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## Don't Stop Believin' – Heterogeneous Updating of Intergenerational Mobility Perceptions across Income Groups

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# Don't Stop Believin' – Heterogeneous Updating of Intergenerational Mobility Perceptions across Income Groups

## Abstract

This article presents a novel explanation why demand for redistribution on average does not respond to information on low intergenerational mobility. Building on insights from behavioral economics, we expect that incentives to update perceptions of intergenerational mobility change along the income distribution. Empirically, we conduct a survey experiment in Austria and show that the average treatment effect of information on perceptions is mostly driven by higher income individuals while low-income respondents hardly react. We replicate this result for the United States and Germany using data from two closely related survey experiments (Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso, 2018; Fehr, Müller, and Preus, 2022). Thus, the frequently observed unresponsiveness of demand for redistribution may result because the group which drives the effect on beliefs does not increase demand for redistribution and may even decrease it. Indeed, despite the strong perception shift in the high-income group, the treatment effects on its preferences are mostly zero and even negative for certain policies. At the same time, the group with the clearest incentives to change its redistributive preferences, the low-income group, is systematically less inclined to update its perceptions and thus their redistributive preferences are mostly unaffected and only partially increased in response to the treatment. We suggest that different responses to information could be due to motivated beliefs, since high social mobility implies for low-income earners that effort is more likely to pay off.

JEL-Codes: C930, D630, D830, H230, J620.

Keywords: intergenerational mobility, beliefs, survey experiment, redistributive preferences.

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# 1 Introduction

Given rising income inequalities and low intergenerational mobility in most rich countries, demand for redistribution, especially among low-income earners, is surprisingly low (OECD, 2018; Romero-Vidal and Van Hauwaert, 2022). Moreover, even though informing people about high inequality or low social mobility shifts their beliefs on average in the first stage, it does not seem to induce stronger redistributive preferences in the second stage (Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso, 2018; Kuziemko et al., 2015). While most of the literature focuses on the second stage to explain this puzzle, we consider the first stage more closely and specifically examine heterogeneous belief updating by income. We find that the average effect of information on beliefs is mostly driven by higher income individuals while low-income respondents hardly react. Thus, the group with the clearest incentives to change its redistributive preferences in the second stage, the low-income group, is systematically less inclined to update its perceptions in the first stage. This finding provides an alternative explanation for the frequently discussed muted average effect of information on redistributive preferences (Ciani, Fréget, and Manfredi, 2021).

The related theoretical literature suggests that low- and high-income groups may react differently to information on low social mobility. Low-income individuals have an incentive to believe in high social mobility, because it entails that they or their children can move up the social ladder. This belief offers hope and acts as a motivator to exert effort as highlighted in the seminal paper of Bénabou and Tirole (2006). To our knowledge, only Lobeck (2022) provides empirical evidence of such “motivating beliefs” in a much more general laboratory setting and unrelated to income. If low-income earners hold these motivating beliefs, they will be reluctant to change them after seeing information on low social mobility, as opposed to high-income earners. Our results provide first evidence outside the laboratory for this mechanism.

To test this hypothesis, we implemented an online survey experiment in Austria. We randomly inform half of the respondents that recent research suggests that social mobility in Austria is low. More specifically, we tell them that it is very unlikely for a poor child to become rich and very likely to stay poor (and vice versa for rich children). This is an Austrian version of the treatment popularized by Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018). Afterwards, we elicit respondents’ redistributive preferences and perceptions of intergenerational mobility. Importantly, we also ask about perceptions of downward mobility, which has not been done before. In line with the results from the literature, we find substantial average changes in perceptions of up- and downward mobility, and mostly small and non-significant effects on demand for redistribution.

Our key finding is that there is substantial heterogeneity in belief updating by income. The average treatment effect on beliefs is mostly driven by high- and middle-income groups, while low-income respondents do not update their beliefs. As there are no statistically nor economically significant differences in baseline perceptions between the income groups, the treatment increases dispersion of social mobility perceptions. Interestingly, this heterogeneity is only present for beliefs on upward mobility, while low- and high-income respondents both update their beliefs on downward mobility. Our result is robust to

using different outcome variable definitions, data subsamples, model specifications, non-parametric machine learning methods, and sample weighting. Importantly, we also replicate this finding in the two largest comparable survey datasets for the U.S. (Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso, 2018) and Germany (Fehr, Müller, and Preuß, 2022). In both countries, high- and middle-income groups also drive the substantial average treatment effect on beliefs, while low-income respondents update much less.

We further provide suggestive evidence that motivating beliefs, as theorized by Bénabou and Tirole (2006) and explained above, may drive the income group differences we observe. First, the heterogeneity is only present for beliefs in upward mobility. Moving up the social ladder is the relevant dimension for the motivational value of social mobility beliefs, whereas downward mobility matters less for the low-income group. Second, we examine a specific subgroup who has lower incentives to hold motivating beliefs in social mobility. Older respondents without children will have fewer possibilities to still move up the social ladder themselves and do not have children to whom they would want to pass on these motivating beliefs (Gärtner, Mollerstrom, and Seim, 2023a). Within this subgroup, low- and high-income respondents both update their upward mobility beliefs. We thus conclude that low-income earners may have motivated beliefs in high social mobility, which are stable and hard to change. Since these beliefs are an important determinant of redistributive preferences (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011), our result may explain why we do not see more demand for redistribution in the low-income group and society at large.

Moreover, we also examine how the treatment effects on perceptions in the first stage translate into effects on demand for redistribution in the second stage. While high-income respondents become much more pessimistic about social mobility, they do not show clear treatment effects on redistributive preferences and even seem to decrease demand for redistribution. This follows the rationale of Magni-Berton (2019), who argues that high-income individuals may reduce demand for redistribution when confronted with low social mobility, since it implies a lower risk of falling down the social ladder and less need for the insurance function of the welfare state. Thus, the group with the strongest treatment effects on beliefs has fewer incentives to increase demand for redistribution and indeed does not do so systematically. This can explain the muted average treatment effects on demand for redistribution often discussed in the literature. On the other hand, the low-income group shows mixed results with higher support for some redistributive policies and insignificant effects on others. This may indicate that even small shifts in mobility beliefs may induce changes in demand for redistribution for the low-income group, as this is also the group with the strongest incentives to increase demand for redistribution.

**Related Literature** This paper builds on a strand of the literature connecting theoretical discussions of the formation of social mobility perceptions and their effect on demand for redistribution (Piketty, 1995; Bénabou and Ok, 2001; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006) with empirical evidence on the importance of social mobility beliefs for redistributive preferences (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Starmans, Sheskin, and Bloom, 2017). For instance, Piketty (1995) argues that beliefs about social mobility are formed based on personal (and familial) experiences of social mobility and these beliefs in

turn affect demand for redistribution. We provide suggestive evidence that low-income groups may form and even strongly hold onto optimistic social mobility beliefs in order to motivate themselves following Bénabou and Tirole (2006), which affects their demand for redistribution.

We also relate to the recently growing body of literature using information experiments to study determinants of economic behavior and choices (Haaland, Roth, and Wohlfart, 2023), more specifically demand for redistribution (Ciani, Fréget, and Manfredi, 2021). These have estimated the effect of providing information on inequality in general (Kuziemko et al., 2015), on the own position in the income distribution (Cruces, Perez-Truglia, and Tetaz, 2013; Karadja, Mollerstrom, and Seim, 2017), or on social mobility (Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso, 2018; Fehr, Müller, and Preuß, 2022; Gärtner, Mollerstrom, and Seim, 2023b) on demand for redistribution. The overarching consensus is that even though people’s beliefs and concerns react to the information on average, their redistributive preferences do not change (Ciani, Fréget, and Manfredi, 2021).

There have been several explanations for this missing link. People could be unable to link their perceptions with specific policies (Bartels, 2005; Kuziemko et al., 2015) or their opinions on specific policies could diverge too much to produce a consistent average effect (Day and Fiske, 2019). Our paper is most directly related to two studies providing information on social mobility at the societal level. Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018) analyze the effect of information about intergenerational mobility on policy preferences in the US, France, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. They find that, while left-wing respondents update their beliefs about social mobility and increase demand for redistribution, right-wing respondents only change their beliefs, but don’t trust the government to deal with the problem and thus do not adjust policy preferences. The second study from Fehr, Müller, and Preuß (2022) examines the same type of information in a German sample. They find a significant average effect on beliefs, but no change in policy preferences, which is rationalized by the fact that respondents do not seem to link low social mobility with the luck-effort beliefs relevant for policy preferences. All of these explanations relate to policy preferences and the second stage, but mostly neglect the first stage, i.e. the effect of information on beliefs. By focusing on these first stage effects and specifically on heterogeneity by income, we provide an additional explanation for the missing effect on demand for redistribution. Further, our results underline the importance of looking beyond averages in the first stage of such studies.

In the literature on redistributive preferences differential belief updating has only been studied along the lines of political ideology. Recently, Alesina, Miano, and Stantcheva (2020) propose a theoretical framework to study motivated reasoning in this context, where new information is weighted depending on the extent to which it is in line with one’s own political preferences. The differential reaction to new information by political ideology has been shown to be relevant for how information about inequality or social mobility influences demand for redistribution in several contexts such as in the US (Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso, 2018; Thaler, 2023) and in Sweden (Karadja, Mollerstrom, and Seim, 2017). However, we provide evidence that in addition to political ideology, belief updating is also systematically influenced by individual economic conditions and “motivating beliefs”.

The field of behavioral economics has long studied how people update their beliefs after seeing new information and that they may hold motivated beliefs, which are defined as beliefs that are affected by people’s preferences and thus serve a specific purpose (Epley and Gilovich, 2016). Most of this research relates to beliefs people hold about themselves and shows that they update in a self-serving way, but there is also some evidence about beliefs held about the society and specifically social mobility. On the one hand, Bjørnskov et al. (2013) argue that low-income earners believe in low social mobility, because it allows them to attribute bad outcomes to the unfairness of the system. Weber (2021) relates to this argument in showing that people only update their beliefs about social mobility on a societal level when they themselves experience downward mobility, because they attribute an experience of upward mobility to their own ability. On the other hand, Bénabou and Tirole (2006) show theoretically that believing in high social mobility can bolster a world view where effort pays off and thus act as a motivator, especially for disadvantaged groups in society. The authors furthermore argue that low-income individuals may be compelled to hold onto these motivating beliefs, disregard information to the contrary and work hard, if they cannot expect a sufficient proportion of the electorate to vote for redistribution instead. This motivational role of believing in high social mobility is emphasized in several other studies as well and presented as more important for more disadvantaged groups (Day and Fiske, 2019; Gärtner, Mollerstrom, and Seim, 2023b). Even though this mechanism has long been discussed theoretically, we are only aware of one paper by Lobeck (2022), who shows in a laboratory setting that people distort their beliefs about the relative importance of effort in a task to motivate themselves for a similar future task. We contribute to this literature by providing the first empirical evidence for the existence of this mechanism of “motivating beliefs” outside the laboratory, in the context of demand for redistribution.

The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the experimental design and the dataset. Section 3 contains our main results on treatment effects on social mobility beliefs. Section 4 provides additional evidence by replicating our main analysis for the U.S. and Germany in two closely related survey datasets, examines further dimensions of heterogeneity and the second stage effects on redistributive preferences in our survey for Austria. Section 4 ends with several robustness checks before the last section concludes.

## 2 Experimental Design, Data & Methodology

### 2.1 The Survey

We conducted the online survey experiment via *YouGov*.<sup>1</sup> The experiment took place in two waves in October 2018 and March 2019. Each wave consists of 2100 respondents from Austria. The respondents were matched to a sampling frame constructed from the 2013 Austrian Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Post-Election Survey (Aichholzer et al., 2018) by stratified sampling on gender, age and education. The median duration of the survey was around 15 minutes. Figure 1 shows the basic structure of the survey, which we

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<sup>1</sup>YouGov is an international polling institute, which has been widely used to generate data for research publications (Ballard-Rosa, Martin, and Scheve, 2017, Twyman, 2008).



discuss in turn. The full questionnaire can be seen in appendix section D.1.




Figure 1: Survey Flow

**Socio-economic characteristics** The survey begins with several questions on gender, age, education, monthly income, employment status, marital status, housing situation, number of children, state and zip code. The income question refers to individual monthly gross income and provides 20 bins respondents can choose from. Therefore, we construct three income groups. The cutoffs are 1500€ for low income and 3000€ for high income, which are chosen to match the terciles of the Austrian gross income distribution.<sup>2</sup> As a robustness check, we repeat the main analysis using a continuous income measure, which we construct by taking the mean of the selected income bin as the income of the respondent. The results are robust and discussed in detail Section 4.4.

**Political and economic ideology** In this part of the survey, respondents start by answering questions on their voting behavior i.e., whether they voted in the last election, which party they voted for, and whether they plan to vote in the next election. They are then asked to place themselves from left (progressive) to right (conservative) regarding matters of economic and social policy.<sup>3</sup> We cross-tested this variable by comparing it with the reported voting choice at the 2017 parliamentary election. The political ideology variable is in line with these answers. The last question in this part asks whether participants think they will be economically worse off or better off in 5 years.

**Treatment** Next, respondents are randomly allocated into a treatment and a control group. While the control group proceeds to the next set of questions, the treatment group receives the information treatment. We use an Austrian version of the treatment implemented by Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018) that is intended to make respondents perceive less social mobility in Austria, i.e. to make them more pessimistic. After a brief introduction, a sequence of six images is presented, which are shown in Figures 2 and 3.

<sup>2</sup>According to the World Inequality Database(retrieved from <https://wid.world/country/austria/>, original data source Jestl and List (2020)) the upper threshold for the first tercile in 2019 is around 1.800€ gross monthly income. This falls into the survey income bin 1.500 to 2.000 €. We use the previous bin (up to 1.500 €) as cutoff value to construct three groups of approximately equal size, because there are more observations with low income. The lower threshold for the top tercile is around 3.100 €, which matches well with our chosen bin of 3.000 € as the cutoff.

<sup>3</sup>The respondents placed themselves on a 5-point scale from “very progressive” to “very conservative”. However, as not many respondents chose to place themselves at both extreme ends, we decided to reduce the variable to three categories.

These state that recent research demonstrates that children from poor families tend to stay poor and children from rich families tend to stay rich in Austria .<sup>4</sup> The treatment is designed to shift perceptions downward, independent of the respondent’s prior beliefs. The content of the treatment is in line with recent findings on social mobility in Austria (OECD, 2018).<sup>5</sup> This allows us to elicit respondents’ beliefs about social mobility only once, after the treatment.<sup>6</sup> Additionally, the general nature of the information makes the effects comparable across countries and specifically with other studies.




Figure 2: Treatment Upward Mobility




Figure 3: Treatment Downward Mobility

<sup>4</sup>The exact translation for Figure 2 is: "What does recent research tell us about how children from poor families will do when they grow up? The chances of a poor kid staying poor as an adult are extremely large. Only very few kids from poor families will ever make it and become rich." Analogously, the exact translation of Figure 3 is: "What does recent research tell us about how children from rich families will do when they grow up? Children born in rich families are extremely likely to stay rich themselves when they grow up. It is extremely rare for a child from a rich family to become poor later in life."


<sup>5</sup>While the treatment is generally designed to be truthful, it might also make respondents who are already too pessimistic even more biased, as discussed in Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018). This might particularly be the case in Europe, where people are more likely to underestimate mobility than in the US. (Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso, 2018).

<sup>6</sup>As Haaland, Roth, and Wohlfart (2023) point out, eliciting beliefs before and after the treatment has several disadvantages, such as inducing consistency bias, experimenter demand effects, and confusing the control group by asking the same question twice.

**Redistributive preferences** Immediately after the treatment, respondents continue to answer questions about their tax preferences. In particular, we ask whether they support or oppose an inheritance tax, a wealth tax, and a property tax. We explain the taxes in detail before asking about their preferences to make sure that the respondents are aware of the functionality of the specific tax. For each tax, they can choose between “*Yes*”, “*Yes, with exemption*”, “*No*”, or “*Don’t know*”.<sup>7</sup> Further, respondents are asked about their preferred rate for the capital gains tax. While Austria levies a property tax and a capital gains tax, there are no wealth or inheritance taxes in place at the time of this study. Eventually, respondents state on a scale from 1 to 10 how important they deem redistribution from the rich to the poor by the government. Such unincentivized elicitation questions have been shown to correspond very well with alternative incentivized ways of measuring redistributive preferences (Fehr, Müller, and Preuß, 2022).

**Perceptions of intergenerational mobility** To elicit respondents’ perceptions of intergenerational mobility, we use the question format in Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018). We show a picture of two ladders that represent income quintiles for parents and their children when these are grown up. Respondents are asked to predict in which income quintiles (ladder on the right side) 100 children from the 100 poorest families (the bottom quintile on the left side) will end up later on in life. Their answers have to sum up to 100. The question can be seen in Figure 4.<sup>8</sup>

Figure 4: Upward Mobility Perceptions Question



<sup>7</sup>Due to technical difficulties, the inheritance tax question was asked before respondents saw the treatment in the first wave. For treatment effect estimates on inheritance tax preferences, we thus have to code the treatment group of the first wave as control group.

<sup>8</sup>Translation of the question text: “Please imagine 500 families that represent the Austrian population. We split these families in five groups based on their income. Each group consists of 100 families (left ladder). We further imagine, that each family has one child. Our question refers to the 100 poorest families: How do you think will the 100 children of these 100 poorest families be distributed across the five income groups when these children are grown up (right ladder)? Please fill in the blanks on the right side of the figure and note that your entries have to sum up to 100.”

