains additional results.

**Summary of results** *Workers strongly underestimate the difference in hourly wage rates between full-time workers and part-time workers in their occupation, with a mean bias of 6.5 percentage points. When asked to predict the causal wage change induced by a switch between*

full-time and part-time employment, individuals expect a part-time wage penalty of 3.4 percent for themselves, of 3.3 percent for an average full-time worker switching to part-time, and of 5.6 percent for an average part-time worker switching to full-time. Expectations about the part-time penalty correlate significantly and positively with perceived average gaps in pay between full-time and part-time workers (Slope = 0.4-0.9), consistent with moderate selection neglect bias.

#### 4.1 Beliefs about Average Full-Time and Part-Time Wage Rates

Here I compare respondents' estimates of the average full-time and part-time wage rate in their occupation to actual wage rates. Actual wage rates are measured based on the VSE data and 3-digit occupation codes obtained from the German Classification of Occupations (KldB 2010). Perceived wage rates are elicited in the SOEP-IS, after respondents receive an estimate of their own current hourly wage, which serves as a benchmark and which is calculated based on their previous responses regarding monthly earnings and weekly hours worked (see Section 3.2).

**Table 2:** Misperceptions of Average Part-Time and Full-Time Wage Rates in Workers' Occupation

	Bias (beliefs-actual)		Absolute error	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Bias avg. full-time wage (in %)	2.67	30.66	23.78	19.48
(S.E.)	(1.97)		(1.25)	
Bias avg. part-time wage (in %)	9.26	35.49	26.68	25.11
(S.E.)	(2.30)		(1.63)	
Bias avg. FT-PT wage gap (in p.p.)	-6.49	14.00	12.16	9.48
(S.E.)	(0.91)		(0.62)	

*Notes.* SOEP-IS 2019 (I5), N=324. Cells show mean biases and mean absolute errors in beliefs about the average wage level of full-time workers and part-time workers in respondents' occupations. Biases defined as the log-deviation from actual occupation mean wages obtained from the VSE 2018, with occupation based on 3-digit KldB 2010. S.E. = standard error, S.D. = standard deviation.

Conditional on being told what their own current hourly wage is, workers give approximately correct estimates of the average full-time wage rate in their occupation (Table 2, Figure A.7a). The mean deviation is only 2.7 percent and statistically insignificant. In contrast, respondents systematically overestimate average hourly wage rates of part-time workers in their occupation, with a mean bias of 9.3 percent (Table 2, Figure A.7b). Hence, individuals implicitly underestimate the difference in hourly pay between full-time workers and part-time workers in their occupation by about 50 percent, or 6.5 percentage points on average.

#### 4.2 Perceived Causal Part-Time Wage Penalties

Next, I analyze workers' predictions of the causal wage change associated with a switch between full-time and part-time employment. I use three different instruments: (i) self-beliefs about the effect of switching between full -and part-time work on the respondent's own wages; (ii)

predicted wage losses for an average full-time worker in the respondent’s occupation switching to part-time; and (iii) predicted wage gains for an average part-time worker switching to full-time.

**Table 3:** Worker Beliefs about the Causal Part-Time Wage Penalty

	All workers		FT workers		PT workers	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Self-beliefs PT penalty (S.E.)	3.42 (0.80)	11.94	1.61 (0.97)	11.76	6.86 (1.32)	11.60
Predicted loss FT worker (S.E.)	3.31 (0.54)	8.24	2.71 (0.57)	7.18	4.48 (1.11)	9.95
Predicted gain PT worker (S.E.)	5.59 (0.69)	10.44	5.70 (0.87)	10.74	5.36 (1.11)	9.89

*Notes.* SOEP-IS 2019 (I5), N=324. Cells contain perceived causal part-time wage penalties for a switch between working full-time (FT) and part-time (PT) in percent. S.E. = standard error, S.D. = standard deviation.


I document similar findings for all three outcomes (Table 3). Workers, on average, expect a part-time penalty of 3.4 percent on their own wages, a part-time wage loss of 3.3 percent for an average full-time worker, and a 5.6 percent full-time premium for an average part-time worker (Table 3). The asymmetry between predicted wage losses and gains for full- and part-time workers mirrors the asymmetry in self-beliefs by respondents’ employment status: full-time workers expect smaller losses from switching to part-time on their own wages (1.6%) compared to the full-time wage premia expected by part-time workers (6.9%).

Variation in beliefs about the causal part-time penalty is substantial, with a standard deviation of 11.9 percent for self-beliefs. Notably, standard socio-demographic characteristics and job attributes barely explain the observed variation in perceived part-time penalties (Table A.8 in the Appendix). However, there is considerable disagreement about the size of the part-time penalty across occupational areas (Table A.8).

### 4.3 Selection Neglect and Causal Misperceptions: Descriptive evidence

In Figure 1, I show how expectations about the part-time penalty relate to perceived average gaps in pay between full-time and part-time workers. The binned scatter plots with the solid fitted lines indicate the empirical relationship in the data. The dashed lines indicate the hypothetical scenario in which respondents expect a part-time penalty that is identical to the perceived difference in average wage rates. Hence, a slope of one benchmarks the full selection neglect scenario with a one-to-one mapping between perceived causal and raw wage gaps (also see Section 3.1). To account for between occupation differences in the true return to full-time work, the graphical analyses condition on occupation-specific estimates of the corrected

part-time penalty.<sup>10</sup>



**Figure 1:** Perceived Causal and Raw Part-Time Wage Gaps

*Notes:* Binned scatter with linear fit of the predicted causal part-time penalty plotted against the perceived raw wage gap between full-time and part-time workers, residualized for corrected occupation part-time wage gaps, separately for full-time workers (panel a,  $N=143$ ) and part-time workers (panel b,  $N=76$ ). Dashed 45-degree line benchmarks full selection neglect. Occupation based on 3-digit KldB 2010. Data sources: SOEP-IS 2019 (beliefs), VSE 2018 (raw and corrected gaps).

I find a positive and significant association between predicted causal penalties and perceived average pay gaps, consistent with moderate selection neglect. Estimates of the slope based on workers' self-beliefs are 0.39 (S.E. = 0.085) for full-time workers (Figure 1, Panel a) and 0.82 (S.E. = 0.11) for part-time workers (Figure 1, Panel b). Hence, part-time workers' expectations about the full-time premium almost mirror perceived raw wage gaps. Full-time workers differentiate notably more between average pay gaps and causal wage penalties. Using alternative definitions of the causal part-time penalty based on average full-time and part-time workers yields similar results. Workers predict full-time wage gains for an average part-time worker that are almost identical to the raw pay gap (Slopes=0.71-0.88). Predicted part-time wage losses for an average full-time worker are correlated less with perceived raw pay gaps (Slopes=0.36-0.57).

While purely descriptive, the empirical findings presented in this section suggest that workers account only insufficiently for selection effects. Although there is no one-to-one mapping between predicted causal effects and perceived correlations, the link is positive and of notable size. A part-time worker who believes that full-time workers earn 30 percent more than part-time workers, on average, also expects a full-time wage premium close to 30 percent. The results from this descriptive exercise suggest that workers may draw causal conclusions from observed pay gaps, neglecting the influence of worker selection. The Online Appendix presents additional material on the perceived selection of workers into part-time (Section E.2). The next section studies causal misperceptions based on the survey experiment.


<sup>10</sup>In the main specification, I use estimates obtained from Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions, additionally I provide a set of sensitivity checks based on alternative estimates of the corrected part-time penalty from wage changes following switches between full- and part-time work, as well as linear wages in the public sector (additional information is presented in the Online Appendix).

## 5 Survey Experiment: Irrational Attention to Correlation?

**Summary of experimental findings** *When receiving correlational information about the raw wage gap between full-time and part-time workers, respondents expect significantly larger part-time pay cuts (+ 3.49 p.p.,  $p < 0.01$ ). The effect size is equivalent to 1/4th of the baseline (control group) standard deviation, or to an increase by factor 1.7. De-biasing reduces selection neglect and renders the treatment effect insignificant (+1.29 p.p.,  $p > 0.1$ ).*

### 5.1 Experimental Results

In Figure 2, I show raw sample means of the expected part-time wage penalty post treatment. Individuals in the control group expect a part-time penalty of 4.56 percent on average (SE=0.95), individuals in Treatment group 1 expect a penalty of 7.57 percent (SE=1.04), and individuals in treatment group 2 expect a part-time penalty of 5.89 percent on average (SE=0.96).



**Figure 2:** Experimental Results

*Notes:* Post-treatment sample means, with robust standard errors (s.e.) in parentheses, of the self-expected part-time wage penalty. Treatment group 1 received the pure correlation treatment, treatment group 2 received the correlation and de-biasing treatment. Data source: SOEP-IS 2019.

