

Groh, Carl-Christian

**Conference Paper**

## Search, Data, and Market Power

Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2023: Growth and the "sociale Frage"

**Provided in Cooperation with:**

Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

*Suggested Citation:* Groh, Carl-Christian (2023) : Search, Data, and Market Power, Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2023: Growth and the "sociale Frage", ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, Kiel, Hamburg

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/277701>

**Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:**

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

**Terms of use:**

*Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.*

*You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.*

*If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.*

# Search, Data, and Market Power\*

Carl-Christian Groh<sup>†</sup>

February 28, 2023

[Link to most recent version](#)

## Abstract

I study the relationship between data and market power in a duopoly model of price discrimination with search frictions. One firm receives a signal about the valuation of any arriving consumer while its rival receives no information. A share of consumers, referred to as searchers, have equal valuation for the good of either firm and optimally choose which firms to visit. The remaining consumers are captive. In equilibrium, a large majority of searchers will only visit the firm with data. The market share of the firm with data converges to one as the share of searchers in the market goes to one, regardless of the signal structure. Reductions of search frictions exacerbate the dominant position of the firm with data. The establishment of a right to data portability can address the competitive imbalances caused by data advantages.

**Keywords:** search, price discrimination, imperfect customer recognition, market power

**JEL Classification:** D43, D83, L13, L15

---

\*I thank Dirk Bergemann, Nicolas Bonneton, Bernhard Ganglmair, Federico Innocenti, Marina Halac, Tsung-Hsien Li, Volker Nocke, Francisco Poggi, Nicolas Schutz, Fiona Scott Morton, Marcel Preuss, Thomas Tröger, Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, and Jidong Zhou for insightful comments. Funding by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) through CRC TR 224 (Project B03) is gratefully acknowledged. This work was supported by the University of Mannheim's Graduate School of Economic and Social Sciences. Declarations of interest: none.

<sup>†</sup>Groh: Department of Economics, University of Mannheim, L7, 3–5, 68161 Mannheim, Germany (email: carl-christian.groh@uni-mannheim.de).

# 1 Introduction

This paper is about the relationship between data and market power. Data is becoming increasingly relevant in the digital age and is accumulating unevenly — some firms are building up significant advantages in terms of the scope and precision of the data they possess.<sup>1</sup> In order to ensure the proper functioning of digital markets, it is hence imperative to understand how such data advantages will translate into competitive advantages and foster market dominance. This question has gathered significant attention by policymakers (European Commission, 2020) and researchers (Kirpalani & Philippon, 2021; Bergemann & Bonatti, 2022; Eeckhout & Veldkamp, 2022) alike.

I consider said relationship in a theoretical model of price discrimination with search frictions, in which individual-level consumer data is used to personalize prices and consumers optimally choose which firms to visit. In such contexts, any firm with a data advantage has a greater ability to tailor its prices to the willingnesses-to-pay of consumers. There is mounting empirical evidence for price discrimination in online markets.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, studying how the competitive effects of data advantages are shaped by the search choices of consumers is important, given that search frictions in online markets are known to be substantial.<sup>3</sup>

I show that even arbitrarily small data advantages can make it optimal for nearly all consumers to only visit a firm with a data advantage, thus granting this firm market shares close to one. Such extreme forms of market dominance will reduce consumer welfare, for example by deterring entry or by reducing the incentives of firms to innovate. To guide policy, I study the optimal regulation in such settings. Whereas reductions of search frictions will exacerbate the dominant position of a firm with superior data, the establishment of a right to data portability (as defined in the EU GDPR and the DMA) is an effective way of correcting the competitive imbalances caused by data advantages.<sup>4</sup>

Formally, I consider a duopoly model of a final goods market in which every consumer can costlessly visit one firm, but has to pay a search cost to visit another firm after the first. Some consumers are *searchers*: They have equal valuation for the good of either firm and want to buy the good at the lowest possible price. The remaining consumers are *captive consumers*, who can only buy the good at the firm they are captive to. The valuation of any consumer is private information to the consumer.

---

<sup>1</sup>See, for example, Statista (2021) and Statista (2022).

<sup>2</sup>Empirical evidence of price discrimination in online markets is put forth by Hannak et al. (2014), Larson et al. (2015), and Escobari et al. (2019). Regulatory bodies around the world are becoming worried about this business practice — see OECD Secretariat (2016) and European Commission (2019).

<sup>3</sup>See, for example, Koulayev (2014), De los Santos (2018), and Jolivet & Turon (2019).

<sup>4</sup>For details, see article 20 of the European Union General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and article 6 of the EU Digital Markets Act (DMA).

The two firms have different degrees of information about consumers' valuations. One firm in the market, referred to as the *firm with data*, exogenously receives a private signal about the valuation of every consumer who visits it. This signal can take on two realizations: low or high. The high signal realization becomes more likely to occur when a consumer's valuation rises. Using this signal, the firm with data will price discriminate: It will offer a relatively low price (the low signal price) to all consumers who arrive and generate the low signal and a higher price (the high signal price) to all other arriving consumers. The other firm, referred to as the *firm without data*, receives no information about any consumer and will thus offer the same price to all arriving consumers.<sup>5</sup>

As a benchmark, I solve a variant of the above model in which every consumer can only visit one firm in Section 4.1. Then, the decision problem of any searcher boils down to choosing which firm to visit. Given that the firm with data price discriminates, searchers with low valuations prefer to visit the firm with data, while searchers with high valuations visit the firm without data. This is because consumers with low (high) valuations are likely to be identified as such and receive a comparatively low (high) price at the firm with data.

This search behaviour affects prices through a *selection effect*. Because searchers with low valuations visit the firm with data and vice versa, the average valuation of consumers who visit the firm without data is larger than the average valuation of consumers who visit the firm with data. Thus, these search patterns entail upward pressure on the uniform price of the firm without data and downward pressure on the prices of the firm with data.

A key message of this paper is that this selection effect amplifies the transmission of data advantages into competitive advantages. Simply put, this effect imposes a competitive externality on the firm without data: It pushes up the uniform price the firm without data would optimally set, which is to the benefit of the firm with data because it incentivizes searchers to visit and buy at this firm. In fact, a large majority of searchers will just visit the firm with data in equilibrium — only searchers with very high valuations will optimally visit the firm without data. Moreover, the market share of the firm with data converges to one as the share of searchers approaches one, regardless of the signal structure.

Why does the market only equilibrate when the firm without data is just visited by its captive consumers and searchers with very high valuations? Intuitively, the selection effect becomes weak enough to enable equilibrium existence: When the mass of searchers who visit the firm without data is small, the distribution of consumer valuations is very similar at the two firms.<sup>6</sup> As a consequence, the optimal uniform price of the firm without data will be

---

<sup>5</sup>I focus on equilibria in which firms play pure strategies. In addition, I show that firms play pure strategies in any equilibrium in which prices are drawn from distributions with connected support.

<sup>6</sup>This is because the distribution of valuations is the same for searchers and captive consumers.

between the prices set by the firm with data. However, the selection effect is still active, which means that the optimal uniform price of the firm without data will lie just below the highest price of the firm with data (the high signal price), but significantly above the lowest price of the firm with data (the low signal price). These prices sustain the aforementioned search behaviour as an equilibrium: It is optimal for all searchers, except those with very high valuations, to visit the firm with data, because the potential benefit of receiving the low signal price at this firm is comparatively large.

In Section 4.2, I show that all previous insights go through when consumers can visit both firms, albeit under slightly stronger restrictions on the share of searchers. Formally, I solve the aforementioned model when the costs of visiting a second firm are arbitrary, while the analysis in Section 4.1 only considers the case in which these search costs are prohibitive.

To begin with, I show that no consumer will visit both firms in equilibrium if the share of searchers is not too low.<sup>7</sup> This result is based on two separate arguments: Firstly, any searcher who initially visits the *firm without data* in equilibrium would never continue searching, because the price this firm offers is non-stochastic.<sup>8</sup> Secondly, there exists no equilibrium in which some searchers continue searching after visiting the *firm with data* if there are enough searchers in the market. This is because searchers who arrive at the firm without data after visiting its rival exert upward pressure on the uniform price of this firm.<sup>9</sup> When the share of searchers is large enough, the price the firm without data would set in such a hypothetical equilibrium is thus so high that it is not worthwhile for any consumer to pay a search cost in pursuit of this price.

In equilibrium, all consumers thus only visit one firm and all results that were derived within the baseline model extend verbatim. The firm with data price discriminates and hence, the selection effect is active. As before, a large majority of searchers will thus only visit the firm with data. Moreover, the market share of the firm with data approaches one as the share of searchers goes to one, regardless of the signal structure.

Reductions of search frictions can only exacerbate the dominant position of the firm with data. When search costs are above a certain threshold, the possibility of searching plays no role and changes in search costs do not affect the equilibrium outcomes. At sufficiently low search costs, reductions of search costs induce even more searchers to visit the firm with

---

<sup>7</sup>I define  $\rho$  as the share of searchers in the market. Assuming that  $\rho \geq 0.2$  is sufficient for this result when the consumers' valuations are uniformly distributed and when restricting attention to linear signal distributions, independent of the exact level of search costs.

<sup>8</sup>Any searcher who finds it optimal to continue searching after visiting the firm without data would not initially visit this firm in equilibrium. She would be strictly better off by visiting the firm with data first and searching thereafter if and only if a high price is obtained, since this endows her with an option value.

<sup>9</sup>Note that the firm without data offers a uniform price and there are search costs. Thus, any searcher would only continue searching after visiting the firm with data if she would buy at the firm without data.

data. Intuitively, searchers constrain the prices of the firm with data with the threat of searching when search costs are sufficiently small. By strengthening this threat, reductions of search costs will induce the firm with data to lower its prices.<sup>10</sup> The reduced prices at the firm with data raise the incentives of searchers to visit this firm, thus granting it even higher market shares. Given that search costs online will likely decrease further in the future (think of augmented reality), access to superior data may thus become even more consequential.

In Section 5, I argue that the market dominance which arises from data advantages within my framework creates a need for regulatory interventions. In short, this is because the accompanying distortions can raise the average price level and will impede innovation and entry. By previous arguments, policies that decrease search frictions or merely reduce the informational advantage of a firm with superior data will not solve these issues.

Thus, I study the effects of two policies designed to curb data advantages on an individual level: the establishment of a right to anonymity and a right to data portability. A right to anonymity allows consumers to ensure that the firm with data receives no signal about them. Conversely, a right to data portability enables consumers to transfer the information the firm with data has about them to the firm without data. Whereas the former is inconsequential, the establishment of a right to data portability can be very effective. No consumer would exercise their right to anonymity, because this would be indicative of having a high valuation. By contrast, the incentives to exercise one's right to data portability are highest for low-valuation consumers. Through an unraveling effect, the establishment of a costless right to data portability can thus induce all searchers to visit the firm without data in equilibrium.

In Section 6, I present the results of various extensions of the baseline model. All results from the baseline model extend even if the firm with data receives a signal with an arbitrary finite number of realizations or a continuous signal, as long as the signal remains noisy. Moreover, the previous insights also apply when both firms receive signals about the valuations of visiting consumers, but the signal of one firm is less precise, or when consumers' preferences admit quality differentiation as in Mussa & Rosen (1978).

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: I offer a detailed literature review in Section 2. In Section 3, I set up the theoretical framework, which is solved in Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 contain the analysis of the aforementioned policy proposals and extensions. I conclude and argue why my insights apply more generally, for example in insurance markets, in Section 7.

---

<sup>10</sup>There is no equivalent effect which influences the price of the firm without data. This is because searchers who visit this firm in equilibrium strictly prefer to refrain from searching when receiving its equilibrium price. Thus, searchers cannot effectively constrain the decisions of the firm without data using the threat of search.

## 2 Related Literature

The findings I establish are novel because all previous work on the competitive effects of data advantages does not focus on the role of consumers’ search choices. In preceding papers, there are either no search frictions (e.g. Eeckhout & Veldkamp, 2022; Rhodes & Zhou, 2022), search is random (Freedman & Sagredo, 2022), or there is no consumer heterogeneity that affects whether consumers visit an entity with better data or not (Kirpalani & Philippon, 2021; Bergemann & Bonatti, 2022). Thus, the selection effect that drives the relationship between data access and competitive advantages in my model is absent in previous work.

Several recent papers study the competitive effects of data advantages. In Belleflamme et al. (2020), a firm probabilistically either knows a consumer’s valuation or knows nothing about the consumer. Bounie et al. (2021), Gu et al. (2019), Garcia (2022), and Delbono et al. (2022) study models where firms receive non-stochastic information about consumer preferences and some firms receive more informative data (e.g. a finer partition of the Hotelling line).<sup>11</sup> Rhodes & Zhou (2022) consider a setting in which some firms conduct first-degree price discrimination, whereas their rivals can only offer uniform prices.<sup>12</sup> Eeckhout & Veldkamp (2022) study a model in which better data reduces demand risk, thus inducing firms with data advantages to invest more into reducing marginal costs and attaining scale. In contrast to my work, there are no search frictions in all the aforementioned contributions.

In Kirpalani & Philippon (2021), consumers choose whether to search for a good on a platform or an outside market. The platform has access to better data, which allows firms on the platform to generate a match with a higher probability. In contrast to my work, there is no consumer heterogeneity in Kirpalani & Philippon (2021) that affects the relative utility of search on the platform vs. searching on the outside market. In equilibrium, all consumers must hence be indifferent between searching on the platform or on the outside market. Thus, the aforementioned separating search behavior of consumers in my model is also absent in Kirpalani & Philippon (2021). In addition, the prices that consumers pay on the platform and on the outside market are the same in Kirpalani & Philippon (2021), i.e. no seller can conduct finer price discrimination in this model.

Freedman & Sagredo (2022) examine a model of quality differentiation in which a unit mass of sellers offer quality-price menus to consumers. The firms observe signals about consumers’ tastes for quality and different firms have access to signals with varying precision levels. Consumers are randomly matched with either one or two sellers. The key distinction

---

<sup>11</sup>Clavorà Braulin (2021) considers a framework in which consumer preferences vary in two dimensions and firms may acquire different information about the components of a consumer’s preferences.

<sup>12</sup>Guembel & Hege (2021) and Osório (2022) consider settings in which firms have different abilities to target their products to the individual preferences of consumers, but there is no price discrimination.

to my work thus lies in the fact that consumers' choice sets are unrelated to their preferences in Freedman & Sagredo (2022) — in their model, consumers neither choose how many firms nor which kind of firms to visit. The heterogeneous search patterns that are central in my model are thus absent in Freedman & Sagredo (2022).

Bergemann & Bonatti (2022) study a model in which a platform has data about consumer preferences and uses this to match consumers and firms. Firms can sell through the platform in exchange for a fee, but do not acquire the platform's data. In contrast to my work, all firms have access to the same information in Bergemann & Bonatti (2022) and make symmetric offers in equilibrium. Moreover, while consumers can decide how many firms to visit outside of the platform, they cannot choose whether to access the platform or not.

My work also relates to the growing literature that studies price discrimination in search markets. Armstrong & Zhou (2016) and Preuss (2021) consider models where firms condition prices on a consumer's search history.<sup>13</sup> Fabra & Reguant (2020) study a simultaneous search setting where firms observe a consumer's desired quantity and price discriminate based on this information. Mauring (2021) and Atayev (2021) study a setting with shoppers and non-shoppers as defined in Burdett & Judd (1983) and Stahl (1989). Mauring (2021) and Atayev (2021) assume that firms receive imperfect information about the affiliation of a particular consumer to the groups of shoppers and non-shoppers. Marshall (2020) and Groh (2022) are the only papers which consider models of price discrimination based on information about valuations together with search, as this paper does. In all the listed contributions, consumers do not engage in directed search and no firm has a data advantage.<sup>14</sup>

Bergemann et al. (2021) study a homogenous goods model with search frictions in which competing firms receive information about the number of price offers a consumer obtains. In Bergemann et al. (2021), different firms may observe signals with varying levels of informativeness. In contrast to my work, all consumers have the same valuation in Bergemann et al. (2021) and consumers do not engage in directed search.

Ke et al. (2022) study the information design problem of an intermediary that connects sellers with consumers. In this model, every consumer just has a match at one seller. Ex ante, both the consumer and the sellers do not know with which seller the consumer has a match. By contrast, the intermediary perfectly knows said information and designs a *public* information structure about this. Consumers engage in directed search by visiting firms according to the intermediary's recommendations. However, all firms are ex ante symmetric

---

<sup>13</sup>Garrett et al. (2019) consider a model of second-degree price discrimination in which consumers differ in their choice sets, but firms do not have information about consumers. Braghieri (2019) studies a search model in which consumers decide whether or not to reveal their horizontal characteristic to firms.

<sup>14</sup>My work is also related to Esteves (2014) and Peiseler et al. (2021), who study price discrimination based on imperfect information about preferences in competitive settings without search frictions.

in Ke et al. (2022) and the intermediary’s signals are public, so no firm has an informational advantage and all firms obtain the same expected outcomes.

### 3 Theoretical framework

There is a unit mass of consumers, who each want to buy at most one unit of an indivisible good that is produced by two firms at zero marginal cost. Consumers can costlessly visit one firm, but visiting a second firm after the first incurs search costs  $c > 0$ . There are two different groups of consumers, namely *captive consumers* and *searchers*. Captive consumers can only buy at the firm they are captive to and have zero valuation for the good of the other firm. By contrast, searchers have equal valuation for the good of either firm. The distribution of a consumer’s valuation ( $v$ ), which I denote by  $G(v)$ , is once continuously differentiable, has support  $[0, 1]$ , and is identical for searchers and captive consumers. Searchers make up a share  $\rho \in (0, 1)$  of the total mass of consumers, while a share  $0.5(1 - \rho)$  of consumers is captive to either firm. If a consumer with valuation  $v$  buys the good at price  $p$ , the utility of the consumer is:

$$u(v, p) = v - p \tag{1}$$

The two firms have differential access to information about consumers. One firm, which I call the *firm with data*, exogenously receives a binary private signal  $\tilde{v} \in \{\tilde{v}^L, \tilde{v}^H\}$  about the valuation of any consumer who visits it. I define the probability distribution of this signal, which only depends on the consumer’s valuation  $v$ , as  $Pr(\tilde{v}^H|v)$ , where  $Pr(\tilde{v}^L|v) := 1 - Pr(\tilde{v}^H|v)$ . As I will formalize later, I restrict attention to probability distributions that are monotonic in  $v$ . I define the signal  $\tilde{v}^H$ , which becomes more likely to occur when a consumer’s valuation increases, as the high signal. The other firm, which I name the *firm without data*, receives no signal about the valuations of consumers.

Both firms can offer a different price to any consumer who visits. Thus, the game’s timing is as follows: At the beginning, every consumer observes her valuation (and whether she is a searcher or captive to some firm) and optimally decides which firm to visit first. The firm that is visited first offers a price to the consumer. Based on her valuation and this price offer, the consumer then decides whether to visit the other firm at cost  $c > 0$ . If the consumer visits a second firm, this firm offers the consumer a price upon arrival. Crucially, both firms receive no information about any consumer’s search history (i.e. they do not know whether an arriving consumer visits them first or second) and do not know whether a consumer is captive or a searcher. This setup implies that, as in Diamond (1971), firms cannot induce more consumers to visit them via downward deviations from equilibrium prices.

I study perfect Bayesian equilibria. Throughout the analysis, I mainly focus on equilibria in which firms play pure strategies. A pure strategy of the firm without data is a uniform price, which I call  $p^{nd}$ . A pure strategy of the firm with data is a price tuple  $(p^L, p^H)$ . This firm offers the price  $p^L$  ( $p^H$ ) to all consumers that visit it and generate the low (high) signal.<sup>15</sup> The strategy of a searcher must define which firm to visit first, based on her valuation. This decision is captured by a measurable function  $s : [0, 1] \rightarrow [0, 1]$ , where  $s(v)$  is the probability that a searcher with valuation  $v$  visits the firm with data first. Moreover, the strategy of a searcher must also codify after which initial price offers they would continue searching, conditional on the firm that is visited first. Captive consumers always visit the firm they are captive to and do not search thereafter.

In the model, consumers know which firm has a data advantage. This assumption can be motivated along two dimensions. Firstly, knowledge of this fact can arise through learning. Over time, consumers can communicate with their peers and learn which firm sets stochastic prices and which firm sets a uniform price, allowing them to infer which firm uses data to personalize prices. Secondly, such awareness might result from regulation. The European Union, for example, has recently implemented regulation that mandates firms which engage in personalized pricing to inform any visiting consumer about this fact.<sup>16</sup> The benefits of measures that increase consumer awareness of personalized pricing have also been stressed by the OECD's competition committee.<sup>17</sup>

Before moving forward with the analysis, I consider the monopoly benchmark. I define  $\Pi^{k,M}(p_j)$  as the profit a monopolist with access to the aforementioned information structure makes when offering the price  $p_j$  to consumers who generate the signal  $\tilde{v}^k$ , with global maximizers  $\{p^{k,M}\}_{k \in \{L,H\}}$  given by:

$$p^{k,M} = \arg \max_{p_j} \underbrace{\int_{p_j}^1 Pr(\tilde{v}^k|v)g(v)dv}_{:=\Pi^{k,M}(p_j)}, \quad k \in \{L, H\} \quad (2)$$

Similarly, I define  $\Pi^{nd,M}(p_j)$  as the profit a monopolist without access to a signal would make when offering the price  $p_j$ , with a global maximizer  $p^{nd,M}$  given by:

$$p^{nd,M} = \arg \max_{p_j} \underbrace{\int_{p_j}^1 g(v)dv}_{:=\Pi^{nd,M}(p_j)} \quad (3)$$

---

<sup>15</sup>The assumption that  $\rho < 1$ , i.e. that every firm has captive consumers, ensures that all information sets of both firms are on the equilibrium path, which rules out the existence of perfect Bayesian equilibria that are sustained by implausible off-path punishments.

<sup>16</sup>For details, please examine Directive 2019/2161 of the European Commission.

<sup>17</sup>See article 5 in OECD Secretariat (2016).

