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The Finance-Dominated Accumulation Regime & the Future of Work in the Post-COVID World *

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Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between financialisation and the future of work in the post-COVID era. It combines an analysis of changes in labour relations due to financialization with an analysis of the macroeconomic impact of financialisation. It will discuss these for the periods before and after the financial crisis and analyse the impact of COVID on labour relations and the growth model in this context. The first section discusses the relationship between the employer-employee distribution of income and economic growth under neoliberalism, highlighting that anaemic growth was largely the outcome of declining wages. A significant amount of declining wages has been associated with the rise of shareholder value orientation which induced the management of non-financial corporations to reduce labour costs. Yet, financialisation is a complex development that has been affecting other domains of the economies beyond the non-financial corporate sector. A notable case is the financialisation of households, and more specifically the financialisation of the housing market. Rapidly rising mortgage debt ratios, driven by rising house prices, generated a debt-fueled real estate bubble in most advanced economies. The effects of rising household indebtedness not only positively affect housing prices, but also exhibits significant effects on class dynamics and has led to several changes at the workplace level. On the one hand, high-income employees who have invested in the real estate market enjoy economic returns and their share of financial incomes and capital gains over their wage income increases steadily. Thus, their class identity transforms from working class to a form of mini-rentier. On the other hand, low-income employees who become indebted become more self-disciplined at the workplace on the fear of defaulting on their debt, which makes them more vulnerable to complying with wage cuts and working under flexible contracts. Since COVID has induced a steep rise in household and corporate indebtedness, the purpose of this paper is to explore how the acceleration of financialisation will impact the future of work in the post-COVID era and discusses potential implications.

Keywords: financialisation, industrial relations, growth models, COVID

1. Introduction

This paper explores how the shock of the COVID-19 crisis and recession exacerbated pre-existing inequalities related to finance-dominated capitalism, and how these, in turn, are currently shaping

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the future of work in the post-COVID era. During the lockdown periods, both corporations and households got deeper into debt as a result of the unavoidable slowdown in economic activity and the lack of more extensive support by the state. Simultaneously, soon after the beginning of the pandemic, where possible, workers moved to remote work. Interestingly, despite almost no public health restrictions being in place at the time of writing, many corporations are still pushing towards remote or at least hybrid work to minimise their real estate-related costs and shift them to employees. Taken together, since both developments are related directly or indirectly to the broader financialisation of the economy, understanding how COVID shaped the future of work requires a better understanding of the linkages between financialisation and work.

This paper examines the relationship between financialisation and the future of work in the post-COVID era. It combines an analysis of changes in labour relations due to financialization with an analysis of the macroeconomic impact of financialisation. The shift to neoliberalism since the late 1970s has brought a number of major policy shifts that have shaped contemporary economies, but its key feature has been the deregulation of the financial sector, which facilitated the financialisation of most advanced economies (Stockhammer 2008; Baccaro and Howell 2017; Harvey 2007). Financialisation, broadly speaking, describes the rising influence of financial motives and institutions over the decisions and strategies of non-financial actors within an economy. The non-financial parts of society that are typically affected by financialisation are non-financial firms, households, and, more recently, pension funds.

The literature on corporate financialisation focuses on how rising financial payments for non-financial firms - either to increase real investment or to buy back their shares and boost shareholder returns - induces them to decrease investment in the long term (Stockhammer 2004). In addition, a smaller part of the financialisation literature looks at how the financialisation of non-financial firms may also affect inequalities and employer-employee relations. This can happen when employers have the bargaining power to pass the increases in their financial payment onto workers by decreasing their wages and other workplace-related costs (Lazonick and O'Sullivan 2003; Thompson 2003, 2013). Such decreases may happen via direct negotiations and adjustments of the salaries of existing workers or, in more liberal economies, employers are often able to replace unionised workers with non-unionised ones to avoid union premia (Kollmeyer and Peters 2019).

