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## Are Immigrants More Left Wing than Natives?

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# Are Immigrants More Left Wing than Natives?

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## ABSTRACT

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# Are Immigrants More Left Wing than Natives?\*

We analyze whether second-generation immigrants have different political preferences relative to children of citizens. Using data on individual voting behavior in 22 European countries between 2001 and 2017, we characterize each vote on a left-right scale based on the ideological and policy positions of the party. First, we describe and characterize the size of the “left-wing bias” in the vote of second-generation immigrants after controlling for a large set of individual characteristics and origin and destination country fixed effects. We find a significant left-wing bias of second-generation immigrants, similar in magnitude to the left-wing bias of those with a secondary, relative to a primary, education. We then show that this left-wing bias is associated with stronger preferences for inequality-reducing government intervention, internationalism and multiculturalism. We find only weak evidence that second-generation immigrants are biased away from populist political agendas and no evidence that they have stronger preferences for pro-immigrant policies. Finally, we show that growing up with a father who is struggling to integrate into the labor market is a strong predictor of this left-wing bias.

**JEL Classification:** D72, J61, P16, Z1

**Keywords:** immigration, elections, Europe

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# 1 Introduction

Immigrants differ from natives in several respects. Differences in language, schooling, and skills generate valuable productive complementarities with natives (Peri and Sparber, 2009; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012). These differences can also generate earning and employment gaps (Borjas, 1985). Strong economic and social incentives exist for the children of immigrants, known as second-generation immigrants, to assimilate in terms of education, language, skills, and preferences. Several studies have shown that second-generation immigrants have historically caught up with natives in earnings, employment and education levels in the United States (see Abramitzky et al., 2020 for an overview of the literature). Assimilation patterns for the second generation, however, appear slower in several European countries such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom (Algan et al., 2010).

While previous work has studied the rates of economic convergence of second-generation immigrants, we know much less about the degree to which second-generation immigrants' preferences over politics and policies converge towards those of natives. The recent literature on immigration and voting behavior has focused on how the inflow of immigrants (first generation) affects the voting behavior of natives (Edo et al., 2019; Tabellini, 2020; Mayda et al., 2022; Moriconi et al., 2022). In the longer run, however, immigrants can change the political landscape of a country in another important way. Their offspring, who usually have full voting rights, could have systematically different preferences for policies and political parties compared to natives. As immigrants and their children become a larger share of many developed countries' populations, the political preferences of these second-generation immigrants can be an important factor in deciding elections. We know much less about this potential effect.

This paper seeks to advance our knowledge about the voting behavior and political preferences of second-generation immigrants. First, we compare these second-generation immigrants with observationally similar natives, and in particular, ask whether these second-generation immigrants differ from natives systematically in their political orientation on a

left-right scale. Then, we analyze whether these differences in political orientation persist after controlling for the parents’ country of origin and for the destination country. Finally, we zoom in these gaps in political preferences by analyzing differences in second-generation immigrants’ preferences for specific policies and for key social and individual values.

To perform the analysis, we use data on the voting behavior and political preferences of 150,000 individuals residing in 22 European Union countries between 2002 and 2018. We combine the European Social Survey (ESS), which reveals which party each individual voted for in the national elections, and the Manifesto Project database (MPD) which uses text analysis to generate standardized information on the content of the political manifesto of parties. This allows us to categorize all political parties along the left-right political spectrum. The ESS also includes information about an array of personal preferences and attitudes as well as demographic information, including the parents’ country of birth. This allows us to distinguish between natives, first- and second-generation immigrants.

Using these data and simple regression analysis, we show that second-generation immigrants and observationally identical natives hold systematically different political preferences. On average, we find that these second-generation immigrants have a left-wing bias relative to observationally identical natives. This difference persists when accounting for origin-specific factors and destination-by-year dummies, where “origin” refers to the country of birth of their parents. Based on our preferred specification, a second-generation immigrant is about 0.08 more left-wing than an observationally equivalent native voter, measured on a left-right scale that we standardize to have variance equal to 1. Such effect is about a twelfth of the difference between the European Social Democrats and the European People’s Party, and similar in magnitude to the left-wing bias of other individual characteristics, such as living in an urban area or obtaining a secondary education degree. Using data on individuals’ specific policy preferences and values, we document that the second-generation immigrants have stronger preferences for government interventions to reduce economic and social disparities and for policies that allow for individual freedom and expression. We also show that

second-generation immigrants do not show different tendencies towards populist party relative to natives, and they do not have different preferences towards migration-related policies than natives. Finally, we show that such left-wing bias is not driven by second-generation immigrants' perceptions about discrimination, but rather it is related to the respondent's experience at a young age of their father's labor market integration: Respondents whose father experienced a skill downgrade express a stronger left-wing bias.

Our paper makes three important contributions to the literature. First, we use our detailed data to describe and characterize how cultural, social, and institutional factors predict the voting behavior of European individuals. The existing literature points out that differences in policy preferences and voting behaviors are strongly correlated with individual socio-demographic characteristics (such as age, race, education, income, and religiosity) as well as contextual factors related to the residence and location of voters (see Cantoni and Pons, 2022 for a synthesis). This literature thus far has not focused on immigrant status as one of these key factors. In the first part of our empirical analysis, we examine how being a second-generation immigrant correlates with voting behavior, and we account for the fact that political preferences may be transmitted from the country of origin of the parents. Second, after identifying a political left-wing bias of second-generation immigrants, we show that this bias cannot be explained by selection based on observable characteristics, and it is robust to the inclusion of many fixed effects and to the choice of demanding matching techniques to reduce omitted bias due to unobservable characteristics (Imbens and Rubin, 2015; Oster, 2019). Finally, we are the first study in the literature to analyze how second-generation immigrants compare to natives in terms of their specific policy preferences and social views.

The economic literature on second-generation (and higher) immigrants has focused mainly on their educational, skill and socio-economic assimilation. Studies of this kind have been conducted in the United States (Borjas, 1993; Card et al., 2000; Smith, 2003; Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017; Duncan and Trejo, 2018), Canada (Kucera, 2008), Israel (Deutsch et al.,

2006) and in a subset of European Countries (Algan et al., 2010, 2013). As a noteworthy exception, Giavazzi et al. (2019) study the cultural convergence of immigrants’ descendants in the United States using the data from the Generalized Social Survey. By exploiting different dimensions of culture, they show that the speed of convergence towards natives’ norms varies by trait. The sociology literature, on the other hand, by describing the assimilation process as a rational choice, highlights different factors that can directly influence immigrants’ offspring choice and preferences, such as natives’ attitudes, local culture, family ties and origin-specific factors (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Alba and Nee, 2009; Luthra et al., 2018).

Few papers provide evidence on the effect of immigration on electoral outcomes through the direct participation of immigrants in elections. Chevalier et al. (2018) study the impact of immigration on public policymaking, exploiting as a natural experiment the sudden arrival of eight million forced migrants in West Germany after World War II. The authors find that local German governments responded to this migration inflow by raising local taxes and welfare spending. The authors interpret these results as consequence of the votes of this group of immigrants, who had full voting rights and eligibility for social welfare. Bhatiya (2023) shows that UK politicians respond to the presence of enfranchised immigrants by increasing their focus on immigration issues in public speeches. Some papers adopt a cultural economics approach that compares emigrants to natives from their country of origin. Luttmer and Singhal (2011) show that migrants coming from countries with strong preferences for redistribution support parties with similar preferences. Similarly, Giuliano and Tabellini (2021) find that US immigrants originating from countries where social reforms had been enacted in the 1800’s shifted the political preferences of US destination counties, in the long run, towards more social spending and public education. To the best of our knowledge, our paper provides new evidence about the differences in voting behaviors between second-generation immigrants and natives in the destination country, after controlling for origin-specific preferences. We are also the first to characterize their differences in preferences for



specific policies and political values.

## 2 Data and Variables

Our primary data source is the *European Social Survey (ESS)*, which was administered in 9 waves (once every two years) in 36 countries between 2002 and 2018. It is a repeated cross-section of individuals, representative of the national adult population in each country. The data include detailed socio-demographic information on personal and family characteristics, including parental background.

We restrict our sample to 22 OECD countries that participated in economic integration processes in Europe (i.e. EU or EFTA).<sup>1</sup> The final sample includes a set of countries belonging to the European Union (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden), plus Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This is a balanced sample of economically-integrated European democracies at similar stages of economic development, plus several Central Eastern countries who went through the economic integration and democratisation process more recently.

ESS records the electoral participation and voting behavior of respondents in each wave in the *most recent* national elections in the country.<sup>2</sup> In the 22 countries of our sample, the waves of 2004-2018 cover the elections held during 2001-2018. Survey respondents are asked the following question: "*Which party did you vote for in the last national election?*" Individuals respond by identifying party names<sup>3</sup>. We link these responses to the corresponding information on each party's political agenda from the *Manifesto Project Database (MPD)*

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<sup>1</sup>In practice, we exclude non-OECD countries in Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Romania, Russia, and Serbia) and non-European OECD countries (Turkey, Israel, and Cyprus). We exclude Latvia and Luxembourg, for which we observe only one electoral event during the sample period, and Italy, due to the extremely small share of migrants' children reported.

<sup>2</sup>Table A-1 reports the number and year of elections covered for each country in columns (1) and (2), and the number and years of the surveys in columns (3) and (4).

<sup>3</sup>When 2 consecutive survey rounds were conducted without any election between them, answers to the question *Which party did you vote for in the last national election?* refers to the same election in both rounds.

(Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006).<sup>4</sup> Among political manifesto variables, we focus on the *left-to-right* index proposed by Budge and Laver (2016). This is constructed as the difference between a party positive stance on free markets, importance of economic incentives, and the importance of traditional values and morality (associated with the political right), and its positive stance on welfare state, public education, market regulations and workers' rights (associated with the political left). The raw index takes values between -74 (radical left-wing party) to +91 (radical right-wing party). This index represents a synthetic measure of a key political dimension across parties.<sup>5</sup> In addition to the left-right divide, we also explore the role of parties' preferences towards fundamental political issues such as their views on the welfare state, public education, labor rights, traditional values, internationalism, and multiculturalism.

For each party, we compute a time-invariant average of the left-right index over our sample. This way, our measure captures voters' changes across parties and not changes in parties' political stances.<sup>6</sup> We standardize the left-to-right index with mean zero and standard deviation equal to one in order to facilitate the interpretation of the variable.

[Insert Figure 1 here]

Figure 1 shows the index for a subset of leading political parties across the considered countries.<sup>7</sup> Left-wing parties are characterized by negative values like the *Socialist Party* in

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<sup>4</sup>The MPD uses text analysis to identify sentence fragments related to each specific political topic, and calculates the fraction of all sentences in the manifesto dedicated to each topic. This fraction (between 0 and 1) is the measure of the relevance of the topic in the party's political agenda. Additionally, MPD provides the share of favorable and unfavorable mentions, which allow them to give a positive or negative direction to the parties' stance on that topic. The MPD includes all parties that participated in national elections and obtained at least one seat in their country's parliament over the 1945-2017 period. It covers all democratic countries in the OECD and Eastern Europe.

<sup>5</sup>The left-right divide is the most recognized divide between political actors. Another potential political cleavage is the split between populist and not-populist parties. MPD does not provide a synthetic index of such divide, but we will characterize it later.

<sup>6</sup>In Table 3, we check the robustness of our results by considering alternative measurements of the left-right index. We use the index measured either at the beginning, or the end of the considered period for each party. We also allow the value of the party-level index to vary over time, featuring political differences between parties and within the political stance of the same party over different elections.

<sup>7</sup>The full distribution of parties is depicted in Figure A-1. Around 80% of existing parties range from -1.3 to 1.3 in their left-to-right position.

France (-1.30), the *PSOE* in Spain (-1.16), *Syriza* in Greece (-0.64) or the *SPD* in Germany (-0.34), while right-wing parties hold positive values of the index, like the *CDU* in Germany (1.31), the *Conservative Party* in United Kingdom (0.94), the *FPÖ* in Austria (0.61) or the *PP* in Spain (0.33). An advantage of this index is that it allows for a comparison of the left-to-right position of parties across countries. Moreover, using the composition of the two major European political groups, the *Socialist & Democrats (S&D)* and the *European People's Party (EPP)*, we construct their left-to-right index by computing the average over the parties belonging to each group.<sup>8</sup> The two European political families are located almost symmetrically along the left-to-right index: -0.54 for the *S&D* coalition and 0.65 for the *EPP* coalition.