In the analysis that follows, I impose the following assumptions on  $Pr(\tilde{v}^H|v)$  and  $G(v)$ :

**Assumption 1** *The function  $Pr(\tilde{v}^H|v)$  is strictly increasing, continuously differentiable, and satisfies  $Pr(\tilde{v}^H|v) \in (0, 1)$  for all  $v \in [0, 1]$ . Moreover,  $\Pi^{L,M}(p_j)$ ,  $\Pi^{H,M}(p_j)$  and  $\Pi^{nd,M}(p_j)$  are strictly concave in  $p_j$ .*

Under this assumption,  $p^{L,M} < p^{nd,M} < p^{H,M}$  holds: When observing the low (high) signal, a monopolist will set a lower (higher) price than when he has no information about a consumer. This holds because the average valuation of consumers who generate the low (high) signal is relatively low (high).

I place no functional form restrictions on  $Pr(\tilde{v}^H|v)$ . Thus, my analysis also covers cases in which the signal  $\tilde{v}$  is almost uninformative. Moreover, it is also possible that the firm with data receives a signal which induces it to set higher average prices than in the absence of information about consumers' valuations. To illustrate the connection between assumptions and primitives, I will consider examples in which  $v \sim U[0, 1]$  and the signal's probability distribution is linear during the analysis. When  $v \sim U[0, 1]$  and  $Pr(\tilde{v}^H|v)$  is linear, assumption 1 is satisfied. A linear  $Pr(\tilde{v}^H|v)$  with precision  $\alpha \in (0, 1)$  is given by:

$$Pr(\tilde{v}^H|v) = 0.5 + \alpha(v - 0.5) \tag{4}$$

In addition, I impose a tie-breaking rule on the behaviour of searchers.

**Assumption 2** *Suppose that  $\underline{p}$  is the lowest price offered by either firm. Any searcher with  $v \geq \underline{p}$  who obtains equal expected utility by visiting either firm first visits both firms first with equal probability.*

In section 4.1, I solve the specified model under the restriction that  $c \rightarrow \infty$ . In section 4.2, I solve this model for arbitrary  $c > 0$ . I call the former framework the *baseline model* and the latter the *sequential search framework*.

## 4 Equilibrium analysis

### 4.1 Baseline model

Consider first the baseline model, in which it is prohibitively costly for searchers to visit a second firm ( $c \rightarrow \infty$ ). In this framework, the only relevant choice that searchers have to make is which firm to visit. If firms play pure strategies, a searcher with valuation  $v$  prefers

to visit the firm with data if and only if:

$$Pr(\tilde{v}^L|v) \max\{v - p^L, 0\} + Pr(\tilde{v}^H|v) \max\{v - p^H, 0\} \geq \max\{v - p^{nd}, 0\} \quad (5)$$

The strategy of searchers is represented by a function  $s(v)$ , where  $s(v)$  is the probability that a searcher with valuation  $v$  visits the firm with data. Given the searchers' behaviour, the firm with data maximizes the following profit function through choice of the price  $p_j$  when observing the signal  $\tilde{v}^k$ , with  $k \in \{L, H\}$ :

$$\Pi^k(p_j; s(v)) = p_j \left[ \underbrace{\rho \int_{p_j}^1 s(v) Pr(\tilde{v}^k|v) g(v) dv}_{\text{searcher demand}} + 0.5(1 - \rho) \underbrace{\int_{p_j}^1 Pr(\tilde{v}^k|v) g(v) dv}_{\text{captive consumer demand}} \right] \quad (6)$$

Analogously, the firm without data maximizes the following profit function:

$$\Pi^{nd}(p_j; s(v)) = p_j \left[ \underbrace{\rho \int_{p_j}^1 (1 - s(v)) g(v) dv}_{\text{searcher demand}} + 0.5(1 - \rho) \underbrace{\int_{p_j}^1 g(v) dv}_{\text{captive consumer demand}} \right] \quad (7)$$

I begin by characterizing equilibria in which firms play pure strategies. In such equilibria, the uniform price of the firm without data must lie between the prices of the firm with data. Moreover, the strategy of searchers is described by a cutoff rule:

**Lemma 1 (Equilibrium search patterns)**

*Consider the baseline model. In an equilibrium in which firms play pure strategies:*

- *The ordering  $p^L < p^{nd} < p^H$  must hold.*
- *There exists a  $\bar{v} > p^L$  such that all searchers with  $v \in (p^L, \bar{v})$  visit the firm with data and all searchers with  $v \in (\bar{v}, 1]$  visit the firm without data.*

Simply put, the first result holds because the optimal prices of the firms satisfy the ordering  $p^L < p^{nd} < p^H$  if the valuations of consumers who visit either firm follow the same distribution. This holds, for example, if all searchers visit a given firm.

In equilibrium,  $p^L < p^H$  must hold. To see this, note first that it is never optimal for the firm with data to set a price  $p^H$  that is strictly below  $p^L$ .<sup>18</sup> Thus, we can restrict attention to equilibrium candidates in which  $p^L \leq p^H$ . The only candidate for an equilibrium in which  $p^L = p^H$  holds is an equilibrium in which all firms set the same uniform price. i.e. in which  $p^L = p^H = p^{nd}$ . But then, searchers with a valuation above the lowest equilibrium price visit

---

<sup>18</sup>If  $p^H < p^L$ , there would either be a downward deviation from  $p^L$  to  $p^H$  when observing  $\tilde{v}^L$  or vice versa.

both firms with equal probability (by the tie-breaking rule described in assumption 2), and the optimal prices of the firms would satisfy  $p^{nd} < p^H$  or  $p^L < p^H$ , a contradiction.

Similar arguments establish that  $p^{nd} \in (p^L, p^H)$  must hold in equilibrium. For example, suppose that  $p^{nd} \leq p^L$ . Then, all searchers with  $v > p^{nd}$  visit the firm without data, implying that  $p^{nd} \geq p^{nd,M}$  must hold. But then, the firm with data has a profitable downward deviation from  $p^L$ , since it only sells to captive consumers at  $p^L$  and  $p^L \geq p^{nd,M} > p^{L,M}$ .

When deciding which firm to visit, any searcher thus faces a tradeoff: By visiting the firm with data, she will attain the lowest price  $p^L$  with probability  $Pr(\tilde{v}^L|v)$ , but she may also obtain an unfavorable outcome if she generates the high signal and is thus offered  $p^H$ . Because the probability of receiving  $p^L$  is strictly falling in  $v$ , the optimal behaviour of searchers is characterized by a cutoff  $\bar{v} > p^L$ .

The equilibrium search behaviour established above will affect the optimal prices (and their ordering) through a *selection effect*: Searchers visit the firm without data if their valuation is comparatively high and vice versa. Thus, the average valuation of consumers who visit the firm without data is *higher* than the average valuation of consumers who visit the firm with data. This effect entails upward pressure on the uniform price of the firm without data and downward pressure on the prices of the firm with data.

An equilibrium in which firms play pure strategies is described by a vector  $(p^L, p^H, p^{nd}, \bar{v})$ . Before characterizing such equilibria, it is instructive to consider the best response functions of firms. Firms optimally set prices, given the search behaviour represented by  $\bar{v}$ . To fix ideas, suppose that all searchers with  $v < \bar{v}$  visit the firm with data and that searchers with valuation  $v > \bar{v}$  visit the firm without data, where  $\bar{v} \in [0, 1]$ . Then, the firm with data maximizes the following objective through choice of  $p_j$  when observing the signal  $\tilde{v}^k$ , with  $k \in \{L, H\}$ :

$$\Pi^k(p_j; \bar{v}) = p_j \left[ \underbrace{\rho \mathbb{1}[p_j \leq \bar{v}] \int_{p_j}^{\bar{v}} Pr(\tilde{v}^k|v)g(v)dv}_{\text{searcher demand}} + \underbrace{0.5(1 - \rho) \int_{p_j}^1 Pr(\tilde{v}^k|v)g(v)dv}_{\text{captive consumer demand}} \right] \quad (8)$$

The firm without data maximizes the following objective function:

$$\Pi^{nd}(p_j; \bar{v}) = p_j \left[ \underbrace{\rho \int_{\bar{v}}^1 \mathbb{1}[p_j \leq v]g(v)dv}_{\text{searcher demand}} + \underbrace{0.5(1 - \rho) \int_0^1 \mathbb{1}[p_j \leq v]g(v)dv}_{\text{captive consumer demand}} \right] \quad (9)$$

I define the optimal prices of the firm with data as  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v}) = \arg \max_{p_j \in [0,1]} \Pi^L(p_j; \bar{v})$  and  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v}) = \arg \max_{p_j \in [0,1]} \Pi^H(p_j; \bar{v})$ . Similarly, I define  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}) = \arg \max_{p_j \in [0,1]} \Pi^{nd}(p_j; \bar{v})$ .

In the following two graphs, I visualize these best response functions for a given paramet-

ric example in which  $\rho = 0.5$ ,  $v \sim U[0, 1]$ , and  $Pr(\tilde{v}^H|v) = 0.5 + 0.7(v - 0.5)$ . The functions  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v})$ ,  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v})$ , and  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})$  are plotted in blue, red, and yellow, respectively:




Figure 1: Best response functions

Consider first the optimal prices of the firm with data and recall that this firm is visited by searchers with valuation in  $[0, \bar{v}]$ . For low values of  $\bar{v}$ , this firm can only sell to searchers by setting very low prices, which yields low total profits. When  $\bar{v}$  is low, it is hence optimal to forego these consumers entirely and to set prices that maximize the profits that accrue from captive consumers, namely  $p^{L,M}$  and  $p^{H,M}$ , respectively. As  $\bar{v}$  increases, it becomes optimal to set a price strictly below  $\bar{v}$ , thereby making the sale to some searchers. For such  $\bar{v}$ , the optimal prices of the firm with data are rising in  $\bar{v}$ , because the average valuation of consumers who visit the firm with data is rising in  $\bar{v}$ .

Now consider the optimal uniform price of the firm without data. Recall that this firm is visited by searchers with valuations in the interval  $[\bar{v}, 1]$ . The profits this firm attains from its searchers would be maximized by setting a price weakly above  $\bar{v}$ . By contrast, the profits this firm attains from its captive consumers are maximized by setting the price  $p^{nd,M}$ , which equals 0.5 in this example. When  $\bar{v} \leq 0.5$ , setting the price 0.5 also maximizes the profits that accrue from searchers. Thus, the optimal price  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})$  is equal to 0.5 when  $\bar{v} < 0.5$ .

When  $\bar{v} \in [0.5, 1]$ , the optimal price of the firm without data depends on the mass of searchers who arrive at this firm and the corresponding strength of the selection effect. Given that these consumers entail upward pressure on the uniform price of this firm, this price will be comparatively low (high) when the mass of arriving searchers is small (large). When  $\bar{v} \in [0.5, 0.5(1 + \rho)]$ , the mass of searchers who arrive at the firm without data is *large*, which implies that  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})$  will be equal to  $\bar{v}$ . For  $\bar{v} \in (0.5(1 + \rho), 1]$ , the mass of searchers who arrive at the firm without data becomes *small*, which means that the optimal price  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})$  will be strictly below  $\bar{v}$ . Moreover,  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})$  is now falling in  $\bar{v}$ , because the average valuation

of consumers who visit the firm without data is *falling* in  $\bar{v}$  in this interval.<sup>19</sup>

For general valuation distributions, the following insight can be taken away: When the mass of searchers who arrive at the firm without data is large (relative to the mass of its captive consumers), this firm will find it optimal to set a price above  $\bar{v}$ . The firm without data will only find it optimal to set a price below  $\bar{v}$  if the mass of searchers who arrive at this firm is small (i.e.  $\bar{v}$  is large). For an arbitrary valuation distribution, the optimal price  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})$  would thus only be below  $\bar{v}$  if  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$ , which is defined as follows:

$$\rho[1 - G(\bar{v}^{nd})] + 0.5(1 - \rho)[1 - G(\bar{v}^{nd}) - (\bar{v}^{nd})g(\bar{v}^{nd})] = 0 \quad (10)$$

When  $v \sim U[0, 1]$  as in the previous example,  $\bar{v}^{nd} = 0.5(1 + \rho)$ , which is the point at which the function  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})$  has its second kink. These considerations imply that a majority of searchers visit the firm with data in equilibrium:

**Proposition 1 (Competitive advantages)**

*Consider the baseline model. In an equilibrium in which firms play pure strategies, the cutoff  $\bar{v}$  must satisfy  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$ .*

Intuitively, any hypothetical equilibrium in which  $\bar{v} < \bar{v}^{nd}$  holds is ruled out by an incompatibility between optimal search behavior and optimal pricing by the firm without data. To see this, note firstly that optimality of the searchers' choices requires that  $p^{nd} < \bar{v}$  must hold in equilibrium. This is because any searcher with valuation just above  $p^{nd}$  would strictly prefer to visit the *firm with data* (since  $p^L < p^{nd}$  must be true in an equilibrium by lemma 1). Thus, the ordering  $p^L < p^{nd} < \bar{v}$  must be satisfied in an equilibrium in which firms play pure strategies.

However, previous results have established that setting a price  $p^{nd} \in (p^L, \bar{v})$  cannot be optimal for the firm without data when  $\bar{v} < \bar{v}^{nd}$ . For any  $\bar{v}$  and any  $p^L$ , the profits of this firm will be equal to  $\Pi^{nd}(p_j; \bar{v})$  when  $p_j \in (p^L, \bar{v})$ . If  $\bar{v} < \bar{v}^{nd}$ , the profits of this firm are thus strictly increasing in the price at any possible equilibrium  $p^{nd} \in (p^L, \bar{v})$ , because the upward pricing pressure created by the large mass of arriving searchers is too strong, a contradiction.

Having defined the key properties of any equilibrium in which firms play pure strategies, I now establish the existence of such an equilibrium.

**Proposition 2 (Equilibrium existence)**

*In the baseline model, there always exists an equilibrium in which firms play pure strategies.*

---

<sup>19</sup>In general, the average valuation of searchers who arrive at the firm without data is rising in  $\bar{v}$ , while their mass is falling in  $\bar{v}$ . Thus, increases in  $\bar{v}$  entail opposing effects on the average valuation of all consumers who visit the firm without data. When  $v \sim U[0, 1]$ , the latter effect dominates for  $\bar{v} \in [0.5(1 + \rho), 1]$ .

The proof of proposition 2 is by construction. I show that there always exists a  $\bar{v}^* \in [\bar{v}^{nd}, 1]$  that induces optimal prices (given by  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v}^*)$ ,  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v}^*)$ , and  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^*)$ ) which, in turn, make it optimal for searchers to visit the firm without data if and only if their valuation is above  $\bar{v}^*$ . I will find such a  $\bar{v}^*$  using a fixed point approach.

Continuity of the firms' best response functions plays an important role in the proof of proposition 2. Without further assumptions, the functions  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v})$  and  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})$  will both be continuous on the interval  $\bar{v} \in [\bar{v}^{nd}, 1]$ . However, the function  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v})$  is not necessarily continuous for these  $\bar{v}$  if  $\Pi^H(p^{nd,M}; \bar{v}^{nd}) \leq 0.5(1 - \rho)\Pi^{H,M}(p^{H,M})$  i.e. when the share of searchers ( $\rho$ ) is too small. This entails the main technical challenge in proving this proposition. I relegate the formal arguments which show existence of an equilibrium in these constellations to the appendix and focus on the case in which  $\Pi^H(p^{nd,M}; \bar{v}^{nd}) > 0.5(1 - \rho)\Pi^{H,M}(p^{H,M})$  holds in the following discussion.<sup>20</sup> Under this assumption, the optimal  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v})$  will lie strictly below  $\bar{v}$  for any  $\bar{v} \in [\bar{v}^{nd}, 1]$ .<sup>21</sup> Thus, the optimal price must satisfy a first-order condition, which guarantees continuity of the function  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v})$  on  $[\bar{v}^{nd}, 1]$ .

To characterize the optimal search behavior of consumers, I define the following function:

$$\hat{v}(p^L, p^H, p^{nd}) := \sup \{v \in [0, 1] : \underbrace{Pr(\tilde{v}^L|v)p^L + Pr(\tilde{v}^H|v)p^H}_{\text{exp. price at firm with data}} < p^{nd}\} \quad (11)$$

Conditional on  $(p^L, p^H, p^{nd})$ , all searchers will obtain a lower expected price at the firm with data if and only if their valuation is below  $\hat{v}(p^L, p^H, p^{nd})$ . Plugging in the best-response price functions into  $\hat{v}(p^L, p^H, p^{nd})$  yields:

$$\hat{v}^B(\bar{v}) := \hat{v}(p^{L,*}(\bar{v}), p^{H,*}(\bar{v}), p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})) \quad (12)$$

A value  $\bar{v}^* \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$  at which  $\bar{v}^B(\bar{v}^*) = \bar{v}^*$ , together with the implied optimal prices, constitutes an equilibrium. To see this, suppose that searchers visit the firm without data if  $v > \bar{v}^*$  and the firm with data if  $v < \bar{v}^*$ , where  $\hat{v}^B(\bar{v}^*) = \bar{v}^*$ . Given this search behaviour, the firm without data optimally sets the price  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^*)$ . The optimal prices of the firm with data are  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v}^*)$  and  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v}^*)$ . Searchers optimally visit the firm where they receive the lower expected price (conditional on their valuation  $v$ ). Thus, it is optimal for searchers to visit firms according to the cutoff rule implied by  $\bar{v}^*$ , because  $\bar{v}^* = \hat{v}^B(\bar{v}^*)$ , which implies that the combination  $(p^{L,*}(\bar{v}^*), p^{H,*}(\bar{v}^*), p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^*), \bar{v}^*)$  constitutes an equilibrium.

Thus, proving that an equilibrium in pure strategies exists amounts to establishing the

<sup>20</sup>When  $v \sim U[0, 1]$ , this property holds for any linear signal distribution if  $\rho \geq 0.13$ .

<sup>21</sup>Consider any  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$ . The high signal profits from any price  $p_j \geq \bar{v}$  are bounded from above by  $0.5(1 - \rho)\Pi^{H,M}(p^{H,M})$ . By setting a price  $p_j < \bar{v}$  (e.g.  $p_j = p^{nd,M}$ ) when observing  $\tilde{v}^H$ , the firm can attain higher profits, because  $\Pi^H(p^{nd,M}; \bar{v}) \geq \Pi^H(p^{nd,M}; \bar{v}^{nd}) > 0.5(1 - \rho)\Pi^{H,M}(p^{H,M})$  holds for any  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$ .

existence of a solution to the equation  $\hat{v}^B(\bar{v}) - \bar{v} = 0$  in the interval  $[\bar{v}^{nd}, 1]$ . The existence of an appropriate fixed point can be verified by applying the intermediate value theorem to this equation, together with the boundary conditions (i)  $\hat{v}^B(\bar{v}^{nd}) > \bar{v}^{nd}$  and (ii)  $\hat{v}^B(1) \leq 1$ . At  $\bar{v} = \bar{v}^{nd}$ ,  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^{nd}) = \bar{v}^{nd}$  holds, while both optimal prices of the firm with data are strictly below  $\bar{v}$ . This establishes that  $\hat{v}^B(\bar{v}^{nd}) = 1$ . The second boundary condition, namely  $\hat{v}^B(1) \leq 1$ , holds because  $\hat{v}^B(\bar{v})$  is the supremum of a set with elements that cannot be larger than 1. Moreover,  $\hat{v}^B(\bar{v})$  is continuous on  $\bar{v} \in [\bar{v}^{nd}, 1]$  because all price functions are continuous in  $\bar{v}$ . Thus, a solution to  $\hat{v}^B(\bar{v}) - \bar{v} = 0$  exists in the interval  $[\bar{v}^{nd}, 1]$ .

To build further intuition, I present a numerical example. Suppose that  $v \sim U[0, 1]$ ,  $\rho = 0.5$ , and that  $Pr(\bar{v}^H | v) = 0.5 + 0.7(v - 0.5)$ . For all possible equilibrium values of  $\bar{v}$  on the x-axis<sup>22</sup>, I have plotted the resulting  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v})$  in blue,  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v})$  in red, and  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})$  in yellow, respectively, in the following graph. The function  $\hat{v}^B(\bar{v})$  is plotted in green:




Figure 2: Visualization - equilibrium existence

The point  $\bar{v}$  at which  $\hat{v}^B(\bar{v})$  crosses the 45-degree line constitutes an equilibrium. When  $\bar{v} \leq \bar{v}^{nd}$  (the term  $\bar{v}^{nd}$  is equal to  $0.5(1 + \rho) = 0.75$  in this example), the selection effect is too strong to sustain an equilibrium. This manifests in the fact that the optimal uniform price of the firm without data lies above both prices the firm with data would set, so all searchers would prefer to visit the firm with data (i.e.  $\hat{v}^B(\bar{v}) = 1$ ).

As  $\bar{v}$  moves closer to 1, the selection effect becomes progressively weaker, i.e. the average valuations of consumers who visit either firm converge to each other.<sup>23</sup> This is accompanied by increases in the optimal prices of the firm with data and decreases in the optimal uniform price of the firm without data. These price changes will induce more searchers to visit the firm without data, which is represented by a falling  $\hat{v}^B(\bar{v})$ . When  $\bar{v} \approx 1$ , the optimal  $p^{nd}$

<sup>22</sup>As argued previously, we can directly exclude equilibrium candidates in which  $\bar{v} < 0.5$ .

<sup>23</sup>To see this, consider the case where  $\bar{v} = 1$ . Then, the firm without data is only visited by its captive consumers, whose valuations are uniformly drawn from  $[0, 1]$ , as is the case for the searchers who all visit the firm with data. Thus, the valuation distribution of consumers who visit either firm is exactly equal.

will lie just below the optimal  $p^H$ , while the optimal  $p^L$  lies substantially below these two prices. These prices, in turn, make the search behaviour represented by such high levels of  $\bar{v}$  optimal. Only consumers with very high valuations, who are very likely to receive the high price at the firm with data, will optimally visit the firm without data.

Note that there may potentially exist multiple equilibria in which firms play pure strategies. This multiplicity can arise from two sources: Firstly,  $\hat{v}^B(\bar{v})$  can jump upwards when the function  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v})$  is discontinuous on  $[\bar{v}^{nd}, 1]$ . Secondly, the search behaviour of searchers with  $v < p^L$  is not pinned down in equilibrium, which means that  $\Pi(p_j; \tilde{v}^L)$  may have a kink at the equilibrium  $p^L$ .

However, this multiplicity is largely inconsequential for the analysis of market concentration, because  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$  holds true in any equilibrium in which firms play pure strategies. Moreover, the issue of multiplicity is easily solved by imposing two assumptions, namely that (i)  $\Pi^H(p^{nd,M}; \bar{v}^{nd}) > 0.5(1 - \rho)\Pi^{H,M}(p^{H,M})$  holds (i.e. that there are enough searchers in the market), and (ii) that searchers with a valuation in an open interval below the lowest equilibrium price visit the firm that offers this price. This is formalized in proposition 6.

This completes the characterization of equilibria in which firms play pure strategies. Now, I consider equilibria in which at least one firm plays a mixed strategy. I restrict attention to equilibria in which firms draw prices from distributions with connected support.<sup>24</sup> As defined in Burdett & Judd (1983), a distribution  $H(p)$  has connected (i.e. convex) support if  $H(p_1) \neq H(p_2)$  holds for any distinct prices  $p_1, p_2$  in the convex hull of its support. There exists no such equilibrium in which firms mix.

### Proposition 3 (No mixing)

*Consider the baseline model and restrict attention to equilibria in which firms draw prices from distributions with connected support. In any such equilibrium, firms play pure strategies.*

This result is based on the following logic: I define the lowest price set by the firm without data and the firm with data as  $\underline{p}^{nd}$  and  $\underline{p}^d$ , respectively. In an equilibrium in which firms mix,  $\underline{p}^d = \underline{p}^{nd}$  must hold. Under our tie-breaking rule, there exists an interval of prices above this lowest price for which the profit functions of both firms are strictly concave. Thus, this lowest price  $\underline{p}^{nd}$  must be offered with probability 1 by the firm without data. If the firm with data mixes, it only sells to its captive consumers for any price above  $\underline{p}^{nd}$ . This would imply that its profits are equal to  $\Pi^{k,M}(p_j)$  for any price  $p_j$  it offers, which is a strictly concave function for either signal  $\tilde{v}^k$ , a contradiction to the mixing indifference condition.

---

<sup>24</sup>This restriction applies to any information set separately. To clarify this restriction, note that an equilibrium in which the firm with data draws prices from the interval  $[0.3, 0.4]$  when observing  $\tilde{v}^L$  and draws prices from  $[0.5, 0.6]$  when observing  $\tilde{v}^H$  is admissible. However, an equilibrium in which this firm draws prices from a distribution with support  $[0.3, 0.4] \cup [0.5, 0.6]$  when observing  $\tilde{v}^L$  is inadmissible.

Thus, we can restrict attention to equilibria in which firms play pure strategies, which I have characterized. In such equilibria, the firm with data has significant competitive advantages, as reiterated by the following corollary:

**Corollary 1 (Market dominance)**

*Consider the baseline model. The equilibrium market share of the firm with data approaches 1 as  $\rho \rightarrow 1$ .*

Recall that  $\rho$  is the share of searchers in the market. As  $\rho \rightarrow 1$ , the share of captive consumers approaches 0. In equilibrium, the measure of searchers who buy at the firm without data also approaches 0, because  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$  and this lower bound converges to 1 as  $\rho \rightarrow 1$ . This is true even when there are multiple equilibria in which firms play pure strategies, because  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$  holds in such any equilibrium. Thus, the equilibrium demand received by the firm without data approaches 0 as  $\rho \rightarrow 1$ , which implies that the market share of the firm with data approaches 1.

To build further intuition for this result, I now visualize the equilibrium prices and search cutoffs for different values of  $\rho$ . I assume that  $v \sim U[0, 1]$ . A given graph corresponds to a fixed linear signal distribution, with  $\alpha \in \{0.25, 0.6, 0.95\}$ , while different levels of  $\rho$  are plotted on the x-axis of each graph. The color scheme of prices is as before, and the equilibrium levels of  $\bar{v}$  are plotted in lilac.




Figure 3: Baseline model - comparative statics ( $\rho$ )

When  $\rho \rightarrow 1$ , corollary 1 has established that  $\bar{v} \rightarrow 1$ . In conjunction, the uniform price of the firm without data approaches  $Pr(\tilde{v}^L|1)p^{L,M} + Pr(\tilde{v}^H|1)p^{H,M}$ , which is the expected price a searcher with valuation 1 would receive at a monopolist with access to data. To see why this must hold, note that the optimal low and high signal prices of the firm with data converge to  $p^{L,M}$  and  $p^{H,M}$  as  $\bar{v}$  approaches 1, respectively. In order for the search behaviour represented by such a high level of  $\bar{v}$  to be optimal, the uniform price of the firm without

data has to be above the expected price at the firm with data (conditional on the valuation) for almost all searchers. This is guaranteed when the uniform price of this firm approaches  $Pr(\tilde{v}^L|1)p^{L,M} + Pr(\tilde{v}^H|1)p^{H,M}$ . Such a price is optimal for the firm without data because the slope of  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})$  on  $\bar{v} \in [\bar{v}^{nd}, 1]$  becomes very large as  $\rho \rightarrow 1$ .

I have established that arbitrarily small data advantages translate into substantial competitive advantages through directed consumer search. This result is underscored by considering what happens when no firm receives an informative signal. In this benchmark, both firms set the same uniform price in equilibrium and will thus receive exactly half of the market under the tie-breaking rule defined in assumption 2.

## 4.2 Sequential search framework

In this section, I show that all the results from the baseline model go through even if searchers can visit a second firm, albeit under slightly stronger restrictions on  $\rho$ . Formally, I no longer assume that  $c$  is prohibitively high, but consider an arbitrary  $c > 0$ . In terms of policy, the results I establish within this section also highlight that reductions of search frictions tend to further benefit the firm with a data advantage.

I begin the analysis by characterizing equilibria in which firms play pure strategies. As before, such an equilibrium needs to define the low signal and high signal price ( $p^L$  and  $p^H$ , respectively) of the firm with data, as well as the uniform price of the firm without data ( $p^{nd}$ ). The strategy of searchers now specifies, for a given  $v$ , (i) which firm to visit first (captured by a function  $s(v)$ , as in the baseline model), (ii) after what price offers to continue searching after visiting the firm with data first, and (iii) after what price offers to continue searching after visiting the firm without data first.<sup>25</sup> Because searchers are forward-looking, they take into account under what conditions they would continue searching after sampling the first firm when deciding which firm to initially visit.

To express whether there is search on the equilibrium path, I define the probability with which a searcher with valuation  $v$  visits both firms in an equilibrium as  $b(v)$ . Consider the set  $\{v \in [0, 1] : b(v) > 0\}$ . I say that there is search on the equilibrium path if and only if this set has strictly positive measure. When the share of searchers ( $\rho$ ) is sufficiently large, there will be no search on the equilibrium path, independent of the exact value of search costs  $c$ . This is formalized by the following assumption and accompanying proposition:

---

<sup>25</sup>Off-path beliefs play no role in the analysis. All information sets of the firms are on the equilibrium path. Any searcher is only uncertain which node the game has reached when visiting the firm with data — then, she does not know which signal was generated. However, this does affect her incentives to continue searching, since these are fully pinned down by the initial price offer and the equilibrium price  $p^{nd}$ .

**Assumption 3** *Suppose that  $p^{nd,s} + c > p^{H,M}$ , where  $p^{nd,s}$  solves the following:*

$$\left[ \rho \int_{p^{nd,s+c}}^1 Pr(\tilde{v}^H|v)g(v)dv + 0.5(1 - \rho) \int_{p^{nd,s}}^1 g(v)dv \right] = 0.5(1 - \rho)p^{nd,s}g(p^{nd,s}) \quad (13)$$

**Proposition 4 (No search beyond the first firm)**

*Suppose that assumption 3 holds. There exists no equilibrium in which firms play pure strategies and there is search on the equilibrium path.*

Assumption 3 requires that enough consumers engage in directed search, i.e. that  $\rho$  is high enough, as is underscored by the following remark:

**Remark 1** *If  $v \sim U[0, 1]$  and  $Pr(\tilde{v}^H|v)$  is linear, assumption 3 is satisfied if  $\rho \geq 0.2$ .*

The proof of proposition 4 consists of three steps: Firstly,  $p^L < p^H$  must hold in any equilibrium in which firms play pure strategies and there is search on the equilibrium path. If  $p^L = p^H$ , any searcher would directly visit the firm which offers the lower uniform price and there would be no reason to search thereafter. If  $p^H < p^L$ , the firm with data would not be optimizing. Thus, the following arguments consider equilibria with  $p^L < p^H$  and establish that (i) no searcher who initially visits the firm without data in equilibrium would continue searching and (ii) that, under assumption 3, there exists no equilibrium in which searchers would continue searching after initially visiting the firm with data.

Result (i) follows from a contrapositive argument and requires no assumptions — any searcher who finds it weakly optimal to continue searching after visiting the firm without data (and receiving  $p^{nd}$ ) would never optimally visit this firm first. This holds by the following logic: By visiting the firm without data first and searching thereafter, the best price this consumer will have in hand after search is  $p^L$  with probability  $Pr(\tilde{v}^L|v)$  and  $p^{nd}$  with probability  $Pr(\tilde{v}^H|v)$ , while the search cost  $c > 0$  is surely paid. Alternatively, the consumer could visit the firm with data first and continue searching if and only if  $p^H$  is received. The latter approach would achieve strictly higher expected utility than visiting the firm without data first and searching thereafter, because it yields the same distribution of prices, but saves search costs. By contraposition, any consumer who visits the firm without data first in equilibrium would not search thereafter.

Now consider point (ii). Equilibria in which consumers search after visiting the firm with data cannot exist when  $\rho$  is high enough. Intuitively, this is based on the following logic: Searchers who arrive at the firm without data second put upward pressure on  $p^{nd}$ . This is because visiting this firm second (i.e. paying the search cost  $c > 0$ ) is only optimal for consumers who would buy at  $p^{nd}$ . When the share of searchers ( $\rho$ ) is high, the upward

pressure these consumers exert on  $p^{nd}$  is strong. Then,  $p^{nd}$  would be very high in such a hypothetical equilibrium — so high, in fact, that no searcher would find it optimal to pay a search cost in pursuit of this price.

Now, I turn my attention to equilibria without on-path search. Under an assumption on  $\rho$ , all the results established for the baseline model go through verbatim for these equilibria:

**Assumption 4** *Assume that  $\Pi^H(p^{nd,M}; \bar{v}^{nd}) > 0.5(1 - \rho)\Pi^{H,M}(p^{H,M})$ .*

**Proposition 5 (Sequential search framework: equilibrium characterization)**

*In an equilibrium in which firms play pure strategies and there is no search on the equilibrium path:*

- *There exists a  $\bar{v} > p^L$  such that all searchers with  $v \in (p^L, \bar{v})$  visit the firm with data first and all searchers with  $v \in (\bar{v}, 1]$  visit the firm without data first.*
- *The cutoff  $\bar{v}$  must satisfy  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$ .*

*Under assumption 4, such an equilibrium exists.*

**Remark 2** *If  $v \sim U[0, 1]$  and  $Pr(\tilde{v}^H|v)$  is linear, assumption 4 is satisfied if  $\rho \geq 0.13$ .*

Consider an equilibrium in which firms play pure strategies and there is no search on the equilibrium path. As before, the equilibrium prices must satisfy the ordering  $p^L < p^{nd} < p^H$ . Thus, the strategy of searchers will be a cutoff rule, because the distribution of prices at the firm with data becomes strictly less favorable as a consumer's valuation rises. Moreover, there exists no such equilibrium in which  $\bar{v} < \bar{v}^{nd}$  holds, because the firm without data would never optimally set  $p^{nd}$  below  $\bar{v}$  in such a hypothetical equilibrium. However, optimal search by consumers implies that  $p^{nd} < \bar{v}$  must hold in equilibrium, because searchers with valuation just above  $p^{nd}$  strictly prefer to visit the firm with data.

The proof that an equilibrium without on-path search exists for any  $c > 0$  under assumption 4 is by construction. First, consider the equilibrium derived for the baseline model (in which  $c$  was prohibitively high). I define the components of this equilibrium as  $(p^{L,1}, p^{H,1}, p^{nd,1}, \bar{v}^1)$ , where  $\bar{v}^1 = \hat{v}^B(\bar{v}^1)$ ,  $p^{L,1} = p^{L,*}(\bar{v}^1)$ ,  $p^{H,1} = p^{H,*}(\bar{v}^1)$ , and  $p^{nd,1} = p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^1)$ . The arguments pertaining to proposition 2 establish that such a combination exists.

If search costs are so high that  $p^{H,1} \leq p^{nd,1} + c$ , this combination of prices and  $\bar{v}$  remains an equilibrium. Then, searchers would never find it optimal to search after visiting the first firm, which implies that it is optimal to visit firms according to the search rule implied by  $\bar{v}^1$ . Given this search behaviour, firms will find it optimal to set the prices  $p^{L,1}, p^{H,1}$  and  $p^{nd,1}$ , respectively, establishing that this vector of prices and  $\bar{v}^1$  constitutes an equilibrium.

Thus, it only remains to establish that an equilibrium of the desired form exists when  $p^{H,1} > p^{nd,1} + c$ . Consider an equilibrium candidate  $(p^{L,2}, p^{H,2}, p^{nd,2}, \bar{v}^2)$ , in which  $p^{L,2} = p^{L,*}(\bar{v}^2)$ ,  $p^{nd,2} = p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^2)$ ,  $p^{H,2} = p^{nd,2} + c$ , and  $\bar{v}^2$  is a solution to the following equation:

$$\bar{v}^2 - \underbrace{\hat{v}(p^{L,*}(\bar{v}^2), p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^2) + s, p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^2))}_{:=\hat{v}^S(\bar{v}^2)} = 0 \quad (14)$$

There exists a  $\bar{v}^2 \in [\bar{v}^{nd}, 1]$  that solves this equation. This holds because (i)  $\hat{v}^S(\bar{v}^1) \geq \bar{v}^1$ , (ii)  $\hat{v}^S(1) \leq 1$ , and (iii)  $\hat{v}^S(\bar{v})$  is continuous on  $[\bar{v}^1, 1]$  under assumption 4. The first result holds because  $\hat{v}^S(\bar{v}^1) \geq \hat{v}^B(\bar{v}^1) = \bar{v}^1$ . This reflects the following notion: When the firm with data sets a high signal price equal to  $p^{nd,1} + c$  instead of the higher  $p^{H,1}$ , more searchers will prefer to visit the firm with data, i.e.  $\hat{v}^S(\bar{v}^1) \geq \hat{v}^B(\bar{v}^1)$ . The latter two results hold by the arguments made in the discussion of proposition 2.

To see why such a  $\bar{v}^2$  constitutes an equilibrium, consider the implied search behaviour of searchers: As before, searchers will maximize their expected utility by initially visiting the firm that offers them (based on their valuation) the lower expected price. Because  $p^{H,2} = p^{nd,2} + c$ , it is weakly optimal to refrain from searching after visiting the firm with data. Moreover, one can show that searchers with  $v > \bar{v}^2$  would not search after visiting the firm without data. Thus, it is optimal for searchers to visit the firm with data if and only if their valuation is below  $\bar{v}^2$  and to refrain from searching thereafter.

It remains to show that the prices  $(p^{L,2}, p^{H,2}, p^{nd,2})$  are optimal for firms if searchers visit firms according to the rule implied by  $\bar{v}^2$ . There will be no profitable deviations from  $p^{L,2}$  and  $p^{nd,2}$ , because these prices are global maximizers of the respective profit functions when no consumer would ever leave to search, which are weakly above true profits for any price.

There will be no profitable deviations from  $p^{H,2}$  under assumption 4 by the following logic: Because search costs are so low that  $p^{H,1} > p^{nd,1} + c$ , the ordering  $p^{H,2} < p^{H,*}(\bar{v}^2)$  will hold. Intuitively, this represents the notion that searchers push down the high signal price of the firm with data below the unconstrained optimal price using the threat of searching. By strict concavity of the respective profit function, there are thus no profitable downward deviations from  $p^{H,2}$ . Moreover, assumption 4 guarantees that there will not be any profitable upward deviations (for which the firm with data would only sell to captive consumers). This is because equilibrium profits are bounded from *below* by  $\Pi^H(p^{nd,M}, \bar{v}^{nd})$ , while the profits from any deviation above  $p^{H,2}$  are bounded from *above* by  $0.5(1 - \rho)\Pi^{H,M}(p^{H,M})$ .

Equilibrium uniqueness (both within the baseline and the sequential search framework) requires a tie-breaking rule restricting the behaviour of searchers who have a valuation just below the lowest price that is offered by either firm, which I call  $\underline{p}$ :

**Assumption 5** *Suppose that  $\underline{p}$  is the lowest price offered by either firm. There exists an  $\epsilon > 0$  s.t., no matter the exact value of  $\underline{p}$ , all searchers with  $v \in [\underline{p} - \epsilon, \underline{p})$  initially visit a firm which offers the price  $\underline{p}$  with weakly higher probability.*

**Proposition 6 (Equilibrium uniqueness)**

*Under assumptions 3, 4, and 5, there exists a unique equilibrium in which firms play pure strategies.*

The tie-breaking rule guarantees that the low signal profit function is differentiable around the lowest equilibrium price  $p^L$ , which must thus be equal to  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v})$ . This eliminates one potential source of equilibrium multiplicity. Moreover, assumption 4 ensures that all functions  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v})$ ,  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v})$ , and  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})$  are continuous on  $[\bar{v}^{nd}, 1]$ , which implies that  $\hat{v}^S(\bar{v})$  and  $\hat{v}^B(\bar{v})$  can never jump up on the interval  $[\bar{v}^{nd}, 1]$ , eliminating the other possible source of equilibrium multiplicity.

As before, one can rule out the existence of equilibria in which firms mix (within the set of equilibria in which firms draw prices from distributions with connected support):

**Proposition 7 (Sequential search framework: no mixing)**

*In any equilibrium in which firms draw prices from distributions with connected support, all firms play pure strategies.*

Summing up, the key results from the baseline model are retained. In equilibrium, a large majority of searchers only visit the firm with data. Moreover, the market share of the firm with data approaches 1, independent of the signal distribution, as  $\rho \rightarrow 1$ .

**Corollary 2 (Sequential search framework: market dominance)**

*The equilibrium market share of the firm with data approaches 1 as  $\rho \rightarrow 1$ .*

When  $\rho$  (the share of searchers) approaches 1, both assumptions 3 and 4 will hold, independent of the signal distribution. Thus, an equilibrium will exist. All consumers just visit one firm and  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$  must hold, which implies the result because  $\bar{v}^{nd} \rightarrow \rho$  as  $\rho \rightarrow 1$ .

It remains to study how changes in search costs ( $c$ ) affect the equilibrium outcomes. Within the equilibrium established for the baseline model, search cost reductions play no role. When  $c$  becomes small, reductions of search costs exacerbate market dominance:

**Corollary 3 (Comparative statics: search costs)**

*The equilibrium  $\bar{v}$  is unaffected by changes in  $c$  if  $c > p^{H,1} - p^{nd,1}$  and is weakly decreasing in  $c$  if  $c \leq p^{H,1} - p^{nd,1}$ . If  $v \sim U[0, 1]$  and  $\Pr(\tilde{v}^H|v)$  is linear, the market share (sales based) of the firm with data is thus falling in  $c$  when  $c \leq p^{H,1} - p^{nd,1}$  and independent of  $c$  otherwise.*

I visualize these effects in the following graph, in which I plot the equilibrium quantities for different levels of search costs (on the x-axis) and  $\alpha$ - $\rho$  combinations.




Figure 4: Comparative statics - search costs

When search costs are sufficiently high (i.e.,  $c \geq 0.03$ ), the equilibrium  $(p^{L,1}, p^{H,1}, p^{nd,1}, \bar{v}^1)$  from the baseline model is played, in which the possibility of searching is not relevant. When  $c$  becomes sufficiently small, the equilibrium quantities are given by  $(p^{L,2}, p^{H,2}, p^{nd,2}, \bar{v}^2)$ . Then, search cost reductions lead to lower price levels, but exacerbate the problem of market dominance. Intuitively, searchers are now able to constrain the high signal price of the firm with data with the threat of searching, which implies that this price will approach  $p^{nd}$  as search costs fall. This increases the incentives of searchers to visit the firm with data. In particular, all searchers will prefer to only visit the firm with data (i.e.  $\bar{v} = 1$ ) when  $c$  becomes sufficiently small, because  $p^L$  always remains substantially below  $p^{nd}$  and  $p^H$ .

Finally, I consider the effects of changes in information precision ( $\alpha$ ). I visualize the equilibrium quantities for different levels of  $\alpha$  (on the x-axis) and  $s$ - $\rho$  combinations.




Figure 5: Comparative statics - information precision

As the signal of the firm with data becomes more informative (i.e. when this firm's data

advantage becomes larger), the degree of market dominance enjoyed by this firm falls.<sup>26</sup> This holds by the following logic: When the precision of the signal ( $\alpha$ ) rises, searchers with high valuations are more likely to be recognized by the firm with data, in which case they receive an unfavorably high price. This reduces their incentives to visit the firm with data, which, in equilibrium, induces more searchers to visit the firm without data.

## 5 Welfare and policy recommendations

### 5.1 Data and consumer welfare

The effects of data advantages imply a need for regulatory interventions for two reasons. Firstly, personalized pricing by the firm with data may lead to higher average prices, thereby reducing consumer welfare. More importantly, the market dominance resulting from data advantages (no matter how small these data advantages are) can reduce consumer welfare by discouraging entry, distorting competition, and by reducing the incentives to innovate.

The personalized pricing that the firm with data implements can lower consumer welfare as such. For example, suppose that the firm with data receives a binary signal that is effective at identifying high-valuation consumers, where  $Pr(\tilde{v}^H|v) = 0.5$  if  $v < 0.6$  and  $Pr(\tilde{v}^H|v) = 1$  if  $v \geq 0.6$ . If all searchers visit the firm with data, a searcher's ex ante expected utility is 0.1025, while it equals 0.125 when no firm has data. When  $\rho$  is high and  $\bar{v}$  is thus close to 1, consumer welfare in the competitive equilibrium with data will hence be lower than when no firm has data. The equilibrium dynamics induce consumers to flock to the firm with data, even though it effectively charges higher prices than its rival in the monopoly benchmark.

The market dominance enabled by data advantages can deter entry. This is best conceptualized by augmenting my model with an initial entry stage. There are two firms: the incumbent and the potential entrant, who has no data about consumers. Initially, the entrant has to decide whether or not to pay a fixed cost to enter the market, while the incumbent has to pay no such cost. After the entry decision, the product market competition game from the baseline model is played. If the incumbent has no data, both firms receive half of the market if the entrant enters. If the incumbent has a data advantage, the entrant is visited by a much lower mass of consumers, which makes entry less profitable. Thus, data advantages may discourage entry, which is to the detriment of consumers who have a strong preference for the entrant's product (e.g. the captive consumers in my model).

---

<sup>26</sup>There are two kinks in the evolution of the equilibrium objects when  $s = 0.03$ . This is because the difference between  $p^{H,1}$  and  $p^{nd,1}$  is maximal (and thus, can be above a given level of  $s$ ) when  $\alpha$  is at intermediate levels. Thus, the equilibrium of category 1 is played whenever information precision is relatively low or high, while the equilibrium of category 2 is played for intermediate levels of information precision.

The presence of data can significantly distort competition. To see this, consider a duopoly with a high-quality and a low-quality firm. The valuations that searchers (and the corresponding captive consumers) have for the product of the high-quality firm, call these  $v$ , are uniformly distributed on  $[0, 1]$ . The valuation that any searcher has for the product of the low-quality firm is given by  $v - \mu$ . In accordance, the valuations that captive consumers have for the product of the low-quality firm are uniformly drawn from  $[-\mu, 1 - \mu]$ , where  $\mu \geq 0$  captures the extent of the quality difference.

Suppose that no firm has data, but that  $\mu > 0$ . In a monopoly benchmark, the low-quality firm would set the price  $0.5(1 - \mu)$ , while the high-quality firm sets the price 0.5. In the competitive equilibrium, searchers thus only visit the high-quality firm.<sup>27</sup> Endowing the low-quality firm with data changes this prediction. To see this, define  $p^{L,\mu}$  and  $p^{H,\mu}$  as the prices this firm would set in the monopoly benchmark when receiving the low and high signal, respectively. If  $p^{L,\mu} + \mu < 0.5 < p^{H,\mu} + \mu$  holds, the equilibrium predictions from the baseline model are retained — a large majority of searchers only visit the low-quality firm, because it has data. This represents a significant distortion of competition.

Empirical evidence by Li et al. (2021) shows that shielding firms from competitive pressures reduces their incentives to innovate. The competitive distortions caused by data advantages have similar effects. To see this, reconsider the aforementioned example with a high-quality and a low-quality firm and consider the incentives of the low-quality firm to reduce  $\mu$ , e.g. by conducting product innovation. When this firm has no data, reducing  $\mu$  to 0 will increase the market share of this firm from  $0.5(1 - \rho)$  to 0.5, while the benefits of innovation are much smaller for this firm if it has a data advantage. This is to the detriment of consumers, who would benefit from innovation.

## 5.2 Policy implications

The preceding analysis has established the need for policy interventions when firms have unequal access to information about consumer preferences in markets with search frictions. However, the comparative statics results I have derived show that reduced market concentration cannot be attained by policy measures which reduce search frictions or which merely reduce the informational advantage of a firm with superior data.

Another way of depriving the firm with data of its advantage is to endow consumers with a right to anonymity. I study the effects of such a policy by integrating this possibility into the baseline model — now, any searcher can pay a cost  $e \geq 0$  before obtaining a price quote at the firm with data to ensure that this firm receives no signal about them, i.e. to

---

<sup>27</sup>This is because any searcher will obtain the utility  $\max\{v - 0.5, 0\}$  at the high-quality firm, which is strictly larger than the utility she would obtain at the low-quality firm, namely  $\max\{v - 0.5(1 + \mu), 0\}$ .

become anonymous. Any searcher thus has three possible choices: (i) visit the firm without data, (ii) visit the firm with data and become anonymous, or (iii) visit the firm with data and refrain from becoming anonymous. As a tie-breaking rule, I assume that whenever two of the approaches listed above entail the offering of an identical uniform price, both these choices will be selected by searchers with equal probability.

The establishment of a right to anonymity will be inconsequential:

**Proposition 8 (Ineffective anonymity)**

*Consider the baseline model, augmented with the right to anonymity. For any  $e \geq 0$ , the set of consumers who exercise this right has measure zero.*

The intuition behind this result mirrors the insights of Belleflamme & Vergote (2016), who derive a similar result in a monopoly setting. Only consumers with comparatively high valuations would ever want to exercise their right to anonymity. Low-valuation consumers, by contrast, benefit from the possibility that a firm profiles them. In equilibrium, firms will thus offer high prices to consumers who choose to become anonymous, which makes it detrimental for consumers to exercise this right.

By contrast, the establishment of a right to data portability (as expressed in the EU GDPR and the DMA) can be very effective. I show this by integrating a right to data portability into the baseline framework. Suppose that any searcher can, before obtaining a price quote, costlessly copy all the information the firm with data has about her and transfer this to the firm without data. A searcher now has three choices: As before, she can (i) visit the firm with data or (ii) obtain a price offer at the firm without data without porting her data. In addition, she can now (iii) obtain a price offer at the firm without data after porting her data. Formally, porting the data implies that the firm without data will, upon being visited, receive a signal about the consumer’s valuation. The distribution of this signal is  $Pr(\tilde{v}^H|v)$ , just as for the firm with data.

A pure strategy of the firm with data remains a price tuple  $(p^L, p^H)$ , while a pure strategy of the firm without data is now a vector  $(p^{L,nd}, p^{H,nd}, p^{nd})$ . This firm offers the price  $p^{nd}$  to all consumers who visit it but do not port their data and the prices  $p^{L,nd}$  and  $p^{H,nd}$  to all consumers who port their data and generate the low and high signal, respectively.

Endowing searchers with the ability to costlessly exercise their right to data portability can eliminate the advantage of the firm with data:

**Proposition 9 (Data portability)**

*Consider the baseline model, augmented with a right to data portability. There exists an equilibrium in which all searchers visit the firm without data.*

This equilibrium has the following form: All searchers visit the firm without data. The firm with data is only visited by its captive consumers and will thus optimally set the monopoly prices, namely  $p^{L,M}$  and  $p^{H,M}$ . Searchers exercise their right to data portability if and only if their valuation is below a cutoff  $v^t$ . If their valuation is above  $v^t$ , they visit the firm without data but don't port their data. This cutoff  $v^t$  solves:

$$v^t = \sup \{v \in [0, 1] : Pr(\tilde{v}^H|v)p^{H,nd} + Pr(\tilde{v}^L|v)p^{L,nd} - p^{nd} \leq 0\} \quad (15)$$

Because  $v^t \leq 1$ , the prices that the firm without data would offer to consumers who port their data are lower than their monopoly counterparts, i.e.  $p^{L,nd} \leq p^{L,M}$  and  $p^{H,nd} \leq p^{H,M}$ . Since  $p^{L,nd} \leq p^{L,M}$  and  $p^{H,nd} \leq p^{H,M}$ , visiting the firm without data and porting one's data yields higher expected utility than visiting the firm with data. Thus, it is optimal for all searchers to visit the firm without data.

Calculating the equilibrium values of  $v^t$  shows that  $v^t$  is generally below 1. This is crucial, because it implies that the equilibrium prices satisfy  $p^{L,nd} < p^L$  and  $p^{H,nd} < p^H$ , making it *strictly* optimal for searchers to visit the firm without data. This insight establishes that a right to data portability can effectively counteract the competitive effects of data advantages even when exercising this right is costly or generates a less informative signal.

There also exists an equilibrium in which no searchers exercise their right to data portability, the respective information sets of the firm without data are off the equilibrium path, and the firm's beliefs are such that it is optimal for searchers to not exercise this right. Then, the equilibrium outcomes will be the same as in the baseline model.

## 6 Extensions

In this section, I discuss the results of various extensions. Because the analysis in section 4.2. indicates that restricting attention to prohibitively high search costs is without loss of generality when the share of searchers is high enough, I assume that searchers can only visit one firm in all the extensions I study. The results from the baseline model are retained when the firm with data receives a finite signal with an arbitrary number of realizations or a continuous signal, so long as the signal is not perfect. Moreover, the previously established insights also apply when both firms have access to data, but one firm's signal is more precise, or when consumers' preferences enable quality differentiation as in Mussa & Rosen (1978).<sup>28</sup>

---

<sup>28</sup>In this version of the paper, I provide formal results only for the first extension. The formal results pertaining to the other three extensions, together with the associated proofs and documentation, may be found in an earlier version of this paper available under this link: <https://www.crctr224.de/en/projects/b/b03/discussion-papers>

Non-binary finite signals:

Suppose that the firm with data receives a signal that can take  $K \geq 2$  possible realizations, where the probability that a consumer with valuation  $v$  generates a signal  $\tilde{v}^k$  is  $Pr(\tilde{v}^k|v)$  and  $\sum_{k=1}^K Pr(\tilde{v}^k|v) = 1$ . Conditional on the search strategy of searchers, namely  $s(v)$ , one can define the cumulative distribution function of a consumer's valuation, conditional on the consumer having generated the signal  $\tilde{v}^k$ , as  $F^k(v; s(v))$ :

$$F^k(x; s(v)) = \frac{1}{Pr(\tilde{v}^k)} \int_0^x Pr(\tilde{v}^k|v) [\rho s(v) + 0.5(1 - \rho)] g(v) dv \quad (16)$$

The hazard ratios are  $h^k(v; s(v)) = \frac{f^k(v; s(v))}{1 - F^k(v; s(v))}$ , where  $f^k(v; s(v))$  are the corresponding densities. I define  $\Pi^{k,M}(p_j)$  as the profit a monopolist with access to said information structure makes when offering the price  $p_j$  to consumers who generate  $\tilde{v}^k$ . The monopoly profit function of a firm without data is  $\Pi^{nd,M}(p_j)$ , as defined in equation (3). The optimal monopoly prices are  $p^{nd,M} := \arg \max_{p_j} \Pi^{nd,M}(p_j)$  and  $p^{k,M} := \arg \max_{p_j} \Pi^{k,M}(p_j)$ .

Everything else is as in the baseline model. An equilibrium consists of the search strategy of consumers, the uniform price set by the firm without data ( $p^{nd}$ ), and the prices set by the firm with data after any signal, namely  $\{p^k\}_{k \in \{1, \dots, K\}}$ . I impose the tie-breaking rule laid out in assumption 2 and the following new assumptions:

**Assumption 7** *Suppose there are  $K \geq 2$  possible signal realizations. Assume that the functions  $Pr(\tilde{v}^k|v)$  are all continuously differentiable, satisfy  $Pr(\tilde{v}^k|v) \in (0, 1) \forall v$  and that:*

- *For any measurable  $s(v)$ , the signals are hazard ratio ordered, i.e.  $h^1(v; s(v)) > h^2(v; s(v)) > \dots > h^K(v; s(v))$  holds for all  $v \in [0, 1]$ .*
- *The monopoly profit functions  $\Pi^M(p_j|\tilde{v}^1), \dots, \Pi^M(p_j|\tilde{v}^K)$ , and  $\Pi^{nd,M}(p_j)$  are all strictly concave in the price and  $p^{nd,M} \in (p^{1,M}, p^{K,M})$ .*

Moreover, for any vector of prices  $(p^1, \dots, p^K)$  s.t.  $p^1 \leq p^2 \leq \dots \leq p^K$  and  $p^1 \neq p^K$ :

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial v} \left[ \sum_{k=1}^K Pr(\tilde{v}^k|v) \max\{v - p^k, 0\} \right] < 1 \quad (17)$$

I label this framework the *extended data framework*. Under these conditions, all results derived within the baseline model go through verbatim:

**Proposition 10** *Consider the extended data framework. In any equilibrium in which firms play pure strategies:*

- The ordering  $p^{nd} \in (p^1, p^K)$  will hold.
- There exists a  $\bar{v} > p^1$  s.t all searchers with  $v \in (p^1, \bar{v})$  visit the firm with data and all searchers with  $v \in (\bar{v}, 1]$  visit the firm without data. The ordering  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$  holds.

*There exists an equilibrium in which firms play pure strategies.*

The specifications listed in assumption 7 guarantee that the effective price a consumer would pay at the firm with data is rising in her valuation. This feature is sufficient to give rise to the selection effect, which strongly incentivizes searchers to visit and buy from the firm with data.

### Continuous signals:

Now suppose that the firm with data receives a continuous signal  $\tilde{v} = v + \epsilon$  about the valuation of any arriving consumer ( $v$ ), where the noise term  $\epsilon$  is uniformly distributed on the interval  $[-\bar{\epsilon}, \bar{\epsilon}]$  and  $\bar{\epsilon} > 0$ . Because the signal is not perfect, any searcher can attain positive utility by visiting the firm with data. However, the fact that the firm with data price discriminates implies that the strategy of searchers will once again be a cutoff rule, and the results of propositions 1 and 2 are retained. Thus, the insights from the main analysis go through, so long as the firm with data receives an imperfect signal. Interestingly, numerically calculating the equilibrium quantities indicates that  $\bar{v} \rightarrow \bar{v}^{nd}$  as  $\bar{\epsilon} \rightarrow 0$ .

### Quality differentiation:

Suppose alternatively that consumers have preferences as in Mussa & Rosen (1978): When buying a good with quality  $q$  at the price  $p$ , a consumer's utility is  $u(q, p) = \theta q - p$ , where  $\theta$  is private information to the consumer. The firm with data offers two different price-quality menus, depending on the observed signal about  $\theta$ . When the share of searchers is high enough, all previous results are retained. This holds by the following logic: When a firm believes that it faces a consumer with a low average type, it will tailor its menus to a consumer with a low type. By the integrability condition, this will favorably affect the offers made to any consumer type. Thus, the low (high) signal menu of the firm with data will be more (less) favorable than the menu of the firm without data in equilibrium. Because consumers with low (high) types are likely to receive the low (high) signal menu when visiting the firm with data, the optimal strategy of searchers remains a cutoff rule and the previous insights extend.

### Endowing both firms with access to data:

Finally, I consider markets in which both firms receive a signal about the valuations of visiting consumers, but the signal of one firm (the firm with better data) is more precise. In equilibrium, searchers with a valuation above a cutoff will visit the firm with worse data and vice versa. This cutoff will be bounded from below. I analytically characterize equilibria in which firms play pure strategies and provide a condition that guarantees uniqueness (if such an equilibrium exists). Numerical analysis reveals that such an equilibrium always exists whenever the signal distribution is linear and the consumers' valuations are uniformly distributed. The market share of the firm with better data converges to 1 as  $\rho \rightarrow 1$ .

## 7 Conclusion

I have analyzed the relationship between data and market power in a duopoly model of directed search and personalized pricing. One of the firms in the market has a data advantage — in the baseline model, this firm receives a signal about the valuation of any consumer who visits it, while its rival receives no such information. Consumers can costlessly visit one firm, but have to pay a search cost to visit a second firm after the first. There are two groups of consumers, namely *captive consumers* and *searchers*. Searchers have equal valuation for the good of both firms and, based on their valuation, optimally choose which firms to visit.

Directed consumer search strongly facilitates the transmission of data advantages into competitive advantages. In equilibrium, a large majority of searchers only visit the firm with data. The firm without data is just visited by searchers with very high valuations. As the share of searchers goes to 1, so does the market share of the firm with data.

While I have considered a framework in which data is only used to price discriminate, the insights apply more generally. Consider, for instance, an insurance market: Consumers with low risk benefit if a firm has information about their traits, because this would translate into more favorable contract terms. Thus, these consumers would all prefer to visit a firm with a data advantage, which improves the overall risk profile of consumers who visit this firm. The generally better contract terms this firm offers as a result will, in turn, attract even more consumers, mirroring the unraveling channels present in my model.

More generally speaking, the selection effect manifests whenever low-valuation consumers systematically prefer a firm with better data. This feature can also emerge through privacy concerns. Empirical evidence by Lin (2022) establishes that consumers with higher wealth tend to value privacy more (i.e. have a larger disutility when firms attain access to their data). In markets where the wealth of consumers is positively correlated with their valuations, the familiar search patterns would thus also emerge in the absence of price discrimination, giving rise to the selection effect and the resulting competitive effects.

# A Proofs

Throughout the appendix, I use the terminology  $Pr^H(v) := Pr(\tilde{v}^H|v)$  and  $Pr^L(v) := Pr(\tilde{v}^L|v)$  for ease of exposition.

## A.1 Proof of lemma 1

**Part 1:**  $p^{L,M} < p^{nd,M} < p^{H,M}$  must hold.

By definition,  $p^{nd,M}$  solves  $\int_{p^{nd,M}}^1 \frac{g(v)}{g(p^{nd,M})} dv - p^{nd,M} = 0$ . The inequality  $Pr^L(v) < Pr^L(p^{nd,M})$  holds for all  $v > p^{nd,M}$  by the assumption that  $Pr^H(v)$  is strictly increasing in  $v$ , which implies that  $\Pi^{L,M}(p_j)$  is strictly decreasing at  $p^{nd,M}$  and that  $\Pi^{H,M}(p_j)$  is strictly increasing at  $p^{nd,M}$ . By strict concavity of the monopoly profit functions,  $p^{L,M} < p^{nd,M} < p^{H,M}$  must hold.

**Part 2:** In an equilibrium in which firms play pure strategies,  $p^H < p^L$  cannot hold.

Suppose, for a contradiction, that  $p^H < p^L$ . One can show that the distribution of a consumers valuation, conditional on the consumer having generated  $\tilde{v}^H$ , will hazard ratio dominate the analogous distribution, conditional on the consumer having generated  $\tilde{v}^L$ . As a result, it will either be profitable to deviate from  $p^L$  to  $p^H$  when observing  $\tilde{v}^L$  or vice versa, a contradiction.

**Part 3:** In an equilibrium in which firms play pure strategies,  $p^L = p^H$  cannot hold.

Suppose  $p^{nd} < p^L = p^H$ . Then, all searchers with  $v \geq p^{nd}$  visit the firm without data. In equilibrium, the firm with data thus only sells to its captive consumers. Thus,  $p^L = p^{L,M}$  and  $p^H = p^{H,M}$  must hold, which contradicts  $p^L < p^H$ . Suppose  $p^L = p^H < p^{nd}$ . Then, all searchers with  $v > p^H$  visit the firm with data. Thus,  $p^H \geq p^{H,M}$  must hold (else, there is an upward deviation because for prices above  $p^H$ , high signal profits are  $0.5(1 + \rho)\Pi^{H,M}(p_j)$ ). Also,  $p^{nd} = p^{nd,M}$  must hold since the firm without data only sells to captive consumers in equilibrium. Thus,  $p^{nd} < p^{H,M} \leq p^H$ , a contradiction.

Thus, suppose that  $p^L = p^H = p^{nd}$ . Then, all searchers with a valuation above the equilibrium price (call this  $p^* := p^L = p^H = p^{nd}$ ) visit either firm with probability 0.5. This implies that  $p^* \geq p^{H,M}$  must hold. Regardless of the way in which consumers with  $v < p^*$  visit firms, there is either a downward deviation for the firm without data or a downward deviation for the firm with data when it observes the low signal.

**Part 4:** In an equilibrium in which firms play pure strategies,  $p^L < p^{nd} < p^H$  must hold.

By previous arguments,  $p^L < p^H$  must hold. Suppose, for a contradiction, that  $p^{nd} \leq p^L$ . Then, all searchers with  $v > p^{nd}$  visit the firm without data. For all prices  $p_j \geq p^{nd}$ , the profit function of the firm without data is thus  $0.5(1 + \rho)\Pi^{nd,M}(p_j)$ , which means that  $p^{nd} \geq p^{nd,M}$  must hold (else, there is a profitable upward deviation). By implication,  $p^{nd,M} \leq p^{nd} < p^L$  holds, which implies that  $p^L > p^{L,M}$ . Because the firm with data only sells to captive consumers in equilibrium, there is a profitable downward deviation from  $p^L$ , a contradiction. By analogous arguments,  $p^H \leq p^{nd}$  cannot hold.

**Part 5:** Existence of the cutoff  $\bar{v}$ .

In equilibrium, we must have  $p^L < p^{nd} < p^H$ . All consumers with  $v \in (p^L, p^{nd}]$  visit the firm with data, since their utility at the firm without data is 0. Consider consumers with  $v \in (p^{nd}, p^H]$ , for whom the preference for the firm with data is  $P^D(v) = [Pr^L(v)(v - p^L)] - (v - p^{nd})$ . This is strictly falling in  $v$ . Now consider consumers with  $v \in [p^H, 1]$ . For them, the preference for the firm with data is  $P^D(v) = [Pr^L(v)(v - p^L) + Pr^H(v)(v - p^H)] - (v - p^{nd})$ , which is continuous at  $p^H$ . For consumers with  $v \in [p^H, 1]$ , the preference for the firm with data is strictly falling in  $v$ .

Thus, there must be a unique  $\bar{v}$ , because all searchers with  $v \in (p^L, p^{nd}]$  strictly prefer the firm with data and the preference for this firm is strictly decreasing in  $v$  thereafter.

## A.2 Proof of proposition 1

Consider first the monopoly profit function of the firm without data, which is  $\Pi^{nd,M}(p_j) = p_j[1 - G(p_j)]$ . The second derivative, which is strictly negative for all  $p_j \in [0, 1]$  by assumption, is:  $\frac{\partial^2 \Pi^{nd,M}(p_j)}{\partial p_j^2} = -2g(p_j) - p_j g'(p_j)$ .

In equilibrium,  $p^{nd} < \bar{v}$  must hold. Suppose, for a contradiction, that  $p^{nd} \geq \bar{v}$  holds. Because  $p^L < p^{nd}$  must hold by lemma 1, consumers with  $v \in (p^L, p^{nd}]$  strictly prefer to visit the firm with data. Since the expected utilities at the two firms are continuous in  $v$ , consumers with  $v$  just above  $p^{nd}$  will also strictly prefer to visit the firm with data. However,  $\bar{v} \leq p^{nd}$  holds by assumption, which means that these consumers visit the firm without data, a contradiction.

Setting a price  $p^{nd} < \bar{v}$  will only be optimal for the firm without data if  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$ . Suppose, for a contradiction, that we have an equilibrium in which  $\bar{v} < \bar{v}^{nd}$ , as defined in equation (10). Recall that  $\Pi^{nd,M}(p_j)$  is strictly concave, which implies that the function

$\rho[1 - G(\bar{v})] + 0.5(1 - \rho)[1 - G(\bar{v}) - (\bar{v})g(\bar{v})]$  is strictly falling in  $\bar{v}$ .

In equilibrium, the objective function of the firm with data for prices  $p_j \in (p^L, \bar{v})$  is:

$$\Pi^{nd}(p_j; \bar{v}) = p_j \left[ \rho \int_{\bar{v}}^1 g(v) dv + \frac{1 - \rho}{2} \int_{p_j}^1 g(v) dv \right] \quad (18)$$

We consider any  $p^{nd} \in (p^L, \bar{v})$  and any  $\bar{v} < \bar{v}^{nd}$ . The derivative of  $\Pi^{nd}(p_j)$  at  $p^{nd}$  satisfies:

$$\left. \frac{\partial \Pi^{nd}(p_j)}{\partial p_j} \right|_{p^{nd}} > \rho[1 - G(\bar{v}^{nd})] + 0.5(1 - \rho)[1 - G(\bar{v}^{nd}) - (\bar{v}^{nd})g(\bar{v}^{nd})] = 0 \quad (19)$$

This is a contradiction. There would exist a profitable upward deviation.

### A.3 Proof of proposition 2

**Part 1:** Preliminaries - definition and properties of  $\bar{v}^{HC}$ .

I define a cutoff  $\bar{v}^{HC}$  that solves:  $\max_{p_j \leq \bar{v}^{HC}} \Pi^H(p_j; \bar{v}^{HC}) = 0.5(1 - \rho)\Pi^{H,M}(p^{H,M})$ . This cutoff captures whether the optimal price high signal price is below or above  $\bar{v}$ . If  $\bar{v} \leq \bar{v}^{nd}$ , then  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v}) = p^{H,M}$ . If  $\bar{v} > \bar{v}^{nd}$ ,  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v}) < \bar{v}$  and solves an appropriate FOC.

Note that  $\max_{p_j \leq \bar{v}} \Pi^H(p_j; \bar{v})$  is strictly rising in  $\bar{v}$ . Also, we can establish that (i)  $\bar{v}^{HC} < p^{H,M}$  and (ii) that, if  $\bar{v} > \bar{v}^{HC}$ ,  $\arg \max_{p_j \leq \bar{v}} \Pi^H(p_j; \bar{v}) < \bar{v}$ . To establish this, recall that:

$$\Pi^H(p_j; \bar{v}) = p_j \left[ \rho \mathbb{1}[p_j \leq \bar{v}] \int_{p_j}^{\bar{v}} Pr(\tilde{v}^H | v) g(v) dv + 0.5(1 - \rho) \int_{p_j}^1 Pr(\tilde{v}^H | v) g(v) dv \right] \quad (20)$$

(i)  $\bar{v}^{HC} < p^{H,M}$ .

Suppose  $\bar{v}^{HC} = p^{H,M}$ . Then, the left derivative of  $\Pi^H(p_j; \bar{v}^{HC})$  at  $p_j = \bar{v}^{HC} = p^{H,M}$  would be strictly negative. Thus, profits could be strictly increased by a downward movement from  $p_j = \bar{v}^{HC}$ , a contradiction to the equality  $\max_{p_j \leq \bar{v}^{HC}} \Pi^H(p_j; \bar{v}^{HC}) = 0.5(1 - \rho)\Pi^{H,M}(p^{H,M})$ .

Suppose  $\bar{v}^{HC} > p^{H,M}$ . Then, setting  $p_j = p^{H,M} < \bar{v}^{HC}$  is available within  $[0, \bar{v}^{HC}]$ . This would yield strictly higher profits than  $0.5(1 - \rho)\Pi^{H,M}(p^{H,M})$ , since the sale will also be made to searchers, a contradiction to the equality  $\max_{p_j \leq \bar{v}^{HC}} \Pi^H(p_j; \bar{v}^{HC}) = 0.5(1 - \rho)\Pi^{H,M}(p^{H,M})$ .

(ii) If  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{HC}$ , i.e.  $\max_{p_j \leq \bar{v}} \Pi^H(p_j; \bar{v}) \geq 0.5(1 - \rho)\Pi^{H,M}(p^{H,M})$ , the locally optimal price  $p_j \leq \bar{v}$  must be strictly below  $\bar{v}$  and thus solve an appropriate FOC.

Suppose  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{HC}$ , but the optimal price is exactly equal to  $\bar{v}$ . Because  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{HC} > p^{H,M}$ , the

left derivative of  $\Pi^H(p_j; \bar{v})$  at  $p_j = \bar{v}$  would be strictly negative, a contradiction.

**Part 2:** The functions  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v})$  and  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})$  are continuous on  $[\bar{v}^{nd}, 1]$ , while the function  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v})$  is continuous on  $[\bar{v}^{HC}, 1]$  and equal to  $p^{H,M}$  for  $\bar{v} < \bar{v}^{HC}$ .

For any  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$ , we have  $p^{L,M} < \bar{v}$ , because  $p^{nd,M} < \bar{v}^{nd}$ . This means that  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v}) < \bar{v}$  and must solve an appropriate first-order condition. Thus, it is continuous in  $\bar{v}$ .

Now consider  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})$  and any  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$ . For prices  $p_j > \bar{v}$ , the derivative of profits is strictly negative, which implies that  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}) \leq \bar{v}$  must hold. At  $p_j = \bar{v}$ , the left derivative of profits is given by:

$$\rho[1 - G(\bar{v})] + 0.5(1 - \rho)[1 - G(\bar{v}) - (\bar{v})g(\bar{v})] \quad (21)$$

By strict concavity of  $\Pi^{nd,M}(p_j)$ , this term is falling in  $\bar{v}$ . It is hence strictly negative for any  $\bar{v} > \bar{v}^{nd}$  and just zero for  $\bar{v} = \bar{v}^{nd}$  (by the concavity assumption, we have  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^{nd}) = \bar{v}^{nd}$ ). For any  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$ , the optimal price must thus solve:

$$\rho[1 - G(\bar{v})] + 0.5(1 - \rho)[1 - G(p^{nd,*}) - (p^{nd,*})g(p^{nd,*})] = 0$$

The solution function will be continuous in  $\bar{v}$ . Moreover, it is falling in  $\bar{v}$  because the LHS is falling in  $\bar{v}$  and  $p^{nd,*}$ .

The fact that  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v})$  is continuous on  $\bar{v} \in [\bar{v}^{HC}, 1]$  follows from previous arguments. It must lie strictly below  $\bar{v}$  and satisfy a first-order condition, making  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v})$  continuous.

**Part 3:** If the firms' prices are given by  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v})$ ,  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})$ , and  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v})$ , searchers optimally visit the firm with data iff  $v < \hat{v}^G(\bar{v})$ , where:

$$\hat{v}^G(\bar{v}) = \sup \left\{ v \in [0, 1] : \sum_{k \in \{L, H\}} Pr(\tilde{v}^k | v) \max\{v - p^{k,*}(\bar{v}), 0\} - (v - p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})) > 0 \right\} \quad (22)$$

To see this, note that the preference for the firm with data, namely  $P^D(v) = \sum_{k \in \{L, H\}} Pr(\tilde{v}^k | v) \max\{v - p^{k,*}(\bar{v}), 0\} - (v - p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}))$  is strictly falling in  $v$ . This holds because  $Pr(\tilde{v}^H | v)$  is strictly increasing in  $v$  and  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v}) < p^{H,*}(\bar{v})$  holds for any  $\bar{v}$ .

To see that  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v}) < p^{H,*}(\bar{v})$ , recall that it was previously established that  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v}) \leq p^{H,*}(\bar{v})$ . Suppose, for a contradiction, that  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v}) = p^{H,*}(\bar{v})$ . If  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v}) = p^{H,*}(\bar{v}) > \bar{v}$ , the prices must equal their monopoly counterparts, a contradiction.

If  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v}) = p^{H,*}(\bar{v}) < \bar{v}$ , the prices  $p^{k,*}(\bar{v})$  must satisfy corresponding first-order condi-

tions. But since  $Pr^H(v)$  is strictly increasing in  $v$ ,  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v}) < p^{H,*}(\bar{v})$  will hold, a contradiction.

Thus, suppose that  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v}) = p^{H,*}(\bar{v}) = \bar{v}$ . If  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{HC}$ , the optimal high signal price must lie strictly below  $\bar{v}$  (see the arguments in part 1), a contradiction. If  $\bar{v} < \bar{v}^{HC} < p^{H,M}$ , the optimal high signal price is  $p^{H,M}$ , which lies above  $\bar{v}$ , a contradiction.

**Part 4:** An equilibrium in which firms play pure strategies exists.

I prove this result by showing that there exists a  $\bar{v} \in [\bar{v}^{nd}, 1]$  such that  $\hat{v}^G(\bar{v}) = \bar{v}$ . Suppose such a fixed point exists and consumers search according to the implied cutoff rule. The prices  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v})$ ,  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v})$ , and  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})$  are optimal by construction. The postulated search behaviour will be optimal, given these prices. Thus, we have an equilibrium.

For any  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$ , both price functions  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v})$  and  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})$  will be continuous in  $\bar{v}$ . To see this, note that  $p^{L,M} < p^{nd,M} < \bar{v}^{nd}$ . This implies that both optimal prices will be below  $\bar{v}$  and solve appropriate first-order conditions.

We will establish the existence of a fixed point of  $v^G(\bar{v})$ . To begin, note that the following two boundary conditions will be satisfied: (i)  $v^G(\bar{v}^{nd}) > \bar{v}^{nd}$  and (ii)  $v^G(1) \leq 1$ .

The first condition holds because, at  $\bar{v} = \bar{v}^{nd}$ , the optimal price of the firm without data will be equal to  $\bar{v}^{nd}$ . Because  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v}^{nd}) < \bar{v}^{nd}$ ,  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v}^{nd}) < p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^{nd})$  would hold. As a result, a consumer with  $v = \bar{v}^{nd}$  would strictly prefer to visit the firm with data, and thus  $v^G(\bar{v}^{nd}) > \bar{v}^{nd}$ . The second condition, namely  $v^G(1) \leq 1$ , holds because all elements of  $\{v \in [0, 1] : \sum_{k \in \{L, H\}} Pr(\tilde{v}^k | v) \max\{v - p^{k,*}(\bar{v}), 0\} - (v - p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})) > 0\}$  are below 1.

Suppose  $\bar{v}^{HC} < \bar{v}^{nd}$ . Then, all functions  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v}^{nd})$ ,  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^{nd})$ , and  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v}^{nd})$  are continuous on  $[\bar{v}^{nd}, 1]$ , which means that  $v^G(\bar{v})$  is continuous on this interval. With our two boundary conditions, the intermediate value theorem guarantees the existence of a fixed point.

Now consider a situation in which  $\bar{v}^{HC} \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$ . Suppose, for a contradiction, that there exists no fixed point of  $\hat{v}^G(\bar{v})$  on  $[\bar{v}^{nd}, 1]$ . This implies that  $\hat{v}^G(\bar{v}) > \bar{v}$  must hold for any  $v \in [\bar{v}^{nd}, \bar{v}^{HC}]$ . At  $\bar{v}^{HC}$ , the optimal high signal price of the firm with data jumps down, which implies that  $\lim_{\bar{v} \downarrow \bar{v}^{HC}} \hat{v}^G(\bar{v}) > \hat{v}^G(\bar{v}^{HC})$ . As a result,  $\hat{v}^G(\bar{v}) > \bar{v}$  holds for  $\bar{v}$  in an open ball above  $\bar{v}^{HC}$ . Since all functions  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v}^{nd})$ ,  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^{nd})$ , and  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v}^{nd})$  are continuous on  $[\bar{v}^{HC}, 1]$ , so is  $\hat{v}^G(\bar{v})$ . Because  $\lim_{\bar{v} \downarrow \bar{v}^{HC}} \hat{v}^G(\bar{v}) > \bar{v}^{HC}$ , the intermediate value theorem guarantees the existence of a fixed point.

## A.4 Proof of proposition 3

A proof of a more general statement may be found in the proof of proposition 7.

## A.5 Proof of corollary 1

I work with the equilibrium  $\bar{v}$  for a given signal distribution as a function of  $\rho$  and call this  $\bar{v}^*(\rho)$ . An equilibrium with  $p^L < p^H$  always exists. First, note that  $\lim_{\rho \rightarrow 1} \bar{v}^*(\rho) = 1$  holds by the squeeze theorem because, for any  $\rho \in (0, 1)$ , we have that  $\bar{v}^{nd}(\rho) \leq \bar{v}^*(\rho) \leq 1$  and  $\lim_{\rho \rightarrow 1} \bar{v}^{nd}(\rho) = 1$ . To see that  $\lim_{\rho \rightarrow 1} \bar{v}^{nd}(\rho) = 1$ , recall that, for any  $\rho \in (0, 1)$ ,  $\bar{v}^{nd}(\rho)$  solves:

$$\underbrace{\rho[1 - G(\bar{v}^{nd}(\rho))]}_{LHS(\rho)} = \underbrace{-0.5(1 - \rho)[1 - G(\bar{v}^{nd}(\rho)) - (\bar{v}^{nd}(\rho))g(\bar{v}^{nd}(\rho))]}_{RHS(\rho)} \quad (23)$$

This equality continues to hold as  $\rho \rightarrow 1$ . As  $\rho \rightarrow 1$ , the RHS goes to 0, no matter the limit of  $\bar{v}^{nd}(\rho)$ . This is because the distribution of valuations, namely  $G(v)$ , is continuous and has finite density. Thus, the LHS must also go to 0 as  $\rho \rightarrow 1$ . This implies that  $\lim_{\rho \rightarrow 1} \bar{v}^{nd}(\rho) = 1$ , since  $G(v)$  is continuous,  $G(v) = 1$  only if  $v \geq 1$ , and  $\bar{v}^{nd}(\rho) \leq 1$  for any  $\rho \in (0, 1)$ .

The total demand that the firm without data receives in equilibrium is  $D^{nd^*}(\rho) = \rho[1 - G(\bar{v}^*(\rho))] + 0.5(1 - \rho) \int_{p^{nd}(\rho)}^1 g(v)dv$ . I have defined  $p^{nd}(\rho)$  as the equilibrium price of the firm without data. Now consider the limit of  $D^{nd^*}(\rho)$  as  $\rho \rightarrow 1$ , noting that all components of demand are continuous in  $\rho$  and that  $\int_{p^{nd}}^1 g(v)dv \in [0, 1]$ . Thus, we have  $\lim_{\rho \rightarrow 1} D^{nd^*}(\rho) = (1)(0) + (0) \int_{\lim_{\rho \rightarrow 1} p^{nd}(\rho)}^1 dv = 0$ . Since the demand of the firm without data approaches 0 when  $\rho \rightarrow 1$ , the market share of the firm with data approaches 1 by any definition of the market share (sales or profit).

## A.6 Statement and proof of lemma 2

**Lemma 2** *Consider the sequential search framework. In any equilibrium in which firms play pure strategies, the ordering  $p^L < p^{nd} < p^H$  must hold and:*

- *There exists an  $\epsilon > 0$  such that any searcher who visits the firm without data first in equilibrium will not search when offered a price  $p_j \in [0, p^{nd} + \epsilon]$  at this firm.*
- *There exists a  $\bar{v} > p^L$  such that all searchers with  $v \in (p^L, \bar{v})$  visit the firm with data first and all searchers with  $v \in (\bar{v}, 1]$  visit the firm without data first.*
- *The ordering  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$  holds.*

**Proof:**

**Part 1:** In equilibrium,  $p^L < p^H$  must hold.

Suppose, for a contradiction, that  $p^H < p^L$  in equilibrium. Previous arguments have established that  $p^{nd} \in (p^H, p^L)$  would have to hold in such an equilibrium.

Suppose  $p^L \leq p^{nd} + c$ , i.e. no searcher will leave the firm with data to search at the equilibrium prices. Thus, for  $p_j \in [p^H, p^L]$ , all consumers who arrive at the firm with data buy there iff the price is below their  $v$ . Then, the structure of equilibrium profits equal the one defined in the proof of lemma 1 and there is either a deviation from  $p^L$  to  $p^H$  or vice versa.

Suppose instead that  $p^L > p^{nd} + c$ . Then, the firm with data only sells to its captive consumers at  $p^L$  and thus  $p^L = p^{L,M}$ . All searchers who arrive at the firm without data buy in an open ball around  $p^{nd}$  (first arrivers must have  $v \geq p^{nd}$  and would never search thereafter by an option value logic, second arrivers would entail inelastic demand around  $p^{nd}$ ). Hence,  $p^{nd} \geq p^{nd,M}$  holds, and  $p^{nd} \geq p^{nd,M} > p^L$ , a contradiction.

Suppose, for a contradiction, that there exists an equilibrium in which  $p^L = p^H$ . The only possible equilibrium candidate is  $p^L = p^H = p^{nd}$  (otherwise, all searchers with valuation above the lowest equilibrium price visit the same firm, which yields a contradiction).

Thus, consider an equilibrium in which  $p^L = p^H = p^{nd} := p^*$ . By our tie-breaking rule and because no consumer will leave to search for prices  $p_j \leq p^* + c$ , the equilibrium price must satisfy  $p^* \leq p^{H,M}$  (else, there is a profitable upward deviation when observing  $\tilde{v}^H$ ). Thus, the arguments made in the proof of lemma (1) imply that either the firm without data or the firm with data (when observing  $\tilde{v}^L$ ) will have a profitable downward deviation to  $p^{nd,M}$ .

**Part 2:** In equilibrium,  $p^{nd} \in (p^L, p^H)$  must hold.

This follows from the arguments made in the proof of lemma 1. If  $p^{nd} \notin (p^L, p^H)$ , all searchers with a valuation below the lowest equilibrium price visit the same firm, which implies that the postulated ordering of prices would not be optimal.

**Part 3:** Any searcher who optimally visits the firm without data first must find it strictly optimal to not search when receiving  $p^{nd}$ .

To see this, define  $U^{nd,s}(v)$  and  $U^{nd,ns}(v)$  as the expected utilities of visiting the firm without data first and searching or not searching, respectively. Define  $U^{d,s}(v)$  as the expected utility of visiting the firm with data and searching if and only if  $p^H$  is received there.

Consider a consumer that optimally visits the firm without data first, who must have  $\nu > p^{nd}$ . Suppose, for a contradiction, that  $Pr^L(v)(p^{nd} - p^L) - s \geq 0 \iff U^{nd,s}(v) \geq U^{nd,ns}(v)$

holds for such a consumer. Crucially,  $U^{d,s}(v) > U^{nd,s}(v)$  will hold generally, because:

$$\underbrace{Pr^L(v)(v - p^L) + Pr^H(v)(v - p^{nd} - s)}_{U^{d,s}(v)} > \underbrace{Pr^L(v)(v - p^L) + Pr^H(v)(v - p^{nd}) - s}_{U^{nd,s}(v)} \quad (24)$$

The utility of visiting the firm without data first is  $U^{nd,s}(v)$ , while the utility of visiting the firm with data first is at least  $U^{d,s}(v)$ . It would thus be strictly optimal for this consumer to visit the firm with data first, a contradiction. Hence,  $Pr^L(v)(p^{nd} - p^L) - s < 0$  must hold for any consumer that visits the firm without data first in equilibrium, which implies that there exists an  $\epsilon > 0$  such that these consumers would also not search for prices  $p_j \leq p^{nd} + \epsilon$ .

**Part 4:** Uniqueness of cutoff  $\bar{v}$  for equilibria with  $p^{nd} + s \geq p^H$

We consider an equilibrium candidate and define a  $\tilde{v}^I$  that solves  $Pr^L(\tilde{v}^I)(p^{nd} - p^L) - s = 0$ . All consumers with  $v \in (p^L, \tilde{v}^I)$  will surely visit the firm with data, because search would be optimal for them after visiting the firm without data (if  $v > p^{nd}$ ). Similarly, consumers with  $v \leq p^{nd}$  will visit the firm with data.

Thus, consider consumers with  $v \in (\max\{p^{nd}, \tilde{v}^I\}, 1)$  and recall that  $p^H \leq p^{nd} + s$  holds by assumption. If  $v < p^H$ , their preference for the firm with data is  $P^D(v) = Pr^L(v)(v - p^L) + Pr^H(v)(0) - (v - p^{nd})$ . If  $v \geq p^H$ , their preference for the firm with data is  $P^D(v) = Pr^L(v)(v - p^L) + Pr^H(v)(v - p^H) - (v - p^{nd})$ . The preference for the firm with data is continuous at  $p^H$  and strictly falling in  $v$  for  $v \in (\max\{p^{nd}, \tilde{v}^I\}, 1)$ . This implies the result.

**Part 5:** Uniqueness of cutoff  $\bar{v}$  in equilibria with  $p^{nd} + c < p^H$

Searchers leave the firm with data to search when receiving  $p^H$  if and only if  $v > p^{nd} + c$ . As before,  $\tilde{v}^I$  solves  $Pr^L(\tilde{v}^I)(p^{nd} - p^L) - s = 0$ . Calculating the relative preferences for the firm with data for two separate cases, namely (i)  $p^{nd} + c < \tilde{v}^I$  and (ii)  $\tilde{v}^I \leq p^{nd} + c$  yields the desired result based on steps that mirror those taken in the previous part.

**Part 6:** Establishing that  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$  holds true.

First, note that  $p^{nd} < \bar{v}$  must hold. A searcher with  $v$  just above  $p^{nd}$  will not visit the firm without data first. If such a consumer would search thereafter, she would not visit the firm without data first (by the arguments of part 3). If she would not search thereafter, her utility at the firm without data is  $v - p^{nd}$ , which converges to 0 as  $v \rightarrow p^{nd}$ . By contrast,

their utility at the firm with data is at least  $Pr^L(v)(v - p^L)$ , which remains strictly positive for any such  $v$ . Since expected utilities are continuous in  $v$ , searchers with a valuation in an open ball above  $p^{nd}$  visit the firm with data, which implies the result.

Hence,  $p^{nd} < \bar{v}$  must hold in an equilibrium (by the choices of searchers). However, if  $\bar{v} < \bar{v}^{nd}$ , such a price is not optimal for the firm without data. I establish this for two different kinds of equilibria, with (i)  $p^H \leq p^{nd} + c$  and with (ii)  $p^H > p^{nd} + c$ .

(i) Case 1: Suppose we have an equilibrium in which  $p^H \leq p^{nd} + c$ .

To constitute an equilibrium,  $p^{nd}$  must lie strictly below  $\bar{v}$ . No arriving searcher will leave the firm without data for prices in an open ball around  $p^{nd}$ . A zero measure of searchers arrives at the firm without data after visiting its rival, because  $p^H \leq p^{nd} + c$  (if  $p^H = p^{nd} + c$ , there would else be undercutting by the firm with data). Thus, for prices in an open ball around  $p^{nd} < \bar{v}$ , the profits of the firm without data are:

$$\Pi^{nd}(p_j; \bar{v}) = p_j \left[ \rho \int_{\bar{v}}^1 g(v) dv + 0.5(1 - \rho) \int_{p_j}^1 g(v) dv \right] \quad (25)$$

But for  $\bar{v} < \bar{v}^{nd}$  and any  $p^{nd} < \bar{v}$ , the derivative at  $p^{nd}$  is strictly positive by the arguments made in the proof of proposition 1, a contradiction.

(ii) Case 2:  $p^H > p^{nd} + c$ .

If  $\bar{v} \leq p^{nd} + c$ , previous arguments directly imply the result, because the set of searchers who visit the firm with data first and search thereafter has measure zero (any such consumer must have  $v > p^{nd} + c$  and  $v < \bar{v}$ , which cannot hold jointly).

If  $\bar{v} > p^{nd} + c$ , searchers with  $v \in (p^{nd} + c, \bar{v})$  visit the firm with data first and then search iff they generate  $\tilde{v}^H$ . Since  $p^H > p^{nd} + c$  holds by assumption, these consumers buy in an open ball around  $p^{nd}$ . In an open ball around  $p^{nd}$ , the profits at the firm without data are:

$$\Pi^{nd}(p_j; \bar{v}) = p_j \rho \int_{p^{nd}+c}^{\bar{v}} Pr^H(v) g(v) dv + p_j \rho \int_{\bar{v}}^1 g(v) dv + p_j 0.5(1 - \rho) \int_{p_j}^1 g(v) dv \quad (26)$$

For any  $\bar{v} < \bar{v}^{nd}$ , the derivative of the second component is strictly positive for any  $p_j < \bar{v}$ . The derivative of the first component is positive. If  $\bar{v} < \bar{v}^{nd}$ , there would always be an upward deviation from any possible equilibrium  $p^{nd}$ . Hence,  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$  must hold.

## A.7 Proof of proposition 4

Any searcher who visits two firms with positive probability must either (i) visit the firm with data first with positive probability and search thereafter with positive probability or (ii) visit the firm without data first and search thereafter with positive probability.

**Part 1:** The set of consumers who visit the firm without data first (with positive probability) and search with positive probability thereafter must have measure zero.

This follows from the arguments made in the proof of lemma 2, part 3. Any searcher who visits the firm without data first in equilibrium would find it strictly optimal to not search thereafter.

**Part 2:** Under assumption 2, there exists no equilibrium in which a strictly positive measure of searchers visit the firm with data first and search thereafter with positive probability.

In such an equilibrium,  $p^H > p^{nd} + c$  must hold. If  $p^H < p^{nd} + c$ , any searcher would find it strictly optimal to not search after any price the firm with data would offer to her in equilibrium, which implies the result. Suppose  $p^H = p^{nd} + c$  holds in equilibrium and suppose, for a contradiction, that the set of searchers who visit the firm without data first and search thereafter has strictly positive measure. By lemma 2, it must hold that  $p^L < p^{nd}$ . Thus,  $p^L$  does not induce search. Any searcher who searches after visiting the firm with data must do so when receiving  $p^H$ . In a hypothetical equilibrium like this, the firm with data would prefer to undercut  $p^H$ , since this deters search by all searchers who visit both firms and hence do not buy at  $p^H$  (since  $p^{nd} < p^H$ ), a contradiction.

Thus, suppose  $p^{nd} + c < p^H$  holds in equilibrium and that the set of searchers who visit the firm without data first and search thereafter has strictly positive measure.

In such an equilibrium, the ordering  $\bar{v} > p^{nd} + c$  must hold. To see this, suppose that  $\bar{v} \leq p^{nd} + c$ . By lemma 2, searchers who visit the firm with data first must have  $v \in [0, \bar{v}]$ . Moreover, searching after visiting the firm with data is only optimal if  $v \geq p^{nd} + c$ . Thus, the set of searchers who visit the firm with data first & search thereafter with positive probability is a subset of  $[0, \bar{v}] \cap [p^{nd} + c, 1]$ , which has zero measure because  $\bar{v} \leq p^{nd} + c$ , a contradiction.

Now let's consider the optimal pricing of the firm with data. We have proven that  $p^{nd} + c < \bar{v}$  must hold. All searchers with  $v \in [p^{nd} + c, \bar{v}]$  will visit the firm with data first and search when being offered  $p^H$ , which occurs with probability  $Pr^H(v)$ . Thus, the firm without data makes the sale to all these searchers at the price  $p^{nd}$  with probability  $Pr^H(v)$ . Since  $p^{nd} + c < \bar{v}$ , the firm without data will also make the sale to all searchers who initially

visit it. For  $p_j$  in an open ball around  $p^{nd}$ , the profit function of the firm without data is hence:

$$p_j \left[ \rho \int_{p^{nd}+s}^{\bar{v}} Pr^H(v)g(v)dv + \rho \int_{\bar{v}}^1 g(v)dv + 0.5(1-\rho) \int_{p_j}^1 g(v)dv \right] \quad (27)$$

Thus, an equilibrium  $p^{nd}$  must equal  $p^{nd,3}(\bar{v})$ , which solves:

$$\left[ \rho \int_{p^{nd,3}+c}^{\bar{v}} Pr^H(v)g(v)dv + \rho \int_{\bar{v}}^1 g(v)dv + 0.5(1-\rho) \int_{p^{nd,3}}^1 g(v)dv \right] = 0.5(1-\rho)p^{nd,3}g(p^{nd,3}) \quad (28)$$

Finally, I make the following argument: Because  $p^{nd,3}(1) + s > p^{HM}$  (which holds by assumption 3), such an equilibrium cannot exist.

In this equilibrium,  $p^H = p^{H,M} > p^{nd} + c$  must be satisfied, where  $p^{nd} = p^{nd,3}(\bar{v})$  must hold for the equilibrium level of  $\bar{v}$ , whatever this may be. Note that the function  $p^{nd,3}(\bar{v})$  is falling in  $\bar{v}$  (by concavity of the monopoly profit function of the firm without data). Thus, we have  $p^{nd,3}(1) + c \leq p^{nd,3}(\bar{v}) + c$  for any possible  $\bar{v}$ . Moreover, note that  $p^H = p^{H,M}$  must hold because the firm with data will only sell to captive consumers for prices in an open ball around the equilibrium  $p^H$ .

We have assumed that  $p^{nd,3}(1) + c > p^{HM}$ , noting that  $p^{nd,3}(1) = p^{nd,s}$  a's defined in assumption 3. Since  $p^H = p^{H,M} < p^{nd,3}(\bar{v}) + c = p^{nd} + c$ , this equilibrium cannot exist, because there exists no  $\bar{v}$  at which the necessary conditions its existence are satisfied.

## A.8 Proof of proposition 5

**Part 1:** The first two bullet points hold by lemma 5.

**Part 2:** When  $\Pi^H(p^{nd,M}; \bar{v}^{nd}) > 0.5(1-\rho)\Pi^{H,M}(p^{H,M})$  (assumption 4), the optimal  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v})$  lies strictly below  $\bar{v}$  for any  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$  and will be strictly increasing in  $\bar{v}$ .

This follows from the definition of  $\bar{v}^{HC}$  in the proof of proposition 2 and the accompanying discussion.

**Part 3:** Consider an equilibrium candidate in which  $p^L < p^{nd} < p^H$ ,  $p^H \leq p^{nd} + c$ ,  $p^H < \bar{v}$ , and  $\hat{v}(p^L, p^H, p^{nd}) = \bar{v}$ . It is optimal for searchers to visit the firm with data if and only if  $v > \bar{v}$  and never search thereafter.

Part 3a: In such an equilibrium candidate, the cutoff  $\tilde{v}^I(p^L, p^H, p^{nd})$  will lie strictly below  $\hat{v}^I(p^L, p^H, p^{nd})$ , where these cutoffs are defined as follows:

$$Pr^L(\tilde{v}^I(.))(p^{nd} - p^L) - s = 0 \quad ; \quad Pr^L(\hat{v}^I(.))p^L + Pr^H(\hat{v}^I(.))p^H - p^{nd} = 0 \quad (29)$$

Any consumer with  $v < \tilde{v}^I(.)$  would find it optimal to search after visiting the firm without data, provided that  $v \geq p^{nd}$ . Thus, all these consumers will prefer to visit the firm with data.

Note first that  $Pr^L(v)p^L + Pr^H(v)p^H = p^{nd} \iff Pr^L(v)(p^{nd} - p^L) + Pr^H(v)(p^{nd} - p^H) = 0$ . Now note that  $p^{nd} + c \geq p^H$  by assumption, i.e.  $p^{nd} - p^H \geq -s$ . Thus:

$$0 = Pr^L(\tilde{v}^I)(p^{nd} - p^L) - s < Pr^L(\tilde{v}^I)(p^{nd} - p^L) - Pr^H(\tilde{v}^I)s \leq Pr^L(\tilde{v}^I)(p^{nd} - p^L) + Pr^H(\tilde{v}^I)(p^{nd} - p^H)$$

Since  $\frac{\partial}{\partial v} [Pr^L(v)(p^{nd} - p^L) + Pr^H(v)(p^{nd} - p^H)] < 0$ , we have  $\tilde{v}^I(p^L, p^H, p^{nd}) < \hat{v}^I(p^L, p^H, p^{nd})$ .

Part 3b: The postulated search behaviour is optimal.

Because  $\hat{v}(p^L, p^H, p^{nd}) = \bar{v}$ ,  $\bar{v}$  is either equal to  $\hat{v}^I(p^L, p^H, p^{nd})$  or 1 (the latter being true if  $\hat{v}^I(p^L, p^H, p^{nd}) \geq 1$ ). Define  $p = (p^L, p^H, p^{nd})$ . It was established that  $\hat{v}^I(p) > \tilde{v}^I(p)$ .

Suppose  $\tilde{v}^I(p) \geq 1$  in equilibrium, which then implies that  $\hat{v}^I(p) > 1$ , and thus  $\hat{v}(p) = 1 = \bar{v}$ . For all consumers with  $v < 1 \leq \tilde{v}^I(p)$ , it is strictly optimal to visit the firm with data in equilibrium, i.e. to visit according to the rule represented by  $\bar{v} = 1$ . No searcher will search after visiting the firm with data since  $p^H \leq p^{nd} + s$ . No searcher who visits the firm without data first finds it optimal to search afterwards (since no such consumer exists).

Suppose  $\tilde{v}^I(p) < 1$ . Because  $\tilde{v}^I(p) < \hat{v}^I(p)$  will also hold,  $\hat{v}(p)$  is either 1 when  $\hat{v}^I(p) \geq 1$  or  $\hat{v}(p) = \hat{v}^I(p)$ . In either case,  $\tilde{v}^I(p) < \bar{v}$ . Thus, any consumer with  $v \geq \bar{v}$  finds it strictly optimal to not search after visiting the firm without data first. Because  $p^H \leq p^{nd} + c$  and  $\hat{v}(p) = \bar{v}$ , she will visit the firm without data first and not search thereafter.

Any searcher with  $v < \tilde{v}^I(p)$  visits the firm with data first and does not search thereafter. Any searchers with  $v \in [\tilde{v}^I(p), \bar{v}]$  would not search after visiting either firm. Because  $\bar{v} = \hat{v}(p)$ , they hence optimally visit the firm with data.

**Part 4:** If  $p^{H,1} \leq p^{nd,1} + c$ , the vector  $(p^{L,1}, p^{nd,1}, p^{H,1}, \bar{v}^1)$  is an equilibrium

Search: It is optimal for searchers to visit the firm with data if and only if  $v > \bar{v}^1$  and never search thereafter.

The ordering  $p^{L,1} < p^{nd,1} < p^{H,1}$  holds by construction, since  $\hat{v}^B(\bar{v}^1) = \bar{v}^1$ . The latter holds because assumption 4 guarantees that a solution to  $\hat{v}^G(\bar{v}) = \bar{v}$  on  $\bar{v} \in [\bar{v}^{nd}, 1]$  also solves  $\hat{v}^B(\bar{v}) = \bar{v}$ . By assumption 4, we also have  $p^{H,1} < \bar{v}^1$ . By specification,  $p^{H,1} \leq p^{nd,1} + c$ . Thus, the insights of part 3 apply and the result follows.

Pricing: There are no profitable deviations from the equilibrium prices, given that searchers split according to  $\bar{v}^1$  and do not search thereafter (for equilibrium prices).

Consider first the firm without data. True competitive profits are bounded from above  $\Pi^{nd}(p_j; \bar{v}^1)$ . This is because no consumers arrive after search. For prices  $p_j \in [0, p^{nd} + \epsilon]$ , true profits equal this function. For prices sufficiently high, searchers leave this firm to search, implying that true profits are below  $\Pi^{nd}(p_j; \bar{v}^1)$ . By construction,  $p^{nd,1}$  maximizes  $\Pi^{nd}(p_j; \bar{v}^1)$ , and so there will be no profitable deviations.

Analogous arguments show that the firm with data has no profitable deviations, because competitive profits are bounded from above by  $\Pi^k(p_j; \bar{v}^1)$ , conditional on the signal  $\tilde{v}^k$ .

**Part 5:** If  $p^{H,1} > p^{nd,1} + c$ , there exists a  $\bar{v}^2 \in [\bar{v}^{nd}, 1]$  s.t.  $\hat{v}^S(\bar{v}^2) = \bar{v}^2$ .

Recall that  $p^{L,1} = p^{L,*}(\bar{v}^1)$ ,  $p^{nd,1} = p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^1)$ , and  $p^{H,1} = p^{H,*}(\bar{v}^1)$ . In an equilibrium of category 2,  $p^L = p^{L,*}(\bar{v})$ ,  $p^{nd} = p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})$ ,  $p^H = p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}) + c$ . We are looking for a  $\bar{v}$  that solves:

$$\bar{v} = \hat{v}^S(\bar{v}) := \sup \left\{ v \in [0, 1] : \underbrace{Pr^L(v)p^{L,*}(\bar{v}) + Pr^H(v)(p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}) + c) - p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})}_{D^S(v;\bar{v}) := Pr^L(v)(p^{L,*}(\bar{v}) - p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})) + Pr^H(v)s} < 0 \right\} \quad (30)$$

For any level of  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$ , we have  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v}) < \bar{v}$  and  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}) \leq \bar{v}$ . As a result, these price functions will be continuous in  $\bar{v}$ . Since  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v}) \leq p^{L,M} < p^{nd,M}$  and  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}) \geq p^{nd,M}$ , we have  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v}) < p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})$  for any  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$ . Since  $p^{H,1} > p^{nd,1} + s$ , we have:

$$\underbrace{\hat{v}(p^{L,*}(\bar{v}^1), p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^1) + c, p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^1))}_{=\hat{v}^S(\bar{v}^1)} \geq \underbrace{\hat{v}(p^{L,*}(\bar{v}^1), p^{H,*}(\bar{v}^1), p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^1))}_{=\hat{v}^B(\bar{v}^1)} \quad (31)$$

In words, this inequality means the following: When the firm with data sets the high signal price  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^1) + c$  instead of the higher  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v}^1)$ , more searchers arrive at the firm with data first (i.e. the LHS is greater), since the prices there are more attractive.

To see that there exists a desired fixed point, note that (i)  $\hat{v}^S(1) \leq 1$  and (ii)  $\hat{v}^S(\bar{v}^1) \geq \bar{v}^1$ . The first point holds by construction. The second point holds because  $\hat{v}^S(\bar{v}^1) \geq \hat{v}^B(\bar{v}^1)$  and  $\hat{v}^B(\bar{v}^1) = \bar{v}^1$ . Moreover, the function  $\hat{v}^S(\bar{v})$  can be shown to be continuous on  $[\bar{v}^{nd}, 1]$ , because

$p^{L,*}(\bar{v})$  and  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})$  are continuous. Thus, the intermediate value theorem implies the result.

**Part 6:** Suppose  $p^{H,1} > p^{nd,1} + c$ . At  $\bar{v}^2$ , the following two conditions are satisfied: (i)  $p^{H,2} < \bar{v}^2$  and (ii)  $p^{H,2} < \arg \max_{p_j} \Pi^H(p_j; \bar{v}^2) := p^{H,*}(\bar{v}^2)$ .

Part 6a: If  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v}^1) > p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^1) + s$  holds, previous results imply that  $\bar{v}^2 \geq \bar{v}^1$ .

Suppose  $\bar{v}^1 = 1$ . Then,  $\bar{v}^2 = \bar{v}^1$  must be true, by previous arguments. Suppose instead that  $\bar{v}^1 < 1$ . Then  $Pr^L(v)p^{L,*}(\bar{v}^1) + Pr^H(v)p^{L,*}(\bar{v}^1) = p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^1)$  must hold. Because  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v}^1) > p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^1) + s$ , we have:

$$\hat{v}(p^{L,*}(\bar{v}^1), p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^1) + c, p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^1)) - \bar{v}^1 > \hat{v}(p^{L,*}(\bar{v}^1), p^{H,*}(\bar{v}^1), p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^1)) - \bar{v}^1 = 0 \quad (32)$$

Note that  $\hat{v}(p^{L,*}(\bar{v}), p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}) + c, p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}))$  is weakly decreasing in  $\bar{v}$  because  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v})$  is rising in  $\bar{v}$  and  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})$  is falling in  $\bar{v}$ . Thus, the function  $\hat{v}^S(p^{L,*}(\bar{v}), p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}) + c, p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})) - \bar{v}$  is strictly decreasing in  $\bar{v}$  and is strictly positive at  $\bar{v}^1$ . Hence,  $\bar{v}^2 \geq \bar{v}^1$  must hold.

Part 6b: Since  $\bar{v}^2 \geq \bar{v}^1$ ,  $p^{H,2} < \arg \max_{p_j} \Pi^H(p_j; \bar{v}^2) = p^{H,*}(\bar{v}^2)$  and  $p^{H,2} < \bar{v}^2$  holds.

Note that  $\bar{v}^1 \in [\bar{v}^{nd}, 1]$ . Because  $\bar{v}^2 \geq \bar{v}^1 \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$ ,  $\arg \max_{p_j} \Pi^H(p_j; \bar{v}^2) = p^{H,*}(\bar{v}^2)$  will be strictly below  $\bar{v}^2$  and solve a FOC. Because  $\bar{v}^2 \geq \bar{v}^1$ , we know that the prices satisfy: (i)  $p^{k,*}(\bar{v}^2) \geq p^{k,*}(\bar{v}^1)$  and (ii)  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^2) \leq p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^1)$ . Thus:

$$p^{H,2} = p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^2) + s \leq p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^1) + c < p^{H,*}(\bar{v}^1) \leq p^{H,*}(\bar{v}^2) < \bar{v}^2 \quad (33)$$

**Part 7:** If  $p^{H,1} > p^{nd,1} + c$ , the vector  $(p^{L,2}, p^{nd,2}, p^{H,2}, \bar{v}^2)$  is an equilibrium

Part 7a: At  $\bar{v}^2$ ,  $\Pi^H(p^{2,H}; \bar{v}^2) \geq 0.5(1 - \rho)\Pi^{H,M}(p^{H,M})$  holds by assumption 4.

Note that  $p^{H,2} = p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^2) + c > p^{nd,M}$ , since  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^2) > p^{nd,M}$ . High signal profits for  $p_j < \bar{v}^2$ , which includes  $p^{H,2}$  since  $p^{H,2} < p^{H,*}(\bar{v}^2) < \bar{v}^2$  are:

$$\Pi^H(p_j; \bar{v}^2) = p_j \rho \int_{p_j}^{\bar{v}^2} Pr^H(v)g(v)dv + p_j 0.5(1 - \rho) \int_{p^H}^1 Pr^H(v)g(v)dv \quad (34)$$

We know that this function is strictly concave on  $p_j \in [0, \bar{v}^2]$  and that  $p^{nd,M} < p^{H,2} < p^{H,*}(\bar{v}^2) < \bar{v}^2$ . Thus, profits from setting  $p^{nd,M}$ , namely  $\Pi^H(p^{nd,M}; \bar{v}^2)$ , will be below equi-

librium profits, namely  $\Pi^H(p^{H,2}; \bar{v}^2)$ . Moreover, we have  $\bar{v}^2 > \bar{v}^{nd}$ , which also implies that  $\Pi^H(p^{nd,M}; \bar{v}^2) \geq \Pi^H(p^{nd,M}; \bar{v}^{nd})$ . By assumption, the final component is above  $\Pi^{H,M}(p^{H,M})$ .

Part 7b: The search behavior represented by the cutoff  $\bar{v}^2$  will be optimal by the arguments in part 3.

This is because  $p^{L,2} < p^{nd,2} < p^{H,2}$  and  $p^{H,2} = p^{nd,2} + c$  hold by construction,  $p^{H,2} < \bar{v}^2$  by part 6, and  $\hat{v}(p^{L,2}, p^{nd,2}, p^{H,2}) = \bar{v}^2$  holds by definition.

