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Han, Joseph

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Delivery

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In the expanding landscape of the platform economy, the rapid rise in the number of platform workers underscores a critical issue: the need for social protection for those not covered by conventional labor laws. Recognizing the transformative impact and significant societal value of the platform economy, it becomes essential to rethink the legal classification of platform workers, moving beyond the traditional "employee" versus "business owner" dichotomy. This paper argues that while platform workers might exhibit similar work patterns, the protection they receive should be proportionate to the labor monopsony power exerted by the platforms they associate with. A harmonized approach that aligns labor and competition policies is crucial to address these challenges.

Designing Social Protections for Platform Workers

Joseph Han, Fellow at KDI

I. Expansion of Platform Labor and Discussions on Social Protection

Today, platform labor is experiencing a swift expansion both in scope and magnitude. In the current digital-driven economic landscape, it is increasingly commonplace to observe individuals drawing income from online platforms, commonly referred to as "platform workers." This cohort primarily comprises delivery personnel affiliated with delivery applications daily transitioning between various locations, in addition to taxi and ride-hailing professionals adept at pinpointing client locations. Beyond these immediate examples, the scope of platform labor stretches from routine services such as cleaning, home maintenance, and childcare to specialized fields like IT, graphic design, language translation, and financial consultancy.

Accurately quantifying the number of individuals engaged in platformcentric tasks remains a challenge,¹⁾ primarily due to the prevalence of non-traditional and short-term positions, leading to considerable variance in size depending on statistical definitions. Nonetheless, their rapid growth is undeniable. A survey by the Korea Employment Information Service (KEIS) highlighted a 32% increase in the number of individuals "who earned income in the preceding three months by providing specific services to consumers through tasks assigned or facilitated by online platforms" in the latter half of 2022, relative to the same period in 2021. Even when considering only those platforms that not only offer information but also actively delegate tasks, there was a notable 20% growth in 2022 compared to 2021.²⁾

The platform workforce's rapid expansion is a global trend anticipated to continue. For instance, the European Union (EU) projects its growth to surpass 50% by 2025 compared to its 2022 levels.³⁾ While the rise of non-face-to-face sectors during the COVID-19 pandemic contributed to this trend, a more profound driving force is the shift of traditional industries towards online platforms. This movement, coupled with digital transformation and swift advancements in artificial intelligence (AI), enables platform businesses to engage users with tailored services powered by data and AI algorithms. The network effect, where the value of a service increases with more users, has led to a concentrated user base gravitating towards specific online platforms.

^{*} Summarized and adapted from Lee, Hwa Ryung and Joseph Han, Economic Analysis of Platform Labor: Focusing on Platforms' Monopsony Power on Labor Demand and Designing Social Protections, Research Monograph 2022-08, Korea Development Institute, 2022 (in Korean).

¹⁾ Depending on the definition of platform workers, their representation ranges from 1-3% of the total workforce to 10% or more.

²⁾ However, when examining "potential platform workers" based on occupation, this trend does not hold. For instance, aggregating short-term workers (temporary day laborers and sole proprietors) within primary platform occupations (subcategories) does not yield a significant surge on a grand scale (Hwaryeong Lee and Josef Han, 2022). Coupled with the survey results from KEIS, this data suggests a rapid shift towards the platform economy, particularly within these vocational areas.

³⁾ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/platform-work-eu

While the growth of platform workers presents numerous benefits, recent developments have spotlighted a few notable concerns. The growth of platform labor, aligned with the expansion of the platform economy, presents numerous positive facets. For instance, digital platform companies excel at connecting service providers with consumers through subscriber data, providing consumers with an unmatched degree of convenience and satisfaction. This, in turn, creates potential avenues for workers to secure higher incomes. Furthermore, the employment opportunities generated by these platforms are appealing, especially given their flexibility, which contrasts markedly with the rigidity of traditional organizational hierarchies and set working hours and locations.

Recently, howerver, several negative implications have come to light. Platform workers are often categorized as freelancers or independent contractors. As a result, despite undertaking responsibilities similar to traditional employees, they are not safeguarded by labor laws nor entitled to social insurance benefits. When their roles resembling that of employees, classifying these workers as merely freelancers or independent contractors subjects them to undue risks. Furthermore, platform companies may attain competitive edges less from technological or managerial innovations and more from sidestepping labor regulations—"regulatory arbitrage." As the platform economy expands, these concerns might infiltrate an even broader array of sectors.