Concerning the other main aspect of financialisation, the financialisation of households, an emerging literature within industrial relations and sociology of work explores to what extent this process shapes labour market outcomes. Early work on the sociology of finance and Foucauldian political economy highlights that indebted individuals tend to become more self-disciplined and avoid conflict (Langley 2008; Lazzarato 2012). Extending this logic to workplace behaviour, recent work shows that increases in household indebtedness are associated with the secular decline of the wage share over the past decades (Wood 2017; Kohler et al. 2019; Gouzoulis

2021, 2022; Gouzoulis et al. 2023a). Indebted workers avoid negotiating for higher wages or even accepting wage reductions because of the fear of losing their job and defaulting on their debt. More recent studies also show that personal indebtedness and the associated fear of default makes workers more likely to accept working involuntarily under part-time contracts or find additional precarious jobs to cope with financial difficulties (Gouzoulis et al. 2023b). Taken together, on the one hand, corporate financialisation pushes employers to pass financial costs to workers via wage reductions and, on the other hand, personal indebtedness makes workers more likely to involuntarily accept working under such conditions.

While the macroeconomic impact of financialisation has resulted in a finance-led growth process, its impact on industrial relations has cemented income inequalities. This has given rise to what has been called ‘debt-driven’ growth models in the Anglo-Saxon countries and southern Europe (Lavoie and Stockhammer 2013, Baccaro, Blyth and Pontusson 2022). Since the Global Financial Crisis, this growth model has given way to what is often referred to as secular stagnation (e.g. Blecker 2016). However, the forces of financialisation have also shaped macroeconomic performance (low growth because of a debt overhang) as well as industrial relations (weak organised labour and indebted workers). While the COVID crisis amplified some existing macroeconomic tendencies, in the field of labour relations it brought up new issues. The rest of this paper explores how financialisation might shape the post-COVID future of work by looking into ongoing developments related to corporate and household financialisation. Our interest is particularly focused on the issue of remote and hybrid work, and how it passes an additional cost – real estate rents - from employers to workers. Our key argument is that a progressive policy agenda that aims to properly address this emerging issue requires measures related not only to workplace regulation but also to macro-financial regulation policies.

2. Financialisation & Growth Models in the Pre-COVID World

Financialisation refers to a complex process of changes whereby financial motives and actors become more important in shaping how economies function. Thus, it refers to how businesses and households behave and what their priorities and mindsets are, but also to the rise of new actors (such as investment funds). These changes have important macroeconomic (and macrosociological) effects, that create new constraints and pressures, but also opportunities and coping mechanisms for firms and households. This section will explore the macro side of things. It will discuss important changes for businesses and for households that impact the economy and then outline the growth models that emerge from that (or, in the terminology of French Regulation Theory, the accumulation regime). Our discussion will be highly stylized and aims to draw a picture of the post-Covid world that is not meant as a full or accurate description but as a stylized regime that enables us to subsequently discuss and appreciate possible changes in the post-Covid world.


The changes affecting non-financial businesses are usually discussed under the heading of shareholder value orientation. In the much-quoted phrase of Lazonick and O'Sullivan (2000), there has been a shift in management strategy from 'retain and invest' to 'downsize and distribute'. The starting point for this was developments in the 1970s, a time of a strong labour movement and high inflation, where (real) share prices declined as did (real) payments to shareholders. Shareholders over the next decades would assert their claims on firms, their strategies and their profits. On the academic and ideological level, this was accompanied by the principal-agent theory of the firm (Jensen and Meckling 1976), which claims that independent management would engage in empire-building and excessive growth (of the size of the firm) rather than maximisation of profits. Thus stock options were meant to align the interests of managers with those of shareholders. From the perspective of workers, or what would then often be called 'stakeholders', this was an assertion of power by shareholders at the expense of other legitimate claims on the firm. What is at stake here is in whose interest firms are run, those of the owners, its management, the employees or the communities in which they are located. The practical means to assert the power of shareholders was the development of a 'market for corporate control', where non-compliant firms could be acquired by means of hostile takeovers and management could subsequently be replaced. This needed financing and involved the use of 'junk bonds', i.e. the issue of high-risk bonds that would finance hostile takeovers, leading to a replacement of management and a subsequent restructuring of the firm. Such a restructuring would involve shifting debt onto the firm and selling off some assets for the firm to pay off the debt. Usually, the firm would be left in a reduced size, but with a higher debt-to-income ratio, which creates a systemic pressure to reduce wage costs. This created waves of mergers and acquisitions, but they remained risky and many of them failed (e.g. Cartwright and Schoenberg 2006).