Going beyond Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018), we ask respondents to repeat the same exercise for 100 children from the 100 richest families, thereby eliciting perceptions of downward mobility as well. These two questions thus provide us with 10 variables, 5 for up- and downward mobility respectively. For our main outcome variables we utilize four of these, thereby following Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018). Two relate to bottom (named Q1Q1) and top (named Q5Q5) persistence; i.e. how many children from the bottom (top) quintile will still be in this quintile when they are grown up. The other two describe extreme upward (downward) mobility from the bottom (top) quintile to the top (bottom), labelled Q1Q5 and Q5Q1 respectively. Our results are robust to different sets of outcome variables, also measuring less extreme mobility and combining the information about all quintiles. These results are discussed in more detail in Section 4.4. Generally, such a quantitative approach of measuring social mobility perceptions has also been shown to correlate strongly with more general, qualitative questions (Fehr, Müller, and Preuß, 2022). Eventually, we minimize experimenter demand effects in two ways. After seeing the information about intergenerational mobility, respondents first answer questions on tax preferences and only then provide their beliefs about intergenerational mobility. Additionally, we do not provide respondents with specific numbers on the treatment screen, but ask for numerical estimates in the question on perceptions of social mobility (Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso, 2018). In general, experimenter demand effects are less of a concern in online surveys, as respondents remain anonymous and do not interact with the researchers (Haaland, Roth, and Wohlfart, 2023).

## 2.2 Data Quality

Table A1 in the Appendix shows the main demographic characteristics of our dataset in comparison with the Austrian population. Our sample is representative in terms of gender and age, but slightly overrepresents more educated individuals, which is one of the known shortcomings of online survey datasets (Börsch-Supan et al., 2004). Yet, we conduct the main analysis without weights, because the focus of our analysis lies on systematic relationships present in the sample. To test the generalizability of our main results to the Austrian population, we re-estimate our main analyses with weights. For this purpose, we apply an iterative post-stratification re-weighting strategy to match the sample to the Austrian population in terms of age, gender and education level.

In terms of data quality, we note that respondents are generally consistent in their answers to similar questions. To increase respondents' engagement with the survey, we emphasize our interest in respondents' views and attitudes on the first page of the survey and point out that it is important that they answer all questions carefully and truthfully. Additionally, we track the time respondents take to complete the survey. None of the respondents spend less than 5 minutes to complete the questions, which is the cutoff Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018) use for excluding respondents in their survey of comparable length. At the end of the survey, we ask respondents to rate the quality of the survey on a scale from 1(poor) to 9(excellent). The mean score is around 7 and only 8 out of all 4.200 respondents rate the survey as poor (1).

We further include an attention check in the survey, which is described in detail in

appendix section A.1. For our main specification, we only use respondents who successfully pass this attention check and thus exclude 1428 respondents. We repeat the main analysis in all possible samples and they are robust to these checks. Moreover, following Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018), we apply a perception check on the answers of the intergenerational mobility question. This test is designed such that lazy response behavior is identified and is further described in appendix section A.1. However, we refrain from excluding respondents who fail the perception check from the main sample, because the question is placed after the treatment. Excluding respondents based on their answering pattern after the treatment could bias treatment effect estimates. Additionally, apart from signaling carelessness, extraordinary answers that arise in response to the treatment could be indicative of cognitive dissonance. Thus, these answers may reflect precisely the kind of behavioral responses we are interested in. Table A1 in the Appendix also shows how the sample changes when applying our restrictions. The sample becomes slightly younger and more educated when excluding respondents, but the changes are minimal. We furthermore analyze differential attrition by regressing an indicator variable for whether a respondent passed the respective quality check on the treatment with and without covariates (see Table A2 in the appendix). The attention check is not related to treatment status, but to education. The perception check, however, is related to the treatment (and again to education), as it is based on the social mobility question that is placed after the treatment. This supports our decision to not exclude observations based on the perception check in our main specification. Nonetheless, we repeat our analysis using the full sample and the sample excluding respondents based on both the perception and the attention check as robustness tests. Eventually, a second treatment informing recipients about inequality is administered to a subset of our sample orthogonally to the social mobility treatment.<sup>9</sup> By definition, our treatment effects should thus not be affected by this. However, we control for treatment status on this inequality treatment in our treatment effect specifications and perform all analyses without these observations as robustness check.

Finally, we evaluate the quality of our experiment and show in appendix section A.1 that treatment randomization was successful. When regressing all possibly relevant variables on the treatment indicator as dependent variable (shown in Table A3), the F-test p-value is far from relevant significance thresholds for all samples. Further, for the main sample, and the most restrictive sample, only the category rural is not balanced and in the full sample, statistically significant coefficients appear merely for two small groups (other employment activity and living for free).

## 2.3 Hypotheses & Estimation Strategy

Based on the literature, we expect to find average effects of our information treatment on perceptions of social mobility, but only small or no average treatment effects on redistributive preferences (Ciani, Fréget, and Manfredi, 2021, Kuziemko et al., 2015). However, our main contribution rests on testing whether treatment effects on perceptions differ between income groups.

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<sup>9</sup>See Ballard-Rosa et al. (2021) for an analysis of the effects of this inequality treatment on Austrian and German income tax preferences.

**Perceptions of social mobility** Social mobility means very different things to low- and high-income earners: While high social mobility implies that low-income earners can still move up the social ladder, it also implies that high-income earners could fall down. This may affect how they update beliefs about social mobility after seeing information on low mobility (as in our experiment). High-income groups have two reasons to believe in low social mobility. First, low social mobility means that they and their children are unlikely to fall down the social ladder. Second, if social mobility is low and they have high income, they can attribute their economic success to their own effort, despite unfavorable circumstances (Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso, 2018). Thus, we expect high-income earners to adjust their beliefs downwards after seeing information on low social mobility. For low-income earners, the literature suggests two opposing directions. On the one hand, low-income earners might have an incentive to believe in low social mobility, as this enables them to attribute their economic situation to external factors (Bjørnskov et al., 2013, Deffains, Espinosa, and Thöni, 2016, Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman, 2002). Low-income respondents may thus readily update their beliefs about social mobility downward. On the other hand, low-income groups also have an incentive to believe in high social mobility, because it entails that they or their children could move up the social ladder. This belief can thus act as a motivator for low-income earners to exert effort, as it suggests that effort can pay off (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006, Gärtner, Mollerstrom, and Seim, 2023b, Lobeck, 2022). Similarly, system justification theory argues that even disadvantaged groups have an incentive to justify the system (i.e. believe in high social mobility), because it increases satisfaction with the status quo and reduces uncertainty (Jost, 2019). The latter two points thus suggest that low-income respondents will want to maintain a belief in high social mobility and thus update less or not at all after receiving information on low social mobility. It is thus not clear, a priori, how the low-income group will update beliefs. Our results may provide insights on which of the aforementioned channels are more important for the updating behavior of mobility perceptions in response to information.

**Redistributive preferences** On the one hand, believing in low social mobility is related to the belief that the economic system is unfair and thus leads to more demand for redistribution (Starmans, Sheskin, and Bloom, 2017). This channel holds independent of the income situation. On the other hand, low-income earners will also vote for more redistribution out of self-interest when social mobility is low (Bénabou and Ok, 2001), while high-income earners will vote for less. The latter is because they are less exposed to downward mobility risks and thus less dependent on the insurance function of redistribution (Magni-Berton, 2019). Hence, the low-income group should increase demand for redistribution after seeing the information, while the high-income group may increase or decrease demand for redistribution.

**Estimation strategy** We test these predictions from the literature using the following methods. To estimate average treatment effects, we estimate the regression model:

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \times treatment_i + \delta_{\mathbf{p}} \mathbf{x}_{pi} + \gamma w_i + \tau t_i + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where  $y_i$  refers to the respective dependent variable, which can be either the four

variables concerning perceptions of social mobility or the variables related to demand for redistribution.  $treatment_i$  is a binary variable equal to 1 if the respondent is in the treatment group and 0 otherwise.  $\mathbf{x}_{pi}$  contains an extensive set of  $p$  control variables including gender, age group, educational attainment, income group, political ideology, urbanization, and whether the respondent has children. The choice of covariates follows the related literature (Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso, 2018, Fehr, Müller, and Preuß, 2022). Finally,  $w_i$  and  $t_i$  refer to fixed effects for the survey wave and the treatment status of the respondent in the orthogonal second treatment. We report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for all regressions.

To test for heterogeneous effects of the treatment by income group, we interact the treatment indicator in equation 1 with the income group variable. In addition to OLS regressions, we implement generalized random forests following Athey, Tibshirani, and Wager (2019) to estimate heterogeneous effects. Generalized random forests is a machine learning method based on causal trees (Wager and Athey, 2018). Apart from acting as a robustness check, this method offers several other advantages. No assumptions about the data generating process and model specification are needed, except perfect randomization of the treatment, which is given by our experimental design. It thus presents a data-driven approach to identify the covariates along which the heterogeneity in treatment effects occurs. Further, the method uses “honest” estimation, i.e. one part of the sample is used to grow the causal trees, while the other part is used to estimate treatment effects. This controls overfitting and significance levels. We use the same covariates as in the OLS regressions to grow the trees. Eventually, we obtain non-parametric estimates of individual level treatment effects, which can be used to gain further insights into differences in treatment effects.


Moreover, we replicate our analysis on treatment effects on beliefs about social mobility in two closely related datasets. First, we use the publicly available data from Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018), which include the same treatment and perception variables we collected for Austria. Further, we also use the German Internet Panel following Fehr, Müller, and Preuß (2022). The authors also implement the treatment from Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018) but employ a different measure for perceptions of social mobility. Details on this analysis are discussed in the corresponding section 4.1. The similarity of both surveys to ours makes our results highly comparable.

## 2.4 Perceptions of Intergenerational Mobility

In Figure 5 we show perceptions of upward social mobility in the Austrian control group in comparison with the control group perceptions reported by Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018) for France, Sweden, the US, Italy, and the UK. For this purpose, we restrict our sample by the perception check, we described earlier, because Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018) do so as well. In general, the perceptions we find for Austria are well in line with those of Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018). Interestingly, Austria seems to be among the more pessimistic countries when it comes to bottom persistence (i.e. the chance of a child from a family in the lowest quintile of the income distribution to remain in that quintile later on in life), but among the most optimistic of the European countries when it

comes to the probability that a child from a poor family can make it to the top income quintile. We can't compare our results for downward mobility to these countries, because Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018) did not collect data on perceptions of downward mobility. However, as visible in Figure A1 in the appendix, where we plot the mean and distribution of the answers to the social mobility perception variable, Austrians believe even less in downward mobility than upward mobility (i.e. a child born to a rich family is on average believed to remain in the top income quintile with a 50% chance). Figure A1 also shows the dispersion of answers to the social mobility question. Especially the bottom and top persistence variables have high variance.

Figure 5: Perceptions of Intergenerational Mobility in International Comparison



This graph shows a comparison of upward mobility perceptions in our sample (AUT) and the five different country samples from Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018), including France (FRA), the United States of America (USA), the United Kingdom (UK), Sweden (SWE), and Italy (IT). All values are unweighted. The x-axis shows the mean estimated probability of a child from the poorest quintile to end up in the respective quintile displayed on the y-axis. The dashed vertical line is the reference value if the child had the same chance to end up in each quintile.

How do these social mobility perceptions compare to reality? Unfortunately, it is not straightforward to find reliable estimates on intergenerational income mobility in Austria, but some work is available in this area. In general, it seems that social mobility in Austria is relatively low, when compared to other European countries and given its low earnings inequality (see OECD, 2018). Altzinger and Schnetzer (2010) estimate a transition matrix using EU-SILC 2005 data and a categorical question on parental income status. More recent estimates are offered by OECD (2018), who only report quartile based information however, which are thus not directly comparable to our estimates. Comparing these numerical estimates to ours, it seems that Austrians are slightly too pessimistic and perceive less intergenerational mobility than there actually is. However, when measuring earnings persistence via the elasticity of earnings between fathers and sons, the OECD (2018) reports that Austrians overestimate social mobility, i.e. perceive



too little persistence. Thus, it is not clear how the perceptions we measure relate to reality.

### 3 Main Results: First-Stage Effects on Perceptions

#### 3.1 Average Treatment Effects

On average, the information treatment was successful in shifting respondents' belief in social mobility. This can be seen in Table 1, which shows regression results following specification 1. The treatment decreased the perceived probability of a poor child moving up to the top quintile and that of remaining in the bottom quintile by 1.2 and 5.3 percentage points respectively. This amounts to 12 and 14 percent of the control group mean. In terms of standard deviations this is comparable to the effects found in Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018) and Fehr, Müller, and Preuß (2022). In addition, we examine the treatment effect on downward mobility. Respondents in the treatment group on average believe that rich children are 3.3 percentage points more likely to remain in the top quintile and around 1 percentage point less likely to fall down. This corresponds to 12% and 6% percent of the control group mean. The information treatment is therefore not only successful in decreasing beliefs in upward mobility, but also in downward mobility on average.<sup>10</sup> Figure A2 further shows the distribution of the four outcome variables by treatment and control group. While the treatment effect on beliefs for the persistence variables Q1Q1 and Q5Q5 occurs mostly in the outer parts of the distribution, the shift for the extreme mobility beliefs is more concentrated around the value 0.

Table 1: Average Treatment Effect on Perceptions of Intergenerational Mobility in Austria

	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q5Q5	Q5Q1
Treatment	-1.245** (0.631)	5.314*** (1.028)	3.334*** (1.121)	-0.932* (0.492)
Reference Group Mean	10.390	37.770	53.421	7.277
Reference Group SD	16.679	26.453	30.025	13.255
Num. obs.	2772	2772	2772	2772

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .


OLS regressions on the treatment indicator additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. The reference group mean refers to the average of the dependent variable within the reference group of the coefficient of interest, in this case the entire control group.

<sup>10</sup>Given that Austrians already perceive too little social mobility, it may seem as if our information treatment makes their beliefs even more wrong. However, the information is general, does not involve any specific numbers, and is in line with recent findings (see OECD, 2018). If highly pessimistic respondents thus become even more pessimistic due to the information, they are overshooting. Additionally, as data on actual social mobility in Austria is scarce, one cannot say whether respondents actually become too pessimistic, as already discussed in the previous section as well.

### 3.2 Heterogeneity by Income

We just saw that the information shifted social mobility perceptions on average, but these average effects could conceal substantial heterogeneity. As elaborated in section 2.3, there are several rationales why specifically respondents with different incomes could react differently.

Figure 6: Treatment Effects on Perceptions of Upward Mobility - Average and Heterogeneity by Income Group



The graph shows the means of the dependent variables Q1Q1 and Q1Q5 for treatment and control group for the full sample (left panel) and for each income group separately (right panel). The y-axis displays the mean estimated probability of a child from the bottom quintile to end up in the bottom quintile (Q1Q1) and in the top quintile (Q1Q5), as indicated on the x-axis. All values are unweighted.

In general, baseline perceptions do not differ by income in the control group, as can be seen in Table A4 in the appendix. The point estimates are not statistically significant and very small relative to the mean in the control group.<sup>11</sup> Nevertheless, low-income earners adjust their beliefs much less than middle- and especially high-income earners after seeing information on low social mobility. This can be seen in Figure 6, which shows average treatment effects on upward mobility beliefs in the left panel and then split by income group in the right panel. The average treatment effect in the left panel is thus predominantly driven by the middle- and high-income groups. This can also be seen when looking at the distribution of Q1Q1 by treatment condition and income group in Figure A4, where the high income group is driving the increase in very high answers, whereas

<sup>11</sup>Appendix Figure A3 highlights that the low-income group even perceives slightly more upward social mobility when responses that fail the perception check are removed and results are weighted to better reflect the Austrian population. Notably, low-income respondents also perceive more downward mobility than high-income respondents in this sample (results available from the authors).

the middle income group is responsible for the downward shift in the number of very low answers. The low-income group does not shift perceptions anywhere along the distribution.

These observed differences in treatment effects between the income groups are statistically significant. Table 2 shows the corresponding regressions for upward and downward mobility perceptions following specification 1 and interacting the treatment indicator with the income groups. The baseline group corresponds to high-income respondents. The first two columns show the heterogeneous treatment effects on upward mobility beliefs. While the high-income group increases the perceived chance of children from the bottom quintile staying poor by 8.6 percentage points, this effect is nearly 7 percentage points lower for low-income respondents, thereby almost offsetting the entire effect. For moving up to the top quintile, high-income respondents report a 2.8 percentage points lower probability after seeing the information treatment, but low-income respondents even become slightly more optimistic about the chance of poor children making it to the top. The size of the treatment effects for the high-income group is considerable; they amount to 20% and 36% of their control group mean respectively. Interestingly, we do not find any heterogeneity by income for treatment effects on downward mobility perceptions, as shown in the last two columns.

Table 2: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Perceptions of Intergenerational Mobility in Austria: Income Interactions

	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q5Q5	Q5Q1
Low income	0.111 (1.198)	0.305 (1.922)	-2.396 (2.222)	1.863* (1.011)
Middle income	1.299 (1.173)	-1.459 (1.786)	1.289 (2.090)	0.393 (0.852)
Treatment	-2.767** (1.136)	8.557*** (2.048)	4.577** (2.275)	-0.353 (0.979)
Treatment*Low income	3.881** (1.568)	-6.847** (2.692)	-0.487 (2.950)	-1.374 (1.315)
Treatment*Middle income	0.636 (1.536)	-2.481 (2.598)	-2.653 (2.876)	-0.322 (1.220)
Reference Group Mean	9.006	39.924	54.748	6.306
Reference Group SD	16.974	27.045	31.509	12.631
Num. obs.	2772	2772	2772	2772

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

OLS regressions including treatment interaction terms with the income groups and additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. The reference group mean refers to the average of the dependent variable within the reference group of the coefficient of interest, in this case the high-income group in the control group.

