

Jäger, Julian

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## Immigration and support for anti-immigrant parties in Europe

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WiSo-Forschungslabor  
Von-Melle-Park 5  
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# Immigration and Support for Anti-Immigrant Parties in Europe

Julian Jäger\*

Universität Hamburg, Germany

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## Abstract

My paper analyzes the link between immigration and support for anti-immigrant parties in Europe. I assemble a unique data set on the share of foreigners for 356 regions in 26 European countries and construct a novel scale for the anti-immigrant position of political parties. I find that Europeans are less supportive of anti-immigrant parties in regions with a higher share of foreigners, consistent with group contact theory. The negative association is driven by Europeans with pro-redistribution attitudes and is stronger among those with tertiary education, who live in the city, are in the labor force, of younger age, and female. I address several endogeneity concerns, e.g., using a shift-share instrumental variable approach, which provides evidence for a causal channel.

*Keywords:* Europe, Immigration, Political preferences

*JEL classification:* D72, J15, Z13

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# 1 Introduction

The topic of immigration has been dominating Europe’s political landscape since the first wave of foreign laborers and refugees arrived in the 1950s and 60s on European territory (Van Mol and de Valk 2016). Today, one in four Europeans regard immigration as one of the two most important issues within the EU (Eurobarometer 2021). Immigration also plays an increasingly relevant role in parties’ political agendas and parties that promote anti-immigrant policies record growing electoral successes.<sup>1</sup> While immigration is clearly a salient topic for Europeans and their political representatives, it is less clear what impact immigrants have on voting outcomes.

Cross-regional studies suggest a link between immigration and election results (e.g., Dustmann et al. 2019; Steinmayr 2021; Mayda et al. 2022). However, they focus on single countries, raising concerns about the external validity of their findings beyond country borders. Furthermore, scholars have so far ignored the individual level, which limits the possibility to test important mechanisms behind the formation of political preferences. I address both research gaps by analyzing the link between individual support for anti-immigrant parties in Europe and the share of foreigners within the region Europeans reside in for the time span from 2002 to 2018.

For this purpose, I assemble aggregate register and census data and construct a harmonized data set on the regional foreign share, i.e., non-natives, for up to 356 regions in 26 European countries. I match this novel data set with individual level data (N= 235,066) from the European Social Survey (ESS) waves 1-9. I measure individual anti-immigrant support as follows: Based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), I construct a unique scale for the anti-immigrant position of 311 political parties in Europe and match each individual to this scale based on the political party they claim to support. This scale allows me to capture Europe’s diverse political party landscape, where party families are not uniquely identifiable with respect to their cultural and economic positions, and makes party support comparable across countries. Exploiting the within-country variation in

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<sup>1</sup> In the 2019 EP elections, the far right was able to increase its vote share from about 20 to 25 percent (Gest et al. 2021).

each wave across regions, I regress individuals' support for anti-immigrant parties on the share of foreigners in their region.

My main finding is that support for anti-immigrant parties is lower in regions with a larger share of foreigners. In particular, Europeans are 13 percent of a standard deviation less supportive of anti-immigrant parties when the log regional foreign share is one standard deviation higher, conditional on a rich set of regional- and individual level control variables. This negative association is similar to the gender gap between female and male respondents in their support for anti-immigrant parties, equivalent to around two third of the educational gap between tertiary and primary educated respondents, or around ten percent of the partisan gap between supporters of radical right and moderate right parties. The negative association is mostly driven by Europeans with pro-redistribution attitudes and is stronger among respondents with tertiary education, who live in the city, are in the labor force, of younger age, and female.

I discuss potential sources of bias, among others, the possibility that the negative association results from non-random location choices of immigrants, who sort into regions with lower shares of anti-immigrant party supporters. The results are robust to using a classical shift-share (or past settlement) instrumental variable approach (Altonji and Card 1991; Card 2001), providing evidence for a causal channel.