Estimates of information treatment effects are presented in Table 4. Panel A contains bivariate estimates and Panel B shows treatment effects adjusted for key observables. I use the multivariate estimates from Panel B as the preferred specification because of moderate imbalances in some observable characteristics in the estimation sample (see Table A.3).

The experimental evidence supports the notion that individuals pay strong attention to correlational information. Individuals in Treatment group 1 expect significantly larger causal part-time

wage penalties than individuals in the control group who receive no information (Table 4, Column 1). The difference in expected pay cuts amounts to 3.49 percentage points ( $p < 0.01$ ) and is roughly equivalent to 1/4th of the control group standard deviation ( $SD = 15.89$ ). The variation between T1 and the control group corresponds to an increase in expectations by factor 1.7.

**Table 4:** Experimental Results: Information Treatment Effects

	Correlation treatment (T1 vs. C)	Correlation inc. de-bias (T2 vs. C)	Overall treatment (Treat vs. C)	De-biasing effect (T2 vs. T1)
<i>Panel A</i>				
Treatment effect (bivariate)	3.37** (1.41)	1.64 (1.35)	2.41** (1.18)	-1.73 (1.42)
Constant	4.27*** (0.95)	4.27*** (0.95)	4.27*** (0.95)	7.64*** (1.04)
<i>Panel B</i>				
Treatment effect (adjusted)	3.49*** (1.34)	1.29 (1.29)	2.34** (1.13)	-2.25* (1.35)
Constant	3.61 (3.36)	6.38* (3.28)	2.95 (2.65)	6.16* (3.34)
Observations	556	620	894	612

*Notes.* SOEP-IS 2019. Dependent variable is the expected part-time penalty in percent. Panel A shows bivariate treatment effects, Panel B shows multivariate results adjusted for employment status (part-time/full-time), gender, education (basic/middle/university), age, region (east/west), employment sector (private/public), an indicator for firm size ( $>/< 200$  employees) and a constant. Treat=T1+T2. Six individuals with missing values in the control variables were dropped. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

However, on a positive note, individuals also react strongly to the de-biasing treatment. Individuals in Treatment group 2 expect moderately larger part-time penalties than those in the control group, but the difference is small (1.29pp, 1/12th of baseline SD) and not statistically significant ( $p > 0.1$ ). Hence, respondents do not significantly react to the correlational information when they simultaneously receive information about the selection mechanism explaining the raw wage gap between full-time and part-time workers (Table 4, Column 2). Although de-biasing does not fully eliminate the effect of the correlation treatment, providing information about the influence of work experience on observed pay gaps substantially reduces and renders insignificant the effect of the correlation treatment (Table 4, Column 4). Hence, educating individuals about selection effects seems to be effective in mitigating selection neglect bias in this context.

In the next section, I study heterogeneous responses to the information treatments and further analyze for which groups de-biasing is most effective.

## 5.2 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

I present treatment effect estimates stratified for different subgroups in Table 5 and report significance tests from interacted models in Table A.15 in the Online Appendix. Sample stratification substantially reduces the sample sizes. While none of the presented group differences

are statistically significant at conventional levels, the subgroup analysis points to some interesting variation in the responsiveness to the different treatments. For example, male workers react more strongly to the pure correlation treatment (+4.10pp,  $p < 0.05$ ) than women (3.22pp,  $p > 0.1$ ), suggesting male workers are more likely to infer about the causal part-time wage penalty based on correlational information. There are several possible explanations for this finding. [Barron et al. \(2019\)](#) show that self-experimentation reduces selection neglect. Women are more likely to switch between full- and part-time work during their career and may rely less on learning from others than men who lack self-experimentation in part-time employment. Job segmentation between full- and part-time sectors further reduces men’s opportunities to learn about hours-based wage differentials from personal contacts, making them more susceptible to the information provided in the treatment. However, estimation results also indicate that men react more to the de-biasing treatment than women (-3.11pp,  $p < 0.1$  vs. -1.31pp,  $p > 0.1$ ). Similarly, full-time workers respond more to de-biasing than part-time workers (-2.71pp,  $p < 0.1$  vs. -0.72,  $p > 0.1$ ).

**Table 5:** Experimental Results: Subgroup Analysis

	Correlation treatment ( T1 vs. C)	Correlation inc. de-bias (T2 vs. C)	Overall treatment (Treat vs. C)	De-biasing effect (T2 vs. T1)
Full sample	3.49***	1.29	2.34**	-2.25*
Women	3.22	2.24	2.74	-1.31
Men	4.10**	0.76	2.32	-3.11*
Full-time	3.52**	0.76	2.12*	-2.71*
Part-time	3.79	3.53	3.80	-0.72
University	4.95*	0.93	2.88	-3.45
No university	3.25**	1.44	2.24*	-1.91
Age > 45	3.03	1.54	2.25	-1.96
Age < 45	3.35*	0.62	1.91	-2.82
Eastern Germany	1.70	-2.05	0.03	-4.11
Western Germany	3.60**	1.70	2.66**	-1.89
Public sector	0.03	1.82	1.27	1.63
Private sector	4.30***	0.80	2.48*	-3.40**
Firm size > 200	3.76**	1.62	2.61*	-2.06
Firm size < 200	3.88*	1.30	2.43	-2.59
Temporary contract	3.74	3.99	3.24	-3.99
Permanent contract	3.36**	0.94	2.12*	-2.50*
Managerial position	3.51	0.53	1.96	-2.94
No managerial position	4.00**	2.19	3.05**	-1.73

*Notes.* SOEP-IS 2019. Dependent variable is the expected part-time penalty in percent. Cells contain coefficient estimates by subgroups of bivariate treatment indicators from multivariate regressions with controls for employment status (part-time/full-time), gender, education (basic/middle/university), age, region (east/west), employment sector (private/public), an indicator for firm size (>/< 200 employees) and a constant. Treat=T1+T2. Six individuals with missing values in the control variables were dropped. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

The most striking difference in treatment responsiveness arises with respect to employment



sectors. Private sector employees react strongly to the correlation treatment (+4.30,  $p < 0.01$ ), whereas public sector employees barely respond (+0.03,  $p > 0.1$ ). Moreover, private sector employees respond strongly to de-biasing (-3.4,  $p < 0.05$ ), whereas the de-biasing treatment has an opposing effect on public sector employees who expect slightly larger part-time penalties after receiving Treatment 2 compared to Treatment 1 (+1.63,  $p > 0.1$ ). These results are of interest for at least two reasons. First, they suggest that strong and transparent wage regulation can mitigate selection neglect in wage expectations. Individuals in public sector occupations with linear wage setting are less likely to misinterpret the correlational link between earnings and part-time status and, hence, do not infer from average part-time pay gaps about the impact of working part-time on their own wages. Second, the findings reveal heterogeneous effects of de-biasing. When receiving information about the importance of work experience in generating wage differentials between full-time and part-time workers, public sector employees diverge from the linear-wage assumption and update their beliefs toward the provided correlational benchmark. One possible explanation is that the de-biasing treatment prompts public sector employees to consider second-order effects of working part-time, such as not being promoted to higher hierarchical positions that are associated with higher salary ratings. The de-biasing treatment in this information experiment is rather simplistic, so these results may not fully transfer to more complex real-life applications. Nevertheless, the results illustrate the importance of tailoring information campaigns to specific target groups to avoid adverse effects.

## 6 Behavioral Implications

In the final section, I exploit the longitudinal dimension of the SOEP-IS and use follow-up data from the latest panel wave to study how worker beliefs about part-time pay relate to planned and realized transitions between full-time and part-time employment.

### 6.1 Planned Employment Transitions

In waves 2017-2019 of the GSOEP, respondents in sample I5 report the subjective probability to switch employment status in the near future based on the following survey question which differs for full-time and part-time workers:

**Q7.** *Now we would like to know how likely you think it is that you will switch from full-time to part-time (from part-time to full-time) in the next 3 years.*

Respondents report the subjective probability in percent using a given interval between 0 and 100. Among full-time workers, 26 percent indicate a positive probability to switch to part-time in the next three years. Among part-time workers, 43 percent report a positive probability to switch to full-time. The full distribution of responses is presented in Figure [A.10](#) in the Online Appendix.

I analyze the association between planned transition rates and worker beliefs about part-time

pay using OLS in Table 6. Worker self-beliefs are collected in all waves, but only wave 2019 contains worker beliefs about wage losses or gains of switching for an average worker in their occupation and beliefs about average pay gaps. Regressions are run separately by employment status and condition on worker characteristics as well as on actual raw and adjusted occupational part-time pay gaps.