### 3.3 Discussion of Mechanisms

We just showed that there is substantial treatment effect heterogeneity by income for perceptions of intergenerational mobility. In this section, we try to uncover the mechanisms behind this result. As there is no statistically and economically significant difference in baseline beliefs between the income groups, the treatment should entail the same extent of new information and thus same incentive to update. Our preferred explanation for the heterogeneous belief updating we observe is based on the channel already discussed in chapter 2.3. The information on low social mobility essentially means for low-income respondents that they or their children are unlikely to move up the social ladder. Thus, if believing in high social mobility acts as a motivator to exert effort, they will have an incentive to downweight information on low social mobility and not to update their beliefs downwards (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Lobeck, 2022). Moreover, system justification theory predicts that even disadvantaged groups of society are prone to justify the system (i.e. believe in high social mobility), which also aligns well with our result (Jost, 2019). These channels can explain why low-income respondents don't change their perceptions in the first stage, while high-income respondents do.

This explanation is also in line with the income heterogeneity only being present for upward mobility perceptions, because it is the relevant dimension for low-income earners. In addition, we can examine a specific subgroup of low-income earners, for whom these channels should be less pronounced. Older people without children will most likely know their own approximate position in the income distribution and do not have children to whom they would want to pass on motivating beliefs (Gärtner, Mollerstrom, and Seim, 2023b). Thus, we analyze heterogeneous treatment effects by income in the subgroup of respondents above 55 years and without children. As can be seen in Figure A5 and Table A8 in Appendix section B, low-income respondents in this group update their perceptions in a similar way as high-income respondents.

Another explanation could be that income is strongly correlated with education. Less educated respondents may understand the treatment less, which would explain the muted response of low-income respondents. In Table A5 in the appendix we show that there are no heterogeneous treatment effects by education, which does not support this explanation. Additionally, the treatment information is rather simple by design and it thus seems unlikely that respondents don't understand it. Further, income could be related to political ideology, which has been shown to be an important dimension for the formation of social mobility beliefs. Appendix Table A6 shows treatment effects on perceptions of social mobility by political ideology. We do not see any evidence for heterogeneity by ideology, which is also in line with the results of Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018). Even right-wing respondents update their beliefs, despite the fact that the presented information strongly contradicts their prior beliefs. Further, we also estimate specification 1 including interactions of the treatment indicator with income, education, and political ideology simultaneously. The results are shown in Table A7. The heterogeneity by income remains robust in this specification, which is further evidence that it is not driven by a correlation of income with these two potentially important characteristics. Eventually, the results from generalized random forests further strengthen the argument that it is indeed income which drives the treatment effect heterogeneity, independently of political ideology and

education. These results are discussed more in detail in section 4.2.

We thus provide evidence that low-income groups are reluctant to change their belief in high social mobility, because they act as a motivator, in line with Bénabou and Tirole (2006). Similar findings have been documented in the US, where Davidai and Gilovich (2015) report that poorer individuals perceive more social mobility, which Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018) also confirm for their sample including five countries. Furthermore, Kraus and Tan (2015) show experimentally that respondents tend to overestimate mobility more if they are asked to think about people similar to themselves, lending further support to the notion that mobility beliefs are subject to motivated reasoning.

## 4 Additional Results


### 4.1 International Evidence: A Replication Exercise

We replicate our main analysis in two independent, but closely related datasets used in Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018) and Fehr, Müller, and Preuß (2022). This increases external validity of our results and helps alleviate concerns of multiple testing for heterogeneity analysis. These two online surveys are highly comparable to our setup. However, Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018) only collected information on perceptions of upward social mobility. Fortunately, this is the relevant dimension for the income heterogeneity we observe. Also, Fehr, Müller, and Preuß (2022) elicit social mobility perceptions differently. They utilize a single question, asking how dependent children’s later economic success in terms of education or income is on the income of their parents. The respondents can answer on a scale of 1 (very little) to 10 (a lot). In our analysis below, we follow Fehr, Müller, and Preuß (2022) and transform this variable such that higher values correspond to higher mobility and standardize it with 0 mean and unit variance. This measure captures up- and downward mobility simultaneously and is more open compared to the question we use. Thereby it additionally allows us to test whether our results are driven by the specific nature of the measurement of the dependent variable. We then regress these dependent variables on the treatment indicator interacted with the income groups, and several control variables, as specified in their papers. All variables are listed below Table 3. For further details on the two experimental designs, we refer to the original papers (Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso, 2018; Fehr, Müller, and Preuß, 2022).

Again, the treatment is successful in increasing the perceived probability of a poor child staying poor in the U.S. and decreases the overall perceived mobility in Germany, as can be seen in Figure 7. As in Austria, we also find substantial treatment effect heterogeneity by income. In both countries the high-income group shifts their beliefs more than the low-income group. The middle-income group reacts similar to the high-income group in the U.S., but follows more closely the effects of the low-income group in Germany. Furthermore, treated low- and middle-income respondents seem to become more optimistic about the probability of poor children moving up the social ladder in the U.S. Low-income respondents in Austria show signs of a similar reaction. That this counter-reaction is more pronounced in the US case could be related to the stronger narrative that exists around

upward mobility in that country, the American Dream (Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso, 2018).

Figure 7: Treatment Effects on Perceptions of Upward Mobility in the United States and Germany



Again the graphs show the averages in control and treatment group of the respective outcome variables for the U.S. and Germany, both for the full sample and for the income groups separately. U.S. data stems from Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018) and German data from Fehr, Müller, and Preuß (2022). The dependent variables for the U.S. are the same as in our survey and measure the mean expected probability of a child from the bottom quintile to end up in the bottom quintile (Q1Q1) and top quintile (Q1Q5). The dependent variable for Germany measures the perception of intergenerational mobility on a scale from 1 to 10, where higher values indicate more perceived social mobility. All values are unweighted.

The observed differences in treatment effects between income groups are statistically significant for the U.S. and Germany. Table 3 shows the corresponding regression results. The high-income group acts as baseline. Again, we see that the strong treatment effects for the high-income group are attenuated for the low-income group. In the U.S. the treatment effect for the latter is around half of the treatment effect of the high-income group. The high-income group in the U.S. even increases the perceived probability of a poor child staying poor by 33% of the control group mean. In Germany the effect for low-income as well as middle-income respondents is only around a quarter of the effect for the high-income group, which is sizable at around 37% of a standard deviation. As in our data, we do not find a significant difference for Q1Q5 as a dependent variable in the U.S.. However, the sign and size of the coefficients suggest again that low- and especially middle-income respondents even increase their belief in social mobility after seeing the treatment.

Table 3: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Perceptions of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States and Germany: Income Interactions

	U.S.		Germany
	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	perceived soc. mob. (stand.)
Low income	0.491 (1.280)	1.850 (1.552)	-0.140 (0.099)
Middle income	-2.630*** (0.991)	2.231* (1.309)	-0.117 (0.088)
Treatment	-0.349 (0.992)	9.883*** (1.343)	-0.370*** (0.092)
Treatment*Low income	0.914 (1.703)	-4.474** (2.189)	0.263** (0.118)
Treatment*Middle income	1.916 (1.428)	-2.270 (1.959)	0.284** (0.115)
Reference Group Mean	13.336	30.323	0.098
Reference Group SD	18.740	23.503	0.950
Num. obs.	3810	3810	1993

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

OLS regressions including treatment interaction terms with the relevant subgroup and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The regressions for the U.S. are based on the data from Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018) and include controls for gender, age, education, whether the respondent has children, whether her parents were born abroad, ideology and whether the respondent experienced upward mobility with respect to her parents. The regression for Germany uses the data from Fehr, Muller, Preuss, et al. (2020). The dependent variable is a standardized version of the respective survey question (0 mean, unit variance), where higher values indicate more belief in social mobility. It additionally controls for age, education, gender, marital status, employment status, household size, living in East Germany, political ideology, and the perceived role of luck vs. effort for getting ahead in life. The information on personal income and political ideology is taken from wave 31, as they are not included in Wave 33. The reference group mean refers to the average of the dependent variable within the reference group of the coefficient of interest, in this case the high-income group in the control group.

The regression results for the four European countries in the dataset of Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018) can be seen in Appendix Table A9. For these countries, the sample sizes are much smaller, which also makes it harder to identify heterogeneous treatment effects. The interaction terms of the treatment with the income groups are not significantly different from zero in any country, except for the UK, where it seems that the middle-income group updates its mobility perceptions the most. In general, it looks as if the effects for Sweden and Italy point in the same direction as in Austria, i.e. lower income groups updating their perceptions less after seeing the treatment. France and the UK seem to point into the opposite direction. However, these results have to be taken with a grain of salt due to the lower sample sizes.

To summarize, the same pattern of income heterogeneity in perception updating we find in Austria can also be observed in the U.S. and Germany using the two most closely related survey datasets of sufficient size for subgroup analysis of heterogeneous effects.

The picture is less clear for the other European countries from Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018) where only samples of limited size are available. In general, these results increase the reliability of our findings in terms of external validity and frequent concerns with heterogeneity analyses.

## 4.2 Generalized Random Forests

We also implemented our main analysis for Austria using generalized random forests, as described in section 2.3. First, we simply replicate the main analysis for income, and as well for political ideology, and education, as can be seen in Table A10 in section C.2 in the appendix. Our results remain robust when using this method. Further, individual-level treatment effect estimates derived from the causal forest can be used to compare the characteristics of groups with high and low treatment effects. For this purpose, we split the sample in two groups at the median individual-level treatment effect. In Tables A11 and A12 in the appendix, we show differences in socio-economic characteristics between the group that has a higher than median and those who have a lower than median estimated treatment effect. As can be seen in Table A11 the group with higher treatment effects on Q1Q1 tends to be a more advantaged subgroup of society. The respondents have higher income, are older, better educated, more likely to hold extreme political positions, more likely to live in urban areas and to be full-time employed or employers, and to have more optimistic views about their own future. The two groups differ less and also less systematically for treatment effects on Q5Q5, as can be seen in Table A12.

Next, we can analyze how important each of the variable levels is in growing the trees in the causal forest (i.e. how often it was used for splitting samples). This gives an indication for which variables are most important for treatment effect heterogeneity. In Figure A6 in the appendix, one can see that for Q1Q1 and Q1Q5 being in the lowest income group is most important. This data-driven method thus chooses income as the most relevant category for treatment effect heterogeneity.

Eventually, we use this method to estimate partial effects of a variable on the treatment effect, i.e. how much the estimate of the treatment effect changes if we only change one variable, while holding all others constant. We evaluate the simultaneous effects of income and political ideology as well as income and education on the treatment effects on Q1Q1 and Q1Q5, which are graphically depicted in so-called heat maps in Figure A7. The main take-away here is that income plays an important role by itself in explaining the treatment effect heterogeneity we observe for upward mobility perceptions and that it is not driven by education or political ideology, especially for upward mobility. The effect of political ideology and education on the estimate of the treatment effect further does not change along the income distribution.



### 4.3 Second-Stage Effects on Demand for Redistribution

This section analyzes how the first stage effects on perceptions translate to the commonly explored second stage, i.e. the treatment effects on preferences. We review the evidence available on this subject utilizing five questions on demand for redistribution from the Austrian survey dataset. Using the same specifications as above, we estimate treatment effects with OLS regressions for all outcomes as well as multinomial logistic regressions for multicategory questions. The results discussed here can be found in appendix section C.3. In line with the literature, average treatment effects are insignificant for most preferences or marginally significant in the case of a small increase in the preferred capital gains tax rate. However, we find that in Austria the treatment has a significant and sizable effect on preferences toward the wealth tax. Support for wealth taxation is more than 10 percent higher in the treatment group.

Since we have seen above that income groups update their mobility perceptions differently in response to the treatment, we will now consider how these groups adjust their preferences. While high-income respondents are most responsive in their perceptions, they hardly demand more redistribution. On the contrary, the only marginally significant coefficient indicates that treated high-income respondents are relatively less likely to provide unconditional (i.e. without exemption) support to the inheritance tax rather than opposing it (the baseline category in the multinomial logit). A reduction in support may also occur for the property tax and the effect on the capital gains tax rate appears smaller than for the low-income group, although these coefficients are insignificant. In contrast to these results, the positive average treatment effect on wealth tax support seems to be carried by the high-income group as well. It is striking that high-income individuals seem to translate the relatively large adjustments of their mobility perceptions into more opposition toward some forms of capital taxation while becoming more favorable toward wealth taxation. On the one hand, it is not totally surprising that the high-income group may reduce demand for redistribution after being informed about low social mobility. The information entails a lower risk of falling down the social ladder for this group (and its offspring) and thus less need for the insurance function of redistribution (Magni-Berton, 2019). On the other hand, in addition to self-interest, fairness motives also determine redistributive preferences and might therefore drive the higher support for wealth taxation among high-income earners (Starmans, Sheskin, and Bloom, 2017). Whether the self-interest or the fairness channel carries more weight on the effect of lower mobility among high-income individuals may also depend on tax specific considerations.<sup>12</sup> Effects may thus differ between policies. What is important to note here is that the group which adjusts its mobility perceptions downward the most does not adjust their policy preferences substantially and may even decrease its support for some redistributive policies.

The low- and the middle-income group, on the other hand, appear to be leaning into a different direction, showing somewhat but insignificantly more support for property, capital gains and inheritance taxation. Only the latter is different from the high-income group effect with marginal significance when the response categories are combined in

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<sup>12</sup>See e.g. Stark and Kirchlner (2017) for a discussion of the relevance of normative value principles and tax design features in the context of Austrian inheritance tax attitudes.

a binary dependent variable. In addition, the low- and middle-income individuals also appear to contribute to the increase in support for wealth taxation. Thus, although the mobility perceptions of the low-income group were hardly altered on average, the effects on preferences indicate that the treatment may not have left everyone in this group completely unaffected. This suggests that even an information treatment that is not particularly successful in lowering perceptions of intergenerational mobility among low-income respondents can make them somewhat more approving of different forms of capital taxation. The direction of the preference effects is in line with theoretical expectations for this group and their small size could be related to the weak effect on perceptions.

Few studies consider heterogeneous effects of information on social mobility on redistributive preferences by income. While Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018) explain the missing effect on redistributive preferences with political cleavages and a lack of trust in government among right wing respondents and Fehr, Müller, and Preuß (2022) point to respondents not linking social mobility perceptions to the role of luck and effort, our results suggest an additional explanation. We find that the group with most incentives to redistribute in response to information about low mobility, the low-income group, hardly adjusts its perceptions and subsequently its preferences. The high-income group, in turn, adjusts its perceptions the most but has fewer incentives to increase demand for redistribution and may even decrease it on some measures.

#### 4.4 Robustness Checks

First, we estimate the heterogeneous treatment effects by income using a continuous income variable. The question for income in our survey is categorical with 20 income bins. To construct the continuous variable we take the mean of the selected bin as the respective income of a respondent. These results, thus, have to be taken with a grain of salt and act only as a robustness test for whether the specific choice of cutoffs for the income groups could spuriously create our heterogeneous effects. The results can be seen in Table A17 in section C.4 in the appendix. It is clear that the heterogeneity by income is still present when using the continuous measure of our income variable. The treatment effect on perceptions of upward mobility is significantly stronger, the higher the income of the respondent. Further, we also observe indications of counter-reactions to the treatment for those respondents with very low income, who seem to become more optimistic after seeing the information. Again, there is no heterogeneity for downward mobility perceptions. Our main results are thus not due to the specific grouping of income in the main analysis and robust to different coding of the variable.

Second, we test the sensitivity of our main results to the choice of the outcome variables. To check whether beliefs about less extreme upward (downward) mobility are affected in the same way, we use the combined probability of a poor (rich) child to end up in the two top (bottom) quintiles, i.e. Q1Q45 (Q5Q12). We also use the probability of a poor or rich child to end up in the third quintile, respectively. Additionally, the answers to the social mobility question can be combined by calculating the expected quintile for a poor (or rich) child via

multiplying the respective probability for each quintile with it’s number. Eventually, one can construct an overall measure of beliefs of intergenerational mobility by calculating the difference in expected quintile for a rich vis-à-vis a poor child. Tables A18 and A19 show the regression results for these outcomes. On average, respondents in the treatment group perceive significantly less social mobility for all outcomes except downward mobility into the third quintile. These results are thus robust to the choice of the outcome variable. The results for heterogeneous treatment effects by income can be seen in Tables A20 and A21. The heterogeneity by income for beliefs in upward mobility can be seen for all alternative outcome variables except mobility into the third quintile, i.e. “the middle class”. Again, there is no clear heterogeneity for the treatment effect on beliefs of downward mobility. It thus seems that the heterogeneity by income that we observe is most pronounced for beliefs about more extreme mobility patterns. To sum up, our main results do not depend on the definition of the outcome variable and are robust to a wide set of alternatives.

Third, we re-estimated the main analysis with post-stratification weights and the results are provided in section C.4 in the appendix. The weighted results for the average first stage treatment effect (Table A22), the heterogeneity results with interactions (Tables A23 to A25), and using generalized random forests (Table A26) are all in line with the unweighted results. This shows that our main results may not be limited to the specific subgroup of Austrians that we reached with our survey, but could, within the usual limitations of online access panels, be applicable to the whole population.

Further, as discussed in section 2, and more thoroughly in appendix section A.1, we only used respondents passing the attention check for our main analysis. However, to ensure robustness of our results, we replicate the main analysis with the full sample, as well as with a more restrictive sample, where we additionally remove respondents that don’t pass the perception check. Moreover, we estimate the main analysis without the treatment group of the second treatment, which was orthogonal to our treatment, to make sure that this is not driving our results. The average first stage treatment effects in Tables A27 to A29 remain robust to the choice of the sample. However, the treatment effect on Q1Q5 and Q5Q1 loses significance in the full sample, as well as in the sample without the second treatment group. The same holds for the income heterogeneity on Q1Q5 in estimations with interactions (Tables A30 to A38) and generalized random forests (Tables A39 to A41). However, the direction of the effects is robust and the loss of statistical power is likely related to increased noise in these datasets, as the attention check is not applied. The heterogeneity in treatment effects on Q1Q1 is robust in all samples. Additionally, we do not find heterogeneities by education or political ideology in any of the samples, except for a higher treatment effect on Q1Q1 for those with upper secondary education and a higher treatment effect for the right-wing on Q1Q5 in the sample without the second treatment group. Yet, this could also be driven by the smaller sample size and increased noise in this sample, as no quality checks were applied. Additionally excluding respondents who didn’t pass the perception check does not change any of the results, indicating that these respondents are not driving our results. To sum up, our main results are robust to sample choice, albeit the heterogeneity by income on Q1Q5 is less strong in samples without the attention check.