## 2.1 Second-generation immigrants: Definition and data

We focus on second-generation immigrants, which we define as those born in the country in which they reside *and* whose father was born abroad (Fernandez and Fogli, 2009).<sup>9</sup> Second-generation immigrants are more comparable to natives than first-generation ones and usually have full voting rights. More than 95% of second-generation immigrants have citizenship rights in our sample (see Figure A-2 in the Appendix).<sup>10</sup> We remove from each of the 22 countries in the sample the origin groups with less than 10 observations in order to avoid noise driven by small and unrepresentative groups. Our final sample includes 156248 individuals (all of them born in the country of residence), of which 5219 are second-generation immigrants from 46 origin countries that span a large range of locations and levels of economic

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<sup>8</sup>Our measure of the composition of each political group is constructed using the composition described by each group on their website in January 2022.

<sup>9</sup>In Table B-2, we present evidence showing that having a foreign-born father is more correlated with political preferences compared to having a foreign-born mother. While the mother often provides an effective transmission channel for other traits from the culture of the origin country on the children's preferences (Rodríguez-Planas and Sanz-de Galdeano, 2019), political preferences seem to be more dependent on the father's country of origin.

<sup>10</sup>Voting behavior of first-generation immigrants can be affected by selection much more than second-generation immigrants. While first generation migrants decide the migration destination in a choice potentially correlated with their characteristics, the second generation cannot affect that choice

development.<sup>11</sup>

[Insert Table 1 here]

Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the personal characteristics of individuals in our final sample. The first two columns report the mean and standard deviations of each variable for natives and immigrants respectively. The third column reports whether the differences between the two are significant or not. Table 1 shows significant differences between migrants and natives: Second-generation immigrants on average are younger, are more likely to live in urban areas, have higher level of income and are more likely to be women than natives. Second-generation immigrants' fathers, instead, were less likely to work and to be college educated than natives' fathers. Thus, in the empirical analysis, we control for these variables to avoid concerns regarding omitted variable bias. To better account for composition differences, we alternatively apply the covariates matching methodology described by Imbens and Rubin (2015). This method selects a control sub-sample, which is more balanced in terms of covariates with respect to the treated sample of second-generation immigrants. This method is more robust than propensity score matching. To do so, we match second-generation immigrants and natives using the *Mahalanobis Metric Matching* method, using all observed covariates to compute the distance between individuals (Zhao, 2004; Docquier et al., 2020; Turati, 2020).<sup>12</sup> Columns (4) to (6) of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the matched sample. The statistics show that distribution of covariates is more balanced. Natives and second-generation immigrants are more alike in the matched sample, and differences in the averages of most covariates are substantially reduced<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>11</sup>The final set of origin countries combines the set of countries included as destinations, Greece excluded, plus the following 25 countries: Algeria, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, India, Indonesia, Italy, Jamaica, Latvia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Republic of Congo, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Suriname, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine and the United States.

<sup>12</sup>A particular property of the *Mahalanobis Metric Matching* method is that the resulting set of matches is invariant to affine transformations of the covariates. Such matching process does not involve the dependent variable at any point.

<sup>13</sup>Appendix Figure A-6 provides raw comparisons of political preferences between natives and second-generation immigrants, revealing that second-generation immigrants are more likely, on average, to be more left-wing than natives in terms of both self-declared political preferences and voting behavior.

[Insert Figure 2 here]

In Figure 2, we present the average share of first- and second-generation immigrants relative to the native population across European Countries in the pre-2005 period (panels (a) and (c)) and the post-2009 period (panels (b) and (d)). The figures show that in each country, the population shares of second-generation immigrants are correlated over time and correlated with the share of first-generation immigrants. Estonia is the country with the highest intensity of second-generation immigrants, around 12% of the native population, due to the high number of Russian-born fathers. Countries characterized by a strong colonial background, like France, the United Kingdom and Belgium, are characterized by a sizeable groups of second-generation immigrants, (around 6% of the native population on average among them). Among Southern European countries, only Greece has a non-trivial share of second-generation immigrants (5% of the native population, mainly of non-European origins) while countries like Portugal and Spain have a very small share of second-generation immigrants (around 0.02%) compared to first-generation immigrants (around 3%). We see that comparing the pre-2005 shares in Figures 2(a) and 2(c) with the post-2009 period in Figures 2(b) and 2(d), the population shares of both first- and second-generation immigrants usually increase over time.

Appendix Figures A-3 and A-4 show that that the overall size of second-generation immigrant population has increased over time, particularly in Western Europe and among young cohorts.<sup>14</sup> Appendix Figure A-5 shows that around 60% of the second-generation immigrant population has European origins. Russia is the most represented country of origin, which accounts for the 14% of the second-generation immigrant population in our sample, followed by Germany and Italy. The largest non-European country of origin is Turkey, which is the country of origin for 6% of the second-generation immigrants in our sample.

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<sup>14</sup>Figure A-4 shows Central Eastern European countries were characterized by a change in the distribution of young second-generation immigrants in the 2005-2008 period, potentially caused by high emigration towards European Union countries after the access to the Schengen Area with the 2004 EU Enlargement.

## 3 Empirical Framework of Immigrant-Native Differences in Voting Behavior

### 3.1 Framework

Thus far, there has been very little evidence about the political outcomes and preferences of second-generation immigrants. The migration literature has largely explored economic outcomes (e.g. labor supply) and pointed out economic assimilation of this group, particularly in the US (Abramitzky et al., 2020; Borjas, 1993; Hammarstedt, 2009; Algan et al., 2010; Duncan and Trejo, 2018). Giavazzi et al. (2019) is an exception: They investigate the assimilation of US immigrants up to the fourth generation in terms of several traits, including political preferences. Using data from the General Social Survey, they argue that political attitudes are particularly persistent across generations. Luttmer and Singhal (2011) studies the persistence of culture in preferences for redistribution of national groups. They show that origin-specific preferences explain voting behaviours of second-generation immigrants for pro-redistribution parties. While the aforementioned studies point out the persistence of origin-specific factors in political preferences of second-generation immigrants in the destination, they do not actually compare the *voting behavior* of immigrants and second-generation immigrants in the destination country.

The political science literature provides descriptive evidence of electoral preferences of migrants for left-leaning parties and relates these preferences to the feeling of belonging to an ‘out-group’ in the residence country (Strijbis, 2021). Still, beyond the specific ethnic or religious background, the precise factors that may determine this out-group experience remain blurred. The sociological literature provides some guidance over such factors, particularly in the US context. This literature, broadly summarized by Luthra et al. (2018), advances the “Segmented Assimilation” hypothesis (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001), which focuses on the two factors that could affect the assimilation decision of individuals from immigrant families. The first one is the local context including native attitudes, immigration policies and

presence of a co-ethnic community. The second one considers family-level strategies (e.g. choice of schools, the language spoken at home), which can directly influence the children’s behaviours and process of assimilation (Alba and Nee (2009)).

Luthra et al. (2018) associates a lack of a full social and political assimilation of second-generation immigrants into the destination country principally to their family experience and upbringing. Their arguments are very well summarized in this extract from the first chapter:

“This second generation is the inevitable by-product of immigration itself: since the young are the people most likely to leave their old home in search of a better future elsewhere, immigrants reach their new home at precisely the age when family formation usually begins. Consequently, their arrival yields large numbers of children born in the host society yet socialized by parents who were raised in a different environment, one with expectations and orientations typically foreign to the place that their children experience as their native world. In beginning again, the parents start out in a new, strange country that must be learned, triggering a process of adaptation that even when successful is almost always error-prone and transmits the signal—to the immigrants themselves, to their children, and to the outsiders around them—that perhaps profoundly, perhaps ineffably, they remain out of place.” (Luthra et al., 2018, p.1)

Informed by this literature, our analysis first accounts for the individual- and family-level determinants of voting preferences of immigrants, as well as the relevant factors in the origin country. In our regressions, we include proxies for culture or social norms, ethnic background, socialization processes that may determine some origin-specific propensity to belong to an out-group in the destination, and variables capturing the specific context of the destination country. The remaining gap in voting outcomes and political preferences between all second-generation immigrants and natives after controlling for these common factors and for culturally transmitted values (Steinhardt, 2012; Bean et al., 2015; Gathmann

and Keller, 2018) can be seen as related to the migratory experience itself. The common experience of being outsiders in a society, observing one’s family’s path to (and struggle for) integration can be one mechanism generating the preference for more inclusive policies and attitudes and the left-wing bias.

### 3.2 Estimation strategy

In order to identify the average difference between second-generation immigrants and natives in the left-right voting index, after controlling for all observable characteristics as well as for destination- and origin-specific unobservable and persistent characteristics, we estimate the following specification:<sup>15</sup>

$$Y_{i,o,c,e}^{\pi} = \alpha + \beta Mig_{i,o,c,e}^{2nd} + \gamma \mathbf{X}_{i,o,c,e} + \theta_{c,e} + \theta_o + \epsilon_{i,o,c,e}. \quad (1)$$

The dependent variable  $Y_{i,o,c,e}^{\pi}$  measures the left-to-right index of party  $\pi$  voted for by individual  $i$  living in country  $c$  with family origin from country  $o$  in election  $e$ . Later in the analysis, we consider other important dimensions of political preferences as outcome variables.  $Mig_{i,o,c,e}^{2nd}$  is a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the voter is born in the country of residence from a foreign-born father (i.e. if  $o \neq c$ ), zero otherwise. The vector  $\mathbf{X}_{i,o,c,e}$  includes a set of extensive controls for individual, family and parental characteristics.<sup>16</sup> Country-by-election-year fixed-effects ( $\theta_{c,e}$ ) capture time-variant country of residence-specific factors such as economic and institutional characteristics that might influence the voting behavior of both natives and immigrants. Finally, origin fixed effects ( $\theta_o$ ) capture any origin-

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<sup>15</sup>Algan et al. (2013) considers a similar specification, which investigates differences between first- and second-generation immigrants, by origin country, and natives in a number of cultural dimensions. We depart from that analysis in two ways. First, we omit first-generation immigrants, a more selected group with more limited voting rights. Second, in equation (1) we control for origin-specific factors instead of analyzing heterogeneous voting behaviors by origin groups.

<sup>16</sup>Individual characteristics include age, age squared, a female dummy, two education dummies (secondary and tertiary education), a dummy for being in a paid job, one dummy for religious intensity and a dummy for being resident in an urban area. Family characteristics include a dummy for being married, a dummy for having at least one child, and household income (in log terms). Parental background includes two dummies capturing the father’s employment status when the respondent was 14 years old: One for whether the father was working at all, and another for whether the father was employed in a high skilled occupation.



specific time-invariant factors that may be persistent determinants of voting behavior of second-generation immigrants.

Our main coefficient of interest is  $\beta$ . Conditional on the extensive set of controls in equation (1), this captures the average difference in voting behavior determined by “having a migrant rather than a native father” in the country of residence. A practical example may be useful to gauge the intuition over the correct interpretation of  $\beta$ . Let us consider two individual types  $i = \{n, m\}$ , both resident citizens of country  $c$ , so they can both vote at the local national elections. Let us also assume that  $n$  and  $m$  types are observationally equivalent in all dimensions considered in vector  $\mathbf{X}$ , and differ only in terms of the birth country of their father: the father of an  $n$  type is born in country  $c$  (i.e., is a native), while the father of an  $m$  type is born in country  $o \neq c$  (thus being a migrant). Consider a  $\hat{\beta} < 0$ : everything else being equal, this would describe  $m$  types voting for a more left-leaning party than  $n$  types at local national elections, on average. Controlling for  $\theta_o$  in eq. (1) guarantees that the different voting choice of an  $m$  type, relative to an  $n$  type, is only due to the fact that the former has a foreign father, while the latter has not, and not by the different political preferences of country of origin  $o$ .

The inclusion of  $\theta_o$  accounts for potential voting differences between  $m$  and  $n$  types driven by the fact that people whose families originate in other countries (i.e., country  $o$ ) could be more left-leaning than people coming from the country of origin of  $n$  (i.e., country  $c$ ), on average. Origin-specific fixed effects capture common roots in voting preferences of people originating from country  $o$ 's culture, regardless of whether they are resident of country  $c$  (i.e., offspring of emigrants), or of country  $o$  (i.e., stayers in the country of origin). Importantly, to consistently estimate the “country” (culture) or origin fixed effects and separate it from the “second generation effect,” we need to observe political preferences of people from each country, both as migrants in other countries and non-migrants in the origin country. This is the same identifying assumption needed to estimate the economic effects of culture (see

Alesina and Giuliano, 2015 for a review).<sup>17</sup>

### 3.3 Identification

As explained earlier, identification of  $\beta$  in equation (1) is guaranteed by the fact that, in our sample, 21 countries appear as both the county of residence and the country of origin of immigrants.<sup>18</sup> These countries enable us to estimate  $\beta$  separately from  $\theta_o$  in equation (1).