Beyond the platform workers who function in roles reminiscent of regular employees, there are many platform workers who are close to genuinely freelancers or independent contractors. When engaging through platforms, these individuals face a host of challenges, including high brokerage fees, unpredictable contract modifications or terminations, and potential disputes with consumers. As some platform companies strive to amplify network effects, they often prioritize consumer benefits, sometimes operating at minimal or even zero profit margins. This strategy could result in substantially diminished earnings for platform workers. The discourse surrounding social protection for platform workers has been active, primarily revolving around the question of acknowledging their status as workers.

The approach needs to be about reconciling the characteristics of the platform economy with genuinely effective protection for its workers. Against this backdrop, the social protection of platform workers has emerged as a pivotal issue both nationally and globally. Central to this discussion is the legal debate surrounding "misclassification." A prime example is the ongoing global dispute over the status of Uber driversonce iconic figures in the gig economy-as either employed workers or independent contractors.⁴⁾ Addressing concerns related to "false (fake) self-employed" individuals—those who masquerade as business owners to circumvent labor regulations while effectively functioning as employees—is imperative. Such measures are crucial not only to safeguard the rights of these workers but also to curtail regulatory arbitrage.

The realities facing platform workers are so diverse and intricate that the "misclassification" debate alone falls short. An absolutist "all or nothing" stance won't adequately protect platform workers who span a spectrum of roles, from authentic business owners to bona fide employees. Such a rigid framework might result in over-regulation, potentially stifling the innovation and job growth vital for the Korean economy. While the discourse around platform workers might evoke memories of the "persons in special types of employment" debates sparked by the last Asian financial crisis, the two discussions have fundamental differences. These differences lie not only in market structures but also in unique service innovations and the race for a pioneering global edge driven by platforms. Moreover, the competitive trajectory of platform companies in Korea diverges from patterns seen in the US and EU (Yang and Lee, 2021).

This paper discusses an approach that underscores the monopsony power platforms wield over labor demand. To elucidate the distinct position of platform workers—who straddle the roles of business owners and employees—the subsequent sections will employ empirical analysis to examine the labor monopsony intrinsic to platforms. Following this analysis, the paper delineates methodologies for crafting social protection tailored to their specific needs.

⁴⁾ The status of workers, particularly in the gig economy, has sparked intense debates across various nations. For instance, both the Supreme Court of France in March 2020 and the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in February 2021 ruled that Uber drivers—a prominent example of platform labor—are workers. In January 2020, the U.S. state of California, where Uber's headquarters is situated, passed Assembly Bill 5 (AB-5) affirming the worker status of Uber drivers. However, this stance was challenged in November 2020 with the passage of a ballot measure, Proposition 22 (Prop 22), which negated AB-5. Prop 22 provided a 120% minimum wage guarantee and restricted overtime work to a maximum of 12 hours per day. The legal standing of Prop 22 has been a point of contention: while it was initially deemed unconstitutional, a later court ruling confirmed its legality. The legal battle persists.

II. Platforms' Monopsony Power and the Elasticity of Labor Supply

By focusing on the labor monopsony inherent to platforms, we can objectively assess the necessity of social protection for platform workers, incorporating discussions on both labor and fair trade policies.

In this paper, ICT software developer platforms and delivery app platforms are investigated as representative examples of web-based freelance platforms and locallybased labor provision platforms, respectively. While the term "monopsony power" might be less familiar to some, it serves as the symmetrical counterpart to the more frequently encountered term "monopoly power." Just as a firm with monopoly power can impose a mark-up on consumers above its production costs, a firm with monopsony power in demand can effectively set a mark-down on platform workers, paying them below the value they generate.

By directing attention to the monopsony power inherent to platforms, relevant discussions can achieve a broader scope to include both labor policies for workers and antitrust policies for businesses. At their core, these policies share a goal: to adjust actual contractual power by moderating the principle of contractual freedom for substantive equality between contracting parties. Integral concepts in these debates, such as "exclusivity" and "economic dependence" in the context of employment status, or "superior bargaining position" and "market power" in antitrust considerations, are directly or indirectly linked to the notion of "monopsony power" on labor demand. Irrespective of how platform workers are classified, the economic substance of "monopsony power" provides a consistent basis for determining their need for social protection. Additionally, by empirically defining and measuring the monopsony power, the need for their social protection can be assessed with greater objectivity. Sectors exhibiting pronounced monopsony power will likely face a more extensive and robust imperative for social safeguards.