Eventually, we re-estimated the average treatment effects (Table A42), and the heterogeneous treatment effects on beliefs using Quasipoisson regression models instead of OLS to account for the specific nature of the dependent variables (Tables A43 to A45). Our results are robust to this change in model specification. The relationships we find are thus systematically present in the data, independent from the estimation method. Furthermore, the results are also robust to whether we estimate the heterogeneous treatment effects via interaction terms or generalized random forests.

## 5 Conclusion

In this paper, we provide evidence on income group heterogeneity in the effects of information about low intergenerational mobility on perceptions and subsequently on demand for redistribution. In contrast to the related literature, we focus on the effect of information on beliefs in the first stage of the experiment.

Using data from a large-scale online survey experiment in Austria, we find that information on low social mobility in Austria reduces beliefs of social mobility on average. However, these average effects are strongly driven by high- and middle-income respondents, while low-income respondents hardly change their beliefs. Examining data from the two most closely related survey experiments, we find that this is also the case in the U.S. and in Germany. Despite the strong perception shift in the high-income group, the treatment effects on its preferences are mostly zero and even negative for certain policies. Redistributive preferences among low-income respondents are also mostly unaffected and only partially increase in response to the treatment. However, we note that the information treatment is effective in increasing support for wealth taxation in Austria on average.

Our results add an important new perspective to the related literature. Several studies find that respondents shift their beliefs on average after receiving information on inequality and social mobility, while policy preferences remain unchanged. Considering that the shifts in beliefs are mostly driven by respondents with higher incomes, however, the missing effect on demand for redistribution seems less surprising. High-income respondents have lower incentives to hold onto beliefs in high mobility and lower incentives to change their redistributive preferences in turn. But the group with most incentives to change its demand for redistribution, the low-income group, also has higher incentives to maintain its mobility beliefs. Since high-income respondents might even decrease support for redistribution and low-income respondents hardly move their perceptions, there are no effects of low mobility information on average. Focusing on the effects of information on beliefs, we can thus provide an explanation for the missing effects on redistributive preferences that is grounded in behavioral economics.

We suggest that the observed heterogeneity may indicate that beliefs in high social mobility for low-income respondents are motivated, following the mechanism proposed by Bénabou and Tirole (2006) and demonstrated empirically in the laboratory by Lobeck (2022). Believing in high social mobility implies that effort pays off for low-income earners, which motivates them to keep going and aspire to move up the income ladder. Thus, our

results imply that in addition to political ideology, belief updating is also systematically influenced by individual economic conditions.

Our results emphasize the need to pay more attention to first-stage effects of information on beliefs when interpreting the effects of such information on other outcomes. Future interventions should be designed such that they are effective across all relevant subgroups. Devising a mobility treatment that shifts beliefs in the low-income group is a necessary next step for testing the causal relationship between mobility perceptions and demand for redistribution. Furthermore, as we only provide suggestive evidence that motivated beliefs drive our results, future research should verify the causal mechanism behind the observed income group heterogeneity in the context of intergenerational mobility. If social mobility beliefs at the lower end of the income distribution turn out to be stable and people *don't stop believin'*, however, this has wide-ranging implications. It could possibly explain the seemingly stagnating demand for redistribution (Ciani, Fréget, and Manfredi, 2021) against the background of rising inequality and declining or stagnating social mobility in rich countries (OECD, 2018).

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# A Experimental Design, Data & Methodology

## A.1 Data Quality

There are three different samples related to the strictness of the quality screenings applied. Our main sample uses all respondents that successfully passed the attention check. The question was the following:

*English translation by the authors: We are interested in your attitudes toward different topics, such as colours. To show that you actually read this far, please select “red” and “green” out of the following alternatives. Ignore the following question and just select these two answers. What is your favourite colour?*

- Pink
- Red
- Green
- White
- Black
- Blue

The participants are required to read the instructions carefully from the beginning until the end, where the desired answer is stated. All participants who did not check these two colors stated were thus flagged. This corresponds to 1428 respondents from the full sample, which is 34% of the sample. This share is relatively large, but can also relate to the specific type of question used, which is a relatively strict type of attention check. The second sample is the full sample and just uses all 4,200 observations. The third sample is the most restrictive one, as it excludes those who do not pass the attention check and additionally puts the following two restrictions on the answers to our outcome variable as displayed in figure 4 and analogous to Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018).

- Not putting 100 somewhere else than in the origin (i.e. the bottom quintile for the upward mobility question and the top quintile for the downward mobility question)
- Not giving the exact same answers for the upward and downward mobility question (apart from the perception of origin independence: 20 for all quintiles)

This check addresses lazy response behaviour or potential lack of understanding and mostly catches aberrant responses. 334 individuals fall into at least one of these conditions.

Berinsky, Margolis, and Sances (2014) emphasize that the passing of such checks is not randomly distributed among the individuals in the sample, but instead correlated with different important characteristics such as age, gender, or race, which could introduce substantial bias in the results. Therefore, these data checks can be seen as a trade-off between internal and external validity. On the one hand, they increase internal validity by improving the quality of the data. On the other hand, they reduce external validity, because a significant share of the target population is probably not appropriately represented in the reduced sample and excluded from the analysis. We decided to use the attention check in our main sample to increase internal validity and reduce noise in our data. We do not use the perception check, as this can be influenced by the treatment and directly changes the distribution of our outcome variable. However, we conduct all analyses with all samples to check for robustness.



Table A1: Sample Representativity

	Full Sample	Main Sample	Restrictive Sample	Austrian population
<b>Gender</b>				
Female	50.52	52.06	52.04	51.29
Male	49.48	47.94	47.96	48.71
<b>Age group</b>				
18-34	27.29	29.87	30.08	26.21
35-54	41.62	42.57	42.45	34.48
55+	31.1	27.56	27.47	39.31
<b>Education</b>				
Vocational training or less	48.76	45.49	44.84	72.02
Upper secondary (AHS, BMHS)	32.71	34.56	34.78	14.30
Tertiary	18.52	19.95	20.38	13.69
<b>Num. obs.</b>	4200	2772	2596	

Austrian population data was retrieved from Statistik Austria and represents the margins along which the post-stratification weighting procedure was executed.

Table A2: Sample Attrition by Quality Checks

	Attention check	Attention check	Perception check	Perception check
Constant	0.340*** (0.010)	0.359*** (0.027)	0.091*** (0.006)	0.084*** (0.015)
Treatment	-0.000 (0.015)	-0.009 (0.039)	-0.022*** (0.008)	-0.021 (0.020)
Low income		-0.004 (0.024)		0.004 (0.014)
Middle income		0.013 (0.028)		0.018 (0.017)
Middle		0.043* (0.024)		0.026* (0.014)
Conservative		0.053 (0.032)		0.045** (0.020)
Upper Secondary		-0.111*** (0.023)		-0.039*** (0.014)
Tertiary		-0.100*** (0.029)		-0.053*** (0.016)
Treatment*Low income		-0.035 (0.034)		0.013 (0.020)
Treatment*Middle income		-0.056 (0.039)		-0.012 (0.022)
Treatment*Middle		0.022 (0.035)		-0.019 (0.019)
Treatment*Conservative		-0.016 (0.045)		-0.052** (0.026)
Treatment*Upper Secondary		0.072** (0.033)		0.029 (0.019)
Treatment*Tertiary		0.028 (0.040)		0.040* (0.022)
Num. obs.	4200	4200	4200	4200

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

OLS regressions using the full sample. The dependent variables are dummies indicating whether the observation would be dropped according to the respective quality check. Both checks are regressed on only the treatment, and the treatment interacted with the three main covariates (education, political ideology, and income group). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses.

In Table A2, we evaluate, whether our quality checks induce differential attrition (i.e. differences between treatment and control group) in our sample. For our main results, it is important that both checks do not indicate differential attrition by income, neither in the control nor in the treatment

group. The attention check is not correlated with the treatment indicator, but induces slightly more attrition among those with upper secondary education in the treatment group. This has to be kept in mind for the interpretation of the heterogeneous treatment effects by education. However, we find no heterogeneity by education, neither in the full nor in the main or the restrictive sample. Importantly, the attention check is placed before the treatment and thus this difference just arose by chance. The perception check is a different case, however. Here, we see a clear correlation with the treatment indicator. This check removed more respondents from the control group than from the treatment group. This is related to the nature of the check, as it removes more optimistic answering patterns, that are more prevalent in the control group, that does not see the pessimistic information. We also find that this is even stronger for conservative respondents, and less prevalent for those with higher education. With this in mind, the results for the sample using the perception check should be taken with a grain of salt. This sample is only used as a robustness check to ensure that our main results are not only driven by such questionable answer patterns.

Table A3: Covariate Balance Regressions for Different Samples


	Main Sample	Full sample	Restrictive Sample
	Treatment dummy	Treatment dummy	Treatment dummy
Constant	0.480 (0.043)***	0.490 (0.035)***	0.494 (0.045)***
Male	0.003 (0.021)	0.000 (0.017)	-0.012 (0.021)
35-54 years	0.001 (0.028)	-0.017 (0.022)	-0.000 (0.029)
55+ years	0.003 (0.025)	-0.022 (0.021)	0.001 (0.026)
Upper Secondary	-0.013 (0.023)	0.015 (0.018)	-0.024 (0.023)
Tertiary	0.001 (0.028)	0.010 (0.023)	-0.011 (0.029)
Low income	-0.000 (0.026)	-0.017 (0.021)	-0.002 (0.027)
Middle income	0.030 (0.032)	0.005 (0.025)	0.041 (0.033)
Middle	-0.010 (0.023)	-0.003 (0.019)	-0.007 (0.024)
Conservative	0.034 (0.030)	0.026 (0.024)	0.048 (0.031)
Child	-0.032 (0.022)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.036 (0.023)
part-time	0.003 (0.032)	-0.004 (0.027)	-0.004 (0.033)
employer	0.013 (0.040)	0.004 (0.032)	0.027 (0.041)
unemployed	0.031 (0.048)	0.016 (0.037)	0.027 (0.049)
out of labour force	0.010 (0.030)	0.011 (0.024)	0.013 (0.031)
Other	-0.062 (0.052)	-0.096 (0.041)**	-0.054 (0.054)
migration background	-0.016 (0.025)	0.009 (0.020)	-0.010 (0.026)
rural	0.036 (0.021)*	0.027 (0.017)	0.045 (0.022)**
owner	-0.004 (0.022)	0.002 (0.018)	-0.011 (0.023)
living for free	0.035 (0.044)	0.068 (0.036)*	0.021 (0.045)
other	0.003 (0.086)	0.005 (0.071)	0.007 (0.090)
pessimistic abt future	0.017 (0.024)	0.013 (0.019)	0.008 (0.025)
don't know about future	0.023 (0.023)	0.012 (0.019)	0.032 (0.024)
Inequality treatment	-0.003 (0.020)	-0.001 (0.016)	-0.011 (0.020)
F statistic	0.666	0.939	0.860
Num. obs.	2772	4200	2596

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

Linear Probability models with the treatment dummy as dependent variable using the three different samples. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses.

## A.2 Perceptions of Intergenerational Mobility


Figure A1: Distribution of Intergenerational Mobility Perceptions in Austria



The graph shows the distribution of the answers to the perception of intergenerational mobility question in the control group. The left panel shows the perceptions of probabilities (x-axis) for children from the bottom quintile to end up in the respective quintile (y-axis) when they are grown up. The right panel shows the same for children from the top quintile. The red square represents the respective average of the variable.

## B Main Results: First-stage Effects on Perceptions

Figure A2: Treatment effects on distribution of outcome variables



This graph shows the distribution of the outcome variables by treatment and control group.


Table A4: Baseline Perceptions of Intergenerational Mobility in Austria by Income

	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q5Q5	Q5Q1
low income	-0.579 (1.244)	1.079 (1.979)	-1.472 (2.318)	1.438 (1.059)
middle income	0.957 (1.177)	-1.108 (1.813)	1.826 (2.125)	0.129 (0.865)
Reference Group Mean	10.390	37.770	53.421	7.277
Reference Group SD	16.679	26.453	30.025	13.255
Num. obs.	1381	1381	1381	1381

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .


OLS regressions including treatment interaction terms with the education groups and additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. The reference group mean refers to the average of the dependent variable within the reference group of the coefficient of interest, in this case the control group.

Figure A3: Perceptions of Upward Mobility Across Income Groups in Austria: Alternative Sample



This graph shows control group means for Q1Q1 and Q1Q5 for the whole population and for the income groups separately. The main sample is however additionally restricted to those, who pass the preception check and the means are weighted.

Figure A4: Treatment effects on distribution of Q1Q1 by income group



This graph shows the distribution of Q1Q1 by treatment and control group and by income groups.

## B.1 Discussion of Mechanisms

Table A5: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Perceptions of Intergenerational Mobility in Austria: Education Interactions

	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q5Q5	Q5Q1
Upper Secondary	-3.399*** (1.038)	5.562*** (1.602)	7.230*** (1.826)	-3.454*** (0.793)
Tertiary	-5.231*** (1.218)	9.491*** (1.968)	9.505*** (2.251)	-2.610** (1.063)
Treatment	-1.021 (1.034)	4.377*** (1.506)	4.546*** (1.699)	-1.211 (0.803)
Treatment*Upper Secondary	-0.557 (1.419)	2.335 (2.314)	-1.632 (2.524)	1.083 (1.075)
Treatment*Tertiary	-0.159 (1.624)	0.651 (2.764)	-3.247 (2.997)	-0.477 (1.352)
Reference Group Mean	12.917	32.987	48.362	9.106
Reference Group SD	17.586	25.799	30.009	14.273
Num. obs.	2772	2772	2772	2772

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

OLS regressions including treatment interaction terms with the education groups and additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. The reference group mean refers to the average of the dependent variable within the reference group of the coefficient of interest, in this case the lowest educated group in the control group.

Table A6: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Perceptions of Intergenerational Mobility in Austria: Ideology Interactions

	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q5Q5	Q5Q1
Middle	0.796 (1.062)	-5.685*** (1.707)	-7.160*** (1.854)	1.693** (0.818)
Right-wing	1.853 (1.444)	-8.700*** (2.219)	-8.370*** (2.507)	1.369 (1.103)
Treatment	-0.923 (1.248)	5.784*** (2.073)	3.405 (2.132)	-0.233 (0.920)
Treatment*Middle	-0.289 (1.490)	-1.033 (2.487)	-0.348 (2.624)	-1.052 (1.145)
Treatment*Right-wing	-0.902 (1.970)	0.531 (3.121)	0.663 (3.394)	-0.672 (1.497)
Reference Group Mean	9.075	43.483	59.656	5.717
Reference Group SD	17.103	28.061	29.418	12.431
Num. obs.	2772	2772	2772	2772

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

OLS regressions including treatment interaction terms with the political ideology groups and additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. The reference group mean refers to the average of the dependent variable within the reference group of the coefficient of interest, in this case the left-wing respondents in the control group.


Table A7: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Education, Political Ideology and Income

	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q5Q5	Q5Q1
Upper Secondary	-3.567*** (1.044)	5.946*** (1.613)	7.356*** (1.848)	-3.326*** (0.801)
Tertiary	-5.597*** (1.238)	10.259*** (1.999)	9.694*** (2.301)	-2.367** (1.094)
Low income	0.098 (1.202)	0.304 (1.942)	-2.041 (2.258)	1.937* (1.022)
Middle income	1.291 (1.167)	-1.478 (1.795)	1.519 (2.099)	0.422 (0.856)
Middle	0.716 (1.075)	-5.592*** (1.730)	-6.911*** (1.873)	1.741** (0.836)
Right-wing	1.618 (1.466)	-8.351*** (2.236)	-8.076*** (2.525)	1.474 (1.107)
Treatment	-2.601 (1.957)	8.763*** (3.319)	6.788* (3.608)	0.368 (1.716)
Treatment*Upper Secondary	-0.264 (1.434)	1.634 (2.357)	-1.895 (2.582)	0.844 (1.112)
Treatment*Tertiary	0.468 (1.662)	-0.696 (2.849)	-3.627 (3.093)	-0.902 (1.408)
Treatment*Middle	-0.165 (1.514)	-1.157 (2.532)	-0.823 (2.673)	-1.112 (1.193)
Treatment*Right-wing	-0.518 (2.009)	-0.044 (3.167)	0.126 (3.444)	-0.849 (1.525)
Treatment*Low income	3.905** (1.597)	-6.846** (2.757)	-1.149 (3.032)	-1.507 (1.366)
Treatment*Middle income	0.652 (1.536)	-2.456 (2.634)	-3.112 (2.900)	-0.385 (1.234)
Num. obs.	2772	2772	2772	2772

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

OLS regressions including treatment interaction terms with with education, political ideology and income groups at once, and additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses.

Figure A5: Treatment Effect Across Income Groups in Austria: Respondents Above 55 Years and Without Children



This graph replicates Figure 6 for the subgroup of respondents above 55 years and without any children. It shows the unweighted control and treatment group means for the whole subsample and for each income group within this subsample separately.

Table A8: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Sample Above 55 Years Without Kids

	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q5Q5	Q5Q1
Low income	2.143 (2.082)	0.033 (4.575)	1.415 (5.313)	-1.758 (2.900)
Middle income	3.234 (2.339)	1.428 (4.530)	3.472 (5.465)	-2.531 (2.866)
Treatment	0.406 (2.336)	5.019 (5.773)	0.610 (6.362)	-2.679 (3.020)
Treatment*Low income	-2.080 (2.991)	3.084 (6.573)	6.446 (7.165)	-1.228 (3.405)
Treatment*Middle income	-5.906* (3.128)	-0.002 (6.626)	2.979 (7.411)	0.649 (3.396)
Reference Group Mean	7.689	37.089	48.600	9.889
Reference Group SD	10.088	26.572	31.218	17.019
Num. obs.	615	615	615	615

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

OLS regressions including treatment interaction terms with the income groups for the subsample of respondents aged at least 55 years and without children and additionally controlling for gender, education, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. The reference group mean refers to the average of the dependent variable within the reference group of the coefficient of interest, in this case the high-income group in the control group among respondents above 55 years and without kids.



