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Narratives on migration and political polarization: How the emphasis in narratives can drive us apart

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Abstract

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Narratives on migration and political polarization: How the emphasis in narratives can drive us apart*

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Abstract

Nowadays, immigration is a polarizing topic in politics. In this paper, we investigate how much this political polarization is driven by the depiction narratives made of immigrants vis-a-vis the natives. Furthermore, we look at whether polarization is rooted in private preferences over narratives or in how they are endorsed in public settings and social media. Our empirical strategy consists of a survey experiment in the 2021 German elections and a field experiment on Twitter in which we manipulate the “pinned tweets” of experimental users. To build our narratives, we manipulate either the policy position — hostile toward or accepting migration — or an emphasis on the out-group, on the in-group, or on economic reciprocity. We find that political polarization is driven both by the policy position and emphasis in narratives. On Twitter, the out-group emphasis drives supporters of different parties apart, and the corresponding hostile narrative becomes the only one going viral. In the survey, right-wing participants prefer the reciprocity emphasis more, but we still find evidence of more polarization when allowing the participants to go public.

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1 Introduction

In recent years, politicians who give examples of the negative economic and cultural consequences of immigration have attracted increasing votes across Europe and have contributed to increasing political polarization (e.g., statements by Tino Chrupalla, Alice Weidel, Geert Wilders, Marine Le Pen, Éric Zemmour, Giorgia Meloni, Matteo Salvini, etc.). Are anti-immigration narratives that offer a negative depiction of immigrants driving political polarization? What about proimmigration narratives? Ultimately, we are interested in studying whether narratives can drive people apart. If they can, is this already rooted in people’s opinions on the narratives, or does it depend on how narratives are endorsed in public settings and on social media?

Stories that fuel hostility against foreigners or minorities have always been powerful. Take, for example, the Protocols of Elders of Zion, forged by czarist propaganda in Russia in 1903, to induce antisemitism. It was a fictional story, but people took it for real, and even though by 1935 the story of the forgery had come out and was officially confirmed, the Protocols are still published and widely distributed even today. With politicians, it is different this time: statements on migration are not always fake, and most of the time, they are not overtly racist. They are based on possible rational facts such that immigrants (could) lower wages or that immigrants (could) have different cultural values. These statements appeal to a concrete possible consequence, but very often, they also have a specific framing: they may either offer a negative depiction of the migrants or appeal to nativist attitudes, or they may state that integration costs are overwhelmingly larger than economic benefits. The same framing may apply to narratives in acceptance of migration. So our first question is as follows: if we keep everything else — the facts and the political position — constant, does the emphasis in these narratives matter in driving polarization?

We think this question is relevant first of all because political polarization has been increasing in the past 30 years in all Western countries, although the drivers and extent of this polarization may vary depending on the country and the specific factors at play (Iyengar et al., 2019). Among the possible determinants of political polarization, the contribution of narratives has not received much attention yet (G. A. Akerlof and Snower, 2016; Eliaz and Spiegler, 2020). However, part of the increase in polarization may indeed be because of politicians increasingly recurring to harsh rhetoric on migrants to win elections (Card et al., 2022). Donald Trump represents a very good example with his insistence on Twitter — before getting banned from social media — on illegal migration, border control, and immigration laws (see Figure 1)¹. Although we know that a focus on a very specific out-group, that is, the political opponent, drives polarization (Rathje, Van Bavel, and Van Der Linden, 2021; Dimant, 2023)², we know much less about what happens when the out-group consists of immigrants. A paradoxical element related to this issue is that narratives with different emphases may still encompass the same policy positions. An anti-immigration narrative, for instance, may always lead to more restrictive immigration policies. Equally, a proimmigration narrative may always lead to higher spending on integration. Hence, the practical relevance of these emphases when it comes to policy implications—what voters should ultimately care about—may be almost nonexistent. Nevertheless, the emphases may still affect political polarization.

¹The wordcloud is based on our own calculations from tweets by Donald Trump during his presidency. We acquired the tweets using an algorithm of our own making before he was banned.

²The effect is well-established on social media. Its effect in proper political campaigning is much more ambiguous (Galasso, Nannicini, and Nunnari, 2023). There is a whole literature in political science on “negative campaigning” which has found mixed results.

We think this is an interesting question also because these spins in communication actually exist, and we find that different parties communicate differently when it comes to migration. As a very first step of our project, we applied the LIWC and Moral Foundation Theory dictionaries to tweets on migration by German political parties from 2016 to 2021³. Differences related to in-group versus out-group emphasis stood out: 6.3% of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) words on migration are about affiliation urges, while they are 5% and 4.3%, respectively, for the Social Democratic Party (SPD), and the Greens. The equivalent number for the Alternative for Germany (AfD) is only 2.6%. CDU also has more words with a positive moral qualification of the in-group compared with all other parties (2.1% compared with 1.5% of the SPD, 1.4% of the Greens, and 0.8% of the AfD). Words such as “family” or “home country” are used by all parties in tweets on migration, but the AfD almost never uses words like “shared” and “together”, and CDU further avoids using words with the root “equal”. Interestingly, using the Moral Foundation Theory dictionary, a difference related to economic reciprocity emerges: the SPD and Greens tend to use words referring to fairness quite often (2.3% and 2% of the time, respectively), while AfD and CDU use them rarely (1.1% and 1% of the time, respectively). Although this is interesting evidence of different narrative spins, it is purely suggestive. In practice, disentangling between the policy position and emphasis in tweets is almost impossible, and this is why we ultimately opted for an experimental approach to investigate our research question.

A second research question naturally stands out when considering the relation between narratives and polarization. In fact, these political narratives are rarely just passively met by individuals. Rather, they are often later shared in online settings and publicly endorsed. Therefore, a potential question is whether there is a discrepancy between individual and public preferences for narratives. Given that public endorsement of a narrative influences the public debate on migration and all aspects related to it (e.g. hate crimes, (Müller and Schwarz, 2021), or voting), it could be even more important than the private agreement with the narratives. Public preferences may be more polarized than private ones and polarization associated with narratives may be especially pronounced in social media. For instance, if narratives with an emphasis on the out-group are not only more polarizing but *perceived* as more polarizing, groupness and social image concerns may push towards more polarizing narratives in a public setting. On the contrary, if expressive rationality prevails, that is, if people tend to publicly endorse narratives that have the highest possibility of influencing the government’s policies, this could either lead to an increase or a decrease in public polarization. To sum up, public support for a narrative may differ from individual preferences and polarization may increase or decrease in a public setting and in social media as a result of it.

As already stated, to answer these questions, we used an experimental approach. In this way, we could identify a causal effect related to specific aspects of narratives that would not be possible using real-life narratives. To be more specific, we changed one aspect of the narratives at a time, either the policy position—in acceptance or hostile to migration—or the emphasis in those narratives—on

³Using Twitter APIs and a home-made algorithm to avoid the Twitter limit for scraping of 3,200 tweets per user, we took all tweets by the German leaders of the main political parties (in the time when they were leaders) and by the official Twitter account of those parties from 2016 to 2021; then, we classified them based on the topic, preprocessed the text, and performed a dictionary-based text analysis. To be more specific, to classify by topic, we considered the Manifesto Project, which manually codes sentences of political parties’ Manifestos by topic (Lehmann et al., 2022). We considered only sentences related to migration and cleaned them of the words of common use before then using the remaining words to identify tweets related to migration. Finally, to apply the psychological dictionaries, we pre-processed the text of the tweets with the usual natural language processing procedure of stemming and removing stopwords. LIWC is a psycho-linguistic dictionary developed by Tausczik and Pennebaker (2010) and validated for German by T. Meier et al. (2019), while the German version of the Moral Foundation Theory dictionary was developed in the context of their paper by Bos and Minihold (2022).

economic reasons. This is also why Germany is interesting: if we already know quite a bit about what drives polarization in the US, we know much less about what happens in a low-polarization European country where, nevertheless, polarization in the past few years has been increasing and where populist parties have recently gained some traction as a result of the 2015 refugee crisis. We exploited a very specific time frame in German politics for fielding our study: the 2021 general election, which was won, to everyone’s surprise, by the SPD guided by Olaf Scholz, ultimately leading to the first center-left government in Germany in 16 years. This was very important to make the narratives more salient, and to make the participants in our experiments feel that their choices had a real impact on German politics.

Based on our results, we can confidently state that narratives can drive individuals apart. Although policy positions obviously matter, we find that political polarization crucially depends on the emphasis in the narratives and that this narrative-driven polarization increases in a public environment. However, our hypothesis that polarization is driven by narratives with an emphasis on the out-group is not always confirmed. We did see this on Twitter, where the anti-immigration pinned tweet with the emphasis on the out-group was the only one going viral. In the survey, right-wing and far-right supporters focused more on economic reciprocity narratives instead. Polarization also became stronger in public in the survey: those who did not reveal a private preference for polarizing narratives just preferred to stay quiet and not express any public preference. We interpret this as evidence that social image/groupness concerns are a relevant component of the public debate on migration.

The present paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a literature review of the topic and states our contributions. Section 3 discusses the theoretical background of our research together with our hypotheses, while Section 4 presents the experimental design. Section 5 presents our results from all experiments, and Section 6 concludes the paper.

2 Literature review

Migration issues have become a key concern of studies analyzing public opinion and electoral competition, with recent contributions focusing on changes in attitudes toward migration (see e.g., Ademmer and Stöhr, 2018; Albada, Hansen, and Otten, 2021; Facchini and Mayda, 2012; Edo et al., 2019; Hangartner et al., 2019; Levi, Mariani, and Patriarca, 2020) and the rise of radical right-wing parties (see e.g., Abou-Chadi, Cohen, and Wagner, 2021; Becker, Fetzer, et al., 2016; Dinas et al., 2019; Gidron and Hall, 2017). Predominantly, this stream of the literature focuses on the demand for and supply of (anti-)migration policy positions, especially in the wake of the increased influx of migrants and asylum seekers to Europe in 2015 and 2016 (see e.g., Downes, Loveless, and Lam, 2021; Marx and Naumann, 2018; Brug and Harteveld, 2021). Although a majority of contributions focus on the specific policy preferences and positions surrounding migration issues, other approaches move beyond the mere analysis of positions by analyzing the narratives that shape migration attitudes and political communication.

Focused on narratives, previous analyses have shown that narratives, that is, “stories that people tell themselves and others” (G. A. Akerlof and Snower, 2016, p. 58), are an important component in shaping attitudes, channeling preferences, and making decisions (R. Akerlof and Rayo, 2020; G. A. Akerlof and Snower, 2016; Braddock and Dillard, 2016; Eliaz and Spiegler, 2020; Hillenbrand and Verrina, 2018). For instance, a recent paper by Galasso, Morelli, et al. (2022) finds that emotionally charged narratives aiming at discrediting populist politicians are more effective than objective information in

reducing support for the populist agenda. Contributions specifically addressing the role of migration narratives have found that narratives of assimilation and symbolic representation of national identity reduce opposition to immigration (Kaufmann, 2019; Wright and Citrin, 2011). However, research has shown that migration narratives can also be a source of widespread hostility toward immigrants when based on misinformation (Barrera et al., 2020; Hameleers and Van der Meer, 2020; Schäfer and Schadauer, 2018).

Focusing on misinformation, research contributions show that fake news and “alternative facts” are especially widespread and influential on social media platforms because these platforms have become an important source of political information and engagement (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017; Grinberg et al., 2019; Schäfer and Schadauer, 2018). Concerned with the impact of “alternative facts”, Barrera et al. (2020) show that misleading information can have a persuasive effect, with the exposure to facts being unable change vote choices. With the increasing importance of social media platforms, studies have found that social media consumption increases polarization through the algorithmic limitation of the exposure to counter-narrative (Bail, 2021; Bowen, Dmitriev, and Galperti, 2021; Garz, Sörensen, and Stone, 2020; Levy, 2021; Wojcieszak and Garrett, 2018). Research on this limited exposure often identifies the formation of “echo chambers” or “filter bubbles,” in which users only process news in line with their views and exclusively engage with like-minded individuals (Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Siderius, 2021; Cinelli et al., 2021; Mosleh et al., 2021; Pariser, 2011; Sunstein, 2018; Stein, Keuschnigg, and Rijt, 2023).

Closely connected to this is the quickly growing strand of literature concerning social media and populism. Although Fujiwara, Müller, and Schwarz (2021) have found no positive effect of Twitter on the Republican vote share in the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections, Manacorda, Tabellini, and Tesei (2022) provide evidence of a positive effect of mobile internet access on the support for right-wing populist parties in Europe. In particular, they argue that the “mobile internet in disadvantaged areas made voters more communitarian in their policy views, increasing their distrust and intolerance of strangers and enhancing nationalist tendencies” (Manacorda, Tabellini, and Tesei, 2022, p. 1). This reasoning is based on earlier work by Tabellini (2008) about an in-group (communitarian) versus out-group (universalistic) cleavage structuring contemporary politics. Although social media can increase communitarian and universalistic views, Manacorda, Tabellini, and Tesei (2022) argue, based on other contributions, that the messages of in-group love and especially out-group hate are—given the emotional nature of the subject and the moral implications—subject to controversies that increase the views and engagements with these messages on social media platforms (see also Crockett, 2017; Rathje, Van Bavel, and Van Der Linden, 2021). Contributions concerned with the sharing of anti-immigration out-group messages have also shown that the provision of rationales for out-group hate increases the likelihood of sharing antimigrant messages on social media (Bursztyn, I. K. Haaland, et al., 2020) or for justifying joining an anti-immigrant organization (Bursztyn, Egorov, et al., 2022).

With the rise of the German right-wing populist AfD, recent analyses have focused on explaining the determinants of the long-failed success of a right-wing populist party in Germany (Arzheimer, 2015; Berbuir, Lewandowsky, and Siri, 2015). Despite focusing on nativism and hostility towards migration as specific policy issues (Arzheimer and Berning, 2019; Bieber, Roßteutscher, and Scherer, 2018; Hambauer and Mays, 2018; Pesthy, Mader, and Schoen, 2021), other contributions have analyzed the role of narratives and misinformation, especially on social media in light of the previously cited contributions concerned with populism and social media (Sängerlaub, M. Meier, and Rühl, 2020; Serrano et al., 2019; Weisskircher, 2020). Consequently, research on social media and AfD support

draws a similar conclusion as previous research by finding the most homogeneous networks among AfD supporters (Gärtner and Wuttke, 2019) and an increased social media engagement by AfD supporters (Schumann et al., 2021).

Although the literature review demonstrates that an increasing amount of contributions moves beyond the mere analysis of policy positions on migration by focusing on the narratives of migration shared on social media, we still lack a comprehensive investigation of what narratives prevail and who shares and engages with differing narratives. This is especially true for Germany, where most publications center on the analysis of social media content and behavior without employing rigorous causal identification strategies in the form of experiments.

3 Theoretical background

We posit that an agent’s preferences for narratives are determined by three basic components. First, an agent has a *private* preference for narratives. We define a narrative as an element $v \in N$ where N is the set of possible narratives. We assume that an agent has her own ranking over such elements $v \in N$. We assume that such an individual ranking may be represented by a utility function $U_i(v, \cdot, \cdot)$. Let us then define the following:

$$\bar{v}_i = \underset{v \in N}{\operatorname{argmax}} U_i(v, \cdot, \cdot) \quad (1)$$

\bar{v}_i is the narrative that maximizes the utility function with respect to the private component exclusively. Based on previous evidence (Rathje, Van Bavel, and Van Der Linden, 2021), we hypothesize that out-group narratives will be chosen by most agents as their preferred ones on both sides of the political spectrum but in relation to opposing policy positions on migration.

H1: Political polarization on migration is driven by out-group narratives.

Second, we posit that an agent has a *public* preference over narratives. By public preference, we mean that an agent has an ordering of narratives that depends on the social image that the agent gains by publicly endorsing a certain narrative rather than another one. We assume that an agent gains utility by publicly endorsing narratives that are perceived by the agent as the most polarizing for their relevant group. For analytical tractability, we assume that narratives are ranked on a continuum in terms of their degree of polarization. Ranking narratives within the hostile and acceptance groups in terms of polarization may be a priori unclear. That is why we derive this ranking from within our experiment by positing that a narrative is more polarizing: a) the more an agent believes it to be preferred by individuals of their relevant group while not being preferred by individuals of other groups and b) the more an agent believes it to be preferred by individuals of other groups while not being preferred by individuals of their relevant groups. In the former case, we say the narrative is a “norm”, while in the latter, it is a “taboo”. To say this in other words, utility increases if the agent endorses a narrative that scores high on the polarization ranking of the narratives—a “norm”—and not for a polarizing narrative that scores low—that is, a “taboo”. This assumption is consistent with how social identity theory associates self-esteem and social image concerns with intergroup relations (Turner et al., 1987; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Bénabou, Falk, and Tirole, 2018). To be more formal, let us define $i \in I$ as an individual belonging to the overall set of individuals in a group I , and $j \in \bar{I}_i$ as an individual j in a subgroup $\bar{I}_i \subseteq I$, with $j \neq i$, where \bar{I}_i is a subset of individuals who form the “reference group” for an agent i . For instance, it is plausible that a right-leaning individual will be concerned with her reputation vis-à-vis other right-leaning individuals only. An agent will have a

set of beliefs over the rankings by other individuals in \bar{I}_i . For simplicity, let us assume that what is relevant for individuals is only the more polarizing narrative, by the other individuals in \bar{I}_i . Let us then define a distribution of probability $\pi_i \in \Pi$ as one assigning a probability to a certain narrative, with $v \in N$ being the most preferred by the majority of individuals in \bar{I}_i and the less preferred by the majority of individuals in \bar{I}_{-i} . Let us label:

$$\hat{\nu}_i = \underset{v \in N}{MODE} \pi_i(v) \quad (2)$$

$\hat{\nu}_i$ is the narrative that agent i believes, according to their probability function π_i , to be the one most preferred by others in their subgroup and not preferred by others not in their subgroup. Admittedly, this model is very simple in assuming that an agent is only concerned with others' preferred narratives and with the mode of such distribution. We believe that generalizing this model to more complex cases would not substantially alter the final results. Obviously, it could be the case that the privately preferred narrative differs from the belief over the more polarizing narrative in the subgroup; that is, $\nu_i^* \neq \hat{\nu}_i$. We assume that an individual derives utility from publicly endorsing $\hat{\nu}_i$, because in this way the individual gains positive reputation in the eyes of fellow individuals belonging to \bar{I}_i or simply derives an additional utility from a sense of belonging to \bar{I}_i . This forms the second argument in the utility function $U_i(., \hat{\nu}_i, .)$.

Finally, we assume that an individual has a second argument in their public preference over narratives. We assume that, by publicly endorsing one narrative over another, the individual may induce the government to implement a policy on immigrants that is close to the preferred one. Even if an individual's voice is close to negligible in the public space, several studies have emphasized so-called expressive rationality, that is, the tendency of individuals to act in the public sphere, as if they were going to be pivotal in public decision-making (Kahan, 2013). We assume that this argument is the third in the utility function: $U_i(., ., \tilde{\nu}_i)$.

Finally, we assume that these three arguments enter the utility function through quadratic components:

$$U(\nu, \hat{\nu}_i, \tilde{\nu}_i) = (\nu - \bar{\nu}_i)^2 + \alpha(\nu - \hat{\nu}_i)^2 + \beta(\nu - \tilde{\nu}_i)^2 \quad (3)$$

$\alpha \geq 0$ and $\beta \geq 0$ are the weights associated with the public "social image" and the public "government influence" components. The main idea behind this utility function is that, when deciding which narrative to publicly endorse, the agent will take into account these three components: their private preference (first term), their willingness to acquire a positive social image in the eyes of their group (second component), and their willingness to influence government policies (third component). Upon maximization of (3), the overall optimal action for the agent will then be the following:

$$\nu^* = \underset{\nu \in N}{argmax} U(\nu, \hat{\nu}_i, \tilde{\nu}_i) = \frac{\bar{\nu}_i + \alpha \hat{\nu}_i + \beta \tilde{\nu}_i}{1 + \alpha + \beta} \quad (4)$$

While the "government influence" component has an ambiguous effect on polarization, "social image" concerns will drive public preferences to be more polarized than private ones as long as beliefs on the most polarizing narrative are mostly correct. That is why we hypothesize, overall, the following:

H2: Based on the polarization ranking, public preferences are more polarized than private ones.

4 Research Design

To empirically assess the relevance of the three components of individual policy preferences on migration, we have designed two survey experiments and a field experiment on Twitter. The design, hypotheses, and analyses were all preregistered on the OSF⁴.

4.1 The narratives

The cornerstone of all studies is the narratives themselves. We used the same narratives both in the survey and on Twitter, with just minor modifications to account for the limited available number of characters on Twitter (see Appendix A for the revised narratives). All narratives present the same fact, that is, the number of people who migrated to Germany from 2015 to 2020⁵.

Our main experimental manipulation was then to construct different and opposing ramifications of this fact in the cultural and economic domain using different arguments. The first dimension is the policy position, and we simplified by presenting only two policy positions on migration: in acceptance of migration (A) or hostile to migration (H). On the other hand, we manipulated the arguments in support of the policy position. The arguments emphasized either the in-group (I), the out-group (O), or economic reciprocity motives. Therefore, we ended up having a 3×2 design in terms of the narratives’ policy positions and emphases. Let us first consider the two narratives focusing on the out-group:

Hostility + Out-group emphasis (H/O): From 2015 to 2020, almost 10 million migrants arrived in Germany. The unacceptable values and practices of many of these immigrants are incompatible with our cultural lives. Furthermore, immigrants also have job skills and work attitudes that threaten to permanently harm our economy.

Acceptance + Out-group emphasis (A/O): From 2015 to 2020, almost 10 million migrants arrived in Germany. The values and practices of many of these immigrants can enrich our cultural lives. Furthermore, immigrants also carry the job skills and work attitudes that are needed for our economy.

The first sentence provides facts on migration and is common across narratives, serving the main purpose of catching the attention of the participants. The two narratives focus on the same aspect of migration—who immigrants are, that is, the out-group—but build two opposing policy positions depending on how migrants are described vis-a-vis Germans both in cultural terms (“incompatible with our cultural life” or “can enrich our cultural life”) and in economic ones (“menace to permanently harm our economy” or “are needed for our economy”). The former presents a negative depiction of the migrants, and the latter paints a positive one. Let us now compare these narratives with those that have an emphasis on the in-group:

⁴The preregistration anticipated the fielding of the surveys and the Twitter experiment. They can be found here: <https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/Z6SGN> for survey 1, <https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/2T46H> for the Twitter experiment and <https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/Q6FEV> for survey 2. The results on beliefs from Survey 1 and 2 can be found in Appendixes B and C.

⁵Based on the Federal Statistical Office of Germany, this number is approximately 10 million (https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2022/06/PE22_268_12411.html). We considered inflows and not net migration, as we wanted participants to the experiment to be impressed and looped into the narratives. We acknowledge that this number may be a priming against migration in itself, but we are interested in differences across narratives by party affiliation, not in the overall level of hostility to migration. It may also be reassuring that we do not actually find a higher hostility to migrants in our study than what is usually found in surveys. For example, based on Eurobarometer data, 38% of people in Germany think immigration is more of a problem than an opportunity compared with 35% who think the opposite; we found 48% vs. 52% in our data.

Hostility + In-group emphasis (H/I): From 2015 to 2020, almost 10 million migrants arrived in Germany. The German values and practices we hold so dear have to be preserved from migrants. Furthermore, Germans have all that they need to sustain a strong economy, even without immigrants.

Acceptance + In-group emphasis (A/I): From 2015 to 2020, almost 10 million migrants arrived in Germany. The German values and practices we hold so dear can be relied upon to live peacefully with migrants. Furthermore, Germans have all that they need to sustain a strong economy, even together with immigrants.

The focus here is on how Germans can benefit or be harmed by migrants, rather than on how migrants can benefit or harm Germany. “German values and practices” and the Germans’ “strong economy” are the subjects of these narratives. The content of these narratives in terms of meaning is exactly the same as in the previous ones with the same ramifications in cultural and economic domains, but the subject and object are inverted, leading to a fundamental shift in the emphasis from the out-group to in-group. The final narratives focus on economic reciprocity:

Hostility + Reciprocity (H/R): From 2015 to 2020, almost 10 million migrants arrived in Germany. Germans and immigrants have different values and practices, as well as different job skills and work attitudes. The integration of immigrants into our society represents too costly an investment, and the costs to integrate them will never be compensated for in the future.

Acceptance + Reciprocity emphasis (A/R): From 2015 to 2020, almost 10 million migrants arrived in Germany. Germans and immigrants have different values and practices, as well as different job skills and work attitudes. The integration of immigrants into our society represents a profitable investment, and the costs to integrate them will be more than compensated for in the future.

These narratives strike a neutral tone when it comes to evaluating immigrants vis-a-vis Germans, stating just that there are different attributes between migrants and Germans. The focus here is on whether the integration of migrants is valuable as an investment: in the anti-immigration narrative it is “too costly”, and the costs “will never be compensated for”, while in the proimmigration narrative it is “profitable” and the costs “will be more than compensated for”. Ultimately, these narratives try to trigger an economic mindset in individuals and ask them to evaluate migration in terms of pure economic reciprocity.

4.2 Survey 1

For Survey 1, we recruited online, and the polling company Kantar found 1,226 participants from Germany between the 10th and 17th of September 2021. Our recruitment strategy included a screening stage in which the participants were asked to express, after a few basic socio-demographics such as age, gender, nationality, and education, their voting intentions in the upcoming national elections. The participants were then classified into four groups according to their political orientation: far-right, right-wing, left-wing, and far-left⁶. Given our specific interest in polarization, we oversampled groups at the extremes of the political spectrum, ending our data collection only after we had a satisfactory

⁶We used the Parliaments and Governments Database to classify German political parties into the four groups (available at <http://www.parlgov.org/explore/deu/party/>). Not surprisingly, the far-right group was mostly made of AfD supporters, the right-wing of CDU/CSU or Liberal ones, the left-wing of the SPD or the Green ones, the far-left of the Left ones. At the time of fielding the survey, opinion polls gave roughly the same votes to the CDU-CSU and SPD plus Greens, while AfD was expected to gather roughly 11% of the votes and the Left 6% of the votes (as of <https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/germany/>, accessed on 7.9.21).

number of far-right and far-left supporters. Those who were unwilling to disclose their voting intentions were screened out of the survey after the screening stage⁷.

The survey had two parts⁸. In the first, we elicited private preferences. We showed the six narratives in random order to the participants and asked them to rank the narratives based on their agreement with them⁹. At the time they defined the ranking, the participants had no information on the preferences of others, so although we could not impede participants from thinking about others' preferences, we avoided explicitly triggering social image or government influence concerns. Just after eliciting preferences, we elicited beliefs over the most preferred and second most preferred narrative by other participants in an incentive-compatible way. The reward for a correct answer was 50 cents on top of the participation fee. In the second part, we focused on public preferences and introduced a within-subject experimental manipulation. The participants were given the possibility to publicly express their support for a narrative on a public website:

We would now like to give you the possibility to express your support for one of the statements you saw in the previous section on the publicly accessible webpage “<https://Who-supports-what.com>.” Your support will be made public, along with the support of all other participants to this survey who decide to do so. The website “<https://Who-supports-what.com>” will be active on the 20th of September and will be deleted on the 25th of September. It will never be reactivated again. You can check the website to see which statement has received the most endorsements from the participants in this research.

Although the website had a clear expiration date, the week in which it was active was the week of the elections, and the participants had no way to know how much we would advertise it online. The participants were offered a picture of the website (Figure 2) and briefed that, in case they chose to go public, they would be asked an alias at the end of the survey, under which their support would be shown¹⁰.

The important features of our experiment were that public support was voluntary and that the participants could choose to publicly endorse a different narrative compared with the privately highly ranked narrative. In fact, we first asked the participants to choose the narrative to be publicly endorsed and then the willingness to go public. This was relevant insofar as it allowed us to fully investigate the difference between private and public preferences. Furthermore, the actual existence of the website created an incentive-compatible way to elicit public preferences compared with other forms of elicitation. Although we acknowledge that it was a weak form because of the anonymity of the online list of supporters, it has been proven effective in other studies (e.g., Romano et al., 2021), and we provide evidence in our results section that it was effective in our experiment, too.

The survey ended with a final questionnaire in which we acquired additional information on the

⁷In addition to party quotas, we also applied quotas to age—according to the following groups: [18-30]; [31-60]; [61-99], where quotas correspond to real-life age distribution based on the 28th of August INSA poll - and gender Male/Female. For gender, we aimed for a 50% split. We ended up, in both these respects, having a satisfactory representative sample (see Table D1 in Appendix D).

⁸The survey had an additional section on COVID vaccination. This section always came second after the part on migration was finished, and the participants were not aware of this additional section until they started it. The structure of this additional section was the same as for the first one with the narratives adjusted to reflect acceptance or hostility towards nonvaccinated people.

⁹As a robustness check that our participants were not just choosing numbers without reading the narratives, we asked them at the following stage to state their agreement with each narrative on a Likert-scale from 1 to 7. When we checked the consistency of these measures with the ranking, we found that 67% of our participants were consistent in their preferred narrative and that 51% were consistent in both the preferred and least preferred narrative. Moreover, if restricting the analysis to this subsample of participants, the results stayed qualitatively the same.

¹⁰Together with Kantar, we decided for this anonymity arrangement because a disclosure — although voluntary — would give the experimenter a way to identify the participant.

Figure 2: Who-supports-what website




Figure 3: Thomas Meier



participants, such as the postal code of the place of residence, the nationality of parents and grandparents, occupation, income, religion, the frequency of in-depth contacts with migrants, and an evaluation of the percentage of Germans and migrants having an illegal job over the total of the German and migrant population¹¹.

4.3 The Twitter experiment

In the present study, similar to Mosleh et al. (2021) the experimental manipulation was given by the different narratives on immigration reported in the “pinned” tweets of four different experimental Twitter profiles, that is, our experimental treatments. To be more precise, our methodology — piloted twice a few months before the actual experiment was fielded — worked as follows:

¹¹There also was a requested evaluation on the percentage of vaccinated individuals over the total population and a question on the frequency with which one wears a facemask.

1. We opened (in June 2021) four Twitter accounts, all by the name of Thomas Meier, that were identical except for the pinned tweets (see Figure 3 for one example of such profiles). The accounts were meant to represent an “average” German young male with a common name and surname¹². The activity of the account up to the starting date of the experiment was limited to posting standard and politically neutral daily news from mainstream German online outlets. The starting date of the experiment was the 22nd of September, and on that date, each Thomas Meier started having a “pinned” tweet on migration. Each Thomas Meier had a different pinned tweet that conveyed a narrative regarding immigration policies in Germany, representing our main experimental variation. The four different statements were based on the most endorsed narratives in Survey 1¹³; they were just slightly shortened to fit into the Twitter limit for tweets (see Appendix A for details).
2. We randomly selected four different pools of German-speaking Twitter users. Each pool was composed of users aligned to a specific political orientation (right-wing: CDU/Christian Social Union (CSU) + Free Democratic Party (FDP), left-wing: SPD+Greens, far-right: AfD, far-left: Die Linke). We selected users based on their past activity on Twitter: if they retweeted in the recent past—starting January 2021—a tweet by one of the parties listed above, then they were candidates to be in our pool and categorized as being supporters of the corresponding party. After running an algorithm to get rid of unwanted subjects in the sample¹⁴, we were left with 19,989 Twitter users, and we proceeded forming four target experimental groups based on a blocked randomization process with the weight of each party within the block determined by the INCA poll from the 17th of September.
3. Each experimental Twitter profile started “following” the assigned target users on the 22nd of September and finished the pool on the 96th day of the experiment¹⁵¹⁶. We decided for this study to rely on a between-subjects design: each target user in the pool was followed by one of our experimental profiles only.

We investigated our questions by looking at the following outcome variables associated with our sample and with the pinned tweets: (a) the follow-back rate realized by the different experimental Twitter accounts, that is, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the targeted user followed back and (b) the activity associated with the pinned tweets, which were almost daily refreshed by us to provide enough independent observations for statistical analysis (the number of likes, comments, retweets, and impressions). It will be apparent that, even if all choices on Twitter are public, (a) and (b) are not public with the same intensity. In fact, following back is public, but it does not appear on any user’s timeline; a random user could spot the choice of following back by another user only by going through

¹²The profile picture was taken from the website Unsplash, whose photos can be used freely for all purposes with no need of permission request.

¹³We limited ourselves to four Twitter profiles because of the technical difficulties in managing more accounts at the same time. With four, the chances that the experiment would prove successful were maximized.

¹⁴See Appendix A for details. It is sufficient here to say that our main concern was bots and media journalists. Therefore, we dropped users who retweeted tweets of more than one party in their Twitter timeline, those who signed up after 2019, national or local branches of the parties, and users who had less than 100 tweets in their timeline.

¹⁵Given the technical constraints imposed by Twitter, we were able to follow approximately 200 accounts per day per single experimental profile for a total of 800 daily new users who were followed. We had to end our experiment when the profiles reached a number of 5,000 users followed each because of a Twitter limit on the followers/following ratio.

¹⁶Our starting date was before the election date of the 26th of September because we wanted to ensure that users did not behave differently before and after the elections; although the sample pool before the election was too small to make any statistical inference, the results were qualitatively the same.

the list of individuals followed by the other user in question. In this sense, the choice of following back corresponds to the least public choice a user can make on Twitter. We are aware that it may be confounded with strategic motives for expanding networks, but as long as these motives are random across the narratives, this influence should not impinge on our results. Engagement over a tweet, the more so if pinned, corresponds to the most public choice one can make on Twitter because every user can easily see that activity. Of course, “liking” a tweet or “retweeting” is a stronger display of support than “replying” or just looking at the tweet either directly or on a search page, which Twitter aggregates into the variable “impressions”. The latter represents more of a display of interest and a willingness to engage, maybe even critically, with the content of the tweet. We exploited this crucial difference in the level of observability of different choices on Twitter to investigate our H2, that is, the influence of going public on political polarization.

4.4 Survey 2

This part of the study explored possible mechanisms behind observed behavior in Survey 1 and collected the information necessary to build a polarization ranking for each party group. As stated in the theory section, we needed to build a polarization ranking from observed beliefs because we could not assume that the individuals, when expressing their public preferences, knew about the private preferences of other individuals in their reference group, so just by looking at polarization on private preferences, we cannot assess if the polarization effect of H2 comes, indeed, from polarization. To this scope, we elicited emotions, beliefs on political correctness, and empirical and normative beliefs associated with the narratives. To be more specific, we recruited 771 participants on Kantar between the 24th and 29th of September 2021 with the same party and age-gender quotas of Survey 1, and after the same screening page of Survey 1, we presented the six narratives to the participants¹⁷. The participants from Surveys 1 and 2 looked very similar on observed characteristics (see Table D1 and D2 in Appendix D). This was reassuring to the validity of our exercise: only with similar participants we can avoid Survey 2 being uninformative with respect to results from Survey 1.

The first goal of this study was to examine the emotions triggered by the narratives. For each narrative, we elicited, here on a 7-point Likert scale, two negative emotions (fear and anger) and one positive emotion (happiness) taken from the six basic emotions proposed by Ekman, Friesen, and Ellsworth (2013). We also elicited the participants’ opinions on whether the narrative was, to the best of their judgment, politically correct. The second goal of the study was to acquire information to build a polarization ranking by political orientation. Here, each participant was asked to state their expectations over the most agreed-upon narrative by participants planning to vote for the same party and the participants planning to vote for a different party. We also asked them the percentage of participants they believed to be agreeing with these narratives, both within their party and among the other parties. All these questions were incentivized with participants guessing each correct answer, earning an additional 50 cents on top of the participation fee. Finally, we elicited the participants’ empirical and normative expectations of the narratives with which other participants agreed the most, as well as the participants’ own agreement. Elicitation followed the approach by Bicchieri and Xiao (2009).

¹⁷Also in the case of Survey 2, we added at the end an additional survey on the topic of COVID vaccination.

5 Results


5.1 Survey experiment

5.1.1 Private preferences

We first computed the proportion of participants within our study who preferred narratives displaying acceptance or hostility toward migration. As expected, most far-right supporters — 88% of them—preferred an anti-immigration narrative. Right-wing narratives were almost equally split between narratives in favor of and against migration (50.6% vs. 49.4%). More than half of left-wing and far-left supporters preferred narratives in favor of migration instead (66% for the left and 64.8% for the far-left).

Result 1: There was polarization over policy positions: far-right voters preferred hostile narratives over acceptance ones, while the opposite was true for left-wing and far-left voters. Right-wing voters were equally split between acceptance and hostile narratives.

Figure 4: Private preferences over narratives



When we unpacked the narratives and also distinguished by their emphasis to test H1 (see Figure 4): H/R ranked higher than H/O and H/I, and this was true regardless of the party under consideration. Using Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests, these differences were statistically significant for right-wing ($p < 0.01$ compared to both H/O and H/I) and left-wing voters ($p < 0.05$ compared to H/I), while they failed to reach significance for supporters of extreme parties. When it came to acceptance narratives, A/O was on average preferred to A/R and A/I. We found a statistically significant difference in this

direction for left-wing and far-left individuals (left-wing: $p < 0.01$ with A/I and $p < 0.05$ with A/R, far-left: with A/I $p < 0.05$).

Result 2 (partly against H1): Political polarization on migration was driven by the reciprocity emphasis for right-wing supporters and by the out-group emphasis for left and far-left supporters.

To sum up, we found polarization over private preferences, but its extent varied by political party. Far-right supporters, not surprisingly, showed more political polarization than left-wing or far-left ones, who, in turn, showed it more than right-wing supporters¹⁸. This polarization seems to have been driven by H/R and A/O, the two leading narratives across the parties, not just by narratives with an emphasis on the out-group.

5.1.2 The polarization ranking

To test H2, we looked at the difference between private preferences and public preferences. Prior to this, let us look at the polarization ranking by political party, such as calculated from beliefs elicited in Survey 2. Remember from the theory section that we needed the ranking as benchmark for correctly interpreting these eventual differences. More specifically, we computed for each party and narrative the ratio between how many supporters of a party believed the narrative was preferred by their own party supporters over the supporters of other parties. A ratio close to 1 meant that the narrative was not polarizing. Higher or lower values meant perceived polarization over the narrative: a high ratio identified the perceived party-level “norm” narratives, while a close to zero ratio defined the “taboo” ones.

Figure 5 displays the results of these calculations. Perceived polarization, such as calculated from the polarization ranking, was higher for far-right supporters. This was consistent with what we assessed on private preferences (i.e., Result 1). In our sample, only 3 out of 20 far-right supporters stated that anti-immigration narratives were preferred by both their own and other parties’ supporters. Among the anti-immigration narratives, the perceived stronger “norms” were H/R and H/O, with H/I scoring lower. Proimmigration narratives were then perceived as polarizing in the opposite direction as “taboos”. The results for left-wing and far-left supporters were the opposite: A/O and A/R emerged as the “norm”, and all anti-immigration narratives were “taboo”. Interestingly, and differently from polarization on private preferences, perceived polarization for right-wing individuals followed the same pattern as for the left. We saw a potential “norm” emerging around A/O, while anti-immigration narratives were believed to be preferred more by other parties than by the right-wing ones.

5.1.3 Public preferences

Figure 6 shows the percentage of private and public preferences for each narrative by parties. The sample for private preferences comprised the whole sample, while for public ones, it was only the endorsers, that is, those who decided to publicly endorse a narrative. Overall, we found an increase in

¹⁸In Table D3 in the Appendix, we look at regressions where the participants’ individual characteristics were related with narrative-driven polarization, such as those identified using the polarization ranking. For instance, theories predict that having more frequent contact with migrants diminish hostility toward migration or that statistical discrimination may play a role. We indeed found some evidence that statistical discrimination, here measured using our questions on the numbers of illegal workers over the total working population, was correlated with polarization over private preferences. The evidence also pointed to religious affiliation, especially for protestants, decreasing polarization. However, controlling for voting intentions in these regressions canceled all these results and confirmed our evidence pointing to the relevance of political preferences.

Figure 5: Polarization ranking by party





Figure 6: Comparison between private and public preferences

polarization when participants had the possibility of going public. Proimmigration preferences for left-wing and far-left parties increased from 66.1% to 77.4% and from 64.8% to 78.7%, respectively. We also saw a shift in right-wing individuals’ preferences, which became 60.2% in favor of migration compared with 49.4% of the private ones. The preferences of far-right supporters stayed almost unchanged (from 88.5% to 87.3% hostile to migration), but for far-right supporters, private preferences were already very much in line with the perceived party “norms”, so there was very little space for adjustment in the direction of more polarization. We could easily measure the opposite effect—for example, from higher shares to proimmigration narratives—but we did not see it in the data. This move to more polarization was consistent both with the activation of social image preferences and with government influence expressive rationality. When we look at the narratives based on their emphasis based on the polarization ranking, we can find some evidence of more polarization for far-right participants, too, because they appreciated H/I less in public than in private (by a rank sum test, $p < 0.05$) and, based on the polarization ranking, H/I was perceived as the weakest “norm” among the anti-immigration narratives. The distribution of public preferences for right-wing participants also shifted toward the perceived polarizing narratives and in a stronger sense. In fact, from private to public preferences, we have a statistically significant drop in H/I ($p < 0.05$) from 13.8% to 7%, while A/O, the party perceived “norm”, increases in popularity from 19.1% to 31.3% ($p < 0.01$). For left-wing participants, we found statistically significant differences for H/I ($p < 0.05$) and H/R ($p < 0.10$) - two of the parties’ “taboos” - and positively for A/R ($p < 0.01$) - one of the party’s “norm”. To obtain further evidence, we associated each chosen narrative by party with its corresponding value in the polarization ranking and use those values in a regression framework. More specifically, we regressed the choice of publicly endorsing a narrative on polarization in public preferences while controlling for polarization in private preferences. The results (in Table D4) provided further evidence that, when going public, individuals chose a more polarizing narrative. This, by a heterogeneity analysis over the supported political parties, held across the parties¹⁹.

Result 3 (consistent with H2): Based on the polarization ranking, public preferences were more polarized than private ones for each party.

5.2 Twitter experiment

In this section, we look at the results of the Twitter experiment. We ended up using only narratives with an emphasis on out-group or reciprocity because these were the most preferred in the survey experiment. As pointed out in the experimental design section, we looked at the follow-back rate and at engagement over the pinned tweets. In the analysis over the follow-back rate, each user in the pool corresponded to an independent observation, while in the analysis on the pinned tweets, each tweeting corresponded to an independent observation.

¹⁹In Table D5 we look at if the difference between private and public preferences can be explained by participants’ individual characteristics. More specifically, we ran regressions in which we interacted the choice of going public with several individual characteristics. We found that middle-aged, female, low-educated, low-income, less-religious, and less-informed individuals were more likely to publicly support a more polarizing narrative than their privately preferred one, although the estimates were quite noisy and did not provide conclusive evidence. The only significant socio-economic interaction was with individuals who worked in the service sector. Together with the previous evidence, this suggests that groupness concerns may be a relevant channel in explaining Result 3. We also found a weakly positive interaction with individuals who had more frequent contact with migrants; mostly likely, those of them who decided to go public move toward the more polarizing narratives to increase their potential influence on public opinion: we interpret this, in line with our theoretical framework, as an attempt at government influence.

5.2.1 Public preferences based on the follow-back rate

In this section, we look at the follow-back rate on Twitter over Thomases. More specifically, we look at how many users from our sample, once we started following them through our Thomases, followed Thomas back depending on Thomas' pinned tweet. We considered this variable a measure of private preferences, although it may be confounded with strategic motives for expanding networks. For instance, far-right users followed-back more than the supporters of all other parties by a proportion of approximately 3 to 1 (10.3% vs. 2.9%). This issue, though not directly related to our research questions, may indirectly relate to our results below; therefore, it will be explored in more detail later on (see Section 5.3.3).

As in the survey, far-right users preferred anti-immigration narratives over proimmigration ones. On Twitter, however, the far-right preference for anti-immigration narratives was much weaker than in the survey (53.4%), and the difference with the half-split was not statistically significant. All other parties displayed similar behavior as in the survey: right-wing users were split but slightly more in favor of migration (55.2%), and left-wing and far-left users were neatly proimmigration (68.2% for the left, 62.4% for the far-left).




Figure 7: Follow-back by pinned tweet and by party

When analyzing the emphases, consistent with H1 but differently than in the survey, we found a strong pro/anti-immigration divide when the emphasis was on the out-group (see Figure 7). Far-right users followed-back more under H/O than under A/O, while the opposite held for left-wing and far-left users, and the statistical significance was provided by Mann-Whitney rank sum tests ($p < 0.05$ for far-right, $p < 0.001$ for left-wing and far-left). Left-wing users, and partly far-left ones, also seemed to display a specific disagreement with H/O and specific agreement with A/O. In fact, by Mann-Whitney rank sum tests, the difference between H/R and H/O was statistically significant for both left-wing

and far-left users (for left-wing: $p < 0.05$, for far-left: $p < 0.10$). These users also followed-back more under A/O than A/R, but the difference was statistically significant for left-wing users only ($p < 0.01$). Results on these comparisons from OLS regressions in Figure D1, where we can additionally control for a range of statistics associated to users’ Twitter usage (number of users followed, number of users whom they follow, the amount of tweeting, signup year), make this evidence even stronger.

Result 4 (in favour of H1): We found political polarization on migration on Twitter — even if, for far-right supporters, lower than in the survey — and it was driven by narratives with an emphasis on the out-group.

5.2.2 Engagement on Twitter

Figure 8 presents the averages for the different dimensions of engagement on Twitter with 95% confidence intervals. We interpreted engaging with a pinned tweet as a display of public preferences. It accounted—especially “likes” and “retweets”—for forming an endorsement. H/O triggered much more engagement than the other narratives. On average, hostile tweets with an emphasis on the out-group induced more impressions, more likes, more replies, and more retweets than all other narratives. The differences were statistically significant ($p > 0.05$), with Wilcoxon rank sum tests in almost every comparison (on impressions: 2 out of 3, on likes: 2 out of 3, on replies: 1 out of 3, on retweets: 3 out of 3). The only nonsignificant differences in impressions and likes were with A/O. We also found some evidence that A/O drove more engagement than A/R because the number of impressions was statistically significantly higher ($p < 0.01$).




Figure 8: Pinned tweets by profile

To go into greater detail, Table 1 shows the Cohen’s d effect sizes and p -values from Wilcoxon

rank sum tests for pairwise comparisons across the content of the narratives — hostile or accepting — and across their emphasis — on out-group or reciprocity. The effect sizes were always larger than 0.2, so based on Cohen (1988), no comparison produced a small effect. When it came to the comparisons involving H/O, the size of the effects was between 0.38 and 0.44, suggesting a medium size effect. In Figure D2, we show the coefficients from OLS regressions where we additionally controlled for date fixed effects and cluster errors at the level of our fake profiles. Not only were the no parametric results on H/O confirmed on every dimension, but we found that A/O attracted significantly more engagement than A/R on every dimension except for retweets.

Table 1: **Cohen’s D and Wilcoxon pairwise comparisons**

	H/R vs H/O	A/R vs A/O	H/R vs A/R	H/O vs A/O
Impression				
Cohen’s d	-0.431	-0.413	-0.048	0.405
Wilcoxon p-value	0.000	0.007	0.599	0.132
Like				
Cohen’s d	-0.441	-0.457	-0.301	0.417
Wilcoxon p-value	0.000	0.117	0.024	0.110
Reply				
Cohen’s d	-0.381	-0.261	0.346	0.421
Wilcoxon p-value	0.282	0.143	0.132	0.232
Retweet				
Cohen’s d	-0.441	-0.152	0.058	0.443
Wilcoxon p-value	0.000	0.703	0.549	0.000

Result 8 (in favour of H2): We found polarization in public preferences on Twitter: out-group narratives drove more engagement on Twitter than reciprocity ones. H/O, in particular, was the only narrative going viral.

5.3 Explaining the mechanisms

In this section, we aim to better explain our main results. We found polarization both in the policy positions and in the emphases, and it became stronger in public. Moreover, Twitter provided us with partially different results, most notably a weaker polarization for far-right individuals but a stronger role for out-group narratives in driving it. What was driving these results? Further insights on social image and government influence preferences come from exploiting the design of Survey 1 and reconstructing the whole causal chain between private preferences, the willingness to publicly endorse a narrative, and the public preferences themselves. Then, we consider additional outcomes, such emotions associated with narratives and their perceived political correctness. Lastly, we obtain further insights by considering an alternative type of polarization: that of the least preferred narrative. Finally, we look at the Twitter sample to understand how much political polarization on Twitter may be a byproduct of how users behave on the social media regardless of our narratives.

5.3.1 From private to public preferences

To explain the increase in polarization from private to public preferences, we decomposed the main analysis into two: we first looked at who were the endorsers and then at their choice of private and public preferences. In this way, we could obtain suggestive evidence on social image and government influence preferences.

On average, 522 participants over 1,226, so slightly above 40% of our sample, decided to go public with a narrative. Hence, although anonymous, the individuals thought this choice meaningful (remember that individuals did not know the extent to which we would advertise the public website outside the survey). The willingness to go public ranged from 46.3% of far-left supporters to 37.7% of right-wing supporters. Right-wing supporters were less likely to publicly endorse a narrative than all other participants (from a Mann–Whitney rank sum test, $p < 0.05$).

Figure 9: Private preferences of endorsers and no endorsers by political party




Figure 9 shows the choice of publicly endorsing a narrative based on the initial private preference. The frequency of endorsers and nonendorsers was compared for each preference and for each party. Using a Mann–Whitney rank sum test, the distributions for right-wing and left-wing supporters were significantly different at the 1% level. For far-left individuals, the p-value was close to significance ($p = 0.16$), and we found that H/R was significantly higher for nonendorsers when using a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test ($p < 0.05$). Overall, anti-immigration left-wing, right-wing, and far-left participants shied away from going public, and this was stronger if their private preference was H/R. Based on the polarization ranking, this meant that endorsers were already more polarized than nonendorsers in terms of private preferences. Evidence in this direction is also shown in the regressions in

Table D6 in Appendix D.

Did the endorsers also change their preferences in the direction of more polarization? We computed the level of change in polarization between the private and public preferences of the endorsers based on the polarization ranking by party group. Almost half of the endorsers (211 over 522) stuck to their private preference when going public. A rank sum test over the absolute values of the changes by the direction of the change failed to reach significance for each party. In Table D8 in Appendix D, we also showed the full matrixes of changes by party, failing to find interesting patterns. The difference in distributions failed to reach 5% significance for each party. The same was true for regressions on changes in polarization between private and public preferences (see Table D7). To sum up, it seems, then, that Result 3 was mostly explained by whom the endorsers were rather than by a change in their preferences.

Although this was not conclusive evidence in favor of social image/groupness concerns, the evidence went in that direction. It is difficult to argue that nonendorsers refrained from endorsing a narrative because of expressive rationality. Instead, it is likely that by publicly endorsing their own private preference if it was an own group “taboo”, they were afraid of harming their party group in the upcoming electoral competition.

5.3.2 Additional outcome variables



Figure 10: Emotions by party and by narrative

To explain polarization in the survey and on Twitter, we first looked at emotions. We elicited happiness, anger, and fear associated with narratives in Survey 2, showing them in Figure 10 by political party. For right-wing, left-wing, and far-left supporters, anti-immigration narratives were associated with less happiness and more fear and anger than proimmigration ones (by Mann–Whitney

rank sum test, $p < 0.01$ for each party and narrative). This was much stronger for the left, which is probably not surprising given that left-wing individuals are the most proimmigration ones. We found different results for the far-right. They were happier with anti-immigration narratives, especially H/I ($p < 0.01$). H/I and H/R ($p < 0.01$) were associated with less anger than all other narratives, and H/I was also associated with less fear ($p < 0.01$). Moreover, although emotions elicited by proimmigration narratives were similar in intensity for each party, there seemed to be some variability in emotions triggered by anti-immigration narratives for the other parties. H/I was associated with more happiness and less anger and fear, regardless of the intention to vote. To sum up, two things emerged: on the one hand, emotions underlined polarization on policy positions; on the other hand, among the anti-immigration narratives H/I seemed to have a special status, like a bridge between pro- and anti-immigration narratives. We speculate that those emotions associated to H/I could well define its status as the weakest “norm” for far-right supporters and explain why it was the less polarizing narrative among the hostile ones.





Figure 11: Political correctness by party and by narrative

Then, we looked at the perceived political correctness of the narratives, that is, a specific belief that one narrative “should” be preferred over another. This may show how individuals change their preferences when going from private to public and how they behave on Twitter. We elicited political correctness in Survey 2. Figure 11 shows the average level of political correctness by party affiliation and by narrative. There was a stark difference when judging the relative appropriateness of the policy positions on migration. Based on a Kruskal–Wallis test, far-right voters deemed correct narratives against migration as more politically ($p < 0.01$), while the opposite happened for the other parties. Interestingly, this also held for the right-wing voters, too, whom we saw as more split when looking at private preferences in Survey 1. This is fully consistent with Result 2 and with right-wing supporters behaving as left-wing and far-left supporters when going from private to public. If we think political correctness is related to social image concerns, then the move to more polarizing narratives may

indeed be at least partly explained by these concerns. When we looked at the emphases, for all parties except for the far-right, H/R was deemed as more politically correct than H/O. This difference was statistically significant by Kruskal–Wallis tests ($p < 0.01$) for left-wing supporters. This evidence was consistent with the right-wing preference for H/R in the survey, and it was consistent with behavior from Twitter, where a stark difference between H/R and H/O emerged for all parties and where H/O, the less politically correct narrative, was the only one going viral.

Figure 12: Least liked narratives



Finally, we considered polarization over the least ranked preferences, that is, dislikes. Was there polarization also over dislikes? Yes, there was. Only 19.91% of far-right supporters chose an anti-immigration narrative as the most disliked one compared with 54.11%, 69.88%, and 70.99%, respectively, of the right-wing, left-wing, and far-left supporters. Figure 12 presents the frequency distribution of the last-ranked narratives stratified by party affiliation. By far, H/O was the narrative driving more polarization. The comparison with the other anti-immigration narratives provided significant results with Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests at the 1% level for each party being only weaker for the far-right, where the out-group versus in-group comparison fell short of being significant. Among proimmigration narratives, A/R was somewhat less liked than the other accepting narratives, but the difference in unpopularity compared with both other narratives was statistically significant (at the 5% level) for right-wing voters only. Therefore, while confirming polarization over migration (Result 1), this evidence provides further qualifications to Result 2. More specifically, the extent to which H/O was disliked across the political spectrum compared with how much A/O was liked also suggests—combined with its low associated political correctness—that, when the participants were free to interact with each other—as in Twitter—then this narrative had the potential to become the more

debated one.

5.3.3 Users' activity on Twitter

A striking piece of evidence from our Twitter experiment was that far-right users followed-back more than users from other parties, regardless of the narrative in the pinned tweets. This may underlie the lower polarization on Twitter for far-right users; they may simply be following back everyone and trumping their natural preferences. To investigate this issue, we exploited the information we had on several dimensions of the behavior of Twitter users by political party, specifically the number of tweets per day, the number of users followed, and the number of users whom they followed. Table 2 summarizes this information both for the whole sample and for those who followed-back our Thomases.

Far-right users tended to tweet more than far-left and right-wing ones, who, in turn, tweeted more than left-wing ones. All these differences, based on Mann–Whitney rank sum tests, were significant ($p < 0.05$). By confronting the mean with the percentiles in Table 2, the distribution of tweeting was skewed to the right, with approximately around 25% of the users tweeting more than the mean value. Far-right users also tended to have more followers. The mean values masked this result, but a comparison between distributions by parties, well reflected by Mann–Whitney rank sum tests (all significant at 1% level), shows that the far-right individuals were more followed. The evidence was qualitatively the same if we considered the whole sample or if we restricted it to those who followed-back our Thomases.

The following behavior presents a similar story only when looking at the restricted sample but in a weaker sense. Far-right users who followed our Thomases back followed in general other users more, but the difference in distributions was significant only when considering the difference between left-wing and right-wing users (with left-wing $p < 0.001$, with right-wing, $p < 0.05$). Then, looking at the whole sample, we can see the opposite story: the difference in distribution with right-wing and far-left users was not significant (with right-wing $p > 0.8$, with far-left: $p > 0.4$) while the difference with left-wing ones was ($p < 0.01$) but in the opposite direction. This is clearly important because it suggests that we should not expect far-right individuals, in general, to follow-back our Thomases more as a mechanical reflex. If anything, we should expect this behavior more from left-wing users because they tended to follow other users more not only compared with the far-right but also to the far-left and right-wing ($p < 0.01$). However, the subgroup of far-right users who followed-back was indeed more active. So for this subgroup, general behavior may have mattered more than our Thomases. It could also be that this subgroup was so interested in the migration topic (or in expanding their network when seeing other users interested in migration) that its users tended to follow-back more than the more active among the other parties. Although this may not have fully overcome their preferences, it may have reduced the extent to which they revealed them in our experimental set-up, hence reducing their level of polarization.

6 Conclusions

In the present paper, we have investigated whether political polarization on migration is driven by the policy position and/or the emphasis in narratives. Furthermore, we have looked at the possible discrepancies between privately preferred narratives and publicly supported ones. Based on our findings, the emphases associated with policy positions in a narrative matter for political polarization. Our main result from the survey is that polarization was driven by economic reciprocity narratives for

Table 2: **Twitter activity of our sample, overall and restricted to those who follow-back Thomas**

	Party							
	far right		right		left		far left	
	Tot	Follow	Tot	Follow	Tot	Follow	Tot	Follow
Frequency	4917	504	5023	154	5040	135	5009	149
Daily tweets								
Mean	14.13	17.93	8.66	13.98	7.33	9.06	9.14	14.48
25th	1.62	3.22	0.47	1.98	0.49	0.93	0.63	1.34
50th	5.20	8.59	1.90	6.17	1.69	3.17	2.30	5.83
75th	15.00	21.26	7.08	14.57	5.91	10.69	8.07	14.32
SD	27.86	31.64	25.44	29.27	22.81	19.27	26.29	36.19
Followers								
Mean	966.35	1363.58	1725.92	2428.47	1385.16	1008.73	1730.41	1125.42
25th	79.00	284.50	52.00	150.00	61.00	107.00	44.00	107.00
50th	275.00	826.50	186.00	356.50	222.00	227.00	160.00	401.00
75th	863.00	1661.00	696.00	1210.00	730.50	867.00	563.00	1220.00
SD	4443.76	1989.20	20472.25	9122.45	8445.88	2000.67	41130.21	2130.08
Following								
Mean	1028.23	1719.75	966.74	2412.51	914.24	1348.83	838.12	1746.54
25th	150.00	487.00	179.00	362.00	204.00	330.00	188.00	395.00
50th	421.00	1137.50	412.00	740.50	469.00	646.00	406.00	802.00
75th	1138.00	2221.00	962.00	2054.00	1011.00	1696.00	877.00	2075.00
SD	3127.23	1979.59	5630.73	7056.31	1384.17	1775.27	1428.43	2329.23

right-wing individuals and by narratives with an emphasis on the out-group for left-wing individuals. This polarization became stronger over public endorsements. On Twitter, the polarization was still there but lower, and it was fully driven by the out-group narratives, with the anti-immigrant out-group tweet driving more engagement than all other narratives on every dimension for interaction.

The evidence from the survey may seem surprising at first. The emphasis on the out-group (i.e., on migrants) did not prevail. However, there are many reasons not to be surprised: social desirability bias may clearly push in this direction, even if we minimized the scope for it in our survey. There is another possible explanation relating to preferences. Right-wing individuals may just be more convinced by economic arguments related to the costs and benefits of immigration than by an evaluation of the possible economic and cultural consequences of immigration. Whatever the explanation, this result is reassuring if one analyses it in terms of the potential social implications conducting racism and hate crimes. However, it is important to note that the right-wing individuals in our experiment still believed this narrative to rank very high on polarization.

The difference in results between the survey and Twitter is another important finding; this result

reconciles the results from the literature, where polarization assumes different qualifications depending on the social media under analysis (Bail, 2021; Levy, 2021). Furthermore, it suggests that Twitter is indeed an environment where more extreme narratives gain ground more easily. It warrants considering interactions in social media as reflecting those in real life or the preferences expressed there as a true picture of our societies. Of course, we cannot assess which preferences are truer to the private true ones—those on the survey or those on Twitter—and it may be that this exercise would be meaningless anyway, but we have recorded that a difference exists. What needs to be better investigated are the reasons behind this difference. This is outside the scope of the present paper, and we lack the necessary information in our data, but we can put forward a few hypotheses. The first is that individuals on Twitter are self-selected based (among other things) on their attitudes toward migration so that more individuals with animosity toward migrants are present on Twitter compared with our representative sample from the survey. Another option is that the social norms on Twitter differ from those in the survey with people focusing not just on polarizing narratives—which is something we also found in the survey—but on specific polarizing narratives, that is, the ones with an emphasis on out-groups. We cannot exclude, of course, the possibility that this difference is an artifact of our experiment because the choice of narratives in our Twitter experiment was restricted compared with the survey experiment. This is a possibility that we feel like discounting both because, on Twitter, we have a between-subjects design and because we did not see a similar move toward higher A/O on Twitter compared with the survey. Overall, exploring these differences—how much the medium makes the message—clearly is exciting grounds for new research.

Finally, we can derive some policy implications. Much of the research so far has focused on misinformation and fake news, suggesting that fact checking and objectiveness do not necessarily correct biased perceptions (Barrera et al., 2020). In our paper, we have shown that there is another overlooked aspect of narratives: the arguments in support of the policy positions and the way they are framed. This shifts the focus from what is said to how it is said. With our paper, we cannot provide a full theory of how the “how” in narratives influences political polarization. We can suggest, though, that some narratives may be more polarizing than others and that, to reduce polarization, one should focus on attractive and nonpolarizing narratives. For example, the anti-immigrant in-group narrative seems to have some potential in this direction because it triggers many positive emotions in individuals, regardless of political orientation, while being less disliked by left-wing individuals. Also, the economic reciprocity narratives, although polarizing, offer the possibility to move away from some of the undesired effects of the out-group narratives, most notably the possible racism and hate crimes that come from negative depictions of migrants. To conclude, we have shown that there is a polarization effect when moving from private to public preferences. This tells us that there is something more to the story of polarization than just preferences: social image concerns, influencing the government, and maybe more. Therefore, rather than just focusing on the stories themselves, politicians could focus on these mechanisms, hence finding ways of undermining their influence.

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A Details on the Twitter experiment

A.1 Revised narratives

We had to adapt our narratives for Twitter by slightly reducing the number of words. The modifications did not impinge on the fundamentals of our narratives. Each narrative still encompassed the fact, policy position, and emphasis both on the cultural and economic domain.

H/O: Since 2015, approximately 10 million migrants have come to Germany. The unacceptable values and practices of many migrants are incompatible with our cultural lives. In addition, many migrants have work attitudes threatening to permanently harm their economy.

H/R: Since 2015, approximately 10 million migrants have come to Germany. Migrants have different values and practices, as well as professional skills. The integration of migrants is an expensive investment, and the costs will never be recouped in the future.

A/O: Since 2015, approximately 10 million migrants have come to Germany. The values and practices of many migrants can enrich our cultural lives. In addition, migrants bring professional qualifications that are necessary for our economy.

A/R: Since 2015, about 10 million migrants have come to Germany. Migrants have different values and practices, as well as professional skills. The integration of migrants is a worthwhile investment, and the costs will be more than offset in the future.

A.2 Sample

To build our sample, we performed several operations to obtain stratification by party and ensure we were not collecting undecided people or bots:

1. We collected the retweets of the main German parties (AfD, CDU, CSU, FDP, Greens, SPD, Die Linke) from the 17th of September backwards. On the first time we performed this operation, we collected a total number of 158,286 retweets, which provided us with a list of 39,152 unique Twitter users. Then, we did this five more times with more limited numbers to enlarge the sample, taking caution that there was no overlap in the users.
2. For each of these users, we collected information (photo profile, description, location, etc.) and a list of their 100 more recent tweets.
3. The users' timelines were used to spot those who retweeted from parties of different political orientations among far-left, left, right, and far-right. We dropped those users for which we found some overlap in the retweeting. We only found 0.009% of the users engaging in this type of online behavior.
4. We further dropped the following types of users: 1) those who signed up in 2020 or afterwards because of their higher chance of being bots or fake accounts, 2) the users who represented national or local branches of the parties, and 3) those users who tweeted less than 100 tweets in total. The remaining users were randomly selected to have a balanced sample of approximately 5,000 users by party groups (AfD, SPD+Greens, FDP+CDU+CSU, Die Linke). Within the groups, we balanced users by party based on the last poll available on the 17th, which was an INCA poll with data from the 13th to 15th of September. For calculating the ratio between

CDU and CSU, we used the ratio in terms of the total number of votes in the 2017 German Federal elections.

A.3 Procedures

Before starting the experiment on November 22, we performed several operations. Some of them were continued on each day of the experiment.

First, starting in July and throughout the course of the experiment, we were randomly posting articles with a neutral tone and devoid of political content from online newspapers and magazines. Tweets were on sports, art, history, culture, and business events. These tweets almost never got any interaction and only worked to keep our Thomas Meier “real.” This was mostly needed because, during our pilots, we realized that, with no activity, our experimental profiles following other users did not trigger any notification to the users who were followed.

Second, we built our sample (see the previous subsection for details). This was done six times in total because our first catch was not enough to complete the experiment.

Third, three days before the starting date of the experiment, we bought fake followers on <https://famousfollower.com>. We started on the planned date with approximately 250 followers per Thomas: this was needed because—as we realized during our pilots—no notification of our following another user would be produced for the followed user. Of course, these fake users were not considered part of the sample, so they were left out of our results completely.

Fourth, each day, we were following approximately 220 users by Thomas, stratified with our sample by political party (i.e., 55 per party group). Because of Twitter’s technical constraints, we could not follow more than 1,000 users per day with our Twitter API account. This procedure was enacted always around 11 a.m. to 12 p.m., a time in which we suspected Twitter users were more active (e.g., <https://statusbrew.com/insights/best-times-to-post-on-social-media/>). It took around 20 minutes to complete this operation with Twitter APIs. Every operation with its exit code was recorded through APIs. On the 96th day of the experiment, we reached a limit of 5,000 users, the maximum for Twitter.


B The role of beliefs: an alternative explanation

To explain the difference between private and public preferences, we also took into account the beliefs on the most preferred narrative. First, we looked at if the participants overestimated agreement at the “society level,” that is, within the survey, on their private preference. Then, we looked at how beliefs entered the decision process on public preference.

To assess whether the individuals overestimated the percentage of others agreeing with the same narrative as themselves, we performed a multinomial logit regression over beliefs on the most preferred narrative. These beliefs were regressed over the preferred narratives while controlling for individual characteristics. Based on that regression, Figure B1 shows the results of the marginal effects of each preferred narrative—with H/I as the baseline category—on each possible belief.

The coefficients associated with proimmigration narratives were always negative in the panels on anti-immigration narratives’ beliefs and positive in the panels on proimmigration narratives’ beliefs. Hence, the popularity of narratives against migration was overestimated by individuals who preferred anti-immigration narratives and vice versa. To be more specific, let us consider each panel in Figure B1 separately. On beliefs on H/I, all coefficients were negative, and all except H/O were significantly so at the 5% level, suggesting that H/I, compared with the other ones, was indeed overestimated by

Figure B1: Beliefs on narratives




Multinomial logit on beliefs on the private preferences of others. Baseline is H/I. Standard errors are adjusted with the Bonferroni correction. Controls import age groups, gender, immigration status, education, income, employment status, occupation, religiousness.

individuals who found it to be the one that they agreed with the most. The same pattern held for the panels on H/R and A/I: the coefficients were significantly different from zero only for the corresponding narrative. Out-group narratives, both hostile and accepting, and A/R seemed to display a different pattern. In these cases, it did not seem to make a difference in the participant’s beliefs if they expressed a specific preference for that narrative, as long as the political position expressed by the narrative—anti-or proimmigration—was the same.

We restricted the sample to those who were willing to share a narrative publicly. In this way, we could disentangle the influence of beliefs from that of preferences on the choice of endorsing one specific narrative rather than another. We ran a multinomial logit regression where the dependent variable was the endorsed narrative and the three independent variables of interest were the beliefs on each narrative and highest ranked narratives. Then, the average marginal effects were computed with the Bonferroni correction to account for multiple hypothesis testing, which have been reported in Figure B2 as graphs.

First, the beliefs on the second preferred narrative were never significant, with just one exception. This type of beliefs was inserted in the regression as a placebo. However, then, to understand how the weight of beliefs compared with preferences on the choice of which narrative to support, let us consider the coefficients of beliefs on the most popular narrative vis-a-vis the individual preference. Both seemed to matter because the coefficients of the beliefs and preferences corresponding to each narrative were significantly different from zero for most of the narratives. The weight varied depending on the narrative. For H/I, both had the same weight: not having an individual preference for

Figure B2: Determinants of endorsing a narratives



Average marginal effects from multinomial logit regression on the endorsed narrative. The sample for this regression is the subgroup of participants who are willing to publicly endorse a narrative. Baseline category is H/I. Standard errors are adjusted with the Bonferroni correction. Controls import age groups, gender, immigration status, education, income, employment status, occupation, religiousness.

proimmigration narratives seemed to matter more than specifically liking the H/I one. In the H/O panel, those coefficients associated with the corresponding belief and preference were the only significant ones, both with the same order of magnitude. To endorse H/R, two things mattered: having the corresponding belief and disagreeing with proimmigration narratives. For A/I, only the corresponding preference mattered. A/O and A/R displayed a pattern in which what mattered was agreeing with a proimmigration narrative and believing that the correspondent one was the one individuals agreed with the most.

C Beliefs over perceived polarization and moral disapproval

In this appendix, we examine in greater detail the degree of perceived polarization over narratives by political orientation. For this purpose, we exploit the rich elicitation of beliefs in Survey 2. We first tested if the participants overestimated the number of supporters of their own party agreeing with the same narrative as the one they agreed with. Table C1 provides the data for this analysis. For each combination of narrative and party affiliation, the row “Same” has the frequency of participants believing the preferred narrative in their party was their own, and the row “Different” has the opposite. Table C2 restricts the sample to “Same” and confronts the beliefs on the percentage of people of their own party agreeing with the narrative with the actual ones (based from data in the same survey, so the rows “Total” in Table C1).

The number of participants who believed their preferred narrative was also the preferred one in their own party was over 50% for each party. This held true for all narratives that supported a political position consistent with the party’s. This was already evidence in favor of an overestimation. However, then, additional evidence emerged by looking at the predicted versus actual numbers. In Table C2, we can see a positive discrepancy for all possible combinations of party affiliation and narrative. The sign rank tests all supported this result at the 1% significance level (except for tests where the statistical power was just too low but the direction was the same). Furthermore, over the entire sample, no participant actually received the number right or underestimated it.

We now look at perceived polarization. Figure C1 presents a measure of perceived polarization by showing, for each party, the percentage of voters who believed the majority of participants of other parties preferred the opposite type of narrative—anti-immigration for proimmigration participants and vice versa. The perceived level of polarization was higher for extreme parties than for mainstream ones: using a Wilcoxon rank sum test, the difference was statistically significant at the 1% level. Moreover, it was not significant when confronting far-right and far-left ($p > 0.15$) and was only weakly so when confronting left-wing and right-wing ($p > 0.05$).

This analysis suggests there might be some overestimation of polarization, but this is not conclusive; that analysis does not tell us anything about the discrepancy between the perceived level and actual one. It might be that extreme parties were correct in believing their own preferred narrative was different from the one preferred by the majority of those voting for other parties. Actually, based on our data, far-right supporters were actually correct, while far-left ones were not. We performed an analysis on overestimation at the aggregate level by confronting beliefs on the other parties’ preferred narratives with the actual distribution from Survey 1. Table C3 shows the distribution of beliefs on the preferred narrative by the other parties. This can be confronted with numbers in Figure 4 in the main text to determine the discrepancy. We performed this comparison with Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests among the distributions. Far-right individuals were good at the individual level in the sense that

Table C1: Same vs different beliefs regarding own party for preferred narrative

	Party affiliation				
	far right	right	left	far left	Total
H/I					
Different	15	14	17	5	51
Same	14	17	6	4	41
Total	29	31	23	9	92
H/O					
Different	20	12	14	10	56
Same	14	6	4	2	26
Total	34	18	18	12	82
H/R					
Different	22	18	25	10	75
Same	40	33	20	3	96
Total	62	51	45	13	171
A/I					
Different	1	9	22	4	36
Same	1	14	28	10	53
Total	2	23	50	14	89
A/O					
Different	4	28	35	12	79
Same		32	74	25	131
Total	4	60	109	37	210
A/R					
Different	6	16	26	9	57
Same	1	15	43	11	70
Total	7	31	69	20	127
Total					
Different	68	97	139	50	354
Same	70	117	175	55	417
Total	138	214	314	105	771

over 50% of them predicted a proimmigration narrative was the preferred one, and this was actually the case. Here, 28% of them also correctly guessed that A/O was the preferred one. They were not good in the aggregate ($p < 0.01$) because they tended to exaggerate how many people of other parties were in favor of migration. For right-wing supporters, the picture was even worse. They were equally bad at the individual and aggregate levels because they tended to believe that most people from other parties were against migration, while the opposite was actually true ($p < 0.01$). Here, 54% of left-wing individuals correctly predicted that anti-immigration narratives were the most preferred by other parties, and 26% of them correctly guessed that H/R attracted more favor. However, at an aggregate level, they exaggerated how many people preferred A/I over A/O ($p < 0.01$). More or less, the same held for far-left individuals. Here, 59% of them were right that anti-immigration narratives were preferred, and 28% of them guessed the preferred one was H/R. However, they exaggerated how many participants preferred H/I over H/O ($p < 0.01$).

Finally, Figure C2 shows moral disapproval, that is, the discrepancy between empirical and nor-




Figure C1: Perceived level of polarization




Figure C2: Moral disapproval by party

Table C2: Actual vs predicted supporters of own preferred narrative

	Party affiliation			
	far right	right	left	far left
Predicted: H/I	66.86	44.06	53.83	42.50
Actual: H/I	21.01	14.49	7.32	8.57
Predicted: H/O	70.71	41.67	53.00	65.00
Actual: H/O	24.64	8.41	5.73	11.43
Predicted: H/R	66.65	45.61	52.70	37.33
Actual: H/R	44.93	23.83	14.33	12.38
Predicted: A/I	50.00	61.07	55.11	41.50
Actual: A/I	1.45	10.75	15.92	13.33
Predicted: A/O		53.31	61.18	56.76
Actual: A/O	2.90	28.04	34.71	35.24
Predicted: A/R	50.00	62.47	60.67	66.55
Actual: A/R	5.07	14.49	21.97	19.05

Table C3: Beliefs on the most preferred narrative by other parties

Beliefs on most preferred of other parties	Party affiliation				Total
	far right	right	left	far left	
H/I	15	35	48	22	120
	10.87%	16.36%	15.29%	20.95%	15.56%
H/O	10	29	41	10	90
	7.25%	13.55%	13.06%	9.52%	11.67%
H/R	21	57	82	30	190
	15.22%	26.64%	26.11%	28.57%	24.64%
A/I	25	31	64	14	134
	18.12%	14.49%	20.38%	13.33%	17.38%
A/O	40	34	41	18	133
	28.99%	15.89%	13.06%	17.14%	17.25%
A/R	27	28	38	11	104
	19.57%	13.08%	12.10%	10.48%	13.49%

mative expectations. The level of moral disapproval was around 35%, meaning that more or less than one-third of the participants experienced dissonance between the narrative they thought should be endorsed and the one they expected most people to endorse. This was weaker for far-left individuals. Only 25% of them experienced such discrepancy, and the difference with left-wing individuals by a Wilcoxon rank sum test was statistically significant ($p < 0.05$). This difference disappeared when considering other parties for comparison purposes (right-wing, $p > 0.05$, far-right $p > 0.10$).

D Additional tables

Table D1: Descriptive statistics on our sample for Survey 1

	far right	right	Party left	far left	Total
Age					
Under 30	23	47	100	18	188
	10.18%	13.82%	20.08%	11.11%	15.33%
Between 30 and 60	143	182	228	84	637
	63.27%	53.53%	45.78%	51.85%	51.96%
Over 60	60	111	170	60	401
	26.55%	32.65%	34.14%	37.04%	32.71%
Gender					
Female	86	177	280	70	613
	38.05%	52.06%	56.22%	43.21%	50.00%
Men	140	163	218	92	613
	61.95%	47.94%	43.78%	56.79%	50.00%
Born in Germany					
No	9	15	15	3	42
	4.02%	4.44%	3.05%	1.85%	3.46%
Yes	215	323	476	159	1,173
	95.98%	95.56%	96.95%	98.15%	96.54%
Mother born in Germany					
Yes	209	305	455	151	1,120
	93.30%	90.50%	91.92%	93.79%	92.03%
No	15	31	35	8	89
	6.70%	9.20%	7.07%	4.97%	7.31%
Do not know	0	1	5	2	8
	0.00%	0.30%	1.01%	1.24%	0.66%
Education					
No degree	2	1	3	1	7
	0.88%	0.29%	0.60%	0.62%	0.57%
Hauptschule	29	16	44	11	100
	12.83%	4.71%	8.84%	6.79%	8.16%
Realschule	65	84	112	28	289
	28.76%	24.71%	22.49%	17.28%	23.57%
High school diploma	30	60	99	26	215
	13.27%	17.65%	19.88%	16.05%	17.54%
Other high school diploma	20	54	76	33	183
	8.85%	15.88%	15.26%	20.37%	14.93%
University degree	27	48	53	21	149
	11.95%	14.12%	10.64%	12.96%	12.15%
Degree from a university of applied sciences	1	2	6	3	12
	0.44%	0.59%	1.20%	1.85%	0.98%
Ph.D.	3	7	6	3	19
	1.33%	2.06%	1.20%	1.85%	1.55%
Dual vocational training	37	32	53	19	141
	16.37%	9.41%	10.64%	11.73%	11.50%
Master's degree	3	21	12	9	45
	1.33%	6.18%	2.41%	5.56%	3.67%
Other professional degree	9	15	34	8	66
	3.98%	4.41%	6.83%	4.94%	5.38%
Income					
under 900 Euro	18	10	34	20	82
	8.04%	2.96%	6.88%	12.42%	6.74%
900-1300 Euro	15	20	58	21	114
	6.70%	5.92%	11.74%	13.04%	9.37%
1301-1500 Euro	17	24	40	14	95
	7.59%	7.10%	8.10%	8.70%	7.81%
1501-2000 Euro	37	40	67	23	167
	16.52%	11.83%	13.56%	14.29%	13.72%
2001-2600 Euro	42	56	79	27	204
	18.75%	16.57%	15.99%	16.77%	16.76%
2601-3200 Euro	39	61	74	23	197
	17.41%	18.05%	14.98%	14.29%	16.19%
3201-4500 Euro	34	81	87	22	224
	15.18%	23.96%	17.61%	13.66%	18.41%
4501-6000 Euro	16	27	43	11	97
	7.14%	7.99%	8.70%	6.83%	7.97%
more than 6001 Euro	6	19	12	0	37
	2.68%	5.62%	2.43%	0.00%	3.04%
Employment status					
Employed	112	158	199	62	531
	49.56%	47.02%	40.12%	38.51%	43.56%
Self-employed	14	31	25	10	80
	6.19%	9.23%	5.04%	6.21%	6.56%
450 Euro employment	10	10	21	4	45
	4.42%	2.98%	4.23%	2.48%	3.69%
Working without registration	3	3	6	1	13
	1.33%	0.89%	1.21%	0.62%	1.07%
Currently not employed and not looking for work	5	10	23	5	43
	2.21%	2.98%	4.64%	3.11%	3.53%
Looking for work but currently unemployed	15	7	14	13	49
	6.64%	2.08%	2.82%	8.07%	4.02%
Student	2	11	32	7	52
	0.88%	3.27%	6.45%	4.35%	4.27%
Retired	50	89	158	50	347
	22.12%	26.49%	31.85%	31.06%	28.47%
Apprentice and trainee	3	5	9	3	20
	1.33%	1.49%	1.81%	1.86%	1.64%
Other	12	12	9	6	39
	5.31%	3.57%	1.81%	3.73%	3.20%
Occupation					
Managers	25	53	37	18	133
	11.21%	15.87%	7.61%	11.32%	11.06%
Professionals	72	124	187	65	448
	32.29%	37.13%	38.48%	40.88%	37.27%
Technicians and Associate Professionals	14	19	24	8	65
	6.28%	5.69%	4.94%	5.03%	5.41%
Clerical Support Workers	43	70	117	33	263
	19.28%	20.96%	24.07%	20.75%	21.88%
Service and Sale Workers	19	18	42	5	84
	8.52%	5.39%	8.64%	3.14%	6.99%
Skilled Agricultural Forestry and Fishery Workers	2	9	4	3	18
	0.90%	2.69%	0.82%	1.89%	1.50%
Craft and Related Trades Workers	24	12	25	9	70
	10.76%	3.59%	5.14%	5.66%	5.82%
Plant and Machines Operators and Assemblers	6	6	8	2	22
	2.69%	1.80%	1.65%	1.26%	1.83%
Unskilled Labor	15	16	41	13	85
	6.73%	4.79%	8.44%	8.18%	7.07%
Armed Forces Occupations	3	7	1	3	14
	1.35%	2.10%	0.21%	1.89%	1.16%
Religion					
I do not belong to any religious community	129	145	214	103	591
	57.08%	42.90%	43.32%	63.98%	48.48%
Protestant	39	75	150	30	294
	17.26%	22.19%	30.36%	18.63%	24.12%
Catholic	51	98	101	21	271
	22.57%	28.99%	20.45%	13.04%	22.23%
Christian Orthodox	3	4	5	2	14
	1.33%	1.18%	1.01%	1.24%	1.15%
Islamic	0	5	11	1	17
	0.00%	1.48%	2.23%	0.62%	1.39%
Jewish	0	1	1	0	2
	0.00%	0.30%	0.20%	0.00%	0.16%
Other	4	10	12	4	30
	1.77%	2.96%	2.43%	2.48%	2.46%

Table D2: Descriptive statistics on our sample for Survey 2

	far right	right	Party left	far left	Total
Age					
Under 30	13	28	50	16	107
	9.42%	13.08%	15.92%	15.24%	13.88%
Between 30 and 60	75	117	163	42	397
	54.35%	54.67%	51.91%	40.00%	51.49%
Over 60	50	69	101	47	267
	36.23%	32.24%	32.17%	44.76%	34.63%
Gender					
Female	66	109	160	42	377
	47.83%	50.93%	50.96%	40.00%	48.90%
Men	72	105	154	63	394
	52.17%	49.07%	49.04%	60.00%	51.10%
Born in Germany					
No	8	5	14	2	29
	5.97%	2.37%	4.47%	2.00%	3.83%
Yes	126	206	299	98	729
	94.03%	97.63%	95.53%	98.00%	96.17%
Mother born in Germany					
Yes	127	193	285	97	702
	93.38%	91.04%	91.64%	93.27%	92.01%
No	8	19	25	5	57
	5.88%	8.96%	8.04%	4.81%	7.47%
Do not know	1	0	1	2	4
	0.74%	0.00%	0.32%	1.92%	0.52%
Education					
No degree	1	0	3	1	5
	0.72%	0.00%	0.96%	0.95%	0.65%
Hauptschule	19	12	23	5	59
	13.77%	5.61%	7.32%	4.76%	7.65%
Realschule	46	55	67	25	193
	33.33%	25.70%	21.34%	23.81%	25.03%
High school diploma	16	41	65	23	145
	11.59%	19.16%	20.70%	21.90%	18.81%
Other high school diploma	11	21	49	17	98
	7.97%	9.81%	15.61%	16.19%	12.71%
University degree	18	32	37	12	99
	13.04%	14.95%	11.78%	11.43%	12.84%
Degree from a university of applied sciences	1	3	2	0	6
	0.72%	1.40%	0.64%	0.00%	0.78%
Ph.D.	0	7	3	0	10
	0.00%	3.27%	0.96%	0.00%	1.30%
Dual vocational training	20	26	44	14	104
	14.49%	12.15%	14.01%	13.33%	13.49%
Master's degree	3	9	9	3	24
	2.17%	4.21%	2.87%	2.86%	3.11%
Other professional degree	3	8	12	5	28
	2.17%	3.74%	3.82%	4.76%	3.63%
Income					
under 900 Euro	13	7	16	15	51
	9.56%	3.29%	5.10%	14.56%	6.66%
900-1300 Euro	14	13	39	19	85
	10.29%	6.10%	12.42%	18.45%	11.10%
1301-1500 Euro	13	12	29	12	66
	9.56%	5.63%	9.24%	11.65%	8.62%
1501-2000 Euro	17	26	41	14	98
	12.50%	12.21%	13.06%	13.59%	12.79%
2001-2600 Euro	17	27	40	17	101
	12.50%	12.68%	12.74%	16.50%	13.19%
2601-3200 Euro	24	34	42	10	110
	17.65%	15.96%	13.38%	9.71%	14.36%
3201-4500 Euro	20	46	46	10	122
	14.71%	21.60%	14.65%	9.71%	15.93%
4501-6000 Euro	7	18	35	2	62
	5.15%	8.45%	11.15%	1.94%	8.09%
more than 6001 Euro	3	16	6	0	25
	2.21%	7.51%	1.91%	0.00%	3.26%
10	8	14	20	4	46
	5.88%	6.57%	6.37%	3.88%	6.01%
Employment status					
Employed	68	93	134	32	327
	49.64%	43.66%	42.68%	31.07%	42.63%
Self-employed	4	23	19	4	50
	2.92%	10.80%	6.05%	3.88%	6.52%
450 Euro employment	6	9	8	1	24
	4.38%	4.23%	2.55%	0.97%	3.13%
Working without registration	0	1	0	3	4
	0.00%	0.47%	0.00%	2.91%	0.52%
Currently not employed and not looking for work	5	5	12	6	28
	3.65%	2.35%	3.82%	5.83%	3.65%
Looking for work but currently unemployed	6	3	12	5	26
	4.38%	1.41%	3.82%	4.85%	3.39%
Student	2	9	19	5	35
	1.46%	4.23%	6.05%	4.85%	4.56%
Retired	42	58	91	43	234
	30.66%	27.23%	28.98%	41.75%	30.51%
Apprentice and trainee	1	5	0	1	14
	0.73%	2.35%	2.55%	0.00%	1.83%
Other	3	7	11	4	25
	2.19%	3.29%	3.50%	3.88%	3.26%
Occupation					
Managers	11	30	31	7	79
	8.09%	14.22%	9.94%	6.86%	10.38%
Professionals	51	83	121	29	284
	37.50%	39.34%	38.78%	28.43%	37.32%
Technicians and Associate Professionals	7	8	20	6	41
	5.15%	3.79%	6.41%	5.88%	5.39%
Clerical Support Workers	35	49	65	20	169
	25.74%	23.22%	20.83%	19.61%	22.21%
Service and Sale Workers	6	18	18	15	57
	4.41%	8.53%	5.77%	14.71%	7.49%
Skilled Agricultural Forestry and Fishery Workers	0	2	4	3	9
	0.00%	0.95%	1.28%	2.94%	1.18%
Craft and Related Trades Workers	9	8	16	6	39
	6.62%	3.79%	5.13%	5.88%	5.12%
Plant and Machines Operators and Assemblers	7	5	2	6	20
	5.15%	2.37%	0.64%	5.88%	2.63%
Unskilled Labor	10	7	34	10	61
	7.35%	3.32%	10.90%	9.80%	8.02%
Armed Forces Occupations	0	1	1	0	2
	0.00%	0.47%	0.32%	0.00%	0.26%
Religion					
I do not belong to any religious community	84	86	160	65	395
	61.31%	40.38%	51.12%	63.11%	51.57%
Protestant	25	57	78	22	182
	18.25%	26.76%	24.92%	21.36%	23.76%
Catholic	20	60	50	10	140
	14.60%	28.17%	15.97%	9.71%	18.28%
Christian Orthodox	3	2	5	1	11
	2.19%	0.94%	1.60%	0.97%	1.44%
Islamic	1	8	1	1	10
	0.73%	0.00%	2.56%	0.97%	1.31%
Jewish	0	1	2	1	4
	0.00%	0.47%	0.64%	0.97%	0.52%
Other	2	4	6	0	12
	1.46%	1.88%	1.92%	0.00%	1.57%
8	2	3	4	3	12
	1.46%	1.41%	1.28%	2.91%	1.57%

Table D3: **Influence of individual characteristics on polarization on private preferences**

	Narrative's polarization		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age			
between 30 and 65	0.022 (0.082)	0.005 (0.082)	-0.057 (0.071)
above 65	0.096 (0.092)	0.081 (0.093)	0.098 (0.081)
Female	-0.103* (0.057)	-0.107* (0.057)	0.005 (0.050)
Born in Germany			
immigrant	0.166 (0.153)	0.160 (0.153)	0.139 (0.132)
missing	-0.039 (0.291)	0.017 (0.320)	-0.126 (0.276)
Education	0.004 (0.058)	0.004 (0.058)	0.009 (0.050)
High income	0.005 (0.057)	0.006 (0.057)	0.078 (0.050)
Unemployed, neet and retired	0.019 (0.032)	0.031 (0.032)	0.040 (0.028)
Occupation			
low-skilled white collars	-0.048 (0.065)	-0.037 (0.065)	-0.085 (0.056)
blue collars	0.044 (0.078)	0.045 (0.079)	-0.050 (0.068)
Religion			
protestant	-0.133* (0.068)	-0.136** (0.069)	-0.061 (0.060)
catholic	-0.111 (0.070)	-0.116 (0.071)	-0.042 (0.061)
other	-0.144 (0.125)	-0.153 (0.127)	-0.025 (0.109)
Contact with imm		-0.026 (0.016)	-0.025* (0.014)
Statistical discrimination		0.277*** (0.103)	0.067 (0.090)
Party			
right			-1.460*** (0.072)
left			-1.000*** (0.068)
far left			-1.076*** (0.086)
R-squared	0.013	0.021	0.275
Number of observations	1226	1218	1218

*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

OLS regressions. Narrative's polarization is a continuous variable based on the polarization index. The baseline categories are under 35 for Age, natives for Born in Germany, managers and professional for Occupation, not belonging to any religion for Religion, and the far right for Party. Contact with immigrants is a continuous variable from 1 ("every day") to 6 ("never"). Statistical discrimination is the difference between the estimated percentage of illegal migrant workers over the total working population and the estimated percentage of illegal native workers over the total working population; the actual value, based on estimates, ranges between 10% and 30%.

Table D4: **Influence of publicly endorsing a narrative on polarization**

	Public narrative's polarization			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Endorser	0.107** (0.046)	0.097** (0.048)	0.123 (0.103)	0.124 (0.105)
Private narrative's polarization	0.531*** (0.024)	0.518*** (0.025)	0.399*** (0.027)	0.377*** (0.028)
Party				
right			-0.717*** (0.095)	-0.772*** (0.098)
left			-0.424*** (0.087)	-0.439*** (0.090)
far left			-0.577*** (0.111)	-0.606*** (0.113)
Party # Endorser				
right			-0.052 (0.134)	-0.050 (0.137)
left			-0.022 (0.124)	-0.049 (0.126)
far left			0.108 (0.159)	0.065 (0.161)
Individual controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
R-squared	0.295	0.330	0.346	0.385
Number of observations	1226	1226	1226	1226

*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

OLS regressions. Included controls are age-group, gender, immigrant status, immigrant status of the mother, education (10 levels), income (10 levels), employment status (10 levels), occupation (10 levels).

Table D5: **Heterogeneity analysis on individual characteristics for public narrative's polarization**

	Public narrative's polarization										
	Young	Old	Female	Low edu	Low inc	Unemp	Service	Blue col	Relig	Contact	Stat disc
Endorser	0.124** (0.052)	0.123** (0.058)	0.051 (0.067)	0.016 (0.079)	0.024 (0.070)	0.092 (0.064)	0.038 (0.056)	0.130** (0.052)	0.126* (0.068)	-0.084 (0.110)	0.051 (0.056)
Control	0.039 (0.095)	0.043 (0.081)	-0.124* (0.065)	-0.312 (0.341)	0.046 (0.294)	-0.012 (0.353)	0.128 (0.236)	-0.008 (0.195)	-0.192 (0.346)	-0.036** (0.018)	0.000 (0.113)
Endorser#Control	-0.177 (0.132)	-0.074 (0.100)	0.096 (0.095)	0.127 (0.099)	0.134 (0.095)	0.013 (0.095)	0.206** (0.104)	-0.191 (0.125)	-0.055 (0.094)	0.048* (0.027)	0.285 (0.178)
R-squared	0.331	0.331	0.331	0.331	0.332	0.330	0.333	0.332	0.331	0.333	0.333
Number of observations	1226	1226	1226	1226	1226	1226	1226	1226	1226	1218	1226

*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

OLS regressions. In each regression, we interact a variable for the noted category with publicly endorsing a narrative and report results both for the interaction and the baseline coefficient. Included controls in each regression are also the polarization level associated to the private preference, age-group, gender, immigrant status, immigrant status of the mother, education (10 levels), income (10 levels), employment status (10 levels), occupation (10 levels) and religion (4 groups).


Table D6: **Influence of the perceived polarization of the private preference on the probability of publicly endorsing a narrative**

	Endorser			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Narrative's polarization	0.065*** (0.015)	0.056*** (0.015)	0.067* (0.037)	0.047 (0.037)
Party				
right			-0.121 (0.132)	-0.169 (0.133)
left			0.063 (0.104)	0.033 (0.105)
far left			0.021 (0.127)	-0.004 (0.129)
Party # Narrative's polarization				
right			0.137 (0.092)	0.147 (0.091)
left			-0.008 (0.042)	-0.000 (0.043)
far left			0.043 (0.063)	0.052 (0.065)
Individual controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
R-squared	0.016	0.081	0.021	0.087
Number of observations	1226	1226	1226	1226

*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1


OLS regressions. Included controls are age-group, gender, immigrant status, immigrant status of the mother, education (10 levels), income (10 levels), employment status (10 levels), occupation (10 levels).

Figure D1: Pairwise comparisons from regressions on the follow-back rate



OLS regression on the follow-back rate. Included controls are the number of users followed, the number of users whom they follow, the number of tweets posted, the year in which users signed up. Each coefficient represent the result of a pairwise comparison of Thomas Meier by the party of the users.

Figure D2: Pairwise comparisons from regressions on pinned tweets



OLS regression on impressions, likes, replies and retweets associated to each tweeting of the pinned tweet by a Thomas Meier. Errors are clustered at Thomas Meier level. Included controls are fixed effects associated to the date of the tweeting. Each coefficient represent the result of a pairwise comparison of Thomas Meier on the specified outcome.

Table D7: **Influence of endorsing a narrative on change in polarization between public and private preferences**

	Endorsing a more polarizing narrative			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Endorser	0.023 (0.031)	0.025 (0.032)	-0.090 (0.072)	-0.066 (0.074)
Party				
right			0.000 (0.061)	-0.005 (0.063)
left			0.000 (0.058)	0.008 (0.060)
far left			0.000 (0.075)	0.007 (0.077)
Party # Endorser				
right			0.133 (0.094)	0.123 (0.096)
left			0.138 (0.087)	0.104 (0.089)
far left			0.159 (0.112)	0.118 (0.113)
Individual controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
R-squared	0.000	0.052	0.005	0.055
Number of observations	1226	1226	1226	1226

*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

OLS regressions. Included controls are age-group, gender, immigrant status, immigrant status of the mother, education (10 levels), income (10 levels), employment status (10 levels), occupation (10 levels).

Table D8: Table with the frequency of public and private preferences

	Public preference						Total
	H/I	H/O	H/R	A/I	A/O	A/R	
far right							
H/I	5	3	12		1		21
H/O	3	19	8		2	2	34
H/R	7	7	22			2	38
A/I				1	1	1	3
A/O			1		2		3
A/R			2			1	3
Total	15	29	45	1	6	6	102
right-wing							
H/I	3	4	5	2		1	15
H/O	3	1	5		1	2	12
H/R	2	3	10	2	4	2	23
A/I		2	4	4	10	4	24
A/O		3	2	3	13	8	29
A/R	1	2	1	3	12	6	25
Total	9	15	27	14	40	23	128
left-wing							
H/I	3	1	1	3	3	1	12
H/O	4	6	7	3		3	23
H/R	2	4	7	3	2	1	19
A/I		2	2	16	12	13	45
A/O	1	4	1	10	30	18	64
A/R		2	2	6	14	30	54
Total	10	19	20	41	61	66	217
far left							
H/I	3	2		1	1		7
H/O	2		2	1		1	6
H/R		1	2		1	1	5
A/I				7	7	4	18
A/O	1	1		3	11	7	23
A/R			2	3	2	9	16
Total	6	4	6	15	22	22	75

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