This paper investigates the conditions of platform workers, with a focus on the monopsony power wielded by platforms. Broadly, labor-supplying platforms can be divided into two categories: web-based and location-based (Jang et al., 2020). For illustrative purposes, this paper examines ICT software developers as a primary example of web-based freelance platforms and delivery app workers for location-based labor platforms. While no singular case can encapsulate the entirety, each instance provides valuable insights for its category and contributes to a comprehensive understanding.

Here, distinct methodologies are employed to assess the monopsony power in each context. For the ICT software developer platform, the elasticity of labor supply was directly estimated using data from actual job postings and applications to ascertain the extent of labor monopsony. Conversely, for delivery apps, surveys were conducted among delivery app workers. Their feedback, combined with a consumer-focused analysis that accounts for dynamics, offers insights While the labor supply elasticity offers an empirical estimate of monopsony power, the platform economy necessitates a broader examination of additional factors. into the multi-homing status and the ease of switching between platforms from both worker and consumer viewpoints. Based on these findings, the paper draws conclusions about the monopsony power inherent to each platform.

Labor monopsony power is inversely related to labor supply elasticity. This elasticity can be empirically quantified by estimating the degree to which labor suppliers adjust to a decrease in labor prices. If labor supply cannot be reduced despite a decrease in its price, this signals strong monopsony power on the side of labor demand. However, the discourse on labor monopsony within the platform economy possesses a distinct uniqueness, setting it apart from broader dialogues. Specifically, when considering competition among platforms, it is vital to account for both (or multifaceted) sides of the consumer-supplier relationship beyond merely assessing the platform's monopoly status or market concentration.⁵⁾

This section examines web-based freelance labor markets, with a specific emphasis on the ICT software developer labor market. This particular market epitomizes a shift toward freelancer-centric operations. As companies grapple with the complexities of managing software development staff and swift technological evolution, they increasingly turn to specialized external firms or individual experts (Lee et al., 2019). In the system integration (SI) domain, software customization tailored to individual companies results in a marked reliance on freelance professionals.

This section estimates the monopsony power of platforms, particularly focusing on in-house contractors potentially more at risk. Data was collected from one of the leading IT platforms through daily web scraping of online project postings from April to September 2022. This dataset is used to measure the correlation between changes in per capita monthly income and the duration of job vacancies. Fundamentally, the analysis investigated how vacancy duration lengthens (or shortens) as the offered income rises (or falls). This

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Status of

Platforms -

ICT Software Developers

Platform Workers:

(1) Web-based

⁵⁾ Consider a scenario in the platform economy where one party commits exclusively to a single platform (single-homing) while the other engages with multiple platforms (multi-homing). Even with the presence of multiple platforms in the market, competition may still be stifled (Armstrong, 2006; Armstrong and Wright, 2007). In such situations of competitive bottlenecks, platforms might intensify their competition to attract more single-homing users (consumers), and this heightened competition can lead to strategies that diminish the earnings of multi-homing users.

As for in-house contracts in the ICT developer platform, an empirical analysis shows that its labor monopsony power is on par with that of the typical labor market. relationship between job vacancy duration and income fluctuations represents labor supply elasticity.

The results in Table 1 reveal that an increase in per capita monthly income corresponds to shorter vacancy durations. Without controlling the specificities of contracts or the characteristics of individuals or firms, a 1% rise in per capita monthly income led to a 0.2% reduction in job vacancy duration (measured in days). This observation could be attributed to the blending of different contract types in the dataset. After accounting for various variables, including job sector, project scale, geographical location, and capability for remote work, the estimates become markedly more pronounced. They approach a value of 1, especially when controlling for firm-fixed effects.

Given the average labor supply elasticity is estimated to be near 1 in the preceding study (e.g., Webber, 2015), the labor monopsony of domestic ICT freelance platforms is on par with that of an average user in a conventional labor market. This value is also five to ten times greater than the existing labor supply elasticity estimates for online platforms (e.g., Dube et al., 2020). Such findings indicate that the monopsony power wielded by these platforms in the local ICT freelance market may not be as strong as predicted.

These findings indicate that, even for the potentially more vulnerable in-house contractors in the ICT software developer market, there seems to be little compelling need for active governmental intervention beyond standard contractual safeguards. Historically, ICT software developer platforms have predominantly functioned as information providers and transaction facilitators, with a number of platforms engaging in meaningful competition.