Part 7c: The prices  $(p^{L,2}, p^{nd,2}, p^{H,2})$  are optimal for firms.

Since no consumer leaves to search on the equilibrium path,  $\Pi^{nd}(p_j; \bar{v})$  and  $\Pi^L(p_j; \bar{v})$  are upper bounds for the true respective objective functions. Since the former are both globally maximized by our prices for the given  $\bar{v}^2 > \bar{v}^{nd}$ , we know there can be no profitable deviations from them  $p^{nd}$  or  $p^L$ .

Now consider the optimal pricing calculus of the firm with data when observing  $\tilde{v}^H$ . Part 6 established that  $p^{H,2} < \arg \max_{p_j} \Pi^H(p_j; \bar{v}^2)$  and  $p^{H,2} < \bar{v}^2$ . Because  $\Pi^H(p_j; \bar{v}^2)$  is strictly concave on  $p_j \in [0, \bar{v}^2]$ , there cannot be any profitable downward deviations  $p_j < p^{H,2}$ , because these would just yield profits of  $\Pi^H(p_j; \bar{v}^2)$ . Any upward deviation would, at best, yield profits equal to  $0.5(1 - \rho)\Pi^{H,M}(p^{H,M})$ . This deviation is not profitable by the result in part 7a. No other possible deviations remain. Thus, it is optimal for firms to set said prices.

## A.9 Proof of proposition 6

**Part 1:** In equilibrium, the low signal price of the firm with data must be given by  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v})$  and the price of the firm without data must be given by  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})$ .

Under assumptions 3 and 4, the search strategy of searchers must be a cutoff rule. Moreover,  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$  must hold, which implies that  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}) < \bar{v}$  must hold and must solve  $\frac{\partial \Pi^{nd}(p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}); \bar{v})}{\partial p_j} = 0$ . Similarly, the equilibrium price  $p^{nd}$  must be between  $p^L$  and  $\bar{v}$ , for which the profits of the firm without data are given by  $\Pi^{nd}(p_j; \bar{v})$ . Thus, the optimal price of the firm without data must solve the same first-order condition, to which there is a unique solution because  $\Pi^{nd,M}(p_j)$  is strictly concave. Thus,  $p^{nd}$  must be equal to  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})$ .

For any  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$  that we consider, the optimal low signal price must be below  $\bar{v}$ , because  $\bar{v}^{nd} > p^{nd,M} > p^{L,M}$ . Moreover, note that  $p^L < p^{nd} < p^H$  must hold in an equilibrium in which firms play pure strategies. Thus, searchers with  $v \in [p^L - \epsilon, \bar{v}]$  visit the firm with

data, so this firm's profits in an open ball around  $p^L$  must be given by  $\Pi^L(p_j; \bar{v})$ . Thus, the optimal price  $p^L$  must satisfy a corresponding first-order condition, to which there will be a unique solution, namely  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v})$ .

**Part 2:** For any  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$ , both  $\hat{v}^B(\bar{v})$  and  $\hat{v}^S(\bar{v})$  are weakly falling in  $\bar{v}$ .

Our assumptions guarantee that, for any  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$ , the functions  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v})$ ,  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v})$ , and  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})$  are continuous in  $\bar{v}$ . Moreover,  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v})$  and  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v})$  are rising in  $\bar{v}$ , while  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})$  is falling in  $\bar{v}$ . Now consider  $\hat{v}^B(\bar{v})$ , which is given by:

$$\hat{v}^B(\bar{v}) = \sup \{v \in [0, 1] : Pr(\tilde{v}^L|v)p^{L,*}(\bar{v}) + Pr(\tilde{v}^H|v)p^{H,*}(\bar{v}) - p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}) < 0\} \quad (35)$$

Consider two  $\bar{v}', \bar{v}''$ , with  $\bar{v}' < \bar{v}''$ . The function in  $Pr(\tilde{v}^L|v)p^{L,*}(\bar{v}) + Pr(\tilde{v}^H|v)p^{H,*}(\bar{v}) - p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})$  is rising in  $\bar{v}$ . Thus, any valuation  $v \in \{v \in [0, 1] : Pr(\tilde{v}^L|v)p^{L,*}(\bar{v}'') + Pr(\tilde{v}^H|v)p^{H,*}(\bar{v}'') - p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}'') < 0\}$  will also be in  $\{v \in [0, 1] : Pr(\tilde{v}^L|v)p^{L,*}(\bar{v}') + Pr(\tilde{v}^H|v)p^{H,*}(\bar{v}') - p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}') < 0\}$ . This implies that  $\hat{v}^B(\bar{v}'') \leq \hat{v}^B(\bar{v}')$  since  $\bar{v}' < \bar{v}''$ .

Now consider  $\hat{v}^S(\bar{v})$ . Because the function  $Pr(\tilde{v}^L|v)[p^{L,*}(\bar{v}) - p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})] + Pr(\tilde{v}^H|v)s$  is increasing in  $v$  and increasing in  $\bar{v}$ , analogous arguments imply that  $\hat{v}^S(\bar{v})$  is falling in  $\bar{v}$ .

**Part 3:** When  $p^{H,1} \leq p^{nd,1} + c$ ,  $\bar{v} = \bar{v}^1$  must hold in equilibrium and the equilibrium prices are uniquely determined.

Consider any  $\bar{v} < \bar{v}^1$ . At  $\bar{v}^1$ , high signal profits are equal to  $\Pi^H(p_j; \bar{v}^1)$  for  $[p^{L,*}(\bar{v}^1), p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^1) + c]$ . Recall that  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})$  is falling in  $\bar{v}$  while  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v})$  is rising in  $\bar{v}$  as long as  $\bar{v} \in [\bar{v}^{nd}, 1]$ , which must hold in equilibrium. For any  $\bar{v} \in [\bar{v}^{nd}, \bar{v}^1]$ , we thus have:  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v}) < p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}) + c$ .

Thus,  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v}) \in [p^{L,*}(\bar{v}), p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}) + c]$  holds for any  $\bar{v} \in [\bar{v}^{nd}, \bar{v}^1]$ . This means that  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v})$  is the unique optimal price to set, because it strictly maximizes  $\Pi^H(p_j; \bar{v})$ . Since  $\hat{v}^B(\bar{v})$  is weakly decreasing (by part 2),  $\hat{v}^B(\bar{v}) > \bar{v}$  for any  $\bar{v}$  under consideration, so we cannot have an equilibrium at these values  $\bar{v} < \bar{v}^1$ .

Consider any  $\bar{v} > \bar{v}^1$ . When  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}) + c < p^{H,*}(\bar{v})$ , the high signal price must be equal to  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}) + c$  to constitute an equilibrium. If the price is above  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}) + c$ , it must optimally be  $p^{H,M}$ , since the sale would only be made to captive consumers. This cannot constitute an equilibrium, because  $p^{H,M} \geq p^{H,*}(\bar{v}) > p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}) + c$ , i.e. there would be search on the equilibrium path, a contradiction. A price below  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}) + c < p^{H,*}(\bar{v})$  cannot be optimal, since profits would be equal to  $\Pi^H(p_j; \bar{v})$ , which are strictly increasing for any  $p_j < p^{H,*}(\bar{v})$ .

Find that  $\bar{v}'$  for which  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}') + c = p^{H,*}(\bar{v}')$ . All  $\bar{v} \in [\bar{v}^1, \bar{v}']$  could not have been

equilibria, because the optimal high signal price is  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v})$  and  $\hat{v}^B(\bar{v}) < \bar{v}$ . Now consider any  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}'$ . Because  $\bar{v}' \geq \bar{v}^1$ , we have  $\hat{v}^S(\bar{v}') = \hat{v}^B(\bar{v}') \leq \bar{v}'$ . We know that  $\hat{v}^S(\bar{v})$  is weakly falling in  $\bar{v}$ , which implies that we cannot have a fixed point of  $\hat{v}^S(\bar{v})$ , and thus no equilibrium, in the interval  $(\bar{v}', 1]$ . It only remains to consider  $\bar{v}'$ . If this equals  $\bar{v}^1$ , it is an equilibrium. If  $\bar{v}' > \bar{v}^1$ ,  $\hat{v}^S(\bar{v}') = \hat{v}^B(\bar{v}') < \bar{v}'$ , and we cannot have an equilibrium.

Thus,  $\bar{v} = \bar{v}^1$  holds in equilibrium. The low signal price and the uniform price of the firm with data must be  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v})$  and  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})$  by previous logic. The high signal price must be  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v})$ . Any other price yields strictly lower profits. All these prices are uniquely determined.

**Part 4:** When  $p^{H,1} > p^{nd,1} + c$ ,  $\bar{v} = \bar{v}^2$  must hold in equilibrium. The equilibrium prices are uniquely determined.

Note that  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}) + c$  is falling in  $\bar{v}$  and  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v})$  is rising for  $\bar{v} \in [\bar{v}^{nd}, 1]$ . Thus, find the  $\bar{v}'$  such that:  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v}') = p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}') + c$ . Because  $p^{H,1} > p^{nd,1} + c$ , we know  $\bar{v}^1 > \bar{v}'$ . For any  $\bar{v} < \bar{v}'$ ,  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v}) < p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}) + c$ , i.e. the optimal price is  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v})$ . Thus, no value  $\bar{v} < \bar{v}'$  can be an equilibrium, because  $\hat{v}^B(\bar{v}) > \bar{v}$  holds there.

Consider any  $\bar{v} \in [\bar{v}', 1]$ . The high signal price must be equal to  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}) + c$  in equilibrium, i.e.  $\hat{v}^S(\bar{v}) = \bar{v}$  would have to hold to constitute an equilibrium. The function  $\hat{v}^S(\bar{v})$  is weakly falling, so there is at most one candidate for an equilibrium.

By previous arguments, the prices must be  $p^{L,*}(\bar{v}^2)$ ,  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^2)$ , and  $p^{H,*}(\bar{v}^2)$ .

## A.10 Proof of proposition 7

Define  $[\underline{p}^j, \bar{p}^j]$  as the convex hull of the support of the price distribution offered by either firm  $j \in nd, d$ . The search strategy of searchers is  $s(v)$  and searchers continue searching after visiting firm  $j$  if and only if the price is above  $\hat{p}^j(v)$ . I show that there exists no equilibrium in which firms mix by considering all possible cases: (i)  $\underline{p}^{nd} < \underline{p}^d$ , (ii)  $\underline{p}^{nd} > \underline{p}^d$ , and (iii)  $\underline{p}^{nd} = \underline{p}^d$ .

**Part 1:** There exists no equilibrium in which firms mix and  $\underline{p}^{nd} < \underline{p}^d$ .

Suppose  $\underline{p}^{nd} < \underline{p}^d$ . The price  $\underline{p}^{nd}$  is played with probability 1. Suppose, for a contradiction, that it is part of a mixed strategy. By the restriction of connected support, there exists multiple prices below  $\underline{p}^d$  that are played by the firm without data.

All searchers with  $v < \underline{p}^d$  will surely visit the firm without data first. For any  $p_j < \underline{p}^d$ , no searcher who arrives at the firm without data first will search. Consumers who arrive at the firm without data second has  $v \geq \underline{p}^d$  and must have received a price strictly above  $\underline{p}^d$ .

Thus, they entail inelastic demand when the firm without data offers a price  $p_j \in [\underline{p}^{nd}, \underline{p}^d]$ . Thus, the firm with data makes the following profits when setting any price  $p_j \in [\underline{p}^{nd}, \underline{p}^d]$ :

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi^{nd}(p_j) = p_j \left[ \rho \int_{\underline{p}^d}^{\underline{p}^{nd}} g(v)dv + \rho \int_{\underline{p}^d}^1 [s(v)Pr(p^d > \hat{p}^s(v)) + (1 - s(v))]g(v)dv + \right. \\ \left. 0.5(1 - \rho) \int_{p_j}^1 g(v)dv \right] \end{aligned} \quad (36)$$

This function is strictly concave (since  $\Pi^{nd}(p_j)$  is strictly concave), which implies that the firm without data cannot make the same profits for the different prices in  $[\underline{p}^{nd}, \underline{p}^d]$  it offers, a contradiction to mixing indifference. Thus,  $\underline{p}^{nd}$  is played with probability 1.

Now consider the prices of the firm with data. Because  $\underline{p}^{nd}$  is played with probability 1 and  $\underline{p}^{nd} < \underline{p}^d$ , all searchers with  $v \geq \underline{p}^d$  never arrive at the firm with data. Thus, the firm with data just makes the sale to its captive consumers for any price  $p_j > \underline{p}^d$  and makes scaled monopoly profits. This implies that the firm with data would not mix, since its monopoly profit functions are strictly concave. Thus, firms do not mix in an equilibrium of category (i).

**Part 2:** There exists no equilibrium in which firms mix and  $\underline{p}^d < \underline{p}^{nd}$ .

Suppose  $\underline{p}^d < \underline{p}^{nd}$ . As before,  $\underline{p}^d$  must be played with probability 1 by the firm with data in the corresponding information set (no matter whether this price is played after seeing  $\tilde{v}^L$  or  $\tilde{v}^H$ ). This is because all searchers with valuation below  $\underline{p}^{nd}$  visit the firm with data. All searchers with valuation above  $\underline{p}^{nd}$  will generate inelastic demand for the firm with data around  $\underline{p}^d$ , because no such consumer would search when receiving a price below  $\underline{p}^{nd}$ .

Now consider the optimal pricing of the firm without data. No consumer who visits the firm without data first in equilibrium would search after receiving  $\underline{p}^{nd}$ . Suppose, for a contradiction, that a searcher with valuation  $v$  visits the firm without data first and finds it weakly optimal to search when receiving the price  $\underline{p}^{nd}$ , which means that she will search for any price she can receive at this firm. Because  $\underline{p}^d < \underline{p}^{nd}$ , it would be better for any such searcher to initially visit the firm with data. This is because this endows the consumer with an option value of saving search costs, which she can do when receiving  $\underline{p}^d$ , the best equilibrium price.

Thus, any searcher who visits the firm without data first must find it strictly optimal to not search at  $\underline{p}^{nd}$ . Because search preferences are continuous in the initial price, searchers will also not search if offered a price just above  $\underline{p}^{nd}$  (by the dominated convergence theorem).

There exist  $\epsilon > 0$  and  $\delta > 0$  such that: (i) Searchers with  $v \in [\underline{p}^d, \underline{p}^{nd} + \epsilon]$  visit the firm

with data first. Setting  $\epsilon$  small enough also implies that these consumers would never search thereafter, and (ii) searchers who visit the firm without data first don't search if offered  $p_j \in [\underline{p}^{nd}, \underline{p}^{nd} + \delta]$ . Moreover, searchers who arrive at the firm without data second buy if offered  $p_j \in [\underline{p}^{nd}, \underline{p}^{nd} + c]$  (else, it would not be optimal to pay the search cost to visit this firm).

This establishes that  $\underline{p}^{nd}$  will be played with probability 1. To see this, set  $\tau = \min\{\epsilon, \delta, c\}$ . For all  $p_j \in [\underline{p}^{nd}, \underline{p}^{nd} + \tau]$ , the profits of the firm without data are:

$$\Pi^{nd}(p_j) = p_j \left[ \rho \int_{\underline{p}^{nd} + \epsilon}^1 [s(v)Pr(\hat{p}^s(v) > p^d) + (1 - s(v))(1)] g(v) dv + 0.5(1 - \rho) \int_{p_j}^1 g(v) dv \right] \quad (37)$$

The demand implied by searchers is fully inelastic for these prices. This means that the profits of the firm without data are strictly concave for all  $p_j \in [\underline{p}^{nd}, \underline{p}^{nd} + \tau]$ . If this firm mixes, it must offer multiple prices in this interval by the restriction of connected support. This violates the mixing indifference condition, a contradiction.

We have established that  $\underline{p}^d$  and  $\underline{p}^{nd}$  both have to be played with probability 1. Thus, the only possibility of mixing is that the firm with data mixes after one of the two signals. Define that the firm with data mixes after  $\tilde{v}^m$  and that the convex hull of the support of the associated price distribution is  $[\underline{p}^m, \bar{p}^m]$ . No consumer who visits the firm without data first will search thereafter (by an option value logic, as above). Moreover, searchers who visit the firm with data first will search if  $v > \underline{p}^{nd} + c$  and the price they receive is above this cutoff.

It cannot hold that  $\underline{p}^{nd} + c < \bar{p}^m$ . Then, all searchers will surely not consume at the firm with data for  $p_j \in [\underline{p}^{nd} + c, \bar{p}^m]$ , which means profits only accrue from captive consumers. Since these are strictly concave, there is a contradiction (by the restriction of connected support).

Finally, suppose that  $\bar{p}^m \leq \underline{p}^{nd} + c$ , i.e. that none of the prices played after  $\tilde{v}^m$  trigger search. Then, we can show that  $\underline{p}^d$ , which is strictly lower than  $\bar{p}^m$  by the assumption that the firm with data is mixing, must be played after the low signal. If  $\underline{p}^d$  were played after  $\tilde{v}^H$ , there would be a contradiction by hazard ratio ordering arguments (since no price triggers search).

Since  $\underline{p}^d < \bar{p}^m$  and  $\underline{p}^d$  is played after  $\tilde{v}^L$ , the strategy of searchers ( $s(v)$ ) will be a cutoff rule, because the price distribution at the firm with data becomes strictly less favorable as a consumer's valuation increases. Searchers will visit the firm with data only if their valuation is below  $\bar{v}$ . Because  $\bar{p}^m \leq \bar{v}$  must hold (else the firm only sells to captive consumers for a subinterval of prices), profits from any price  $p_j \in [\underline{p}^m, \bar{p}^m]$  are  $\Pi^H(p_j; \bar{v})$  as defined in equation (8). But this is strictly concave, so the firm with data would also never mix.

**Part 3:** There exists no equilibrium in which  $\underline{p}^d = \underline{p}^{nd}$

Suppose  $\underline{p}^d = \underline{p}^{nd}$ . For prices in an open ball above the lowest price, no consumer that arrives at any firm will leave to search (any consumers who arrive after searching directly buy). Consider such an interval of prices, and call it  $[\underline{p}^d, \underline{p}^d + \epsilon]$ , s.t.  $\underline{p}^d + \epsilon < \bar{p}^d$ .

Even if some individual prices in this interval are played with positive probability, the preferences that consumers with  $v \in [\underline{p}^d, \underline{p}^d + \epsilon]$  have over which firm to visit will be continuous in  $v$ . This can be shown by applying the dominated convergence theorem.

Suppose that there exists a  $v' \in [\underline{p}^d, \underline{p}^d + \epsilon]$  such that a searcher with valuation  $v'$  strictly prefers to visit the firm with data. Then, consumers with valuation in an open ball with radius  $\delta$  around  $v'$  will also strictly prefer to visit the firm with data first. As a result, setting any price  $p_j \in [v', \underline{p}^d + \epsilon]$  will yield the following profits for the firm with data:

$$p_j \left[ \rho \int_{p_j}^{v'+\delta} Pr^k(v)g(v)dv + \rho \int_{v'+\delta}^1 [s(v) + (1-s(v))Pr(\hat{p}^{nd}(v) < p^{nd})] Pr^k(v)g(v)dv + 0.5(1-\rho) \int_{p_j}^1 Pr^k(v)g(v)dv \right] \quad (38)$$

This profit function is strictly concave in this domain, a contradiction to mixing indifference.

Similar arguments rule out that some searchers with  $v \in [\underline{p}^d, \underline{p}^d + \epsilon]$  strictly prefer to visit the firm without data. Thus, they must all be indifferent and randomize by our tie-breaking rule. But then, the firm without data would make the following profits for any price  $p_j \in [\underline{p}^d, \underline{p}^d + \epsilon]$ :

$$p_j \left[ \rho \int_{p_j}^{\underline{p}^d + \epsilon} (0.5)g(v)dv + \rho \int_{\underline{p}^d + \epsilon}^1 [(1-s(v)) + s(v)Pr(\hat{p}^d(v) < p^d)]g(v)dv + 0.5(1-\rho) \int_{p_j}^1 g(v)dv \right] \quad (39)$$

But this profit function is strictly concave once more. Thus, the firm without data would have to set this lowest price with probability 1. If the firm with data sets this price with probability 1 as well, we have no MSE. Alternatively, it sets it with probability below 1. Then, all searchers with  $v > \underline{p}^{nd}$  visit the firm without data and don't search. Thus, the firm with data would not mix, because it sells only to captive consumers for any of its prices.

## A.11 Proof of corollary 2

As  $\rho \rightarrow 1$ , assumptions 3 and 4 both hold. First, note that  $p^{nd,s}(\rho)$  as defined in equation (13) satisfies  $p^{nd,s}(\rho) \rightarrow \max\{p^{nd,M}, 1 - c\}$  as  $\rho \rightarrow 1$ . Thus,  $\lim_{\rho \rightarrow 1}[p^{nd,s}(\rho) + c] \geq 1 > p^{H,M}$ , i.e. assumption 3 is satisfied. Now consider assumption 4, namely  $\Pi^H(p^{nd,M}, \bar{v}^{nd}) > 0.5(1 - \rho)\Pi^{H,M}(p^{H,M})$ . As  $\rho \rightarrow 1$ , the LHS goes to something strictly positive, while the RHS goes to 0. Thus, the assumption is satisfied as well.

As  $\rho \rightarrow 1$ , there is no search on the equilibrium path and  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$  holds in equilibrium by the previous results. Thus,  $\bar{v} \rightarrow 1$  as  $\rho \rightarrow 1$ , which implies the result.

## A.12 Proof of corollary 3

**Part 1:** The equilibrium  $\bar{v}$  weakly decreases in  $c$ .

First, consider  $c > p^{H,1} - p^{nd,1}$ . Then, the equilibrium  $(p^{L,1}, p^{H,1}, p^{nd,1}, \bar{v}^1)$  is played, in which  $\bar{v}$  is unaffected by  $c$ . Second, consider  $c \leq p^{H,1} - p^{nd,1}$ . Then, the equilibrium  $(p^{L,2}, p^{H,2}, p^{nd,2}, \bar{v}^2)$  is played, in which  $\hat{v}(p^{L,*}(\bar{v}^2), p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^2) + s, p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^2)) - \bar{v}^2 = 0$ .

Consider two values of  $c$  for which  $c \leq p^{H,1} - p^{nd,1}$  and call them  $c'$  and  $c''$ , with  $c'' > c'$ . Define the resulting equilibrium levels of  $\bar{v}$  as  $\bar{v}^2(c'') := \bar{v}^{2''}$  and  $\bar{v}^2(c') := \bar{v}^{2'}$ . I show that  $\bar{v}^2(c'') \leq \bar{v}^2(c')$ . If  $\bar{v}^{2'} = 1$ , the result is immediate.

Thus, suppose that  $\bar{v}^{2'} < 1$ . Then,  $\bar{v}^{2''}$  must set the expected prices exactly equal. For  $c'' > c'$ , we thus have:  $Pr^L(\bar{v}^{2''})(p^{L,*}(\bar{v}^{2''}) - p^{nd,*}(\bar{v}^{2''})) + Pr^H(\bar{v}^{2''})c'' > 0$ . This implies that  $\hat{v}^S(\bar{v}^{2''}) - \bar{v}^{2''} < 0$  at  $c''$ . Because said expression is falling in  $\bar{v}$ , it must hold that  $\bar{v}^{2''} < \bar{v}^{2'}$ .

**Part 2:** Market shares

When  $c > p^{H,1} - p^{nd,1}$ , changes of  $c$  do not affect the equilibrium outcomes.

Suppose  $v \sim U[0, 1]$  and that  $Pr^L(v)$  is linear. Then,  $g(p)p = p$  is rising in  $p$ . Moreover, the function  $g(p)pPr^L(p)$  is rising in  $p$  for any  $p < 0.5$  (note that  $p^{L,M} < 0.5$  in our example).

As  $c$  rises,  $\bar{v}$  falls. This reduces the high signal demand of the firm with data and increases the high signal price because  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})$  is falling in  $\bar{v}$ . The high signal price further rises because  $c$  rises. Thus, the high signal demand of the firm with data falls. Moreover, the low signal demand of the firm with data falls for any relevant  $p$ . This reduction of demand will, by strict concavity of the low signal profit function, lead to a decrease in  $p^L$ . Note that  $p^L \leq p^{L,M} < 0.5$  must hold. Because  $g(p)pPr^L(p)$  is rising in  $p$  when  $p \in [0, 0.5]$ , and this equals demand by the FOC that  $p^L$  must satisfy, the equilibrium low signal demand falls.

Now consider the firm without data. Because  $\bar{v}$  falls, the demand of the firm without

data rises for any relevant price. This will trigger an increase of the price, which leads to higher equilibrium demand for the firm without data because  $g(p)p$  is rising in  $p$ .

Thus, total demand of the firm with data is falling in  $c$  and the demand of the firm without data is rising. Thus, the sales based market share of the firm with data falls in  $c$ .

### A.13 Proof of proposition 8

If  $e > 0$ , it is optimal to exercise this right only if  $v \geq p^a + e$ . Suppose the right to anonymity is exercised by a positive measure of consumers. Thus, the corresponding information set for the firm with data is on-path and this firm must believe that a consumer who has anonymized is a searcher and has  $v \geq p^a + e$ . Thus, there is a profitable upward deviation from  $p^a$ .

Now consider  $e = 0$  and suppose that a strictly positive measure of consumers exercises the right to anonymity.

Suppose  $p^{nd} < p^a$ . Then, any searcher with  $v > p^{nd}$  would not visit the firm with data and utilize their right to anonymity. If a consumer exercises this right, she must have  $v < p^{nd}$ . But then, setting the price  $p^a$  would be suboptimal, a contradiction.

Suppose  $p^a \leq p^{nd}$ . Then, all searchers weakly prefer to visit the firm with data. Suppose  $p^L \neq p^H$ . Then,  $p^L < p^a < p^H$  must hold. But then, consumers with  $v \in (p^L, p^a]$  will not exercise the right to anonymity. Thus, there is a profitable upward deviation from  $p^a$ , as the firm with data knows that any searcher who anonymizes (and has  $v > p^L$ ) has a valuation strictly above  $p^a$ .

Thus,  $p^L = p^H$  must hold. If  $p^a$  is not equal to  $p^L$ , either no consumer will anonymize (a contradiction to the premise) or all searchers anonymize (then there is a contradiction to the postulated ordering of prices). The final case is hence  $p^L = p^H = p^a$ . By assumption, consumers then randomize between anonymizing and not anonymizing. Then, we obtain several contradictions. For instance,  $p^L = p^H$  would not be optimal.

### A.14 Proof of proposition 9

There are five equilibrium prices: the prices of the firm with data  $(p^L, p^H)$ , the uniform price of the firm without data  $(p^{nd})$  and the signal prices at this firm  $(p^{L,nd}, p^{H,nd})$ . I will construct an equilibrium in which (i) searchers with  $v \in [0, v^t)$  visit the firm without data and port their data, and (ii) searchers with  $v \in (v^t, 1]$  visit the firm without data but do not port their data.

Setting up the equilibrium candidate:

The prices  $p^{L,nd}$  and  $p^{H,nd}$  must, given  $v^t$ , solve  $p^{k,nd}(v^t) = \arg \max_{p_j} [p_j \int_{p_j}^{v^t} \rho P r^k(v) g(v) dv]$ .

Thus, these optimal prices will be strictly below  $v^t$ . The price  $p^{nd}$  must maximize:

$$\Pi^{nd}(p_j; v^t) = p_j \left[ \rho \int_{v^t}^1 \mathbb{1}[p_j \leq v] g(v) dv + 0.5(1 - \rho) \int_0^1 \mathbb{1}[p_j \leq v] g(v) dv \right] \quad (40)$$

In order for the search behavior we posited to be optimal, we need to have  $p^{nd} < v^t$ . This, in turn, implies that  $v^t \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$  must hold. For any  $v^t \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$ , the price  $p^{nd}$  will equal  $p^{nd,*}(v^t)$ . Because all prices must be below  $v^t$  in equilibrium,  $v^t$  must solve:

$$v^t = \underbrace{\sup \{v \in [0, 1] : Pr^H(v)p^{H,nd}(v^t) + Pr^L(v)p^{L,nd}(v^t) - p^{nd}(v^t) < 0\}}_{:=\hat{v}^T(v^t)} \quad (41)$$

Previous arguments show that the function in this supremum is rising in  $v$ , which means we have a well-defined supremum. The function  $\hat{v}^T(v^t)$  is continuous because all price functions are continuous in  $v^t$ . At  $v^t = \bar{v}^{nd}$ , we have  $\hat{v}^T(\bar{v}^{nd}) = 1 > \bar{v}^{nd}$ . At  $v^t = 1$ , we have  $\hat{v}^T(1) \leq 1$  by definition. Thus, the intermediate value theorem guarantees that  $v^t = \hat{v}^T(v^t)$  holds at some  $v^t \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$ .

Based on this, I construct the following candidate for an equilibrium: The firm with data sets the prices  $(p^{L,M}, p^{H,M})$ . The firm without data sets the prices  $(p^{L,nd}(v^t), p^{H,nd}(v^t), p^{nd}(v^t))$ , where  $v^t = \hat{v}^T(v^t)$ . Searchers with  $v \in [0, v^t)$  visit the firm without data and port their data, and (ii) searchers with  $v \in (v^t, 1]$  visit the firm without data but do not port their data.

#### Equilibrium verificaton:

The search behaviour in the posited equilibrium is optimal, given the prices: For all searchers with  $v < v^t$ , porting the data is strictly better than remaining anonymous at the firm without data. This is because the expected price when porting the data lies below  $p^{nd}$  for a consumer with  $v = p^{H,nd}$  (because  $p^{H,nd} < v^t$  must hold). For any consumer with  $v > p^{H,nd}$ , the preference for porting is strictly falling in  $v$  and switches sign at  $v^t$ . For searchers with  $v > v^t$ , it is better to remain anonymous at the firm without data than to port the data.

For any searcher, it is better to port the data to the firm without data than to visit the firm with data. To see this, recall that the firm with data sets  $p^L = p^{L,M}$  and  $p^H = p^{H,M}$ . Since  $v^t \leq 1$ , we know that  $p^{L,nd} \leq p^L = p^{L,M}$  and  $p^{H,nd} \leq p^H = p^{H,M}$ . Thus, any searcher prefers porting the data over visiting the firm with data.

Thus, all searchers with  $v < v^t$  port the data. All searchers with  $v > v^t$  prefer to visit the firm without data anonymously over porting the data, which they in turn prefer to visiting the firm with data. Hence, the postulated search behavior is optimal.

The postulated prices of the firms are optimal, given the equilibrium search behaviour. This holds by construction. Thus, said equilibrium candidate constitutes an equilibrium.

## A.15 Proof of proposition 10

**Part 1:** In an equilibrium in which firms play pure strategies,  $p^{nd} \in (p^1, p^K)$  holds.

The monopoly prices satisfy  $p^{1,M} < p^{2,M} < \dots < p^{K,M}$ . In general, our assumption on the ordering of the hazard ratios implies that  $p^1 \leq p^2 \leq \dots \leq p^K$  holds in any equilibrium in which firms play pure strategies.

There exists no equilibrium in which the firm with data sets a uniform price, i.e.  $p^1 = p^2 = \dots = p^K$ . The only possible such equilibrium is  $p^1 = p^2 = \dots = p^K = p^{nd} := p^*$ . But then, the tie-breaking rule defined in assumption 2 applies, so all searchers with  $v \geq p^*$  randomize between firms. Thus,  $p^* \geq p^{K,M}$  holds. But because  $p^{nd,M} < p^*$  and  $p^{1,M} < p^*$ , there is either a downward deviation from  $p^*$  to  $p^{nd,M}$  for the firm without data or a deviation from  $p^*$  to  $p^{1,M}$  for the firm with data when it observes  $\tilde{v}^1$ , a contradiction. Thus,  $p^1 < p^K$  must hold in equilibrium.

Suppose that  $p^{nd} \leq p^1$ . There will exist a price above  $p^1$  that any consumer will receive with strictly positive probability. Thus, any consumer with  $v \geq p^{nd}$  will visit the firm without data, which implies that  $p^{nd} \geq p^{nd,M}$  must hold. This implies that  $p^1 \geq p^{nd} > p^{1,M}$ . The firm with data only sells to its captive consumers at  $p^1$ , which means there is a profitable downward deviation for this firm, because monopoly profits are strictly maximized at  $p^{1,M}$ , a contradiction.

Suppose that  $p^K \leq p^{nd}$ . Because there will exist a price below  $p^K$  (we have ruled out uniform price equilibria), all searchers with a valuation above  $p^K$  will visit the firm with data. Thus,  $p^K \geq p^{K,M} > p^{nd,M}$  must hold, which implies that there will be a downward deviation from  $p^{nd}$ , since the firm without data only sells to captive consumers at this price.

This establishes the desired ordering of prices:  $p^{nd} \in (p^1, p^K)$  must hold.

**Part 2:** The strategy of searchers will be a cutoff rule.

In equilibrium,  $p^1 < p^{nd}$  must hold. All consumers with  $v \leq p^{nd}$  will strictly prefer to visit the firm with data. For all consumers with  $v > p^{nd}$ , the preference for the firm without

data is as follows:

$$P^{nd}(v) = (v - p^{nd}) - \left[ \sum_{k=1}^K Pr(\tilde{v}^k|v) \max\{v - p^k, 0\} \right] \implies \frac{\partial P^{nd}(v)}{\partial v} > 0 \quad (42)$$

By assumption, the derivative of this object will be above 0, i.e. the preference for the firm without data will be strictly rising in  $v$ . This establishes the existence of a unique cutoff.

**Part 3:** In equilibrium,  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$  must hold. This holds by previous logic. Because  $p^1 < p^{nd}$  and  $Pr(\tilde{v}^1|v) > 0$  for any  $v$ ,  $p^{nd} < \bar{v}$  must hold in equilibrium, since a consumer with valuation  $v = p^{nd}$  would find it strictly optimal to visit the firm with data. The firm without data must find it optimal to set  $p^{nd} < \bar{v}$ , which will only be true if  $\bar{v} \geq \bar{v}^{nd}$ . This is because, for  $p_j \in (p^1, \bar{v})$ , the profits of the firm without data are given by  $\Pi^{nd}(p_j; \bar{v})$ .

**Part 4** An equilibrium in which firms play pure strategies exists.

For any possible cutoff search strategy, one can show that  $p^1 \leq p^2 \leq \dots \leq p^K$  and  $p^1 \neq p^K$  will hold. As a result, a consumer's preference for the firm without data is strictly rising as  $v \geq p^{nd}$  and we can describe the search behaviour of consumers using a cutoff that solves:

$$\hat{v}(p^1, \dots, p^K, p^{nd}) = \sup \left\{ v \in [0, 1] : \sum_{k=1}^K Pr(\tilde{v}^k|v) \max\{v - p^k, 0\} - (v - p^{nd}) > 0 \right\} \quad (43)$$

Similarly, we can define:

$$v^F(\bar{v}) = \sup \left\{ v \in [0, 1] : \sum_{k=1}^K Pr(\tilde{v}^k|v) \max\{v - p^{k,*}(\bar{v}), 0\} - (v - p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})) > 0 \right\} \quad (44)$$

Note that  $p^{k,*}(\bar{v})$  are the optimal prices set by the firm with data, if searchers visit firms according to said cutoff rule. The optimal price of the firm without data is given by  $p^{nd,*}(\bar{v})$ .

We work towards showing the existence of a fixed point of  $v^F(\bar{v})$ . To begin, note that the following two boundary conditions will be satisfied: (i)  $v^F(\bar{v}^{nd}) > \bar{v}^{nd}$  and (ii)  $v^F(1) \leq 1$ .

The first condition holds because, at  $\bar{v} = \bar{v}^{nd}$ , the optimal price of the firm without data will be equal to  $\bar{v}^{nd}$ , which lies above  $p^{nd,M}$ . Thus, we have  $p^{1,M} < p^{nd,M} < \bar{v}^{nd}$ , so the lowest signal price of the firm without data would optimally lie below  $\bar{v}^{nd}$ . As a result, a consumer with  $v = \bar{v}^{nd}$  would strictly prefer to visit the firm with data, and thus  $v^F(\bar{v}^{nd}) > \bar{v}^{nd}$ . The second condition holds by construction.

There may be multiple points of discontinuity in this function, because the optimal price

functions may jump, namely at the cutoffs  $\bar{v}^{k,C}$ , which are defined as follows:

$$\max_{p_j \leq \bar{v}^{k,C}} \Pi^k(p_j; \bar{v}^{k,C}) = 0.5(1 - \rho)\Pi^{k,M}(p^{k,M}) \quad (45)$$

As before, we can argue that  $\bar{v}^{k,C} < p^{k,M}$ . It cannot be exactly equal, because then the left derivative at  $\bar{v}^{k,C} = p^{k,M}$  would be strictly negative, implying a contradiction. By analogous arguments,  $p^{k,M}$  cannot be below  $\bar{v}^{k,C}$ .

For all  $\bar{v} \leq \bar{v}^{k,C}$ , the optimal price will be equal to the monopoly price (since  $\max_{p_j \leq \bar{v}} \Pi^k(p_j; \bar{v})$  is strictly falling in  $\bar{v}$ ). For any  $\bar{v} \in (\bar{v}^{k,C}, 1)$ , the optimal price will be strictly below  $p^{k,M}$ , while it becomes exactly equal to the monopoly price when  $\bar{v} = 1$ .

Since  $\bar{v}^{k,C} < 1$ , we know that the optimal price  $p^{k,*}(\bar{v})$  jumps from  $p^{k,M}$  to something below this. This downward jump in prices raises the incentives of searchers to visit the firm with data, i.e. will induce an *upward* jump in  $\hat{v}^F(\bar{v})$ .

Thus, there will be up to  $K$  potential points of discontinuity on the relevant interval  $[\bar{v}^{nd}, 1]$ . At any such point of discontinuity,  $\hat{v}^F(\bar{v})$  jumps upwards.

Suppose, for a contradiction, that there exists no fixed point of  $\hat{v}^F(\bar{v})$  on  $[\bar{v}^{nd}, 1]$ . This implies that  $\bar{v}^F(\bar{v}) > \bar{v}$  for any interval on which said function is continuous (this proof can be done by induction). Thus, you can find the largest point of discontinuity, which will still be strictly below 1. At that point, you will have  $\bar{v}^F(\bar{v}) > \bar{v}$ . The function is continuous up to 1, where said inequality flips. Thus, a fixed point must exist, a contradiction.

And thus, an equilibrium exists. The prices are optimal by the construction of  $\hat{v}^F(\bar{v})$ . The search choices are optimal by definition.

## References

- Armstrong, M., & Zhou, J. (2016). Search deterrence. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 83(1), 26–57.
- Atayev, A. (2021). Search cost based price discrimination. *Working paper*.
- Belleflamme, P., Lam, W. M. W., & Vergote, W. (2020). Competitive imperfect price discrimination and market power. *Marketing Science*, 39(5), 996–1015.
- Belleflamme, P., & Vergote, W. (2016). Monopoly price discrimination and privacy: The hidden cost of hiding. *Economics Letters*, 149, 141–144.
- Bergemann, D., & Bonatti, A. (2022). Data, competition, and digital platforms.
- Bergemann, D., Brooks, B., & Morris, S. (2021). Search, information, and prices. *Journal of Political Economy*, 129(8), 2275–2319.
- Bounie, D., Dubus, A., & Waelbroeck, P. (2021). Selling strategic information in digital competitive markets. *The RAND Journal of Economics*, 52(2), 283–313.
- Braghieri, L. (2019). Targeted advertising and price discrimination in intermediated online markets. *Working paper*.
- Burdett, K., & Judd, K. L. (1983). Equilibrium price dispersion. *Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society*, 955–969.
- Clavorà Braulin, F. (2021). The effects of personal information on competition: Consumer privacy and partial price discrimination. *ZEW-Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper*(21-007).
- Delbono, F., Reggiani, C., & Sandrini, L. (2022). Strategic data sales to competing firms. *Available at SSRN*.
- De los Santos, B. (2018). Consumer search on the internet. *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 58, 66–105.
- Diamond, P. A. (1971). A model of price adjustment. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 3(2), 156–168.
- Eeckhout, J., & Veldkamp, L. (2022). *Data and market power* (Tech. Rep.). National Bureau of Economic Research.

- Escobari, D., Rupp, N. G., & Meskey, J. (2019). An analysis of dynamic price discrimination in airlines. *Southern Economic Journal*, 85(3), 639–662.
- Esteves, R.-B. (2014). Price discrimination with private and imperfect information. *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, 116(3), 766–796.
- European Commission. (2019). Directive (eu) 2019/2161 of the european parliament and of the council. *Official Journal of the European Union*.
- European Commission. (2020). A proposal for a regulation of the european parliament and of the council on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (digital markets act).
- Fabra, N., & Reguant, M. (2020). A model of search with price discrimination. *European Economic Review*, 129, 103571.
- Freedman, C., & Sagredo, J. (2022). The invisible faang. *Available at SSRN 3948210*.
- Garcia, D. (2022). Harmonic price targeting. *Information Economics and Policy*, 60, 100984.
- Garrett, D. F., Gomes, R., & Maestri, L. (2019). Competitive screening under heterogeneous information. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 86(4), 1590–1630.
- Groh, C.-C. (2022). Competitive price discrimination, imperfect information, and consumer search. *Working paper*.
- Gu, Y., Madio, L., & Reggiani, C. (2019). Exclusive data, price manipulation and market leadership.
- Guembel, A., & Hege, U. (2021). *Data, product targeting and competition* (Tech. Rep.). Working Paper.
- Hannak, A., Soeller, G., Lazer, D., Mislove, A., & Wilson, C. (2014). Measuring price discrimination and steering on e-commerce web sites. In *Proceedings of the 2014 conference on internet measurement conference* (pp. 305–318).
- Jolivet, G., & Turon, H. (2019). Consumer search costs and preferences on the internet. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 86(3), 1258–1300.
- Ke, T. T., Lin, S., & Lu, M. Y. (2022). Information design of online platforms. *Available at SSRN*.

- Kirpalani, R., & Philippon, T. (2021). *Data sharing and market power with two-sided platforms* (Tech. Rep.). National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Koulayev, S. (2014). Search for differentiated products: identification and estimation. *The RAND Journal of Economics*, 45(3), 553–575.
- Larson, J., Mattu, S., & Angwin, J. (2015). Unintended consequences of geographic targeting. *Technology Science*.
- Li, X., Lo, A. W., & Thakor, R. T. (2021). *Paying off the competition: Market power and innovation incentives* (Tech. Rep.). National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Lin, T. (2022). Valuing intrinsic and instrumental preferences for privacy. *Marketing Science*, 41(4), 663–681.
- Marshall, G. (2020). Search and wholesale price discrimination. *The RAND Journal of Economics*, 51(2), 346–374.
- Mauring, E. (2021). Search and price discrimination online. *Working paper*.
- Mussa, M., & Rosen, S. (1978). Monopoly and product quality. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 18(2), 301–317.
- OECD Secretariat. (2016). Executive summary of the roundtable on price discrimination.
- Osório, A. (2022). Data and competitive markets: Some notes on competition, concentration and welfare. *The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics*.
- Peiseler, F., Rasch, A., & Shekhar, S. (2021). Imperfect information, algorithmic price discrimination, and collusion. *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics*.
- Preuss, M. (2021). Search, learning and tracking. *Working paper*.
- Rhodes, A., & Zhou, J. (2022). Personalized pricing and competition. *Available at SSRN 4103763*.
- Stahl, D. O. (1989). Oligopolistic pricing with sequential consumer search. *American Economic Review*, 700–712.
- Statista. (2021). *Leading e-commerce websites in the united states as of june 2021, based on number of monthly visits*. Retrieved 2022-11-09, from <https://www.statista.com/statistics/271450/monthly-unique-visitors-to-us-retail-websites/>

Statista. (2022). *Worldwide desktop market share of leading search engines from january 2010 to july 2022*. Retrieved 2022-09-16, from <https://www.statista.com/statistics/216573/worldwide-market-share-of-search-engines/>