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The energy efficiency gap and barriers to investments

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Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper

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The energy efficiency gap and barriers to investments

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Abstract

This study investigates the energy efficiency (EE) gap, referring to private agents who are not making seemingly profitable investments to reduce energy use. We deploy a questionnaire among firms in the Netherlands in which we ask them about investment behavior and barriers to investing in EE. A set of 16 barriers is constructed based on the literature. We find that most firms (70%) have made EE investments in the past five years, and that the median firm has saved 10% of its energy use. The remaining profitable EE investment opportunities still leave room for another 15% of energy savings at the median firm. We find that uncertainty about future policies ranks as the leading barrier to EE investments, followed by lock-ins in current equipment, and energy price uncertainty. Especially energy-intensive firms indicate the importance of policy uncertainty. Past policies have not been successful in addressing these barriers. Additionally, we find that a firm's network can be an important channel for obtaining EE investment knowledge. *Keywords (JEL): C83, D22, O33, Q40.*

1 Introduction

To perform their main activities, most firms require energy in some form: industrial firms to operate machines, construction firms to use tools, and financial service firms to make use of computers. This use of energy has considerable drawbacks, as the consumption of most energy types produces greenhouse gas emissions and many countries rely on imports for their energy needs. While the emphasis is often on substituting away from fossil energy sources to renewable sources, a large component of reaching climate targets includes reducing total energy use. Accordingly, the European Commission has set targets for energy efficiency (EE) improvements for 2030 in its Energy Efficiency Directive (EED)

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(European Parliament, 2018). Individual member states have to incorporate these targets in their national policy agendas. Due to the war in Ukraine, the EU has proposed to further reduce energy dependency and increase the energy saving ambitions with its REpowerEU plan (European Commission, 2022). Figure 1 presents the EU targets for the Netherlands, with the most recent proposal requiring a 24.4% reduction in primary energy usage by 2030 from 2021 levels, double the forecast reduction of 11.9% based on current policies in place (PBL, 2022). Although, globally investments in EE have increased in 2022, with projected policies the levels are still too low to reach the 2050 net zero targets, according to the IEA (2022). To reach the set targets, consumers, firms and governments need to invest more in EE improvements.




Figure 1: ENERGY USAGE IN THE NETHERLANDS AND 2030 TARGETS.

Note: Primary energy usage (Eurostat definition) in the Netherlands in petajoules (PJ). The figure depicts the forecast energy usage according to PBL (2022), the reference scenario used in the EED and the targets according to the EED (as in Menkveld et al., 2022). A revision to the EED is proposed (EED revised) and a more ambitious target is formulated (EED REPowerEU). The percentages indicate the total reductions needed from 2021 levels in order to reach the 2030 targets.

The ambitions are high and often perceived to be costly to achieve. However, economic literature suggests that many *profitable* investment opportunities are ignored. This is known as the *energy efficiency gap* (or energy efficiency paradox) (Hirst & Brown, 1990). This concept gives rise to an important question about the barriers that firms are facing in the adoption of profitable technologies, causing this gap. Such a gap also suggests that policies could induce improvements in EE by lowering these barriers. This study therefore sets out to (1) measure the EE gap, (2) explore which barriers are responsible for the existence of the gap, and (3) distinguish drivers that can alleviate the experienced barriers. In doing this, we also study heterogeneity in firms in the gap, barriers and drivers they experience.

In order to answer these questions, data is collected through a questionnaire. The questionnaire asks firms in the industry, construction and utilities sectors in the Netherlands about their investments, energy savings, remaining energy saving potential, experienced barriers, policy evaluations, and other background information. A list of barriers to EE investments is carefully constructed from reviewing the literature (especially Cagno et al., 2013; De Groot et al., 2001; Sorrell et al., 2004). The questionnaire allows the quantification of the EE gap and a ranking of the most important barriers to EE investments. The variables stemming from accompanying questions allow for studying heterogeneity

across firms and robustness of the findings. The sample consists of 196 firms, with 102 full responses, which is quite sizable compared to the number of observations in related literature.

We find that the median firm indicates to have an EE gap of 15%, meaning they can profitably save 15% of their energy use through investments. Interestingly, this remaining opportunity is larger than the energy saved in the past five years, which is 10% of the energy use for the median firm. Using non-parametric paired tests we show with more than 95% confidence that the EE gap is higher than the energy already saved in the past five years. This within-firm comparison of the two variables is robust to several response biases. Using regression analysis we further find that larger and more innovative firms indicate to have larger EE gaps.

Furthermore, from the taxonomy of barriers, uncertainty about future policies ranks as the most important barrier. Compared to the findings from 1998 of De Groot et al. (2001), this barrier also increased the most in importance. Other relevant barriers are energy price uncertainty and lock-ins in current equipment, followed by investments already having been made, technological reasons, low priority, organizational frictions, and competence. Multinomial ordered logit regressions show that especially energy-intensive firms indicate the importance of policy uncertainty and internal budget constraints, while being more likely in need of replacing current equipment. In order to address potential biases stemming from the questionnaire data, we propose a categorical normalization of the barrier variables in order to cancel out any respondent-level biases in fill out behavior. The mentioned relationships between barriers and firm characteristics still hold in these robustness exercises.

When looking at drivers of EE investments firms indicate that government policies have not been successful in addressing EE investment barriers. A firm's network is found to be an important channel for obtaining EE investment knowledge. The most important parties for such knowledge transfers differ significantly between types of firms. Whereas industrial and energy-intensive firms rank financiers highest, construction firms rank their competitors highest. Large firms rank trade associations highest.

This paper continues as follows. In [Section 2](#) the related literature is reviewed and an overview of the Dutch policy background is provided. The survey and data are presented in [Section 3](#) and [Section 4](#) respectively. [Section 5](#) presents our main results, which are discussed in [Section 6](#), and [Section 7](#) concludes.

2 Background

This section discusses related literature and the policy background. Especially literature on the energy efficiency (EE) gap and the related firm investment decision is considered. The policy background sketches the context of the policy landscape in the Netherlands in which this study is conducted.

2.1 The energy efficiency gap

The concept of the EE gap was introduced by Hirst and Brown (1990). They predicted that, based on past trends, only about half of the potential for EE in the U.S. was going to be utilized between 1990 and 2010. They hypothesize that structural and behavioral barriers to the commercialization and adoption of EE technologies are responsible for its sub-optimal uptake. Following this, Jaffe and Stavins (1994) pose that the gap can be

identified from various perspectives, e.g. the societal perspective, the firm’s perspective, or the technologist’s perspective, subsequently giving “sub-optimal” different meanings. More recently, Gerarden et al. (2017) provide a literature review on the gap and refer to a *private* EE gap. In this study, we consider this private EE gap that describes firms not improving EE as much as they are expected to from a profit-maximizing perspective.

Various studies attempt to establish or measure the size of the EE gap, using interviews, case studies, firm-level data and surveys. Studies of the German and Swedish iron and steel industry find that, respectively, 12 and 7% of energy could be conserved cost-effectively (Brunke & Blesl, 2014; Brunke et al., 2014). There is heterogeneity in these findings, as EE adoption differs e.g. with corporate performance (DeCanio, 1994), innovativeness (Gerstlberger et al., 2016), investment characteristics (Cooremans, 2012), or sector (Arvanitis et al., 2016; Sorrell et al., 2000).

Similarly, De Groote and Verboven (2019) show empirically that consumers implicitly use an irrationally high discount rate when making investment decisions for solar panels. High discount rates and large EE gaps are two sides of the same coin. In behavioral economics and psychology, models of discounting are used that better represent human behavior than expected utility theory. For example, prospect theory offers a popular framework for decision under uncertainty (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Furthermore, decisions involving inter-temporal choice and discounting have been modelled with present biases and hyperbolic discounting (Ainslie & Herrnstein, 1981). An in-depth discussion of such methods and literature is out of the scope of this paper.

Understanding the reasons for the existence of the EE gap or seemingly excessive discounting is crucial for addressing it with appropriate policies. In many studies, an explanation in terms of (unobserved) barriers is provided. Exhaustive taxonomies of barriers have been developed in the literature to capture the reasons for sub-optimal private adoption of EE technologies. Not only economic barriers are considered, but also behavioral and organizational barriers. Taxonomies are designed to be complete and to avoid overlap, to identify the barriers underlying the firm decision (see e.g. Cagno et al., 2013; De Groot et al., 2001; Sorrell et al., 2004; Sorrell et al., 2000). Similar to findings regarding the EE gap, studies find large heterogeneity when considering the most important barriers in the firm investment decision (De Groot et al., 2001; Schleich & Gruber, 2008; Sorrell et al., 2004).

One important barrier is uncertainty, which can play an important role in the decision-making process of the firm when the technology is still being developed (see for example Dixit et al., 1994). Van Soest and Bulte (2001) show that if new arrivals of EE technologies are uncertain, there is a positive option value to postponing EE investments, thereby partially explaining the EE gap. In addition, De Groot et al. (2003) model the firm’s investment decision under uncertainty when subsidies are available. Subsidies in this case speed up adoption in the short term, but they might have adverse effects on EE in the long term. This result is driven by early adoption of relatively poor-quality technologies at the expense of later adoption of higher-quality technologies. Related, Bigerna et al. (2019) show that the size of the subsidy influences the timing of the investment decision of the firm, and that conditional subsidies may be necessary to reach the investment targets. Uncertainty surrounding policies as subsidies influences the investment decision as well, as shown by Hagspiel et al. (2021) and Sendstad and Chronopoulos (2020) who study the effect of subsidy retraction on the firm investment decision. Noailly et al. (2022) additionally show empirically that environmental policy uncertainty is associated with reduced low-carbon investments.

Furthermore, recent studies look at drivers of EE adoption in addition to barriers. Drivers can reduce particular barriers and hence increase EE investments and reduce the gap. Trianni et al. (2017) provide an elaborate framework of barriers and drivers in this context. Various studies have used this framework. For example, Solnørdal and Foss (2018) review the empirical literature on EE drivers in the manufacturing sector and find that the firm’s organization and management is the most important driver, followed by economic incentives from EE investments. Market drivers, including market competition and networks, rank third. Policy and regulation rank fourth and last. Furthermore, Schützenhofer (2021) shows empirically that standardized energy management systems help large Austrian firms to increase the adoption of EE technologies.

The main driver of interest relates to various policy measures. Allcott and Greenstone (2012) and Allcott et al. (2014) use a simple framework to show what policies can do in closing the EE gap. They show how subsidies and taxes could close the social and private gap. However, not all EE investments that seem profitable ex-ante turn out to have a positive return, as shown empirically by Fowlie et al. (2018). By studying a U.S. weatherization program, they find that realized gains from improved EE did not outweigh actual costs, also not when including social benefits from reduced energy usage.

2.2 Dutch policy context

In an exploratory study, Cagno et al. (2015) describe that the Netherlands has a long history of industrial EE and environmental policies. This is mostly based on long-term voluntary agreements (VAs) with relevant clusters in sectors, complemented with financial instruments. By interviewing both firms as well as regulatory bodies, the authors investigate whether they both identify the same barriers to and drivers of EE investments. The firms indicate that identifying the right EE measures can be difficult, implying informational barriers. Subsidies are seen as a relevant driver of promoting more EE investments and reducing the gap. However, the authors identify a mismatch between the responses of the firms and the government agents, where the firms, all small or medium-sized enterprises active in metal manufacturing industry, do not think VAs address the main barriers. Furthermore, Abeelen et al. (2013) study these Dutch VAs in the period 2001-2011, showing that large differences exist in realized energy savings across firms. The savings over the time period for the firms that were part of the second-generation VA were between 1.5% and 2.5% per year. Similarly, Algemene Rekenkamer (2011) states that the policies in the period 1995-2008 did not result in targeted reductions of energy use in the industry sector. They conclude that the implemented policies were less strict than the policies that were ex-ante believed to be necessary for the targets. Further, various studies indicate that lack of knowledge or capabilities of the firms form a barrier to investments (e.g. Algemene Rekenkamer, 2011; SER, 2018). Meanwhile, as shown in Figure 1, to reach the set targets more investment in EE is required.