Dependent variable: Log (duration of job vacancy)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Log (per capita monthly income)	-0.198*** (0.061)	-0.363*** (0.103)	-0.502*** (0.112)	-0.736*** (0.124)	-1.052*** (0.383)
Fixed effects (Time: Month)	\vee	\vee	\vee	\vee	V
Fixed effects (Task, sector, and number of persons)		\vee	\vee	\vee	\vee
Fixed effects (Region, work-from-home)			\vee	\vee	\vee
Fixed effects (Skill)				\vee	\vee
Fixed effects (Firm (developer))					V
Observations	1,419	1,419	1,419	1,417	1,417

Table 1. Estimation of Labor Supply Elasticity

Note: () denote standard errors clustered at the firm level, and *** p < 0.01.

Source: Reproduced with slight modifications from Lee and Han (2022), p. 54, Table 4-3.

IV. Status of Platform Workers: (2) Location-based Platforms - Delivery App Workers

In the delivery app market, it is imperative to examine the competitive dynamics among platforms from the standpoints of delivery app providers and consumers. Of particular interest is understanding the reasons and frequency of individuals using multiple apps at the same time (multihoming), along with the ease of switching between platforms.

From the consumer perspective, the entry of newer players and heightened competition among delivery apps have increased multi-homing and reduced market dominance. Next, this study turns its attention to the delivery app market as a prime example of location-based platforms. According to the Online Shopping Survey by Statistics Korea (2023), online food product transactions saw a marked increase, rising from 9.7 trillion won in 2019 to 26.6 trillion won in 2022.

The discussion surrounding the employment status of delivery app workers has been longstanding. From the perspective of this paper, this highlights potential concerns about substantial monopsony power wielded by delivery app platforms. Unlike the ICT software developer platforms discussed earlier, delivery apps are not simply viewed as intermediary platforms. These platforms exert significant influence over riders' compensation and working conditions, suggesting their dominant position vis-à-vis the riders.

The delivery app market, characterized by the dominance of three primary apps, might experience constraints in individual platform market power due to competition among them. In simpler terms, an individual delivery app platform could struggle to enforce pay and working conditions distinct from its competitors. In the platform economy, especially in the absence of a clear dominant platform, the ability of consumers and delivery workers—on both ends of the platform economy—to easily switch between or use multiple delivery app platforms concurrently becomes especially pertinent. Therefore, it is crucial to investigate the reasons behind platform choices from the viewpoints of both consumers and delivery app workers.

This paper leverages data on the app preferences of Korean consumers to examine the standing of delivery apps and the intensity of competition in the consumer market. Panel data from a survey documenting the behavioral tendencies of Korean delivery app users sheds light on the evolving competitive dynamics over time.

The data reveals a significant surge in both the overall user count and the proportion of multi-homing users, especially in the latter half of 2020 (Figure 1). Accounting for potential duplicate counts of multihoming users, the adjusted user count has shown a steady increase since 2019, with a sharp uptick in the latter half of 2020. This rise coincides with the rapid emergence of Coupang Eats, where the portion of consumers using multiple apps soared from roughly 40% to over 60% during this timeframe. Initially, this trend was prominent in the capital region, but similar patterns emerged slightly later in noncapital regions.



In addition, the market concentration index (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: HHI) for (major) delivery apps was already notably high before 2020, surpassing 4,000.⁶⁾ However, there was a sharp decline in the latter half of 2020 (Figure 2). While it remains at a level that's hard to deem low, it's nearing the 2,500 benchmark, which is typically viewed as high. Similarly, this trend initially emerged in the capital area and subsequently manifested in non-capital regions after a brief delay.



Note: 1) "HHI_Major Delivery Apps" assumes that the market is composed of only Baedal Minjok, Yogiyo, and Coupangits, while "HHI_Delivery Apps" considers all delivery apps.

2) Here, HHI is based on user counts and includes duplicate counts of multi-homing users. *Source:* Lee and Han (2022), p. 94, Table 5-10.

6) Given the overlap of multi-homing users in calculations, a discrepancy might emerge between the HHI and actual market dominance, depending on the proportion of these multi-homing users. Another perspective to consider involves delivery app workers. The KDI survey carried out in September 2022 incorporated detailed queries regarding the use of multiple platforms and the costs tied to transitioning between them, thus providing a richer dataset than earlier surveys.