**Table 6:** Worker Beliefs and Planned Employment Transitions

Dep.Var. = Planned transition (in %)	FT workers		PT workers	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Self-beliefs PT penalty	-0.048 (0.061)	-0.149 (0.111)	-0.144 (0.129)	-0.216 (0.574)
Predicted loss FT worker		-0.193 (0.432)		0.096 (0.758)
Predicted gain PT worker		0.546 (0.388)		1.666** (0.716)
Perceived raw gap		-0.389* (0.220)		-0.168 (0.656)
<i>N</i>	464	114	214	66
Sample	2017-19	2019	2017-19	2019

*Notes.* SOEP-IS 2017-2019. Dependent variable is the self-reported subjective probability to switch from full-time to part-time employment (FT workers) or from part-time to full-time employment (PT workers) within the next three years, in percent. Coefficient estimates from OLS regressions with controls for true average raw and adjusted occupation part-time wage gaps, gender, education, age, region (East/West), public sector employment and firm size. Standard errors clustered at the person level in parentheses \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Overall, individuals who predict larger part-time wage gaps also report a lower willingness to switch between full-time and part-time employment. For part-time workers, there is a positive and significant association between predicted full-time wage premia for an average part-time worker and their own intention to switch to full-time (+1.7pp,  $p < 0.05$ ). For full-time workers, the link between planned transitions and predicted wage losses for average full-time workers is negative, as one would expect, although statistically insignificant. Moreover, full-time workers who overestimate the raw pay gap between full-time and part-time workers in their occupation report a lower willingness to switch to part-time in the next three years (-0.4,  $p < 0.1$ ).<sup>11</sup> Taken together, these results indicate that planned employment choices relate to perceived losses and gains of working different hours. Next, I explore the association between beliefs and actual employment choices.

<sup>11</sup>One can interpret the coefficient on the perceived raw pay gap as an indication of workers overestimating the raw gap because the regressions condition on actual measures of the occupational raw pay gap.

## 6.2 Realized Transitions between Full- and Part-Time Work

Annual transition rates between full-time and part-time employment in the GSOEP average at below five percent, generating only limited variation in employment status during the survey period. Nonetheless I can show that worker beliefs about the part-time wage penalty are predictive of actual transition rates (Table 7).<sup>12</sup>

**Table 7:** Worker Beliefs and Realized Employment Transitions

Dep.Var. = Transition in t+1 (yes/no)	FT workers		PT workers	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Self-beliefs PT penalty	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.021 (0.024)	0.003** (0.001)	0.035* (0.019)
Planned transition probability	0.001 (0.001)	0.013 (0.010)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.032*** (0.009)
<i>N</i>	351	351	152	152
Estimation	LPM	Logistic	LPM	Logistic

*Notes.* SOEP-IS 2017-2019. Dependent variable is a binary indicator of transitioning from full-time to part-time (full-time workers) or from part-time to full-time (part-time workers) in the next year. Coefficient estimates from linear probability models (LPM) and logistic regressions with controls for true average raw and adjusted occupation part-time wage gaps, gender, education, age, region (East/West), public sector employment and firm size. Standard errors clustered at the person level in parentheses \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Part-time workers expecting stronger full-time wage premiums are significantly more likely to switch from part-time to full-time within a year. Similarly, full-time workers who expect larger part-time wage penalties are less likely to switch from full-time to part-time employment. Moreover, I show that stated intentions about job switching are predictive of actual job switching, corroborating the relevance of the first stage results presented above. In sum, the findings from this descriptive exercise suggest that worker beliefs and beliefs-biases regarding part-time pay may have relevant behavioral implications, although it must be cautioned that I do not establish a causal link between expectations and actions.

## 7 Discussion

Correlation can be a natural starting point to infer causation whenever the causal link between actions and outcomes is not observed directly: College graduates live longer. Women with children earn lower salaries. There are numerous examples from everyday life where true causal linkages are obscured, whereas correlation is salient. However, learning from correlational data is challenging and individuals can make mistakes. This paper provides novel empirical evidence of causal misperceptions in the context of the part-time wage penalty. Guided by selection neglect theory and based on representative survey data from Germany, I quantify

<sup>12</sup>Table A.16 in the Online Appendix contains the full set of estimation results including covariates.

and assess workers' beliefs about the consequences of working part-time on wages. I show that workers underestimate raw differences in pay between full-time and part-time workers. Further, I document a significant correlation between perceived raw pay gaps and the expected causal effect of working part-time. An additional information experiment confirms a causal link between perceived raw and causal part-time wage gaps. Moreover, subjective beliefs about the full-time/part-time pay differential are predictive of planned and actual transitions between full-time and part-time employment, necessitating the prevention of causal misperceptions.

Economists trained in the art of causal analysis may sneer at the temptation to infer causality based on correlational data. Yet, given our everyday struggles to adjust correlations for confounding variables, self-selection, or reverse causality - should we not be surprised, if not offended, if individuals in their everyday lives were equally capable of identifying causal effects? So far, empirical evidence on selection neglect bias remains scarce. This paper attempts to advance our understanding of how individuals form beliefs about causal mechanisms in a relevant labor market application. Future studies may investigate the prevalence and the implications of causal misperceptions across different contexts.

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# Online Appendix

# Online Appendix: ‘Causal misperceptions of the part-time pay gap’

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# A Institutional Context

This section describes key institutional features regarding part-time employment in Germany.

## A.1 Institutional Context

In 2000, German legislators established a near-universal entitlement to part-time work in the *Act on part-time and temporary work (Teilzeitbefristungsgesetz, TzBfG)*. Since the law became effective in 2001, all workers in German firms with more than 15 employees can demand a reduction in working hours if they have worked at the firm for at least six months (§8 *TzBfG*).<sup>13</sup> Employers can not deny the request to work part-time except for operational reasons, which can be specified in collective agreements.<sup>14</sup> Notably, worker rights to reduce working hours are also established in the *Federal Act on Gender Equality*, which states that employers must accommodate the requests to work part-time of workers at all hierarchical levels, including managers (§16, *Abs.1, BGleiG*).<sup>15</sup> The promotion of flexible hours through legislative efforts has contributed to a vast expansion of part-time work arrangements in the last decades; as of 2021, one in three women and one in ten men in Germany works part-time (OECD 2022).

Employers in Germany must not discriminate in pay between full-time and part-time workers unless discrimination is justified by objective reasons. Specifically, equal pay principles in German federal law determine that a ‘part-time worker is to be granted remuneration or another divisible compensation that corresponds to at least the proportion of her working time in the working time of a comparable full-time working employee’ (§4(1) *TzBfG*). Moreover, part-time workers are equally entitled to statutory sick pay and proportional end-of-year bonuses.<sup>16</sup> In the civil service, the requirement of hours-proportional compensation extends to all salary components, including family allowances, premiums, overseas and hardship allowances and performance bonuses (§6, *Abs.1, BBG*).<sup>17</sup> However, statutory rules explicitly permit differential treatment of part-time and full-time workers when discrimination is justified by objective reasons (§4 *Abs.1, TzBfG*). This ambiguity leaves some wriggle room for employers who can justify different wage rates by pointing to differences in performance that can be hard to measure. In sectors with low unionization where pay is negotiated individually, pay gaps between full-time and part-time workers tend to be larger because workers bargaining over wages forgo the equalizing effects of collective agreements. Moreover, earnings transparency in Germany remains

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<sup>13</sup> *Teilzeit- und Befristungsgesetz (TzBfG)*, *Act on part-time and temporary work*. Adopted in 2000, last modified in 2019.

<sup>14</sup> In addition, in 2019 the German government established worker rights to reduce working hours only temporarily, for a pre-specified length, but the empirical analyses in this paper use data that was collected before this law was passed (§9a, *TzBfG, Brückenteilzeit*, German for ‘bridging part-time employment’.)

<sup>15</sup> *Bundesgleichstellungsgesetz (BGleiG)*, *Federal Act on Gender Equality*. Adopted in 2015, last modified in 2021.

<sup>16</sup> In the civil service, the requirement of hours-proportional compensation extends to all salary components, including family allowances, premiums, overseas and hardship allowances and performance bonuses (*Bundesbesoldungsgesetz (BBG)*, *Federal Salary Act* §6, *Abs.1, BBG*)

<sup>17</sup> *Bundesbesoldungsgesetz (BBG)*, *Federal Salary Act*. Adopted in 1975, last modified 2021.

low, facilitating the evasion of equal pay principles.<sup>18</sup> One exception is the public sector where wage tables prescribing hours-proportional pay are openly available. Taken together, the extent to which employers can discriminate in pay between comparable full-time and part-time workers presumably varies across different sectors.