A recent report by the OECD (2021) investigates the set of Dutch policy instruments in place to reach the 2050 decarbonization targets, focusing on the industry sector. The Dutch industry sector is very concentrated, while it specializes in carbon-intensive, highly-traded products, such as chemical, steel, and computer products. In 2019, the Climate Agreement (in Dutch: Klimaatakkoord) was adopted by the Dutch government, which states that by 2050 Dutch industry should be carbon-neutral. The report shows with a scenario analysis that the 2050 goal requires an EE gain of 15% in the industry sector.

Regarding policy design, the OECD (2021) states that the Dutch government applies

a bottom-up approach, in which information from large firms and industry representatives is used to set up appropriate support instruments for adoption or investment. The government maintains a list of technologies eligible for support. While this policy design guarantees flexibility, it comes at the risk of excluding smaller and younger firms that are not represented in the consultations. Free-riding is another inherent risk of such government support. In line with the above disadvantages to smaller firms, Vollebergh (2020) finds that free-riding on the energy investment allowance (EIA) scheme disproportionately occurs at larger firms.

3 Survey

To shed light on the energy efficiency (EE) gap and the barriers that firms experience when making EE investments, a firm survey is deployed. The questionnaire consists of six parts. These parts contain questions about (1) the firm’s activities, performance and expectations, (2) energy usage, (3) investments, including barriers to investments, (4) labor market expectations, (5) relevant government policies and their evaluation, and (6) innovation. Information from different sections can be used to control for firm characteristics, control for fill-out behavior, or test for representativeness of the sample. In order to maximize the number of responses, both length and complexity of the questionnaire were restricted. The questionnaire had an expected fill out time of 10 minutes. Most questions are answered on a 5-point Likert scale, while some questions are open-ended.¹

The question on the perceived EE gap is an important question in the questionnaire. As the notion of a *gap* likely does not relate to the respondent, the questionnaire contained an alternative formulation, namely “*Imagine your firm would take all currently profitable energy saving investments. What percentage of the energy costs would then be saved?*” Note that this formulation stresses the *currently profitable* investments, necessary in order to align with the definition of the gap, following the private EE gap definition in Jaffe and Stavins (1994) and Gerarden et al. (2017). As respondents are likely less familiar with investment numbers and savings in terms of energy or emission units, the question asks about savings as a percentage of costs. Such a percentage can also be compared across firms.

We hypothesize that firms are taking profit-maximizing decisions, but that there are barriers leading to sub-optimal EE investment decisions. To explain the EE gap, we create a list of barriers and ask firms to score each on importance. This list of barriers is constructed based on the literature such as Cagno et al. (2013). The starting point is De Groot et al. (2001) who ran a similar firm survey in 1998. Their list of barriers to EE investments contained 15 barriers. The completeness of the list of barriers is important to ensure a reliable ranking of barriers from the responses. Furthermore, barriers should not overlap, nor give the respondent the impression that it implicitly contains more than stated by the respective barrier. Both issues will lead to biased responses, affecting the ranking of barriers. The barriers can also be grouped into larger categories. For these categories we based ourselves on the taxonomy of Cagno et al. (2013), who base themselves mostly on Sorrell et al. (2000) and Jaffe and Stavins (1994). The resulting list of 16 barriers

¹The questionnaire did not involve any experimentation or other forms of deceiving, as also confirmed by the ethics procedures within the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. Participants to the questionnaire landed on an information page stating the affiliations of the researchers, the financial support by ASI, and the promise that data will be anonymized. To participate, respondents had to tick a box indicating they have read and understood this information.

represents a complete and disjoint set of barriers to EE investments. An “other” category is included that could capture any barriers or frictions not included in the list. The list of barriers in the questionnaire is presented in [Table A.2](#) in [Appendix A](#).

We sent the questionnaire to a sample of firms located in the Netherlands. To reach these firms, we employed I&O Research to disperse the questionnaire amongst their firm panel.² We explicitly reached out to firms active in the industry, construction and utilities sectors. Further, several observations come from sending the questionnaire to firms through two network organizations, namely the Dutch Metal Branch (Metaalunie) and the Amsterdam Metropolitan Area (Metropoolregio Amsterdam). The number of observations in these additional samples is low, namely 4 and 1 respectively. All observations are merged into one dataset. Details of the respondents are presented in [Section 4](#). The survey is conducted in Dutch. Any presentations in this article are translations by the authors.³

4 Data

The questionnaire was sent out by I&O Research to 476 firms across three sectors, namely industry, construction and utilities. Of those invited, 186 opened the questionnaire, of which 99 respondents reached the end resulting in a response rate of 20.8%. Another ten observations stem from the questionnaires sent through the metal trade organization and the Amsterdam Metropolitan Area, of which three reached the end. As the majority of questions required answering before being able to proceed, the number of observations to later questions gradually declines. For example, 144 respondents made it to the end of the second section. The number of observations per section can be found in [Figure B.1](#). Respondents received a small incentive from I&O Research in the form of points that can be exchanged for a donation or a gift card. The firm panel of I&O Research aims at having an accurate representation of firms in the Netherlands, mostly across firm size and sector. With these goals in mind, firms are contacted to participate in the panel and thereby be available for questionnaires.

A set of summary statistics can be found in [Table 1](#). A list of underlying questions can be found in [Table A.1](#). The number of observations ranges from 99 to 196 for compulsory questions. The statistics show that 53% of the sample is active in the industry sector, 45% in the construction sector, and 2% in the utilities sector. Interestingly, the mean and median of the energy efficiency (EE) gap are larger than the energy saved in the past five years. This hints at firms still seeing plenty of profitable EE investment opportunities. Also, note that 85% of respondents to the questionnaire are in an executive position.⁴ As mentioned earlier, most data is collected through the I&O Research panel, namely 95%. Lastly, one might notice that some maximum values seem extreme. Later analysis will address some of these data concerns.

The questionnaire was sent out between October 7 and 17, 2022. The median fill out time was around 13 minutes for complete responses. While the energy crisis in Europe was

²I&O Research was approached by the authors to execute the data collection for the authors’ questionnaire. I&O Research did not take part in the analysis of the data.

³The full original questionnaire is available upon request with the authors.

⁴The function of the respondent is derived from the background information on the firms in the panel. This background information includes information on the respondent. Functions with executive power are owners, managers and directors. This information was collected at the time respondents signed up for the I&O Research panel.

Table 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF ALL RESPONSES.

	Obs	Mean	SD	Min	p25	Median	p75	Max
Energy efficiency gap (%)	126	22.92	27.42	0.0	5.0	15.0	25.0	100.0
Energy saved past 5 yrs (%)	135	17.30	22.43	0.0	0.0	10.0	20.0	100.0
Competition (1-7)	154	3.80	1.82	1.0	2.0	4.0	5.0	7.0
Competition abroad (%)	128	22.49	33.51	0.0	0.0	0.0	41.2	100.0
Construction sector (indicator)	164	0.45	0.50	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.0
Data source: I&O (indicator)	196	0.95	0.22	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Employees (imputed)	192	29.41	123.98	0.0	1.0	3.0	14.5	1500.0
Energy costs (%)	144	9.31	13.04	0.0	2.0	5.0	10.0	100.0
Energy efficiency gap > 0 (indicator)	126	0.79	0.41	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Energy intensity level (1-5)	116	2.94	0.87	1.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	5.0
Energy saved > 0 (indicator)	135	0.70	0.46	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Exec. function (indicator)	186	0.85	0.35	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Expectation revenue (1-5)	139	3.52	1.02	1.0	3.0	4.0	4.0	5.0
Importance EE in invest (1-5)	134	2.81	1.20	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0
Industry sector (indicator)	164	0.53	0.50	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Innovativeness (1-4)	99	2.56	1.04	1.0	2.0	3.0	3.0	4.0
Payback period (yrs)	56	5.64	3.11	0.0	5.0	5.0	7.0	15.0
Regulated (indicator)	105	0.36	0.48	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.0
Relative innovativeness (1-5)	119	3.29	0.88	1.0	3.0	3.0	4.0	5.0
Utilities sector (indicator)	164	0.02	0.15	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0

Energy saved in the past five years (EE gap) expresses the percentage of (potential) energy savings. Indicators take only two values, true or false. Energy costs are a percentage of total costs. Competition abroad refers to the share of competitors that is located outside the Netherlands. The number of employees is imputed from underlying categorical bins, e.g. 349.5 if the firm employs between 200 and 499 people. Data source refers to whether the data comes from the I&O Research panel or from the few Metal Branch and Amsterdam Metropolitan Area observations. Underlying details to these variables can be found in [Appendix A](#).




Figure 2: REPRESENTATIVENESS ACROSS FIRM SIZE AND SECTOR.

Note: The distribution for different subsets of the population across firm size and split by sector. The bars of each distribution add up to 100% of observations. “Respondents” are firms that opened the questionnaire, while “Completed” refers to firms reaching the end of the questionnaire. The utilities sector is omitted due to few observations. Only the data from the I&O data source are used, as for that target group non-response data is available. Population data is taken from Statistics Netherlands.

ongoing during the questionnaire dates, there is no reason to believe that specific events affected earlier or later responses within our sample. The gas price was high, but it did not break trend during the response dates, nor were trading volumes exceptionally high (see Figure C.1). Similarly, studying trends of government satisfaction there is no reason to believe specific events interfered with the responses in our sample (see Figure C.2). However, this context is important to keep in mind when analyzing the responses of the firms, which we come back to in Section 6.

By comparing the characteristics of the invited firms to the characteristics of the population of firms, we see whether the panel is representative of the underlying Dutch firm population. For the total population, public data from Statistics Netherlands (CBS) are used. A comparison of firm sizes, as measured by the number of employees, is presented in Figure 2. The figures present the distribution across firm size for multiple samples, split by the main two sectors. It shows there is no systemic response or completion bias in the samples, as none of the sample distributions skews more towards one of the extremes. Noticeable is that small firms are under-represented in the samples compared to the population of firms in the Netherlands. This is likely because these firms do not sign up for the research panel. This becomes even more likely when considering that many small firms might only exist for administrative reasons or to host one self-employed person. Also, there seems to be no systematic difference in distributions across sectors. Note that we omitted the utilities sector, as there are significantly fewer firms active in that sector compared to the other two.

Table 2 shows differences in firm characteristics between sectors. Where the first row presents the average values for the construction sector, the consecutive rows present the average deviation from the construction sector for the other two sectors. Industrial firms

are significantly larger, more innovative, and they have already saved more energy in the past five years. The other differences are not statistically significant, but they indicate that industrial firms are more energy intensive, experience more competition and have slightly smaller EE gaps. Firms in the utilities sector claim to be more innovative. Other differences are highly insignificant due to the few observations in the utilities sector. Table B.1 shows the differences across different industries in our sample.

Table 2: FIRM CHARACTERISTICS BY SECTOR.

	Energy costs (%)	Employees (imputed)	Innovativeness (1-4)	Competition (1-7)	Energy saved past 5 yrs (%)	EE gap (%)
Construction	8.29*** (1.60)	11.67 (15.73)	2.21*** (0.14)	3.69*** (0.22)	13.42*** (2.76)	23.29*** (3.63)
Industry (+/-)	+2.15 (2.20)	+39.88* (21.57)	+0.65*** (0.20)	+0.22 (0.30)	+7.75** (3.86)	-0.38 (4.97)
Utilities (+/-)	-4.63 (7.71)	-1.30 (69.04)	+1.79* (1.00)	-0.19 (0.94)	-0.92 (15.98)	-10.79 (19.86)
Num. obs.	144	160	99	154	135	126

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

The first row shows the construction sector’s average value and tests its deviation from zero. The consecutive rows show how the other sectors’ averages deviate from the construction sector. These numbers are generated with OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses.

5 Findings

This study poses three main questions, namely about the size of the energy efficiency (EE) gap, the barriers explaining the gap, and what drivers stimulate EE investments. Throughout we use the data to study the heterogeneity in these findings. Furthermore, several robustness tests are proposed to filter out biases from the data.

5.1 The energy efficiency gap

Before investigating the size of the gap, Figure 3 shows the firm responses to the question of how often EE was the goal of investments over the past five years. Results show that for roughly a third of the firms, EE was an important goal, and for a third of firms it was not. When comparing it to other investment goals, we find that improving EE is actually the most common goal of the past investments. Other sustainability goals, like increasing the share of renewable energy or developing renewable innovations, rank lower. The “other” category, which captures any other investment goals, also ranks lower than EE improvement. Thus, EE improvements clearly played a role in investment decisions over the past five years, and arguably an important role.