## C Additional Results

### C.1 International Evidence: A Replication Exercise

Table A9: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Perceptions of Intergenerational Mobility in Europe: Income Interactions

	France		Italy		Sweden		U.K.	
	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q1Q5	Q1Q1
Low income	2.034 (1.534)	-5.553** (2.491)	5.402*** (1.647)	-1.095 (2.213)	1.106 (2.280)	-2.433 (3.172)	2.381* (1.329)	-3.878 (2.425)
Middle income	-0.809 (1.450)	-4.481* (2.416)	0.615 (1.391)	-1.143 (2.111)	-1.036 (1.983)	0.764 (2.791)	1.567 (1.414)	-3.001 (2.474)
Treatment	1.025 (2.112)	9.257*** (3.208)	0.999 (1.562)	11.789*** (2.538)	-3.410* (1.975)	12.892*** (3.151)	1.759 (1.820)	4.416 (3.130)
T*Low income	-0.912 (2.476)	1.828 (3.800)	-3.444 (2.207)	-1.903 (3.298)	4.203 (3.015)	-2.631 (4.408)	-1.932 (2.228)	5.103 (3.776)
T*Middle income	0.220 (2.498)	1.379 (3.846)	1.212 (2.238)	-1.488 (3.440)	2.293 (2.534)	-2.178 (4.093)	-2.521 (2.356)	7.366* (3.873)
Reference Group Mean	7.836	38.786	8.757	33.299	9.422	33.605	7.389	42.463
Reference Group SD	14.348	23.704	13.536	21.786	18.282	25.398	11.830	24.027
Num. obs.	1524	1524	1559	1559	959	959	1526	1526

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*  $p < 0.1$ .

OLS regressions using data from Alesina et al. (2018). Each regression includes treatment interaction terms with the income groups and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, as well as controls for gender, age, education, whether the respondent has children, whether her parents were born abroad, ideology and whether the respondent experienced upward mobility with respect to her parents. The reference group mean refers to the average of the dependent variable within the reference group of the coefficient of interest, in this case the high-income group in the control group in the respective country.

### C.2 Generalized Random Forests

Table A10: Non-parametric Subgroup Treatment Effects Estimated via Generalized Random Forests: Main Sample

Subgroup	Q1Q5		Q1Q1		Q5Q1		Q5Q5	
	Treatment effect	SE	Treatment effect	SE	Treatment effect	SE	Treatment effect	SE
<b>Income</b>								
Low income	1.189	1.137	0.864	1.843	-1.976	0.944	3.924	1.967
Middle income	-1.999	1.055	6.252	1.661	-0.591	0.755	2.280	1.830
High income	-2.973	1.166	9.009	2.116	-0.241	1.023	4.672	2.359
<b>Ideology</b>								
Middle	-1.186	0.857	4.615	1.436	-1.312	0.698	3.317	1.596
Left	-0.993	1.270	6.025	2.136	-0.266	0.962	3.792	2.211
Right	-1.660	1.573	5.902	2.386	-0.869	1.228	3.350	2.698
<b>Education</b>								
Vocational Training or less	-0.877	1.068	4.469	1.576	-1.479	0.839	5.258	1.775
Upper Secondary	-1.774	0.988	6.281	1.819	0.120	0.736	2.666	1.934
Tertiary	-1.040	1.302	5.141	2.410	-1.594	1.154	0.694	2.570

Average treatment effect estimates on the dependent variable indicated on top within the subgroup listed on the left. The estimates result from causal forests, following Athey, Tibshirani, Wager, et al. (2019) and are estimated using the main sample (N=2772) and the same controls as in the OLS regressions (gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment).

Table A11: Comparison of Groups With High and Low Treatment Effects on Q1Q1

Variable	TE estimate < median (A)	TE estimate > median (B)
<b>Gender</b>		
Female	52.95 B	47.05
Male	46.80	53.20 A
<b>Age group</b>		
18-34	56.10 B	43.90
35-54	57.59 B	42.41
55+	34.30	65.70 A
<b>Education</b>		
Vocational training or less	59.79 B	40.21
Upper secondary	36.22	63.78 A
Tertiary	51.54	48.46
<b>Income Group</b>		
Low income	79.18 B	20.82
Middle income	38.78	61.22 A
High income	31.48	68.52 A
<b>Ideology</b>		
Middle	55.88 B	44.12
Left	41.52	58.48 A
Right	44.82	55.18 A
<b>Children</b>		
No	49.88	50.12
Yes	50.10	49.90
<b>Parents born abroad</b>		
Yes	49.31	50.69
No	52.91 B	47.09
<b>Residential area type</b>		
Urban	45.01	54.99 A
Rural	53.71 B	46.29
<b>Employment status</b>		
Employed (full time)	39.85	60.15 A
Employed (part time)	53.94 B	46.06
Employer	44.67	55.33 A
Unemployed	70.95 B	29.05
Out of labour force	60.00 B	40.00
Other	63.25 B	36.75
<b>Housing situation</b>		
Renter	51.49	48.51
Owner	49.27	50.73
Living for free	40.49	59.51 A
Other	57.89 B	42.11
<b>Better or worse off in 5 years?</b>		
Better	46.04	53.96 A
Worse	53.58 B	46.42
Don't know	50.88	49.12
<b>Num. obs.</b>	1386	1386


The sample is split in two subgroups according to their individual predicted treatment effects on Q1Q1 resulting from the causal forest. The first column refers to those with predicted treatment effects below the median predicted treatment effect and the second column to those with above median effects. Then the percentage of people with the characteristics described on the left is compared between these two groups. If one of them is significantly smaller, the letter of the respective column is written next to the bigger value, i.e. A if this characteristic is significantly less often found in the group with lower predicted treatment effects.

Table A12: Comparison of Groups With High and Low Treatment Effects on Q5Q5

Variable	TE estimate < median (A)	TE estimate > median (B)
<b>Gender</b>		
Female	49.20	50.80
Male	50.87	49.13
<b>Age group</b>		
18-34	60.51 B	39.49
35-54	42.28	57.72 A
55+	42.15	57.85 A
<b>Education</b>		
Vocational training or less	42.82	57.18 A
Upper secondary	53.97 B	46.03
Tertiary	59.49 B	40.51
<b>Income Group</b>		
Low income	43.96	56.04 A
Middle income	59.98 B	40.02
High income	42.06	57.94 A
<b>Ideology</b>		
Middle	50.49	49.51
Left	50.20	49.80
Right	48.21	51.79
<b>Children</b>		
No	59.39 B	40.61
Yes	42.63	57.37 A
<b>Parents born abroad</b>		
Yes	49.80	50.20
No	50.84	49.16
<b>Residential area type</b>		
Urban	55.92 B	44.08
Rural	45.60	54.40 A
<b>Employment status</b>		
Employed (full time)	51.37	48.63
Employed (part time)	51.15	48.85
Employer	51.78	48.22
Unemployed	54.05 B	45.95
Out of labour force	45.77	54.23 A
Other	49.57	50.43
<b>Housing situation</b>		
Renter	51.42	48.58
Owner	48.41	51.59
Living for free	49.08	50.92
Other	50.00	50.00
<b>Better or worse off in 5 years?</b>		
Better	49.74	50.26
Worse	51.67	48.33
Don't know	48.80	51.20
<b>Num. obs.</b>	1386	1386

The sample is split in two subgroups according to their individual predicted treatment effects on Q5Q5 resulting from the causal forest. The first column refers to those with predicted treatment effects below the median predicted treatment effect and the second column to those with above median effects. Then the percentage of people with the characteristics described on the left is compared between these two groups. If one of them is significantly smaller, the letter of the respective column is written next to the bigger value, i.e. A if this characteristic is significantly less often found in the group with lower predicted treatment effects.

Figure A6: Variable Importance in GRF - Q1Q1 and Q1Q5



This graph plots the variable importance measures of the respective variable levels for the causal forests. Higher variable importance means that this variable is more often used to split the tree. This in turn means that this variable explains more of the variance in the treatment effect. The left plot refers to the forest with Q1Q1 as dependent variable, and the right plot to Q1Q5 as the dependent variable.




Figure A7: Heat maps- Partial effects of income and political ideology/education on upward mobility treatment effects

### C.3 Second-stage Effects on Demand for Redistribution

Table A13: Average Treatment Effects on Preferences for Redistribution

	Inherit. Tax	Wealth Tax	Property Tax	Capital Gains Tax (Rate)	Support for Redistr.
Treatment	0.010 (0.024)	0.048*** (0.019)	0.011 (0.018)	1.072* (0.558)	-0.017 (0.098)
Reference Group Mean	0.322	0.418	0.622	17.101	6.733
Reference Group SD	0.467	0.493	0.485	13.309	2.520
Num. obs.	2772	2772	2772	2322	2572

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

OLS regressions based on the main sample with all control variables (gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment). The outcomes of the multicategory questions on inheritance, wealth and property taxation are combined such that the responses 'Yes' and 'Yes, with exemption' correspond to 1 and 'No' and 'Unsure' correspond to 0. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. The reference group mean refers to the average of the dependent variable within the reference group of the coefficient of interest, in this case everybody in the control group.

Table A14: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Preferences for Redistribution across Income Groups

	Inherit. Tax	Wealth Tax	Property Tax	Capital Gains Tax (Rate)	Support for Redistr.
Low income	-0.049* (0.028)	-0.038 (0.036)	-0.077** (0.035)	-0.097 (1.083)	0.696*** (0.193)
Middle income	-0.057** (0.026)	0.008 (0.033)	-0.058* (0.032)	0.422 (0.946)	0.430** (0.175)
Treatment	-0.046 (0.040)	0.051 (0.036)	-0.024 (0.034)	0.557 (0.921)	0.035 (0.192)
Treatment*Low income	0.058 (0.051)	0.029 (0.048)	0.048 (0.047)	1.226 (1.399)	-0.006 (0.259)
Treatment*Middle income	0.092* (0.048)	-0.032 (0.046)	0.046 (0.044)	0.347 (1.296)	-0.123 (0.244)
Reference Group Mean	0.391	0.442	0.688	17.221	6.188
Reference Group SD	0.489	0.497	0.464	12.450	2.550
Num. obs.	2772	2772	2772	2322	2572

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

OLS regressions based on the main sample with all control variables (gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment). The outcomes of the multicategory questions on inheritance, wealth and property taxation are combined such that the responses 'Yes' and 'Yes, with exemption' correspond to 1 and 'No' and 'Unsure' correspond to 0. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. The reference group mean refers to the average of the dependent variable within the reference group of the coefficient of interest, in this case the high-income group in the control group.

Table A15: Average Treatment Effects on Preferences for Redistribution for Multicategory Questions

	Inherit. Tax Yes	Inherit. Tax w. exemption	Inherit. Tax Unsure	Wealth Tax Yes	Wealth Tax w. exemption	Wealth Tax Unsure	Property Tax Yes	Property Tax w. exemption
Treatment	-0.268 (0.247)	0.139 (0.126)	0.157 (0.204)	0.265** (0.132)	0.272*** (0.089)	0.318** (0.127)	-0.126 (0.114)	0.110 (0.086)
Num. obs.	2772	2772	2772	2772	2772	2772	2772	2772
K	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

Multinomial logistic regressions based on the main sample with all control variables (gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment). The baseline category corresponds to 'No' for all three questions.

Table A16: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Preferences for Redistribution Across Income Groups for Multicategory Questions

	Inherit. Tax Yes	Inherit. Tax w. exemption	Inherit. Tax Unsure	Wealth Tax Yes	Wealth Tax w. exemption	Wealth Tax Unsure	Property Tax Yes	Property Tax w. exemption
Low income	0.089 (0.268)	-0.271* (0.149)	0.397 (0.266)	0.326 (0.265)	-0.199 (0.175)	0.576** (0.262)	-0.256 (0.215)	-0.388** (0.170)
Middle income	-0.490* (0.272)	-0.192 (0.132)	0.333 (0.256)	0.208 (0.254)	0.026 (0.156)	0.200 (0.262)	-0.260 (0.198)	-0.277* (0.159)
Treatment	-0.749* (0.454)	-0.098 (0.202)	0.202 (0.392)	0.427 (0.268)	0.203 (0.166)	0.221 (0.291)	-0.251 (0.215)	-0.060 (0.171)
Treatment*Low income	0.406 (0.562)	0.329 (0.268)	0.124 (0.455)	-0.246 (0.349)	0.302 (0.233)	0.014 (0.353)	0.306 (0.292)	0.182 (0.227)
Treatment*Middle income	0.900 (0.551)	0.343 (0.247)	-0.220 (0.461)	-0.179 (0.338)	-0.046 (0.217)	0.248 (0.354)	0.043 (0.283)	0.257 (0.217)
Num. obs.	2772	2772	2772	2772	2772	2772	2772	2772
K	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

Multinomial logistic regressions based on the main sample with all control variables (gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment). The baseline category corresponds to 'No' for all three questions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses.

## C.4 Robustness Checks

Table A17: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Log(Income)

	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q5Q5	Q5Q1
log(income)	0.455 (0.585)	-0.660 (0.960)	0.970 (1.087)	-0.923 (0.571)
Treatment	10.560* (5.688)	-14.227 (10.169)	5.673 (10.975)	-5.550 (5.146)
Treatment*log(income)	-1.570** (0.752)	2.598* (1.348)	-0.310 (1.457)	0.613 (0.676)
Num. obs.	2772	2772	2772	2772

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

OLS regressions including treatment interaction terms with income (continuous and in logs) and additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment. Naturally, we also include log(income) instead of income groups as covariate. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses.

Table A18: Average Treatment Effect on Perceptions of Intergenerational Mobility in Austria - alternative outcome measures I

	Q1Q45	Q1Q3	Q5Q12	Q5Q3
Treatment	-1.687*** (0.345)	-2.125*** (0.579)	-0.822** (0.388)	-0.755 (0.468)
Reference Group Mean	20.064	19.560	15.143	12.620
Reference Group SD	23.526	15.694	20.836	12.612
Num. obs.	2772	2772	2772	2772

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

OLS regressions on the treatment indicator additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. The reference group mean refers to the average of the dependent variable within the reference group of the coefficient of interest, in this case the entire control group.

Table A19: Average Treatment Effect on Perceptions of Intergenerational Mobility in Austria - alternative outcome measures II

	Expected Quintile Q1	Expected Quintile Q5	Diff. in Expected Quintiles
Treatment	-0.145*** (0.032)	0.085*** (0.032)	0.217*** (0.049)
Reference Group Mean	2.323	4.032	1.771
Reference Group SD	0.855	0.858	1.316
Num. obs.	2772	2772	2772

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

OLS regressions on the treatment indicator additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. The reference group mean refers to the average of the dependent variable within the reference group of the coefficient of interest, in this case the entire control group.

Table A20: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Perceptions of Intergenerational Mobility in Austria - alternative outcome measures I: Income Interactions

	Q1Q45	Q1Q3	Q5Q12	Q5Q3
Low income	1.068 (1.700)	-0.491 (1.181)	2.675* (1.551)	-0.517 (0.991)
Middle income	2.046 (1.603)	-0.545 (1.095)	0.622 (1.404)	-1.086 (0.942)
Treatment	-4.719*** (1.613)	-3.054*** (1.172)	-1.522 (1.526)	-2.018** (0.995)
Treatment*Low income	4.933** (2.239)	0.949 (1.529)	-1.135 (2.033)	1.179 (1.256)
Treatment*Middle income	0.446 (2.126)	1.517 (1.470)	0.337 (1.930)	2.150* (1.228)
Reference Group Mean	17.544	19.419	13.550	12.909
Reference Group SD	23.382	16.745	20.975	15.035
Num. obs.	2772	2772	2772	2772

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

OLS regressions including treatment interaction terms with the income groups and additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. The reference group mean refers to the average of the dependent variable within the reference group of the coefficient of interest, in this case the high-income group in the control group.

Table A21: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Perceptions of Intergenerational Mobility in Austria - alternative outcome measures II: Income Interactions

	Expected Quintile Q1	Expected Quintile Q5	Diff. in Expected Quintiles
Low income	0.015 (0.062)	-0.091 (0.064)	-0.105 (0.096)
Middle income	0.063 (0.058)	0.007 (0.058)	-0.063 (0.088)
Treatment	-0.238*** (0.061)	0.100 (0.063)	0.318*** (0.096)
Treatment*Low income	0.215*** (0.083)	0.020 (0.084)	-0.186 (0.129)
Treatment*Middle income	0.055 (0.079)	-0.052 (0.080)	-0.099 (0.123)
Reference Group Mean	2.236	4.084	1.914
Reference Group SD	0.858	0.874	1.327
Num. obs.	2772	2772	2772

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

OLS regressions including treatment interaction terms with the income groups and additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. The reference group mean refers to the average of the dependent variable within the reference group of the coefficient of interest, in this case the high-income group in the control group.

Table A22: Average Treatment Effects: First-stage, Weighted

	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q5Q5	Q5Q1
Treatment	-2.124** (0.866)	5.726*** (1.241)	4.327*** (1.381)	-1.553** (0.670)
Reference Group Mean	12.247	34.877	50.465	8.530
Reference Group SD	17.682	25.663	29.570	13.977
Num. obs.	2772	2772	2772	2772

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

Weighted OLS regressions on the treatment dummy and additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. The reference group mean refers to the average of the dependent variable within the reference group of the coefficient of interest, in this case everybody in the control group.