## B Survey Questionnaire

### B.1 Reminder of Hourly Wage

To help respondents in their assessment of counterfactual hourly wages and to improve response precision, individuals first receive an estimate of their current gross hourly wage:

**HW A.** *The following questions again draw on your income situation. For this purpose, we have used your previous responses regarding your monthly earnings and your contractual working hours and calculated your current gross hourly wage.*

*Your current gross hourly wage is [X] Euros.*

If individuals did not provide valid responses to either gross monthly income or weekly hours such that hourly wages cannot be calculated, or if the calculated hourly wage is implausibly low (below 7 euros) or high (above 60 euros), individuals do not receive an estimate of their hourly wage but instead are asked to estimate their own hourly wage:

**HW B.** *What do you think is your current gross hourly wage (without considering overtime hours)? Please think of your contractual working hours and your gross monthly earnings before taxes.*

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<sup>18</sup>Efforts seeking to improve pay transparency have had little bite so far. In 2017, legislators passed the *Transparency of Remuneration Act (Entgelttransparenzgesetz)* to improve earnings transparency between men and women, thereby reducing the gender pay gap. However, the complexity of the procedure and the lack of legal consequences explain why, as of 2019, only 0.15 percent of eligible workers had put forward a claim based on the *EntgTranspG* (DJB 2019).

## B.2 Original German Questionnaire

This section contains the relevant survey questions from the original German questionnaire of the 2019 GSOEP Innovation Sample survey.

### UE60 Innomodul SFB-I5 - Teil 3: Vollzeit/Teilzeit, Gehalt von Anderen

(Q2000:sample=6)&(Q302:perw=1,2)&(Q430:paz09!=1,-1)&(Q434:pbrut!=1)&(7<=Bruttostundenlohn<=60)

**Q442** Die nachfolgenden Fragen beziehen sich abermals auf Ihre Einkommenssituation. Wir haben dazu anhand Ihrer Angaben zu Ihrem monatlichen Verdienst und Ihren vertraglichen Arbeitsstunden Ihren aktuellen Bruttostundenlohn berechnet. Ihr aktueller Bruttostundenlohn beträgt  $[\text{Bruttomonatsverdienst}/(\text{vereinbarte Arbeitszeit} * (52/12))]$  Euro.

(Q2000:sample=6)&(Q302:perw=1,2)&((Q430:paz09=1,-1)|(Q434:pbrut=1)|(Bruttostundenlohn<7)|(Bruttostundenlohn>60))

**Q443** Was denken Sie ist Ihr aktueller Bruttostundenlohn (ohne Überstunden zu berücksichtigen)? Bitte denken Sie hierbei an Ihre vertraglichen Arbeitsstunden und Ihren monatlichen Brutto-Verdienst, d.h. vor Abzug von Steuern.

0-99999  
keine Angabe 1

(Q2000:sample=6)&(Q302:perw=1)

**Q448** Bitte stellen Sie sich nun vor, Sie würden ab sofort in einen Teilzeitjob mit 20 Stunden pro Woche wechseln. Denken Sie bitte an Teilzeitjobs, die Sie mit Ihrer Qualifikation ausüben können.

Q302:perw=1

**Q449** Welchen Bruttostundenlohn erwarten Sie von einer Teilzeittätigkeit mit 20 Stunden? Euro 0-99999  
keine Angabe -1

(Q2000:sample=6)&(Q302:perw=1)

**Q450** Nun möchten wir von Ihnen wissen, wie wahrscheinlich es für Sie ist, dass Sie in den kommenden 3 Jahren von Vollzeit in Teilzeit wechseln.  
*Bitte geben Sie Ihre Antwort in Prozent an.*

Prozent 0-100  
keine Angabe -1

Figure A.1: Survey Questionnaire GSOEP-IS 2019 (Full-Time Worker)

(Q2000:sample=6)&(Q302:perw=2)

**Q466** Vielen Dank für Ihre Einschätzung zu Ihren Arbeitsstunden. Nun interessiert uns, wie Sie diesbezüglich andere Arbeitnehmer einschätzen.

(Q2000:sample=6)&(Q302:perw=1,2)

**Q467** Zur Erinnerung, Ihr eigener geschätzter Bruttostundenlohn beträgt [siehe oben] Euro.

*INT: Falls Bruttostundenlohn = 0: Das liegt vermutlich daran, dass die Zielperson in den Vorfragen zum Bruttostundenlohn keine Angabe gemacht hat und somit der Bruttostundenlohn nicht berechnet werden konnte.*

(Q2000:sample=6)&(Q302:perw=1,2)

**Q468** Was denken Sie ist der Bruttostundenlohn durchschnittlicher Teilzeit-Arbeitnehmer in Ihrem Beruf?

Euro

keine Angabe

(Q2000:sample=6)&(Q302:perw=1,2)

**Q469** Was denken Sie ist der Bruttostundenlohn durchschnittlicher Vollzeit-Arbeitnehmer in Ihrem Beruf?

Euro

keine Angabe

(Q2000:sample=6)&(Q302:perw=1,2)

**Q470** Dummy

Gruppe A

Gruppe B

(Q2000:sample=6)&(Q302:perw=1,2)

**Q471** Nehmen Sie nun an, ein durchschnittlicher Teilzeit-Arbeitnehmer in Ihrem Beruf, der momentan einen Bruttostundenlohn von [ISFB2019\_17] Euro erhält, wechselt auf eine Vollzeitstelle. Welchen Bruttostundenlohn erwarten Sie für diesen Arbeitnehmer in Vollzeit?

Euro

keine Angabe

(Q2000:sample=6)&(Q302:perw=1,2)

**Q472** Betrachten wir nun den entgegengesetzten Fall

(Q2000:sample=6)&(Q302:perw=1,2)

**Q473** Nehmen Sie nun an, ein durchschnittlicher Vollzeit-Arbeitnehmer in Ihrem Beruf, der momentan einen Bruttostundenlohn von [ISFB2019\_18] Euro erhält, wechselt auf eine Teilzeitstelle. Welchen Bruttostundenlohn erwarten Sie für diesen Arbeitnehmer in Teilzeit?

Euro

keine Angabe

**Figure A.2:** Survey Questionnaire GSOEP-IS 2019 (Full-Time Worker, Continued)

## UE59 Innomodul Stundenlohn

(Q302:perw=1,2)&(Q2000:sample=1:5)&(Q430:paz09!=1,1)&(Q434:pbrut!=1)

**Q435** Die nachfolgenden Fragen beziehen sich abermals auf Ihre Einkommenssituation. Wir haben dazu anhand Ihrer Angaben zu Ihrem monatlichen Verdienst und Ihren vertraglichen Arbeitsstunden Ihren aktuellen Bruttostundenlohn berechnet.

Ihr aktueller Bruttostundenlohn beträgt  $[\text{Bruttomonatsverdienst}/(\text{vereinbarte Arbeitszeit} * (52/12))]$  Euro.

(Q302:perw=1,2)&(Q2000:sample=1:5)&((Q430:paz09=1)|(Q434:pbrut=1))

**Q436** Was denken Sie ist Ihr aktueller Bruttostundenlohn (ohne Überstunden zu berücksichtigen)? Bitte denken Sie hierbei an Ihre vertraglichen Arbeitsstunden und Ihren monatlichen Brutto-Verdienst, d.h. vor Abzug von Steuern.

0-99999

keine Angabe -1

(Q302:perw=1,2)&(Q2000:sample=1:5)

**Q437** Dummy

Kein Treatment 1

Treatment 1 2

Treatment 2 3

Q437:isl\_dummy=2

**Q438** Studien zeigen, dass durchschnittliche Vollzeit-Beschäftigte in Deutschland etwa 20% mehr pro Stunde verdienen als durchschnittliche Teilzeit-Beschäftigte pro Stunde.

Q437:isl\_dummy=3

**Q439** Studien zeigen, dass durchschnittliche Vollzeit-Beschäftigte in Deutschland etwa 20% mehr pro Stunde verdienen als durchschnittliche Teilzeit-Beschäftigte pro Stunde. Dieser Lohnunterschied kann jedoch größtenteils dadurch erklärt werden, dass Vollzeit-Beschäftigte im Durchschnitt mehr Arbeitserfahrung haben.

(Q302:perw=1,2)&(Q2000:sample=1:5)&(Q302:perw=1)

**Q440** Bitte stellen Sie sich nun vor, Sie würden ab sofort in einen Teilzeitjob mit 20 Stunden pro Woche wechseln. Denken Sie bitte an Teilzeitjobs, die Sie mit Ihrer Qualifikation ausüben können. Welchen Bruttostundenlohn erwarten Sie von einer Teilzeittätigkeit mit 20 Stunden?