Besides origin-specific persistent factors, we address a number of concerns that may pose threats to the identification of  $\beta$ . The first is the selection of respondents into migration on the basis of individuals characteristics that may be systematically correlated with their left-to-right political preferences. In our case, however, we are only looking at second-generation immigrants, whose migration status depends on the migration choice of the father. A concern for the estimate of  $\beta$  in eq. (1) arises only if vertical transmission generates correlation of these characteristics between the father and the children.

[Insert Figure 3 here]

To gain insight on the size of potential selection bias, Figure 3 graphs the distributions of the left-wing bias of first- and second-generation immigrants, relative to natives, predicted purely by their different composition of observed characteristics. These are simulations of the value of the dependent variable in (1) (left-wing indicator) obtained by multiplying the migrant-native average differences in each relevant characteristic included in the regression,  $\mathbf{X}$ , by the coefficients from equation (1) estimated on natives only. We simulate each estimated coefficient as a random variable having an independent normal distribution with average equal to  $\hat{\gamma}$  (estimated coefficients) and the estimated standard deviation and draw-

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<sup>17</sup>Besides vertically-transmitted culture, the political science literature identifies other possible factors that relate to the importance of the country of origin, namely ethnic factors, or socialization processes at the level of the origin country (Strijbis, 2021). Through the paper we investigate these channels extensively, e.g. by accounting for the size of the diaspora effect and analyzing the role of perceived discrimination .

<sup>18</sup>This is the original sample of 22 countries, with the only exception is Greece, whose sample does not include second-generation migrants from other EU21 countries.

ing 1000 times from it.<sup>19</sup> A number of reassuring facts emerge. In both panels of Figure 3, the average simulated effect (the vertical line) has a value which is very close to zero (smaller than 0.01 in absolute value). This implies that the differences in observable characteristics of first- and second-generation immigrants, relative to natives, does not predict a left- or right-wing bias. In particular, Panel (a) shows a predicted left-wing bias around  $-0.003$  for second-generation immigrants.<sup>20</sup> Additionally, a comparison of Panels (a) and (b) does not provide evidence of significant transmission of a political bias from the first to the second generation through observable characteristics. Characteristics of second-generation immigrants predict a slight left-wing bias, while those of first generation immigrants predict a slight right-wing bias.

In the paper, we take additional steps to attenuate any remaining issues of selection of second-generation immigrants, which are presented in Tables 3. One important extension is to implement a covariate matching technique that reduces the imbalances in the distribution of observable characteristics between second-generation immigrants and natives (Imbens and Rubin, 2015). Namely, we construct a balanced sample in terms of observed covariates. Table 1 shows that, while some imbalances exist in the full sample, the matched sample of natives and second-generation immigrants have a similar distribution of covariates. Estimates of the voting gap of second-generation immigrants are almost unchanged when we move from the full to the balanced sample. This is also true if we condition on specific subsets of individual characteristics (see Table B-1 in the Appendix). While these checks reassure us about selection on observable characteristics, one may still wonder about selection on unobservable individual characteristics that may be correlated with political preferences. To address this concern, we perform the Oster (2019) test, which shows that unobservable sources of selection must be more than six times larger than observable ones in order to to

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<sup>19</sup>Precisely the  $\gamma$  coefficient and the corresponding standard error are estimated from equation (1) on natives and omitting the migration dummy term. Figure C-9 in the Appendix plots all these distributions. See Appendix C for further details on the procedure.

<sup>20</sup>As we will see in the next section, this is only the 3.2 percent of the coefficient estimated in our benchmark equation (cfr. column (6) of Table 2).

make the estimated political differences between migrants and natives insignificant.

Since unobserved economic and social channels may also affect differences in voting preferences of migrants and natives, in robustness checks we control for destination-specific factors which may affect the assimilation rate of immigrant families. In those checks we estimate equation (1) including time-invariant sub-national region fixed-effects and a set of time-varying regional controls (such as GDP per capita, the unemployment rate and the fertility rate). In the most demanding regressions we control for sub-national region by year fixed effects to replace the country-by-year fixed effects in eq. (1). In the main specification, in order to minimize the potential sources of unobserved heterogeneity, we limit our sample to more homogeneous country-of-origin samples excluding eastern European destinations.

After accounting for the effects of origin culture, observable individual and regional characteristics of second generation migrants, our coefficient estimate should be close to isolate the element of political preferences that are specifically driven by the experience of being a second generation migrant. The left-wing bias that we estimate implies that that this experience drives support of policies that protect more vulnerable outsiders. These are political values that are rooted in the difficulties one’s family experienced in the economic assimilation process in the destination country.

## 4 Empirical Results

### 4.1 The basic left-wing bias estimate

Table 2 reports the baseline set of estimates for equation (1). For comparison, we show estimates from a simplified version of equation (1) where we omit the origin-specific fixed effect  $\theta_o$ . Those fixed-effects measure the persistent origin-specific averages that should capture culture-driven differences by origin country. Controlling for them eliminates the bias deriving from specific origin countries’ preferences, as discussed in Section 3.2.

The different estimates across columns of Table 2 originate from the fact that we consider

three different samples of origin countries (of the parents of second-generation immigrants). Columns (1) and (2) are estimated on an unrestricted sample, including all 46 available countries of origin, some of which have very different institutions and economic conditions compared to the destination countries. The coefficients in columns (3) and (4) are estimated on a sample of second-generation immigrants and natives whose parents come from OECD countries, with more similar institutions and economic structures to the 21 destination countries. Finally, in columns (5) and (6), we consider only the squared matrix of countries, including only those that appear as both origin and destination countries in our data. This final specification uses a balanced sample of 21 European countries (EU21).<sup>21</sup>

Selecting countries of origin that are increasingly similar to the destination countries (and eventually identical) attenuates concerns about common unobserved features of countries of origin, related to institutional, structural or economic characteristics that differ from destination countries and produce this average difference in the political orientation of second-generation immigrants. Additionally, it allows identification of a country of origin effect using both non-migrants and movers (i.e., second generation immigrants).

[Insert Table 2 here]

The estimated coefficient on the second-generation immigrant dummy is precisely estimated and has a negative and statistically significant value (at the 1% or 5% level). Hence, second-generation immigrants are more likely to vote left-wing parties compared to observationally similar natives. As we move from the heterogeneous set of origin countries, featuring all 46 origins, to our preferred squared matrix sample, the estimated coefficient is stable as long as origin country fixed effects are included. The stability of this estimated coefficient is a first indicator that immigrant-native differences are not driven by unobserved factors related to specific origin countries. Once we control for those, the second-generation immigrants as a group are still significantly more left-wing than observationally equivalent natives.

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<sup>21</sup>From our original set of 22 destination countries, we remove Greece, since in our sample we do not have second-generation immigrants with Greek origin across the other destinations, and a very small minority of second-generation immigrants in Greece are from European countries.

Table 2 also shows the estimated partial correlations between individual characteristics and left-leaning preferences. These estimates align with the results found in the existing literature that studies the individual and contextual determinants of voting behavior, usually within a single country (see e.g. Cantoni and Pons, 2022). Being male, religious, married, having at least one child, having higher economic status (i.e. employed in a full time job, higher household income), and having an advantaged family background (father working and in a high-skilled occupation when the respondent was 14 years old) are each associated with a significantly positive coefficient, i.e. right-wing tendency, as the index increases in value from left (negative) to right (positive). Conversely, having a degree beyond primary education,<sup>22</sup> living in an urban area, and being older increase an individual’s propensity to vote for a left-leaning party.

## 4.2 Relevance and magnitudes

The estimates in column (6) of Table 2 reveals that a second-generation immigrant in a EU21 country tends to be 8.3 percent of a standard deviation more leftist than a EU21 native voter with the same individual, family, and parental characteristics. The magnitude is sizeable and comparable to how other relevant individual characteristics predict voting behavior. It is similar to the leftward shift from a reduction in (log) income by one standard deviation (equivalent to a reduction of monthly household income by 1150 euros). It is also comparable in size to the leftward shift associated with obtaining a secondary education degree, and only a bit smaller than the coefficient associated with living in an urban neighbourhood. Comparing the magnitude of the estimates with the evidence of Figure 1, the estimated effect is equivalent to about one fifth of the difference in political preferences between a perfect centrist (standardized leftism =0) and one voting for the European social-democrat party, S&D-EU (standardized leftism =-0.5). This is a sizeable magnitude, which suggest that

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<sup>22</sup>The coefficients of secondary and tertiary education go in opposite directions. However the negative coefficient of secondary education is much larger than the positive coefficient of tertiary education. This suggests that educated voters are on average more left-leaning than voters with a primary education degree.

migration status represents a significant trait contributing to individual voting behavior, at least as much as other individual characteristics studied by the literature. Cantoni and Pons (2022) show that overall, individual-level factors explain roughly the 63% of the variation in turnout and party affiliation preferences in the United States.

The estimated left-wing bias, however, is unlikely to generate large political shifts, even as the share of second-generation immigrants in the European electorate grows. Most EU countries, whose average voter is to the right of the political spectrum, will not be swung by second generation migrants to the other side for predictable increases in second generation immigrants.

In Appendix D, we use the estimated  $\hat{\beta}$  coefficient from Table 2 (column (6)) to perform a simple simulation exercise by projecting plausible future population shares of second-generation immigrants in each country. This exercise suggests that, on average, the estimated left-wing bias of second-generation immigrants is likely to have only a limited impact on the political outcomes of most Western European countries. Even in scenarios where second-generation immigrants may become as large as 30% of the total population – the largest share observed in any country (i.e., United States) – the outcome will only be an average leftward shift of the median voter by 2%. Thus, even a substantial increase of the share of second generation migrants would not generate a substantial leftward shift in the vote share. Still, for countries in our sample where the median voter is close to, but to the right of, the European center (value 0 of our left-right index), such as Belgium and Portugal, a rise in the second-generation immigrant population share could play a significant role in shifting them towards the center. For example, the growth of the population share of second-generation immigrants to 10% is predicted to generate a substantial shift towards the center, equal to half (for Portugal) or all (for Belgium) of the current right-wing bias of the median voter electorate, relative to the "zero value" representing the center of the European left-right distribution.

### 4.3 Robustness checks

In Table 3, we present a battery of checks to test the robustness of the main result. For comparison purposes, in column (1) we report our preferred estimate (from Table 2, column (6)).

[Insert Table 3 here]

**Heterogeneity** - The first two checks modify the sample used in the analysis: the estimated political bias of second-generation immigrants could be affected by (unobservable) heterogeneity in the origin countries or individuals in our sample. Column (2) shows the estimate using only the sample of Western European countries. In column (3), we present the estimate using the balanced sample obtained after implementing the Mahalanobis Metric Matching technique, which corrects for the different distributions of observable characteristics between second-generation immigrants and natives –as shown in Table 1 (see columns (3) and (6)).

**Local Conditions** - In column (4) of Table 3, we include destination-region fixed effects capturing time-invariant differences across European regions within each country. In column (5) we add time-varying regional controls, and in column (6) we include destination region-by-year effects. These fixed effects should capture specific aspects of the local regional context (economy, culture, and local institutions) that may affect the integration of second-generation immigrants or their preferences and vary slowly or only vary at the regional level. Our estimates are similar with or without the inclusion of this wide set of local fixed-effects.

**Selection on Unobservables** - In columns (7) and (8) we address the potential concern that significant selection on unobservables could bias our estimates. To do so we compute the degree of selection on unobservables at different levels of  $R_{max}$  (Oster, 2019). The degree of selection on unobservables ( $\tilde{\delta}$ ) is higher than 1 in absolute term, indicating that we would need a larger degree of selection on unobservables than on observables to make the estimated coefficient insignificant.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>To give more insights behind this statistic, a  $\tilde{\delta} = -6.7$  as in column (8) would imply that selection on



**Subsample Analysis** - To capture whether our main results are driven by specific countries, groups or years, we perform a series of subsample analyses in columns (9) to (15). The specifications are as follows: in (9) and (10) we remove Estonia and Portugal, the countries with the highest and lowest share of second-generation immigrants; in (11) we remove countries not belonging to the European Union; in (12), (13) we drop the first and last electoral event per country; in (14) we remove second-generation immigrants with German origin, since they are the most highly represented in our restricted sample; in (15) we remove the Jus Sanguinis (citizenship by descentance) countries (i.e. Hungary, Norway, Switzerland, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia) (Bertocchi and Strozzi, 2010), from the sample. Such practice may limit access to citizenship for second-generation immigrants relative to countries characterized by Jus Soli (citizenship by birthplace). Overall, the estimated partial correlation remains negative and statistically significant, consistent with our benchmark results.