Today shareholders are self-confident to voice their claims on the profits of firms and actively try to influence management strategy. Firms now routinely issue quarterly reports to investors and detail their business strategy to shareholders (but in most cases not to their employees and unions). This change in power relations is clearly reflected in the use of profits. In the US non-financial corporate sector, dividend pay-outs have increased from less than 30% of profits in 1960 to more than 50% in recent years (Federal Reserve: Flow of Funds 2022). In addition to that, US firms have engaged in extensive share buybacks. Net share issue is now a net drag on corporate finance rather than a source of finance, i.e. share buybacks have exceeded share issues for many years since the 1980s

As one measure of the impact of this shift in the US, Figure 1 plots net capital formation and dividend and interest payments (often referred to as 'rentiers payments'), both as % of net (pre-tax) operating surplus. The series shows substantial variation and a strong cyclical pattern (with for example the dot com boom and the global financial crisis clearly visible). But for our purposes more interesting, the series documents a secular rise in rentiers' payments from around 40% of profits in the 1960s to around 80% in recent years and a decline of investment somewhat

below 40% in the 1960s to values around 20% today. Figure 1 also includes two simple linear trends to illustrate the divergence between rentier payments and real investment.

Figure 1: Rentiers payments and real investment as % of profits of non-financial corporate business, USA



Notes: Rentier payments are dividend and interest payments; investment is net capital formation, both as % of operating surplus (Source: Federal Reserve, Flow of Funds (table S5a))

There are several econometric studies that give more rigorous support for the argument here. Stockhammer (2004) was one of the first studies to document the negative effect of financialisation on business investment, using macroeconomic data. Orhangazi (2008) for the USA, Demir (2009) for Turkey and Mexico, Onaran and Tori (2018) and Barradas (2017) for various European economies, use firm-level data and confirm the negative impact of financialization on business investment. This trend also holds for European countries, but the levels of dividend payments are lower than in the USA (Valeeva et al 2022). In short, the first main macroeconomic effect of financialisation is that it tends to depress business investment.

Financialisation has also affected households, with an ultimately powerful macroeconomic impact. For households, effects include a rise in investor (rather than working class) identity, the increased exposure to the volatility of financial markets (in particular as regards pension provision), but macroeconomically the most important one is around housing wealth and household debt (Stockhammer and Kohler 2021). These fuelled the boom before the GFC and eventually the crisis itself.

For many countries, the boom period of the early 2000s was driven by consumption growth and by residential investment (this does not hold for all countries, we will return to this below). At the same time, countries experienced a sustained increase in household debt. This has given rise to the suggestion of a debt-driven growth model (again, more below), with implications for the role of housing wealth, household debt and house prices. Much of the empirical literature on consumption and household debt initially came from the applied wing of mainstream research, which was driven by policy concerns over low household saving rates in the 1990s in the USA. The analytical framework adopted was one of rational choice lifetime utility maximisation. Thus growing consumption expenditures were interpreted as the rational reaction of households to their rising financial wealth. Initially, this rising wealth was discussed in the context of the dot com boom, i.e. equity prices. When the dot com bubble burst and consumption kept growing a realisation set in that it was housing wealth rather than financial wealth as such that was driving expenditure growth. This was also the time when home equity withdrawals were going mainstream in the USA. For the USA the size of these wealth effects was often put in the order of magnitude of a 5% to 10% marginal propensity to consume out of changes in household wealth (Case et al 2005). These effects were found to be substantially larger for housing wealth than for financial wealth. On the heterodox economics side, Wynne Godley and the stock-flow consistent approach to macroeconomic modelling (Godley 1999) as well as Minskyans highlighted the risk of growing debt to income levels in terms of financial stability. And, indeed, the growth process based on rising household debt came to an abrupt end in 2008, when house prices fell and the prices of real estate-based securities collapsed, bringing the global financial system close to a meltdown. This meltdown was eventually prevented by determined fiscal and monetary policy intervention and the crisis gave rise to a decade of 'secular stagnation' rather than another 'Great Depression' (Tooze 2018).

One key question is whether to interpret this boom-bust cycle as due to specific one-off shocks, say related to financial innovation and difficulties in valuing complex securities, or whether these are part of an endogenous systemic cycle as the approach pioneered by Hyman Minsky and Charles Kindleberger suggests (Minsky 1975, 1986, Kindleberger 1978). In contrast, the financialisation literature often conceives financialisation as a secular structural change with the trend moving in a certain direction (say, increasing household debt). Comparative Political Economy often associates this with particular varieties (i.e. the liberal version) of capitalism. A Minskyan approach would highlight the cyclical nature and emphasise that financial booms tend to be followed by busts that lead to deleveraging (i.e. falling debt levels), which induce prolonged stagnation. Integrating the cyclical and secular changes caused by financialisation is an ongoing challenge.

Thus, the financialisation of businesses and of households have opposite effects on economic growth: it will lead to lower business investment, but higher consumption expenditures. This has led to various macroeconomic attempts to model the resulting regimes.

Boyer (2000) focussing on increases in equity valuation (writing in response to the dot com boom), tries to identify conditions under which this can give rise to a sustained growth process. Based on neo-Kaleckian analyses, Lavoie and Stockhammer (2013) distinguish between debt-driven and export-driven growth models (also Hein and Mundt 2013), reflecting pronounced unevenness in the growth of household debt across countries. Export-driven models try to stimulate growth via exports, which typically comes with weak domestic demand growth, whereas debt-driven ones stimulate domestic demand and usually run current account deficits. This distinction (with some variation in labels) was picked up by Baccaro and Pontusson (2016) and has since become a core building block of what has become known as the growth models approach to Comparative Political Economy (Baccaro, Blyth and Pontusson 2022).

We want to highlight two important issues in this debate. First, one important question is what the significance of the Global Financial Crisis is in this context. Should we analyse developments since the GFC along the lines of the debt-led/export-led axis (in a period of low growth) or does the GFC constitute an occasion for a potentially more far-reaching reconfiguration in growth models? Baccaro and Pontusson (2021), and Hein et al (2021) interpret changes since the GFC as a general shift away from debt-led to export-led growth models. In contrast, Kohler and Stockhammer (2022) make the case that demand management by the state has been a major growth driver since the GFC and that the stagnation should not be interpreted as the demise of debt-led growth, but rather as part of the cyclical downturn that forms part of any finance-led growth model. Second, is the question of how to conceive the relative importance of household debt and house prices to growth. As the label 'debt-led growth' suggests, many analyses regard household debt as the key variable (Hein and Mundt 2013). However, some analyses put house prices at the centre (Kohler et al 2023). During the boom, the growth in household debt has mostly been driven by growth in mortgages. However, house prices have more volatility than household debt; house prices can fall sharply while deleveraging (reducing debt relative to income) is a slow process. Since the GFC there seems to have been a continued strong link between house price growth and economic growth, but the link between household debt has become weaker. Moreover, there is mounting evidence for the existence of genuine housing cycles, i.e. reoccurring boom-bust cycles in house prices (Borio 2014; Bracken 2013)

3. Financialisation & Industrial Relations in the pre-COVID World

Since the early 2000s, political economists, sociologists of work, and industrial relations scholars have been arguing that shareholder primacy pushes managers to maximise dividend payments, often via debt-financed share buybacks (Froud et al. 2000; Lazonick and O'Sullivan 2000; Medoff and Harless 1996). Rising financial payments related to these processes lead to deteriorating balance sheets and, thus, managers cut wages, downsize, and increase atypical work to improve the financial position of their firm.

Clark and Macey (2015), Darcillon (2016), Gospel and Pendleton (2003) and Palpacuer et al. (2011) demonstrate that corporate financialisation is often associated with worsening working conditions for both skilled and unskilled workers across different varieties of capitalism and different types of non-financial firms. Focusing on Private Equity (PE) and New Investment Funds (NIFs), Appelbaum et al. (2013) and Appelbaum and Batt (2014) demonstrate that broader 'breaches of trust' between different types of stakeholders happen more often in non-financial firms that have been taken over by such funds. In most cases, since these 'breaches of trust' typically aim to improve short-term financial performance, their primary target is the stakeholders who are less powerful within these organisations. Unsurprisingly, more often than not this is non-managerial workers (Cushen and Thompson 2016).

Yet, financialisation is a complex and dynamic process that over the last decades has been particularly influential for working-class households. At least since the early 1990s, financial institutions have been increasingly financing household spending, real estate purchases, and investments in assets by pension funds rather than non-financial firms (McKernan and Sherraden 2008; Froud et al. 2010; Ebbinghaus 2021). As Thompson and Cushen (2020) underline, while the rising financialisation of households is a well-established stylised fact, there are very few studies that link this phenomenon to changes in the labour process. Therefore, examining how workers' dependence on finance affects their compliance with the corporate financialisation-induced reshaping of the labour process is of great importance.

How can the rising financialisation of households be linked to labour market outcomes and workplace relations? While for high-skilled employees household debt is often used to finance residential investments and enjoy some returns from assets, for the vast majority of workers household credit accumulation increases debt repayments and their financial insecurity. Sociologists of finance argue that the fear of defaulting on their debt makes working-class households more risk-averse and self-disciplined (Langley 2007; Lazzarato 2012; Sweet 2018). In the context of wage bargaining, various recent studies show that the rise in household indebtedness is strongly associated with the decline of the share of wages across advanced and developing economies. Wood (2017) and Gouzoulis (2021) show that this relationship is robust in liberal market economies and much weaker in Scandinavian economies where social housing remains extensive and households are more protected in the event of personal bankruptcy. By the same token, Kohler et al. (2019) use panel data analysis and find evidence that household debt decreases the wage share in economies where wage bargaining institutions are weaker and low-income households are indebted. More recently, studies also report evidence that this relationship holds in developing regions like Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East (Gouzoulis et al. 2023a; Gouzoulis 2022; Gouzoulis and Constantine 2022).

Other recent work within industrial relations highlights that the rise in household indebtedness does not only make workers more self-disciplined in terms of wage bargaining *per*

se but also less willing to risk participating in industrial action. Grady and Simms (2019) discuss the political economy of financialisation and the labour market in the UK and claim that personal indebtedness can be a major driving force behind the declining duration of strike action in the country over the last four decades. That is because striking involves a direct loss of income for the days one is striking, thus, it may increase the risk of default. Building on this study, Gouzoulis (2023) examines the effects of household indebtedness on strike duration, participation, and the number of strikes that have taken place in the USA, UK, Japan, Korea, Sweden, and Norway since 1970. The main finding is that, despite institutional heterogeneity between these countries, household debt has been negatively affecting strike action rates in almost all of them.

On top of its effects on wages and industrial action, the literature also demonstrates that self-disciplined behaviour linked to personal indebtedness is associated with the rise of atypical employment. For example, the qualitative study of Karacimen (2015) on indebted Turkish households highlights that their members are more pressurised to enter the labour market out of necessity and, thus, more vulnerable to accepting working under precarious contracts. Moreover, since economic hardship often leads to multiple job-holding (Glavin 2020; Smith and McBride 2021) and household indebtedness is the main source of financial hardship for many households (Gouzoulis et al. 2023b), household debt is closely related to the rise of contingent work. In addition, Gouzoulis et al. (*ibid.*) also argue that, given that economic insecurity pushes employees to put more effort to secure their job (McGovern et al. 2007, p. 141), household debt-induced self-discipline potentially allows employers to hire workers for fewer hours and without major productivity losses.