Euro 0-99999

keine Angabe 1

(Q302:perw=1,2)&(Q2000:sample=1:5)&(Q302:perw=2)

**Q441** Bitte stellen Sie sich nun vor, Sie würden ab sofort in einen Vollzeitjob mit 40 Stunden pro Woche wechseln. Denken Sie bitte an Vollzeitjobs, die Sie mit Ihrer Qualifikation ausüben können. Welchen Bruttostundenlohn erwarten Sie von einer Vollzeittätigkeit mit 40 Stunden?

Euro 0-99999

keine Angabe 1

Figure A.3: Information Experiment GSOEP-IS 2019

## C Data

### C.1 Sample

**Table A.1:** Sample Characteristics in GSOEP Innovation Sample

<i>GSOEP Innovation Sample</i>	Main Sample (1)	Experiment (2)
Part-time employed	26.9	27.3
Female	44.1	47.2
Education: Basic	20.2	18.7
Education: Middle	49.7	55.7
Education: University	30.1	25.6
Hourly wage (in euros)	19.7	20.1
Age (in years)	42.5	43.8
Eastern Germany	13.9	18.4
Public sector	25.0	25.8
Firm size > 200	59.6	54.6
<u>Occupational Area:</u>		
1. Agriculture, Forestry, Farming etc.	2.1	2.0
2. Raw Materials, Goods, Manufacturing	18.0	18.2
3. Construction, Architecture, Technical Building	6.6	4.2
4. Natural Sciences, Geography, Informatics	7.0	4.5
5. Traffic, Logistics, Safety, Security	13.2	12.5
6. Commercial Services, Trading, Tourism etc.	9.6	11.6
7. Business Organization, Accounting, Law etc.	16.2	21.9
8. Health Care, Social Sector, Teaching etc.	24.4	22.3
9. Philology, Literature, Humanities etc.	2.9	2.7
Survey years	2016-19	2019
Observations	1,362	1,425

*Notes.* GSOEP 2016-19. Means weighted. Occupation defined by 1-digit KldB 2010.



## C.2 Survey Experiment

**Table A.2:** Experimental Sample Statistics

	Raw data	Full sample		Estimation sample	
	N	<i>N</i>	% (Raw)	N	% (Full)
Treatment T1	512	457	89.3	275	60.2
Treatment T2	550	506	92.0	339	67.0
Control	522	462	88.5	286	61.9
Total	1,584	1,425	90.0	900	63.2

*Notes.* GSOEP 2019. Full sample after sample restrictions. Estimation sample after excluding missing and invalid responses in hours, actual and expected wages.

**Table A.3:** Survey Experiment: Sample Characteristics by Randomization Status

	Mean				Diff.	p-val	Diff.	p-val	Diff.	p-val	Diff.	p-val
	C	T1	T2	Treat	T1 - C	T2 - C	Treat - C	T2 - T1				
<i>A. Raw data</i>												
Part-time employed	0.250	0.267	0.291	0.279	0.017	0.660	0.040	0.297	0.029	0.379	0.024	0.556
Female	0.461	0.440	0.486	0.464	-0.021	0.632	0.025	0.569	0.003	0.939	0.046	0.290
Education: Basic	0.206	0.180	0.166	0.172	-0.026	0.469	-0.040	0.235	-0.034	0.280	-0.015	0.652
Education: Middle	0.517	0.555	0.567	0.561	0.038	0.391	0.050	0.254	0.044	0.248	0.012	0.783
Education: University	0.277	0.265	0.268	0.266	-0.012	0.756	-0.009	0.812	-0.010	0.754	0.003	0.945
Hourly wage (in euros)	20.583	19.373	20.260	19.855	-1.210	0.148	-0.323	0.707	-0.728	0.331	0.887	0.269
Age (in years)	45.772	43.951	43.277	43.600	-1.821	0.100	-2.495	0.014	-2.173	0.018	-0.674	0.529
Eastern Germany	0.170	0.196	0.180	0.188	0.026	0.386	0.010	0.723	0.018	0.481	-0.016	0.609
Public sector	0.224	0.223	0.263	0.244	-0.002	0.958	0.039	0.287	0.019	0.531	0.040	0.274
Firm size > 200	0.541	0.539	0.569	0.555	-0.002	0.962	0.028	0.545	0.014	0.736	0.030	0.515
Observations	522	512	550									
<i>B. Estimation sample</i>												
	C	T1	T2	Treat	T1 - C	T2 - C	Treat - C	T2 - T1				
Part-time employed	0.246	0.217	0.264	0.244	-0.029	0.562	0.018	0.719	-0.002	0.965	0.047	0.366
Female	0.487	0.403	0.504	0.462	-0.084	0.147	0.017	0.763	-0.025	0.611	0.101	0.076
Education: Basic	0.203	0.172	0.159	0.164	-0.031	0.527	-0.045	0.310	-0.039	0.333	-0.014	0.765
Education: Middle	0.512	0.524	0.591	0.563	0.013	0.827	0.080	0.152	0.052	0.296	0.067	0.240
Education: University	0.285	0.303	0.250	0.272	0.018	0.732	-0.035	0.473	-0.013	0.771	-0.053	0.290
Hourly wage (in euros)	21.516	20.595	20.109	20.306	-0.920	0.354	-1.406	0.160	-1.210	0.171	-0.486	0.606
Age (in years)	43.104	43.061	43.523	43.331	-0.043	0.973	0.419	0.733	0.226	0.837	0.463	0.707
Eastern Germany	0.147	0.190	0.159	0.172	0.043	0.285	0.012	0.728	0.025	0.428	-0.031	0.451
Public sector	0.233	0.193	0.307	0.260	-0.040	0.365	0.073	0.120	0.026	0.512	0.113	0.016
Firm size > 200	0.603	0.565	0.553	0.558	-0.038	0.501	-0.050	0.355	-0.045	0.340	-0.012	0.835
Observations	286	275	339									

*Notes.* GSOEP 2019. Means weighted. C= Control group, T1= Correlation treatment, T2=Correlation/de-biasing treatment. Treat = T1+T2. P-values from robust two sample mean-comparison tests.

## D Research Design

### D.1 German Classification of Occupations (KldB 2010)

Table A.4 presents the structure of the German Classification of Occupations (KldB 2010), with broad (1-digit) to skill-specific (5-digit) levels of aggregation.

**Table A.4:** German Classification of Occupations (KldB 2010) - Structure

Digit Level	Breakdown Level	No. of Levels	Example (Classification Title)	Example (Code)
1	Occupational Area	10	Production of raw materials and goods, manufacturing	2
2	Occupational Main Group	37	Metal-making and working, metal construction	24
3	Occupational Group	144	Metalworking	242
4	Occupational Sub-Group	700	Non-cutting	2421
5	Occupational Type	1286	Skilled tasks	24212

*Source:* Statistik der Bundesagentur für Arbeit. German Classification of Occupations 2010. Own representation.

In Table A.5, I illustrate how I define occupational reference groups by providing examples of occupational definitions at different digit levels.

**Table A.5:** German Classification of Occupations (KldB 2010) - Examples

1 digit	<b>Health Care, Social Sector, Teaching, Education (8)</b>			
2 digit	<u>Medical and Health Care (81)</u>			
3 digit	<b>Nursing, emergency medical services, obstetrics (813)</b>		<b>Human medicine and dentistry (814)</b>	
4 digit	Emergency medical services (8134)	Obstetrics, maternity care (8135)	Pediatrics and adolescent medicine (8141)	Dentists and orthodontists (8147)
5 digit	<i>Unskilled/ semi-skilled (81341)</i> <i>Skilled (81342)</i> <i>Complex (81343)</i>	<i>Skilled (81352)</i> <i>Complex (81353)</i>	<i>Highly complex (81414)</i>	<i>Highly complex (81474)</i>
2 digit	<u>Teaching and Training (84)</u>			
3 digit	<b>Vocational schools and training (842)</b>		<b>Driving, flying, sports instructors (845)</b>	
4 digit	Teachers for occupation-specific subjects at vocational schools (8421)	In-company instructors in vocational training (8422)	Driving instructors (8451)	Coaches in ball sports (8454)
5 digit	<i>Complex (84213)</i> <i>Highly complex (84214)</i>	<i>Complex (84223)</i> <i>Highly complex (84224)</i>	<i>Complex (84513)</i>	<i>Complex (84543)</i>

*Source:* Statistik der Bundesagentur für Arbeit. German Classification of Occupations 2010. Own representation.

### D.2 Alternative Measures of the Corrected Part-Time Wage Gap

In the main analyses, selectivity-corrected part-time wage gaps are based on occupation-specific Blinder-Oaxaca-decompositions of the part-time wage gap (Section 3.4). This section describes alternative approaches of measuring selectivity-corrected part-time wage gaps.