My findings are consistent with group contact theory, which states that contact between members of different groups enhances mutual understanding and lowers prejudice towards out-group members (e.g., Allport 1954; Blumer 1958; Pettigrew 1998; Paluck et al. 2019). While the theory has been originally applied to prejudicial attitudes and behavior, my findings suggest that it also holds explanatory power for the formation of political preferences: Individuals seem to translate their positive experiences with immigrants into support for parties with a lower anti-immigrant political agenda. Additional analyses provide evidence for this reasoning: Exploiting the detailed questionnaires on immigration within the ESS rotating modules of waves 1 and 7, I find that Europeans who reside in more diverse regions have more likely immigrants in their circle of friends and those having immigrant friends are less supportive of anti-immigrant parties.

The negative relationship between the share of foreigners and support for anti-immigrant parties is in line with a number of studies, which find that contact with foreigners decreases right-wing party support (e.g., van der Waal et al. 2013; Steinmayr 2021; Levi et al. 2020; Lonsky 2021; Schneider-Strawczynski 2021; Gamalerio et al. 2022; Vertier et al. 2023). Other studies investigate the political consequences of a (relatively sudden) short-term exposure of foreigners and find that larger exposure increases the vote shares of right-wing parties (e.g., Halla et al. 2017; Dinas et al. 2019; Gessler and Wachs 2019; Hangartner et al. 2019; Campo et al. 2021). These findings do not necessarily contradict group contact theory, as short-term exposure is plausibly not sufficient in establishing bonds between natives and foreigners, eventually reducing the in-group bias among natives. Furthermore, Barone et al. (2016) and Dustmann et al. (2019) show that an inflow of refugees increases support for right-wing parties in rural areas, but turns insignificant or even negative in urban regions. The opposite effects in the cities are plausibly driven by citizens experiencing larger group contact with foreigners (Dustmann et al. 2019).

A major problem with previous studies is that they are prone to the ecological inference problem, which may arise when studies infer individual relationships from aggregate (regional) data (King 1997). Since group contact is a theory about the development of individual attitudes, my study design uses individual data and makes contact theory directly testable. I also extend this literature by focusing on a large sample of European countries, which makes my findings generalizable to the whole of Europe.

To my knowledge, there exist only three related studies, which analyze the association of the regional share of foreigners with individual political attitudes (Stockemer 2016; Moriconi et al. 2019, 2021). Stockemer (2016) combines census with ESS wave 6 data for 20 European countries and finds no association between the regional share of foreigners and the probability to vote for a radical right party. Moriconi et al. (2019, 2022), in turn, combine European Labor Force Survey data for 12 Western European countries with data from the ESS waves 5-8 and find that individuals who are in contact with high-skilled (low-skilled) foreigners are less (more) supportive of parties with a nationalist, anti-EU agenda and less supportive of parties that are more economically right-wing. In contrast

to these studies, I use a much larger sample of Western and Eastern European countries over a longer time span, relying on census (not survey) data. Furthermore, my focus is more nuanced, as I look at party support only along parties' position towards immigration, avoiding controversial party classifications, in particular, the on-going discussions about which parties actually belong to the radical right. The one-dimensionality of the scale, in turn, allows me to separate the cultural and political positions of parties, which usually do not coincide. In particular, while immigration underlies support for anti-immigrant parties, I find that it plays no role for Europeans' support for parties along the economic dimension.<sup>2</sup>

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data sources, variables, and descriptive results. Section 3 contains the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the results, discusses endogeneity concerns, robustness, additional results, and heterogeneity. Section 5 concludes.

## 2 Data sources, variables, and descriptive statistics

### 2.1 Data sources

To investigate the link between the regional share of foreigners and support for anti-immigrant parties, I rely on several different data sources. Data on support for anti-immigrant parties are drawn from waves 1-9 of the European Social Survey (ESS) and the years 2006, 2010, 2014, and 2019 of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). The individual level controls stem from the ESS. I collect data for my main explanatory variable, the regional share of foreigners, from 2001 and 2011 census or population register data of the 26 countries that are represented in the ESS: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. Data were provided by Eurostat

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<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, and in contrast to Moriconi et al.'s (2021) reasoning, parties' positions towards nationalism and the EU do not necessarily align: For instance, radical left and radical right parties have very different positions on immigration, but are both similarly skeptical towards the EU (based on my own calculations with the CHES).



(for details, see appendix table **C1**).<sup>3</sup> Data for the wave-specific regional shares of foreigners, used in the robustness checks, were provided by the national statistical offices, either on their websites or after contacting their staff via email or phone, and in few cases from the European Labor Force Survey (EU LFS) (see appendix table **C2**). The regional controls stem from national statistical offices, mostly provided by Eurostat (in some cases also by the national statistical offices directly), and the EU LFS. In the following, I provide details on the operationalization along with some descriptive statistics.

## 2.2 Support for anti-immigrant parties

To ensure comparability across different countries and to not conflate party positions on different topics, I classify political parties based on one single issue: their position towards immigration.<sup>4</sup> My classification is based on CHES (Jolly et al. 2022), which comprises expert surveys on political parties' policy platforms in Europe. CHES surveys are conducted by contacting party scholars to classify political parties in their country based on different issues, such as their stance towards the EU and specific cultural and economic policies. This dataset has several advantages, such as providing an impartial classification of parties, in contrast to e.g., party manifestos, which are written by the parties themselves and often serve a specific goal such as to win elections. Furthermore, the CHES is conducted roughly every four years, which allows me to account for changes in the parties' positions over time.

In a first step, I construct a scale for the survey years 2006, 2010, 2014, and 2019, based on the following three items in the CHES: position towards (i) *immigration policies*

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<sup>3</sup> Due to missing data in Eurostat for 2001, regional foreign shares for Belgium and Germany stem directly from the national statistical offices and for Greece from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS).

<sup>4</sup> Many cross-country studies analyze support for anti-immigrant parties by focusing on support for the radical right, which is comprised of parties with a strong anti-immigrant position (e.g., Rydgren 2008, Arzheimer 2009, Lucassen and Lubbers 2012, Eger and Valdez 2015, Rooduijn et al. 2017). One problem with this approach is the disagreement in the scientific community, which European parties actually belong to this party family and the number of controversial candidates (e.g., Lega Nord in Italy, Fidesz in Hungary, Fremskrittspartiet in Norway, or PiS in Poland) increases when parties are analyzed over a larger time span. Furthermore, party support is often operationalized with binary choice models, which does not represent realistic voting behavior, since individuals plausibly do not base their voting decisions on a 'one party vs. the rest' logic, but evaluate parties against each other. It also raises methodological issues due to the often very small vote shares of the radical right.

(strongly opposes (0) to strongly favors tough policy (10)), (ii) *multiculturalism* (strongly favors multiculturalism (0) to strongly favors assimilation (10)), and (iii) *ethnic minorities* (strongly favors (0) to strongly opposes more rights for ethnic minorities (10)).<sup>5</sup> For each party within each CHES year, I construct the scale by summing parties' scores on all three items and dividing it the number of items (correlation: >0.8, see appendix table **A2**).<sup>6</sup> The resulting scale denotes the anti-immigrant position of parties, ranging from 0 (pro-immigrant) to 10 (anti-immigrant).

To validate my scale, **Fig. 1** depicts the mean values of the anti-immigrant positions for different party families per survey year. I define moderate left, moderate right, liberal, and regionalist parties with the party family indicator in CHES. For the sake of clarity, I bundle social democratic, socialist, and Green parties into moderate left parties, and conservative and Christian democratic parties into moderate right parties. Classifications of radical left and radical right parties are controversial in the scientific community. Therefore, I use ThePopulist (Rooduijn et al. 2019), a cooperative project among the scientific experts, journalists, and The Guardian, which was initiated for the specific purpose to analyze these party families.


Fig. 1 shows an increasing anti-immigrant position from radical left, moderate left, over regionalist and liberal, up to moderate right, and radical right parties. This pattern shows that left-wing parties are rather pro-immigrant, whereas right-wing parties are rather anti-immigrant. Furthermore, the regionalist and liberal party families comprise a wide range of different parties and therefore hold on average a rather neutral position towards immigration. Lastly, the anti-immigrant positions within each party family are quite constant across the four survey years.<sup>7</sup> This consistency is remarkable, as the time interval 2006-2019 includes both the financial crisis in 2007/2008 and the so-called refugee crisis in 2015/2016, which could have shifted parties' positions towards immigration.

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<sup>5</sup> For details on the operationalization and summary statistics of the variables, see appendix table **C3** and **A1** respectively.

<sup>6</sup> There is missing data on Estonia, Norway, and Switzerland for 2006. I use the data for these countries from 2010 instead.

<sup>7</sup> The slight increase within the radical right party family is mainly driven by the Fidesz (Hungary), PiS (Poland), and SDS (Slovenia), which developed a much stronger anti-immigrant position over time.



Notes: Own calculations based on CHES.

**Fig. 1:** Anti-immigrant position of party families by CHES year

In a second step, I construct support for anti-immigrant parties by merging the anti-immigrant position identified for each party in CHES with the individual level data of the ESS based on the party that individuals claim to support. Following Lucassen and Lubbers (2012), party support is primarily based on the party respondents affiliate with. However, around half of the respondents in each wave do not affiliate with any party, but many still indicate the party they voted for in the last election. For these respondents, I use the party they voted for instead.<sup>8</sup> To account for the (even though small) differences in positions over time, I assign parties' anti-immigrant position from CHES year 2006 to the first three ESS waves, from CHES year 2010 to ESS waves 4-5, from CHES year 2014 to ESS waves 6-7, and from CHES year 2019 to the last two waves.<sup>9</sup> For the list of parties included in the ESS and their respective support shares per country in each wave,

<sup>8</sup> In my construction of the dependent variable, I prioritize party affiliation over party vote to construct their party preference, since affiliation measures party support at the time of fieldwork, while voting behavior measures retrospective support. It also allows me to include respondents in the sample that are not eligible to vote (including non-natives) but might still affiliate with a party. The main results are robust to excluding the small share of non-natives (around 2 percent) from the sample (see section 4.1).

<sup>9</sup> In few cases, adjustments needed to be made: Some parties in a specific ESS wave are not in the respective CHES year, but data exists on these parties in another year. For these parties, I substitute missing data in that year with data from the year that is closest to it. Furthermore, few parties are only present in the CHES year 1999 and 2002. However, the two CHES years before 2006 do not include the three questions on immigration, which I use to construct the anti-immigrant scale. For these parties, I use the their score on the variable *galtan* (position of the party in terms of its ideological position on democratic freedoms and rights) instead, since *galtan* and the anti-immigrant scale highly correlate.

see appendix table C4.

## 2.3 Regional share of foreigners

Most national statistical offices define foreigners either based on their country of birth or on their citizenship. I opted for a definition based on citizenship, as it includes foreigners who might have been born in the country but did not obtain the country's citizenship, since their parents are foreign citizens (contingent on the country's legislation).<sup>10</sup> These conceptual considerations should not be overstated, though, as the shares of foreigners defined by citizenship or country of birth are highly correlated.

For all 26 countries, there exist data on the regional share of foreigners based on census or population register data in 2001 and 2011, with regions mostly coded into the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS).<sup>11</sup> In the ESS, most of the regions that individuals reside in are based on NUTS. Therefore, the data can be merged relatively easily with the data on the regional share of foreigners. In the country-waves where other geographical coding was used, I re-code the NUTS regions to align with these regions (for details, see appendix table C1). I merge the regional level data from 2001 with individual level data of ESS waves 1-4 and the data from 2011 with the ESS waves 5-9. I obtain 356 unique regions for 198 country-waves, of which 26 country-waves include regions at NUTS 1, 94 country-waves include regions at NUTS 2, 69 country-waves include regions at NUTS 3, and 9 country-waves include regions with a different coding scheme.

**Fig. 2** depicts the distribution of the regional shares of foreigners in the 26 countries for 2011.<sup>12</sup> We see substantial variation across regions, which does not simply reflect differences between countries as the regional shares largely vary within many countries. The regional share of foreigners ranges for the whole sample from 0.03 percent in Sud-Vest


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<sup>10</sup> This definition is particularly apt for the Baltic States of Latvia and Estonia, since they host large minorities of ethnic Russians who were mostly born in these countries but do not have a citizenship.

<sup>11</sup> NUTS coding is roughly based on population size, where NUTS 1 regions comprise 3 to 7 million inhabitants, NUTS 2 regions of 800 thousand to 3 million inhabitants, and NUTS 3 regions of 150 up to 800 thousand inhabitants.

<sup>12</sup> The distribution is similar for 2001. I chose an illustration for 2011 only, as for some country samples in the ESS the NUTS level changes over time (see appendix table C1).


Oltenia (Romania) up to 54.20 percent in Kirde-Eesti (Estonia).



*Notes:* Own depiction based on census and register data.

**Fig. 2:** Share of foreigners across regions in 2011 for the 26 ESS countries

**Fig. 3** depicts the distribution of the share of foreigners by region for 2011. The distribution is right-skewed with a median of 4.04 percent. Furthermore, in 71 regions, the foreign share is below one percent (all of these are in Central-Eastern Europe), while in 53 regions it is higher than ten percent (spread across different areas).



*Notes:* Own depiction based on census and register data.

**Fig. 3:** Percentage share of foreigners at regional level (2011)

## 2.4 Control variables

I control for several regional and individual factors to account for potential confounding factors and to increase the precision of the estimates in the regression models. At the regional level, I include the gross domestic product per capita, unemployment rate, share of tertiary educated, population size, and population density. At the individual level, I account for respondents' redistribution preferences, political trust, religiosity, age, employment status, education, perceived economic security, if their father, and if their mother is foreign born.

## 2.5 Missing values

I remove all respondents from the sample with missing data on the party they support. These are respondents who do not affiliate with any party and also do not indicate any party they voted for. Consequently, I lose around one third of the respondents within each wave due to missing data on that variable. I find a high overlap in missing values between respondents who did not vote and who, thus, also do not identify with a specific party. In particular, respondents who abstained from voting (around 22 percent) and respondents who were not eligible to vote (around 7.5 percent) make up by far the

largest share of respondents with missing data on that variable (the remaining share comprises respondents who did not know which party they voted for or affiliate with, refused to answer the questions, or who support fringe parties that are not included in the CHES). Missing values might harm the internal validity of my findings, if party support is contingent on the share of foreigners in the region respondents reside in. Results of appendix table **A3** show no significant association between the regional share of foreigners and the probability to support a political party.

I also remove all respondents with missing answers on any of the control variables, which reduces the sample size within each wave by additional 6-9 percent. In total, I obtain 235,066 individuals, residing in 356 regions within 26 European countries, who support 311 political parties over the time span of 2002 to 2018.

### 3 Empirical strategy

For my main analysis, I estimate the following linear regression model:

$$AIS_{ircw} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 F_{ry} + \lambda_{ry} + \gamma_{iw} + \theta_{cw} + \epsilon_{ircw} \quad (1)$$

where the outcome variable, anti-immigrant support ( $AIS_{ircw}$ ), measures the support for anti-immigrant parties of individual  $i$  in region  $r$ , country  $c$ , and ESS wave  $w$ . The variable of interest is  $F_{ry}$ , the regional share of foreigners in the year 2001 (ESS waves 1-4) and 2011 (ESS waves 5-9). I take the logarithm of the regional share, due to the skewed distribution of the share of foreigners across regions (see Fig. 3 in section 2).  $\lambda_{ry}$  denotes the regional controls (log GDP per capita, unemployment rate, share of tertiary educated, log population size, and log population density).  $\gamma_{iw}$  denotes the individual controls for each wave (redistribution preferences, political trust, religiosity, age, employment status, education, perceived economic security, and indicators for whether their father or mother is foreign born).  $\theta_{cw}$  represents country-wave fixed effects. By adding the country-wave-dummies, I exploit the cross-regional variation in the share of foreigners within each country per wave. This specification allows me to control for any higher

order correlations between the regions, since they are nested in the same country and wave. Lastly,  $\epsilon_{ircw}$  denotes the error term. I follow the advise by Abadie et al. (2023) and cluster standard errors at the regional level, due to stratified sampling applied in the ESS where countries are first divided into regions and within these, individuals are interviewed based on randomization.