Usage patterns among platform workers can be generally classified into shifters and non-shifters. Shifters are those who interact with multiple platforms and move between them. The KDI survey highlighted that approximately 47% of delivery (agency) app riders used two or more delivery apps simultaneously (multi-homing). On the other hand, 14% relied on a single delivery app but might switch to another over time (single-homing/shifting). The remaining 40% consistently used only one delivery app (Table 2).

	(Number of persons, %)			
Platform usage flexibility	Types	Number of respondents (%)		
Shifter	Multi-homing	132 (46.5)		
	Single-homing/Switching	39 (13.7)		
Non-shifter	Single-homing	113 (39.8)		

Table 2. Classification of Delivery App Usage Patterns

Note: Single-homing is defined as using only one app in the past year. *Source*: Lee and Han (2022), p. 71, Table 5-2.

Delivery app riders generally view themselves as wage workers. While they enjoy considerable flexibility in tasks and working hours, they are Responses on the reasons behind platform usage patterns suggest that, while there is fierce competition among delivery app platforms to attract more consumers, the rivalry for securing riders might be less intense (Lee and Han, 2022). The survey data reveals that riders predominantly engage with multiple platforms "due to insufficient income or to enhance income," suggesting that their engagement across several platforms might not be entirely by choice. Many riders committed to a single platform cited "the challenges of juggling multiple apps" and the perceived "benefits of remaining loyal to one platform." Such observations hint at potential intrinsic or externally imposed costs in transitioning between platforms. As a result, a surge in consumer demand may not necessarily translate to better conditions for those working on these platforms.

Upon closer examination of the working conditions of delivery app workers, many of these concerns become more apparent. About 71% of these workers expressed that their jobs resemble traditional paid work despite the limited control the apps have over tasks, working hours, and idle intervals (Table 3). While these sentiments are subjective and may not accurately reflect reality, a notable portion of also subject to significant ex-post oversight through performance evaluations. respondents mentioned that their pay is determined by the apps and that there is a system in place to evaluate their performance through mechanisms like ratings and reviews (Table 3). Detailed feedback suggests a high likelihood of work limitations or even account suspension based on such performance evaluations (Lee and Han, 2022).

In sum, these findings suggest that while there are reasons for those concerns about labor monopsony in relation to delivery apps, there is also a growing chance that their influence may be diminishing over time. From a consumer perspective, competition among platforms is intensifying, with newer entrants diluting market concentration and more users opting for multi-homing. However, for delivery app workers or riders, this heightened competition does not necessarily lead to better working conditions because elements like involuntary participation due to insufficient earnings and high switching costs complicate shifts between platforms. Moreover, even with the flexibility to determine their own working schedule, there is still a considerable level of oversight exerted by platforms through post-task evaluations and task allocation algorithms.

		Average	Median	
App paying riders	App pays (=1, customer/restaurant pays=0)	0.93	1	
Dislaws way in a the same	One-time subscription fee (=1)	0.25	0	
Riders paying the app	Platform usage fee/commissions (=1)	0.47	0	
(Self-assessed) Employment types	Wage earner (=1, Sole proprietor/self-employed=0	0) 0.71	1	
	Eligible for four major social insuranc workplace (=1)	esat 0.55	1	
How much contro does the app have	Determined by the app in choosing tasks (%)	33.8	20.0	
	Reward level: determined by the app (=1)	0.86	1	
	Working hours: determined by the app (=1)	0.15	0	
	No freedom to schedule changes (=1)	0.09	0	
	Job performance evaluation (=1)	0.58	1	
	Personal use of waiting time not allowed (=1)	0.25	0	
Number of respondents			284	

Table 3. Working Experiences with the Main Platform

Source: Lee and Han (2022), p. 83, Table 5-11.

V.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations: Designing Social Protection Based on Platforms' Monopsony Power

Discussions regarding the protection of domestic platform workers have primarily revolved around the issue of recognizing their status as employees. While such distinctions are undeniably vital, the rigid dichotomy of employee versus business owner impedes a deeper understanding of the intricate nature of their real-world roles. Consequently, this often results in inadequate measures to address the protection needs of a vast majority of platform workers.