**Wage changes of switchers** A different approach to measure the causal  $ATT_{R_i}$  is to use the actual wage changes of workers who switched between full-time and part-time jobs. Exploiting the longitudinal depth of the GSOEP, I construct occupation-specific estimates of the  $ATT_{R_i}$ s based on within-variation as an alternative proxy of the true part-time wage effect.<sup>19</sup> By conditioning on wage changes following switches, I address the concern of selection on unobservables

<sup>19</sup>The estimates are obtained separately for each 3-digit KldB2010 occupation code based on robust fixed effects regressions of log hourly wage on part-time status with controls for age, years of education, tenure, children, marital status, and region, using panel waves 2010-2019 from the core GSOEP (see Section 3.5 for additional information about the data). Occupations with fewer than 100 observations are dropped.

because the  $ATT_{R_i}$ s are identified using person fixed effects. However, identification based on switchers does not yield the ATT when switchers differ from the population of interest and, indeed, there is evidence that switchers are not representative. One problem is for instance that only few male workers switch between full- and part-time work; hence, the  $ATT_{R_i}$ s are mostly identified based on women. And even among women, switchers represent a select group (Schrenker 2022). The main challenge in computing a plausible proxy of the part-time wage effect for an average worker is that the workers we observe switching between full- and part-time employment do not represent the average worker. On top of this, using wage changes of switchers does not solve the concern imposed by heterogeneous treatment effects.

In a set of robustness analyses, I use longitudinal data from the core GSOEP to estimate wage changes following switches between full- and part-time employment. The core GSOEP is larger than the SOEP-IS and has a longer panel dimension, which I exploit to estimate wage changes on the occupational level. I use longitudinal information between 2010-2019 from GSOEP wave v36, yielding 43,733 observations from approximately 9,800 individuals. I match core GSOEP and SOEP-IS data based on KldB occupation codes (match rate based on 3-digit *KldB2010* for the SOEP-IS sample is 98.2 percent).

**Linear wages in public sector and civil service** An alternative way of thinking about the causal  $ATT_{R_i}$  is by adopting the employer’s perspective. By law, German firms must not discriminate between part-time and full-time workers (see Section A.1). In reality, the extent to which employers can pay workers different wages and obfuscate differences in pay varies across firms and sectors. Importantly, it depends strongly on the adoption of collective agreements. One sector of the German economy where discriminatory pay based on hours worked is essentially impossible is the public sector. In public sector occupations, as well as in the civil service, salaries are set based on publicly available pay scales, and working time reductions automatically come with proportional reductions of all salary components including performance-based allowances. Accordingly, the causal  $ATT_{R_i}$  should be equivalent to zero in public sector occupations. Likewise, heterogeneous treatment effects are essentially ruled out.<sup>20</sup> I exploit this in the sensitivity analyses by separately investigating the beliefs of workers in public sector employment, assuming that the true causal effect of part-time work on wages in these occupations equals zero.

### D.3 Belief Types

In learning from other workers’ outcomes, individuals may differ in their ability to account for selection effects. However, estimates of Equation 2 only indicate average responses to group differences. To further analyze the extent of disagreement in worker beliefs, as well as the

---

<sup>20</sup>There is some evidence that performance bonuses are becoming increasingly important in public sector occupations, driving a wedge between the average earnings of men and women in the civil service (Detmer 2021). Similarly, public sector employers could circumvent hours-proportional pay by disproportionately rewarding full-time employees with incentive bonuses.

determinants of beliefs biases, I distinguish workers by classifying three broad belief types:

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Type I} & \quad \text{if } \tilde{E}[Y_{FT,i} - Y_{PT,i}|FT] \in (ATT_{R_i} - \iota, ATT_{R_i} + \iota), \\
\text{Type II} & \quad \text{if } \tilde{E}[Y_{FT,i} - Y_{PT,i}|FT] > ATT_{R_i} + \iota, \\
\text{Type III} & \quad \text{if } \tilde{E}[Y_{FT,i} - Y_{PT,i}|FT] < ATT_{R_i} - \iota.
\end{aligned}$$

where  $\iota$  denotes a constant tolerance parameter specifying the permissible deviation from the  $ATT_{R_i}$ . Under the assumption that true part-time wage effects  $E[Y_{FT,i} - Y_{PT,i}]$  are constant *within* worker peer groups,  $E[Y_{FT,i} - Y_{PT,i}] = ATT_{R_i} \forall i \in \{1, \dots, N\}$ , beliefs of Type I are consistent with *rationality*.<sup>21</sup> Likewise, with constant within-peer-group treatment effects, Type-II beliefs are consistent with *selection neglect*.<sup>22</sup> Finally, Type-III beliefs are consistent with *overoptimism* (full-time workers) or *overpessimism* (part-time workers), respectively.

## E Additional Results

### E.1 Part-Time Wage Gaps and Worker Selection

Table A.6: Part-Time Employment Shares by Gender and Education across Occupational Areas

	Overall			No degree			Vocational degree			University degree		
	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
All workers	32.0	12.7	54.4	40.6	21.7	63.4	30.7	8.90	54.9	26.1	11.1	43.7
1. Agriculture, Forestry, Farming etc.	19.7	11.9	45.3	13.1	9.4	36.9	19.0	10.1	44.8	10.5	4.1	37.3
2. Raw Materials, Goods, Manufacturing	11.9	7.0	36.6	18.9	11.8	34.9	9.1	5.1	35.6	9.1	5.6	27.1
3. Construction, Architecture, Technical Building	13.7	11.5	44.5	16.8	14.9	66.0	9.5	7.9	48.0	17.4	8.9	38.1
4. Natural Sciences, Geography, Informatics	14.2	8.5	34.2	25.4	22.4	34.3	12.8	6.7	34.7	14.0	8.3	33.8
5. Traffic, Logistics, Safety, Security	31.3	16.2	63.5	45.2	24.1	73.7	21.5	10.2	53.6	13.9	6.2	34.1
6. Commercial Services, Trading, Tourism etc.	45.2	19.5	61.2	63.8	47.9	71.0	41.8	11.6	59.3	19.7	8.0	36.3
7. Business Organization, Accounting, Law etc.	34.2	10.4	48.7	46.7	25.0	61.7	37.8	9.0	50.5	23.7	8.2	39.9
8. Health Care, Social Sector, Teaching etc.	53.8	29.0	60.8	69.3	57.7	72.1	57.6	29.9	62.5	42.3	24.8	52.1
9. Philology, Literature, Humanities etc.	28.9	17.2	40.1	43.9	35.8	53.6	30.0	15.2	44.3	23.8	12.6	33.5

Notes. VSE 2018. Cells contain part-time shares in percent. Occupational areas based on 1-digit KldB 2010 (German classification of occupations). Means weighted.

<sup>21</sup>I refer to Type-I beliefs as being consistent with rationality. However, it is worth noting that it is difficult to classify beliefs *ex-post* as rational because individuals may hold beliefs that are objectively consistent with rationality but may be the result of lucky guessing. Likewise, in scenarios where the  $ATT_{R_i}$  is zero, Type I beliefs are also consistent with an anchoring heuristic or naiveté, such as when individuals anchor their beliefs about the counterfactual wage outcome at their current factual wage.


<sup>22</sup>For part-time workers who form beliefs about switching to full-time, Type II-beliefs are consistent with both selection neglect and overconfidence (see the related discussion in Barron et al. (2019) on separate identification of selection neglect and overconfidence), whereas selection neglect and overconfident types are separately identified for full-time workers who form beliefs about switching to part-time.

**Table A.7:** Part-Time Wage Gaps and Worker Selection across Occupational Areas


	Log hourly wage			University degree (percent)			Tenure (years)			Managerial position (percent)		
	FT	PT	Diff.	FT	PT	Diff.	FT	PT	Diff.	FT	PT	Diff.
All workers	2.987	2.768	0.219	20.8	15.6	5.2	11.6	10.8	0.8	6.5	1.8	4.7
1. Agriculture, Forestry, Farming etc.	2.707	2.471	0.236	11.7	5.6	6.1	10.1	6.1	4.0	2.5	1.2	1.3
2. Raw Materials, Goods, Manufacturing	2.986	2.682	0.304	10.1	7.5	2.6	11.4	8.7	2.7	5.5	2.7	2.8
3. Construction, Architecture, Technical Building	2.858	2.684	0.173	10.3	13.7	-3.4	10.0	6.8	3.2	6.9	2.7	4.2
4. Natural Sciences, Geography, Informatics	3.261	3.105	0.156	39.4	38.8	0.6	9.9	10.9	-1.0	4.1	1.5	2.6
5. Traffic, Logistics, Safety, Security	2.738	2.533	0.205	8.8	3.1	5.7	10.8	9.4	1.4	2.2	0.6	1.6
6. Commercial Services, Trading, Tourism etc.	2.907	2.548	0.359	11.2	3.3	7.8	8.7	7.5	1.2	10.4	1.6	8.8
7. Business Organization, Accounting, Law etc.	3.152	2.899	0.253	33.6	20.1	13.5	14.6	14.9	-0.3	10.5	2.3	8.2
8. Health Care, Social Sector, Teaching etc.	3.037	2.892	0.145	38.2	24.0	14.2	12.1	11.0	1.1	5.6	1.8	3.8
9. Philology, Literature, Humanities etc.	3.083	2.843	0.240	37.7	28.9	8.8	7.9	7.8	0.1	4.2	1.4	2.8

*Notes.* VSE 2018. Cells contain weighted sample means for full-time (FT) and part-time (PT) workers and differences in means (Diff.). Occupational area based on 1-digit KldB 2010 (German classification of occupations).