Table A23: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Income, Weighted

	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q5Q5	Q5Q1
Low income	0.445 (1.625)	0.089 (2.173)	-4.588* (2.589)	2.715** (1.253)
Middle income	2.627 (1.692)	-1.365 (2.033)	1.878 (2.465)	0.225 (1.031)
Treatment	-3.074* (1.569)	10.139*** (2.410)	6.286** (2.698)	-1.206 (1.094)
Treatment*Low income	3.954* (2.160)	-7.687** (3.236)	0.232 (3.590)	-1.576 (1.593)
Treatment*Middle income	-1.525 (2.071)	-3.469 (3.051)	-5.141 (3.433)	0.687 (1.518)
Reference Group Mean	9.815	37.445	52.982	6.903
Reference Group SD	17.727	26.064	31.087	13.029
Num. obs.	2772	2772	2772	2772

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

Weighted OLS regressions on the treatment dummy interacted with income groups and additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. The reference group mean refers to the average of the dependent variable within the reference group of the coefficient of interest, in this case the high-income group in the control group.

Table A24: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Ideology, Weighted

	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q5Q5	Q5Q1
Middle	-0.435 (1.632)	-3.720* (2.092)	-3.876* (2.266)	0.525 (1.203)
Right-wing	-0.010 (1.937)	-5.208** (2.546)	-6.508** (2.990)	0.493 (1.561)
Treatment	-3.135* (1.726)	7.356*** (2.569)	7.000*** (2.700)	-1.789 (1.291)
Treatment*Middle	1.155 (2.068)	-2.425 (3.069)	-4.308 (3.270)	0.067 (1.577)
Treatment*Right	1.934 (2.754)	-1.450 (3.739)	-1.390 (4.231)	1.049 (2.030)
Reference Group Mean	11.883	39.258	54.636	7.663
Reference Group SD	19.068	28.347	30.043	14.580
Num. obs.	2772	2772	2772	2772

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

Weighted OLS regressions on the treatment dummy interacted with political ideology groups and additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. The reference group mean refers to the average of the dependent variable within the reference group of the coefficient of interest, in this case the left-wing in the control group.

Table A25: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Education, Weighted

	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q5Q5	Q5Q1
Upper Secondary	-4.597*** (1.234)	5.721*** (1.703)	7.464*** (1.955)	-3.787*** (0.902)
Tertiary	-6.978*** (1.357)	10.716*** (2.063)	9.929*** (2.382)	-2.969*** (1.148)
Treatment	-2.577** (1.211)	5.884*** (1.672)	5.180*** (1.873)	-1.686* (0.925)
Treatment*Upper Secondary	0.751 (1.593)	1.651 (2.483)	-2.024 (2.708)	1.223 (1.181)
Treatment*Tertiary	2.209 (1.772)	-2.797 (2.926)	-3.504 (3.134)	-0.419 (1.424)
Reference Group Mean	14.213	31.690	47.318	9.705
Reference Group SD	18.430	24.871	29.273	14.422
Num. obs.	2772	2772	2772	2772

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

Weighted OLS regressions on the treatment dummy interacted with education groups and additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. The reference group mean refers to the average of the dependent variable within the reference group of the coefficient of interest, in this case the lowest educated group in the control group.

Table A26: Non-parametric Subgroup Treatment Effects Estimated via Generalized Random Forests: Main Sample With Post-stratification Weights

Subgroup	Q1Q5		Q1Q1		Q5Q1		Q5Q5	
	Treatment effect	SE	Treatment effect	SE	Treatment effect	SE	Treatment effect	SE
<b>Income</b>								
Low income	0.612	1.690	1.623	2.360	-2.843	1.226	6.091	2.562
Middle income	-3.729	1.338	6.247	1.953	-0.408	1.077	1.250	2.285
High income	-3.370	1.637	11.029	2.543	-0.840	1.139	6.280	2.853
<b>Ideology</b>								
Middle	-1.874	1.209	4.536	1.798	-1.652	0.913	2.504	1.998
Left	-2.809	1.772	7.489	2.693	-1.846	1.353	7.614	2.869
Right	-1.001	2.306	5.275	2.810	-0.369	1.651	4.693	3.445
<b>Education</b>								
Vocational Training or less	-2.326	1.281	5.416	1.791	-1.588	0.953	5.120	2.023
Upper Secondary	-2.001	1.038	7.472	1.884	-0.369	0.769	3.254	2.018
Tertiary	-0.141	1.338	3.251	2.496	-2.016	1.124	1.031	2.632

Average treatment effect estimates on the dependent variable indicated on top within the subgroup listed on the left. The estimates result from causal forests, following Athey, Tibshirani, Wager, et al. (2019) and are estimated using the main sample ( $N=2772$ ) and the post-stratification weights.

Table A27: Average Treatment Effect: First-stage, Full Dataset

	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q5Q5	Q5Q1
Treatment	-0.893 (0.546)	4.502*** (0.838)	2.594*** (0.940)	-0.435 (0.464)
Reference Group Mean	12.068	35.089	49.582	9.008
Reference Group SD	17.875	26.239	30.739	14.918
Num. obs.	4200	4200	4200	4200

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

OLS regressions in the full sample on the treatment dummy and additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. The reference group mean refers to the average of the dependent variable within the reference group of the coefficient of interest, in this case everybody in the control group.

Table A28: Average Treatment Effect: First-stage, Dataset With Perception and Attention Checks

	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q5Q5	Q5Q1
Treatment	-1.286** (0.564)	5.296*** (1.046)	3.181*** (1.135)	-0.765* (0.447)
Reference Group Mean	9.003	39.373	55.038	6.439
Reference Group SD	14.694	25.959	29.338	11.526
Num. obs.	2596	2596	2596	2596

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

OLS regressions on the treatment dummy and additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment. Regressions are based on the sample excluding those that didn't pass the perception and attention checks. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. The reference group mean refers to the average of the dependent variable within the reference group of the coefficient of interest, in this case everybody in the control group.

Table A29: Average Treatment Effect: First-stage, Dataset Without Second Treatment Group

	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q5Q5	Q5Q1
Treatment	-0.105 (0.642)	4.308*** (1.118)	2.828** (1.234)	-0.367 (0.528)
Reference Group Mean	10.130	36.944	51.573	7.712
Reference Group SD	15.369	25.722	29.728	12.622
Num. obs.	2305	2305	2305	2305

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

OLS regressions on the treatment dummy and additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave. Regressions are based on the full sample without those in the inequality treatment group. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. The reference group mean refers to the average of the dependent variable within the reference group of the coefficient of interest, in this case everybody in the control group.

Table A30: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Income Groups, Full Dataset

	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q5Q5	Q5Q1
Low income	0.799 (1.073)	-0.236 (1.565)	-2.367 (1.848)	1.902** (0.905)
Middle income	1.347 (1.042)	-1.290 (1.444)	1.449 (1.743)	0.625 (0.808)
Treatment	-1.317 (1.079)	6.565*** (1.688)	4.749** (1.911)	0.053 (0.939)
Treatment*Low income	2.057 (1.413)	-3.980* (2.217)	-1.817 (2.474)	-0.551 (1.254)
Treatment*Middle income	-0.659 (1.389)	-1.800 (2.128)	-3.821 (2.417)	-0.751 (1.165)
Reference Group Mean	10.601	37.034	50.655	7.928
Reference Group SD	18.669	26.743	31.846	14.184
Num. obs.	4200	4200	4200	4200

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

OLS regressions in the full sample on the treatment dummy interacted with income groups and additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. The reference group mean refers to the average of the dependent variable within the reference group of the coefficient of interest, in this case the high-income group in the control group.

Table A31: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Political Ideology, Full Dataset

	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q5Q5	Q5Q1
Middle	1.631*	-5.597***	-7.345***	2.557***
	(0.917)	(1.422)	(1.596)	(0.737)
Right-wing	2.740**	-8.672***	-9.004***	2.280**
	(1.249)	(1.799)	(2.067)	(0.994)
Treatment	-0.126	3.905**	1.165	0.755
	(1.092)	(1.786)	(1.900)	(0.880)
Treatment*Middle	-0.715	0.001	1.221	-1.704
	(1.306)	(2.095)	(2.277)	(1.088)
Treatment*Right	-1.989	3.263	4.046	-1.253
	(1.721)	(2.609)	(2.886)	(1.427)
Reference Group Mean	10.119	40.836	56.023	6.881
Reference Group SD	17.571	28.177	30.630	13.320
Num. obs.	4200	4200	4200	4200

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

OLS regressions in the full sample on the treatment dummy interacted with political ideology groups and additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. The reference group mean refers to the average of the dependent variable within the reference group of the coefficient of interest, in this case the left-wing in the control group.

Table A32: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Education, Full Dataset

	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q5Q5	Q5Q1
Upper Secondary	-3.649***	5.835***	6.029***	-3.427***
	(0.888)	(1.292)	(1.526)	(0.706)
Tertiary	-5.081***	8.326***	7.581***	-2.289**
	(1.097)	(1.628)	(1.874)	(0.981)
Treatment	-0.794	3.722***	2.967**	-0.792
	(0.834)	(1.172)	(1.353)	(0.697)
Treatment*Upper Secondary	-0.454	1.695	-0.673	1.297
	(1.211)	(1.891)	(2.122)	(1.017)
Treatment*Tertiary	0.265	1.219	-0.827	-0.365
	(1.477)	(2.329)	(2.558)	(1.309)
Reference Group Mean	14.413	31.009	45.691	10.674
Reference Group SD	18.519	25.462	30.741	15.648
Num. obs.	4200	4200	4200	4200

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

OLS regressions in the full sample on the treatment dummy interacted with education groups and additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. The reference group mean refers to the average of the dependent variable within the reference group of the coefficient of interest, in this case the lowest educated group in the control group.

Table A33: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Income Group, Dataset With Perception and Attention Checks

	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q5Q5	Q5Q1
Low income	1.078 (1.141)	-1.426 (1.960)	-2.389 (2.260)	0.747 (0.891)
Middle income	0.875 (1.065)	-1.815 (1.828)	0.248 (2.135)	0.165 (0.818)
Treatment	-2.223** (1.059)	7.531*** (2.079)	4.133* (2.287)	-0.875 (0.880)
Treatment*Low income	2.507* (1.468)	-5.302* (2.736)	-1.295 (2.978)	0.077 (1.174)
Treatment*Middle income	0.278 (1.369)	-1.218 (2.642)	-1.300 (2.901)	0.210 (1.120)
Reference Group Mean	7.606	42.163	56.988	5.772
Reference Group SD	15.243	26.434	30.737	11.788
Num. obs.	2596	2596	2596	2596

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

OLS regressions on the treatment dummy interacted with the income groups and additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment. Regressions are based on the sample excluding those that didn't pass the perception and attention checks. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. The reference group mean refers to the average of the dependent variable within the reference group of the coefficient of interest, in this case the high-income group in the control group.

Table A34: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Political Ideology, Dataset With Perception and Attention Checks

	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q5Q5	Q5Q1
Middle	1.341 (0.937)	-5.993*** (1.724)	-6.397*** (1.882)	1.234* (0.734)
Right-wing	2.549* (1.349)	-8.521*** (2.252)	-6.132** (2.550)	0.792 (0.974)
Treatment	-1.167 (1.007)	6.119*** (2.062)	3.999* (2.144)	-0.550 (0.807)
Treatment*Middle	0.202 (1.271)	-1.383 (2.501)	-0.824 (2.644)	-0.465 (1.023)
Treatment*Right-wing	-1.293 (1.728)	-0.372 (3.143)	-2.073 (3.433)	0.225 (1.327)
Reference Group Mean	7.368	44.992	60.368	5.211
Reference Group SD	14.261	27.402	29.173	11.138
Num. obs.	2596	2596	2596	2596

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

OLS regressions on the treatment dummy interacted with the political ideology groups and additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment. Regressions are based on the sample excluding those that didn't pass the perception and attention checks. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. The reference group mean refers to the average of the dependent variable within the reference group of the coefficient of interest, in this case the left-wing in the control group.

Table A35: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Education, Dataset With Perception and Attention Checks

	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q5Q5	Q5Q1
Upper Secondary	-2.907*** (0.946)	4.960*** (1.644)	7.127*** (1.863)	-3.455*** (0.719)
Tertiary	-3.865*** (1.138)	8.205*** (1.987)	9.692*** (2.258)	-2.794*** (0.925)
Treatment	-0.907 (0.928)	3.879** (1.544)	4.004** (1.737)	-0.918 (0.745)
Treatment*Upper Secondary	-0.553 (1.266)	3.200 (2.363)	-0.475 (2.556)	0.741 (0.991)
Treatment*Tertiary	-0.917 (1.452)	1.492 (2.780)	-3.225 (3.012)	-0.512 (1.198)
Reference Group Mean	11.261	34.867	49.925	8.309
Reference Group SD	15.249	25.207	29.377	12.308
Num. obs.	2596	2596	2596	2596

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

OLS regressions on the treatment dummy interacted with the education groups and additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment. Regressions are based on the sample excluding those that didn't pass the perception and attention checks. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. The reference group mean refers to the average of the dependent variable within the reference group of the coefficient of interest, in this case the lowest educated group in the control group.

Table A36: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Income Group, Dataset Without Second Treatment Group

	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q5Q5	Q5Q1
Low income	2.233* (1.194)	-1.907 (2.065)	-2.139 (2.434)	1.308 (1.052)
Middle income	1.449 (1.162)	-1.288 (1.907)	1.572 (2.299)	0.172 (0.969)
Treatment	-0.251 (1.204)	7.119*** (2.257)	5.521** (2.470)	-0.840 (1.045)
Treatment*Low income	1.520 (1.642)	-4.634 (2.937)	-2.906 (3.208)	1.099 (1.403)
Treatment*Middle income	-0.935 (1.591)	-3.104 (2.868)	-4.288 (3.169)	0.248 (1.319)
Reference Group Mean	8.239	39.444	52.587	7.007
Reference Group SD	14.805	26.021	30.773	13.042
Num. obs.	2305	2305	2305	2305

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

OLS regressions on the treatment dummy interacted with the income groups and additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave. Regressions are based on the full sample without the inequality treatment group. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. The reference group mean refers to the average of the dependent variable within the reference group of the coefficient of interest, in this case the high-income group in the control group.

Table A37: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Political Ideology, Dataset Without Second Treatment Group

	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q5Q5	Q5Q1
Middle	1.695 (1.033)	-5.880*** (1.856)	-5.776*** (2.077)	1.809** (0.877)
Right-wing	2.821* (1.451)	-8.744*** (2.457)	-6.915** (2.729)	1.175 (1.106)
Treatment	0.625 (1.236)	4.234* (2.381)	3.257 (2.490)	0.168 (1.022)
Treatment*Middle	-0.171 (1.512)	-1.005 (2.795)	-1.153 (2.993)	-0.814 (1.250)
Treatment*Right-wing	-3.496* (1.973)	3.548 (3.538)	1.228 (3.796)	-0.413 (1.605)
Reference Group Mean	8.328	42.507	56.338	6.348
Reference Group SD	14.351	27.294	29.546	12.104
Num. obs.	2305	2305	2305	2305

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

OLS regressions on the treatment dummy interacted with the political ideology groups and additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave. Regressions are based on the full sample without the inequality treatment group. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. The reference group mean refers to the average of the dependent variable within the reference group of the coefficient of interest, in this case the left-wing in the control group.

Table A38: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Education, Dataset Without Second Treatment Group

	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q5Q5	Q5Q1
Upper Secondary	-1.655 (1.072)	3.808** (1.728)	3.981** (2.011)	-2.245*** (0.859)
Tertiary	-4.391*** (1.154)	8.208*** (2.120)	8.364*** (2.456)	-2.468** (1.033)
Treatment	0.576 (0.987)	2.399 (1.540)	2.170 (1.773)	-0.288 (0.789)
Treatment*Upper Secondary	-1.451 (1.481)	4.177* (2.531)	2.724 (2.788)	0.010 (1.191)
Treatment*Tertiary	-1.109 (1.577)	2.922 (3.114)	-1.227 (3.370)	-0.437 (1.429)
Reference Group Mean	11.815	33.424	48.542	8.953
Reference Group SD	15.767	24.883	29.634	12.824
Num. obs.	2305	2305	2305	2305

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

OLS regressions on the treatment dummy interacted with the education groups and additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment. Regressions are based on the full sample without the inequality treatment group. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. The reference group mean refers to the average of the dependent variable within the reference group of the coefficient of interest, in this case the lowest educated group in the control group.

Table A39: Non-parametric Subgroup Treatment Effects Estimated via Generalized Random Forests: Full Sample

Subgroup	Q1Q5		Q1Q1		Q5Q1		Q5Q5	
	Treatment effect	SE	Treatment effect	SE	Treatment effect	SE	Treatment effect	SE
<b>Income</b>								
Low income	0.767	0.957	2.201	1.523	-0.588	0.887	2.679	1.662
Middle income	-1.986	0.894	5.134	1.358	-0.761	0.724	1.673	1.557
High income	-1.166	1.134	6.583	1.777	0.541	1.007	4.385	2.010
<b>Ideology</b>								
Middle	-0.788	0.749	3.877	1.157	-0.926	0.670	2.487	1.328
Left	-0.157	1.116	4.206	1.866	0.988	0.925	1.535	1.989
Right	-1.991	1.369	6.975	1.954	-0.494	1.161	5.050	2.231
<b>Education</b>								
Vocational Training or less	-0.720	0.872	4.163	1.241	-0.840	0.741	3.639	1.437
Upper Secondary	-1.221	0.899	4.861	1.554	0.866	0.782	1.550	1.719
Tertiary	-0.533	1.252	4.896	2.106	-1.285	1.165	2.347	2.251

Average treatment effect estimates on the dependent variable indicated on top within the subgroup listed on the left. The estimates result from causal forests, following Athey, Tibshirani, Wager, et al. (2019) and are estimated using the full sample (N=4200).