When asking about their expectations for the coming five years, firms are on average optimistic. More firms foresee growth rather than decline in revenue, investments and employees (Figure 4). EE investments out-rank expectations of total investments, indicating that the relative importance of EE investments compared to other investments is expected to further increase. About half the firms expect growth in their EE investments.

These figures show that firms are actually considering EE in their investment decisions. This gives us confidence that the firms in our sample are aware of their EE investments and can therefore provide useful information on their past and future EE investments.




Figure 3: IMPORTANCE OF DIFFERENT GOALS IN INVESTMENT DECISIONS OF THE PAST FIVE YEARS.

Note: The question states: “How often were the investments of the past five years aimed at the following goals?”. The number of observations is in square brackets. Questions are sorted by their average score.




Figure 4: EXPECTATIONS FOR THE COMING FIVE YEARS.

Note: The question states: “Can you indicate your expectations for your firm for the coming five years with respect to ...?”. The number of observations is in square brackets. Questions are sorted by their average score.

To quantify EE improvements, the questionnaire asks two related questions about EE investments. One question is backward-looking and asks what percentage of energy costs the firm saved in the past five years due to improvements in EE. The second question is forward-looking and asks what percentage of energy costs the firm could save if it undertakes all profitable EE investments. The latter measures the EE gap. Note that both are denominated the same, as percentage of energy costs. [Table 1](#) already showed that the median firm saved 10% in the past and still sees potential for another 15%, and that 70% of firms made EE improvements, while 79% identified a remaining EE gap.⁵ [Figure 5](#) presents a breakdown of these figures for subgroups in the sample. Firm size, measured by the number of employees, positively relates to both past savings and the EE gap. Furthermore, for each size category, the distribution of the EE gap is located to the right of past savings. A somewhat similar picture arises when considering innovativeness of the firms in the sample, although the relationships and comparisons are less pronounced. These figures show firm heterogeneity underlying these savings statistics.




Figure 5: EE GAP AND PAST SAVINGS.

Note: Each box is based on a subset of data according to the values (horizontal axis) of a variable (sub-figure title). Boxes depict the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles and whiskers depict the 10th and 90th percentiles.

We explicitly test whether the EE gap is larger than past savings. This is useful, because the two questions are comparable and therefore likely interpreted similarly by the respondent. Within each respondent we can therefore confidently state which of the two is larger, regardless of several respondent biases and measurement errors stemming from the nature of self-reported survey data.

To test the difference between the EE gap and the past savings, paired and unpaired T-tests, a sign test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test are used. The paired tests take the within-firm comparison into account, while unpaired tests discard the within-firm links across variables. Moreover, the parametric tests like the T -test are common, but they make assumptions on the underlying distribution. The sign test only considers the sign of the difference between two variables and then tests the likelihood of positives occurring according to the binomial distribution. In contrast, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is non-parametric and therefore does not assume a particular underlying distribution. This test takes into account both the sign and the magnitude of the difference. The magnitude

⁵The joint distribution of the two variables is presented in [Figure B.2](#).

of the difference is determined by ranking the absolute differences over all observations. The null hypothesis states that the variables have equal distributions. As magnitudes are reduced to ranks, some define the null hypothesis as testing for equal medians.

To correct for potential misreporting of the EE gap variable, the ratio of the two variables can be considered. The ratios can cancel out some potential biases. Specifically, the share of EE gap in the sum of the EE gap and past savings is defined. Or mathematically, this share s is defined as

$$s_i = \frac{G_i}{G_i + A_i} \quad (1)$$

with G the remaining EE gap and A energy already saved in the past five years for firm i . By construction this variable ranges from 0 to 1 (or 0-100%) and is missing for firms reporting 0 on both variables. It can be interpreted as the share of remaining energy savings in all the past and present opportunities. For example, a firm that saved 15% and still sees a 5% opportunity still has 25% of their total savings ahead of them. $s = 25\%$ is therefore that firm's *remaining* EE opportunity. On the other 75% the firm already acted.

Table 3 presents the outcomes of the discussed tests. All tests reject their null hypothesis, except the unpaired T -test that can only do that with 94% certainty. The EE gap share refers to the variable defined in Equation 1 and the test concludes that most EE investment opportunities are not yet taken. The variable has fewer observations as divisions by zero result in missing observations. Additionally the signed tests drop ties. The preferred non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test also concludes that the current EE gap is larger than the energy already saved in the past five years.

Table 3: COMPARING PAST ENERGY SAVINGS AND THE REMAINING ENERGY EFFICIENCY GAP.

Test	Paired	Null hypothesis	p-value	Obs
T-test	No	Equal means	0.060	122
T-test	Yes	Mean of difference is 0	0.049	122
T-test	Yes	EE gap share is 50%	0.011	106
Sign test	Yes	Share positives is 50%	0.044	99
Wilcoxon signed-rank test	Yes	Equal distributions	0.032	99

Each test compares the EE gap with energy saved in the past five years. The EE gap share refers to the variable specified in Equation 1. All p -values refer to a two-sided test. The Sign test only takes into account the sign of $gap - saved$, while the Wilcoxon signed-rank test also takes into account the magnitude of that difference by considering the ranks of their absolute differences. Both these non-parametric tests ignore ties, i.e. observations where the difference is zero.

As already shown by Figure 5, the EE gap differs substantially between (groups of) firms. To formalize the correlations between the EE gap and firm characteristics, we use regression analysis to determine the correlations between the EE gap and firm characteristics. As there is no exogenous variation in the firm characteristics, no causality will be established. Columns 1-4 of Table 4 present the main results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. Column 1 presents results for all observations, while columns 2-4 present results for samples that exclude respondents with small and large values for the EE gap. Excluding such observations might exclude misreported data points as well as improve the fit of OLS estimation. The results show that firm size positively correlates

with the EE gap, as already suggested by [Figure 5a](#). This relationship is particularly strong and precise when excluding respondents with a large EE gap. Firms that report to be innovative also report larger EE gaps. Although not significant, the industry sector consistently reports lower EE gaps.

Table 4: EXPLAINING THE ENERGY EFFICIENCY GAP.

	Filtered EE gap (%)				EE gap>0	EE gap share (%)
	All	0-50%	1-50%	1-25%	All	All
Competition (1-7)	1.008 (1.741)	0.913 (0.790)	0.698 (0.777)	-0.076 (0.582)	-0.030 (0.201)	-1.696 (2.129)
Energy costs (%)	0.235 (0.254)	0.024 (0.138)	-0.105 (0.136)	-0.130 (0.098)	0.089 (0.059)	0.023 (0.301)
Energy saved past 5 yrs (%)	0.060 (0.118)	0.055 (0.054)	0.073 (0.061)	-0.000 (0.048)	-0.002 (0.012)	
Industry sector (indicator)	-5.862 (5.916)	-3.173 (2.693)	-4.026 (2.644)	-2.688 (2.023)	0.235 (0.680)	-16.094** (7.092)
Innovativeness (1-4)	10.549*** (2.775)	5.075*** (1.254)	4.994*** (1.310)	2.827*** (1.021)	0.474 (0.298)	6.125* (3.473)
log(Employees) (avg imputed)	0.789 (1.821)	1.730** (0.814)	1.289 (0.798)	1.944*** (0.597)	0.365 (0.248)	0.845 (2.177)
Constant	-7.043 (9.049)	-3.938 (4.181)	1.738 (4.472)	6.297* (3.274)	-0.497 (0.870)	57.584*** (11.608)
R ²	0.170	0.279	0.284	0.322	—	0.079
Num. obs.	98	83	68	55	98	89

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Ordinary least squares regressions for columns 1-4 and 6. Logit regression for column 5. The dependent variable for the first four columns is the EE gap. The mentioned filters apply to the EE gap itself, e.g. 1-50% refers to filtering for $1\% \leq \text{EE gap} \leq 50\%$, thereby excluding zeros and large values for the EE gap. Column 5 explains the extensive margin by only considering whether the EE gap is positive or not. In column 6 the dependent variable is the share s from [Equation 1](#), transformed to percentages.

Furthermore, column 6 reports OLS findings for the EE gap share variable ([Equation 1](#)). It confirms that industrial firms see fewer remaining opportunities and to some extent that innovative firms see more remaining opportunities. Firm size loses its statistical significance in this specification and its coefficient estimate is clearly smaller in magnitude. Lastly, column 5 reports a logit regression on the extensive margin, i.e. whether a firm sees opportunity or not, disregarding the size of that opportunity. This specification yields no statistically significant results. Note that the far majority of firms reports a positive EE gap.

5.2 Barriers to energy efficiency investments

To determine what reasons firms have to underinvest in profitable EE opportunities, we ask firms to score each barrier in our list of 16 barriers. If needed, respondents can also indicate other barriers, by scoring an “other, namely ...” barrier. The full list of barriers and the question format can be found in [Table A.2](#).

The averages of the responses to the barrier questions are presented in [Figure 6](#). The figure excludes do-not-knows, which does not significantly impact the number of




Figure 6: BARRIERS TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY INVESTMENTS.

Note: The average score of each barrier is presented, excluding do-not-knows. Barriers are sorted in descending order. Scores are assigned linearly, e.g. “very unimportant” is assigned 1 and “very important” is assigned 5. The average scores from the 1998 questionnaire by De Groot et al. (2001) are included when available. The 1998 results are from a different sample. Colors represent the broader categories that each barrier belongs to. Numbers in square brackets report number of observations underlying the 1998 and 2022 averages respectively.

observations.⁶ Averages from the questionnaire by De Groot et al. (2001) are included when available. As the underlying samples, context and number of observations differ, comparisons over time should be interpreted carefully. For a more granular representation of responses to the 2022 questionnaire one can find an overview in Figure D.1.

The most prominent barrier to EE investments is policy uncertainty, followed by equipment that is not yet to be replaced, energy price uncertainty, and the firm already having invested in EE. Interestingly, uncertainty generally ranks high and policy uncertainty ranks higher than energy price uncertainty, even though 2022 was marked by extremely high and volatile energy prices. Compared to the results from 1998, policy uncertainty also stands out. The ranking of barriers is roughly completed by technological reasons, low priority, organizational frictions, and competence. Financial barriers do not play a prominent role, as external financing ranks second lowest and internal budget constraints rank in the middle. Also, the “other” category ranks low and is only selected by few firms, arguably indicating that our taxonomy is rather exhaustive.

We use regression analysis to disentangle some of the underlying heterogeneity to the average barrier scores. Since the dependent variable, the barrier importance score, is categorical, we use multinomial ordered logit regressions. Such a model estimates one coefficient per independent variable and $k - 1$ category cutoffs for the k categorical values of the dependent variable. The signs and significance of the coefficient estimates can readily be interpreted, however the size of the coefficient estimate has a less direct interpretation. The results of the main regression specification are presented in Table 5

⁶The number of do-not-knows barely differs across barriers, causing little reason for concern over selection. The “other” category does see a large drop in observations as the question is optional.

for the four highest ranking barriers and the two financing barriers (for all other barriers, see Table D.2). These six barriers can be grouped into uncertainty, technology lock-in, and financing constraints. Technology lock-in refers to not having the ability to update equipment or machinery due to the presence and state of current assets.

Table 5: EXPLAINING BARRIERS TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY.

	PolUnc	EnPric	NoRepl	Already	ExFin	IntFin
Energy costs (%)	0.115*** (0.030)	0.010 (0.013)	-0.031** (0.013)	-0.040*** (0.015)	0.014 (0.015)	0.030* (0.017)
Energy saved past 5 yrs (%)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.022** (0.009)	0.019** (0.009)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.020** (0.010)
Expectation revenue (1-5)	-0.167 (0.199)	-0.595*** (0.198)	-0.522*** (0.189)	-0.233 (0.196)	0.068 (0.186)	0.163 (0.180)
Industry sector (indicator)	-0.220 (0.408)	0.288 (0.383)	-0.254 (0.386)	0.058 (0.393)	0.846** (0.390)	0.591 (0.383)
Importance EE in invest (1-5)	0.695*** (0.216)	0.748*** (0.206)	0.370* (0.195)	0.589*** (0.204)	0.013 (0.188)	0.213 (0.190)
log(Employees) (avg imputed)	-0.148 (0.112)	-0.038 (0.114)	0.105 (0.117)	-0.034 (0.115)	-0.083 (0.109)	0.057 (0.110)
AIC	279.794	307.214	313.059	279.648	335.289	322.300
Num. obs.	103	105	104	103	102	104

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Multinomial ordered logit regressions with the four highest ranking barriers and the two financing barriers as dependent variables. The barriers are policy uncertainty (PolUnc), energy price uncertainty (EnPric), equipment not ready for replacement (NoRepl), already invested in EE equipment (Already), external financing (ExFin) and internal financing (IntFin). The estimated constants representing the cutoffs between the categories are not presented. Do-not-knows are excluded.