**(a) Wage gap vs. education gap**  
Diff. full-/part-time by occupation



**(b) Wage gap vs. gender gap**  
Diff. full-/part-time by occupation




**(c) Wage gap vs. permanent contract gap**  
Diff. full-/part-time by occupation



**Figure A.4:** Part-Time Wage Gaps and Worker Selection within Occupation


*Notes:* Binned scatter with linear fit of the raw part-time wage gap plotted against the full-time/part-time gaps in worker education (panel a), worker sex (panel b), and worker share with permanent contract (panel c), by occupation. Occupation based on 3-digit KldB 2010. Data source: VSE 2018.

## E.2 Perceived Relative Productivity of Part-Time Workers



**Figure A.5:** Perceived Relative Productivity of Part-Time Workers


*Notes:* Plot shows the fraction of workers stating that the motivation, the qualification, and the resilience of part-time workers is lower, comparable, or higher among part-time workers in comparison to full-time workers. Data source: SOEP-IS 2019.



**Figure A.6:** Perceived Relative Productivity of Part-Time Workers by Subgroups

*Notes:* Plots show the fraction of workers stating that the motivation, the qualification, and the resilience of part-time workers is lower, comparable, or higher among part-time workers in comparison to full-time workers, separately by employment status (panel a) and by gender (panel b). Data source: SOEP-IS 2019.

### E.3 Worker Misperceptions about Average Full- and Part-Time Wages



**Figure A.7:** Worker Misperceptions about Average Part-Time Pay Gaps

*Notes:* Binned scatter with linear fit of perceived and true occupational full-time wages (panel a), part-time wages (panel b), and the full-/part-time wage gap (panel c). Dashed 45-degree line benchmarks correct beliefs. Occupation based on 3-digit KldB 2010. Data sources: GSOEP 2019 (beliefs), VSE 2018 (benchmarks).



## E.4 OLS Estimates of Self-Beliefs about the Part-Time Penalty

**Table A.8:** OLS: Self-Beliefs about the Part-Time Penalty

	(1) Full-time workers	(2) Part-time workers
Female	0.12 (1.81)	3.29 (3.10)
Age (in years)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.17 (0.12)
Eastern Germany	-0.63 (1.99)	1.86 (2.57)
Education: Middle	-0.26 (2.13)	-5.34 (4.08)
Education: University	0.49 (2.22)	-4.33 (4.77)
Public sector	-4.76*** (1.72)	-2.47 (2.28)
Firm size > 200	2.90* (1.52)	-6.57*** (2.20)
<u>Occupational Area (Ref.: 1. Agriculture)</u>		
2. Raw Materials, Goods, Manufacturing	11.00** (5.50)	9.94 (8.87)
3. Construction, Architecture, Technical Building	10.22* (5.80)	4.95 (6.68)
4. Natural Sciences, Geography, Informatics	9.93* (5.83)	-0.89 (8.09)
5. Traffic, Logistics, Safety, Security	11.14* (5.81)	0.74 (6.64)
6. Commercial Services, Trading, Tourism etc.	3.55 (6.03)	0.30 (6.66)
7. Business Organization, Accounting, Law etc.	8.85 (5.58)	2.25 (6.62)
8. Health Care, Social Sector, Teaching etc.	9.28 (5.67)	0.93 (6.45)
9. Philology, Literature, Humanities etc.	5.95 (7.49)	-0.67 (7.43)
Observations	634	288

*Notes.* GSOEP 2016-19. Dependent variable is the self-expected wage loss for a switch from full-time to part-time (full-time workers) or wage gain for a switch from part-time to full-time (part-time workers) in percent. Reference category for education is basic education. Standard errors clustered at the person level in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

## E.5 Belief Types

A classification of workers into different belief types based on workers' self-beliefs (Table A.9) reveals that approximately 12 percent of workers hold beliefs that are consistent with rationality (Type I). Among full-time workers, 14 percent hold beliefs that are consistent with selection neglect (Type II), and a vast majority is overconfident (Type III). For part-time workers, selection neglect and overoptimism are not separately identified; jointly these beliefs constitute 36 percent of workers.

**Table A.9:** Belief Types based on Self-Beliefs about the Part-Time Penalty

$\tilde{E}$ = Self-beliefs PT penalty	All workers	FT workers	PT workers
Type I	11.68	11.51	12.00
Type II	21.50	13.67	36.00
Type III	66.82	74.82	52.00
N	214	139	75

*Notes.* GSOEP 2019 (I5). Cells contain shares in percent. Type I:  $\tilde{E}_i \in (ATT_{R_i} - \iota, ATT_{R_i} + \iota)$ , Type II:  $\tilde{E}_i > ATT_{R_i} + \iota$ , Type III:  $\tilde{E}_i < ATT_{R_i} - \iota$ , with tolerance  $\iota = 2$  percent and corrected occupation group part-time wage gap  $ATT_{R_i}$  based on the VSE 2018 and 3-digit occupation codes (KldB 2010).

Table A.10 presents belief types based on predicted wage losses for an average full-time worker switching to part-time (Panel A) and predicted wage gains for an average part-time worker switching to full-time (Panel B).

**Table A.10:** Belief Types based on Predicted Losses and Gains for an Average Worker


A) $\tilde{E} = \text{PT loss FT worker}$	All workers	FT workers	PT workers
Type I	15.22	18.42	8.97
Type II	20.43	15.79	29.49
Type III	64.35	65.79	61.54
N	230	152	78
B) $\tilde{E} = \text{FT gain PT worker}$	All workers	FT workers	PT workers
Type I	15.25	17.81	10.39
Type II	29.15	26.71	33.77
Type III	55.61	55.48	55.84
N	223	146	77

*Notes.* GSOEP 2019 (I5). Cells contain shares in percent. Type I:  $\tilde{E}_i \in (ATT_{R_i} - \iota, ATT_{R_i} + \iota)$ , Type II:  $\tilde{E}_i > ATT_{R_i} + \iota$ , Type III:  $\tilde{E}_i < ATT_{R_i} - \iota$ , with tolerance  $\iota = 2$  percent and corrected occupation group part-time wage gap  $ATT_{R_i}$  based on the VSE 2018 and 3-digit occupation codes (KldB 2010).

## E.6 Robustness: Wage Changes following Switches between Full-Time and Part-Time Employment

To investigate the sensitivity of my findings to alternative specifications of the corrected part-time penalty, I replicate all analyses, replacing cross-sectional estimates obtained from decomposition analyses with longitudinal estimates based on wage changes following actual switches between full-time and part-time employment (see Section D.2). Estimates of the corrected part-time penalty using within-variation in wages among switchers yields smaller estimates of the corrected part-time penalty than cross-sectional estimates, leading to a larger fraction of Type-I belief types as well as moderate increases in the share of individuals with Type-II beliefs that are consistent with selection neglect and/or overconfidence (Table A.11). Slope estimates of self-beliefs with respect to the perceived raw part-time wage gap are similar to the main specification when conditioning on corrected part-time penalties based on switchers, with an elasticity of 0.465 (Figure A.8), corroborating the conclusion that individuals account only insufficiently for selection effects in the context of the part-time penalty.

In Table A.11, I present a classification into belief types based on estimates of the corrected part-time penalty from wage changes following switches.



**Figure A.8:** Perceived Causal and Raw Part-Time Wage Gaps based on Wage Changes following Switches

*Notes:* Binned scatter with linear fit of the self-expected causal part-time penalty plotted against the perceived raw occupational wage gap between full-time and part-time workers, residualized for corrected occupation part-time wage gaps based on wage changes following switches. Dashed 45-degree line benchmarks full selection neglect. Occupation based on 3-digit KldB 2010. Data sources: GSOEP-IS 2019 (beliefs), VSE 2018 (raw gaps), GSOEP 2010-2019 (corrected gaps).