**Definition of Parties Political Ideology** - In columns (16) to (21), we perform a set of robustness checks involving the dropping of extreme parties of the left-to-right political index. In columns (16) to (18), we remove all populist parties, right wing populist and left wing according to the definition by Docquier et al. (2022), to see whether our results are driven by the support (or lack thereof) for a subset of extreme populist parties. Finally columns (19) and (20) show estimates linking each party to a time-invariant left-to-right political stance from the Manifesto Project Database measured in the first or in the last election available, respectively. These robustness checks captures whether the left-wing preference is associated with a different choice of parties, rather than with a change in the position of parties, possibly as consequence of being voted by second generation immigrants. Results in column (21) associates to each party its time-variant left-to-right index. All results confirm size and significance of the left-wing bias of second-generation migrants.

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unobserved factors should be 6.7 times more important than selection on observed factors to generate an estimated partial correlation between second generation dummies and voting preferences equal to zero. In general, the rule of the thumb of  $\tilde{\delta} > |1|$  is accepted to minimize concerns on selection on unobservables. In our case, this threshold is abundantly met

**Additional Robustness Checks** - Table B-1 in the Appendix shows that the estimated coefficient for the second-generation dummy remains stable and precisely estimated if we exclude fully the set of individual controls (column 1) or specific subsets of controls (2)-(7). This is consistent with the previous findings that the results are not driven by selection of second-generation individuals along some observed dimension. Appendix Table B-2 considers an alternative definition of second-generation immigrant based on the origin country of the mother (rather than the father). The negative coefficient is still present, but its size drops by half. This suggests that the immigrant experience that leads to left-leaning preferences is stronger when it relates to the father, likely the bread winner of an immigrant family and more subject to local economic and social pressures. These results are confirmed by the results in column (3) and (4) of the Table B-2, where we explore the role played by presence or absence of parents in the second-generation immigrants' household during adolescence. We find that if the father has died before the child's teenage years, the left-wing bias for the second generation immigrant is smaller. Presence or absence of the mother does not have this effect.

## 5 Mechanism

### 5.1 Preferences for Policies and Values

In this section, we look beyond the left-right index and we characterize second-generation immigrants' relative preferences for specific policy and values.

[Insert Table 4 here]

We present the results in Table 4. We start by investigating immigrant-to-native differences in political attitudes, ideological views, beliefs about institutions and the society as a whole. These opinions are directly elicited in reply to ESS survey questions and not inferred from voting behavior in elections. We find that second-generation immigrants say they are

significantly more interested in politics than natives (column 2), but that they are not more likely to vote than natives (column 1). Relative to natives, second-generation immigrants have more tolerant views towards different sexual orientations, and have more appreciation for the enriching role of immigrants in the host society (columns 3 and 4). They support more the EU integration process as well as government intervention to improve education and health, and to reduce income inequalities (columns 5-8). These results suggest that immigrants vote for left-wing parties because they exhibit an array of policy preferences that are more closely aligned with these parties. Column 9 shows that their self-reported ideological views exhibit only a weak left-wing bias and that they tend to identify less with a specific party compared to natives (column 10). Taken together, these results suggest that the left-wing bias of second-generation immigrants derives from more pragmatic policy preferences rather than from supporting an abstract ideology.<sup>24</sup>

[Insert Table 5 here]

In Table 5, we analyze whether the differences in policy and values revealed in the survey corresponds to votes for political parties that actually support each of those specific political issues. In order to do this, we now estimate each party’s specific policy-related positions and values-related positions derived from the content analysis of the Manifesto Project database, and use it as dependent variable in equation (1).<sup>25</sup> Results reported in columns (1)-(3) suggest that, compared to natives, second-generation immigrants are more likely to vote for parties that support expanding the welfare state and the education system and for parties that support labor groups and unions. In terms of societal views, they are less likely to vote for parties that emphasize nationalist and conservative views, while they have more support for parties that favor multiculturalism (see columns 4 and 5).

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<sup>24</sup>Gonnot and Lo Polito (2021) find similar results for preferences for redistribution of first-generation immigrants.

<sup>25</sup>Using the share of quasi-sentences related to each specific topic as a fraction of all sentences in the manifesto, and computing the difference between the share of favorable mentions and the share of unfavorable mentions related to a specific political issue, we can construct the net position of each political party on each issue.

Second-generation immigrants' left-wing stances do not necessarily reflect immigrants' self-interest on migration-related issues. Columns (6)-(9) shows that these immigrants are not more in favour of expanding immigration or simplifying citizenship acquisition procedures. They do not specifically vote for parties that emphasize the importance of immigrants keeping their own culture, but at the same time, they are mildly less favourable to parties arguing explicitly for immigrants' assimilation into the native culture. Finally, we explore whether immigrants are more likely to vote for right-wing or left-wing parties (a discrete version of our earlier index) and if they vote for 'populist' parties. In this analysis we rely on the set of indicators developed by Docquier et al. (2022).<sup>26</sup> Populism emphasize anti-establishment sentiment, negative attitudes towards the EU, protection of internal markets and national sovereignty (see Mudde, 2004; Morelli et al., 2021 for details). Results in columns (10) and (11) confirm that second-generation immigrants are more prone to vote for left-wing parties and less inclined to vote for right-wing parties compared to natives. Columns (12) to (14) suggest that these immigrants are less likely to vote for populist parties, and in particular, for right-wing populist parties.

## 5.2 Mechanism: own or family migration experience?

An interpretation consistent with results presented so far is that second-generation immigrants vote for policies that can reduce potential barriers to full economic and social integration of disadvantaged people. This may partly be the result of experiencing, during their formative years, their parents' struggling to integrate and possibly facing discrimination (e.g. based on nationality, race or ethnicity). We explore this interpretation in Table 6. The dependent variable is the left-right index as in Table 2. In column (1), we analyze more fully the role of an immigrant father or mother in generating their political preferences. Results from this analysis confirm that it is mainly the presence of a foreign-born father

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<sup>26</sup>Docquier et al. (2022) defines right-wing, left-wing, populist, right-wing populist parties and left-wing populist parties over the whole MPD sample. Parties on the bottom and top tercile of the left-to-right index distribution available in MPD are defined as left wing/right wing, respectively. Parties are defined as "populist" if their populism score is above a specific threshold.

that produces the left-wing bias in second-generation immigrants. Next, we study whether this left-wing bias is associated with the father’s labor market integration, or lack thereof, when the second-generation is a child (Donato et al., 2014). In particular, we check whether occupational mismatch (in terms of skills) in the father’s past employment strengthen the future left-wing bias of the child. Column (2) includes interaction terms between the second-generation immigrant indicator and dummies capturing whether the father was in a job for which he was over or underqualified when the respondent was 14 years old.

[Insert Table 6 here]

Focusing first on the coefficients of the dummies, our results show the experience of having a father in a positively mismatched job shifts preferences towards right-wing parties. This effect is the same for natives and second-generation immigrants: the interaction term between the positive mismatch and the second-generation dummy is not significantly different from zero. However, having an immigrant father experiencing negative job mismatch increases the left-wing bias of second-generation immigrants relative to natives by a factor of four. This evidence suggests that a negative labor market integration experience for the immigrant father actually strengthens the left-wing bias of second-generation immigrants. In column (3), we shift focus from the parent to one’s own integration experience, and perform a similar heterogeneity exercise using a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent identifies as belonging to a discriminated group (Fouka, 2019).<sup>27</sup> Neither the dummy nor its interaction with the main variable of interest turn out to be statistically significant. In column (4), we consider a dummy equal to one if the second-generation immigrant was raised speaking a foreign language with their family - presumably the language of the origin country - instead of the language of the country of residence. This serves as a proxy for the degree of integration. In this case as well, neither the foreign language dummy nor its interaction with the second-generation migrant dummy show any significant effects. Finally, in

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<sup>27</sup>The dummy variable has a value equal to one if the respondent recognize himself as a "*member of a group discriminated against in this country*".

column (5), we consider all the previously tested mechanisms simultaneously, showing that only the dimensions related to father's labor market mismatch affect the left-leaning bias of immigrants.

Overall, the evidence presented in Table 6 suggests that the labor market integration experience of the father (likely the main wage earner in the immigrant's family) is strongly correlated with increased left-support for the second generation. These results are in line with an established literature in social psychology, which shows that adolescence and young adulthood (generally the age window between 18 and 25 years old) is the most relevant period when social and political attitudes are developed. Experiences during the "impressionable years" of one's life, shape persistent attitudes and preferences (see Newcomb, 1957, 1967; Ryder, 1985).<sup>28</sup>

[Insert Table 7 here]

Table 7 shows additional evidence in support of the "impressionable years" hypothesis considering only first-generation immigrants. Estimates in column (1) show that, on average, first-generation migrants are slightly more left-leaning than natives in the destination country. However, when we decompose the effect by the age of the migrant and the length of stay in the destination country, we see no evidence of a left-wing bias among migrants older than 45 (columns (2) and (3)). Those people do not seem to carry left-leaning preferences from their immigration experience (or from selection). However, for those younger than 45 who arrived in the country before the age of 25 (column (5)), who were more likely to experience struggle of integration in their youth, there is a strong left-wing bias. On the other hand, no left-wing bias emerges instead among those migrated when adults (column (6)). These results are consistent with left-wing bias emerging for immigrants who spent early "impressionable years" in the destination country, when their family may have struggled to

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<sup>28</sup>Acemoglu et al. (2021) provides recent evidence consistent with this "impressionable years" hypothesis by showing that exposure to democratic institutions during the young adulthood (called "the impressionable years") leaves a civic footprint on individuals. They show that exposure to democracy during this period affects lifetime attitudes towards that institution.

adjust.

## 6 Conclusions

This paper uses an original dataset which combines information from the European Social Survey (ESS) and the Manifesto Project database (MPD) to compare the voting behavior of second-generation immigrants to that of citizens born of natives, across a large sample of European countries. We consider the differences in a left-to-right index of political preferences as well as in preferences for particular key policies. In the first part of the paper, we show significant second-generation immigrant-native differences in the left-to-right index. These differences are robust to the inclusion of destination-by-year fixed effects and origin fixed effects, which capture both the effects of formal institutions in the destination and culture in the origin country of the immigrants. We show that on average, second-generation immigrants in European countries voted for more left-wing parties compared to natives and that this association is quantitatively sizeable, with similar magnitude to the association between achieving a secondary school degree and left-wing voting preferences.

To qualify this effect, simulations shown in the Appendix indicate that while left-wing bias of this group is non-trivial, it is also likely not large enough to shift to the left of the center the median voter in most European countries, currently where it is currently to the right. Even if we project the second-generation immigrant population to grow to as much as 20-30% of the total population (comparable to the US at its peak during the 20th century) this will only produce a fraction of a one percent shift in the average left-right ideology index in most EU countries.


In the second part of the paper, we consider the difference between second-generation immigrants and natives in their preferences towards specific policy issues and values. We show that second-generation migrants support policies for redistribution, public education, and government welfare. They do not exhibit strong party affiliation, they do not vote for

specific migration policies, and they have a lower propensity than natives for voting for populist parties, particularly right-wing ones. These results have two interesting political implications. First, they suggest that being a second-generation immigrant is a trait that generates some commonality in political views. This group of people could be considered as more sensitive to some issues and messages than the generic population. Second, the specific analysis shows that second-generation immigrants vote based on preferences for policy proposals rather than on ideological affiliation.



# Tables and Figures

Figure 1: Left-to-Right Index - Relevant Parties




Note: Author's calculations using MPD . The figure plots the standardized left-to-right index associated with a selected pool of political parties, and the average left-to-right index of parties belonging to the S&D and EPP European Political families. The dashed line shows the average value over our sample

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics


	Full Sample			Matched Sample		
	(1) Natives	(2) Immigrants	(3) Difference	(4) Natives	(5) Immigrants	(6) Difference
Age	51.89 (16.90)	49.39 (15.69)	-2.505** (0.994)	49.91 (15.66)	49.33 (15.63)	-0.581* (0.302)
Female	0.504 (0.500)	0.531 (0.499)	0.026*** (0.006)	0.544 (0.498)	0.532 (0.499)	-0.012 (0.012)
Tertiary ed.	0.338 (0.473)	0.356 (0.479)	0.018 (0.021)	0.363 (0.481)	0.357 (0.479)	-0.006 (0.007)
Secondary ed.	0.414 (0.493)	0.459 (0.498)	0.045 (0.029)	0.438 (0.496)	0.459 (0.498)	0.021** (0.010)
Married	0.635 (0.481)	0.619 (0.486)	-0.017 (0.013)	0.596 (0.491)	0.620 (0.485)	0.024 (0.014)
At least 1 child	0.402 (0.490)	0.430 (0.495)	0.028 (0.021)	0.427 (0.495)	0.433 (0.496)	0.006 (0.013)
Urban Area Resident	0.283 (0.450)	0.374 (0.484)	0.091*** (0.033)	0.381 (0.486)	0.374 (0.484)	-0.007 (0.020)
Father Working	0.898 (0.303)	0.853 (0.354)	-0.045*** (0.012)	0.845 (0.362)	0.855 (0.352)	0.010 (0.009)
Father High Skilled	0.205 (0.404)	0.167 (0.373)	-0.039*** (0.012)	0.234 (0.423)	0.168 (0.374)	-0.066*** (0.014)
Log Household Income	10.07 (0.862)	10.19 (0.821)	0.117** (0.052)	10.19 (0.829)	10.19 (0.817)	0.009 (0.021)
Employed	0.554 (0.497)	0.589 (0.492)	0.035 (0.023)	0.600 (0.490)	0.590 (0.492)	-0.010 (0.022)
Prays Everyday	0.177 (0.382)	0.220 (0.414)	0.043* (0.022)	0.203 (0.403)	0.215 (0.411)	0.011 (0.021)
Observations	151029	5219	156248	4533	5127	9660

Notes: authors' calculation on ESS data. Immigrants refers to second-generation immigrants, that is all individuals born in the country of destination but whose father is not born in the destination country. Standard errors reported in parenthesis. The difference column reports robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Significance levels: \*: 10% \*\*: 5% \*\*\*: 1%


Figure 2: Immigration Distribution - Country Level




(a) 1<sup>st</sup> Gen. - Pre 2005



(b) 1<sup>st</sup> Gen. - After 2009




(c) 2<sup>nd</sup> Gen. - Pre 2005



(d) 2<sup>nd</sup> Gen. - After 2009

Note: authors' calculation on ESS data. The figure plots the average share of first and second-generation immigrants over the total population before 2005 (a, c) included, and after 2009 (b, d) included. The legend is determined by the quartile distribution of 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants in the period before 2005.

Figure 3: Simulated Left wing stance based on Selection on Observables



Note: authors' calculation on ESS data. The figure plot the distribution of the simulated left leaning stance of second generation (panel (a)) and first-generation immigrants (panel (b)) due to selection on observables. We first estimate the individual characteristic specific coefficient on the sample of natives, then we draw 1000 different estimated coefficients based on the point estimate and standard deviation of the estimated coefficient. Finally, we generate the simulated left wing stance based on observables by interacting the simulated coefficients with the difference between the average characteristics of migrants and natives. Figures (a) and (b) shows the distribution after computing the differences in average immigrant and native characteristics over the whole sample. Figures C-7 and C-8 in the Appendix show the distribution after computing the country-specific differences in average immigrant and native characteristics, and then averaging them out both with respect to destination countries and origin countries. The solid line provides the average simulated effect.

Table 2: Migrant to native difference in left-to-right voting  
Origin-specific effect and sample selection

	Unrestricted Sample		OECD Sample		EU21 Sample	
	(1) Without Origin FE or Controls	(2) With Origin FE or Controls	(3) Without Origin FE or Controls	(4) With Origin FE or Controls	(5) Without Origin FE or Controls	(6) With Origin FE or Controls
2nd-gen Immigrants	-0.140*** (0.026)	-0.073** (0.033)	-0.117*** (0.027)	-0.083*** (0.029)	-0.076** (0.033)	-0.083*** (0.020)
Age	-0.013*** (0.004)	-0.013*** (0.004)	-0.013*** (0.004)	-0.013*** (0.004)	-0.014*** (0.004)	-0.014*** (0.004)
Age <sup>2</sup>	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Female	-0.076*** (0.011)	-0.076*** (0.011)	-0.076*** (0.011)	-0.076*** (0.011)	-0.075*** (0.011)	-0.075*** (0.011)
Secondary Edu.	-0.093*** (0.025)	-0.094*** (0.024)	-0.093*** (0.026)	-0.094*** (0.025)	-0.097*** (0.027)	-0.097*** (0.027)
Tertiary Edu.	0.021** (0.009)	0.021** (0.009)	0.022** (0.010)	0.022** (0.010)	0.018 (0.011)	0.018 (0.011)
Married	0.053*** (0.015)	0.054*** (0.015)	0.052*** (0.015)	0.053*** (0.015)	0.055*** (0.015)	0.055*** (0.015)
At least 1 child	0.024* (0.012)	0.024* (0.012)	0.026** (0.012)	0.026** (0.012)	0.025** (0.012)	0.025** (0.012)
Urban Area Resident	-0.122*** (0.034)	-0.119*** (0.034)	-0.121*** (0.034)	-0.120*** (0.034)	-0.121*** (0.035)	-0.121*** (0.035)
Log Household Income	0.088*** (0.025)	0.086*** (0.024)	0.086*** (0.025)	0.085*** (0.025)	0.086*** (0.025)	0.087*** (0.025)
Employed	0.027*** (0.009)	0.026*** (0.009)	0.028*** (0.009)	0.028*** (0.009)	0.031*** (0.009)	0.031*** (0.009)
Prays Everyday	0.206*** (0.051)	0.210*** (0.051)	0.213*** (0.049)	0.214*** (0.050)	0.219*** (0.052)	0.218*** (0.052)
Father Working	0.042*** (0.013)	0.040*** (0.012)	0.041*** (0.013)	0.041*** (0.013)	0.040** (0.014)	0.040*** (0.014)
Father High Skilled	0.050* (0.024)	0.049* (0.025)	0.048* (0.026)	0.047* (0.026)	0.047* (0.026)	0.047* (0.026)
Observations	130911	130911	129361	129361	126373	126373
R2	0.205	0.207	0.204	0.206	0.206	0.206
Destination#Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Origin F.E.		✓		✓		✓

Notes: Unrestricted sample includes all natives and 2<sup>nd</sup>-gen immigrants. OECD sample includes natives and 2<sup>nd</sup>-gen immigrants from OECD origin countries, and the EU21 sample includes destination and origin countries from the restricted origin-destination countries available from our dataset (square matrix). All specifications also include destination country-by-election, and in even columns country of origin fixed-effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at country level. Significance levels: \*: 10% \*\*: 5% \*\*\*: 1%.

Table 3: Migrant to native difference in left-to-right voting - EU21 Sample  
Robustness Checks

	Benchmark	Alternative Samples		Regional Level			Oster Test	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Party Voted Ideology	Western EU Sample	Matched Sample	With Time invariant FE	With Time invariant FE and Controls	With Time variant FE	$R_{max} =$ $1.3 * R2$	$R_{max} =$ $3 * R2$
2nd-gen Immigrants	-0.083*** (0.020)	-0.073** (0.028)	-0.085*** (0.025)	-0.066** (0.028)	-0.059* (0.031)	-0.068** (0.029)	-0.083*** (0.020)	-0.083*** (0.020)
$\tilde{\delta}$							-44.948	-6.749
R2	0.206	0.188	0.186	0.238	0.238	0.244	0.206	0.206
$R_{max}$							0.268	0.619
Observations	126373	98156	5470	126372	104290	126371	126373	126373
Subsample Analysis								
	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	
	No Estonia	No Portugal	No Norway and Switzerland	No 1 <sup>st</sup> Election	No Last Election	No German 2nd Gen	No only Jus Sanguinis Countries	
2nd-gen Immigrants	-0.084*** (0.020)	-0.083*** (0.020)	-0.071*** (0.018)	-0.071*** (0.017)	-0.058** (0.021)	-0.143*** (0.034)	-0.056** (0.023)	
R2	0.206	0.207	0.210	0.198	0.207	0.206	0.186	
Observations	121728	123065	114087	103102	99383	125977	99420	
Excluding Populist Voters								
	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)		
	No Populist	No Right Wing Populist	No Left Wing Populist	First Election	Last Election	Election Varying		
2nd-gen Immigrants	-0.085*** (0.021)	-0.083*** (0.020)	-0.084*** (0.020)	-0.073*** (0.023)	-0.074** (0.029)	-0.057** (0.021)		
Observations	125311	126070	125838	126373	126373	120475		
R2	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.25	0.35		
Individual Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Destination#Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Origin F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: 2<sup>nd</sup>-gen immigrants (by father) are respondents who are born in the destination country but whose father is not born in the destination country. All specifications include controls for age, logarithm of income, dummy for female, two dummies for education, a dummy for marital status, dummy for children, dummy for urban resident, dummy for praying everyday, dummy for employment status, dummy for father's employment status and two dummies for father's occupational skill. Column (1) shows our benchmark specification. Column (2) provides results over the Western European countries. Column (3) uses the same definition as column (1), but only includes respondents in the matched sample which is balanced on observable individual and parental characteristics. Column (4) includes NUTS-2 regional FE and country-by-election FE. Column (5) includes additional NUTS-2 controls - fertility rate, unemployment rate and GDP per-capita. Column (6) includes NUTS-2 time-varying regional fixed effects. Columns (7) and (8) provides the results from Oster (2019) test ( $\tilde{\delta}$ ) using different level of  $R_{max}$ . The second panel provides robustness checks after dropping observations from our sample. Columns (9) and (10) exclude Estonia and Portugal, respectively, which are the countries with the highest and lowest share of 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants. Column (11) excludes Norway and Switzerland, which are not part of the European Union. Column (12) excludes from the sample the first election of each country, while column (13) excludes the last election. Column (14) shows the results after removing 2<sup>nd</sup> generation migrants with German origin, which is the most represented origin among the European ones. Column (15) shows results after removing destination countries with just Jus Sanguinis citizenship law in 2001, according to Bertocchi and Strozzi (2010). Finally, the third panel provides results excluding voters for populists and using alternative definition of our political left-to-right definition. Columns (16), (17) and (18) excludes from the sample of voters the ones that voted populist parties, right wing populist parties and left wing populist parties respectively, following Docquier et al. (2022) definition. Columns (19) and (20) shows the estimates using as dependent variable the standardized left-to-right index available in the first election or last election, respectively, while column (21) presents the estimates using a time-varying definition of the left-to-right index of parties political stance. Robust standard errors clustered at the region and country level. Significance levels: \*: 10% \*\*: 5% \*\*\*: 1%

Table 4: Migrant-native difference - EU21 Sample  
Political Attitudes

	Participation to Politics		Society and Openness		
	(1) Voting	(2) Interested in Politics	(3) Gay and Lesbians free to live	(4) Immigrants Enrich Culture	(5) EU Integration go further
2nd-gen Immigrants	0.007 (0.010)	0.073** (0.009)	0.109*** (0.026)	0.078** (0.033)	0.049** (0.022)
R2	0.117	0.213	0.237	0.154	0.109
Observations	180465	180157	124482	124087	105672
	Public Sector and Redistribution			Ideological Intensity	
	(6) Satisfied Education Sys.	(7) Satisfied Health Sys.	(8) Government reduce income differences	(9) Self-declared Ideology	(10) Feel Close to a Party
2nd-gen Immigrants	-0.142*** (0.025)	-0.061** (0.027)	0.073** (0.026)	-0.061* (0.034)	-0.023 (0.014)
R2	0.145	0.184	0.109	0.071	0.059
Observations	122886	125760	125510	121909	126359
Individual Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Destination#Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Origin F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: 2<sup>nd</sup>-gen immigrants are respondents who are born in the destination country but whose father is not born in the destination country. All specifications include controls for age, logarithm of income, dummy for female, two dummies for education, a dummy for marital status, dummy for children, dummy for urban resident, dummy for praying everyday, dummy for employment status, dummy for father's employment status and two dummies for father's occupational skill. Dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if individuals voted in the last election (col. 1) and a variables capturing respondent's interest in Politics (col. 2). Cols. (3) and (4) reports estimates on individual's attitudes towards a positive stance towards gays and lesbians and towards the positive contribution of immigration on local culture. Col. (5) shows estimates on individual's attitudes towards a stronger EU integration. Cols. (6) and (7) reports estimates associated to individual's satisfaction on the education and health system. Col. (8) shows results on individual's attitudes towards a stronger government intervention in reducing income differences. Col. (9) reports results on individual's self-declared left-to-right ideology, while col. (10) shows whether respondent feel close to a specific party. Robust standard errors clustered at country level. Significance levels: \*: 10% \*\*: 5% \*\*\*: 1%

Table 5: Migrant-native difference - EU21 Sample  
Voting-specific Issues

	Voting: Economic-related Stances			Voting: Values-related Stances	
	(1) Welfare Expansion	(2) Education Expansion	(3) Support Workers	(4) National Way of life	(5) Multiculturalism
2nd-gen Immigrants	0.064** (0.026)	0.137** (0.052)	0.076** (0.027)	-0.092*** (0.022)	0.052** (0.022)
R2	0.54	0.46	0.45	0.18	0.25
Observations	126373	126373	126373	126373	126373
	Voting: Immigration-related Issues				
	(6) Expanding Immigration	(7) Lax Citizenship Requirements	(8) Immigrants Should Assimilate	(9) Immigrants keep their culture	
2nd-gen Immigrants	-0.041 (0.026)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.023* (0.012)	-0.033 (0.025)	
Observations	126373	126373	106596	106596	
R2	0.16	0.30	0.49	0.55	
	Right/Left Party		Populist Party		
	(10) Right Wing	(11) Left Wing	(12) All	(13) Right Wing	(14) Left Wing
2nd-gen Immigrants	-0.033*** (0.009)	0.018** (0.008)	-0.011* (0.006)	-0.005** (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)
Observations	126225	126225	126225	126225	126225
R2	0.12	0.18	0.15	0.15	0.09
Individual Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Destination#Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Origin F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: 2<sup>nd</sup>-gen immigrants (by father) are respondents who are born in the destination country but whose father is not born in the destination country. All specifications include controls for age, logarithm of income, dummy for female, two dummies for education, a dummy for marital status, dummy for children, dummy for urban resident, dummy for praying everyday, dummy for employment status, dummy for father's employment status and two dummies for father's occupational skill. Col.s (1) to (5) report results using alternative parties' political dimension as dependent variables. Column (6) show results on voting parties with a net positive stance in favoring new immigration inflows. Column (7) presents the estimate on voting parties with favorable stance in making the path to citizenship more lax for immigrants. Column (8) shows results on voting parties that state that immigrants should assimilate to local culture, while column (9) presents results on voting parties promoting that immigrants should keep their own culture. Col.s (10) to (14) dependent variables are voted party probability to be a right-wing party, a left wing party, a populist party, a right-wing populist party and left-wing populist party. All the measures are taken from Docquier et al. (2022). Robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Significance levels: \*: 10% \*\*: 5% \*\*\*: 1%



Table 6: Migrant-native difference in left-to-right voting- EU21 sample  
Discrimination, Mismatch & Language Spoken at home

	(1) Migrants' Parents	(2) Father Mismatch	(3) Personal Disc.	(4) Foreign Language at Home	(5) All Factors
2nd-gen (Father)	-0.092*** (0.023)	-0.077*** (0.022)	-0.077*** (0.021)	-0.079*** (0.022)	-0.069*** (0.023)
2nd-gen (Mother)	-0.038 (0.039)				
2nd-gen (Father) x 2nd-gen (Mother)	0.080 (0.125)				
2nd-gen Immigrants x Pos. Mismatch		-0.047 (0.116)			-0.051 (0.114)
2nd-gen Immigrants x Neg. Mismatch		-0.248*** (0.050)			-0.249*** (0.051)
Pos. Mismatch		0.091*** (0.025)			0.091*** (0.025)
Neg. Mismatch		0.024 (0.019)			0.024 (0.019)
2nd-gen Immigrants x Discriminated			-0.088 (0.078)		-0.107 (0.077)
Discriminated			0.003 (0.044)		-0.019 (0.031)
2nd-gen (Father) x Foreign Language				-0.198 (0.175)	-0.215 (0.182)
Foreign Language				-0.002 (0.060)	0.006 (0.072)
R2	0.206	0.208	0.206	0.206	0.208
Observations	125107	100977	125107	125107	100977
Individual Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Destination#Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Origin F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: All specifications include controls for age, logarithm of income, dummy for female, two dummies for education, a dummy for marital status, dummy for children, dummy for urban resident, dummy for praying everyday, dummy for employment status, dummy for father's employment status and two dummies for father's occupational skill. *Pos. Mismatch* is a dummy that takes value of 1 if the skill content of father's occupation is higher than his education, while *Neg. Mismatch* is a dummy that takes value of 1 if the skill content of father's occupation is lower than his education. *Discriminated* is a dummy variable which report whether the individual perceive to belong to a discriminated group within the country. *Foreign Language* is a dummy equal to one if the main language spoken at home is different from the official language(s) of the country of residence. All specifications also include destination country-by-election FE and origin FE. Robust standard errors clustered at the country destination level. Significance levels: \*: 10% \*\*: 5% \*\*\*: 1%

Table 7: Migrant to native difference in left-to-right voting - EU21  
First-Generation Migrants

	All	Older than 45		Younger than 45		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All	All	More than 20 years of residence	All	More than 20 years of residence	Less than 20 years of residence
1st-gen Immigrants	-0.043* (0.022)	0.002 (0.034)	0.010 (0.035)	-0.098** (0.045)	-0.133*** (0.042)	-0.044 (0.153)
Observations	126334	125735	125655	124975	124859	124454
R2	0.207	0.207	0.207	0.208	0.208	0.207
Origin F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Individual Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Destination#Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: 1st-gen immigrants are respondents who are born abroad. All specifications include controls for age, logarithm of income, dummy for female, two dummies for education, a dummy for marital status, dummy for children, dummy for urban resident, dummy for praying everyday, dummy for employment status, dummy for father's employment status and two dummies for father's occupational skill. The table shows the results using as outcome the standardized left-to-right political position of the voted party. Column(1) presents the results over the whole sample of natives and first generation migrants. Columns (2) and (3) provide results over the sample of natives and first generation migrants over 45 years old, while columns (4) to (6) show the results over the sample of natives and first generation migrants younger than 45. Columns (3) and (5) kept migrant respondents that stay in the country more than 20 years, while column (6) keep migrant respondent that stay in the country less than 20 years. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Significance levels: \*: 10% \*\*: 5% \*\*\*: 1%

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# Appendix

## A Data Appendix

Our primary data source is the *European Social Survey (ESS)*. Established to monitor social change in Europe, the survey was administered in 9 waves/rounds (one every two years) in 36 countries between 2002 and 2018. The ESS is a repeated cross-section of a random sample of individuals which are representative of the national population over 18 in each country. On average, each wave contains around 1,500 individuals for each country. The data include detailed socio-demographic information on personal and family characteristics such as age, gender, education, marital status, number of children in the family, place of birth, labor market characteristics such as employment status, and NUTS2 region of residence.<sup>29</sup> It also includes detailed information on parental background, such as parents' education, employment status, occupation when the respondent was 14 years old, and their own country of birth.

ESS is composed of 'rotating modules', which are themes occasionally included across the waves, and a 'core module', which includes themes that are largely the same across rounds. Questions concerning individuals behavior and beliefs on political issues belong to the second group. Specifically on voting, which is the focus of this paper, ESS records individual's participation to national elections and voting choice, by asking the following question: "*which party did you vote for in the last national election?*". Individuals respond by identifying party names, and we link these party names to information on their political agenda obtained from the *Manifesto Project Database (MPD)*. Widely used among political scientists and economists as the most comprehensive and accurate source to compare parties' agenda and ideology across countries and over time (Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006; Moriconi et al., 2022), the MPD analyzes the political manifesto of 1,093 parties over 715 parliamentary elections covering all the countries and the years we consider.<sup>30</sup> Each party's political manifesto is analyzed through a content analysis.

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<sup>29</sup>ESS data provides information on the location of respondents based on the "Nomenclature for Territorial Units for Statistics" (NUTS) system at the regional level (NUTS2) for all EU countries, with a few exceptions (e.g. Austria, Germany, UK) where the local units identified are larger (NUTS1).

<sup>30</sup>The MPD includes all parties that participated in national elections and obtained at least one seat in their country's parliament over the 1945-2017 period, covering all democratic countries in the OECD and Eastern Europe.

Specifically, the MPD provides the share of quasi-sentences related to each specific political topic as a fraction of all sentences in the manifesto. Such share is taken as a measure of the relevance of the political topic (or intensity of that political position) in analysis in the party's political agenda. Additionally, for a wide range of topics, MPD provides the share of favorable/positive and unfavorable/negative mentions, which allow to better grasp parties' stance on relevant topics (e.g. Welfare state, societies' values, etc.).

Table A-1: Elections and ESS Rounds by Country and Year

Country	(1) # Elections	(2) Election Years	(3) # Survey Rounds	(4) Survey Years
Austria	5	2002, 2006, 2008, 2013, 2017	7	2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2014, 2016, 2018
Belgium	4	2003, 2007, 2010, 2014	8	2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018
Czech Republic	5	2002, 2006, 2010, 2013, 2017	7	2004, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018
Denmark	4	2001, 2005, 2007, 2011	6	2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, (2018)
Estonia	4	2003, 2007, 2011, 2015	8	2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018
Finland	4	2003, 2007, 2011, 2015	8	2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018
France	4	2002, 2007, 2012, 2017	8	2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018
Germany	5	2002, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017	8	2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018
Greece	3	2004, 2007, 2009	3	2004, 2010, 2012
Hungary	4	2002, 2006, 2010, 2014	8	2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018
Ireland	4	2002, 2007, 2011, 2016	8	2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018
Lithuania	3	2008, 2012, 2016	5	2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, (2018)
Netherlands	5	2003, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2017	8	2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018
Norway	5	2001, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017	8	2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018
Poland	3	2005, 2007, 2011	5	2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014
Portugal	5	2002, 2005, 2009, 2011, 2015	7	2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, (2018)
Slovakia	4	2002, 2006, 2010, 2012	5	2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, (2018)
Slovenia	4	2004, 2008, 2011, 2014	6	2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016
Spain	4	2004, 2008, 2011, 2016	7	2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, (2018)
Sweden	4	2002, 2006, 2010, 2014	7	2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, (2018)
Switzerland	4	2003, 2007, 2011, 2015	8	2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018
United Kingdom	5	2001, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2017	8	2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018

Note: Column (1) shows the number of elections available from ESS and column (2) the year of each elections. Column (3) shows the number of ESS waves by country and column (4) the year of each round. In parenthesis the year of the waves not available yet. Source: ESS.

We include in our sample only OECD countries that participated to economic integration processes in Europe (i.e. EU or EFTA). In practice, we exclude non-OECD countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Romania, Russia and Serbia) and non-European OECD countries (Turkey, Israel, Cyprus). We also exclude Latvia and Luxembourg, for which we observe only one electoral event during the sample period, and Italy, given the extremely small share of migrants' children reported. As reported in Table A-1, this process leaves 19 OECD countries belonging to the European Union (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden), plus Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This constitutes a balanced sample including



economically integrated European democracies at a similar stage of economic development, plus some Central Eastern countries, which have a recent experience with economic integration and democratic institutions.


As ESS data convey information on the vote cast by each respondent in the *most recent* national election, the survey rounds carried out between 2004 and 2018 report the votes of respondents in elections held during the 2001-2018 period. Since some consecutive survey rounds have been conducted without any electoral occurrence between them, the respondents to different waves may provide voting preferences associated with the same electoral event. This is better understood by looking at Table A-1, which reports the number and year of elections covered by ESS for each country in columns (1) and (2), and the number and years of the surveys in columns (3) and (4).

In the case of France, for instance, the survey records respondents *most recent* voting behavior every two years between 2004 and 2018 (column (4)) but there are French national elections only in 2002, 2007, 2012 and 2017. Hence the vote in the 2002 elections was the one recorded both in 2004 and 2006 ESS, the vote in 2007 was recorded in the 2008 and 2010 ESS waves and the vote in 2012 was recorded in 2014 and 2016. When the survey and election years corresponded (e.g. in France in 2012, or Sweden in 2010 and 2014), we use the exact dates of the ESS interviews (i.e. including months and days if needed) to determine which is the most recent national elections in which the respondent participated. Following this procedure, we map countries' election-year into survey years. The time-variation in political indicators, in our analysis is across election-years (rather than survey-years).

Among the several political dimensions available in the MPD, we focus our attention on the *left-to-right* index proposed by Budge and Laver (2016). This index is constructed as the difference between a party positive stance on political preferences associated with the right, such as pro-free market, pro-economic incentives, pro-traditional values and morality, and the positive stance on political preferences associated with the left, such as pro-welfare state, pro-public education, pro-market regulations and workers' rights. The index takes values between -74 (radical left-wing party) to +91 (radical right-wing party). The advantage of using such index is to rely on one synthetic measure that captures a key political dimension across parties.

Additionally, in the analysis we explore the role of parties' preferences towards individual political issues such as favouring the welfare state, public education expansion, support for labor rights, support for traditional values, internationalism and multiculturalism. Following Moriconi et al. (2022) we link measures of parties political preferences with the individual votes expressed through their voting behavior. Given the fact that we want to exploit differences driven by changes in voting preferences, for each party we compute a time-invariant average of the left-right index over our sample, such that variations are driven by voters' changes across parties and not changes in parties political stances. Moreover, to facilitate the interpretation of the variable, we standardize the left-to-right index with mean zero and standard deviation equal to one.

Figure A-1: Left-to-Right Index - Full Sample




Note: authors' calculations on MPD and ESS. Each dot shows party's standardized left-to-right index and election-specific votes' share across our sample of national elections.

Figure A-1 shows the distribution of parties over the standardized left-right index and their shares of votes. Parties' characterized by the highest share of votes locate themselves around the mean of the distribution, and around 80% of our parties are characterized by a standardized left-to-right value between -1.3 to 1.3. Nonetheless, there are still relevant parties characterized by both an high share of votes and relevant right wing stance (e.g, the *Swiss People's Party* or the *Slovak Democratic and Christian Union*) or left wing stance (e.g., *Podemos* or *Socialistisk Folkeparti* in Denmark), with a standardized left-to-right index above two in absolute terms.

Since our paper aims at exploring differences in terms of political preferences between natives

and second-generation immigrants, a coherent definition of the second group is needed. Following the literature, we define a second-generation immigrant as an individual born in the country of residence *and* with his/her father born abroad (Fernandez and Fogli, 2009).<sup>31</sup> In our final sample, we systematically exclude first-generation immigrants from the empirical analysis, since these migrants are less comparable to natives, and they are less likely to hold voting rights in the host country. Additionally, we remove from each of the 22 countries in the sample the origin groups with less than 10 observations based on father's origin, to avoid noise driven by small and not representative groups. Our final sample includes 156248 individuals (all of them born in the country of residence), of which 5219 are second-generation immigrants from 46 origin countries that span a large range of location and levels of economic development.

Figure A-2: Share of 2<sup>nd</sup>-Gen immigrants Citizens




Notes: authors' elaboration using ESS data. The histograms represent the share of 2<sup>nd</sup> generation migrants that are citizens of the country of residence

Below we present some figures and descriptive statistics for our sample of second-generation immigrants. In some cases, we find it useful to present figures for first-generation immigrants (i.e. living in the country of residence but born abroad) too, as a relevant comparison group. Nonetheless, an important relevant factors for our research is that the majority of our sample of second-generation immigrants hold citizenship status (i.e., right to vote). Figure A-2 shows the

<sup>31</sup>In Table B-2 we present evidence showing that having a foreign-born father affects more significantly political preferences compared to having a foreign-born mother. The cultural economics literature instead points out that the mother often provides a more effective transmission channel for specific traits of the culture of origin on sons/daughters preferences (Rodríguez-Planas and Sanz-de Galdeano, 2019).

country-specific share of second-generation migrants with citizenship, which is always close to one.

Figure A-3: Immigrants by Age Groups




Note: authors' calculation on ESS data. The Figure reports the share of first and second-generation immigrants over natives by age groups. Figure (a) reports the results for our overall sample, while Figure (b) reports the results for the Western European Countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The Netherlands and United Kingdom)

Figure A-3(a) shows the share of the two immigrant groups over natives by age groups. The incidence of 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants has a linear and declining trend over the age groups, suggesting that the overall size of 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrant population is increasing after each generational change. Compared to 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants, the incidence of first-generation immigrants is higher in almost all age groups (in line with Figure 2), it reaches its highest value among the 38-47 age group (6%) and it has an hump-shaped distribution over the age groups. The only notable exception is among the youngest cohort (18-27 y.o.) where the 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants have a higher incidence compared to first-generation immigrants. This suggestive evidence is confirmed once focusing on Western European countries in Figure A-3(b), characterized by a longer and different immigration history compared to Central Eastern countries (Van Mol and Valk, 2016).

Figure A-4 confirms the previous highlighted suggestive evidence, by plotting the average ratios between 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants and natives over different sub-periods. Over our period of analysis the incidence of 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants is increasing over time, and the growth is stronger among young cohorts (18-37 years old) compared to the overall 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants

Figure A-4: Share of second-generation migrants over different populations




Note: authors' calculation on ESS data. The figure shows the share of 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants over the natives population between 18 and 37 years old and across all age groups. The figure reports the average over four periods, and over the full sample and Western European countries only.

population. Moreover, the trend is stronger and more persistent among Western European countries than among Central Eastern European countries. These were characterized by a change in the distribution of young 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants in the 2005-2008 period, potentially caused by high emigration towards European Union countries after the access to the Schengen Area with the 2004 EU Enlargement.

Figure A-5 plots the broad area-specific average share of first and 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants over the total respective populations. We define the broad areas of origin by aggregating countries of origin using the same methodology adopted by EULFS statistics. Both distributions show that Europeans origins are the most represented ones, both for first and 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants: around 60% of immigrant population has European origins. Russian origin is the most represented group, which counts for the 14% of the 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants population in our sample, followed by German and Italian origins. Among not European countries, Turkish origin accounts for 6% of the 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants origin.


Finally, Figure A-6 explores the raw differences in political preferences between natives and 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants by plotting the normal density distribution of: (a) the standardized left-right index derived from respondent's voting preferences, and (b) the respondent self-placement

Figure A-5: Distribution by broad origins



Note: authors' calculation on ESS data. The figure plots the broad origin-specific share of first-generation (a) and second-generation (b) immigrants over their total population, respectively.

Figure A-6: Left to Right Preferences: voting and self-declared ideology



Note: authors' calculation on ESS data. The figure plots the normal density curves of natives and second-generation immigrants concerning the standardized left to right index (a) and self-declared left-to-right wing political stance (b).

over the left-to-right index. Both figures suggest that 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants are more likely to locate themselves on the left-wing political spectrum compared to natives.

## B Additional Results: Robustness Checks

In the section we firstly conduct a robustness analysis and produce both conditional and unconditional migrant-to-native differences, and results with alternative samples, specifications, and voting preferences over the more strict sample of EU21 countries (origin and destination).

Table B-1: Migrant to native difference - EU21 Sample  
Unconditional and Conditional Differences

	Individual Controls						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
2nd-gen Immigrants	-0.072*** (0.020)	-0.077*** (0.019)	-0.083*** (0.020)	-0.079*** (0.020)	-0.084*** (0.020)	-0.071*** (0.020)	-0.083*** (0.020)
Age		-0.004 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.014*** (0.004)		-0.014*** (0.004)
Age <sup>2</sup>		0.000*** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)		0.000*** (0.000)
Female		-0.052*** (0.012)	-0.055*** (0.011)	-0.051*** (0.011)	-0.075*** (0.011)		-0.075*** (0.011)
Secondary Edu.			-0.049 (0.033)	-0.052 (0.034)	-0.086** (0.030)		-0.097*** (0.027)
Tertiary Edu.			0.035** (0.017)	0.034** (0.016)	0.021* (0.011)		0.018 (0.011)
Married				0.095*** (0.014)	0.054*** (0.014)		0.055*** (0.015)
At least 1 child				0.041** (0.018)	0.025** (0.012)		0.025** (0.012)
Urban Area Resident					-0.118*** (0.036)		-0.121*** (0.035)
Log Household Income					0.089*** (0.025)		0.087*** (0.025)
Employed					0.030*** (0.010)		0.031*** (0.009)
Prays Everyday					0.218*** (0.052)		0.218*** (0.052)
Father Working						0.035** (0.016)	0.040*** (0.014)
Father High Skilled						0.013 (0.033)	0.047* (0.026)
Observations	150041	149738	148100	147124	126373	150041	126373
R2	0.193	0.196	0.197	0.200	0.206	0.193	0.206
Destination#Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Origin F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: 2<sup>nd</sup>-gen immigrants (by father) are respondents who are born in the destination country but whose father is not born in the destination country. Results are presented gradually including individual and parental controls. Robust standard errors clustered at the region and country level. Significance levels: \*: 10% \*\*: 5% \*\*\*: 1%

Table B-1 provides in column (1) the migrant-to-native differences in voting preferences unconditional to individual characteristics. Interestingly, the unconditional difference is not that

different from the conditional one presented in Table 2. By gradually adding individual and parental controls, Table B-1 shows that both conditional and unconditional migrant-to-native differences in voting preferences are rather similar. Additionally, excluding the country of origin fixed effects does not substantially influence the magnitude of the coefficient also in the unconditional specification.

Table B-2 considers an alternative definition of second generation migrant based on the country of origin of the mother (rather than the father). The negative coefficient is preserved, but its size drops by half, implying that mother's migration status is a less important channel of migrant-native voting differences in the residence country. These results are confirmed once exploring the role of played by parent's absence in the respondent's adolescence: father's absence is associated with a milder left-wing stance compared to mother's absence.

Table B-2: Migrant to native difference - EU21 sample  
Parents death & both immigrant parents

	(1) Mother's Definition	(2) Migrants' Parents	(3) Father's Death or Absence	(4) Mother's Death or Absence
2nd-gen (Mother)	-0.038 (0.027)	-0.038 (0.039)		-0.034 (0.026)
2nd-gen (Father)		-0.092*** (0.023)	-0.079** (0.029)	
2nd-gen (Father) x 2nd-gen (Mother)		0.080 (0.125)		
Father Death			0.031* (0.015)	
2nd-gen (Father) x Father Death			0.039 (0.147)	
Mother Death				-0.025 (0.025)
2nd-gen (Mother) x Mother Death				0.400** (0.168)
R2	0.206	0.206	0.207	0.207
Observations	125107	125107	123288	124193
Individual Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Destination#Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓
Origin F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: All specifications include controls for age, logarithm of income, dummy for female, two dummies for education, a dummy for marital status, dummy for children, dummy for urban resident, dummy for praying everyday, dummy for employment status, dummy for father's employment status and two dummies for father's occupational skill. They also include destination country-by-election and origin FE. Robust standard errors clustered at the country destination level. Significance levels: \*: 10% \*\*: 5% \*\*\*: 1%



## C Selection on Observables

Our main set of results presented in Section 3 shows that second-generation immigrants are more likely to vote for left wing parties compared to alike natives, hence after controlling for a relevant set of observable characteristics. In our main specification, the estimated coefficient is equal to -0.083, which is close to the coefficient associated to obtaining a secondary education degree.

Although our estimated results are conditional to respondent characteristics, part of the left wing stance of second-generation immigrants could be purely driven by their set of individual characteristics: if second-generation immigrants hold a distinctive set of individual characteristics compared to natives, and these characteristics are the ones that drives a left wing political stance, then our estimated coefficient could be partially explained by this selection on observable characteristics.

To quantify the potential role played by selection on observables, we firstly estimate the coefficients (and standard errors) related to our set of individual characteristics on the sample of *natives* (i.e., non-movers). In our model we control for country-by-election fixed-effects, and the standard errors are clustered at country of residence level. For each estimated coefficient we simulate a normal distribution using the estimated coefficient as mean and the estimated standard error as standard deviation, and we then randomly draw  $n \in \{1, \dots, 1000\}$  coefficients from the distribution. Figure C-9 reports for each of the estimated coefficient the simulated distribution built from the random draw of the coefficients.


We compute the average for each of the individual characteristic  $x \in \{1, \dots, X\}$  for the samples of natives and second-generation immigrants, and we construct the difference in average characteristics between second-generation immigrants and natives. Finally, we simulate the left wing stance of second generation immigrant based on selection on observables as follows:

$$Left_n = \sum_x^X \hat{\beta}_n^x (\bar{x}_{mig} - \bar{x}_{nat}). \quad (C-1)$$

Equation (C-1) provides the simulated left wing stance of immigrant, which is the sum of the difference in observable characteristic compared to natives times the predicted left leaning effect

associated to each characteristic, and proxied by the estimated coefficients ( $\hat{\beta}^x$ ). We compute the simulated left wing stance using the full simulated vector of estimated coefficient  $n \in \{1...1000\}$ , and Figure C-7(a) reports the distribution of the simulated left wing stance. The average effect is around -0.003, which is around 3.2% of the coefficient estimated in our benchmark equation.

Figure C-7: Simulated Left wing stance based on Selection on Observables



Note: authors' calculation on ESS data. The figure plot the distribution of the simulated left leaning stance of second-generation immigrants due to selection on observables. We first estimate the individual characteristic specific coefficient on the sample of natives, then we draw 1000 different estimated coefficients based on the point estimate and standard deviation of the estimated coefficient. Finally, we generate the simulated left wing stance based on observables by interacting the simulated coefficients with the difference between the average characteristics of migrants and natives. Figures (a) and (b) show the distribution after computing the country-specific differences in average immigrant and native characteristics, and then averaging them out both with respect to destination countries and origin countries. The solid line provides the average simulated effect.

As an alternative exercise, Figure C-7(b) and (c) shows the distribution of the simulated left wing stance of second-generation immigrants computing first the difference of migrant and native average characteristic at country level, and then averaging them out over the whole sample. We do this exercise both focusing on the country of residence (destination) and on the country of origin, as we present in the equations here below:


$$Left_n^D = \sum_x \hat{\beta}_n^x \frac{1}{D} \sum_d (\bar{x}_{mig}^d - \bar{x}_{nat}^d) \quad (C-2)$$

$$Left_n^O = \sum_x \hat{\beta}_n^x \frac{1}{O} \sum_o (\bar{x}_{mig}^o - \bar{x}_{nat}^o). \quad (C-3)$$

Compared to the exercise presented in equation (C-1), there are two main differences. First,

this approach put the exact same weight to each country-specific potential selection pattern. Second, by performing the exercise both on the country of residence and on country of origin, we could highlight potential selection on observables with respect to both populations. Focusing on destination countries, the simulated distribution of the left wing stance based on selection on observables is more disperse, but the average effect is still small and around -0.008, hence around 10% of our benchmark coefficient. Concerning the country of origin exercise, the simulation results show that, if any, second generation migrants compared to natives from the same country of origin holds characteristics that makes them slightly more right-wing: the average effect is equal to 0.012.

Figure C-8: Simulated Left wing stance based on Selection on Observables (1st-Gen)




Note: authors' calculation on ESS data. The figure plot the distribution of the simulated left leaning stance of first-generation immigrants due to selection on observables. We first estimate the individual characteristic specific coefficient on the sample of natives, then we draw 1000 different estimated coefficients based on the point estimate and standard deviation of the estimated coefficient. Finally, we generate the simulated left wing stance based on observables by interacting the simulated coefficients with the difference between the average characteristics of migrants and natives. Figures (a) and (b) show the distribution after computing the country-specific differences in average immigrant and native characteristics, and then averaging them out both with respect to destination countries and origin countries. The solid line provides the average simulated effect.

Finally, Figure C-8 replicates the simulation exercise focusing on the differences in observables between natives and first generation migrants. Focusing on the full sample averages, Figure C-8(a) shows that, if any, selection on observables of first generation migrants make them slightly more right wing compared to natives, with an average effect equal to 0.006. Once exploring the potential selection providing country-specific differences, first-generation migrants present a similar pattern of selection on observables of second generation migrants, both in terms of magnitude and direction of selection: a small and left-wing selection with respect to the country of residence (-0.017) and

a small and right-wing selection compared to the country of origin (0.011).

Figure C-9: Selection on Observables - Distribution of the simulated coefficients



Note: Authors' calculations on ESS data. The histograms show for each individual characteristics the distribution of the coefficients drawn from a normal distribution with mean and standard deviation equal to the size and the standard error of the estimated coefficient over the sample of natives. The simulated distribution of the coefficients is constructed over 1000 random drawn.

## D Simulations

To quantify the actual and potential contribution of  $2^{nd}$  generation immigrants to determining voting patterns of European countries, we perform a simulation exercise, based on observed and expected shares of  $2^{nd}$  generation immigrants over the total population of each country. We start by considering an initial time 0, where the degree of leftism of country  $c$  is a weighted average of the observed leftism of natives and incumbent  $2^{nd}$  generation immigrants:

$$\widehat{Leftism}_{c,0} = (1 - Share_{c,0}^{2nd})Leftism_{N,0} + (Share_{c,0}^{2nd})Leftism_{M,0}. \quad (D-4)$$

Equation (D-4) can be simplified as follows:

$$\widehat{Leftism}_{c,0} = Leftism_{c,N,0} + Share_{c,0}^{2nd} \times (Leftism_{c,M,0} - Leftism_{c,N,0}), \quad (D-5)$$

where the term in brackets is the average migrant-native difference predicted from equation (1), so that:

$$\widehat{Leftism}_{c,0} = Leftism_{c,N,0} + Share_{c,0}^{2nd} \times \widehat{\beta}. \quad (D-6)$$

$\widehat{Leftism}_{c,0}$  is the predicted average leftist content of voting of the population of country  $c$ , at hypothetical national elections taking place at time 0. Equation (D-6) shows this is equal to the leftism of the native population,  $N$ , of country  $c$  at time 0, plus the contribution of incumbent  $2^{nd}$  generation immigrants,  $M$  in the country, weighted by the corresponding share at time 0.

To properly evaluate the relative contribution of  $2^{nd}$  generation immigrants to the actual political outcomes of country  $c$ 's national elections, we propose a normalization of the indicator  $\widehat{Leftism}_{c,0}$ , based on the absolute value of the leftism of natives  $\|Leftism_{c,N,0}\|$ . This is a measure of increasing radicalization of political preferences of the native electorate (either to the right or to the left) in the country of destination. We divide both sides of equation (D-6) by  $\|Leftism_{c,N,0}\|$ , and obtain a predicted leftism measure normalized by natives' political preferences in country  $c$  at

time 0, i.e.  $\widehat{Leftism}_{c,0}^{Pol} = \frac{\widehat{Leftism}_{c,0}}{\|\widehat{Leftism}_{c,N,0}\|}$  such that:

$$\widehat{Leftism}_{c,0}^{Pol} = \frac{Leftism_{c,N,0}}{\|Leftism_{c,N,0}\|} + \frac{(Share_{c,0}^{2nd} \times \beta)}{\|Leftism_{c,N,0}\|}. \quad (D-7)$$

The first term in equation (D-7) is equal to  $-1$  or  $+1$  depending on whether natives of country  $c$  are on average left-leaning or right-leaning, respectively. The second term,  $\frac{(Share_{c,0}^{2nd} \times \beta)}{\|Leftism_{c,N,0}\|}$ , measures the normalized contribution of  $2^{nd}$  generation migrants. In practice, it tells us by how much immigrants reduce the right-wing stance (or increase the leftist stance) of the electorate in country  $c$  at time 0.<sup>32</sup>

While equation (D-7) points out the predicted contributions of incumbent migrants at time 0, we can use the same approach to compute some counterfactual scenarios. For example, we can imagine hypothetical scenarios where  $Share_{c,EXP}^{2nd} = \{10\%, 30\%, \dots\}$ . These are consistent with plausible shares of  $2^{nd}$  generation immigrant population for the US by 2050 according to Pew Research Center (2013):

$$\widehat{Leftism}_{c,EXP}^{Pol} = \frac{Leftism_{c,N,0}}{\|Leftism_{c,N,0}\|} + \frac{(Share_{c,EXP}^{2nd} \times \beta)}{\|Leftism_{c,N,0}\|} \quad (D-8)$$

Table D-1 reports results from the simulation exercises. We feature as average native preferences and share of immigrants at a hypothetical time 0, the corresponding country-specific averages over the electoral span covered by our ESS sample (e.g.  $Leftism_{FR,N,0}$  and  $Share_{FR,0}^{2nd}$  are country-specific average preferences and immigrant shares for France over electoral years 2002-2017). Columns (1) and (2) reports the average native leftism and share of  $2^{nd}$  generation migrants at time 0, respectively. The share is below 1% in Southern European countries (Greece being a relevant exception), while it is in the range between 3%-7% for continental European countries (e.g. Germany, France, Austria, Switzerland). Countries from Central Eastern Europe (with the

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<sup>32</sup>Recalling that  $\beta = -0.083$ , when native voters are right-wing on average,  $\frac{(Share_{c,0}^{2nd} \times \beta)}{\|Leftism_{c,N,0}\|} = (\widehat{Leftism}_{c,0}^{Pol} - 1)$ , incumbent immigrants reduce the right-wing stance of the electorate in country  $c$  at time 0. When the native electorate is left-wing on average,  $\frac{(Share_{c,0}^{2nd} \times \beta)}{\|Leftism_{c,N,0}\|} = (\widehat{Leftism}_{c,0}^{Pol} + 1)$ , migrants further polarize the national electorate, moving preferences of the average voter of country  $c$  at time 0 towards more extreme left-wing positions.

relevant exception of Estonia) present shares comprised between 2% and 5% of the national sample. Generally speaking, these percentages of migrant population do not produce significant departures of the average voter from the voting preferences of the native population (col. 3). The generalized increase in leftist stance is equivalent to up the 3% of native voting stance. Two notable exceptions are Belgium and Estonia. The former country presents a very moderate native population, so that the 5% share of 2<sup>nd</sup> generation migrants is enough to shift the preferences of the average Belgian voter by the 49% of the native voting stance. The latter country presents a relatively large share of 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants (11% of the national sample), able to reduce the right-wing stance of the Estonian average voter by the 4% .

Table D-1: Simulation: country-specific normalization

	$Leftism_{N,0}$	$\widehat{Leftism}_{c,0}^{Pol}$		$\widehat{Leftism}_{c,EXP}^{Pol}$	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
		$Sh_{c,0}^{2nd}$ [Avg]		$Sh_{c,0}^{2nd}$ [10%]	$Sh_{c,0}^{2nd}$ [30%]
Norway	-0,736	0,011	-1,00	-1,01	-1,03
Spain	-0,562	0,002	-1,00	-1,01	-1,04
France	-0,537	0,069	-1,01	-1,02	-1,05
Finland	-0,425	0,005	-1,00	-1,02	-1,06
Ireland	-0,380	0,018	-1,00	-1,02	-1,07
Austria	-0,354	0,042	-1,01	-1,02	-1,07
Sweden	-0,162	0,034	-1,02	-1,05	-1,15
Czech Republic	-0,134	0,030	-1,02	-1,06	-1,19
Belgium	-0,009	0,050	-1,49	-1,98	-3,93
Portugal	0,021	0,003	0,99	0,61	-0,17
Slovenia	0,136	0,056	0,97	0,94	0,82
Lithuania	0,165	0,039	0,98	0,95	0,85
United Kingdom	0,209	0,044	0,98	0,96	0,88
Germany	0,233	0,044	0,98	0,96	0,89
Estonia	0,245	0,111	0,96	0,97	0,90
Denmark	0,249	0,013	1,00	0,97	0,90
Hungary	0,455	0,018	1,00	0,98	0,95
Poland	0,525	0,020	1,00	0,98	0,95
Switzerland	0,577	0,048	0,99	0,99	0,96
Netherlands	0,598	0,030	1,00	0,99	0,96
Slovakia	1,122	0,021	1,00	0,99	0,98

Notes: authors calculations. Column (3) reports the results of equation (D-7), while columns (4) and (5) show the results of equation (D-8) with respectively the following shares of second-generation immigrants: 0.10 and 0.30.

Columns (4)-(5) simulate hypothetical shifts of the preferences of the average voter in each country, under the scenarios described above. Two facts seem to emerge very clearly. First, migration has a very limited impact on the average voter of most Western European countries, whose natives exhibit political preferences clearly located on one of the two sides of the left-to-right



political spectrum. For instance, Switzerland, Netherlands, or Poland have very right-wing native voters, while Spain, Finland, and France are characterized by very left-leaning voters. In these countries, even the scenario where half of the population is composed of 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants implies a shift of the preferences of the average voter by no more than 10%. Second, in some Southern and Central European countries such as Slovenia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Greece, the long-term effects of migration on the average voter may be sizeable: in these countries the high migration incidence scenario is associated with a left-wing shift of the preferences of the average voter by over 15%. In a country like Portugal, where the native population has very moderate political preferences, the leftism of the average voter increases by 117% as 2<sup>nd</sup> generation migrants touch the 30% of the total population.