The results show that energy-intensive firms, as measured by the share of energy costs in total costs, indicate policy uncertainty and internal financing more often as an important barrier compared to other firms, while also indicating they are more likely in need of replacing current equipment and are less likely to have already invested in EE. This could indicate that energy-intensive firms suffer from being locked in older, less efficient equipment (see Table D.7 for further lock-in results). Past energy savings negatively correlates with all barriers, except the indication that the firm already invested in EE equipment. This could indicate that firms with lower barriers have made investments or that firms that made investments are more optimistic about perceived barriers after their investment experience. Further, industrial firms struggle more with finding external financing opportunities. Firms reporting EE to be important in the investment decision rank uncertainty as being more important and technology lock-ins as less important. Lastly, firm size does not significantly correlate with any of these six barriers.

5.3 Drivers of energy efficiency investments

Following the results on the barriers to EE investments, it is relevant to look into the *drivers* of these investments, following work of Solnørdal and Foss (2018) and Trianni et al. (2017). Studying the relevant drivers in the investment decision can assist in understanding how to alleviate barriers and increase adoption of EE.

Studying the past EE investment decision can be informative of which firm characteristics are correlated with larger past energy savings. Table 2 shows that there are sectoral

differences in the uptake of energy savings measures in the past. Firms that innovate also seem to have adopted more EE measures already in the past, as shown in Figure 5b.

In Table 6 we study these relationships with several specifications for the intensive and the extensive margins. Columns 1 to 4 study the intensive margin for several sets of observations, filtering out observations based on their past energy savings. Most persistent is the positive relationship between innovativeness and the energy savings, where more innovative firms have already saved more energy. The relationship is however only significant at the 90% level for two specifications. This finding is in line with Gerstlberger et al. (2016), who find that innovating firms are more likely to adopt EE measures. When studying the extensive margin in column 5 we fit a logit model. Of the 98 observations 69 (70%) realized positive energy savings over the past five years. We find that industrial firms are more likely to have engaged in energy savings. When comparing column 2 to column 3, one sees how filtering out the zeros reverses the relationship on the intensive margin. Although the coefficients on the intensive margin are statistically insignificant, a story arises in which industrial firms are more likely to have made energy-saving investments, but when making these investments they achieved smaller percentage savings compared to firms in the other sectors. A somewhat similar pattern emerges for the relationship between energy savings and firm size, but none of the coefficients are statistically significant. Lastly, competition seems to be a driver of energy savings, but these results are all statistically insignificant.

Table 6: EXPLAINING PAST ENERGY SAVINGS.

	Filtered energy saved (%)				Energy saved > 0
	All	0-50%	1-50%	1-25%	All
Competition (1-7)	-0.680 (1.510)	0.940 (0.954)	0.187 (1.244)	0.290 (0.660)	0.239 (0.162)
Industry sector (indicator)	7.361 (5.097)	2.638 (3.270)	-3.269 (4.075)	-2.557 (2.079)	1.410*** (0.536)
Innovativeness (1-4)	1.865 (2.427)	2.582* (1.536)	3.736* (2.069)	0.962 (1.138)	0.151 (0.248)
log(Employees) (avg imputed)	0.420 (1.576)	0.718 (0.989)	0.070 (1.140)	-0.423 (0.603)	0.278 (0.182)
Constant	11.487 (7.811)	-0.092 (4.969)	9.875 (8.248)	10.996** (4.149)	-1.398* (0.803)
R ²	0.041	0.096	0.057	0.059	—
Num. obs.	98	90	61	47	98

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Ordinary least squares regressions for columns 1-4. Logit regression for column 5. The dependent variable is the energy saved over the past five years. The mentioned filters apply to the dependent variable, e.g. 1-50% refers to filtering for $1\% \leq \text{past savings} \leq 50\%$, thereby excluding zeros and large values for the past energy savings. Column 5 explains the extensive margin by only considering whether the savings were positive or not.

To reduce the barriers to investing, contacts in a firm's network can be useful. When asked which contacts are important for acquiring *knowledge* about EE investments, the respondents rank trade associations highest (see Figure 7). These are organizations that represent the sector or industry firms are in. Ranked second are competitors. Interestingly, governments rank in the middle when it comes to being a source of knowledge on EE




Figure 7: IMPORTANT CONTACTS FOR ACQUIRING EE INVESTMENT KNOWLEDGE.

Note: The question states: “How important are the following contacts for acquiring knowledge about (potential) energy savings investments?” The numbers in square brackets refer to the number of observations. Questions are ranked by their average score. Straight-lining observations are excluded.

investments. Commercial parties through courses and such, and financiers do not seem to successfully disperse information about EE investments to firms.

Further breaking down these information dispersal channels by firm type results in Table 7. For several firm groups it describes the share of firms that ranked each contact as their most important contact. This means that each column adds to 100%. Whereas this type of measurement disregards information on average scores, it does provide information on the relative importance of contacts. Each firm is represented once and the information conveys which contact is most important to that firm. For example, whereas on average financiers received the lowest score, 11.6% of firms indicate financiers are their most important contact for information on EE investments, more than provincial governments. The breakdown in groups shows that especially industrial firms acquire EE knowledge through financiers. For industrial firms financiers are even the most important contact for EE knowledge. Construction firms acquire most knowledge from their competitors. Large firms indicate trade associations and the national government as their most important contacts for information about EE investments. For energy-intensive firms, financiers are most important, but trade associations and competitors make a close second.


While policies can be seen as an important driver or mechanism to alleviate barriers to investment, we find that policy uncertainty is indicated to be the main barrier. To further investigate how policy can act as a driver, the questionnaire asks firms to what extent the policies they are subject to influenced the barriers they may experience. Figure 8 presents the firms’ evaluations of the policies they are subject to. As not all firms indicated to be subjected to energy or environmental policies, the number of observations is lower at 38. The evaluation is overwhelmingly negative, with on average 61% of respondents disagreeing to statements and 13% agreeing (and 26% feeling neutral). Much in line with the main barriers to EE investments, the policies did not successfully take away uncertainty about policies, energy prices or quality of EE technology. What policies succeed most in doing is prioritizing EE and aiding the implementation procedure. Also, both internal and external financing barriers are rarely eased by existing policies, as only three firms indicated to agree with each statement.

In the open text box in the questionnaire, various firms have expressed their discontent

Table 7: FIRM’S MOST IMPORTANT CONTACTS FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY INVESTMENTS.

	All	Industry	Construction	Energy costs > 5%	Employees > 9
Trade association(s)	19.7	16.6	23.8	17.0	23.2
Competitors	19.4	12.8	28.2	17.0	11.6
Government - national	16.1	18.4	13.0	16.1	19.3
Government - municipality	13.1	11.2	15.7	14.9	10.7
Commercial parties	12.2	12.5	11.8	8.9	16.9
Financiers and investors	11.6	19.8	0.9	18.5	9.0
Government - province	7.8	8.7	6.7	7.5	9.2
Num. obs.	88	50	38	40	38

The numbers represent the percentage of firms that indicate the particular contact as most important to them. Ties are broken by splitting the score equally. For example, a respondent indicates financiers and competitors are “rather important”, and all other contacts are scored “neutral”, then financiers and competitors each receive half a firm’s score. Columns refer to subsets of firms, according to characteristics. Number of firms is indicated in the bottom row. Percentages add up to 100 per column. Firms that straightline or that did not answer each contact question are excluded.

**Figure 8: POLICY EVALUATION.**

Note: The question states: “The government policy induced ...”. As only a subset of respondents indicated to be regulated by a set of common regulations, the number of observations is lower (as presented in square brackets). The authors compiled the list of regulations.

with the current policies in place: “*The government is not helping us at all*”, or “*policy makers do not know what we are being confronted with*”. While these responses should be treated with caution as these may not be representative for the whole sample or population, these results indicate a severe discontent with past and future policies when it comes to EE regulations.

5.4 Robustness

To challenge our results, various robustness checks are performed. First, we perform additional analyses for the EE gap results, and second for the barriers.

While the analysis in [Table 4](#) already filtered out several observations to test robustness of the relationship between the EE gap and firm characteristics, some further checks can be performed. First, we can split the sample by sector, which is done in columns 1 and 2 of [Table 8](#). Like in the earlier specifications, we find that innovativeness strongly correlates with a larger EE gap. This seems to be stronger for industrial firms. The relationship between the EE gap and past energy savings also differs between sectors, where the relationship is positive for industrial firms.

In columns 3 and 4 some firms are filtered out based on firm complexity. Here a firm is considered complex when it has more than one employee and when more than one type of fuel is used by the firm. The latter is derived from a question asking firms to indicate which fuels they use from a list of common fuel types. Additionally, in column 3 the EE gap is filtered for the values 1 to 50%. Column 4 considers the share as defined in [Equation 1](#). Again the positive relationship between the EE gap and innovativeness prevails.

Column 5 considers alternative variables to measure innovativeness and energy intensity. Instead of using the innovativeness variable that is based on how often firms introduce new innovations, it uses the 5-point relative innovativeness score (see [Table D.8](#)). This variable represents how firms see themselves compared to their main competitors, with scores above 3 indicating a firm evaluates itself as more innovative than their competitors. Energy intensity is similarly measured in column 5, namely as a 5-point scale of energy intensity compared to their main competitors. The alternative innovation measure is only significant at the 90% level, but the sign is the same and the magnitude is similar to the original innovativeness measure. The alternative energy intensity measure is statistically insignificant, like the original measure in the other specifications.

A further quality check on the self-reported data on the EE gap and past energy saved can be performed by comparing the past energy savings to other data sources and the literature. Using data from Statistics Netherlands, [Figure 9](#) plots EE trends of the two main sectors in the survey sample. The labels in the figure present changes over a five year period, in order to align with the energy saved measure in the questionnaire. Reassuringly, our average energy savings of 17% (see [Table 1](#)) is not far off the 18 and 24% energy intensity reductions of the industry and construction sector, respectively. Looking at the literature, Abeelen et al. (2013) finds that over the period 2001-2011 industrial firms in the Netherlands that fall under voluntary agreements on energy savings reduced their energy intensity by 1.9% per year on average, but the authors noticed large differences across firms. Over a 5-year period these savings would be 9.1%, in line with the 2001-2011 savings reported in [Figure 9](#) (5-year average savings of 9.3% in the industry sector). Note that the figure suggests that the savings in more recent years are larger, in line with our survey findings.

Table 8: EXPLAINING THE EE GAP (ROBUSTNESS).

	Sector		Complex		Other
	Industry	Construction	1-50%	Share	1-50%
Competition (1-7)	0.344 (2.532)	−0.008 (2.509)	0.192 (0.910)	0.003 (0.025)	0.118 (1.001)
Energy costs (%)	0.094 (0.349)	0.042 (0.404)	−0.199 (0.174)	0.006 (0.005)	
Energy intensity level (1-5)					−0.052 (1.941)
Energy saved past 5 yrs (%)	−0.138 (0.157)	0.365* (0.213)	0.036 (0.071)		0.127 (0.079)
Industry sector (indicator)			−1.824 (3.101)	−0.177** (0.084)	−4.683 (3.385)
Innovativeness (1-4)	8.888** (4.182)	11.927*** (4.026)	3.875** (1.489)	0.112** (0.042)	
Relative innovativeness (1-5)					3.528* (1.990)
log(Employees) (avg imputed)	0.773 (2.430)	1.039 (2.798)	1.795* (1.049)	0.043 (0.028)	0.347 (0.948)
Constant	0.424 (16.736)	−8.754 (11.317)	4.948 (6.610)	0.186 (0.168)	6.690 (8.778)
R ²	0.130	0.305	0.246	0.210	0.103
Num. obs.	50	47	40	49	63

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Ordinary least squares regressions. Columns 1 and 2 filter for the respective sector. Columns 3 and 4 only consider firms with a certain complexity, where a firm is considered complex if it has more than one employee and it uses multiple types of fuels. Column 5 considers alternative independent variables for innovativeness and energy usage. The column headers contain information about the dependent variables, namely 1-50% indicates having filtered for EE gaps between 1 and 50%, and “share” refers to its definition in [Equation 1](#).




Figure 9: ENERGY INTENSITY AND 5-YEAR CHANGES PER SECTOR.

Note: Each point represents the sector’s total final energy usage in petajoules (PJ) per billion Euros of value added (in base prices in 2015 Euros) in the Netherlands. Each sector has its own vertical axis. The labels describe five year changes in the plotted energy intensity for the most recent year 2021 and each five years before that. Data source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS).

Furthermore, as each respondent might have a different understanding of the answering scale, the results on the importance of the barriers are prone to respondent bias. Some respondents answer questions more optimistic or pessimistic by default. And some respondents vary more in their answers. As the results in Table 5 are utilizing variation across respondents, such response biases might influence the coefficient estimates. One solution is to normalize the dependent variable within each respondent, using the moments from a set of answers. The literature suggests normalization methods, but these use means and standard deviations (Paczkowski, 2022, p. 62-64; Fischer, 2004). Such standardization disregards the categorical nature of the dependent variable and assumes symmetry around the mean. Instead, we propose to normalize the categorical variable by maintaining its categorical nature. As the categorical variable can be ordered, we can take the median and determine whether each answer option is below, equal to or above that median.⁷

To be precise, we normalize respondent i 's answer y to question q according to

$$\bar{y}_{iq\mathcal{Q}} = \begin{cases} \text{Below median} & \text{if } y_{iq} < \text{med}(y_{i\mathcal{Q}}) \\ \text{Median} & \text{if } y_{iq} = \text{med}(y_{i\mathcal{Q}}) \\ \text{Above median} & \text{if } y_{iq} > \text{med}(y_{i\mathcal{Q}}) \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

where \mathcal{Q} is the set of questions considered to determine the within-respondent median (med). For our application we take \mathcal{Q} to be all EE investment barrier questions, except for the optional "other" barrier. This normalization cancels out any difference in center. It does allow for some differences in variation, as some respondents scored more barriers with their median score. The normalized variable \bar{y} can be interpreted as the relative importance of barrier q for each firm. Figure D.2 presents the ranking of these normalized barriers. Ranks do change to some extent, but not dramatically.

Table 9 provides the results of multinomial ordered logit regressions with normalized dependent variables. The coefficient estimates should be interpreted as making the barrier more or less important than other barriers. We note that energy intensity retains the same signs and significance as in the previous exercise, except for the lock-in due to already having invested in EE. This means that energy-intensive firms experience policy uncertainty and internal financing as relatively important barriers, while also indicating that replacement of old equipment is relatively important. Industrial firms experience external financing as an important barrier, like in the non-normalized specification. Note that the variables that are reported on a Likert scale mostly lose their significance. This is likely because each respondent answers similarly to different categorical questions causing correlations between variables of the same question type. This correlation is lost as the dependent variable is transformed. Revenue expectations play no statistically significant role anymore, while firms that indicate EE is important in the investment decision rank external financing relatively lower as a barrier to EE investment. The positive significant relationship between past energy savings and firms having already invested in EE remains. Size plays again no role in this specification for these six barriers.

In order to further assess the quality of the responses, we can leverage the fill out behavior of the respondents. Especially the EE investment barriers question, consisting of 17 sub-questions, might be prone to behavioral biases like inattention. Inattentive or dishonest answers might be identified by straightlining. Straightlining is when respondents

⁷When the median returns a value in between two categories, the lowest category is chosen as the median.

Table 9: EXPLAINING NORMALIZED BARRIERS TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY.

	PolUnc	EnPric	NoRepl	Already	ExFin	IntFin
Energy costs (%)	0.074*** (0.027)	0.015 (0.015)	-0.037** (0.015)	-0.017 (0.014)	0.019 (0.013)	0.027* (0.014)
Energy saved past 5 yrs (%)	0.003 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.010)	-0.009 (0.010)	0.025** (0.011)	0.010 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.010)
Expectation revenue (1-5)	0.094 (0.206)	-0.294 (0.206)	-0.289 (0.200)	0.076 (0.202)	0.100 (0.196)	0.276 (0.196)
Industry sector (indicator)	-0.463 (0.443)	-0.205 (0.410)	-0.447 (0.426)	-0.271 (0.415)	0.851** (0.412)	0.565 (0.412)
Importance EE in invest (1-5)	0.284 (0.216)	0.201 (0.204)	-0.058 (0.199)	0.082 (0.201)	-0.483** (0.201)	-0.184 (0.197)
log(Employees) (avg imputed)	-0.044 (0.124)	0.019 (0.122)	0.162 (0.121)	0.100 (0.121)	-0.098 (0.116)	0.058 (0.117)
AIC	188.592	209.151	206.909	214.824	224.567	216.451
Num. obs.	103	105	104	103	102	104

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Multinomial ordered logit regressions with the three highest ranking barriers and the two financing barriers as dependent variables. The barriers are policy uncertainty, energy price uncertainty, equipment not ready for replacement, external financing and internal financing. The dependent variables are normalized into three within-respondent categories, namely below median, median and above median. The estimated constants between the categories are not presented.

tick the same answer box for each consecutive row in a matrix. [Table D.5](#) removes all responses in which the respondent answered the same to all EE investment barrier questions. This filter removes nine observations. The findings largely hold up, with only marginal changes in the coefficient sizes, and all but one coefficient that was significant at the 95% level losing significance, but still being significant at the 90% level. Additionally, responses with a short fill out time can be removed. Short fill out times might indicate a poor quality response. Of the 106 firms filling out the last barrier question, the median fill out time is 13 minutes. Setting a conservative minimum of 10 minutes, gives [Table 10](#). This discards another 23 responses, pushing the limits of the statistical power of the estimates. Still none of the signs flip. Statistical significance does change slightly for some coefficient estimates. Most notably the relationship between energy intensity and lock-in barriers is no longer significant. But the relationship between energy intensity and internal financing barriers becomes statistically significant.

6 Discussion

Our findings shed light on the size of the energy efficiency (EE) gap and the main barriers and drivers of EE investments. The main benefits of collecting data through a questionnaire are that the set of questions, and thus variables, is fully within the control of the researcher. This allows for a direct estimate of the EE gap and a ranking of the barriers in our taxonomy, as well as a heterogeneity analysis based on firm characteristics. The main drawback of using a questionnaire is that the data are self-reported and thereby prone to misreporting. We have addressed some of these concerns by making within-firm comparisons between stated values (as for the EE gap versus past savings in [Table 3](#) and in [Equation 1](#)), normalizing responses to eliminate biases from firm-level fill out behavior

Table 10: EXPLAINING BARRIERS TO EE (NO INATTENTION).

	PolUnc	EnPric	NoRepl	Already	ExFin	IntFin
Energy costs (%)	0.095*** (0.030)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.020 (0.017)	-0.032 (0.020)	0.035* (0.018)	0.050** (0.019)
Energy saved past 5 yrs (%)	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.040*** (0.011)	-0.027*** (0.010)	0.019* (0.010)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.023** (0.010)
Expectation revenue (1-5)	-0.039 (0.235)	-0.615*** (0.238)	-0.540** (0.223)	-0.164 (0.229)	0.153 (0.221)	0.217 (0.215)
Industry sector (indicator)	-0.741 (0.496)	-0.003 (0.462)	-0.702 (0.469)	-0.131 (0.463)	0.870* (0.463)	0.494 (0.461)
Importance EE in invest (1-5)	0.827*** (0.269)	1.131*** (0.276)	0.571** (0.243)	0.715*** (0.259)	0.077 (0.236)	0.054 (0.243)
log(Employees) (avg imputed)	-0.222* (0.134)	-0.060 (0.133)	0.131 (0.138)	-0.048 (0.133)	-0.035 (0.126)	0.040 (0.127)
AIC	197.961	213.711	219.486	202.773	235.849	226.212
Num. obs.	72	73	72	72	71	72

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Multinomial ordered logit regressions with the three highest ranking barriers and the two financing barriers as dependent variables. The barriers are policy uncertainty (PolUnc), energy price uncertainty (EnPric), equipment not ready for replacement (NoRepl), external financing (ExFin) and internal financing (IntFin). The estimated constants between the categories are not presented. Do-not-knows are excluded, as well as responses that are identified as straightliners, and responses that fill out the entire questionnaire in less than 10 minutes.

(using Equation 2 as for the barrier analysis in Table 9), removing responses that might suffer from inattention (Table 10), and by comparing the stated values to the literature and external data sources (as for past energy savings in Figure 9).

Of all 16 barriers in our taxonomy, policy uncertainty seems to play an especially large role in the EE investment decision. It ranks as the main barrier and its average score is significantly higher than that of the second highest barrier (see Table D.6). The differences between the policy uncertainty average score and the other barriers average scores ranges from 0.39 to 0.99, which is quite sizable given the 1-5 scale. The prominence of policy uncertainty is confirmed by the poor evaluation of existing policies (Figure 8). The consistency of such findings strengthens the robustness of this finding.

Meanwhile, one should be careful interpreting these findings as firms could be looking for a scapegoat and the government could be targeted. Studying whether recent events might have affected the negative evaluation of government policies, results in somewhat inconclusive evidence. Figure C.2 shows no sign of particular disapproval of the government around the survey period. The longer-term trend in citizen's trust in the government in Figure C.3 might show some recent negative tendency as of 2017, although this trend is also clearly affected by the Covid-19 pandemic.

This scapegoat explanation is also not supported by the comparison with the findings from 1998 of De Groot et al. (2001) in which policy uncertainty played no significant role amongst firms in the Netherlands. In the context of the Swedish iron and steel industry in 2012, Brunke et al. (2014) find that the combined category "uncertainty about future energy prices and fiscal policies" ranks sixth in a list of 15 barriers. Their highest ranking barrier relates to technological uncertainty. The prominence of policy uncertainty therefore clearly stands out compared to the related literature. The general prominence of uncertainty in our findings does not stand out compared to the literature. Our findings

confirm once more that uncertainty hampers investments. Thus, policy makers interested in closing the EE gap should take uncertainty into account when devising environmental and energy policies.

While we do not specifically test what parts of Dutch policy making is causing the harmful policy uncertainty, we can put it in light of the policy background discussed in [Section 2.2](#). EE policies in the Netherlands have mostly comprised of bottom-up (voluntary) agreements with sectors. While subsidies are available for a list of EE technologies, and this list gets updated regularly, such policies seemed to have been unable to avoid policy uncertainty. In the policy background we discussed that one of the drawback of the Dutch policy approach was that mostly larger firms were represented in the process of the bottom-up agreements. Our findings in [Table 7](#) are in line with this hypothesis, as large firms acquire knowledge on EE investments more often through their contacts with trade associations and the national government compared to smaller firms.

The regressions have also uncovered a particularly strong relationship between the EE gap and innovativeness. This positive relationship survives several robustness tests ([Table 8](#)). On the one hand one might think that innovative firms experience small EE gaps as they might be more likely to have closed the gap already. On the other hand one might think that innovative firms see more potential savings, as they are more aware of technological possibilities. The correlation exercises in this study cannot provide the exact channels that make innovation and the EE gap positively correlate, but they hint at the latter explanation.

When looking at drivers and potential levers for the policy maker to decrease the barriers that firms experience, our findings suggest that larger, and more innovative firms are more likely to have saved energy in the past. When studying other parties in a firm's network, trade association(s) play an important role in the EE knowledge dispersion. Especially larger firms receive EE investment information through their trade association(s), a finding in line with the Dutch policy approach of involving sector representatives and large firms in policy discussions. However, this could suggest that the trade associations are mostly successful in reaching larger firms. Construction firms exchange more EE knowledge with their competitors, suggesting firm-to-firm knowledge spillovers in this sector. Whether these networks are effective in promoting EE investments goes untested here, however, knowledge flows from networks will likely lead to better EE investment decisions as they lower informational barriers.

7 Conclusion

This study seeks answers to questions about the energy efficiency (EE) gap. The EE gap literature states that agents might not make some profitable EE investments, leading to below-optimal EE investment levels and a suboptimal EE level. The distance between observed behavior and expected optimal behavior creates a paradoxical gap. Why would profit-maximizing agents not make profitable investments? These unused investment opportunities also make it more difficult to achieve EE and climate targets. In this study we seek to find out whether an EE gap exists at firms, and if so, what is explaining the existence of this gap. For the latter question we hypothesize there might be relevant barriers to EE investments. We therefore develop a taxonomy of potential barriers and test which most prominently explain the EE gap. We further study drivers that can play a role in mitigating EE barriers.

To answer these questions, we deploy a questionnaire among firms in the Netherlands

and ask them about their estimate of the energy savings they could achieve by pursuing currently *profitable* investment opportunities, and to score each of the barriers in our taxonomy for importance in hindering such investments. We find that the median firm identifies an EE gap of 15% and that uncertainty about future policies is the main reason not to make these investments. Other important barriers are lock-ins in current equipment, uncertainty over energy costs, and already-made EE investments, followed by technological reasons, low priority of EE, organizational frictions, financial constraints, and competence.

We rigorously test our estimate of the EE gap by comparing it to a similar question on energy already saved in the past five years. With three different paired tests, both parametric and non-parametric, we show that with more than 95% confidence we can conclude that the remaining EE gap is larger than the energy savings over the past five years. We further compare these past energy savings, which are 10% at the median firm, with aggregate sector-level data on energy intensity improvements and conclude they are within a plausible range, indicating respondents likely were able to report these statistics accurately. Studying the heterogeneity in these findings shows that innovative firms see more potential for further energy savings. Also larger firms have larger EE gaps, although this relationship is not statistically significant for all regression specifications.

Heterogeneity underlying experienced EE investment barriers is studied with ordered logit regressions. Especially energy-intensive firms are hindered by policy uncertainty and internal financing constraints. These relationships, while not causal, are upheld in several robustness exercises that address respondent-level fill out behavior and inattention.

Amongst the studied drivers of EE investments, government policies seem to have been unsuccessful in addressing barriers to EE investments, as regulated respondents evaluate past policies poorly. A firm's network is found to be an important channel for obtaining EE investment knowledge. The most important parties for such knowledge transfers differ significantly between types of firms. Whereas industrial and energy-intensive firms rank financiers highest, construction firms rank their competitors highest. Large firms rank trade associations highest. Future research could focus on the role of the networks of firms and establishing causal evidence of their effect on EE investments.

Together these findings put forward evidence for the existence of a significant EE gap of 15% at the median firm. Especially uncertainty about future policies inhibits profitable EE investments. This raises interesting follow-up questions about which policy aspects are creating this uncertainty. In any case, policy makers interested in closing the EE gap should take uncertainty into account when devising energy and environmental policies.

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Appendix

A Questionnaire

[Table A.1](#) provides a mapping between the variable names used in this study and the way they are derived from the questionnaire, i.e. from which question they stem. The taxonomy of barriers is presented in [Table A.2](#). The entire table is translated from Dutch to English by the authors. Note that the respondents did not see the last column, which provides the categorization of barriers.

Table A.1: VARIABLES AND THEIR UNDERLYING QUESTIONS.

Variable	Question	Answer style
Energy efficiency gap (%)	Imagine your firm would take all currently profitable energy saving investments. What percentage of the energy costs would then be saved?	0-100%.
Energy saved past 5 yrs (%)	What percentage of energy costs has your firm saved in the past five years through improvements in energy efficiency?	0-100%.
Competition (1-7)	How much competition do you experience in your main sales market?	Scale 1-7 (1=no competition, 7=heavy competition).
Competition abroad (%)	Which share of the most important competitors are located ...?	Four subquestions (region, Netherlands, EU, outside EU) adding up to 100%.
Employees (imputed)	Background info: How many people are employed at your branch?	12 binned options or unknown. Variable imputed from middle value of bin.
Contacts	How important are the following contacts for acquiring knowledge about (potential) energy savings investments?	Likert 1-5
Energy costs (%)	Can you indicate the energy costs as a percentage of total costs for 2021? (You may make an estimate.)	0-100%.
Energy intensity level (1-5)	Can you for the following factors indicate whether for your firm they are smaller or larger than most of your closest competitors? Energy intensity of the production	Much smaller - smaller - about the same - greater - much greater - do not know.
Exec. function (indicator)	Background info: What is your function within the branch?	Three options: (1) Self-employed, director, owner, manager, (2) HRM contact person, or (3) other, namely ...
Expectation revenue (1-5)	Can you indicate your expectations for your firm for the coming five years with respect to revenue?	Strong decline - some decline - about the same - some increase - strong increase - do not know.
Firm age	Background info: Since what year is your firm active?	Open.
Importance EE in investments (1-5)	How often were the investments of the past five years aimed at the following goals?	Never - rarely - sometimes - often - always.
Industry sector (indicator)	Background info, verified by: According to our data, your firm is active in the sector [SECTOR]. Is that correct?	Yes - no.
Innovativeness (1-4)	Does your firm introduce new innovations?	Options: No, never - Yes, rarely - Yes, sometimes - Yes, regularly - Do not know.
Payback period (yrs)	Which payback period does your firm apply to investments in energy savings?	... years and ... months. Or do not know.
Regulated (indicator)	Does your firm fall under the following government policies? Multiple answers possible.	List of policies, other namely, and none of the above option.
Relative innovativeness (1-5)	Can you for the following factors indicate whether for your firm they are smaller or larger than most of your closest competitors? Innovativeness	Much smaller - smaller - about the same - greater - much greater - do not know.

Questions and answers are translated from Dutch by the authors. “Background information” indicates that this data is collected by I&O Research at an earlier stage and made available to the authors.

Table A.2: QUESTIONNAIRE’S BARRIERS TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY INVESTMENTS.

	Very unimportant	...	Very important	Do not know	Cat.
Existing energy saving technologies are not (yet) suitable or available.	○	...	○	○	Te
The energy saving technologies are from a technical perspective difficult to implement.	○	...	○	○	Co
Energy efficiency has a too low priority in the firm.	○	...	○	○	Be
Within (or because of) the structure of the firm these types of investments are difficult to realize.	○	...	○	○	Or
No good overview of available technologies and costs.	○	...	○	○	In
Within the firm no research is done which energy saving technologies can be implemented.	○	...	○	○	Co
It is difficult to find external expertise about energy savings.	○	...	○	○	Co
Internal constraints on the investment budget.	○	...	○	○	Ec
Problems to finance investments externally.	○	...	○	○	Ec
The current equipment is not ready for replacement.	○	...	○	○	Ot
Expectation that the costs of the energy saving technologies will decrease.	○	...	○	○	Ec
Uncertainty about future energy prices.	○	...	○	○	Ec
Uncertainty about the quality.	○	...	○	○	Ec
Uncertainty about future government policies.	○	...	○	○	Ec
It is better to wait and see how the technologies performs at other firms.	○	...	○	○	Ec
Already invested in energy saving equipment.	○	...	○	○	Ot
Other, namely ...	○	...	○	○	Ot

The question states: “Can you for each of the following reasons indicate to what extend they form a barrier to invest in profitable energy saving technologies within your firm?”. The answer options are: very unimportant, rather unimportant, neutral, rather important, very important, and do not know. The last column, which does not show up to the respondent, provides the categorization of the barriers, namely technology (Te), competence (Co), behavioral (Be), organizational (Or), informational (In), economic (Ec), and other (Ot).

B Further descriptives

The number of observations throughout the questionnaire is presented in [Figure B.1](#). [Figure B.2](#) presents the joint distribution of the energy efficiency (EE) gap and the energy already saved in the past five years. The individual distributions of the two variables look similar and are skewed towards the higher values. Further, several respondents report 0% on either of the variables, while some indicate 100%. The extremely high values could indicate that those respondents misinterpreted the question, which is taken into consideration in [Table 4](#).




Figure B.1: NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS THROUGHOUT THE QUESTIONNAIRE.

Note: Number of observations at the last mandatory question of each section, and at the beginning and end of the questionnaire. Two drops in observations are noticeable, namely (1) respondents only opening the link to the questionnaire but not getting through the first section and (2) firms leaving the questionnaire while answering the section on investments.

Interestingly the scatter plot in [Figure B.2](#) does not show a clear negative or positive correlation. A priori one might expect either pattern. A negative relationship would occur if firms that already made EE investments do not see further opportunities. A positive relationship would occur if firms that made EE improvements discover that more opportunities are available. A combination of the two hypotheses would also be possible. An inverted-U relationship might be expected, where some past savings are necessary to discover further opportunities, but where having exhausted all opportunities already leaves few remaining opportunities. The figure does not allow testing these hypotheses.

[Figure B.3](#) shows the investment goals per sector. While both industrial firms and construction firms seem to rank the goals similarly, industrial firms assign more importance to EE and developing renewable innovations.

[Table B.1](#) shows differences in the firm characteristics for the different industries in the industry sector. Notice the large differences in the number of employees. These employee averages also come with large standard errors as the underlying distribution can be heavily skewed. Note that the number of observations is quite small. This small number of observations and the homogeneity within the industry sector make the deviations between industries mostly statistically insignificant. Only the industry active in producing and maintaining machinery seems to be significantly more innovative than the “other” industry.

C Overlapping events

[Figure C.1](#), [C.2](#) and [C.3](#) provide insight in potentially overlapping events, i.e. the 2022 European energy crisis, popularity of the sitting coalition, and trust in the government,




Figure B.2: JOINT DISTRIBUTION OF THE EE GAP AND PAST ENERGY SAVINGS.

Note: Each circle represents one observation. As observations might overlap, they are made transparent.




Figure B.3: IMPORTANCE OF DIFFERENT GOALS IN INVESTMENT DECISIONS OF THE PAST FIVE YEARS BY SECTOR.

Note: The question states: “How often were the investments of the past five years aimed at the following goals?”. The number of observations is in square brackets. Questions are sorted by their average score across sectors.

Table B.1: FIRM CHARACTERISTICS BY INDUSTRY.

	Energy costs (%)	Employees (imputed)	Innovativeness (1-4)	Competition (1-7)	Energy saved past 5 yrs (%)	EE gap (%)
Other	12.00*** (2.01)	47.95 (30.37)	2.69*** (0.17)	3.83*** (0.29)	22.00*** (4.39)	23.55*** (4.53)
Metal (+/-)	-4.98 (3.64)	+64.76 (54.13)	-0.41 (0.38)	+0.63 (0.53)	-7.73 (8.77)	-3.13 (8.77)
Chemicals (+/-)	-3.38 (4.61)	-34.40 (65.84)	+0.31 (0.54)	-0.43 (0.61)	+1.71 (10.48)	-12.71 (11.55)
Machines (+/-)	-0.76 (3.48)	-24.08 (52.14)	+0.74** (0.29)	+0.06 (0.50)	+0.94 (7.52)	+4.79 (8.11)
Num. obs.	74	83	50	79	68	66

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

The first row shows the “other” industry’s average value and tests its deviation from zero. These are all industries that could not be grouped in the consecutive industry categories. The consecutive rows show how the respective industry’s average deviates from this “other” industry. These numbers are generated with OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses.

respectively. The frequency of these three data sources differs, allowing for different insights. The gas price shows that energy prices were high during the fill out period of the questionnaire, but that they were on their way down from the end-of-summer peak. Arguably there was heightened energy price uncertainty at the time of the survey, although during the survey dates no particular events are identified. Figure C.2 shows that during the time of the survey, polls did not convey any particular changes in disapproval of the sitting coalition. While the coalition would not get a majority in case of a re-election, according to the polls, no significant events seem to have influenced the questionnaire responses. This is relevant, since the main barrier to EE investments was identified as being policy uncertainty.

**Figure C.1: NATURAL GAS PRICE IN THE NETHERLANDS.**

Note: Dutch TTF gas close price for the January 2023 futures contract (solid line, left axis) and their trading volumes (bars, right axis). The shaded area marks the dates at which the questionnaire was filled out by the respondents (Oct 7-17).

Lastly, Figure C.3 plots a longer-term trend of government trust in the Netherlands. Three things are noticeable, namely (1) a flat long-term trend around 60%, (2) a recent




Figure C.2: SEATS OF THE SITTING COALITION.

Note: The number of seats of the sitting coalition according to the polls of IPSOS (2023). Any number of seats above the black line gives a majority in the house of representatives. Polls are held about once a month.

downturn since 2017, and (3) an exceptional high approval score in 2020. The Covid-19 pandemic likely explains the 2020 outlier, as people approved of early policy responses. The recent downturn might part be explained by that same Covid-19 pandemic, as people later on disapproved of restrictive pandemic rules, or it might be general disapproval of the government. The latter explanation is coherent with our survey’s finding of negative policy evaluations.




Figure C.3: TRUST IN THE GOVERNMENT.

Note: Data comes from the OECD (2023). The figure represents the number of people answering “yes” to the question whether they have trust in the government. Data is annual. The survey period is marked by the grey shaded area in 2022 (which is narrow due to the scale of the horizontal axis).

D Further results

D.1 Energy efficiency gap

Table D.1 provides the outcomes of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test on the paired difference between the EE gap and past energy savings per sector. Note that both differences are positive, meaning that the EE gap is greater than the savings over the past five years for both sectors. But, the difference is statistically different from zero only for the construction sector. For the industry sector the test cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal distributions. Note that splitting the sample up does leave fewer observations and hence less power.

Table D.1: COMPARING THE EE GAP AND PAST SAVINGS PER SECTOR.

Sector	(Pseudo) median	p-value	Obs
Construction	9.500	0.008	46
Industry	2.500	0.576	53

The hypothesis of equal distribution is tested with a paired Wilcoxon signed-rank test per sector. The (pseudo) median refers to the difference between the EE gap and the energy already saved. Ties are ignored.

D.2 Barriers to energy efficiency investments

Figure D.1 presents the raw responses to the barriers questions. Figure D.2 does the same for the normalized responses (as proposed by Equation 2). Both figures are sorted according to their average scores. Note that the ranking of the normalized barriers can therefore differ from the ranking of the raw responses. This is expected as the variables have different meanings. The normalized barriers measure whether a barrier is more or less important to the firm than other barriers. While there are some barriers that change rank, there is still a clear positive correlation between their ranks.

The ordered logit regressions of EE investment barriers on firm characteristics for all barriers is presented in Table D.2. The meanings of the barrier names can be found in Table D.4. This overview does allow for understanding the patterns between experienced barriers and firm characteristics further. Across all barriers firms with greater past energy savings experience lower barriers, and they indicate they already made EE investments. This is a logical finding and to some extent confirms the validity of such regressions. Similarly, firms that think EE is important in the investment decision struggle more with each barrier. Industrial firms give EE a low priority and they run into external financing issues. Energy-intensive firms find policy uncertainty an important barrier, while experiencing fewer issues of lock-ins. Lock-ins mean that firms are stuck with certain equipment and cannot easily change it. The two barriers that might indicate lock-ins are current equipment not being ready for replacement (NoRepl) and EE equipment already being invested in (Already). Lastly, large firms, as measured by their number of employees, seem to experience fewer barriers.

Table D.3 presents the findings of ordered logit regressions of all the normalized barriers on firm characteristics. As discussed for the highlighted six barriers in Table 9, the significance of coefficients to independent variables that are reported on a Likert scale is




Figure D.1: BARRIERS TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY INVESTMENTS.

Note: The number of observations are presented in square brackets. Barriers are sorted based on their average score, where “very unimportant” is assigned 1 and “very important” is assigned 5. Do-not-knows are excluded.




Figure D.2: NORMALIZED BARRIERS TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY INVESTMENTS.

Note: Barriers are normalized within each respondent to three categories, namely below median, median and above median. Number of observations are in square brackets. Barriers sorted by average score. Do-not-knows are excluded.

Table D.2: EXPLAINING BARRIERS TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY (ALL BARRIERS).

	NoTech	TechImp	LowPrio	FirmStr	Overview	NoRes
Energy costs (%)	−0.015 (0.018)	−0.007 (0.018)	0.005 (0.015)	−0.010 (0.014)	−0.026* (0.015)	−0.009 (0.015)
Energy saved past 5 yrs (%)	−0.020** (0.009)	−0.017* (0.009)	−0.028*** (0.009)	−0.015 (0.009)	−0.023** (0.009)	−0.022** (0.009)
Expectation revenue (1-5)	−0.075 (0.189)	−0.032 (0.195)	−0.104 (0.192)	0.016 (0.188)	−0.446** (0.188)	0.024 (0.186)
Industry sector (indicator)	−0.064 (0.384)	0.167 (0.387)	0.848** (0.394)	0.013 (0.386)	0.069 (0.391)	0.508 (0.376)
Importance EE in invest (1-5)	0.705*** (0.211)	0.495** (0.202)	0.097 (0.200)	0.195 (0.192)	0.373* (0.194)	0.336* (0.197)
log(Employees) (avg imputed)	−0.035 (0.118)	0.022 (0.113)	−0.227** (0.115)	−0.082 (0.115)	−0.079 (0.112)	−0.387*** (0.116)
AIC	297.574	306.227	308.790	311.527	308.162	324.604
Num. obs.	101	102	105	102	103	105
	ExtExp	IntFin	ExFin	NoRepl	CostDec	EnPric
Energy costs (%)	−0.012 (0.014)	0.030* (0.017)	0.014 (0.015)	−0.031** (0.013)	0.018 (0.014)	0.010 (0.013)
Energy saved past 5 yrs (%)	−0.004 (0.009)	−0.020** (0.010)	−0.005 (0.009)	−0.022** (0.009)	−0.032*** (0.010)	−0.026*** (0.009)
Expectation revenue (1-5)	−0.126 (0.183)	0.163 (0.180)	0.068 (0.186)	−0.522*** (0.189)	−0.283 (0.196)	−0.595*** (0.198)
Industry sector (indicator)	0.295 (0.393)	0.591 (0.383)	0.846** (0.390)	−0.254 (0.386)	−0.117 (0.395)	0.288 (0.383)
Importance EE in invest (1-5)	0.237 (0.197)	0.213 (0.190)	0.013 (0.188)	0.370* (0.195)	0.802*** (0.214)	0.748*** (0.206)
log(Employees) (avg imputed)	−0.194* (0.115)	0.057 (0.110)	−0.083 (0.109)	0.105 (0.117)	−0.233** (0.113)	−0.038 (0.114)
AIC	318.918	322.300	335.289	313.059	275.485	307.214
Num. obs.	103	104	102	104	102	105
	QualUnc	PolUnc	Wait	Already	Other	
Energy costs (%)	0.026 (0.016)	0.115*** (0.030)	0.000 (0.015)	−0.040*** (0.015)	−0.008 (0.029)	
Energy saved past 5 yrs (%)	−0.020** (0.010)	−0.006 (0.009)	−0.032*** (0.010)	0.019** (0.009)	0.023 (0.017)	
Expectation revenue (1-5)	−0.552*** (0.196)	−0.167 (0.199)	−0.240 (0.195)	−0.233 (0.196)	0.114 (0.292)	
Industry sector (indicator)	−0.233 (0.400)	−0.220 (0.408)	−0.511 (0.400)	0.058 (0.393)	0.769 (0.651)	
Importance EE in invest (1-5)	0.639*** (0.204)	0.695*** (0.216)	0.400* (0.205)	0.589*** (0.204)	−0.350 (0.320)	
log(Employees) (avg imputed)	−0.174 (0.111)	−0.148 (0.112)	−0.110 (0.112)	−0.034 (0.115)	−0.142 (0.183)	
AIC	300.306	279.794	297.205	279.648	123.133	
Num. obs.	102	103	101	103	44	

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Multinomial ordered logit regressions. The mapping between the barrier names and their description can be found in [Table D.4](#). The estimated constants between the categories are not presented. Do-not-knows are excluded.

mostly lost. This is likely due to firms having a particular fill out behavior throughout the questionnaire. Additional to the findings discussed in [Section 5](#), these normalized regressions show that large firms do research on EE and are more likely to indicate external expertise is available, and industrial firms are less inclined to wait and see how the technology performs at other firms.

[Table D.5](#) presents results from ordered logit regressions of six barriers on firm characteristics where only straightliner observations are removed (compared to [Table 5](#)). [Table D.6](#) presents the paired T-tests between the highest ranking barrier, policy uncertainty, and all other barriers. All differences are statistically significant.

For the set of barriers relating to technology lock-in, an additional multinomial logit specification is fitted in [Table D.7](#). This specification additionally tests the hypothesis that younger firms experience lower lock-in barriers. The results seem to confirm that hypothesis, as younger firms are less likely to have already invested in EE technologies, are less likely to prefer to wait with EE investments, and are less often held back by technology implementation issues. The indicator for young firms also negatively correlates with the other two lock-in barriers, but their coefficients are not statistically significant.

D.3 Innovation

Besides investments in existing energy saving technologies, firms might decide to innovate themselves. Through the questionnaire several measures for innovation were collected, as well as barriers to the innovation decision. [Table D.8](#) provides summary statistics of the innovation measures. Innovativeness occurs in three formats, as its original 4-point scale, as a 3-point scale that excludes the “never” category, and as an indicator for any answer greater than “never”. The relative innovation measure stems from asking firms how their innovativeness compares to their direct competitors. They can answer on a five-point scale ranging from much smaller to much greater. Patents is an indicator for firms having applied for a patent in the past five years. Whereas 77% of firms consider themselves innovative to some extent, the median firm considers themselves equally innovative as their competitors, and only 14% indicate to have applied for a patent.

Delving into the relationship between innovation decisions and firm characteristics provides understanding which types of firms are the innovators. [Table D.9](#) uses the different innovation measures and relates them to firm characteristics. The econometric method fits the data type of the dependent variable. Ordered categoricals are fitted with an ordered logit regression, while indicators are fitted with a logit regression. Whereas the innovation literature has often delved in the relationship between competition and innovation, here we find no evidence of a systematic relationship.⁸ Firms that report a high energy intensity report to innovate more than their direct competitors (column 3). And industrial firms and larger firms are more innovative across all measures, although size is mostly statistically insignificant, except when it comes to patenting. The latter confirms the literature in that patenting is a large firm activity. Lastly, innovative firms seem to have already saved more energy in the past, but this relationship is not statistically significant.

Considering innovation to have beneficial effects on society, we might be concerned with any barriers to innovation. Asking firms a set of five potential barriers to score, results in [Figure D.3](#). First, notice that around a quarter of the firms does not think these barriers are important. Second, the barriers are clearly ranked, with the high costs

⁸Studying a quadratic relationship also does not reveal a statistically convincing relationship.

Table D.3: EXPLAINING NORMALIZED BARRIERS TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY (ALL BARRIERS).

	NoTech	TechImp	LowPrio	FirmStr	Overview	NoRes
Energy costs (%)	−0.008 (0.014)	0.002 (0.014)	−0.000 (0.013)	−0.009 (0.014)	−0.019 (0.014)	−0.003 (0.013)
Energy saved past 5 yrs (%)	0.002 (0.009)	0.004 (0.009)	−0.010 (0.009)	0.002 (0.010)	−0.007 (0.010)	−0.002 (0.009)
Expectation revenue (1-5)	0.124 (0.199)	0.218 (0.202)	0.195 (0.201)	0.251 (0.217)	−0.277 (0.219)	0.290 (0.202)
Industry sector (indicator)	−0.354 (0.414)	−0.265 (0.402)	0.417 (0.402)	−0.428 (0.438)	−0.419 (0.442)	0.500 (0.412)
Importance EE in invest (1-5)	0.119 (0.206)	−0.113 (0.199)	−0.352* (0.199)	−0.341 (0.215)	−0.260 (0.217)	−0.172 (0.200)
log(Employees) (avg imputed)	0.044 (0.127)	0.078 (0.120)	−0.233* (0.124)	−0.015 (0.128)	−0.083 (0.129)	−0.499*** (0.139)
AIC	208.340	219.281	221.063	194.893	186.267	209.574
Num. obs.	101	102	105	102	103	105
	ExtExp	IntFin	ExFin	NoRepl	CostDec	EnPric
Energy costs (%)	0.003 (0.014)	0.027* (0.014)	0.019 (0.013)	−0.037** (0.015)	−0.004 (0.015)	0.015 (0.015)
Energy saved past 5 yrs (%)	0.017* (0.010)	−0.004 (0.010)	0.010 (0.009)	−0.009 (0.010)	−0.014 (0.010)	−0.005 (0.010)
Expectation revenue (1-5)	0.094 (0.202)	0.276 (0.196)	0.100 (0.196)	−0.289 (0.200)	0.056 (0.219)	−0.294 (0.206)
Industry sector (indicator)	0.071 (0.426)	0.565 (0.412)	0.851** (0.412)	−0.447 (0.426)	−0.444 (0.431)	−0.205 (0.410)
Importance EE in invest (1-5)	−0.402* (0.217)	−0.184 (0.197)	−0.483** (0.201)	−0.058 (0.199)	0.130 (0.212)	0.201 (0.204)
log(Employees) (avg imputed)	−0.294** (0.129)	0.058 (0.117)	−0.098 (0.116)	0.162 (0.121)	−0.173 (0.125)	0.019 (0.122)
AIC	192.849	216.451	224.567	206.909	197.912	209.151
Num. obs.	103	104	102	104	102	105
	QualUnc	PolUnc	Wait	Already	Other	
Energy costs (%)	0.011 (0.014)	0.074*** (0.027)	0.012 (0.013)	−0.017 (0.014)	−0.014 (0.028)	
Energy saved past 5 yrs (%)	0.010 (0.010)	0.003 (0.010)	−0.012 (0.010)	0.025** (0.011)	0.033* (0.020)	
Expectation revenue (1-5)	−0.262 (0.206)	0.094 (0.206)	0.116 (0.202)	0.076 (0.202)	−0.012 (0.299)	
Industry sector (indicator)	−0.515 (0.438)	−0.463 (0.443)	−0.934** (0.420)	−0.271 (0.415)	0.911 (0.662)	
Importance EE in invest (1-5)	−0.008 (0.210)	0.284 (0.216)	−0.171 (0.201)	0.082 (0.201)	−0.688** (0.341)	
log(Employees) (avg imputed)	−0.178 (0.127)	−0.044 (0.124)	0.015 (0.120)	0.100 (0.121)	−0.012 (0.183)	
AIC	197.654	188.592	213.653	214.824	96.216	
Num. obs.	102	103	101	103	44	