**Table A.11:** Belief Types based on Wage Changes following Switches

$\tilde{E}$ = Self-beliefs PT penalty	All workers	FT workers	PT workers
Type I	61.27	62.88	58.33
Type II	31.37	25.76	41.67
Type III	7.35	11.36	0.00
N	204	132	72

*Notes.* GSOEP 2019 (I5). Cells contain shares in percent. Type I:  $\tilde{E}_i \in (ATT_{R_i} - \iota, ATT_{R_i} + \iota)$ , Type II:  $\tilde{E}_i > ATT_{R_i} + \iota$ , Type III:  $\tilde{E}_i < ATT_{R_i} - \iota$ , with tolerance  $\iota = 2$  percent and corrected occupation group part-time wage gap  $ATT_{R_i}$  based on GSOEP estimates of wage changes following switchers and 3-digit occupation codes (KldB 2010).

## E.7 Robustness: Linear Wages in the Public Sector

The linear wage mandate in public sector occupations allows me to study if workers mislearn from average pay gaps in a setting where true causal part-time penalties are essentially ruled out. A separate analysis of public sector workers reveals that public sector employees, including civil servants, also expect small part-time wage penalties between 3.3 and 3.6 percent (Table A.12). Moreover, the beliefs of public sector workers about the part-time penalty also correlate with perceived raw pay gaps in their occupation (Slope = 0.7, see Figure A.9). A classification of public sector workers into different belief types further shows that although a majority rationally expects near-linear wages (Type I), a non-negligible share of workers holds Type-II-beliefs consistent with selection neglect and/or overconfidence, with estimates ranging between 13 to 19 percent (Table A.13). Taken together, I document that workers expect part-time pay penalties even in occupations with linear wage mandates and that these beliefs correlate with perceptions about raw peer group wage gaps, as hypothesized by selection neglect theory.

In Table A.12, I show sample means and standard deviations of worker self-beliefs about the part-time penalty separately for public sector employees. Given limited sample size, I pool individuals from GSOEP-IS Sample I5 together with individuals from the experimental control group who receive the identical question on self-beliefs.


**Table A.12:** Public Sector Employees: Self-Beliefs about the Part-Time Penalty

	Public sector		Excl. civil servants		Civil servants	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Self-beliefs PT penalty (S.E.)	3.65 (1.16)	13.72	3.74 (1.27)	13.27	3.32 (2.72)	15.38

*Notes.* GSOEP-IS 2019, N (all public sector employees)= 223, N (excl. civil servants)= 166, N (civil servants)= 57. Cells contain perceived causal part-time wage penalties for a switch between working full-time (FT) and part-time (PT) in percent. S.E. = standard error, S.D. = standard deviation.

In Table A.13, I present a classification into different belief types separately for public sector employees, based on the pooled sample and self-beliefs about the part-time wage penalty. In line with the linear wage mandate, the rational benchmark for public sector employees is set to zero, with a tolerance  $\iota$  of 0.5 percent (e.g. workers are considered Type-I rational if they expect a part-time wage penalty between -0.5 and 0.5 percent).

## E.8 Additional Experimental Results



**Figure A.9:** Perceived Causal and Raw Part-Time Wage Gaps based on Public Sector Employees

*Notes:* Binned scatter with linear fit of the self-expected causal part-time penalty plotted against the perceived raw occupational wage gap between full-time and part-time workers, residualized for corrected occupation part-time wage gaps based on public sector employees. Dashed 45-degree line benchmarks full selection neglect. Occupation based on 3-digit KldB 2010. Data sources: GSOEP-IS 2019 (beliefs), VSE 2018 (raw gaps), GSOEP 2010-2019 (corrected gaps).

**Table A.13:** Belief Types based on Public Sector Employees

$\tilde{E}$ = Self-beliefs PT penalty	Public sector	Excl. civil servants	Civil servants
Type I	76.60	75.23	81.25
Type II	17.73	19.27	12.5
Type III	5.67	5.50	6.25
N	141	109	32

*Notes.* GSOEP-IS 2019. Cells contain shares in percent. Type I:  $\tilde{E}_i \in (-\iota, \iota)$ , Type II:  $\tilde{E}_i > \iota$ , Type III:  $\tilde{E}_i < -\iota$ , with tolerance  $\iota = 0.5$  percent.

**Table A.14:** Experimental Belief Types

$\tilde{E}$ = Self-beliefs PT penalty	Control group	Treatment 1	Treatment 2
Type I	61.89	49.82	53.98
Type II	27.62	39.64	33.04
Type III	10.49	10.55	12.98
N	286	275	339


*Notes.* GSOEP 2019. Cells contain shares in percent. Type I:  $\tilde{E}_i \in (ATT_{R_i} - \iota, ATT_{R_i} + \iota)$ , Type II:  $\tilde{E}_i > ATT_{R_i} + \iota$ , Type III:  $\tilde{E}_i < ATT_{R_i} - \iota$ , with tolerance  $\iota = 2$  percent and corrected occupation group part-time wage gap  $ATT_{R_i}$  based on the VSE 2018 and 3-digit occupation codes (KldB 2010).

**Table A.15:** Experimental Results: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

	Correlation treatment ( T1 vs. C)	Correlation inc. de-bias (T2 vs. C)	Overall treatment (Treat vs. C)	De-biasing effect (T2 vs. T1)
Full sample	3.49***	1.29	2.34**	-2.25*
Female $\times$ TE	-0.50	1.42	0.45	1.61
Full-time $\times$ TE	-0.64	-2.20	-1.30	-1.61
University $\times$ TE	0.76	-0.35	0.44	-0.88
Age > 45 $\times$ TE	-0.02	0.93	0.42	0.64
Eastern Germany $\times$ TE	-1.00	-2.41	-1.96	-1.55
Public sector $\times$ TE	-3.27	1.25	-0.71	4.32
Firm size > 200 $\times$ TE	0.32	0.28	0.35	-0.14
Temporary contract $\times$ TE	2.05	3.91	3.16	2.44
Managerial position $\times$ TE	-1.01	-2.06	-1.60	-1.06

*Notes.* GSOEP 2019. Dependent variable is the expected part-time penalty in percent. Cells contain coefficient estimates of subgroup indicators interacted with bivariate treatment indicators (TE) from multivariate regressions with controls for employment status (part-time/full-time), gender, education (basic/middle/university), age, region (east/west), employment sector (private/public), an indicator for firm size (>/< 200 employees) and a constant. Treat=T1+T2. Six individuals with missing values in the control variables were dropped. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

## E.9 Behavioral Implications



**Figure A.10:** Planned Transition Probabilities

*Notes:* Distribution of the subjective probability to switch from part-time to full-time (Panel A, part-time workers) and from full-time to part-time (Panel B, full-time workers) within the next 3 years. Data source: GSOEP-IS 2017-19.

**Table A.16:** Worker Beliefs and Realized Employment Transitions

Dep.Var. = Transition in t+1 (yes/no)	FT workers		PT workers	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Self-beliefs PT penalty	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.021 (0.024)	0.003** (0.001)	0.035* (0.019)
Planned transition probability	0.001 (0.001)	0.013 (0.010)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.032*** (0.009)
Raw PT wage gap	0.002 (0.002)	0.050 (0.045)	0.010* (0.005)	0.095** (0.047)
Adjusted PT wage gap	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.094 (0.086)	-0.016** (0.008)	-0.168** (0.067)
Public sector (yes/no)	-0.046 (0.042)	-0.978 (1.126)	-0.072 (0.048)	-1.165 (0.762)
Firm size > 200 (yes/no)	0.024 (0.027)	0.481 (0.616)	0.046 (0.043)	1.267 (0.852)
Education: medium	-0.010 (0.032)	-0.432 (0.820)	-0.045 (0.078)	-0.936 (0.858)
Education: university	-0.017 (0.037)	-0.481 (0.896)	0.072 (0.094)	0.327 (0.864)
Female (yes/no)	0.069** (0.034)	1.491** (0.644)	-0.203** (0.079)	-1.670*** (0.602)
Age in years	0.000 (0.001)	0.004 (0.025)	0.002 (0.002)	0.012 (0.032)
Eastern Germany (yes/no)	0.021 (0.039)	0.333 (0.617)	-0.073 (0.045)	-1.326 (0.877)
<i>N</i>	351	351	152	152
Estimation	LPM	Logistic	LPM	Logistic

*Notes.* GSOEP 2017-2019. Dependent variable is a binary indicator of transitioning from full-time to part-time (full-time workers) or from part-time to full-time (part-time workers) in the next year. Coefficient estimates from linear probability models (LPM) and logistic regressions. Base category for education is low education. Standard errors clustered at the person level in parentheses \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .