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
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Donations to increase productivity in public good production: experimental evidence

Natalie Struwe^a, Esther Blanco^{a,b}, James M. Walker^{b,c}

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Abstract: This research is inspired by in-kind donations that have the capacity to increase the marginal benefit (productivity) in provision of public goods, for example by providing critical infrastructure that increases the productivity of resources utilized by local public good providers. We provide experimental evidence from a two-stage decision environment where donors (outsiders), who benefit from a public good, send transfer donations to providers (insiders) of the public good, who also receive benefits. We find that that donors are willing to offer transfers at a sufficiently high level to increase the productivity (MPCR) of the public good. Public good provision by insiders, however, is neither increased significantly above levels observed in treatments with the same MPCR where outsiders' donations are used as compensation rewards to insiders, nor in treatments without donations. Thus, whether a given MPCR is reached endogenously through donations by outsiders or exogenously does not significantly affect insiders' public good provision. In addition, when comparing continuous to threshold endogenous changes in the MPCR, we cannot find significant differences in public good provision, despite transfer donations by outsiders are higher for threshold increases in the MPCR.

JEL classification: D70, D62, D64, H41

Keywords: Public goods, Privately Provided Public Goods, Institution, Externality, Donation, Reciprocity

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1. Introduction

Donations to charities have the capacity to support public good provision by local agents who offer services that provide a wide array of public goods. Often, donations serve to compensate local agents for their time (salaries) – referred to as in-cash donations – while other times donations provide much needed local infrastructure to increase the productivity of the local agents – referred to as in-kind donations. Examples for in-kind donations consist of building of physical infrastructure (e.g. schools, hospitals or water treatment plants), generating networks of knowledge (e.g. associations of teachers or nurses; providing training on organic farming to landowners), or providing consumable materials (e.g. computer notebooks, sanitary equipment or tree seedlings). The common characteristic of these examples is that donations can increase the productivity of each unit of effort undertaken by public good providers (increase the MPCR). Consider for example payments for ecosystem services (PES), in particular payments for agricultural ecosystem services. Here, the efforts by farmers to sustainably manage their land are *ceteris paribus* more effective with (i) better infrastructure for water availability allowing the development of wet areas, replenishment of the ground water table and regulation of floods or droughts; (ii) better inflow of information on best-practice sustainable farming techniques; and (iii) with better seedlings or more precise use of fertilizers, reducing greenhouse gas emissions.¹ While in-cash donations allow more flexibility on the side of the recipients, in-kind donations could less likely result in leakage (i.e. the donation being used for purposes other than the public good), and thus more likely to have welfare-enhancing effects.

In this study we provide experimental evidence on the impact of donations that increase the productivity (MPCR) of public good provision, and the associated changes in effort of public good providers. In a one-shot decision setting, we use the insider-outsider decision environment first introduced in (Blanco, Haller, & Walker, 2018) designed to study the interrelation of the decisions of donors and public good providers. In this setting, a subgroup (herein *outsiders*) can make donations to another subgroup (herein *insiders*) that can provide a public good. The two subgroups interact in a two-stage game where both receive the benefits of the public good. This decision setting aims to capture the reality that many public goods are provided by a specific subgroup of society that undertake costly actions which benefit a broader segment of society. At the same time, a large part of society cannot provide the public good themselves but have opportunities to support others who can provide the public good by making donations. For example, charitable or NGO-type organizations collect donations and distribute them to support

¹ Similarly, the efforts of teachers to educate children are *ceteris paribus* more effective in schools with better infrastructure, with better inflow of information on innovative pedagogy, and with better in-class materials.

activities that have benefits beyond those receiving the donations, such as programs to alleviate poverty (conditional cash transfer programs) or conservation programs (payments for climate protection, payments for ecosystem services).

Previous experimental results, in the context of a repeated decision game, of this insider-outsider decision setting show that transfer payments by outsiders can be substantial and that these generate significant increases in public good provision when the distribution of donations is tied to the relative effort of the public good providers (Blanco et al., 2018, 2021; Struwe et al., 2021). On the other hand, equal sharing of transfers among insiders is not found to significantly increase public good provision (Blanco et al., 2018), nor are additionality or conditionality requirements for receiving transfers (Blanco et al., 2018, 2021). In these previous studies, all transfers were designed as compensation to insiders, where the MPCR of the public good was defined exogenously. In this study, we consider the effectiveness of transfer donations that can endogenously increase the marginal value of the public good provided by insiders, and thus capturing characteristics of in-kind payments.

Examples from the field suggest two cases for endogenously changing the productivity (MPCR), through continuous capital investments or through lump sum investments that require a threshold of investment. In PES for agroecosystem service, a continuous increase in the MPCR is similar to purchases of small eco-friendly equipment, e.g. drip irrigation systems, for a population of insiders (greater funding implies the ability to purchase a greater number of equipment). The case of a threshold captures the incentives of situations where larger investments in infrastructure are necessary, such as a water irrigation channels or a water treatment plant.

The experiments herein are designed to better understand the relationship between calls for in-cash vs. in-kind donations and subsequent public good provision. To address this question, one needs to consider how and where donations are used, as well as their impact on public good provision. In addition, from the perspective of methodology, the experiment settings are designed to examine the difference in cooperativeness of both insiders and outsiders when the MPCR is defined by the experimenter versus by the transfers made by outsiders. Finally, using the insider-outsider decision setting, this project provides a robustness test of previous public good studies in relation to the relevance of the MPCR in public good provision.

We present the results of a pre-registered² one-shot online experiment with 968 participants in 121 groups in four main treatment conditions, in a between-subjects design. Specifically, we consider a two-stage game, where in the first stage each individual outsider can make a transfer to the group of insiders. The transfers are collected in a Transfer Account and the size of the Transfer Account is communicated to insiders who then make independent contributions to the public good. Across these four treatments, there are two key differences related to the use of the Transfer Account. First, we consider *endogenous* variations in the MPCR, where transfer donations by outsiders increase the value of the MPCR, considering two separate treatments: a threshold that transfers must reach to impact the MPCR, and a continuous increase of the MPCR based on transfers. In both of these two treatments, the MPCR starts at a low level of 0.4 and can increase up to a level of 0.8 with donations by outsiders. This entails that the donations of outsiders have public good characteristics, as their allocations increase the benefit of the public good provided by insiders. Both insiders and outsiders have incentives to free ride on decisions made by others in their group. Second, in two *exogenous* treatments, groups face exogenously defined MPCRs, either at 0.4 or at 0.8, and the transfer donations from outsiders are equally shared among the group of insiders. In these four treatment conditions, we are interested in the relative willingness of outsiders to provide transfers, and the reciprocal reaction of insiders under the different scenarios. Finally, for an additional 312 subjects in 39 groups, we consider two additional robustness treatments, where outsiders are passive, and we *exogenously* vary the MPCR, again at 0.4 or 0.8. This allows for disentangling the “pure” effect of the higher MPCR on insiders’ public good provision and serves as a robustness test in relation to previous studies considering changes in the MPCR in single-group public good environments (without outsiders).

In summary, the results show that in the large majority of groups in the endogenous treatments, both in the continuous and the threshold case, outsiders offer transfers at a level sufficient to

² This study has been pre-registered under the following link: https://aspredicted.org/C6T_2FL. The pre-registration includes the treatments under considerations, our main behavioral conjectures as well as a power analysis to determine the required sample size.

We chose to run an online experiment mainly due to the ongoing uncertainty regarding running live in-presence experiments in the economic laboratory in times of the Covid-19 pandemic. The one-shot design was then implemented to reduce expected difficulties involving large (8 person) groups and repeated interactions online, potentially resulting large numbers of dropouts (see Arechar, Gächter, & Molleman, 2018 who argue attrition in online public good experiments is likely linked to group size, complexity of decision making environment and overall pace of the experiment.).

We believe our design is appropriate to capture charitable giving situations where the interactions within the subgroup of outsiders, the subgroup of insiders and across subgroups of insiders and outsiders are of a more anonymous and non-repetitive nature.

increase the efficiency of the public good. Further, transfers offered from outsiders in these treatments exceed transfers made in treatments where they are used to compensate insiders (where the high MPCR is exogenous). Insiders in the endogenous treatments, however, are not found to sufficiently reciprocate the behavior of outsiders by increasing contributions beyond the levels found in the exogenous treatments. More specifically, insiders are not found to react differently to an endogenously defined high or low MPCR as compared to when it is exogenously imposed.

2. Related Literature

Our study aims at narrowing the gap between the literature on charitable giving and the literature on incentivizing public good provision. We contribute to several strands of literature and structure our discussion into three broad themes, focusing on one-shot experiments in the context of public good and trust games, the relevance of the MPCR in public goods, and the impact of changes in donation incentives on charitable giving.

One-shot public good and trust game experiments

First, given that our experiment is conducted in a one-shot context, we add to the literature on studying social dilemmas in non-repeated one-shot public good experiments with direct responses (as opposed to experiments using the strategy method).³ These studies show that for different contexts of one-shot interactions a substantial share of subjects chooses cooperation (see, among others, Cherry, Kroll, & Shogren, 2005; Kroll, Cherry, & Shogren, 2007; Rondeau, Schulze, & Poe, 1999). We extend the one-shot interaction of public good providers to include the decisions of outside donors as well. A main difference of our study to these previous one-shot social dilemma experiments is that the stage-game we implement allows not only for within-group group reciprocity (and free riding) but also across groups of outsiders and insiders.

Secondly, given the non-repeated and sequential nature of our decision environment, the experiment, and especially the settings with transfers endogenously increasing the MPCR, also has elements of the so-called investment or trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). In these two-player games, while the multiplication factor is exogenously given, multiplication per se depends on the first mover (referred to as the *trustor*) to send a share of the endowment to the receiver (the *trustee*). Thus, the action of the first mover is potentially efficiency enhancing, but only profitable for the sender if the receiver sufficiently reciprocates by sending

³ Unlike the often used strategy methods for one shot experiments, given that we want to explicitly capture the endogenous interactions of groups of outsiders with groups of insiders, the insider-outsider environment requires of single decisions that reflect the response to a single decision made by outsiders.

back more than what the first mover invested. Experimental evidence has widely established that many first movers are willing to send substantial amounts of their endowment to the receiver, and receivers on average returning what they have been sent (Burks, Carpenter, & Verhoogen, 2003; Chaudhuri & Gangadharan, 2007; Croson & Buchan, 1999). Similar results are found for the version of the trust game played between groups (instead of individuals) (e.g. Cox, 2002; Kugler, Bornstein, Kocher, & Sutter, 2007; Song, 2009). Broadly, we investigate a decision setting with many attributes of the trust game within a public good provision environment, i.e. willingness of outsiders to trust insiders and send transfers to improve the welfare of the whole group, and willingness of insiders to reciprocate with trustworthy behavior by making sufficient contributions to the public good.

The relevance of the MPCR in public good games

Previous literature in experimental economics has considered the effect of *exogenous* changes in marginal contribution incentives on the side of public good providers. An increase in the MPCR induces higher public good provision (see for example, Isaac & Walker, 1988; Isaac, Walker, & Thomas, 1984; Isaac, Walker, & Williams, 1994; Goeree, Holt, & Laury, 2002; van den Berg, Dewitte, Aertgeerts, & Wenseleers, 2020; see also Chaudhuri, 2011; Ledyard, 1995; Zelmer, 2003 for surveys), both for repeated and one-shot decisions, and for within- and between-subject changes of the MPCR.⁴ These studies have in common that the experimenter exogenously varies the marginal private value of the public good and public good provision occurs in “closed” groups without outsiders receiving externalities from public goods. Similarly, we consider variations in MPCR between subjects to understand to what extent individuals in the insider-outsider environment behave differently when in high vs low valued public good scenarios and compare these results to scenarios where outsiders’ transfers endogenously impact the value of the MPCR.

Our setting with *endogenous* variations in the MPCR also has similarities to public good games where the production of public goods depends endogenously on group efforts. These include threshold public good games, where public good providers receive the benefits from public goods only if provision meets or exceeds a pre-defined threshold (referred to as *provision points*) (see, for example, Bagnoli & Mc Kee, 1991; Suleiman & Rapoport, 1992; Choice, 1989; R. Croson & Marks, 1998; Cadsby & Maynes, 1999; Marks & Croson, 1999). Croson and

⁴ Similarly, evidence from appropriation games support the relationship between marginal private incentives and willingness to cooperate. Lower opportunity costs of conservation lead to lower appropriation rates, this holds true for within-subject comparisons (Blanco, Lopez, et al., 2016) as well as for non-repeated single decisions (Blanco, Haller, Lopez, & Walker, 2016)

Marks (2000) have established the term *step return* in threshold public goods, to capture the idea that the MPCR depends on the discontinuity defined by the thresholds. They find that with increasing step return requirements, contributions to the public good significantly increase. Similarly, in probabilistic public good games, where the probability of provision of the public good increases with contributions, the expected value of the MPCR depends on the expectations of the groups' efforts (Blanco, Haller, & Walker, 2017; Blanco, Lopez, & Walker, 2016; Dickinson, 1998; Gangadharan & Nemes, 2009). The decision setting considered in our study differs from these mentioned studies in the sense that there is no minimum contribution required or probability attached to produce the public good. The level of public good provision increases with the level of contributions. However, the marginal benefit (MPCR) increases with increasing donations, either continuously so or through a pre-defined threshold.

Finally, the case of continuous endogenous increases of the MPCR is also related to a study by Noussair & Soo (2008) considering a *dynamic public good* where the value of the MPCR depends on the groups' contributions from the previous period. They find that for most groups, contributions are sufficiently high for the MPCR to increase over time; and as a result in the treatment where the MPCR started at 0.4, contributions on average do not decrease over time.

Donation incentives in charitable giving experiments

Finally, by specifically considering the decisions of outside donors, our study is also related to the large body of experimental literature investigating the behavioral drivers of charitable donations (e.g. Andreoni, 1990; Vesterlund, 2003; Frey & Meier, 2004; Bénabou & Tirole, 2006; Ariely, Bracha, & Meier, 2009; Gneezy, Keenan, & Gneezy, 2014; Garcia, Massoni, & Villeval, 2020). By investigating outsiders' decisions under varying productivity levels of public goods, we also contribute to research concerned with analyzing how impact matters for giving. In dictator-to-charity games, matching donations is a common way of incentivizing charitable donations. Evidence from laboratory experiments varying the matching rate suggests that donations increase with higher matching rates (while the results are mixed for field experiments) (for a review, see Epperson & Reif, 2019).

In summary, we contribute to the above strands of literature by specifically considering the interrelation of donor's and public good providers' decisions to changes in marginal incentives, that are either exogenously determined or endogenously dependent on the decisions of group members. Thus, we revisit the question of the impact of changes in the MPCR, but in a setting with group-to-group payoff interactions in a one-shot game. In doing so, we provide novel experimental evidence on the influence of the endogenous dependency of the MPCR based on

the donations via transfers from outsiders and the resulting contributions to the public good by insiders.

3. Experimental Design

3.1. Decision settings

In the insider-outsider decision setting, a group consists of 8 members in two subgroups, specifically $n_I = 4$ individuals in the subgroup of insiders and $n_O = 4$ individuals in the subgroup of outsiders. Both insiders and outsiders receive an endowment of $w_I = 100$ ECUs (Experimental Currency Units). Insiders can make contributions g_i out of endowment w , with $g_i \in [0, 100]$ to a Group Account $G = \sum_{i=1}^{n_I} g_i$ that constitutes a public good with an equal marginal return (MPCR) of a for insiders and outsiders, where $\frac{1}{(n_I+n_O)} < a < 1$, so that the cumulative value of a contribution across all recipients (insiders and outsiders) exceeds the marginal cost of a contribution. Outsiders cannot make contributions but benefit from public good provision, where the decision faced by outsiders varies across treatment conditions.

The six treatment conditions considered in this study are described in Table 1. We consider two treatments where the MPCR is endogenously defined by the allocation decisions of the outsiders in a group (THRES and CONT). In addition, four control conditions are examined where the MPCR is exogenously given, EXO(high), EXO(low) and NoT(high) and NoT(low), varying whether outsiders active (can send transfer donations) or inactive.

Table 1: Description of Treatment Conditions

Treatments	Role of outsiders	MPCR (α)	# observations
THRES	Transfers define MPCR	Defined by outsiders, either 0.4 or 0.8	320 individuals 40 groups
CONT	Transfers define MPCR	Defined by outsiders, continuous increases between 0.4 and 0.8 in 0.004 increments	320 individuals 40 groups
EXO(high)	Send transfer donations	Exogenously given at 0.8.	160 individuals 20 groups
EXO(low)	Send transfer donations	Exogenously given at 0.4.	168 individuals 21 groups
NoT(high)	inactive	Exogenously given at 0.8.	152 individuals 19 groups
NoT(low)	inactive	Exogenously given at 0.4	160 individuals 20 groups

In all treatments with active outsiders, outsiders can use their endowment to make a transfer $t_j \in [0, w]$ to a Transfer Account of size T . Importantly, outsiders make their transfer decisions before insiders make their contribution decisions. The use of the Transfer Account then varies between treatments. In EXO(high) and EXO(low), the Transfer Account is shared equally among insiders. In the two treatments with endogenously defined MPCR (THRES and CONT) the Transfer Account is used to alter the MPCR from public good provision, in the interval $[0.4, 0.8]$, either through a pre-defined threshold or continuously.⁵

In all decision settings, $MPCR < 1$, implying that free-riding incentives exist. Nevertheless, given the positive relationship between contribution rates and MPCR that previous experimental studies have established (see the references in section 2), one can expect that agents in our setting will also react to changes in marginal incentives to contribute. Importantly, in all settings under consideration, insiders receive information about the transfers from outsiders and the resulting value of the MPCR before making decisions (as described in further details in section 3.2). Thus, they can react to the endogenously valued MPCR, based on outsiders' decisions.⁶

THRES

In the THRES treatment, the MPCR is increased from the starting value of 0.4 to the value of 0.8 if outsiders' transfers meet a publicly specified threshold. Importantly, if transfers offered fall short of the threshold, they are returned to outsiders. In public good games with exogenously defined provision points, such a "money-back guarantee" has been shown to significantly increase contribution levels (Isaac et al., 1989). Further, transfers above the

⁵ In a recent study, van den Berg et al. (2020) have explicitly considered the effect of exogenously implemented incremental increases of the MPCR on public good provision in an online experiment, where subjects made a sequence of one-shot decisions in randomly re-matched groups of three. The results of that study show that contributions increase substantially for MPCRs between 0.4 and 0.7 (from around 40% of endowments to above 60% of endowments), after which the increase in contribution declines. Indeed, upwards of an MPCR of 0.7 contributions increased by less than 1%. These results are qualitatively stable when considering only the first period decisions (in a sense the true one-shot decision). Additionally, even with the highest MPCR (0.833) contributions do not exceed 68% of endowment. Based on these findings, we believe our chosen interval for the MPCR of $[0.4, 0.8]$ is able to capture a substantial amount of variation in behavior while still allowing for room for improvement when moving from the exogenous groups where the high MPCR is "free" vs endogenous groups that invested funds to achieve the high MPCR of 0.8.

⁶ The decision setting considered here is somewhat related to leader-follower public good games (i.e. Cartwright & Lovett, 2014). In those games, different levels of MPCRs have strong effects on unconditional contributions (contributions of the leaders), and conditional cooperators (the followers) react accordingly. Thus, in high MPCR environments, leaders contribute more, and followers give more due to conditional cooperation. Applying this line of thought to our decision environment, outsiders can be understood as leaders (making unconditional contributions to insiders) and insiders as followers.

threshold are refunded in proportion to individual transfers offered.⁷ This design feature has been implemented in previous experimental studies on threshold public goods in repeated game settings (e.g. Marks & Croson, 1998; Spencer, Swallow, Shogren, & List, 2009) as well as in a one-shot experiment (Rondeau et al., 1999).

Thus, in the following, we distinguish by individual *transfers offered* t_j and *transfers implemented* \hat{t}_j (i.e. the amount of transfers the outsider has to pay for). The resulting payoff functions described in equations (1) and (2):

$$\pi_i = w_I - g_i + a(T)G \quad (1)$$

$$\pi_o = w_O - \hat{t}_j + a(T)G \quad (2)$$

Recall that insiders receive an endowment of $w_I = 100$ ECUs, similarly outsiders receive an endowment of $w_O = 100$ ECUs. As can be seen, the MPCR is now a function of the sum of transfers offered by outsiders, $a(T)$. Equation (3) gives the function for the case of the threshold:

$$a(T)_{Thres} = \begin{cases} 0.8 & \text{if } T \geq 25\% \text{ of outsider group endowment} \\ 0.4 & \text{if } T < 25\% \text{ of outsider group endowment} \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

The value of the threshold is chosen such that it corresponds to the average transfers offered in period 6 (the first period with transfers, where outsiders offered 23% of their group endowment in transfers) in the *Equal* treatment condition in Blanco et al., 2020. In that treatment, less than half of the groups provided transfers on average in period 6 at a level of more or equal to 25% of the outsider's endowment. Thus, we consider the threshold to be demanding, but not so much as to expect that few groups will pass the threshold.⁸

Transfers in this treatment have threshold public good characteristics. But, contrary to standard threshold public good games, a contribution of zero is still a dominant strategy for purely self-regarding insiders. This is because the THRES treatment is different than standard threshold games in the sense that the impact of outsiders' decisions is not deterministic. In the standard threshold public good games, if public good provision reaches a certain threshold, the public

⁷ We chose this design feature in order for transfers to be purely efficiency enhancing (in terms of the MPCR from public good provision) in the treatments with endogenous changes in the MPCR, and to be purely redistributive in the *Exogenous* treatment.

⁸ In the field, the value of the threshold will correspond to the value of the lump sum investment necessary. This is the first study to consider such a threshold. Certainly, future studies could provide valuable insights from varying the level of the threshold.

good is produced and pays a deterministic return. In the THRES treatment, if transfers reach a certain threshold, the marginal return of the public good is deterministic, but the impact on individual earnings depends on insiders' contributions. Based on backward induction, zero contributions to the public good by insiders would imply zero transfers by purely self-regarding outsiders. Notice though, that previous research on the insider-outsider environment has shown that outsiders are motivated by reciprocity and cooperation concerns (Struwe, Bogner, & Blanco, forthcoming) and are willing to offer transfers and insiders do contribute significantly above zero to the public good (BHW, BSW, SBW). This is even true for the last period, where there is no future interaction between insiders and outsiders (as is the case in the one-shot setting considered here).

It is therefore reasonable to assume that outsiders' decisions will include their beliefs regarding the willingness of insiders to a) make contributions to the public good motivated by other-regarding preferences, or pro-social concerns, and b) to reciprocate on outsiders' behavior. Dependent upon expectations of other outsiders, it can therefore be optimal for outsiders in THRES to make transfers that exactly reach the threshold for the higher MPCR, as long as outsiders have beliefs regarding sufficient contributions to the public good by insiders. Specifically, if outsiders believe insiders as a group will contribute $G \geq \frac{25}{0.4} = 62.5 \text{ ECUs} = 15.6\%$ of insider group endowment to the Group Account, based on back-ward induction, it is profitable for outsiders to send transfers that reach exactly the threshold for the higher MPCR (dependent upon expecting the other outsiders in a group to behave in the same way), as compared to deviating to a zero transfer and consequently receiving benefits from the public good at the lower MPCR.

The frequency of how many groups will be able to establish the high MPCR is an empirical question. From a behavioral perspective, we expect this will depend on endogenous expectations of reciprocity, individual pro-social preferences, and trust motives.

CONT

In the CONT treatment, the MPCR continuously increases within the interval of $[0.4, 0.8]$ for any transfers between 0% and 25% of outsider group endowment. More specifically,

$$a(T)_{cont} = \begin{cases} 0.8 & \text{if } T \geq 25\% \text{ of outsider group endowment} \\ 0.4 + 0.4 \left(\frac{T}{100} \right) & \text{if } T < 25\% \text{ of outsider group endowment} \end{cases} \quad (4)$$

This implies that the MPCR can never be below 0.4 or above 0.8 (as in THRES). With the Transfer Account reaching 100 ECUs, the highest MPCR of 0.8 is reached for the same level of transfers (i.e. same investment by outsiders) as in the threshold case above (that is, 25% of total outsider group endowment). As in THRES, transfers above the necessary investment to reach the highest MPCR of 0.8 are refunded to the outsiders in proportion to their individual transfers offered. The payoff functions for insiders and outsiders are equivalent to those described in equations (1) and (2).

If outsiders have the same expectations about insiders' collective contributions to the Group Account as in the THRES treatment, i.e. Group Account contributions exceeding $G \geq \frac{25}{0.4} = 62.5 \text{ ECUs} = 15.6\%$, outsiders have the same incentives to send transfers at 25% of their group endowment and establish the highest MPCR of 0.8. The main difference to the THRES treatment is for the case of the $0 < T < 100 \text{ ECUs}$. In these groups, the MPCR will be higher than in the THRES groups, as the case of transfers not affecting the MPCR is excluded here. Again, the frequency of how many groups will be able to establish the high MPCR is an empirical question.

EXO

In the EXO(high) and EXO(low) treatment, outsiders can use their endowment to make unconditional donations to the group of insiders. That is, outsiders can send transfer donations $t_j \in [0, w]$ out of an endowment w to compensate insiders for their contributions. Transfers from outsiders are added together in a Transfer Account of size $T = \sum_{j=1}^{n_o} t_j$. The Transfer Account is distributed to insiders *independent* of individual contribution levels. The payoff functions are as follows:

$$\pi_i = w_i - g_i + aG + \frac{1}{n}T \quad (5)$$

$$\pi_o = w_o - t_j + aG \quad (6)$$

In EXO(low) the MPCR is defined at $a_{low} = 0.4$ and outsiders' endowment is $w_o = 100 \text{ ECUs}$. In EXO(high) the MPCR is $a_{high} = 0.8$ and outsiders' endowment is

Each outsider's endowment in the EXO(high) treatment is reduced because in this setting with the high MPCR of 0.8 and an endowment to each outsider of 100 ECUs, maximum possible group earnings would exceed those of the setting where outsiders endogenously define the

MPCR to be at 0.8.⁹ Given the parameters for the other treatments, this change means the maximum possible group earnings are constant for all treatments.

In both EXO treatments, similar considerations of other-regarding preferences and conditional reciprocity, as in the treatments with endogenously defined MPCRs, apply. Thus, one can expect transfers by outsiders and contributions by insiders to occur and to be sensitive to the exogenously defined level of the MPCR (that is, contributions are expected to be higher in groups with higher MPCR). However, a crucial difference in both EXO treatments compared to the THRES and CONT treatment is that in EXO(high) and EXO(low), for any given level of expected contributions by insiders, outsiders always have self-regarding individual incentives to deviate to zero transfers. This result holds because the level of the MPCR is not directly dependent upon their transfer decisions.

NoT

In the NoT(high) and NoT(low) treatments, outsiders are inactive and there are no transfers. They simply receive the benefit from contributions to the Group Account by insiders. Payoff functions are as follows:

$$\pi_i = w_I - g_i + aG \quad (7)$$

$$\pi_o = w_O + aG \quad (8)$$

Parallel to the two EXO treatments, in NoT(low) the groups face the low MPCR defined at $a_{low} = 0.4$ and outsiders' endowment is $w_O = 100$ ECUs; while in NoT(high) the high MPCR applies, $a_{high} = 0.8$. In line with the arguments above for EXO(high) treatment, outsiders' endowment in NoT(high) is $w_O = 75$ ECUs.

3.2. Behavioral conjectures

In this section we present formal conjectures on insiders' contributions (designated as "C" conjectures), as well as exploratory conjectures (designated as "E" conjectures) on outsiders' transfers. The formal conjectures proposed below on insiders' contributions are rooted in aspects of formal game theory, conditional reciprocity, and prior results reported in BHW.

⁹ That is, assume insiders invest their full endowment into the Group Account, such that $G=400$ ECUs, and outsiders invest 25% of their endowment into the Transfer Account, such that $T=100$ ECUs. For the *groups in* EXO(low), the group's earnings will amount to 1680 ECUs. Transfers are purely redistributive in nature. Moving to groups in EXO(high), maximum group earnings of 2960 ECUs are possible, since transfers again take the form of a re-distributive measure. Comparing this to the endogenous groups in THRES and CONT, starting from the low MPCR of 0.4, if outsiders are now given the opportunity to invest their transfers into improving the MPCR to 0.8, the group as a whole will earn 2860 ECUs.

Conjectures about outsiders' transfer decisions are of more explorative nature and thus marked as such.¹⁰

Consider first the comparison of behavior in the THRES treatment compared to the two EXO treatments. In order to derive causal effects of the different transfer institutions on individual behavior within a given group, the conjectures are based on the comparisons of the groups in THRES where outsiders' transfers reached the threshold to yield a high (these groups are designated below as THRES(high) groups) and groups in the EXO(high) treatments. Similarly, we will make comparisons between groups where outsiders' transfers did not reach the threshold to yield a high MPCR in the THRES treatment THRES (referred to as THRES(low) groups) and groups in the EXO(low). That is, the response of insiders to the transfer decisions by outsiders are analyzed holding the MPCR constant.

First, consider the comparison of insiders' behavior in THRES(high) groups compared to groups in EXO(high). From the point of insiders, we conjecture that the behavioral response of insiders towards the behavior of outsiders is rooted in positive conditional reciprocity (see Sugden, 1984 for a formal discussion of reciprocity and Croson, 2007 for experimental evidence in repeated linear VCM public good settings). While we expect reciprocity to play a role in insider's behavior in EXO(high), the main difference is that in the EXO(high) condition, the high MPCR of 0.8 is provided exogenously by the experimenter. In this treatment condition, outsiders can make transfers as reward to contributions by insiders and considering that insiders might reciprocate on by their contributions to the public good. Note, however, that these rewards are unconditional of insiders' relative efforts and there is no repeated interaction between the insiders and outsiders. That is, there is room for insiders to simply "pocket" the donations from outsiders without fearing a negative reciprocal response from outsiders that might happen in a repeated setting. In the THRES(high) groups, however, the outsiders are allowed to invest their endowments to enhance the efficiency of the public good for both insiders and outsiders. If successful, this welfare improving investment by outsiders can be interpreted as a signal of trust from outsiders towards insiders, as the effect of such transfers will be lost unless insiders reciprocate on outsiders' investments.

McCabe, Rigdon, & Smith (2003) define positive reciprocity as "the costly behavior of a second mover that rewards a first mover based on both the gains from exchange to the second mover as well as the second mover's beliefs about the intentions motivating the action of the first

¹⁰ These conjectures for insiders' behavior and exploratory conjectures for outsiders' behavior have been pre-registered.

mover.” (see McCabe et al., 2003 p. 269) and have documented that reciprocity motives can be used to predict behavior in trust games. Using this assumption and the arguments developed above, we conjecture insiders to reciprocate more strongly to an endogenously chosen high MPCR than to an exogenously imposed high MPCR, as summarized in conjecture C1a.

***C1a:** Average contributions of insiders in the THRES(high) groups will be significantly higher than in EXO(high).*

Based on “backward-induction” – outsiders expecting this behavior of insiders in the Threshold condition, where the group reaches the high threshold, can be expected to be more willing to offer transfers compared to outsiders in the Exogenous treatment with high MPCR. Further, the threshold to reach the higher MPCR can be seen as a focal point for outsiders. Outsider groups that have reached the threshold by design have offered donations of at least 25% of their group endowment. For groups in the EXO treatment this threshold, a focal point of 25%, does not exist. Thus, we conjecture that, as a percent of endowment, outsider’s average transfers offered in the THRES(high) groups will be significantly higher than average transfers in the EXO(high) groups.

***E-C1a:** Average transfers of outsiders in the THRES(high) groups will be significantly higher than average transfers of outsiders in EXO(high).*

Next consider the comparison of THRES(low) groups with groups in the EXO(low) treatment. In THRES(low) groups, by definition, the transfers offered by outsiders’ fall short of the threshold. This might be interpreted as a signal of mistrust from the outsiders towards insiders. We conjecture that insiders might react with negative conditional reciprocity (due to being disappointed in the low efforts of the outsider subgroup), and will provide the public good at a lower level than in the exogenous comparison groups where donations are simply unconditional rewards, EXO(low). That is, we expect insiders to react more strongly (more negatively) to an endogenously defined low MPCR than when it is exogenously imposed upon the group.

***C1b:** Average contributions of insiders in the THRES(low) groups will be significantly lower than in EXO(low).*

With respect to the comparison of transfer levels by outsiders, we conjecture there will be no differences between the THRES(low) groups – that have by definition offered transfers lower than 25%, and the EXO(low) groups. This conjecture is based on previous insider-outsider studies (specifically period 6 decisions) where the average transfers offered were just below 25% of outsider endowment (BHW).

E-C1b: Average transfers of outsiders in the Threshold(low) groups will not be significantly different to average transfers of outsiders in the Exogenous(low) groups.

Finally, consider average behavior in the THRES and CONT treatments.

C2: CONT will result in significantly higher average contributions than THRES.

E-C2: CONT will result in higher average transfers than THRES.

In regards to the exploratory conjecture for transfers, E-C2, – as discussed in section 3.1, if outsiders have the same expectations about insiders' collective contributions to the Group Account as in the THRES treatment, they have the same incentives to send transfers at the level necessary to establish the highest MPCR, which is the same in both CONT and THRES. Nonetheless, for outsiders that expect insiders to not reciprocate sufficiently on the high MPCR of 0.8, in THRES, this would mean to not send transfers at all. The CONT treatment, however, also supports sending transfers sufficient to increasing the MPCR to 0.6, for example, given expectations of insider behavior that are supporting such transfer levels.

The reasoning for C2 is based on two additional conjectures, C3a and C3b presented below, differentiating between insiders' behavior in groups where transfers offered by outsiders are above or below 25% of their group endowment. First, we expect insiders to react the same way to an endogenously defined high MPCR, and thus we do not expect differences in contribution levels between THRES(high) groups and groups in CONT with transfers above 25% of endowment (referred to as CONT(high) groups).

C3a: In groups with transfers above 25% in CONT, insiders' contributions will not be significantly different than in THRES(high) groups.

In groups where outsiders' transfers are below 25% of their group endowments, the MPCR is 0.4 in THRES(low). Contrary to the THRES treatment, the case of transfers being returned to outsiders and thus not impacting the MPCR is excluded in the CONT treatment. Indeed, in this treatment for any level of transfers greater than 0, $MPCR > 0.4$. Based on a conjecture of reciprocity and the result from prior research that public good provision is sensitive to the level of the MPCR, we expect insiders to contributions to be positively correlated with higher MPCRs. This is conjecture is rooted in conditional cooperation and the increased efficiency gains in public good provision (Isaac & Walker, 1988; Isaac et al., 1994; Chaudhuri, 2011).

C3b: In groups with transfers below 25% in CONT, insiders' contributions will be significantly higher than in THRES(low) groups.

3.3. Procedures

Data were collected online during May 2022. Participants were recruited via Prolific and participated in the experiment that was programmed in oTree (Chen, Schonger, & Wickens, 2016). A total of 1280 participants were recruited on nine experiment days, resulting in eighteen sessions. Participants were recruited from the U.K. with the requirements that they were fluent in English and had a minimum approval rate of 95% from previous studies. Participants could only participate once. Participation took on average 20 minutes and participants earned on average £5.71, which included a base payment of £2.5.

For each treatment, we recruited participants for two consecutive sessions, where recruitment for the second session only started after the first session was finished. Those participants who signed up for the first session made decisions in the role of outsiders and received instructions based on the treatment conditions to which they were assigned. Each individual made decisions independently of the others in their session. The session was open until the necessary number of participants for the outsider session was reached. At this point, the sum of decision taken by four outsiders in a matched group was calculated to determine the size of the Transfer Account for each group. The next session began immediately after the outsider session was completed. In this session, participants made decisions as insiders receiving the relevant instructions for their treatment condition. They observed the aggregate decisions of the 4 outsiders with whom they were matched in the treatment condition and made decisions based upon this information and the MPCR value based on the treatment condition and the outsiders' decisions. At the end of the insiders' session, payoffs were calculated for each participant and sent to them as bonus rewards via Prolific. No subject participated in more than one experimental session.

In all sessions, all participants received the same (treatment specific) instructions, numerical examples and were asked to answer a series of comprehension questions (all instructions and comprehension questions are provided in the online supplementary material). All participants had to answer the comprehension questions correctly before they could move forward in the experiment. Participants learned their type (outsider or insider, referred to as Type 1 or Type 2) after answering all comprehension questions correctly. Then, participants were guided to a waiting screen to be matched with three others of their type, forming a subgroup of four. Groups of insiders and outsiders were matched according to the arrival time of participants to the waiting page. In summary, once matched, each participant took part in three tasks: a) an incentivized estimation of the expected behavior of the members of the other Type with whom

they would be grouped,¹¹ b) their own allocation decision (in the role of either outsider or insiders), and c) completing a questionnaire containing questions about the main motivations for their decisions and on their donation and volunteering history.

4. Results

The presentation of results is organized around two subsections. Section 4.1. serves to test our behavioral conjectures with respect to whether institutions where transfers from outsiders can change the MPCR are more effective in raising both transfers and public good contributions as compared to institutions where transfers represent redistributions from outsiders to insiders. In section 4.2. we then analyze the behavioral determinants of both insiders' and outsiders' decision in each of the different treatments, aiming to analyze the underlying heterogeneity in the data.

Notice that in line with the development of the conjectures, the majority of comparisons will not be on average treatment effects, instead they will focus on conditional outcomes within treatments that are endogenously determined by outsiders' decisions. Thus, the analysis will differentiate between treatment conditions THRES, CONT, EXO(high), EXO(low) and NoT(high) and Not(low); as well as treatment(groups) determined by whether outsiders decisions led to a high or low MPCR outcome in the endogenous treatments, e.g. THRES(high), THRES(low) or CONT(high), CONT(low).

4.1. Aggregate Group Effects

Table 2 presents summary statistics of average individual contributions by insiders and average individual transfers by outsiders, respectively; for each treatment condition, or treatment(group) separately.¹² A first observation is that in the majority of groups, in both the THRES and CONT

¹¹ That is, outsiders were asked to make an estimate of the average amount of ECUs they expected the insiders to contribute to the Group Account. Similarly, insiders were asked to make an estimate of the average amount of ECUs they expected outsiders had transferred to the Transfer Account. To incentivize informed estimates, participants could earn £1.5 divided by the deviation between the actual value and their estimate, up to a maximum of £1.5.

¹² While we cannot make causal comparisons between this data and the data from previous insider-outsider studies in the laboratory, we do provide some insights in qualitative comparisons. For example, we can compare our data with period 1 data from the Donation II treatment in BHW, which started with transfers by outsiders and is therefore comparable to our decision period in the EXO(low) groups (with the exception that participants in Donation II anticipate that there will be a repeated interaction). There, average transfers by outsiders were around 20% and average contributions by insiders around 25%. This level of transfers is also very similar to Period 06 average transfers in the Equal treatment in BSW (first period of transfers in that treatment). So, in the online one-shot case outsiders are willing to offer higher transfers (a little less than 10% -point more), on average, than in the repeated lab-environment. Further, period 1 data from the No-Transfers treatment in BSW showed average contributions by insiders at 38% of endowment which is very similar to what we find here in the NoT(low) condition.

treatments, outsider groups offered transfers sufficient to establish the high MPCR of 0.8. The frequency is higher in the THRES treatment with 35 out of 40 groups (87.5%) compared to 27 out of 40 groups (67.5%) in the CONT. This difference is significant (p-value from two-sample test of proportions is 0.032, n=80).

Table 2: Summary statistics of average individual decisions, by treatment or treatment(group). Std. deviations in parentheses.

Treatment(Group)	Avg. individual contributions (in % of endowment)	Avg. individual transfer (in % of endowment)	# number of observations
THRES	42.22 (27.54)	36.19 (25.29)	320 individuals 40 groups
<i>THRES(high) MPCR=0.8</i>	42.11 (27.43)	38.68 (25.64)	280 individuals 35 groups
<i>THRES(low) MPCR=0.4</i>	43 (28.98)	18.8 (13.29)	40 individuals 5 groups
CONT	40.86 (29.83)	29.69 (23.22)	320 individuals 40 groups
<i>CONT(high) MPCR=0.8</i>	42.07 (30.30)	35.14 (24.12)	216 individuals 27 groups
<i>CONT(low) MPCR<0.8</i>	38.33 (28.96)	18.37 (16.31)	104 individuals 13 groups
EXO(high)	35.48 (32.35)	31.73 (26.17)	160 individuals 20 groups
EXO(low)	38.25 (27)	30.13 (22.86)	168 individuals 21 groups
NoT(high)	40.51 (29.04)	-	152 individuals 19 groups
NoT(low)	38.875 (26.94)	-	160 individuals 20 groups

In order to test the conjectures proposed above, the analysis herein will be based on OLS regressions with cluster-robust standard errors at the individual level. For each regression model, the dependent variable is either (i) the individual insider's contribution to the Group Account, or (ii) the individual outsider's contribution to the Transfer Account.

Figure 1 presents the coefficient plots for the test of conjectures C1a and C1b for individual contributions, as well as exploratory conjectures E-C1a and E-C1b for individual transfers, comparing THRES(high) groups vs. EXO(high), panel a, and THRES(low) groups vs. EXO(low), panel b.




Fig 1. Comparison of average individual contributions (g) and average individual transfers (t) for THRES(high) groups vs EXO(high) (**panel a**) and THRES(low) groups vs EXO(low) (**panel b**). Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals from OLS regression with clustered standard errors at the group level.

Figure 1, panel a shows that in groups where outsiders have increased the efficiency of the public good with their donations (THRES(high)), outsiders are willing to offer donations 6.95% above the level of when the MPCR is exogenously defined (EXO(high) – where donations are used as unconditional cash rewards for insiders). This difference is significant at $p=0.031$. Notice also that the average of offered transfers in THRES(high) groups is well above the threshold of 25% necessary for the high MPCR. So even though the 25% represents somewhat of a focal point, outsiders are willing to offer substantially more than 25% on average. Turning to the subsequent reaction from insiders to the behavior of outsiders, the contributions in THRES(high) are 6.63% higher than in EXO(high). This difference however is not statistically significant ($p\text{-value} = 0.128$).

Result 1a: *While average transfers offered by outsiders in THRES(high) groups are significantly higher than average transfers in EXO(high), average contributions by insiders in are not significantly different.*

For the comparison of THRES(low) groups and EXO(low), we find the opposite result for outsiders' transfers. Transfers offered are significantly lower by 11.3% ($p\text{-value} < 0.0001$) in groups that failed to establish the higher MPCR compared to when transfers are unconditional donations. Contributions by insiders are 4.75% higher in THRES(low) and EXO(low), but this difference is again not significant ($p\text{-value} = 0.452$).

Result 1b: *Average transfers offered in THRES(low) are significantly below those in EXO(low). Average contributions in THRES(low) are not significantly different to EXO(low).*

Turning now to the relative performance of the two endogenous treatments, CONT and THRES, Figure 2 presents the coefficient plots for the test of conjectures C2, E-C2 as well as C3a and C3b. Note, since these two treatments differ only in how the MPCR is affected by transfers below 25% of outsider group endowments, we make average treatment comparisons. Panel a provides the comparison of average individual contributions and individual transfers in the CONT vs. THRES treatment (conjecture C2 and exploratory conjecture E-C2). As shown, average contributions are very similar in both THRES and CONT (difference is 1.36%, p-value = 0.659), while average transfers in CONT are significantly lower in CONT by 6.51% (p-value = 0.006).




Fig 2. Comparison of average individual contributions (g) and average individual transfers (t) for the CONT vs THRES treatment (**panel a**), for CONT(high) vs THRES(high) groups (**panel b**) and CONT(low) vs THRES(low) groups (**panel c**). Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals from OLS regression with clustered standard errors at the group level.

Result 2: We find no significant difference in average contributions between CONT and THRES. Average transfers in CONT are significantly below average transfers in THRES.

The result on average transfers can be explained by the observation that more groups in the CONT treatment have transfers below the 25% of group endowments. But once we split up the groups in both treatments in having (not) established the high MPCR of 0.8, we observe no differences in behavior, as discussed in Results 3a and 3b.

In addition, in Figure 2, Panel b presents the comparison for CONT(high) vs THRES(high) groups, corresponding to conjecture 3a, and panel c shows the results for the comparison of CONT(low) vs THRES(low) groups, corresponding to conjecture 3b. For the relative comparison of THRES(high) and CONT(high) groups, we conjectured that there would be no significant differences, which is supported. Average contributions differ by 0.03% (p-value = 0.992) and average transfers differ by 3.54% (p-value = 0.095).

***Result 3a:** No significant difference is found in contributions of insiders when the high MPCR of 0.8 has been endogenously defined by outsiders in both the CONT(high) and THRES(high) groups. There is also no significant difference in transfers offered by outsiders in these groups.*

Considering the relative comparison of THRES(low) and CONT(low) groups, average contributions differ by 4.67% (p-value = 0.541) and average transfers differ by 0.43% (p-value = 0.8).

***Result 3b:** No significant difference is found in contributions of insiders for groups where outsiders did not reach the high MPCR 0.8, CONT(low) and THRES(low). Similarly, transfers offered are not significantly different in these groups.*

Recall that in CONT(low), transfers by outsiders increased the MPCR continuously above 0.4, but fell short of the MPCR=0.8 upper limit. However, in THRES(low) the MPCR=0.4 because the transfers did not reach the threshold. More specifically, if the Transfer Account > 0 for a group, the MPCR in CONT(low) groups is by definition higher than in THRES(low) groups. Further, for groups in CONT(low) where $T < 100$ (where 100 is the value necessary for MPCR=0.8), transfers offered are observed to be not significantly different than in THRES(low). In summary, the MPCR in the CONT(low) groups is substantially higher than in THRES(low). Result 3b implies that insiders in the (online, one-shot, single decision) insider-outsider environment of this study did not on average respond significantly to the higher MPCR in CONT(low). This result is also confirmed by analysis in the next section on determinants of insiders' behavior (column 5 in Table 4). Further analysis comparing average contributions in NoT(high) and NoT(low) in the appendix supports the results that insiders' contribution levels

are insensitive to the higher MPCR as opposed to the lower MPCR, see Figure A1. Figure A1 also shows that neither contributions nor transfers are different comparing EXO(high) vs EXO(low).

Finally, Figure A2 in the appendix make the relevant comparisons between EXO(high) vs. NoT(high), and EXO(low) vs. NoT(low). In short, the data here replicates the main finding of BHW: average contributions by insiders are not significantly different in decision settings where outsiders can send unconditional transfers as compared to where they are inactive. This result holds for both the high and the low MPCR.

4.2. Determinants of Individual Behavior

We observe substantial variation in individual decisions of both outsiders and insiders in all treatments. To visualize the underlying heterogeneity that is apparent in the data, Figure B1 in the appendix plots the empirical cumulative distribution functions of insiders' contributions and outsiders' transfers, respectively, for each treatment separately. In this section we consider potential determinants of individual decisions of insiders and outsiders.

As discussed in the experimental design section, we conjecture that individual behavior in the decision settings under consideration will depend on expectations of the behavior of insiders by outsiders, as well as motives such as trust, conditional reciprocity and other individual pro-social preferences. Thus, below we make use of the data from the incentivized estimation task as well as the self-reported motivations from the post-experimental questionnaire. The aim is to provide insights into whether there are systematic differences between the different treatment(groups). The self-reported motivations are measured in 5-likert-scale questions, with answers ranging from "I fully agree" ... to ... "I fully disagree". For the analysis, these were coded as dummy variables, with individuals receiving a 1 for a given motivation if they answered the question with either "I fully agree" or "I agree", and 0 otherwise.¹³ Find the full questionnaire in the supplementary materials. This approach results in 9 motivations for outsiders, and 7 motivations for insiders: mistrust in-group, mistrust out-group (only relevant

¹³ The motivations under consideration refer to the following questions (as presented to outsider subjects, with relevant wording changes for insider subjects). *Mistrust in-group*: "I did not trust the Type 1 group members. I did not expect them to transfer much. ". *Mistrust out-group*: "I did not trust the Type 2 group members to allocate much to the Group Account.". *No impact*: "I did not expect allocations by the Type 1 members to the Transfer Account to increase the allocations by the Type 2 group members to the Group Account." *In-group bias*: "Because I cared about the other Type 1 members of my group first." *Egoism*: "To get the highest payoff for myself." *Social-efficiency*: "To get the highest payoff for the whole group, both for Type 1 and Type 2." *Responsibility*: "I felt the responsibility to make allocations to the Transfer Account so I would not let my group members down." *Social norm*: "Because allocating to the Transfer Account was the right thing to do, irrespective of what other Type 1 and Type 2 group members did." *Confusion*: "I did not understand the decision task of Type 1 participants."

for outsiders), no-impact (only relevant for outsiders), in-group bias, egoism, social efficiency, responsibility, social norm and confusion.

Figures B2 (for outsiders) and B3 (for insiders) in the appendix show the relative frequencies of individuals for the different motivations, for each treatment, or treatment(group), separately. Both for outsiders and insiders we find generally little systematic variation in the relative frequencies between the different treatment(groups). Overall, for outsiders, reported motivations for in-group bias are low, and we find moderate levels of mistrust. The no-impact motivation is reported more frequently in the EXO treatments than in the THRES and CONT. Further, outsiders report higher levels of responsibility in THRES(high) and CONT(high). For insiders, we observe relatively higher levels of reported social efficiency concerns than egoism motives across all treatments and treatment(groups). Similarly, reported levels of responsibility and social norm motives are high. The reported levels of in-group bias are low throughout, with the exception in THRES(low). Insiders in these groups report higher levels of “caring first for other insiders”, which is reasonable given the outsiders in their group did not offer sufficient transfers to establish the higher MPCR. This observation is however based on only five groups overall. Finally, Figure B4 shows the reported levels of confusion with the decision task. Both insiders and outsiders report low levels of confusion across all treatment(groups).

We start with the analysis of determinants of outsiders’ transfers, as shown in Table 3. Here we present the regression analysis for individual transfers of outsiders, for each treatment, or treatment(group) separately. Explanatory variables are (i) the estimate that outsiders made about the expected behavior of insiders, and (ii) the self-reported motivations. Notice that the results for column II (corresponding to THRES(low)) need to be taken with caution as this is based on a very small subsample, due to most groups in THRES having reached the high MPCR.

First, we consistently find in all treatment(groups) that outsiders’ expectations of the average behavior of insiders significantly and positively correlates with individual transfers offered. In terms of self-reported motivations, a few results are notable. Overall, mistrust towards the other outsiders in a group, as well as towards the insiders in a group is not predictive of transfers (with the exception of a positive effect on transfers in EXO(low) groups. Believing that transfers will have no impact on insiders’ contributions has a significant and negative effect on transfers offered in EXO(low). For EXO(high) we find that social norm and confusion motivations are predictive of transfers offered. Finally, we observe that social efficiency

concerns are positively and significantly correlated with transfers offered in the THRES(high) and CONT(high) groups. This is in line with what these particular treatment(groups) suggest, as outsiders' transfers did indeed increase social efficiency by establishing the high MPCR. We find no such correlation in the THRES(low) and CONT(low) groups.

Table 3: Determinants of outsiders' transfers. Cluster-robust standard errors on the group level in parentheses. *** p<0.005, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

dep. var.: individual transfers (t)	THRES (high)	THRES (low)	CONT (high)	CONT (low)	EXO (high)	EXO (low)
estimate	0.380*** (0.118)	0.503*** (0.0702)	0.615*** (0.0958)	0.299* (0.152)	0.509*** (0.146)	0.657*** (0.122)
mistrust in-group	-2.528 (4.332)	-2.083 (4.807)	3.025 (4.154)	-0.188 (6.874)	0.909 (3.860)	-0.689 (3.396)
mistrust out-group	4.220 (5.644)	13.87** (4.116)	-4.361 (4.543)	-0.652 (6.483)	-9.206 (6.233)	0.453 (3.752)
in-group bias	1.184 (4.240)	-13.49 (10.50)	-0.386 (5.245)	3.759 (6.065)	2.599 (6.778)	2.968 (4.938)
no impact	-2.428 (4.105)	4.390 (8.002)	-2.026 (4.071)	6.708 (4.495)	5.407 (4.166)	-6.187** (2.783)
egoism	-7.754** (3.712)	-10.18 (6.927)	-2.309 (4.620)	-10.54* (5.341)	-5.978 (4.439)	-1.068 (4.074)
social efficiency	14.21*** (4.086)	0.510 (7.016)	10.75** (3.790)	-2.892 (5.624)	5.964 (6.468)	7.829* (3.888)
responsibility	3.778 (4.907)	2.765 (3.652)	8.411 (5.003)	-6.901 (6.489)	-2.891 (5.997)	1.260 (3.326)
social norm	4.766 (4.614)	-0.694 (5.973)	-4.425 (4.535)	6.454 (6.186)	18.00*** (4.712)	3.491 (3.380)
confusion	6.469 (7.134)	-3.957 (15.72)	-12.36 (9.366)	-3.932 (5.535)	36.33** (12.63)	19.23 (11.22)
constant	10.26* (6.030)	3.392 (7.732)	5.542 (4.592)	12.15** (5.364)	6.459 (8.330)	2.533 (5.821)
<i># individuals</i>	<i>140</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>108</i>	<i>52</i>	<i>80</i>	<i>84</i>
<i># groups</i>	<i>35</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>27</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>21</i>
<i>R-squared</i>	<i>0.356</i>	<i>0.774</i>	<i>0.447</i>	<i>0.257</i>	<i>0.544</i>	<i>0.545</i>

Turning to the analysis of determinants of insiders' decisions, Table 4 shows the respective results from an OLS regression analysis for individual contributions of insiders, for each treatment or treatment(group) separately. Explanatory variables are (i) the estimate that insiders made about the expected behavior of outsiders, (ii) the sum of transfer in the Transfer Account for the THRES(high), THRES(low), CONT(high) and CONT(low) treatment groups, which directly translates to the size of the MPCR, (iii) the average transfer received by insiders in the EXO(high) and EXO(low) treatments; and (iv) the self-reported motivations. As in Table 3, that the results for column II (corresponding to THRES(low)) need to be taken with caution as this is based on a very small subsample, due to most groups in THRES having reached the high MPCR.

With the exception for insiders in THRES(low), we find positive and significant correlations of expectations of the average behavior (cooperativeness) of others and own behavior. The level of the MPCR (as measured by the size of the Transfer Account) does not significantly affect contributions, except in THRES(low) treatment groups. This result is in line with the analysis presented in the previous section, underlining that insiders seem to be insensitive to changes in marginal benefits in this decision environment. Similarly, for insiders in the EXO(high) or EXO(low) groups, the average transfers received do not impact individual contributions. In regards to motivations, one noticeable pattern is that social efficiency concerns correlate significantly with higher contributions only in the high MPCR environment, THRES(high), CONT(high) and EXO(high). Mistrust towards other insiders in the group has a significant negative effect in THRES(low), CONT(high) and CONT(low) treatment-groups, while in-group biases are not predictive of contributions in either treatment group. Further, egoistic motives are only predictive of contributions in THRES(high), while social norm concerns as well as confusion correlate with contributions in EXO(low). Table B1 in the appendix presents the same analysis for the NoT treatments. The main findings there are that egoism motives are the main explanatory variable for insiders' contributions, while the social efficiency variable has no impact.

Table 4: Determinants of insiders' contributions. Cluster-robust standard errors on the group level in parentheses.
 *** p<0.005, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

dep. var.:	THRES	THRES	CONT	CONT	EXO	EXO
individual contribution (g)	(high)	(low)	(high)	(low)	(high)	(low)
transfers offered / MPCR	-0.0407 (0.0799)	1.323** (0.323)	0.0618 (0.0519)	0.284 (0.163)	-	-
avg. transfers received	-	-	-	-	0.213 (0.238)	0.208 (0.171)
estimate	0.218** (0.0837)	0.329 (0.335)	0.530*** (0.0993)	0.577*** (0.153)	0.549*** (0.169)	0.597*** (0.180)
insufficient transfers	-4.368 (5.254)	2.364 (11.06)	0.263 (7.890)	1.001 (10.57)	1.932 (7.847)	9.087 (7.866)
mistrust in-group	-6.854 (5.418)	-12.61** (4.511)	-11.90** (5.096)	-19.32** (7.889)	-8.538 (7.538)	-2.256 (6.127)
in-group bias	4.622 (4.684)	2.651 (6.750)	1.404 (4.502)	2.055 (6.633)	-1.255 (9.367)	-10.11 (6.718)
egoism	-14.66** (5.034)	-8.732 (9.871)	-2.359 (5.650)	13.02* (6.808)	-7.484 (7.413)	-6.344 (5.265)
social efficiency	13.76** (4.630)	13.62 (11.73)	11.62* (5.660)	9.349 (5.940)	19.60** (7.539)	3.053 (5.400)
responsibility	-9.441 (6.451)	-53.81*** (7.262)	-2.456 (5.431)	10.72 (11.15)	-3.909 (9.005)	1.108 (6.690)
social norm	5.335 (5.854)	36.68 (21.54)	1.929 (5.198)	8.140 (9.421)	12.95 (9.633)	13.65** (5.352)
confusion	-2.727 (9.091)	-22.57* (10.17)	-0.273 (6.596)	-5.831 (9.085)	2.224 (6.723)	-15.41** (6.622)
constant	40.66*** (13.40)	-64.07 (48.47)	10.26 (11.06)	-22.92 (17.21)	4.840 (10.45)	2.482 (8.922)
# individuals	140	20	108	52	80	84
# groups	35	5	27	13	20	21
R-squared	0.224	0.811	0.341	0.567	0.406	0.373

5. Discussion & Conclusion

This study focuses on *exogenous* and *endogenous* variations in the marginal benefit of public goods within the insider-outsider environment. In a one-shot online experiment, we consider decision settings where outsiders can send donations to a group of public good providers where donations have the capacity to increase the productivity of public goods (in-kind payments) for

all group members – insiders and outsiders. Thus, as related to previous studies, we introduce to the insider-outsider environment the possibility of outsiders making donations that alter the *effectiveness* of public good investments. Behavior in these settings is compared relative to situations where outsiders' donations are unconditionally distributed among public good providers (equal cash rewards to all) and the productivity of the public good is exogenously determined.

We consider situations where both outsiders and insiders have no monitoring capacity of individual or peer behavior, such that effort-based distribution of donations are not feasible. Within such an information environment, our research design allows to explore the role of charitable organizations in using outsiders' donations in different contexts, comparing the relative effectiveness of in-cash vs. in-kind payments in a laboratory experiment. The research of Elinor Ostrom and colleagues on the use of institutions to alleviate social dilemmas highlights the relevance of the institutional fit to the specific contextual variables in defining the capacity of institutions to enhance cooperation (Kiser & Ostrom, 1982; Ostrom, 2011). Thus, the analysis of the effectiveness of institutions needs to consider the relevance of contextual factors on outcomes as well.

Summarizing our main findings, while the majority of outsiders, on average, send transfers to establish the high MPCR in their groups in both THRES and CONT, insiders' contributions to the public good are similar in all treatment conditions. We find neither evidence of positive conditional reciprocity of insiders as a reaction to the behavior of outsiders in the THRES(high) groups compared to EXO(high) groups, nor evidence of negative conditional reciprocity of insiders as a reaction to the behavior of outsiders in THRES(low) as compared to EXO(low) groups. That is, insiders do not react differently to an endogenously defined high or low MPCR as compared to when it is exogenously imposed on them. Further, there is no difference in the relative comparison of the institutions where outsiders can increase the MPCR continuously or via a threshold. Finally - and most surprising given the previous findings in the literature on the effect of MPCRs on public good provision - insiders' contributions to the public good are highly insensitive to changes in marginal incentives across all treatment conditions. That is, we find no pure MPCR effect on contributions to the public good. Insiders reaction to changes in marginal incentives is characterized by very low elasticity.

The question is why we find that insiders do not reciprocate the behavior of outsiders in the endogenous treatments. One explanatory factor could be the non-sensitivity to higher MPCRs. Other possible explanations include that this is truly a one-shot game and the insider-outsider

decision environment is a more complex (two stage game) that entails more strategic uncertainty and possible across group motivations than simpler public good games without outsiders. Further, because of the existence of outsiders, insiders might be focusing less on social efficiency, and more on potential payoff inequalities. To this point, at least the data from the self-reported motivations does not suggest that insiders are purely driven by in-group biases and do consider overall social efficiency. Finally, if participants perceive this more like a trust-game than a public good environment, then the results are more in line with findings from that literature, where second movers on average return the amount that was sent to them. Across treatments, the level of average contributions of insiders in our experiment is somewhat higher than the level of average transfers offered, but not substantially so.

Insiders did not increase contributions in the endogenous treatments compared to baseline levels. Still, from a welfare perspective, one can make an argument about the relative efficiency of the endogenous treatments, since most outsiders did invest sufficiently to establish the higher MPCR, and contributions in these treatments were high enough to cover the cost of investments of outsiders. That is, for a given level of contributions of insiders, the groups as a whole are better off compared to the lower MPCR. So, from a cost-efficiency-perspective; if it is desirable to implement such unconditional payment programs, using in-kind payments of outsider donors to invest into local infrastructure seems to be preferable to in-cash payments (especially if only the donations needed to cover the cost of program are used, and anything above that is returned back to the donors).

The fact that we did not find a significant increase in contributions by insiders as a reaction to outsiders transfers that increased the efficiency of insiders' contributions were not expected. The experiment was not designed to answer the question why insiders do not react to increases in the marginal productivity of public goods. Thus, this surprising result provides an interesting avenue for further research. A first step is to test whether the existence of outsiders can causally explain this result. Secondly, since this is so relevant for field implications, further investigations could analyze whether the results hold true if insiders in the experiment were to contribute to a real-life public good, represented by a charitable recipient, and where outsiders could use their endowments to increase the matching rate of donations (which can be seen as equivalent to the return from a public good). Such design would allow to abstract away from any potential concerns about payoff inequalities between insiders and outsiders; and consider purely the willingness of insiders to invest into a pro-social activity following the behavior of outsiders in their group.

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Appendix

1. Control Treatments

1.1. Additional Hypotheses

We consider additional hypotheses related to the control treatments. While the main focus of our experimental design lies on analyzing behavioral changes due to endogenously induced changes in the MPCR, the design also allows to test the causal effect of an exogenous change in the MPCR. This allows to test whether the result from the literature on the positive relationship between MPCR and cooperation holds also in the insider-outsider decision setting. Thus, extrapolating from what we know from previous literature, we expect groups in environments with higher exogenous MPCR to result in higher contributions by insiders, on average. Based on (expected) reciprocity, and the result from the literature that impact matters with respect to charitable giving, we expect also higher transfer donations with higher MPCR.

AH1: We expect average contributions in groups in NoT(high) to be significantly higher than average contributions in groups in NoT(low).

AH2: Average contributions and average transfers will be higher in EXO(high) groups than in EXO(low) groups.

Further we can compare contribution levels of insiders in *EXO(low)* groups to those in *NoT(low)* (which tests the main result of BHW), and similarly the contribution levels in *EXO(high)* groups to those in *NoT(high)*.

1.2. Additional Results




Fig A1. Comparison of average individual contributions (g) and average individual transfers (t) for NoT(high) vs NoT(low) groups (**panel a**) and EXO(high) vs EXO(low) groups (**panel b**). Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals from OLS regression with clustered standard errors at the group level.

AR 1: When outsiders are passive, an exogenous increase in the MPCR does not lead to significantly higher contributions to the public good by insiders.

AR2: There is no significant difference in average contributions or average transfers between EXO(high) and EXO(low)

Summing up AR1 and AR2, an exogenous increase in the MPCR does not result in higher contributions to the public good, independent of outsiders are passive or can send cash donations. Further, an exogenous increase in the MPCR does not result in higher transfers by outsiders.




Fig A2. Comparison of average individual contributions (g) and average individual transfers (t) for EXO(low) vs NoT(low) groups (**panel a**) and EXO(high) vs NoT(high) groups (**panel b**). Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals from OLS regression with clustered standard errors at the group level.

AR 3: *With an exogenously low MPCR, allowing outsiders to send transfers that are shared equally among insiders does not result in average contributions compared to the situation where outsiders are inactive (replication of result in Blanco et al. 2018 for the one-shot, online environment considered here). This is the case even though outsiders on average send a substantial amount of their endowment as transfers to insiders.*

AR 4: *The result found in AR 3 is robust to an environment with higher MPCR.*

2. Further Analysis




Fig. B1: empirical cumulative distribution functions for individual contributions (panel a) and individual transfers (panel b), by treatment.




Fig. B2: Frequency of self-reported motivations by outsiders.




Fig. B3: Frequency of self-reported motivations by insiders.




Fig. B4: Frequency of outsiders and insiders agreeing to the statement “I did not understand the decision task of Type 1 / 2”.

Table B1: Determinants of insiders’ contributions in the NoT treatment. Cluster-robust standard errors on the group level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.005$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

dep. var.:	NoT	NoT
individual contribution (g)	(high)	(low)
estimate	0.808*** (0.116)	0.820*** (0.109)
mistrust ingroup	-5.267 (4.358)	-5.461 (5.270)
ingroup bias	-1.444 (7.397)	5.762 (7.282)
egoism	-10.87** (4.496)	-6.722** (3.086)
social efficiency	7.258 (4.850)	-1.925 (4.232)
responsibility	-2.839 (4.590)	2.577 (3.161)
social norm	3.122 (4.849)	-0.594 (3.441)
confusion	-0.921 (12.79)	-0.640 (4.378)
constant	8.066 (6.298)	9.136 (6.193)
# individuals	76	80
# groups	19	20
R-squared	0.593	0.701

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2023-02

Natalie Struwe, Esther Blanco, James M. Walker

Donations to increase productivity in public good production: experimental evidence

Abstract

This research is inspired by in-kind donations that have the capacity to increase the marginal benefit (productivity) in provision of public goods, for example by providing critical infrastructure that increases the productivity of resources utilized by local public good providers. We provide experimental evidence from a two-stage decision environment where donors (outsiders), who benefit from a public good, send transfer donations to providers (insiders) of the public good, who also receive benefits. We find that that donors are willing to offer transfers at a sufficiently high level to increase the productivity (MPCR) of the public good. Public good provision by insiders, however, is neither increased significantly above levels observed in treatments with the same MPCR where outsiders' donations are used as compensation rewards to insiders, nor in treatments without donations. Thus, whether a given MPCR is reached endogenously through donations by outsiders or exogenously does not significantly affect insiders' public good provision. In addition, when comparing continuous to threshold endogenous changes in the MPCR, we cannot find significant differences in public good provision, despite transfer donations by outsiders are higher for threshold increases in the MPCR.

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