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Multinomial ordered logit regressions. The mapping between the barrier names and their description can be found in [Table D.4](#). The estimated constants between the categories are not presented. Do-not-knows are excluded.

Table D.4: BARRIER NAMES AND THEIR DESCRIPTIONS.

Barrier name	Description
NoTech	Existing EE tech not (yet) available
TechImp	EE tech difficult to implement
LowPrio	EE has low priority
FirmStr	Firm structure hinders these investments
Overview	No good overview of tech and costs
NoRes	No research done on which tech could be used
ExtExp	Difficult to find external expertise
IntFin	Internal limitations on investment budget
ExFin	External financing
NoRepl	Current equipment not ready for replacement
CostDec	Expect costs of EE tech to decrease
EnPric	Uncertainty about future energy costs
QualUnc	Uncertainty about the quality
PolUnc	Uncertainty about future policies
Wait	Better to wait and see how others experience it
Already	Already invested in EE
Other	Other reasons, namely . . .

Table D.5: EXPLAINING BARRIERS TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY (NO STRAIGHTLINERS).

	PolUnc	EnPric	NoRepl	Already	ExFin	IntFin
Energy costs (%)	0.102*** (0.029)	0.007 (0.013)	-0.037*** (0.014)	-0.042*** (0.015)	0.012 (0.015)	0.025 (0.017)
Energy saved past 5 yrs (%)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.026*** (0.010)	-0.023** (0.009)	0.018* (0.009)	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.020** (0.010)
Expectation revenue (1-5)	-0.113 (0.210)	-0.601*** (0.209)	-0.527*** (0.199)	-0.211 (0.205)	0.042 (0.195)	0.153 (0.186)
Industry sector (indicator)	-0.468 (0.427)	0.146 (0.397)	-0.523 (0.407)	-0.065 (0.404)	0.803** (0.402)	0.484 (0.394)
Importance EE in invest (1-5)	0.640*** (0.227)	0.690*** (0.214)	0.290 (0.204)	0.579*** (0.212)	-0.068 (0.196)	0.113 (0.196)
log(Employees) (avg imputed)	-0.182 (0.117)	-0.045 (0.118)	0.093 (0.123)	-0.037 (0.118)	-0.063 (0.113)	0.059 (0.113)
AIC	255.065	285.337	285.124	264.078	309.530	303.610
Num. obs.	94	96	95	95	93	96

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Multinomial ordered logit regressions with the four highest ranking barriers and the two financing barriers as dependent variables. The barriers are policy uncertainty (PolUnc), energy price uncertainty (EnPric), equipment not ready for replacement (NoRepl), already invested in EE equipment (Already), external financing (ExFin) and internal financing (IntFin). The estimated constants representing the cutoffs between the categories are not presented. Do-not-knows are excluded, as well as responses that are identified as straightliners.

Table D.6: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE POLICY UNCERTAINTY BARRIER AND OTHER BARRIERS.

Rank	Barrier	Difference	P-value	Obs
2	Uncertainty about future energy costs	0.37	0.001	110
3	Current equipment not ready for replacement	0.39	0.005	109
4	Expect costs of EE tech to decrease	0.45	0.000	109
5	Already invested in EE	0.47	0.003	105
6	Existing EE tech not (yet) available	0.49	0.000	105
7	Uncertainty about the quality	0.49	0.000	109
8	EE tech difficult to implement	0.62	0.000	105
9	Internal limitations on investment budget	0.66	0.000	106
10	Better to wait and see how others experience it	0.69	0.000	108
11	Firm structure hinders these investments	0.76	0.000	104
12	EE has low priority	0.80	0.000	107
13	External financing	0.85	0.000	107
14	No research done on which tech could be used	0.89	0.000	107
15	No good overview of tech and costs	0.90	0.000	106
16	Difficult to find external expertise	0.99	0.000	106

Paired T-tests between the policy uncertainty barrier and other barriers. The paired T-test tests the mean of the difference of the scores. Note that the pairwise comparison can delete some observations resulting in a slightly different ranking compared to Figure 6. Barriers sorted by rank.

Table D.7: EXPLAINING TECHNOLOGY LOCK-IN.

	NoTech	TechImp	NoRepl	Already	Wait
Firm age 0 - 5 years (indicator)	-0.551 (0.723)	-1.335** (0.648)	-0.350 (0.642)	-1.459** (0.634)	-1.141* (0.662)
Firm age 20+ years (indicator)	0.068 (0.399)	-0.021 (0.408)	0.224 (0.408)	-0.336 (0.435)	-0.110 (0.422)
Energy costs (%)	-0.011 (0.017)	-0.006 (0.017)	-0.027** (0.013)	-0.036** (0.016)	0.003 (0.014)
Energy saved past 5 yrs (%)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.018** (0.008)	0.028*** (0.008)	-0.026*** (0.008)
Industry sector (indicator)	-0.119 (0.392)	0.120 (0.392)	-0.532 (0.388)	-0.042 (0.393)	-0.691* (0.399)
log(Employees) (avg imputed)	-0.029 (0.118)	-0.001 (0.118)	0.004 (0.119)	-0.012 (0.122)	-0.128 (0.119)
AIC	293.788	293.966	301.285	272.546	282.430
Num. obs.	95	96	97	97	95

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Multinomial ordered logit regressions with all barriers associated with lock-in as dependent variables. The barriers are existing EE tech not (yet) available (NoTech), EE tech difficult to implement (TechImp), current equipment not ready for replacement (NoRepl), already invested in EE (Already) and better to wait and see how others experience it (Wait). The estimated constants between the categories are not presented. Do-not-knows and straightliners are excluded.

Table D.8: INNOVATION VARIABLES AND DESCRIPTIVES.

Description	Short reference	Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Median	Max
Innovativeness (scale 1-4)	Innov	99	2.56	1.04	1	3	4
Innovativeness (scale 2-4)	Innov (ex never)	76	3.03	0.67	2	3	4
Innovativeness (indicator)	Innov > 0	99	0.77	0.42	0	1	1
Relative innovativeness (scale 1-5)	Innov (relative)	119	3.29	0.88	1	3	5
Patents (indicator)	Patents > 0	79	0.14	0.35	0	0	1

Categorical and factor variables are transformed to integers in order to produce these statistics. “Innov (relative)” is on a 5-point Likert scale. “Innov” has four categories (never, rarely, sometimes, often) of which “never” is removed in the “Innov (ex never)” measure. Do-not-knows are excluded.

Table D.9: EXPLAINING INNOVATION DECISIONS.

	Ordered logit			Logit	
	Innov	Innov (ex never)	Innov (relative)	Innov > 0	Patents > 0
Competition (scale 1-7)	0.103 (0.121)	0.112 (0.141)	−0.008 (0.123)	0.081 (0.159)	−0.058 (0.219)
Energy costs (%)	0.008 (0.017)	−0.022 (0.019)	0.038*** (0.014)	0.073 (0.044)	−0.017 (0.037)
Energy saved past 5 yrs (%)	0.006 (0.008)	0.000 (0.010)	0.012 (0.008)	0.013 (0.014)	0.017 (0.014)
Industry sector (indicator)	0.880** (0.404)	0.253 (0.469)	0.888** (0.407)	1.260** (0.602)	
log(Employees) (avg imputed)	0.067 (0.124)	0.047 (0.143)	0.166 (0.119)	0.055 (0.181)	0.490** (0.209)
AIC	262.037	162.797	265.446	101.940	64.667
Num. obs.	98	76	105	99	76

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

The dependent variables are described in [Table D.8](#). According to the dependent variable a multinomial ordered logit or a logit model is fitted.




Figure D.3: BARRIERS TO INNOVATION.

Note: Responses to the question: “To what extend do the following reasons form an obstacle when undertaking innovation activities?” Number of responses in square brackets.

and risks associated with innovation being the main barriers. Uncertainty and financial constraints play an import role for a third of the firms. Lastly, more than a quarter of the firms indicate external sources are sufficient, meaning they do not see the need to innovate themselves. The other option ranks high, but is only based on 10 observations, as it is optional to the respondent.⁹

As for investment barriers, we can identify the firm characteristics that correlate with the innovation barriers. This could provide information on which firms experience which barriers. The ordered logit regressions are presented in [Table D.10](#). Larger firms experience fewer barriers to innovation, but only the negative relationship to financial constraints is statistically significant. They do indicate more often that external sources suffice for their innovation needs, although this coefficient is not statistically significant. It still is interesting that also larger firms might not do their innovation themselves. Firms identifying larger EE gaps also experience higher innovation barriers, especially regarding costs and financing. Firms with the greatest EE opportunities therefore do struggle to finance innovation activities. Industrial firms, the sector that is more innovative (see [Table D.9](#)), experiences higher barriers, although these coefficients are not statistically significant. Lastly, both competition and energy intensity relate to higher barriers, but these relationship are statistically insignificant.

⁹Only responses to the “other” barrier are kept that provide an informative input about what other barrier that might be. For example, a follow-up explanation “none” or “no” will be excluded.

Table D.10: INNOVATION BARRIERS AND FIRM CHARACTERISTICS (NO STRAIGHTLINING).

	Costs	Risk	Ext	Unc	Fin
Competition (scale 1-7)	0.064 (0.138)	0.005 (0.134)	0.034 (0.151)	0.074 (0.136)	0.093 (0.134)
Energy efficiency gap (%)	0.013 (0.009)	0.004 (0.009)	-0.010 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.008)	0.010 (0.009)
Energy costs (%)	-0.003 (0.020)	0.001 (0.019)	0.006 (0.020)	0.015 (0.020)	0.002 (0.018)
Industry sector (indicator)	0.252 (0.479)	0.223 (0.464)	-0.351 (0.495)	0.046 (0.479)	0.291 (0.473)
Innovativeness (scale 1-4)	0.031 (0.269)	0.063 (0.261)	-0.676** (0.291)	0.209 (0.267)	0.186 (0.268)
log(Employees) (avg imputed)	-0.124 (0.149)	-0.164 (0.140)	0.254 (0.159)	-0.110 (0.145)	-0.279* (0.144)
AIC	218.192	239.099	167.444	231.361	240.525
Num. obs.	73	73	73	73	73

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Multinomial ordered logit regressions of the innovation barriers on firm characteristics. The barriers are: Too high costs (Costs), too high risk (Risk), external sources are sufficient (Ext), uncertainty about the result (Unc), financial constraints (Fin), other (Other). These results exclude any respondents that straight-lined, i.e. filled out the same answer to all the innovation barriers.