Table A40: Non-parametric Subgroup Treatment Effects Estimated via Generalized Random Forests: Sample With Perception and Attention Checks

Subgroup	Q1Q5		Q1Q1		Q5Q1		Q5Q5	
	Treatment effect	SE	Treatment effect	SE	Treatment effect	SE	Treatment effect	SE
<b>Income</b>								
Low income	0.500	1.079	1.478	1.876	-0.971	0.799	2.700	1.979
Middle income	-1.844	0.910	6.300	1.707	-0.714	0.723	3.229	1.860
High income	-2.319	1.094	7.862	2.143	-0.652	0.916	4.116	2.362
<b>Ideology</b>								
Middle	-0.821	0.812	4.413	1.481	-1.052	0.639	3.453	1.607
Left	-1.314	1.057	6.485	2.140	-0.562	0.845	4.382	2.232
Right	-2.191	1.434	5.263	2.413	-0.292	1.094	1.128	2.734
<b>Education</b>								
Vocational Training or less	-0.801	0.977	3.829	1.616	-1.118	0.769	4.578	1.805
Upper Secondary	-1.404	0.901	6.514	1.865	-0.090	0.667	3.474	1.942
Tertiary	-1.731	1.170	5.643	2.406	-1.224	1.000	0.151	2.568

Average treatment effect estimates on the dependent variable indicated on top within the subgroup listed on the left. The estimates result from causal forests, following Athey, Tibshirani, Wager, et al. (2019) and are estimated using the sample excluding those that didn't pass the perception and attention checks (N=2596).



Table A41: Non-parametric Subgroup Treatment Effects Estimated via Generalized Random Forests: Sample Without Second Treatment Group

Subgroup	Q1Q5		Q1Q1		Q5Q1		Q5Q5	
	Treatment effect	SE	Treatment effect	SE	Treatment effect	SE	Treatment effect	SE
<b>Income</b>								
Low income	1.145	1.154	1.880	1.982	0.348	0.968	2.244	2.164
Middle income	-1.171	1.091	4.318	1.860	-0.576	0.840	1.765	2.093
High income	0.045	1.277	6.839	2.345	-0.549	1.106	5.008	2.597
<b>Ideology</b>								
Middle	0.593	0.917	2.936	1.538	-0.507	0.752	1.908	1.757
Left	0.537	1.283	4.558	2.495	0.329	1.062	3.781	2.589
Right	-2.936	1.555	7.342	2.610	-0.279	1.244	4.089	2.926
<b>Education</b>								
Vocational Training or less	0.452	1.041	2.771	1.624	-0.373	0.826	2.856	1.880
Upper Secondary	-0.533	1.146	5.745	2.117	0.107	0.905	3.991	2.284
Tertiary	-0.582	1.286	4.940	2.820	-0.574	1.254	0.461	2.957

Average treatment effect estimates on the dependent variable indicated on top within the subgroup listed on the left. The estimates result from causal forests, following Athey, Tibshirani, Wager, et al. (2019) and are estimated using the sample without the inequality treatment group (N=2305).

Table A42: Average Treatment Effect: First-stage, Quasipoisson Regressions

	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q5Q5	Q5Q1
Constant	2.383*** (0.173)	3.777*** (0.067)	4.077*** (0.054)	2.056*** (0.188)
Treatment	-0.126* (0.065)	0.132*** (0.026)	0.061*** (0.020)	-0.135* (0.072)
Num. obs.	2772	2772	2772	2772

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .  
Quasipoisson regressions on the treatment dummy and additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment.

Table A43: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Income Group, Quasipoisson Regressions

	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q5Q5	Q5Q1
Constant	2.389*** (0.155)	3.727*** (0.059)	4.067*** (0.048)	1.904*** (0.173)
Low income	0.005 (0.126)	0.003 (0.050)	-0.047 (0.040)	0.248* (0.136)
Middle income	0.126 (0.117)	-0.041 (0.047)	0.023 (0.037)	0.054 (0.132)
Treatment	-0.368** (0.144)	0.195*** (0.048)	0.081** (0.039)	-0.064 (0.146)
Treatment*Low income	0.476*** (0.179)	-0.149** (0.066)	-0.003 (0.053)	-0.159 (0.188)
Treatment*Middle income	0.158 (0.175)	-0.041 (0.062)	-0.046 (0.050)	-0.032 (0.185)
Num. obs.	2772	2772	2772	2772

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .  
Quasipoisson regressions on the treatment dummy interacted with the income groups and additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment.

Table A44: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Political Ideology, Quasipoisson Regressions

	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q5Q5	Q5Q1
Constant	2.268*** (0.156)	3.767*** (0.058)	4.080*** (0.047)	1.895*** (0.172)
Middle	0.074 (0.109)	-0.145*** (0.042)	-0.129*** (0.034)	0.251** (0.125)
Right-wing	0.175 (0.140)	-0.228*** (0.059)	-0.153*** (0.046)	0.208 (0.159)
Treatment	-0.107 (0.132)	0.126*** (0.046)	0.056 (0.037)	-0.040 (0.151)
Treatment*Middle	-0.009 (0.158)	-0.002 (0.058)	0.002 (0.047)	-0.134 (0.178)
Treatment*Right-wing	-0.065 (0.198)	0.045 (0.078)	0.022 (0.062)	-0.084 (0.223)
Num. obs.	2772	2772	2772	2772

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

Quasipoisson regressions on the treatment dummy interacted with the political ideology groups and additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment.

Table A45: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Education, Quasipoisson Regressions

	Q1Q5	Q1Q1	Q5Q5	Q5Q1
Constant	2.254*** (0.149)	3.766*** (0.057)	4.061*** (0.046)	1.940*** (0.163)
Upper Secondary	-0.309*** (0.103)	0.157*** (0.043)	0.139*** (0.034)	-0.480*** (0.118)
Tertiary	-0.536*** (0.139)	0.249*** (0.050)	0.177*** (0.040)	-0.340** (0.142)
Treatment	-0.079 (0.086)	0.125*** (0.040)	0.090*** (0.032)	-0.142 (0.095)
Treatment*Upper Secondary	-0.111 (0.148)	0.030 (0.058)	-0.040 (0.046)	0.121 (0.166)
Treatment*Tertiary	-0.101 (0.198)	-0.016 (0.067)	-0.067 (0.054)	-0.170 (0.207)
Num. obs.	2772	2772	2772	2772

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

Quasipoisson regressions on the treatment dummy interacted with the education groups and additionally controlling for gender, age, education, children, type of residential area, income, ideology, survey wave and the inequality treatment.

## D Questionnaire

### D.1 Questionnaire Survey

Vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme an dieser Umfrage. New York University Abu Dhabi, Stanford University und die University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill führen eine Forschungsstudie durch, um Einstellungen zu gegenwärtigen politischen und wirtschaftlichen Fragestellungen in Österreich zu untersuchen. Die Teilnahme an dieser Studie erfordert das Ausfüllen einer 20-minütigen Umfrage. Ihre Antwort zu dieser Umfrage sowie zu jeder einzelnen Frage in dieser Umfrage ist komplett freiwillig. Dies ist eine Studie mit minimalem Risiko. Sollten Sie sich entscheiden, an dieser Studie teilzunehmen, können Sie jederzeit aufhören, indem Sie Ihren Browser schließen.

Ihre Antworten sind anonym – Sie werden nicht persönlich identifiziert und Ihre Antworten werden ausschließlich für statistische Zwecke verwendet. Sollten Sie Fragen zu Ihren Rechten als Teilnehmer an dieser Umfrage haben, oder sollten Sie an irgendeiner Stelle unzufrieden mit irgendeinem Aspekt dieser Umfrage sein, so können Sie uns unter folgender E-Mail Adresse kontaktieren: [socialsurveys.respond@gmail.com](mailto:socialsurveys.respond@gmail.com).

Wenn Sie mit einer Person außerhalb der Forschungsgruppe sprechen möchten, um Probleme oder Bedenken zu besprechen, Situationen zu besprechen falls ein Mitglied des Forschungsteams nicht verfügbar ist, oder Ihre Rechte als Forschungsteilnehmer zu besprechen, können Sie das Büro für Compliance in Forschung der Stanford University unter der E-Mail Adresse [irb2-manager@lists.stanford.edu](mailto:irb2-manager@lists.stanford.edu) oder der Telefonnummer +1 (650) 723-2480 und der Referenz 39652 oder das Institutional Review Board der UNC unter der Telefonnummer +1 (919) 966-3113 oder der E-Mail Adresse [IRB\\_subjects@unc.edu](mailto:IRB_subjects@unc.edu) und der Referenz 16-2946 sowie das Institutional Review Board der New York University Abu Dhabi unter der Telefonnummer +971 2-628-4313 oder der E-Mail Adresse [IRBnyuad@nyu.edu](mailto:IRBnyuad@nyu.edu) und der Referenz 046-2017 kontaktieren.

Falls Sie möchten, können Sie diese Seite für späteres Nachschlagen drucken oder eine elektronische Kopie speichern.

1. (single) Um an dieser Umfrage teilzunehmen, müssen Sie Ihren Wohnsitz in Österreich haben.
  - Ja, ich bestätige, dass ich dauerhaft in Österreich wohne und das 18. Lebensjahr vollendet habe. Ich möchte an dieser Umfrage teilnehmen.
  - Nein, ich möchte nicht an dieser Umfrage teilnehmen.

Die folgenden Fragen werden an Personen in ganz Österreich gestellt, um mehr über individuelle soziale, wirtschaftliche und politische Interessen und Meinungen zu lernen. Verschiedene Menschen unterscheiden sich sehr in Ihren Antworten zu diesen Fragen. Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten und wir schätzen es, mehr über Ihre eigenen Ansichten zu erfahren.

An manchen Stellen können Sie eine Frage erhalten, die einer bereits gestellten Frage ähnelt. Dies kommt daher, dass die Fragen gleich aussehen aber in Wirklichkeit ein wenig unterschiedlich sind. Auch wenn einige der folgenden Fragen Ihnen vertraut erscheinen, beantworten Sie sie bitte so gut Sie können.

2. (single) Was ist Ihr Geschlecht?
  - Männlich
  - Weiblich
3. (dropdown varlabel="Birth year" topic=".hide" required=1) In welchem Jahr wurden Sie geboren?
4. (single) Welchen höchsten Schulabschluss haben Sie?
  - Kein Pflichtschulabschluss
  - Pflichtschule
  - Lehre
  - Berufsbildende mittlere Schule (z.B. Handelsschule)
  - Allgemeinbildende höhere Schule (AHS)
  - Berufsbildende höhere Schule (BHS, z.B. HAK, HTL)
  - Bachelor an Fachhochschule / Pädagogische Hochschule
  - Bachelor an Universität
  - Diplomabschluss/Master an Fachhochschule
  - Diplomabschluss/Master an Universität
  - Postgradualen Universitätslehrgang (aufbauend auf Diplomabschluss, z.B. MBA)

- Doktorat

Nun würden wir Ihnen gerne einige Fragen über ihren Hintergrund stellen. Wie gesagt, wir werden diese Informationen nur für statistische Zwecke verwenden und ihre Antworten sind anonym.

5. (single) Was ist Ihr derzeitiger Beschäftigungsstatus?

- Angestellt (Vollzeit)
- Angestellt (Teilzeit)
- Freiberufler
- Einzelunternehmer
- Größerer Unternehmer
- Arbeitslos und arbeitssuchend
- Nicht im Erwerbsleben (in Ausbildung / Elternzeit / Ruhestand)
- Anderer (open)

6. (single) Welchen Familienstand haben Sie?

- Verheiratet
- Eingetragene Lebenspartnerschaft
- In Partnerschaft lebend
- Geschieden / getrennt
- Verwitwet / Lebenspartner/in verstorben
- Ledig, nicht in Partnerschaft lebend

7. (dropdown varlabel="Number of children") Wie viele Kinder haben Sie?

- 0
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6 oder mehr

8. (single) Leben Kinder unter 18 Jahren mit Ihnen?

- Ja
- Nein

9. (single) Wurden beide Ihrer Eltern in Österreich geboren?

- Ja
- Nein

10. (single) Wurden Sie in Österreich geboren?

- Ja

- Nein

11. (dropdown varlabel="State grew up in - Austria") In welchem Bundesland sind Sie aufgewachsen?

- Burgenland
- Kärnten
- Niederösterreich
- Oberösterreich
- Salzburg
- Steiermark
- Tirol
- Vorarlberg
- Wien

12. (open-intrange 1000 9999 varlabel="Postal code grew up in - Austria" dk=1 dk.text="Weiß nicht") Falls Sie sich erinnern, was war dort Ihre Postleitzahl?

13. (dropdown varlabel="State of residence - Austria") In welchem Bundesland leben Sie?

- Burgenland
- Kärnten
- Niederösterreich
- Oberösterreich
- Salzburg
- Steiermark
- Tirol
- Vorarlberg
- Wien

14. (open-intrange 1000 9999 varlabel="Postal code of residence - Austria") Was ist dort Ihre Postleitzahl?

15. (single) Wie würden Sie ihre momentane Wohnsituation beschreiben?

- Besitze das Haus, in dem ich wohne
- Miete das Haus, in dem ich wohne
- Miete die Wohnung, in der ich wohne
- Besitze die Wohnung, in der ich wohne
- Ich wohne gratis
- Andere (open)

16. (single) Was ist Ihr persönliches monatliches Bruttoeinkommen? Wir meinen damit die Summe, die sich aus Lohn, Gehalt, Einkommen aus selbständiger Tätigkeit, Rente, Pension, Einkünften aus öffentlichen Beihilfen, Einkommen aus Vermietung, Verpachtung, Wohngeld, Kindergeld und sonstigen Einkünften vor Abzug der Steuern und Sozialversicherungsbeiträge ergibt.

- 0 - 699 €

- 700 – 1.099 €
- 1.100 – 1.499 €
- 1.500 – 1.999 €
- 2.000 – 2.499 €
- 2.500 – 2.999 €
- 3.000 – 3.499 €
- 3.500 – 3.999 €
- 4.000 – 4.499 €
- 4.500 – 4.999 €
- 5.000 – 5.999 €
- 6.000 – 6.999 €
- 7.000 – 7.999 €
- 8.000 – 9.999 €
- 10.000 – 11.999 €
- 12.000 – 13.999 €
- 14.000 – 15.999 €
- 16.000 – 17.999 €
- 18.000 – 19.999 €
- Mehr als 20.000 €

17. (multiple) Wir sind an Ihren Einstellungen zu verschiedensten Themen interessiert, so auch Farben. Um zu zeigen, dass Sie so weit gelesen haben, wählen Sie im Folgenden bitte rot und grün aus den folgenden Alternativen. Beachten Sie die Frage nicht und wählen Sie diese beiden Möglichkeiten. Was ist ihre Lieblingsfarbe?

- Rosa
- Rot
- Grün
- Weiß
- Schwarz
- Blau

18. (single) Haben Sie in der Nationalratswahl in 2017 gewählt?

- Ja
- Nein

19. (single) Welche Partei haben Sie gewählt?

- SPÖ
- ÖVP
- FPÖ
- GRÜNE

- NEOS
- PILZ
- Andere (open)

20. (single) Welche Partei denken Sie, werden Sie in der nächsten Nationalratswahl unterstützen?

- SPÖ
- ÖVP
- FPÖ
- GRÜNE
- NEOS
- PILZ
- Andere (open)
- Keine Präferenz

21. (single) In Fragen der Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik, wo sehen Sie sich selbst auf dem politischen Spektrum?

- Sehr links
- Eher links
- In der Mitte
- Eher rechts
- Sehr rechts

22. (single) Denken Sie, dass es Ihnen in 5 Jahren besser oder schlechter als heute gehen wird?

- Besser
- Schlechter
- Weiß nicht

23. (multiple) Bitte geben Sie für jedes der folgenden Ereignisse an, ob Sie davon in den letzten 5 Jahren, also seit Anfang 2014, betroffen waren. (Zutreffende ankreuzen)

- Scheidung
- Arbeitslosigkeit und Arbeitssuche länger als 1 Monat
- Tod eines nahen Verwandten
- Krankenhausaufenthalt (außer Geburt)
- Nichts davon

24. (single) Wir würden Sie jetzt gerne zu Einkommensteuern in Österreich befragen. Momentan besteuert Österreich Einkommen unter 11.000€ nicht. Der Grenzsteuersatz für Einkommen zwischen 11.000€ und 18.000€ liegt bei 25%. Stellen Sie sich eine Person vor, die 15.000€ im Jahr verdient. Diese Person zahlt ...