Although household debt is the main feature of the financialisation of 'everyday life', the privatisation of pension funds and cuts in social security nets have also induced the financialisation of pension funds' portfolios (Braun 2022; Engelen 2003). Due to financial sustainability challenges related to capital-funded schemes, cuts in employer pension contributions, and workforce ageing (van der Zwan 2017), pension funds are increasingly investing in risky, high-return financial assets. Even for public pension funds, the financialised managerial logic has been pervasive and their portfolios are becoming even more exposed to high-return, high-risk financial instruments (e.g., listed shares or financial derivatives) than those of private pension funds (Triest and Zhao 2014). The global convergence towards highly financialised pension funds has made the retirement income of current and future pensioners increasingly dependent on stock market fluctuations (Ebbinghaus 2021; Langley 2008; Anderson 2019; Belfrage 2008; Bonizzi et al. 2020; Langley 2004; Macheda 2012; McCarthy et al. 2016; Natali 2018; Rodrigues et al. 2018; Saritas 2020; Wayne 2001), which, ultimately makes working-class households 'everyday' investors without consent. Needless to say, such high-risk financial investments involve a risk of default, thus, similar to household debt, they can have strong disciplinary effects on the behaviour of workers. Gouzoulis and Galanis (2021) argue that the financialisation of pension funds can incentivise people close to retirement age to remain in the

labour market to secure their income and encourage younger workers to seek additional jobs to secure more income for their retirement. Therefore, pension fund financialisation can intensify workforce casualisation and the deterioration of working conditions via these two mechanisms. Platanakis and Sutcliffe (2016) and Roberts (2001) argue that in most cases pension managers shift the risk of failed financial investments to the members of the scheme by increasing employee contributions. This approach puts the burdens primarily on the shoulders of younger pension scheme members rather than employees approaching retirement. Indeed, Gouzoulis et al. (2023b) confirm this argument using panel data analysis for the period 1997-2020.

Taking everything into consideration, on the one hand, the financialisation of non-financial corporations pushes their managers to shift financial risks onto labour and, on the other hand, increasing personal financial insecurity due to personal indebtedness and pension fund financialisation that households face curbs their resistance to such managerial practices.

4. COVID-19 and Changes in Economic Policy & Macroeconomic Dynamics

This section discussed changes in post-COVID regimes in terms of macroeconomic policy and the growth drivers underpinning the growth models. However, we should make clear from the beginning that when we say 'post-COVID' we refer to a broad set of changes that may not necessarily be causally linked to covid. Rather we analyse a neoliberal system after the GFC, which experienced also a pandemic. Thus 'post GFC and COVID' would be a more precise, if cumbersome label. We extrapolate some current trends and the tensions they are likely to create.

Before we start, let us note that financialisation has been an uneven and multifaceted process. Not only have different sectors have been affected differently, but financialisation has also taken different shapes at different times. In the 1980s financialisation meant high real interest rates and shareholder value orientation. In the 1990s and early 2000s, it came with first a stock market boom and its bust, then with a housing boom, both with modest interest rates (see also Auvray et al 2021). Then, after the GFC and the housing bust, there was a period of extraordinarily low interest rates and massive expansion of central bank balance sheets, as well as episodes of large expansionary fiscal policy. In short, one should not expect the financialised dynamics to always look the same.

In response to the GFC, the pre-crisis macroeconomic policy consensus (Blanchard et al 2010) was suspended. Not only were interest rates close to zero for an extended period of time but central banks were buying unprecedented amounts of financial assets, mostly government bonds. Fiscal policy was not consistent during this time, with the pendulum swinging from strongly expansionary to severe austerity. But overall, the expansion of government debt was unprecedented in peacetime, and this holds both for the GFC as well as (again) for the Covid period. The lack of consistency is remarkable: there is no agreed policy framework of when and how expansionary fiscal policy should be. (Even the British government which is actively trying

to shrink the state keeps postponing the date by which it wants to achieve a balanced budget). It is difficult to avoid the impression that with GFC the genie of activist fiscal policy was let out of the bottle. After decades of neoliberal arguments concerning the supposed futility of state expenditures, it became obvious that the state can act (and spend) if it wants. We don't know how states would have reacted if Covid had occurred during the height of neoliberal orthodoxy, but it is well conceivable that the strong and expensive government responses to Covid were only possible in the aftermath of the interventions around the GFC. This political potential for state activism is likely to stay, and will likely be boosted again as the urgency of action to mitigate climate change and decarbonise the economy will become more apparent over the coming years. At the same time, the tensions around the conduct of fiscal policy will increase.