This paper began by analyzing the status of platform workers through the perspective of platforms' monopsony power over labor demand. It conducted an empirical analysis to estimate monopsony power in the prime examples of both web-based freelance and location-based labor supply platforms. For the ICT software developer platforms (web-based freelance platforms), the estimated monopsony power aligns with general labor market levels and does not raise immediate concerns. On the other hand, delivery apps (location-based platforms) presented riders with hurdles such as algorithm-driven oversight and barriers to platform switching. These findings suggest potential concerns about pronounced monopsony power. Furthermore, the recent rise in competition among platforms and increased consumer multi-homing call for careful monitoring of these evolving dynamics.

As platform sectors exhibit varied competitive conditions and the protective requirements of platform workers differ, adopting universal criteria might risk either under-regulation or over-regulation. This complexity arises because platforms' monopsony power is not uniform across sectors. Furthermore, its magnitude can vary, reflecting shifts in the competitive landscape.

To safeguard platform workers effectively while still fostering platformdriven innovation, policies must be flexible yet unified, with the primary aim of curbing platforms' monopsony over labor demand and averting potential abuses. Moreover, given that intensifying competition among platforms might not directly alleviate issues tied to their labor monopsony power, there's a pressing need to bridge the divide between antitrust policies, which aim to enhance competition, and labor policies tailored to protect workers with limited bargaining capabilities.

In situations where there is ambiguity in classifying platform workers as either paid or self-employed, the prudent course of action starts from categorizing them as self-employed given the current regulatory landscape. However, their social protection should be proportionally determined by assessing the platform's monopsony power. When a

To ensure the effective protection of platform workers while allowing platform-driven innovation, policies must be both flexible and unified under the goal of curbing platforms' monopsony power over labor demand and preventing potential abuses. significant degree of this monopsony power is either directly measured or reasonably expected, the extent of regulatory intervention can be proportionately heightened. When the monopsony power decreases, these interventions may need to be adjusted accordingly.

For instance, when a platform's monopsony power surpasses a designated threshold, it might be interpreted as the platform having a "superior bargaining position." Platforms with this distinction could then be subject to regulations aimed at preventing the misuse of such power. Although this criterion could be relevant for a broader group of workers,⁷⁾ it holds special significance for platform workers, given that a platform's monopsony power can be readily quantified through data analysis.

Furthermore, regulations on algorithmic transparency can be incrementally fortified based on the extent of monopsony power. Previous discussions have shed light on self-preferencing issues. Specifically, concerns have been raised by mobile app developers regarding the ranking systems in app stores like Google and Apple. Debates have also emerged around perceived self-favoritism in certain domestic mobility apps. As labor monopsony power becomes more pronounced, the push for greater algorithmic transparency intensifies in parallel. It is posited that platforms should be obligated to establish transparent criteria, incorporate post-implementation human reviews, and offer mechanisms for users to challenge automated task allocations. Such interventions should be viewed as crucial "guardrails" in the rapidly evolving landscape of AI.

Competition among platforms can lead to improved working conditions, including better compensation, as they vie for platform workers, emphasizing the important role of traditional competition policies. Yet, even when multiple platforms are in competition, restricted worker mobility might allow a single platform to maintain monopsony control. This underscores the importance of actively reducing barriers for workers transitioning between platforms or into wage-based roles. In situations where a platform demonstrates significant monopsony power over labor demand, considering measures such as limiting multi-homing restrictions, curbing preferential treatment clauses, or enhancing data portability becomes essential. Broadly speaking, including the standpoint of labor policy, there's a potential need to discourage non-compete clauses,

⁷⁾ The recently introduced "Guidelines on Review of Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position to Labor Providers" (formerly "Guidelines on Review of Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position to Persons in Special Types of Employment") shares a similar purpose, targeting all labor providers.

commonly included by default, or even to review their removal. Additionally, the standardization of work-related data for each platform worker, facilitating its transferability or validation as evidence of work experience, is also worth consideration.

Also, there is a compelling need to establish basic protections for all labor providers since promoting competition among platforms or reinforcing fair trade policies among businesses might be insufficient to protect individual workers. Such protections encompass provisions like safety guidelines, health regulations, and workers' compensation. These fundamental safeguards serve not only as a basic human rights guarantee, but also as a countermeasure to platforms' monopsony power. Limiting these protections solely to "platform workers" could result in unintended outcomes. Consequently, extending these safeguards universally to all labor providers is recommended. However, setting this protection bar too high might inadvertently hamper the growth of the platform economy or lead to unintended advantages in regulatory grey areas. In this regard, it is crucial to determine these standards carefully with a comprehensive review of the current economic situation.

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