- ... weniger als 25% ihres Einkommens in Steuern
- ... genau 25% ihres Einkommens in Steuern
- ... mehr als 25% ihres Einkommens in Steuern

- Weiß nicht
25. (single) Wie oft vertrauen Sie der Regierung, das Richtige zu tun?
- So gut wie immer
  - Meistens
  - Manchmal
  - So gut wie nie
26. (single) Denken Sie im weiteren Sinne über den Zweck der Regierung nach. Wo stehen Sie auf einer Skala von 1 bis 5, auf der 1 bedeutet, dass die Regierung nur die grundlegendsten Regierungsfunktionen erfüllen soll, und 5 bedeutet, dass die Regierung aktiv Maßnahmen ergreifen soll, das Leben der Bürger in allen Bereichen zu verbessern?
- 1 (nur grundlegende Regierungsfunktionen)
  - 2
  - 3
  - 4
  - 5 (aktive Maßnahmen, um das Leben der Bürger in allen Bereichen zu verbessern)
27. (single) Denken Sie, dass wirtschaftliche Ungleichheit in Österreich in den letzten Jahren zu- oder abgenommen hat?
- Zugenommen
  - Ungefähr gleich
  - Abgenommen
28. (single) Denken Sie die Besteuerung von Spitzenverdienern verlangsamt das Wirtschaftswachstum?
- Ja
  - Nein
  - Unsicher
29. (single) Denken Sie wirtschaftliche Ungleichheit ist ein ernstes Problem in Österreich?
- Kein Problem
  - Ein kleines Problem
  - Ein Problem
  - Ein ernstes Problem
  - Ein sehr ernstes Problem
30. (single) Sind Sie mit Ihrem derzeitigen Einkommen zufrieden?
- Sehr zufrieden
  - Ziemlich zufrieden
  - Nicht allzu zufrieden
  - Nicht zufrieden



31. (single) Ihrer Meinung nach, verdienen Spitzenverdiener in unserer Gesellschaft ihre hohen Einkommen?
- Meistens
  - Manchmal
  - Selten
32. (single) Einige Leute sagen, dass man im Leben durch harte Arbeit vorankommt. Andere sagen, dass glückliche Umstände oder die Hilfe anderer wichtiger sind. Was denken Sie ist am wichtigsten?
- Harte Arbeit ist am wichtigsten
  - Harte Arbeit und Glück sind gleich wichtig
  - Glück ist am wichtigsten
33. (single) Wie denken Sie darüber, wenn Kinder aus armen und reichen Familien nicht die gleichen Chancen in ihrem Leben haben?
- Kein Problem
  - Ein kleines Problem
  - Ein Problem
  - Ein ernstzunehmendes Problem
  - Ein sehr ernstzunehmendes Problem
  - Weiß nicht

SOCIAL MOBILITY TREATMENT: Jüngste akademische Forschung hat den Zusammenhang zwischen dem familiären Umfeld einer Person und ihren Zukunftschancen untersucht. Im Speziellen wurden dabei die Möglichkeiten und Zukunftschancen von Kindern mit verschiedenen familiären Hintergründen evaluiert. Wir werden Ihnen nun zwei kurze Animationen zeigen, welche die zwei zentralen Erkenntnisse dieser Studien zusammenfassen. Klicken Sie bitte weiter, wenn Sie bereit sind.

- subsection D.2.2.

34. (single) Einige Nationen erheben derzeit eine universelle Erbschaftssteuer. Jedes Mal, wenn Vermögen (z. B. materieller Besitz, Land, Immobilien) nach dem Tod an eine andere Person übergeht, erhält der Staat eine Zahlung. Würden Sie solch eine Steuer gerne in Österreich eingeführt sehen?
- Ja
  - Ja, mit Freibetrag
  - Nein
  - Unsicher
35. (open-int) Wie hoch sollte der Freibetrag sein? (in Euro)
36. (rule 0 100 left="0%" right="100%" show\_value=1 varlabel="Q40 followup B" dk=1 dk\_text="Weiß nicht") Wie viel Prozent ihres Erbvermögens (abzüglich Freibetrag) sollte eine Person an Steuern bezahlen?

37. (single) Wie Sie vielleicht wissen, wird in Österreich von Zeit zu Zeit die Einführung einer Vermögensteuer diskutiert. Damit ist eine Steuer auf die Summe aller Vermögensgegenstände, wie z. B. Geldbestände, Immobilien, Fahrzeuge und Aktien, im Eigentum einer Person gemeint. Würden Sie der Einführung einer Vermögensteuer zustimmen?
- Ja
  - Ja, mit Freibetrag
  - Nein
  - Unsicher
38. (open-int) Wie hoch sollte der Freibetrag sein?
39. (rule 0 100 left="0%" right="100%" show\_value=1 varlabel="Percent of total wealth taxes per year" dk=1 dk\_text="Weiß nicht") Wie viel Prozent ihres Gesamtvermögens (abzüglich Freibetrag) sollte eine Person pro Jahr an Steuern bezahlen?
40. (single) Österreich hebt derzeit eine Grundsteuer ein, die eine Steuer auf das Eigentum an Grundstücken und deren Bebauung darstellt. Wie stehen Sie zur Grundsteuer?
- Dafür
  - Dafür, aber mit Freibetrag (Grundstückswert bis zu dem Grundstücke von der Steuer ausgenommen werden)
  - Dagegen
41. (open-int) Wie hoch sollte der Freibetrag sein?
42. (rule 0 100 left="0%" right="100%" show\_value=1 varlabel="Percent of total property value taxes per year" dk=1 dk\_text="Weiß nicht") Wieviel Prozent des Grundstückswerts (abzüglich Freibetrag) sollte eine Person pro Jahr an Steuern bezahlen?
43. (rule 0 100 left="0%" right="100%" show\_value=1 varlabel="Preferred tax rate for capital gains" dk=1 dk\_text="Weiß nicht") Österreich hebt momentan eine Kapitalertragsteuer ein. Einkommen, das aus Kapital entsteht (wie z. B. Zinserträge, Dividenden und Kursgewinne), ist von dieser Steuer betroffen. Stellen Sie sich bitte vor, alle Kapitaleinkünfte würden mit einem einzigen Steuersatz besteuert werden und wählen Sie dann Ihren bevorzugten Kapitalertragsteuersatz: Beachten Sie: Wenn Sie gegen eine Kapitalertragsteuer sind, setzen Sie den Regler auf 0. Der Regler ist zu Beginn auf den momentanen Steuersatz eingestellt, der auf Zinszahlungen erhoben wird.
44. (multiple) Engagieren Sie sich politisch auf eine der folgenden Arten bzw. können Sie sich vorstellen, sich auf eine der folgenden Arten in Zukunft politisch zu engagieren? (Mehrere Antworten und keine Antwort sind möglich.)
- Petitionen/Volksbegehren unterschreiben
  - PolitikerInnen direkt kontaktieren
  - An Demonstrationen teilnehmen
  - Parteimitgliedschaft
  - Mitarbeit in zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen/NGOs
  - Streik
  - Andere Arten des Engagements

45. (rule 1 10 left="Gar nicht" right="Sehr" show\_value=0 varlabel="Importance that govt redistributes income from the rich to the poor" dk=1 dk\_text="Weiß nicht") Wie wichtig ist es Ihnen, dass der Staat Einkommen von reich zu arm umverteilt?
46. (multiple) Was sind Ihrer Meinung nach geeignete Instrumente dafür? (Zutreffende ankreuzen)
- Steuern (z. B. Einkommensteuer)
  - Öffentliche Dienstleistungen (z. B. Schulen, Gesundheitssystem)
  - Staatliche Transfers (z. B. Familienbeihilfe, Arbeitslosengeld, Notstandshilfe)
  - Sozialversicherung (höhere Beiträge für Höherverdienende)
  - Anderes (open)
  - Weiß nicht
47. (grid-open) Stellen Sie sich für die folgende Frage bitte 500 Familien vor, die die österreichische Bevölkerung repräsentieren sollen. Anschließend unterteilen wir die Familien nach Einkommen in fünf Gruppen, wobei jede Gruppe 100 Familien enthält (siehe linke Leiter in der Grafik). Nehmen wir außerdem an, dass jede Familie genau ein Kind bekommt.
- Unsere Frage bezieht sich auf die Einkommensgruppe der ärmsten 100 Familien. Was glauben Sie, wie sich die 100 Kinder aus den ärmsten Familien im Erwachsenenalter auf die fünf Einkommensgruppen verteilen werden (rechte Leiter)?
- Bitte füllen Sie die Felder auf der rechten Seite der Grafik aus und beachten Sie, dass Ihre Einträge sich auf 100 summieren müssen, um fortfahren zu können.
- Figure A8.
48. (grid-open) Wenden wir uns nun der Einkommensgruppe der reichsten 100 Familien zu. Was glauben Sie, wie sich die 100 Kinder aus den reichsten Familien im Erwachsenenalter auf die fünf Einkommensgruppen verteilen werden (rechte Leiter)?
- Bitte füllen Sie die Felder auf der rechten Seite der Grafik aus und beachten Sie, dass Ihre Einträge sich auf 100 summieren müssen, um fortfahren zu können.
- Figure A9.
49. (imagemap-multiple) Stellen Sie sich bitte eine Leiter mit 10 Sprossen vor, die zeigen soll, wo die Menschen in Österreich stehen.
- Ganz oben stehen die Menschen mit dem meisten Geld, der höchsten Bildung und den besten Jobs. Ganz unten stehen diejenigen mit dem wenigsten Geld, der niedrigsten Bildung und den schlechtesten Jobs oder ohne Job. Je höher man auf der Leiter steht, desto näher ist man den Personen ganz oben, je niedriger, desto näher den Personen ganz unten.
- Wo würden Sie sich selbst auf der Leiter platzieren? Bitte geben Sie an, auf welcher Sprosse Sie Ihrer Meinung nach in Ihrer aktuellen Lebensphase im Verhältnis zu anderen Menschen in Österreich stehen.
- Figure A10.
50. (imagemap-multiple) Wo würden Sie Ihren Vater auf der Leiter platzieren, als Sie noch ein Kind waren? Bitte geben Sie an, auf welcher Sprosse Ihrer Meinung nach Ihr Vater zur Zeit Ihrer Kindheit im Verhältnis zu anderen Menschen in Österreich stand?

- Figure A10.

51. (imagemap-multiple) Wo würden Sie Ihre Mutter auf der Leiter platzieren, als Sie noch ein Kind waren? Bitte geben Sie an, auf welcher Sprosse Ihrer Meinung nach Ihre Mutter zur Zeit Ihrer Kindheit im Verhältnis zu anderen Menschen in Österreich stand?

- Figure A10.

52. (single) Die Armutsgrenze ist die monatliche Nettoeinkommensgrenze (nach Abzug von Steuern), unter der eine Person offiziell als "in Armut lebend" bezeichnet wird. Wo schätzen Sie liegt die Armutsgrenze für einen 1-Personen-Haushalt in Österreich?

- 500€
- 600€
- 700€
- 800€
- 900€
- 1.000€
- 1.100€
- 1.200€
- 1.300€
- 1.400€
- 1.500€
- 1.600€
- Weiß nicht

53. (open-int) Unter welcher monatlichen Nettoeinkommensgrenze (nach Abzug von Steuern) würden Sie eine Person als "NiedrigverdienerIn" bezeichnen? (in Euro)

54. (open-int) Ab welcher monatlichen Nettoeinkommensgrenze (nach Abzug von Steuern) würden Sie eine Person als "HochverdienerIn" bezeichnen? (in Euro)

55. (single) Die Top 1% Einkommensgrenze ist jenes Einkommen, über dem eine Person offiziell mehr als 99% der ÖsterreicherInnen verdient. Ab welchem monatlichen Nettoeinkommen (nach Abzug von Steuern) glauben Sie, dass eine Person mehr als 99% der ÖsterreicherInnen verdient?

- 4.000€
- 4.500€
- 5.000€
- 5.500€
- 6.000€
- 6.500€
- 7.000€
- 7.500€
- 8.000€
- Weiß nicht

56. (single) Bitte bewerten Sie den gesamten Fragebogen auf einer Skala von 1 bis 9, bei der 1 bedeutet, dass der Fragebogen "Schlecht" war und 9 bedeutet, dass der Fragebogen "Ausgezeichnet" war.

- 1 (Schlecht)
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9 (Ausgezeichnet)


## **D.2 Additional Survey Material**

### **D.2.1 Testlinks**

- Survey I: <https://isurvey-us.yougov.com/refer/vRWWFjZfpGPTDX>
- Survey II: <https://isurvey-us.yougov.com/refer/vZSx0H6nPGtt24>


## D.2.2 Treatment

Kinder aus armen Familien      Kinder aus reichen Familien



Was sagen aktuelle Forschungsergebnisse über die Zukunftschancen von Kindern aus armen Familien aus?

Kinder aus armen Familien      Kinder aus reichen Familien




Arme Menschen




Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass ein Kind aus einer armen Familie im Erwachsenenalter arm bleibt, ist extrem hoch.

Nur sehr wenige Kinder aus armen Familien schaffen es, reich zu werden.

Arme Menschen      Reiche Menschen




Kinder aus armen Familien      Kinder aus reichen Familien



Was sagen aktuelle Forschungsergebnisse über die Zukunftschancen von Kindern aus reichen Familien aus?

Kinder aus armen Familien      Kinder aus reichen Familien




Reiche Menschen



Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass ein Kind aus einer reichen Familie im Erwachsenenalter ebenfalls reich sein wird, ist extrem hoch.

Es passiert extrem selten, dass ein Kind aus einer reichen Familie später im Leben arm wird.

Arme Menschen      Reiche Menschen



### D.2.3 Mobility Perceptions Questions

Stellen Sie sich für die folgende Frage bitte 500 Familien vor, die die österreichische Bevölkerung repräsentieren sollen. Anschließend unterteilen wir die Familien nach Einkommen in fünf Gruppen, wobei jede Gruppe 100 Familien enthält (siehe linke Leiter in der Grafik). Nehmen wir außerdem an, dass jede Familie genau ein Kind bekommt.

Unsere Frage bezieht sich auf die Einkommensgruppe der ärmsten 100 Familien. Was glauben Sie, wie sich die 100 Kinder aus den ärmsten Familien im Erwachsenenalter auf die fünf Einkommensgruppen verteilen werden (rechte Leiter)?

Bitte füllen Sie die Felder auf der rechten Seite der Grafik aus und beachten Sie, dass Ihre Einträge sich auf 100 summieren müssen, um fortfahren zu können.




Figure A8: Question on upward mobility perceptions.

Wenden wir uns nun der Einkommensgruppe der reichsten 100 Familien zu. Was glauben Sie, wie sich die 100 Kinder aus den reichsten Familien im Erwachsenenalter auf die fünf Einkommensgruppen verteilen werden (rechte Leiter)?

Bitte füllen Sie die Felder auf der rechten Seite der Grafik aus und beachten Sie, dass Ihre Einträge sich auf 100 summieren müssen, um fortfahren zu können.

Hier sind 500 Familien, die die österreichische Bevölkerung repräsentieren




Figure A9: Question on downward mobility perceptions.



## D.2.4 Socio-economic Status Question

**Stellen Sie sich bitte eine Leiter mit 10 Sprossen vor, die zeigen soll, wo die Menschen in Österreich stehen.**

Ganz oben stehen die Menschen mit dem meisten Geld, der höchsten Bildung und den besten Jobs. Ganz unten stehen diejenigen mit dem wenigsten Geld, der niedrigsten Bildung und den schlechtesten Jobs oder ohne Job. Je höher man auf der Leiter steht, desto näher ist man den Personen ganz oben, je niedriger, desto näher den Personen ganz unten.

**Wo würden Sie sich selbst auf der Leiter platzieren?** Bitte geben Sie an, auf welcher Sprosse Sie Ihrer Meinung nach in Ihrer aktuellen Lebensphase im Verhältnis zu anderen Menschen in Österreich stehen.




Figure A10: Question on SES.

## D.2.5 Conjoint Question Example

Merkmale	Plan A	Plan B
Die Grenzbelastung für eine Person, die weniger als 11.000€ im Jahr verdient	5%	20%
Die Grenzbelastung für eine Person, die zwischen 11.000€ und 18.000€ im Jahr verdient	45%	25%
Die Grenzbelastung für eine Person, die zwischen 18.000€ und 31.000€ im Jahr verdient	45%	35%
Die Grenzbelastung für eine Person, die zwischen 31.000€ und 60.000€ im Jahr verdient	45%	55%
Die Grenzbelastung für eine Person, die zwischen 60.000€ und 90.000€ im Jahr verdient	50%	30%
Die Grenzbelastung für eine Person, die zwischen 90.000€ und 1.000.000€ im Jahr verdient	10%	20%
Die Grenzbelastung für eine Person, die mehr als 1.000.000€ im Jahr verdient	30%	60%
Mehrwertsteuer / Umsatzsteuer (USt)	14%	14%
Die gesamten Steuereinnahmen aus dem Steuerplan relativ zu den momentanen Steuersätzen (% der derzeitigen Einnahmen)	Weniger Einnahmen (75-95%)	Weniger Einnahmen (75-95%)

Welchen dieser Steuerpläne würden Sie lieber in Österreich eingeführt sehen?

- Plan A  
 Plan B

Auf einer Skala von 0 bis 10, wie sehr würden Sie **Plan A** unterstützen? 0 bedeutet, dass Sie den Plan stark ablehnen und 10, dass Sie ihn stark unterstützen.

Starke Ablehnung 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Starke Unterstützung

Auf einer Skala von 0 bis 10, wie sehr würden Sie **Plan B** unterstützen? 0 bedeutet, dass Sie den Plan stark ablehnen und 10, dass Sie ihn stark unterstützen.

Starke Ablehnung 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Starke Unterstützung



Figure A11: Conjoint Question Screenshot.

## D.2.6 Income Tax Question

Bitte wählen Sie Ihre am meisten bevorzugten Einkommensteuerraten (Grenzbelastungen, in %) in den folgenden Stufen:

*Hinweis: Um die derzeitigen Raten auszuwählen, bewegen Sie den Schieberegler ein wenig und dann zurück zu der ursprünglichen Position.*

0 € - 11,000 €		0
11,000 € - 18,000 €		25
18,000 € - 25,000 €		35
25,000 € - 31,000 €		35
31,000 € - 60,000 €		42
60,000 € - 90,000 €		48
90,000 € - 1,000,000 €		50
mehr als 1,000,000 €		55

Die Steuereinnahmen, die durch diese Raten entstehen relativ zu den momentanen Steuersätzen (% der derzeitigen Einnahmen): **100%**

Figure A12: Income Tax Question Screenshot.

## D.2.7 VAT Question

Bitte wählen Sie Ihre am meisten bevorzugte Mehrwertsteuer- / Umsatzsteuerrate (in %):

*Hinweis: Um die derzeitige Rate auszuwählen, bewegen Sie den Schieberegler ein wenig und dann zurück zu der ursprünglichen Position*

Mehrwertsteuer / Umsatzsteuer		20
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Die Steuereinnahmen, die durch diesen Mehrwertsteuer- / Umsatzsteuersatz entstehen relativ zu der derzeitigen Rate. (% der derzeitigen Einnahmen): **100%**

Figure A13: VAT Question Screenshot.