But we expect a different outcome for monetary policy. After a decade of extraordinary expansion of central bank balance sheets, we expect central banks to change course. The past decade has been what could be called a form of 'bastard-MMT':³ effective central bank financing of government debt without a clear government strategy and, at times even without active government spending. Central bankers have for some time now been concerned about 'fiscal dominance', i.e. the central bank following fiscal policy's lead. A growing number of central bankers have become uncomfortable with this stance and they are reverting increasingly to the standard neoliberal formula: the role of central banks is to fight (or prevent inflation). We think that interest rates will not revert to near zero after Covid. This leads to two important follow-up challenges.

First, the private sector: higher interest rates will be cold water on house prices. In many countries house prices have already reached high levels. Higher interest rates may well trigger another housing bust. But even if that is not the case, we would expect a period of subdued house price growth or (real) house price decline. Given the centrality of house prices in the macroeconomic dynamics and the fact that housing markets look overheated in several countries, including the USA, this will be a major challenge.

Second, the public sector: higher interest rates will fuel the tensions around fiscal policy as servicing the public debt will become more difficult. But the main effect will be felt in the Euro area. Since the Euro crisis, the cracks in the Euro system have been covered by quantitative easing by the European Central Bank (ECB). If that runs out, the lack of a sustainable fiscal policy framework, which would require some form of mutualisation of sovereign debt (Hein 2013), will become apparent.

³ MMT stands for Modern Monetary Theory, which is a Keynesian approach that highlights that there are no financial constraints for government borrowing. Rather government debt is the basis of the modern financial system. However, there can be 'real' constraints (e.g. full employment or lack of productive capacity) on government. Like other Keynesian approaches, MMT suggests to use government spending to achieve full employment.

5. COVID-19 & the Future of (Remote) Work

While in terms of macro level changes COVID mainly exacerbated existing trends of finance-dominated capitalism, this is not the case for the labour market and the workplace. Public health measures included restrictions related to people's movement and lengthy lockdowns for crowded public spaces, including physical workplaces. However, given the nature of certain occupations that was not possible for all sectors or all types of jobs. Overall, many high-skilled, managerial and professional workers were able to work from home as many of the tasks associated with their jobs could be performed online. Obviously, that was not the case for workers whose jobs could only be performed at the workplace outside the home and who instead had to survive through furlough schemes that, in most countries, covered a significant part of their salaries but rarely compensated 100 percent of it. Consequently, COVID deepened income disparities between workers.

Regarding essential workers like nurses, grocery store employees or delivery people, their industries had to keep operating since they offer services and products that are necessary under any conditions. Therefore, while essential workers kept working and receiving their salaries, their working conditions deteriorated dramatically. This is obvious for healthcare workers who had to deal with the health crisis itself, but indirect changes occurred in other industries too. For instance, the duties of grocery store workers expanded significantly beyond their typical role as they had to maintain appropriate public health conditions for the customers and simultaneously protect themselves. In other words, COVID has deepened not only income disparities between blue and white-collar workers, but also increased occupational hazards for some of the most precarious occupations within the economy. Since long COVID remains an issue for many precarious workers there is discussion on whether it must officially be classified as an occupational disease (Limb 2021).

Interestingly, COVID also widened inequalities between white-collar workers. While the transition to remote work was possible for a fairly wide range of workers, the costs and conditions of working from home differ substantially. Typically, senior managers and highly paid professionals earn enough income to have residencies with separate office rooms and appropriate equipment. In contrast, lower-paid white-collar employees, particularly in big cities, live in smaller residencies. Thus, COVID left them with the option to either work in an inappropriate working environment within the home and potentially risk harming their mental and/or physical health. In the first case, recent studies show that inappropriate work spaces negatively affect mental health and work-life balance and also physical health in the absence of costly equipment like office chairs and computer monitors (Keightley et al. 2022). In the latter case, purchasing or renting a larger residency with a home office and necessary equipment shifts a major cost that typically firms provide to lower-tier white-collar workers. Even after COVID, many firms especially in large cities have closed down their downtown offices or moved to smaller hotdesking-dominated spaces (Fiorentino et al. 2022). This strategy ultimately shifts the costs of

the financialisation-fuelled real estate bubble from firms to workers allowing for bigger profit margins and leaving workers with even less disposable income. Given the ongoing hikes in interest rates which are increasing debt servicing costs and rents, the financial burden for workers becomes even greater, further suppressing consumption.

