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[^0]No. 22-18

# Who Is Paying All These Fees? An Empirical Analysis of Bank Account and Credit Card Fees 

Oz Shy and Joanna Stavins


#### Abstract

: Banks impose a variety of account fees, and credit card issuers impose a variety of fees related to card usage. Using detailed data from a 2021 representative diary survey of US consumers, we investigate whether lower-income consumers and Black consumers are more likely to pay bank account or credit card fees, and how payment behavior varies depending on paying such fees. We find that the probability of paying several types of bank account and credit card fees is correlated with consumers' demographic attributes and payment behavior. The percentage of Black consumers who pay overdraft or low-balance fees on their bank accounts or pay late fees or cash-advance fees on their credit cards is higher than the percentage of White consumers who pay those fees. We find that lower-income consumers were significantly more likely to pay overdraft fees, and Black consumers were significantly more likely to pay any bank account fee when we hold income and account balances constant in the regressions. However, when controlling for income, we find that the race effect was smaller than in the summary statistics.


JEL Classifications: G21, G5, D14
Keywords: Bank account fees, credit card fees, fees by demographics, payment choice

[^1]This paper presents preliminary analysis and results intended to stimulate discussion and critical comment.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not indicate concurrence by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, the principals of the Board of Governors, or the Federal Reserve System.

This paper, which may be revised, is available on the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston at https://www.bostonfed.org/publications/research-department-working-paper.aspx.

## 1. Introduction

High account fees are one of the primary reasons why consumers choose not to have a bank account (FDIC 2020), and overdraft fees can be costly for low-income individuals (Prescott and Tatar 1999). The Overdraft Protection Act, recently considered by Congress, would regulate overdraft fees imposed by banks. ${ }^{2}$ Credit card issuers can also impose high fees on cardholders who fail to pay their full balance on time, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) just announced that it will assess whether late fees charged by credit card issuers are "reasonable and proportional." ${ }^{3}$ This paper investigates the following questions: Are fees assessed on bank account and credit card holders regressive-in other words, are lower-income consumers more likely to pay certain fees compared with higher-income consumers? Are there significant differences across consumers by age, race, and education?

We use data on a variety of fees paid by consumers on their bank accounts and credit cards from the 2021 Diary of Consumer Payment Choice (DCPC). Consumers with bank accounts were asked whether they paid any of the six types of account fees, such as overdraft and low-balance fees, and credit card holders were asked whether they paid any of the six types of fees associated with credit cards, such as late-payment and cash-advance fees. Because the diary collects detailed data on each respondent's income and demographic attributes, as well as information on payment-method adoption and use, we can analyze which consumers were more likely to pay the various fees and how payment behavior differed between consumers who paid various fees and those who did not pay those fees. Although bank account fees and credit card fees are imposed on different financial services and are therefore not directly related to each other, both types of fees can be paid disproportionally by consumers of a certain race or from a certain income cohort.

We find that the probability of paying several types of bank account and credit card fees is correlated with consumers' demographic attributes and payment behavior. The percentage of Black consumers who pay overdraft or low-balance fees on their bank accounts or pay late fees

[^2]or cash-advance fees on their credit cards is higher than the percentage of White consumers who pay those fees. Even when controlling for checking account balances in a regression, we find that lower-income consumers were significantly more likely to pay overdraft fees, and Black consumers were significantly more likely to pay any bank account fee when we hold income and account balances constant.

Studies on the prevalence of various types of fees are scarce, and the available data sources are not recent. A Pew survey conducted in 2012 found that 18 percent of consumers had incurred overdraft fees in the preceding year. The likelihood of paying overdraft fees was much higher among lower-income consumers, and consumers making less than $\$ 30,000$ a year were nearly twice as likely to incur an overdraft penalty fee compared with those making more than $\$ 30,000$ (Pew 2012). The FDIC (2020) finds that 34.2 percent of unbanked consumers stated that high bank account fees is one reason for their decision not to have a bank account, and 7.3 percent identified such fees as the main reason for not having a bank account. Stavins (2018) analyzes the role of consumer preferences for specific payment methods and how price discounts and surcharges based on payment method affect the choice of payment method at the point of sale. Using an administrative panel of credit card accounts from the CFPB's Credit Card Database, Grodzicki et al. (2022) investigate how credit card users respond to prices. They find that consumers internalize both rates and fees when making purchasing, borrowing, and laterpayment decisions on their card.

The goal of this paper is to explore how bank account and credit card fees are distributed across different demographic groups and to analyze the relationship between those fees and payment behavior. However, it is important to note that the relationship between fees and consumers' choices of whether to use payment methods affected by those fees exhibits a chicken-and-egg nature. A greater use of payments out of bank accounts and of credit cards makes it more profitable for financial institutions to raise their fees. In contrast, consumers may be deterred from using those payment methods when fees are raised. Our goal is not to suggest that certain types of fees should be eliminated or that consumers would be better off making other financial arrangements. Even though paying bank account or credit card fees may not be desirable for consumers, it is potentially less costly to maintain an account and pay fees than to
be unbanked. While banks maximize profits, consumers maximize their utility given the fees they might have to pay. ${ }^{4}$

The remaining sections of this paper are as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in the analysis. Section 3 summarizes various bank account fees paid by consumers, with an emphasis on differences by demographics, and Section 4 provides a similar analysis for credit card fees. Section 5 provides regression results estimating the probability of paying various fees on demographic and financial attributes. Section 6 concludes. In the Appendices, we extend the analysis to include results on the relationship between fees and account balances, and between fees and payment behavior.

## 2. Data

We use data from the 2021 Diary of Consumer Payment Choice (DCPC). ${ }^{5}$ The DCPC surveys a representative sample of US adults (18 and older). DCPC respondents report their checking and savings bank account holdings, list payment instruments they have (adopt), and report how they use those payment instruments. Payment instruments include cash, paper checks, credit cards, debit cards, prepaid cards, and electronic payments out of bank accounts. Consumers record all of their transactions during three consecutive days. Transactions include purchases (in person or online), bill payments, person-to-person payments, and ATM withdrawals and deposits.

Respondents' three-day diaries are evenly distributed throughout the month of October each year. Each October diary day has an equal number of overlapping respondents recording their first-, second-, and third-day payment information.

Although the DCPC has been administered annually since 2015, the 2021 edition was the first to include a relatively detailed set of questions about bank account and credit card fees paid by consumers. In addition to including new questions, the 2021 DCPC had many more

[^3]respondents than earlier editions did- 3,969 respondents, whereas each of the earlier surveys had fewer than 3,000 respondents.

Table 1 shows bank account and credit card adoption, mean checking account balances, and credit card revolving balances by income and demographic cohort. In total, 95 percent of consumers were banked, and 93 percent had a checking account in October 2021. The share of consumers who were banked increased with age, income, and education. White consumers were more likely to be banked than Black consumers, employed more likely than unemployed, homeowners more likely than renters, and married consumers more likely than those with any other marital status (separated, divorced, widowed, or never married). The average checking account balance also increased monotonically with income, age, and education. Among checking account adopters, a White consumer had more than three times as much money in their checking account compared with a Black consumer, on average: $\$ 6,323$ versus $\$ 2,037$.

Table 1 also shows that three-fourth of consumers (76 percent) had at least one credit card, and credit card adoption also increased monotonically with age, income, and education. While 78 percent of White respondents had a credit card, only 57 percent of Black consumers had one. Among credit card adopters, 41 percent carried an unpaid balance during the preceding month, and 45 percent carried an unpaid balance at some point during the preceding 12 months. Cardholders with an annual household income of $\$ 25,000$ to $\$ 50,000$ were more likely to revolve compared with those who had a lower or higher income. Black consumers and unemployed consumers were more likely to revolve compared with White consumers and employed consumers, respectively.

## 3. Bank Account Fees

In the DCPC survey, bank account holders were asked whether they paid each of the following fees:

## 1. Overdraft fees

2. Low-balance fees
3. ATM fees for withdrawing cash
4. Bounced-check fees
5. Too-many-transactions fees

## 6. Teller fees

Table 2 shows the percentage of bank account holders who paid each type of fee, by demographic and financial variables. All the numbers are weighted. ${ }^{6}$ Only slightly more than one-quarter of account holders-27 percent-paid any fees on their accounts. However, the prevalence of fees varied across consumers with different income levels and other characteristics.

Looking at the breakdown by income, we see that the percentage of consumers who paid fees for ATM cash withdrawals is similar across income cohorts. We do not find evidence that ATM fees are regressive. This would be expected, because ATM fees are not typically based on the dollar balance in the account; instead, they are charged for using out-of-network ATMs, regardless of the account balance.

Overdraft fees are charged when a consumer spends more money than they have in their account. This happens when the consumer uses a debit card, withdraws cash from an ATM, or writes a check for an amount greater than their account balance. Consumers who hold both a checking and a savings account at the same financial institution may have overdraft protection, which allows the bank to use funds available in both accounts to cover the transactions. ${ }^{7}$ While 10.9 percent of consumers paid an overdraft fee in 2021, that number varied across income cohorts: Consumers in the $\$ 25,000-\$ 50,000$ cohort were more than twice as likely to pay an overdraft fee compared with those in the $\$ 100,000$-and-above cohort, 16.3 percent versus 7.0 percent.

Low-balance fees are assessed when a bank requires the account holder to maintain a minimum balance in the account and the balance drops below that minimum. Some banks waive the fee if a consumer links their checking and savings accounts, or if other conditions (such as direct deposit of income) are met. Low-balance fees are less common than overdraft fees, with only 2.3 percent of consumers paying the fee in 2021 . However, low-income consumers were much more likely to pay low-balance fees, with 4.0 percent of consumers with income of less

[^4]than $\$ 25,000$ having paid the fee compared with 1.8 percent of consumers in the $\$ 50,000-$ $\$ 75,000$ income cohort and only 1.1 percent of those in the $\$ 75,000-\$ 100,000$ income cohort.

A "bounced"-check fee-assessed when the amount on a check exceeds the account balance ${ }^{8-w a s ~ a l s o ~ r a r e, ~ w i t h ~ o n l y ~} 1.0$ percent of all consumers having paid such a fee in 2021. However, 1.4 percent of consumers with an income of $\$ 25,000$ to $\$ 50,000$ and 2.4 percent with an income of $\$ 75,000$ to $\$ 100,000$ paid the fee, compared with 0.7 percent of consumers with an income of $\$ 100,000$ more.

Looking at the breakdown by race, Black consumers were significantly more likely to pay overdraft fees and low-balance fees compared with White consumers. Black consumers were more than 50 percent more likely to pay overdraft fees ( 17.3 percent versus 10.0 percent), and they were more than twice as likely to pay low-balance fees ( 4.6 percent versus 1.7 percent).

Overdraft fees were also much more common among consumers in the lowest credit score cohort (below 600) compared with those in the highest credit score cohort (over 800): 32.0 percent versus 2.3 percent.

Figure 1 displays the three types of bank account fees paid—overdraft fees, low-balance fees, and any fee-by race and by income. While the differences across income cohorts are not very large, the differences across race groups are more pronounced. Black consumers were substantially more likely to pay bank account fees compared with White consumers.

## 4. Credit Card Fees

Table 1 shows that approximately three-quarters of consumers had at least one credit card in 2021 (76 percent of the sample, weighted). Credit card adopters were asked whether they paid each of the following types of fees:

1. Late-payment fee
2. Cash-advance fee
3. Balance-transfer fee
4. Annual fee
5. Over-limit fee
[^5]
## 6. Foreign-transaction fee

Table 3 shows the percentage of credit card adopters who paid each type of fee by demographic and financial variables. All the numbers are weighted. As was the case with bank account fees, only one-quarter of consumers paid any credit card fees ( 25.8 percent). The most common type of credit card fee was the annual fee, with 18 percent of consumers paying it. The proportion of consumers who paid the annual credit card fee was highest for the top income cohort and lowest for the bottom income cohort. Because many credit cards that charge annual fees tend to offer high-level rewards such as airline miles, cash back, and/or free access to airport lounges, those cards are more likely to be owned by high-income consumers.

The next most common type of fee was for late payments, with 5.2 percent of all cardholders paying the fee in 2021. Low- to moderate-income consumers were much more likely to pay a late-payment fee. Those with a household income of $\$ 25,000$ to $\$ 50,000$ were most likely to pay the late-payment fee: In that cohort, 9.4 percent of consumers paid the fee, compared with 3.1 percent of consumers with an annual household income greater than $\$ 100,000$. Black consumers were more than twice as likely as White consumers to pay the latepayment fee: 10.8 percent versus 4.4 percent. Also, consumers with low levels of education were more likely to pay the fee compared with those with high levels of education. Regression analysis enables us separate the effects of income and race from other factors.

Credit scores reflect the likelihood of default, so it is not surprising that the incidence of paying a late-payment fee decreases with rising credit scores. Almost 26 percent of consumers in the bottom credit score bracket (below 600) paid the fee, compared with 2.2 percent of consumers in the top credit score bracket (over 800).

Figure 2 displays the three types of credit card fees-late fees, cash-advance fees, and any fees-by race and by income. As was the case with bank account fees, Black consumers were substantially more likely than White consumers to pay any credit card fees.

## 5. Regression Results

In this section, we estimate the probability of paying various types of fees as a function of consumers' demographic and income attributes and account balances. We test the hypothesis that low-income consumers and Black consumers were more likely to pay certain types of fees when controlling for other observable characteristics. We estimate the following regression models:
$\operatorname{Pr}\left(\right.$ accountfee $\left._{i j}=1\right)=f\left(\right.$ BALANCE $_{i}$, SAV $_{i}, I N C_{i}$, DEM $\left._{i}, E M P_{i}\right)$
$\operatorname{Pr}\left(\right.$ creditcardfee $\left._{i j}=1\right)=f\left(\right.$ BALANCE $_{i}$, SAV $_{i}, I N C_{i}$, DEM $\left._{i}, E M P_{i}\right)$
where accountfee $_{i j}=1$ if consumer $i$ paid fee type $j$ on their bank account during the preceding 12 months and 0 otherwise, $j=\{$ overdraft fee, low-balance fee, ATM fee, any fee $\}$ and creditcardfee $_{i j}=1$ if consumer $i$ paid fee type $j$ on their credit card account during the preceding 12 months and 0 otherwise, $j=\{$ late-payment fee, cash-advance fee, annual fee, any fee $\}$; $B A L A N C E_{i}$ is the balance in consumer $i$ 's checking account at the time of the survey; $S A V_{i}$ is a dummy variable indicating whether consumer $i$ has a savings account; ${ }^{9} I N C_{i}$ is a vector of dummy variables equal to 1 if consumer $i$ 's annual household income is in a given cohort \{below $\$ 25 \mathrm{~K}, \$ 25 \mathrm{~K}-\$ 50 \mathrm{~K}, \$ 50 \mathrm{~K}-\$ 75 \mathrm{~K}, \$ 75 \mathrm{~K}-\$ 100 \mathrm{~K}$, above $\$ 100 \mathrm{~K}\} ; D E M_{i}$ is a set of demographic variables for consumer $i$ (race, ethnicity, age, gender, education, marital status, homeownership, urban/rural); and $E M P_{i}$ is consumer $i$ 's employment status \{employed, unemployed, retired $\}$.

We estimate equations (1) and (2) using probit. Table 4 displays the estimated marginal effects at means for bank account fees, and Table 5 shows them for credit card fees. In addition to testing whether there were significant differences across income and demographic cohorts, we also test whether such differences exist even after controlling for the checking account balance and for whether the respondent has a savings account. Specification (a) is estimated without $B_{A L A N C E}^{i}$ or $S A V_{i}$, while specification (b) includes both variables.

[^6]
## A. Regression results: Bank account fees

Lower-income consumers were significantly more likely to pay overdraft fees on their account compared with higher-income consumers. Compared with consumers whose annual household income was more than $\$ 100,000$, those with a household income of less than $\$ 25,000$ had a 6.9 percentage point higher probability of paying an overdraft fee in the preceding 12 months, and those with a household income of $\$ 25,000$ to $\$ 50,000 \mathrm{had}$ an 8.1 percentage point higher probability (column (1) (a)). Even after holding the checking account balance and savings account adoption constant, we find that lower-income consumers were significantly more likely to pay an overdraft fee, although the magnitude of the effect was smaller: Compared with consumers who had an annual household income of more than $\$ 100,000$, consumers with a household income of less than $\$ 25,000$ had a 3.7 percentage point higher probability of paying an overdraft fee in the preceding 12 months, and those with a household income of $\$ 25,000$ to $\$ 50,000$ had a 5.3 percentage point higher probability (column (1)(b)). Asian consumers were significantly less likely to pay an overdraft fee compared with White consumers, but there was no significant difference between the probabilities of Black and White consumers paying an overdraft fee.

Holding a larger balance in a checking account significantly reduced the likelihood of paying an overdraft fee, but the effect was small in magnitude. A $\$ 1,000$ larger balance was associated with a 0.6 percentage point lower probability of paying the fee. Consumers can overdraft even if they typically tend to hold a large balance because they may not be able to control the exact timing of inflows and outflows to and from their checking account. Having a savings account in addition to a checking account also significantly reduced the probability of paying an overdraft fee, and the magnitude of that effect was greater: Consumers who held both types of accounts were 1.6 percent less likely to pay the fee.

Column (4) shows the results of a regression estimating the probabilities of various consumer groups having paid any fee in the preceding 12 months. Controlling for income and other characteristics, we find that Black consumers had a 6.7 percentage point higher probability of paying any fees compared with White consumers. When we hold checking account balances and savings account adoption constant, the effect is even greater: Black consumers had a 7.3 percentage point higher probability of paying any fees compared with White consumers. Asian
consumers had a 10.9 percentage point lower probability of paying any fees (and a 11.6 percentage point lower probability of paying any fees when we control for checking account balances and savings account adoption).

Holding a savings account reduced the probability of paying any bank account fees by 6.4 percentage points. Controlling for income and demographics, we find that homeowners were less likely to pay any type of fee, possibly because homeowners tend to be more conscientious in terms of budgeting and maintaining a minimum balance in their accounts. A homeowner had an 8.3 percentage point lower probability of paying any fee compared with a renter, all else held constant (and a 7.7 percentage point lower probability when we control for account balances). Compared with employed consumers, an unemployed person had a 6.5 percentage higher probability of paying some fee, while a retired person had a 7.1 percentage lower probability of paying a fee, even when we control for age.

## B. Regression results: Credit card fees

The results of regressions estimating the probabilities of different consumer groups paying credit card fees are in Table 5. As in Table 4, column (a) shows the specification without the checking account balance, while column (b) shows the specification with checking account balances and savings account adoption included. Lower-income consumers had a significantly higher probability of paying a late-payment fee compared with higher-income consumers (column (1)), regardless of whether we control for their checking account balances and savings account adoption. Compared with consumers with an annual household income of more than $\$ 100,000$, those with a household income of less than $\$ 25,000 \mathrm{had}$ a 5.3 percentage point higher probability of paying a late-payment fee in the preceding 12 months ( 4.5 percentage points when we control for account balances and savings account adoption), and those with a household income of $\$ 25,000$ to $\$ 50,000$ had a 5.2 percentage point higher probability ( 4.6 percentage points when we control for account balances and savings account adoption).

Annual fees are more commonly paid by higher-income consumers, as those fees are associated with cards that offer high perks such as reward points and airline miles. Compared with consumers whose annual household income is more than $\$ 100,000$, those with a household income of less than $\$ 25,000$ had a 9.9 percentage point lower probability of paying an annual credit card fee in the preceding 12 months, and those with a household income of $\$ 25,000$ to
$\$ 50,000$ had an 8.9 percentage point lower probability (column (3)). The effect of education on the probability of paying annual credit card fees was even stronger than the effect of income: Less-educated consumers were significantly less likely to pay an annual fee, even when income is held constant.

Income's effect on the probability of paying an annual fee was stronger than its effect on the probability of paying a late-payment fee. As a result, the lowest-income consumers were less likely to pay any fee compared with higher-income consumers, although the overall effect was not highly significant.

Compared with White consumers, a Black cardholder had a 7.3 percentage point higher probability of paying some type of credit card fee ( 8.4 percentage points when we control for account balances and saving account adoption). Homeowners had a 6.8 percentage point lower probability of paying some type of credit card fee.

## 6. Conclusion

Bank account fees are one of the main reasons why consumers do not have a bank account, and paying such fees affects consumers' attitudes toward banking. We use data from a 2021 representative diary survey of US adults to test whether lower-income consumers and Black consumers with bank accounts were more likely to pay fees on their accounts or on their credit cards. We find some evidence that lower-income consumers were more likely to pay overdraft and low-balance fees, even when we control for other characteristics such as their bank account balances at the time of the survey and savings account adoption. We also find that Black consumers were more likely to pay some bank account fees compared with White consumers when we hold income and bank account balances constant, although when we control for income in regressions, the effect of race becomes less significant than it is in the summary statistics. Lower-income consumers were also more likely to pay late-payment fees on their credit cards. Tracking the same consumers in future diary surveys will allow us to assess the effect of paying fees on subsequent banking relationships and payment decisions.

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Figure 1. Percentage of bank account adopters who paid any fee, overdraft fee, and low-balance fee, by race and income


Source: 2021 Diary of Consumer Payment Choice.

Figure 2. Percentage of credit card adopters who paid any fee, late fee, and cash-advance fee, by race and income


Source: 2021 Diary of Consumer Payment Choice.

Table 1. Bank account and credit card variables by demographic and income cohorts


## Source: 2021 Diary of Consumer Payment Choice.

## Note: Results are weighted.

Table 2. Percentage of bank account adopters who paid fees on their primary bank account in the preceding 12 months, by fee type and demographic/financial health variables
$\left.\begin{array}{lr|ccccccc|cc}\hline & & \begin{array}{c}\text { ATM fees for } \\ \text { withdrawing } \\ \text { cash }\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}\text { Overdraft } \\ \text { fees }\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}\text { Bounced } \\ \text {-check } \\ \text { fees }\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}\text { Low- } \\ \text { balance } \\ \text { fees }\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}\text { Too-many- } \\ \text { transactions } \\ \text { fees }\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}\text { Teller } \\ \text { fees }\end{array} & \text { Any fee }\end{array} \begin{array}{c}\text { Number } \\ \text { of } \\ \text { Obs }\end{array} \begin{array}{c}\text { Weighted } \\ \text { Num } \\ \text { of Obs }\end{array}\right]$

Source: 2021 Diary of Consumer Payment Choice.
Notes: Results are weighted. Stars indicate the result of a t-test for difference in mean between members of the demographic group and others. ${ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.10,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05,{ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01$.

Table 3. Percent of credit card adopters who paid fees on their primary credit card in the preceding 12 months, by fee type and demographic/financial health variables

|  |  | Cash- <br> advance fee | Late- payment fee | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { Balance- } \\ \text { transfer } \\ \text { fee } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | Annual fee | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { Over- } \\ \text { limit } \\ \text { fee } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Foreign- } \\ \text { transaction } \\ \text { fee } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | Any fee | Number of Obs | Weighted Num of Obs |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| All |  | 1.8 | 5.2 | 2.7 | 18.0 | 0.9 | 1.6 | 25.8 | 3197 | 3197 |
| Age | Under 25 | 0.5** | 5.5 | 0.4*** | 14.0 | 4.0 | 1.6 | 21.1 | 74 | 146 |
|  | 25-34 | 2.3 | 7.2 | 2.3 | 17.6 | 0.8 | 2.3 | 26.9 | 334 | 672 |
|  | 35-44 | 0.7*** | 6.3 | 3.9 | 22.3** | 1.8 | 2.2 | 30.8** | 594 | 497 |
|  | 45-54 | 2.7 | 6.5 | 4.9** | 18.3 | 0.8 | 1.5 | 27.5 | 587 | 506 |
|  | 55-64 | 2.7 | 5.4 | 2.1 | 17.3 | 0.5 | 0.8** | 25.2 | 694 | 554 |
|  | $65+$ | 1.2 | 2.0 *** | 1.6** | 16.6 | 0.5 | 1.3 | 22.0** | 913 | 821 |
| Income | < \$25,000 | 2.1 | 5.9 | 2.6 | 13.8** | 1.2 | 0.3*** | 21.4* | 440 | 431 |
|  | \$25,000-\$49,999 | 3.6* | 9.4*** | 2.3 | 17.0 | 1.5 | 2.5 | 27.4 | 542 | 559 |
|  | \$50,000-\$74,999 | 2.4 | 6.3 | 2.4 | 14.8* | 1.0 | 1.8 | 24.5 | 558 | 538 |
|  | \$75,000-\$99,999 | 2.4 | 3.9 | 3.2 | 16.7 | 1.7 | 2.6 | 26.0 | 526 | 453 |
|  | $\geq$ \$100, 000 | 0.5*** | 3.1 *** | 2.8 | 21.8*** | 0.3** | 1.2 | 27.1 | 1127 | 1215 |
| Education | Less Than High School | 2.1 | 9.7 | 3.0 | 13.8 | 0.0*** | 0.0*** | 25.5 | 66 | 114 |
|  | High School | 1.9 | 3.8 | 2.8 | 12.8*** | 0.9 | 1.2 | 20.3*** | 427 | 864 |
|  | Some College | 3.1* | 6.4 | 3.2 | 15.3 | 2.2 | 1.1 | 26.3 | 641 | 521 |
|  | College | 1.9 | 5.8 | 2.5 | 19.9 | 0.9 | 1.9 | 26.9 | 1344 | 1065 |
|  | Graduate | 0.5*** | 4.5 | 2.2 | 24.9*** | 0.2*** | 2.4 | 31.1*** | 718 | 632 |
| Gender | Male | 2.0 | 4.1** | 3.5* | 17.8 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 25.1 | 1349 | 1515 |
|  | Female | 1.7 | 6.3** | 2.0* | 18.1 | 0.9 | 1.3 | 26.4 | 1848 | 1682 |
| Ethnicity | Latino | 1.7 | 5.3 | 4.0 | 23.4 | 1.0 | 2.5 | 30.6 | 191 | 329 |
|  | Non-Latino | 1.9 | 5.2 | 2.5 | 17.4 | 0.9 | 1.5 | 25.2 | 3006 | 2868 |
| Race | White | 1.5 | 4.4** | 2.7 | 16.6** | 0.6 | 1.4 | 24.1** | 2715 | 2350 |
|  | Black | 5.5** | 10.8** | 2.6 | 22.2 | 3.4 | 0.7 | 34.2** | 193 | 326 |
|  | Asian | 0.0*** | 2.8 | 1.5 | 22.1 | 0.0*** | 2.6 | 28.0 | 105 | 213 |
|  | Other | 2.1 | 7.1 | 3.1 | 21.6 | 1.4 | 3.7 | 28.3 | 175 | 300 |
| Home | Homeowner | 1.6 | 4.3** | 2.9 | 16.8* | 0.8 | 1.4 | 24.6* | 2466 | 2264 |
| Ownership | Non-homeowner | 2.5 | 7.5** | 2.0 | 20.8* | 1.2 | 2.1 | 28.8* | 731 | 933 |
| Work <br> Status | Employed | 2.2 | 6.0* | 3.0 | 19.1 | 1.0 | 1.9 | 28.0*** | 1807 | 1937 |
|  | Unemployed | 1.3 | 11.3* | 3.9 | 15.6 | 2.3 | 5.8 | 27.4 | 108 | 123 |
|  | Retired | 0.6*** | 1.3 *** | 1.5** | 16.7 | 0.5 | 1.0 | 20.2*** | 761 | 635 |
|  | Disabled/other | 2.2 | 5.8 | 2.6 | 16.0 | 1.1 | 0.3*** | 23.8 | 518 | 498 |
| Marital Status | Married | 1.3* | 4.8 | 3.2* | 18.5 | 1.1 | 2.0 | 25.7 | 2039 | 1899 |
|  | Separated | 1.4 | 3.5 | $0.3^{* * *}$ | 17.8 | 0.0*** | 1.9 | 24.9 | 31 | 28 |
|  | Divorced | 2.3 | 4.8 | 3.4 | 17.0 | 0.3** | 0.4*** | 23.8 | 447 | 388 |
|  | Widowed | 3.2 | 3.5 | 2.1 | 12.5* | 0.0*** | 0.0 *** | 20.3 | 179 | 199 |
|  | Never Married | 2.7 | 7.2* | $1.2 * * *$ | 18.6 | 1.2 | 1.7 | 28.7 | 501 | 683 |
| Urbanicity | Rural | 2.1 | 3.2 ** | 1.5** | 12.7*** | 1.7 | 1.0 | 18.7*** | 648 | 544 |
|  | Urban | 1.9 | 4.7 | 2.5 | 22.1*** | 0.3** | 1.8 | 29.7** | 855 | 971 |
|  | Mixed | 1.7 | 6.2* | 3.2 | 17.3 | 1.1 | 1.7 | 25.9 | 1692 | 1679 |
| FICO Score | <600 | 3.1 | 25.8*** | 0.1 *** | 23.8 | 5.4* | 0.0*** | 40.9** | 109 | 103 |
|  | 600-649 | 5.3* | 11.9*** | 2.2 | 31.0*** | 3.7** | 1.4 | 40.1*** | 211 | 281 |
|  | 650-699 | 5.2** | 10.5** | 2.0 | 22.4 | 1.9 | 1.3 | $33.7 * *$ | 286 | 299 |
|  | 700-749 | 2.7 | 4.3 | 3.5 | 13.9** | 0.4** | 1.5 | 23.3 | 570 | 618 |
|  | 750-800 | $0.3 * * *$ | 3.0 *** | 4.3** | 15.0** | 0.3** | 2.8* | 22.9* | 814 | 819 |
|  | >800 | 0.4*** | 2.2*** | 1.6** | 18.2 | 0.0*** | 1.3 | 22.8** | 1034 | 899 |
|  | unknown | 1.3 | 2.8 | $0.4^{* * *}$ | 14.0 | 2.1 | 0.4** | 18.6* | 173 | 178 |
| Revolving CC Balance | in last 12 mo | $3.2 * * *$ | 9.4*** | 5.1 *** | 20.6*** | 1.9*** | 1.2 | 32.8*** | 1453 | 1443 |
|  | not in last 12 mo | $0.7 * * *$ | 1.8 *** | $0.7 * * *$ | 15.8*** | 0.2*** | 2.0 | 20.1*** | 1744 | 1754 |
|  | in last mo | $3.2 * * *$ | 9.4*** | 5.3 *** | 20.7** | 2.1*** | 1.3 | 33.2*** | 1325 | 1305 |
|  | not in last mo | $0.9 * * *$ | 2.4*** | $0.8^{* * *}$ | 16.1** | 0.2*** | 1.9 | 20.6*** | 1867 | 1888 |

## Source: 2021 Diary of Consumer Payment Choice.

Notes: Results are weighted. Stars indicate the result of a t-test for difference in mean between members of the demographic group and non-members. ${ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.10,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05,{ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01$.

Table 4. Probit regression results, probability of paying various bank account fees in the preceding 12 months

|  |  | (1) <br> Overdraft |  | (2) <br> Low-balance |  | (3) <br> ATM |  | (4) <br> Any |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) |
| Checking ac <br> Savings acco | balance (\$1000) <br> nt adopter |  | $\begin{gathered} \hline-0.006 * * * \\ -0.016 * \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.000 \\ -0.003 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.000 \\ -0.046 * * * \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.000 \\ -0.064 * * * \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| Age | Under 25 | 0.005 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.077* | 0.076* | 0.078 | 0.082 |
|  | 25-34 | 0.058*** | 0.041** | 0.012 | 0.012 | 0.099*** | 0.102*** | 0.135*** | 0.137*** |
|  | 35-44 | 0.069*** | 0.050*** | 0.024*** | 0.024*** | 0.123*** | 0.124*** | 0.159*** | 0.157*** |
|  | 45-54 | 0.063*** | 0.048*** | 0.010 | 0.010 | 0.084*** | 0.081*** | 0.116*** | 0.114*** |
|  | 55-64 | 0.022 | 0.017 | 0.011* | 0.012* | 0.047** | 0.047** | 0.051** | 0.053** |
|  | Over 65 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Income | Less than \$25,000 | 0.069*** | 0.037*** | 0.012 | 0.011 | -0.024 | -0.029 | 0.044* | 0.031 |
|  | \$25,000-\$49,999 | 0.081*** | 0.053*** | 0.003 | 0.003 | -0.005 | -0.011 | 0.053** | 0.044* |
|  | \$50,000-\$74,999 | 0.035*** | 0.019* | 0.003 | 0.004 | -0.005 | -0.006 | 0.021 | 0.018 |
|  | \$75,000-\$99,999 | 0.017 | 0.008 | -0.003 | -0.003 | 0.016 | 0.016 | 0.014 | 0.013 |
|  | ore than \$100,000 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Education | Than High School | 0.016 | -0.005 | -0.007 | -0.007 | 0.009 | -0.005 | 0.052 | 0.027 |
|  | High School | 0.005 | -0.010 | -0.003 | -0.003 | 0.009 | 0.002 | 0.013 | 0.004 |
|  | Some College | 0.021 | 0.004 | 0.007 | 0.008 | -0.006 | -0.008 | 0.021 | 0.017 |
|  | College | -0.002 | -0.012 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.015 | 0.014 | 0.008 | 0.005 |
|  | Graduate | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Gender | Male | -0.026*** | -0.016** | 0.001 | 0.001 | -0.004 | -0.008 | -0.018 | -0.022 |
|  | Female | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Ethnicity | Latino | 0.003 | 0.000 | 0.002 | 0.002 | -0.039* | -0.039* | -0.027 | -0.031 |
|  | Non-Latino | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Race | Black | 0.024 | 0.015 | 0.012 | 0.012 | 0.021 | 0.023 | 0.067** | 0.073** |
|  | Asian | -0.067*** | -0.049*** | 0.027 | 0.028 | $-0.078^{* * *}$ | -0.078*** | $-0.109^{* * *}$ | -0.116*** |
|  | Other | 0.019 | 0.011 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.014 | 0.009 | 0.030 | 0.026 |
|  | White | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Home | Homeowner | -0.046*** | $-0.031^{* * *}$ | -0.002 | -0.002 | -0.075*** | -0.074*** | -0.083*** | -0.077*** |
| Ownership | Non-homeowner | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Work Status | Unemployed | -0.011 | -0.007 | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.093*** | 0.085** | 0.065* | 0.056 |
|  | Retired | $-0.032 * *$ | -0.021 | 0.002 | 0.002 | -0.045** | -0.045** | $-0.071^{* * *}$ | -0.068*** |
|  | Disabled/other | 0.000 | 0.002 | 0.003 | 0.003 | -0.005 | -0.008 | -0.005 | -0.006 |
|  | Employed | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Marital Status | Separated | -0.031 | -0.027 | 0.006 | 0.005 | 0.022 | 0.021 | 0.069 | 0.070 |
|  | Divorced | -0.023* | -0.020* | 0.003 | 0.004 | 0.029 | 0.028 | 0.022 | 0.020 |
|  | Widowed | -0.022 | -0.019 | 0.003 | 0.003 | -0.026 | -0.026 | 0.008 | 0.002 |
|  | Never Married | -0.018 | -0.012 | 0.011 | 0.011 | -0.023 | -0.028 | -0.015 | -0.018 |
|  | Married | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Urbanicity | Urban | 0.002 | 0.006 | -0.011 | -0.011 | 0.022 | 0.023 | 0.007 | 0.014 |
|  | Mixed | 0.011 | 0.011 | -0.010 | -0.011 | 0.019 | 0.023 | 0.012 | 0.018 |
|  | Rural | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Pseudo R-Squared |  | 0.074 | 0.099 | 0.056 | 0.059 | 0.051 | 0.053 | 0.055 | 0.057 |
| Number of Respondents |  | 3,762 | 3,690 | 3,762 | 3,690 | 3,762 | 3,690 | 3,762 | 3,690 |

Source: 2021 Diary of Consumer Payment Choice.
Notes: Dependent variable $=1$ if respondents paid a fee, 0 otherwise. Specification (a) is estimated without checking account balance and whether the respondent has a savings account, while specification (b) includes those variables. Results are reported as marginal effects at means, * $\mathrm{p}<0.10,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05,{ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01$. The sample is limited to bank account adopters. "--" denotes the reference group.

Table 5. Probit regression results, probability of paying various credit card fees in the preceding 12 months


Source: 2021 Diary of Consumer Payment Choice.
Notes: Dependent variable $=1$ if respondents paid a fee, 0 otherwise. Specification (a) is estimated without checking account balance and whether the respondent has a savings account, while specification (b) includes those variables. Results are reported as marginal effects at means, $* \mathrm{p}<0.10,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05,{ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01$. The sample limited to credit card adopters. "--" denotes the reference group. Asian is omitted from the cashadvance regression because no Asian respondents paid the fee.

## Appendix A: Bank Account Fees and Account Balances

We expect that consumers who paid an overdraft fee or a low-balance fee on their bank account did, in fact, keep a lower balance in their account compared with consumers who did not pay such fees, regardless of their income, race, or any other attributes. We do find that consumers who did not pay an overdraft fee maintained a checking account balance that was, on average, about six times the balance maintained by consumers who did pay such a fee: $\$ 6,363$ versus $\$ 1,110$. The average balance for those who did not pay a low-balance fee was about twice as high as the average for those who did pay: $\$ 5,849$ versus $\$ 3,129$ (Table $6 a$ ).

Although we find that the incidence of paying an overdraft or low-balance fee is negatively correlated with the account balance, some consumers who maintained a relatively high balance paid a fee, and some who maintained a low balance avoided paying a fee. Because the data were collected in October and the questions pertained to the preceding 12 months, it is possible that respondents changed the amount of money they kept in their bank account at some point during the year. Among consumers who paid the overdraft fee, 78 percent maintained an average checking account balance that was less than the median value of $\$ 1,421$, while 22 percent had a balance that was greater than the median (Table 6b). Among consumers who paid a low-balance fee, 69 percent had a balance that was less than the median and 31 percent had a balance that was greater than the median.

## Appendix B: Bank Account Fees and Payment Behavior

We examine whether consumers who paid bank account fees were more likely to exhibit different behavior in their choice of payment methods and the number and value of payments they made in a given period. Table 7 displays the average number of transactions, and Table 8 displays the dollar value of transactions conducted using each payment instrument, broken down by consumers who either paid or did not pay each type of account fee. As would be expected, consumers who paid ATM cash withdrawal fees used cash more frequently and spent more in cash than those who did not pay ATM fees. Consumers who paid overdraft fees made 4.4 credit card transactions with a combined value of $\$ 391$ in a month, while those who did not pay overdraft fees made 11.5 credit card transactions with a combined value of $\$ 942$, on average. Thus, consumers who did not pay overdraft fees spent more than twice as much using credit cards compared with those who paid fees. Similarly, consumers who paid bounced-check fees or
"too-many-transactions" fees spent less using credit cards than those who did not pay such fees. Consumers who had low account balances were more likely to pay fees on their bank accounts, but they did not seem to rely on credit cards more heavily compared with those who did not pay such fees.

## Appendix C: Credit Card Fees and Account Balances

Even though credit card fees are not directly related to cardholders' bank account balances, consumers who paid a late-payment fee or a cash-advance fee on their credit cards were likely to have a lower checking account balance, on average, compared with consumers who did not pay these fees. That is because consumers who maintain low account balances are more likely to be liquidity constrained and might need to borrow on their credit cards.

As with bank account fees, we find that consumers who did not pay a late-payment fee on their credit cards maintained, on average, more than twice as much money in their checking account compared with consumers who did pay such a fee: $\$ 6,926$ versus $\$ 3,353$ (Table 6a). The average balance for consumers who paid a cash-advance fee was about five times higher than for those who did not pay the fee: $\$ 6,838$ versus $\$ 1,404$. Among consumers who paid a late-payment fee, 63 percent maintained an average checking account balance that was less than the median value of $\$ 1,421$, while 37 percent had a balance that was greater than the median (Table 6 b). Among consumers who paid a cash-advance fee, 72 percent had a balance that was less than the median and 28 percent had a balance that was greater the median. Again, there is a negative correlation between a consumer's likelihood of paying a fee and their bank account balance, but these variables are not perfectly correlated.

## Appendix D: Credit Card Fees and Payment Behavior

Table 9 shows the average number of transactions, and Table 10 shows the dollar value of transactions conducted using each payment instrument, broken down by consumers who either paid or did not pay each type of credit card fee. Consumers who paid a late-payment fee used debit cards more frequently and credit cards less frequently compared with those who did not pay the fee, but the overall amount spent on either credit or debit cards was not significantly different between the two groups.

Table 6a. Average checking account balance (\$) among respondents who paid a given fee ("Yes" column) or did not pay a fee ("No" column)

| Paid fee? | Yes | No |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Bank account fees: |  |  |  |
| Overdraft fee | 1110 | 6363 | $* * *$ |
| Low-balance fee | 3129 | 5849 | $* *$ |
| Credit card fees: |  |  |  |
| Late-payment fee | 3353 | 6926 | $* * *$ |
| Cash-advance fee | 1404 | 6838 | $* * *$ |

Source: 2021 Dia ry of Consumer Payment Choice.
Notes: Results are weighted. $* * *$ indicate that the a verage checking a ccount balance differed significantly between those who paid a given fee and those who did notpay the fee.

Table 6 b . Among respondents who paid a given fee, percentage of respondents who maintained a checking account balance below the median (left column) and above the median (right column)

|  | Checking account balance <br> Above <br> Below <br> $\mathbf{( \mathbf { \$ 1 , 4 2 1 } )}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 , 4 2 1 )}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Bank account fees: |  |  |
| Paid overdraft fee | 78.3 | 21.7 |
| Paid low-balance fee | 68.7 | 31.3 |
| Credit card fees: |  |  |
| Paid late-payment fee <br> Paid cash-advance <br> fee | 62.7 | 37.3 |

Source: 2021 Diary of Consumer Payment Choice.
Notes: Results are weighted. Forexample, on average during the three-day dia ry period, 21.7 percent of respondents who paid a n overdraft fee in the preceding 12 months had a checking a ccount balance greater than the sample medianof $\$ 1,421$.

Table 7. Average number of monthly payments among bank account adopters who paid or did not pay fees in the preceding 12 months

|  | ATM fees forwithdrawing cashyes no |  |  | Overdraft fees |  |  | Bounced-check fees |  |  | Low-balance fees |  |  | Too-manytransactions fees |  |  | Teller fees |  |  | Any fee |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | yes | no |  | yes | no |  | yes | no |  | yes | no |  | yes | no |  | yes | no |  |
| All Payments | 45.4 | 35.4 | *** | 38.2 | 37.1 |  | 26.3 | 37.3 | ** | 46.6 | 37.0 |  | 39.1 | 37.2 |  | 35.2 | 37.2 |  | 43.0 | 35.1 | *** |
| Paper | 9.4 | 8.2 |  | 7.4 | 8.5 |  | 7.3 | 8.4 |  | 9.7 | 8.4 |  | 5.5 | 8.4 | * | 10.9 | 8.4 |  | 8.9 | 8.2 |  |
| Cash | 7.9 | 6.4 | ** | 6.1 | 6.7 |  | 6.5 | 6.6 |  | 8.2 | 6.6 |  | 5.1 | 6.7 |  | 7.2 | 6.6 |  | 7.4 | 6.4 |  |
| Check | 1.1 | 1.8 | ** | 1.3 | 1.7 |  | 0.7 | 1.7 |  | 1.5 | 1.6 |  | 0.4 | 1.7 | *** | 3.1 | 1.6 |  | 1.2 | 1.8 | ** |
| Money order | 0.3 | 0.1 |  | 0.1 | 0.1 |  | 0.0 | 0.1 | *** | 0.0 | 0.1 | *** | 0.0 | 0.1 | *** | 0.6 | 0.1 |  | 0.3 | 0.1 |  |
| Card | 28.5 | 21.1 | *** | 24.4 | 22.3 |  | 11.1 | 22.6 | *** | 28.3 | 22.4 |  | 25.6 | 22.5 |  | 20.4 | 22.5 |  | 26.9 | 20.9 | *** |
| Debit | 18.2 | 9.4 | *** | 18.8 | 10.1 | *** | 9.3 | 11.0 |  | 13.2 | 11.0 |  | 23.8 | 10.9 | ** | 13.3 | 11.0 |  | 17.7 | 8.6 | *** |
| Credit | 9.4 | 11.0 |  | 4.4 | 11.5 | *** | 1.1 | 10.8 | *** | 14.5 | 10.6 |  | 1.5 | 10.8 | *** | 5.6 | 10.7 | * | 8.3 | 11.6 | *** |
| Prepaid | 1.0 | 0.7 |  | 1.2 | 0.7 |  | 0.7 | 0.7 |  | 0.6 | 0.7 |  | 0.3 | 0.7 | ** | 1.5 | 0.7 |  | 1.0 | 0.7 |  |
| Electronic | 5.6 | 4.7 |  | 4.7 | 4.9 |  | 3.3 | 4.9 |  | 6.2 | 4.9 |  | 3.2 | 4.9 |  | 1.3 | 4.9 | *** | 5.4 | 4.7 |  |
| BANP | 3.2 | 2.5 | * | 2.9 | 2.5 |  | 2.9 | 2.6 |  | 3.1 | 2.6 |  | 1.2 | 2.6 | ** | 0.6 | 2.6 | *** | 3.1 | 2.4 | * |
| OBBP | 2.4 | 2.3 |  | 1.8 | 2.4 |  | 0.4 | 2.3 | *** | 3.1 | 2.3 |  | 2.0 | 2.3 |  | 0.7 | 2.3 | *** | 2.3 | 2.3 |  |
| Other | 1.9 | 1.3 |  | 1.7 | 1.4 |  | 4.7 | 1.4 | *** | 2.5 | 1.4 |  | 4.8 | 1.4 |  | 2.6 | 1.4 |  | 1.8 | 1.3 | * |
| Mobile payment app | 0.2 | 0.2 |  | 0.3 | 0.2 |  | 2.1 | 0.2 | * | 1.1 | 0.2 | * | 0.3 | 0.2 |  | 1.0 | 0.2 |  | 0.3 | 0.2 |  |
| Account to account | 0.3 | 0.4 |  | 0.4 | 0.4 |  | 1.9 | 0.4 |  | 0.6 | 0.4 |  | 0.6 | 0.4 |  | 0.5 | 0.4 |  | 0.3 | 0.4 |  |
| Income deduction | 0.3 | 0.1 |  | 0.0 | 0.1 |  | 0.0 | 0.1 | *** | 0.1 | 0.1 |  | 0.0 | 0.1 | *** | 0.2 | 0.1 |  | 0.2 | 0.1 |  |
| Other | 1.1 | 0.6 | * | 0.9 | 0.7 |  | 0.6 | 0.7 |  | 0.6 | 0.7 |  | 3.9 | 0.7 |  | 0.9 | 0.7 |  | 0.9 | 0.6 | * |
| Number of Respondents | 656 | 3130 |  | 384 | 3402 |  | 36 | 3750 |  | 79 | 3707 |  | 40 | 3746 |  | 27 | 3759 |  | 963 | 2823 |  |

Source: 2021 Diary of Consumer Payment Choice.
Notes: Results are weighted. Stars indicate theresult of a test for difference in mean between bank account adopters who paid the fee and those who did not, * $\mathrm{p}<0.10, * * \mathrm{p}<0.05, * * * \mathrm{p}<0.01$. The means are compared by applying a procedure used in the officialDCPC tables; we use a SUR model so that we canemploy the delta method calculation for standard errors, taking covariance into account.

Table 8. Average $\$$ amount of monthly payments among bank account adopters who paid or did not pay fees in the preceding 12 months

|  | ATM fees for withdrawing cash yes no |  |  | Overdraft fees |  |  | Bounced-check fees |  |  | Low-balance fees |  |  | Too-many-transactions fees |  |  | Teller fees |  |  | Any fee |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | yes | no |  | yes | no |  | yes | no |  | yes | no |  | yes | no |  | yes | no |  |
| All Payments | 5552 | 5798 |  | 4660 | 5883 |  | 8503 | 5726 |  | 6558 | 5735 |  | 4381 | 5766 |  | 3170 | 5769 | ** | 5498 | 5847 |  |
| Paper | 1101 | 1412 |  | 886 | 1411 |  | 1123 | 1358 |  | 512 | 1375 | * | 410 | 1365 | * | 1103 | 1357 |  | 996 | 1488 |  |
| Cash | 399 | 246 |  | 520 | 244 | * | 1083 | 266 |  | 275 | 274 |  | 119 | 275 | *** | 574 | 272 |  | 412 | 223 | ** |
| Check | 505 | 1154 |  | 345 | 1118 |  | 40 | 1045 | ** | 238 | 1054 | * | 291 | 1042 |  | 210 | 1040 | * | 443 | 1253 |  |
| Money order | 197 | 13 | * | 21 | 50 |  | 0 | 47 | ** | 0 | 48 | ** | 0 | 47 | ** | 320 | 45 |  | 140 | 12 | * |
| Card | 2032 | 1677 |  | 2190 | 1689 |  | 875 | 1751 | *** | 3934 | 1691 |  | 2291 | 1737 |  | 1357 | 1744 |  | 2101 | 1610 | * |
| Debit | 1211 | 755 | ** | 1766 | 728 | * | 691 | 840 |  | 3000 | 788 |  | 2202 | 825 |  | 890 | 838 |  | 1407 | 629 | *** |
| Credit | 792 | 904 |  | 391 | 942 | *** | 129 | 891 | *** | 925 | 882 |  | 82 | 891 | *** | 455 | 886 |  | 664 | 964 | ** |
| Prepaid | 29 | 19 |  | 33 | 19 |  | 55 | 20 |  | 10 | 21 |  | 8 | 21 | * | 12 | 21 |  | 29 | 17 |  |
| Electronic | 2009 | 2068 |  | 1376 | 2138 | * | 6087 | 2017 |  | 1892 | 2061 |  | 1440 | 2063 |  | 357 | 2068 | *** | 2051 | 2059 |  |
| BANP | 1011 | 1024 |  | 581 | 1074 | *** | 5915 | 974 |  | 967 | 1023 |  | 487 | 1027 |  | 84 | 1028 | *** | 1096 | 995 |  |
| OBBP | 998 | 1043 |  | 795 | 1064 |  | 173 | 1044 | *** | 925 | 1038 |  | 953 | 1036 |  | 273 | 1040 | *** | 954 | 1065 |  |
| Other | 410 | 641 |  | 208 | 645 | ** | 418 | 600 |  | 219 | 607 | * | 241 | 602 | * | 352 | 600 |  | 351 | 690 |  |
| Mobile payment app | 15 | 43 |  | 22 | 40 |  | 73 | 38 |  | 97 | 37 |  | 18 | 38 |  | 20 | 38 |  | 24 | 43 |  |
| Account to account | 137 | 474 |  | 123 | 447 |  | 318 | 413 |  | 95 | 420 | * | 137 | 415 |  | 103 | 414 |  | 138 | 513 |  |
| Income deduction | 24 | 28 |  | 4 | 30 | ** | 0 | 28 | ** | 8 | 28 |  | 0 | 28 | ** | 21 | 28 |  | 19 | 31 |  |
| Other | 234 | 95 |  | 59 | 128 |  | 28 | 122 | ** | 20 | 123 | *** | 86 | 121 |  | 208 | 120 |  | 170 | 102 |  |
| Number of Respondents | 656 | 3130 |  | 384 | 3402 |  | 36 | 3750 |  | 79 | 3707 |  | 40 | 3746 |  | 27 | 3759 |  | 963 | 2823 |  |

Source: 2021 Diary of Consumer Payment Choice.
Notes: Results are weighted. Stars indicate the result of a test for difference in mean between bank account adopters who paid the fee a nd those who did not, * $\mathrm{p}<0.10, * * \mathrm{p}<0.05, * * * \mathrm{p}<0.01$. The means are compared by applying a procedure used in the officialDCPC tables; we use a SUR model so that we can employ the delta method calculation for standard errors, taking covariance into account.

Table 9. Average number of monthly payments among credit card adopters who paid or did not pay fees in the preceding 12 months

|  | Cash-advance fee yes no |  |  | Late-payment fee |  |  | Balance-transfer fee |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Annual } \\ & \text { fee } \end{aligned}$ |  |  | Over-limit fee |  |  | Foreign-transaction fee |  |  | Any fee |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | yes | no |  | yes | no |  | yes | no |  | yes | no |  | yes | no |  | yes | no |  |
| All Payments | 50.0 | 40.1 | * | 43.3 | 40.1 |  | 57.2 | 39.9 | *** | 50.3 | 38.1 | *** | 28.5 | 40.4 | ** | 60.5 | 40.0 | ** | 48.3 | 37.5 | *** |
| Paper | 12.6 | 8.7 |  | 9.4 | 8.8 |  | 13.9 | 8.7 | ** | 8.3 | 8.9 |  | 1.7 | 8.9 | *** | 14.0 | 8.7 |  | 9.1 | 8.7 |  |
| Cash | 10.2 | 6.8 |  | 8.2 | 6.7 |  | 10.2 | 6.7 |  | 6.9 | 6.8 |  | 1.5 | 6.9 | *** | 9.0 | 6.8 |  | 7.2 | 6.7 |  |
| Check | 1.5 | 1.9 |  | 1.2 | 2.0 | ** | 3.6 | 1.9 |  | 1.4 | 2.1 | * | 0.2 | 2.0 | *** | 5.0 | 1.9 |  | 1.9 | 2.0 |  |
| Money order | 0.8 | 0.0 |  | 0.0 | 0.0 |  | 0.1 | 0.0 |  | 0.0 | 0.0 |  | 0.0 | 0.0 |  | 0.0 | 0.0 |  | 0.1 | 0.0 |  |
| Card | 27.6 | 24.2 |  | 26.2 | 24.1 |  | 30.2 | 24.1 |  | 32.4 | 22.4 | *** | 21.4 | 24.2 |  | 38.9 | 24.0 | ** | 29.9 | 22.3 | *** |
| Debit | 14.5 | 10.2 |  | 15.0 | 10.0 | ** | 17.0 | 10.1 | * | 11.6 | 10.0 |  | 19.2 | 10.2 | * | 13.0 | 10.2 |  | 12.0 | 9.7 | ** |
| Credit | 11.2 | 13.2 |  | 10.2 | 13.3 |  | 12.5 | 13.1 |  | 20.0 | 11.6 | *** | 2.0 | 13.2 | *** | 24.8 | 12.9 | ** | 17.0 | 11.8 | *** |
| Prepaid | 1.9 | 0.8 |  | 1.0 | 0.8 |  | 0.7 | 0.8 |  | 0.8 | 0.8 |  | 0.2 | 0.8 | ** | 1.1 | 0.8 |  | 0.9 | 0.8 |  |
| Electronic | 6.9 | 5.6 |  | 6.6 | 5.6 |  | 10.7 | 5.5 | * | 7.1 | 5.3 | ** | 4.3 | 5.7 |  | 5.7 | 5.7 |  | 7.1 | 5.2 | *** |
| BANP | 2.3 | 2.9 |  | 4.7 | 2.8 |  | 5.4 | 2.8 | * | 3.6 | 2.8 |  | 1.3 | 2.9 | * | 3.6 | 2.9 |  | 3.7 | 2.6 | ** |
| OBBP | 4.5 | 2.7 |  | 1.9 | 2.8 | * | 5.3 | 2.7 |  | 3.5 | 2.6 | * | 3.0 | 2.7 |  | 2.1 | 2.8 |  | 3.4 | 2.5 | * |
| Other | 3.1 | 1.6 |  | 1.0 | 1.7 | * | 2.4 | 1.6 |  | 2.5 | 1.4 | ** | 1.1 | 1.6 |  | 1.9 | 1.6 |  | 2.2 | 1.4 | ** |
| Mobile payment app | 0.0 | 0.2 | *** | 0.0 | 0.2 | *** | 0.6 | 0.2 |  | 0.3 | 0.2 |  | 0.3 | 0.2 |  | 0.7 | 0.2 |  | 0.3 | 0.2 |  |
| Account to account | 0.9 | 0.4 |  | 0.3 | 0.5 |  | 0.6 | 0.4 |  | 1.1 | 0.3 | ** | 0.0 | 0.5 | *** | 0.2 | 0.5 | ** | 0.9 | 0.3 | ** |
| Income deduction | 0.5 | 0.1 |  | 0.1 | 0.1 |  | 0.2 | 0.1 |  | 0.2 | 0.1 |  | 0.0 | 0.1 | *** | 0.0 | 0.1 | *** | 0.2 | 0.1 |  |
| Other | 1.7 | 0.8 |  | 0.6 | 0.8 |  | 1.0 | 0.8 |  | 0.9 | 0.8 |  | 0.9 | 0.8 |  | 1.1 | 0.8 |  | 0.9 | 0.8 |  |
| Number of Respondents | 61 | 3136 |  | 182 | 3015 |  | 94 | 3103 |  | 568 | 2629 |  | 30 | 3167 |  | 51 | 3146 |  | 841 | 2356 |  |

Source: 2021 Diary of Consumer Payment Choice.
Notes: Results are weighted. Stars indicate theresult of a test for difference in mean between bank account adopters who paid the feea nd those who did not, * $\mathrm{p}<0.10,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05,{ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01$. The means are compared by applying a procedure used in the officialDCPC tables; we use a SUR model so that we canemploy the delta method calculation for standard errors, taking covariance into a ccount.

Table 10. Average \$ amount of monthly payments among credit card adopters who paid or did not pay fees in the preceding 12 months

|  | Cash-advance fee yes no |  |  | Late-payment fee |  |  | Balance-transfer fee |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Annual } \\ & \text { fee } \end{aligned}$ |  |  | Over-limit fee |  |  | Foreign-transaction fee |  |  | Any fee |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | yes | no |  | yes | no | yes | no |  | yes | no |  | yes | no |  | yes | no |  |
| All Payments | 4453 | 6721 | ** | 4219 | 6814 | *** | 6326 | 6686 | 12084 | 5491 | ** | 3642 | 6706 |  | 5148 | 6701 |  | 9828 | 5589 | * |
| Paper | 1023 | 1540 |  | 667 | 1578 |  | 1029 | 1543 | 3814 | 1029 |  | 74 | 1544 | ** | 1079 | 1537 |  | 2986 | 1027 |  |
| Cash | 509 | 267 |  | 393 | 265 |  | 214 | 273 | 208 | 285 |  | 72 | 273 | *** | 172 | 273 |  | 248 | 279 |  |
| Check | 220 | 1268 | * | 274 | 1303 | * | 768 | 1261 | 3603 | 731 |  | 3 | 1260 | ** | 907 | 1253 |  | 2710 | 743 |  |
| Money order | 293 | 5 |  | 0 | 11 |  | 47 | 9 | 2 | 12 |  | 0 | 10 |  | 0 | 10 |  | 28 | 4 |  |
| Card | 1721 | 1899 |  | 1880 | 1896 |  | 1936 | 1894 | 2650 | 1730 | ** | 1138 | 1902 | ** | 1775 | 1897 |  | 2369 | 1732 | ** |
| Debit | 980 | 773 |  | 746 | 779 |  | 746 | 778 | 714 | 791 |  | 980 | 775 |  | 725 | 778 |  | 707 | 801 |  |
| Credit | 669 | 1093 |  | 1123 | 1083 |  | 1181 | 1083 | 1924 | 901 | *** | 154 | 1094 | *** | 1039 | 1086 |  | 1646 | 892 | *** |
| Prepaid | 72 | 32 |  | 11 | 34 |  | 9 | 34 | 12 | 38 |  | 4 | 33 | ** | 12 | 33 |  | 16 | 39 |  |
| Electronic | 1306 | 2542 | * | 1565 | 2571 | ** | 2836 | 2509 | 3824 | 2231 | ** | 2365 | 2519 |  | 2242 | 2522 |  | 3141 | 2303 |  |
| BANP | 425 | 1259 | *** | 927 | 1260 |  | 1785 | 1228 | 1786 | 1123 | * | 101 | 1254 | *** | 1127 | 1244 |  | 1500 | 1154 |  |
| OBBP | 881 | 1283 |  | 639 | 1311 | ** | 1051 | 1281 | 2039 | 1108 | * | 2265 | 1265 |  | 1115 | 1278 |  | 1641 | 1149 |  |
| Other | 403 | 741 |  | 106 | 769 | *** | 526 | 740 | 1796 | 501 |  | 65 | 741 | *** | 51 | 745 | *** | 1331 | 528 |  |
| Mobile payment app | 0 | 46 | ** | 7 | 47 | * | 11 | 46 | 113 | 30 |  | 38 | 45 |  | 11 | 45 |  | 80 | 33 |  |
| Account to account | 178 | 518 |  | 47 | 537 | ** | 234 | 518 | 1335 | 330 |  | 0 | 516 | ** | 18 | 519 | ** | 967 | 353 |  |
| Income deduction | 67 | 32 |  | 6 | 35 | * | 170 | 29 | 10 | 38 |  | 0 | 33 | ** | 0 | 34 | ** | 25 | 36 |  |
| Other | 158 | 145 |  | 47 | 151 | ** | 111 | 146 | 338 | 103 |  | 27 | 146 | ** | 22 | 147 | *** | 258 | 106 |  |
| Number of Respondents | 61 | 3136 |  | 182 | 3015 |  | 94 | 3103 | 568 | 2629 |  | 30 | 3167 |  | 51 | 3146 |  | 841 | 2356 |  |

Source: 2021 Diary of Consumer Payment Choice.
Notes: Results are weighted. Stars indicate theresult of a test for difference in mean between bank account adopters who paid the feea nd those who did not,* $\mathrm{p}<0.10, * * \mathrm{p}<0.05, * * * \mathrm{p}<0.01$. The means are compared by applying a procedure used in the official DCPC tables; we use a SUR model so that we canemploy the delta method calculation for standard errors, taking covariance into account.


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    Helpful comments were provided by José Fillat and Joe Peek. Ruth Cohen provided excellent research assistance.

[^2]:    ${ }^{2}$ https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/6.14_bills-1174277ih.pdf
    ${ }^{3}$ See https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-initiates-review-of-credit-card-company-penalty-policies-costing-consumers-12-billion-each-year/; and Ka te Berry, "CFPB Launches Opening Sa lvo in Battle a gainst Credit Card Late Fees," American Banker, June 22, 2022.

[^3]:    ${ }^{4}$ It is possible, however, that consumers cannot optimize their utility due to a lack of transparency about the fees, fina ncial litera cy issues, or inattention.
    ${ }^{5}$ The diary is conducted through a collaboration between the Federal ReserveBanks of Atlanta, Boston, and San Francisco. The data and assisting documents (codebooks) are publicly a vailable for downloading from the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta's Consumer Payments webpage. Summary reports are given in Greene and Stavins (2021) and Cubides andO'Brien (2022). Similar surveys a re conducted by the Bank of Canada; see Henry, Huynh, and Welte (2018).

[^4]:    ${ }^{6}$ The weights a re used to adjust the DCPC sample to fit the demographics of the US adult (18 and older) population. For more details, see the section on weighting in Foster and Prescott (2021).
    ${ }^{7}$ Overdraft protection does not necessarily eliminate fees. A bank may charge a fee for overdraft protection, and many banks a ssess a fee per overdraft protection transfer, which can result in multiple fees in a single day. Transactions may be declined if a consumer does nothave sufficient funds in their linked sa vings a ccount.

[^5]:    ${ }^{8}$ Also referred to as an insufficient funds fee or a non-sufficient funds (NSF) fee.

[^6]:    ${ }^{9}$ We cannot establish whether the savings and checking a ccounts are linked, or whether a consumer has overdraft protection, which might help prevent paying fees on the account.