Another major implication of the shrinkage of traditional corporate-owned/rented office spaces is the rise of shared office spaces (Gabrielli and Fiorentino 2022). Initially, the target for such spaces has been freelancers and self-employed workers who could not afford their own offices. Yet, since COVID this has changed dramatically with a substantial number of dependent employees working in coworking spaces (Preß 2021). Even if the cost of renting a desk in a coworking space can be lower compared to moving to a large apartment or house with office space, it still constitutes a cost that has been shifted from employers to employees. Since interest rate hikes have also affected real estate prices and commercial rents for the companies offering co-working spaces, the cost of hiring a desk is likely to rise and employees working in such spaces face rising financial burdens.

6. Conclusions

The crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic triggered another major recession for finance-dominated capitalism. While health-related policies that were implemented as a means of halting the pandemic had major short-run implications for work, they also deepened pre-existing inequalities related to the current finance-dominated growth regime. The main change that COVID-19 brought to the world of work is the rise of remote and hybrid work. Working from home was much rarer in the past, but soon after the beginning of the pandemic, it became compulsory for a wide range of occupations. Interestingly, this development seems to be here to stay, as many large companies, especially in big urban centres have reduced significantly their physical office spaces and are instead making extensive use of remote work arrangements. While admittedly this process creates a number of managerial challenges for employers and work-life balance challenges for employees, its most important effect is that it shifts a major economic burden from employers to employees: the cost of renting office space or financing a real estate loan to purchase such a space. In this respect, one of the main challenges for governments and trade unions is to negotiate and engage in discussion about workplace regulation in this new 'hybrid' office environment. Yet, focusing on workspace regulation per se is not sufficient since this COVID-induced shift of real estate costs from employers to workers is directly linked to a much greater macro-level issue: the growth of the real estate bubble since the late 1970s.

On the macroeconomic and growth model side the post-COVID world is struggling with the very issues that already surfaced in Global Financial Crisis and the following secular stagnation. Key economies are in a finance-led growth model, which might be better characterized as a house price-led growth model. But house prices come with cycles that spread

through the entire financial system. They lead to periods of house price-led growth (during the boom) and house price-led busts. After the GFC this stagnation was, in part counteracted by fiscal policy and unconventional monetary policy. Post-COVID and with higher inflationary pressure this will work less: higher interest rates will undermine house price growth and increase pressures on fiscal policy for consolidation. Both are unhelpful to address the profound social problems societies are facing: the homeowner-oriented model of housing provision has not only led to financial instability, but it is also not providing adequate housing for working classes and is increasingly pricing younger generations and precarized parts of the working class out of the housing market. In times of climate change (and the care crisis) government strategic expenditures in the energy and transport sectors as well as in social infrastructure are urgently needed. In short, the neoliberal, finance-led growth model isn't working. Rather a shift to a state that is active on the demand side as well as the supply side of the economy and builds industrial relations institutions will be necessary.

Taken together, future research should strengthen the links between the growth models and the industrial relations and human resources literatures, which offers a fruitful area for future work. On the one hand, the growth models literature shows that improving working conditions and raising salaries is not only an issue of social justice but also a prerequisite for sustainable growth. On the other hand, better understanding workers' organising capacity and union power via an industrial relations lens is fundamental to understanding *how* we can improve working conditions in practice. Since macro level policies can have significant implications for labour militancy, it is essential to scrutinise how financial constraints for non-financial firms and households shape union membership as well as industrial action. In addition, the political side of growth models is also of great interest and significance, since not all workers lose from financialisation. Managerial, white-collar employees (particularly in the FIRE sectors) often enjoy significant bonuses linked to financial profits, which often makes them more conservative in terms of supporting a wage-led growth agenda. Therefore, investigating the links between mobilising such workers and political support for a wage-led policy agenda would be a most useful research agenda in terms of bringing this concept into practice.

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