To address concerns of reverse causality, i.e., immigrants settling into regions with lower shares of supporters for anti-immigrant parties, I also use a classical shift-share (Card, 1991) or 'past settlement' (Jaeger, 2018) instrument for the regional share of foreigners. In constructing the instrument, I leverage the fact that immigrants usually sort into regions where their national peers already live, based on existing networks. My approach is as follows: For most countries in the sample (N=23), the census data contain information on the origins of foreigners. These origins are 14 EU member states (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) and eight country-groups (new EU member states, EFTA, rest of Europe, North Africa, rest of Africa, America, Asia, and Oceania). I use the data of the regional share of foreigners by origin in the census year 2001 in Europe (represented by the 23 countries in the sample) and the absolute number of foreigners by origin in Europe in 2011 to predict the share of foreigners per region in 2011 in Europe.<sup>13</sup>

Specifically, I firstly calculate the native share (NS) and foreign share (FS) by origin ( $o$ ) per region ( $r$ ) in Europe ( $EU$ ) in 2001:

$$NS_{EU,r,01} = \frac{N_{r,01}}{\sum_r N_{r,01}} \quad \text{and} \quad FS_{o,r,01} = \frac{F_{o,r,01}}{\sum_r F_{o,r,01}} \quad (2)$$

Next, I predict the number of natives and foreigners by origin per region in Europe in 2011 by multiplying the shares of natives and foreigners by origin in 2001 with the absolute number of natives ( $N_{11}$ ) and foreigners by origin ( $F_{o,11}$ ) in 2011 and calculate for the latter the sum of shares across all origins:

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<sup>13</sup> Denmark is excluded from the sample due to changes in the classification system of regions between 2001 and 2011, which are not recodable. Greece is excluded due to missing data. Romania is excluded, as it only participated in ESS waves 3 and 4.



$$\hat{N}_{r,11} = NS_{EU,r,01}N_{11} \quad \text{and} \quad \hat{F}_{r,11} = \Sigma_o FS_{o,r,01}F_{o,11} \quad (3)$$

Lastly, I predict the share of foreigners per region in 2011 by dividing the predicted share of foreigners in each region in 2011 ( $\hat{F}_{r,11}$ ) with the predicted population size in that region in 2011 ( $\hat{P}op_{r,11} = \hat{N}_{r,11} + \hat{F}_{r,11}$ ):

$$\hat{F}S_{r,11} = \frac{\hat{F}_{r,11}}{\hat{P}op_{r,11}} \quad (4)$$

## 4 Results

### 4.1 Main finding

**Table 1** displays the OLS estimates for Equation 1. Column (1) shows the specification with only country-wave fixed effects and reveals a statistically significant negative association between the logarithm of the regional share of foreigners and individual support for anti-immigrant parties. This association is quite robust: Adding regional controls in column (2) and individual controls in column (3) reduces the size of the coefficient by less than 15 percent and the coefficient remains statistically significant at the 1%-level.

Conditional on the regional and individual controls, Europeans are by 13 percent of a standard deviation less supportive of anti-immigrant parties when the log regional foreign share increases by one standard deviation (standard deviation: 1.28, as shown in appendix table **A1**). The coefficient size is equivalent to 44 percent of the partisan gap between moderate left and radical left party supporters (difference: 0.295) and more than 11 percent of the gap between moderate right and radical right party supporters (difference: 1.118) (see Fig. **A1**). Furthermore, the association is similar in size to the difference between female and male respondents ( $-0.129$ ) and equivalent to 63 percent of the educational gap between tertiary and primary educated ( $-0.204$ ) in their support for anti-immigrant parties (see appendix table **A4**). Both, gender and education, are very consistent predictors of the support for anti-immigrant parties (e.g., Immerzeel et

al. 2015, Savelkoul and Scheepers 2017). So, the estimated association in column (3) is quite sizable.

Table 1: Foreigners and support for anti-immigrant parties

	Anti-immigrant support		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Foreign share (log)	-0.118*** (0.018)	-0.111*** (0.031)	-0.101*** (0.028)
Observations	235,066	235,066	235,066
R <sup>2</sup>	0.113	0.115	0.167
Country-wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional controls		Yes	Yes
Individual controls			Yes

*Notes:* Dependent variable is a standardized (std) scale of support for anti-immigrant political parties (with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one). Regional controls include GDP per capita (log), unemployment rate, share of tertiary educated, population size (log), and population density (log). Individual controls include anti-redistribution preferences (std), political trust (std), religiosity (std), perceived economic security (ref. not secure), female (ref. male), having a native father (ref. foreign born), having a native mother (ref. foreign born), living in the city (ref. suburban/rural), education (primary, secondary, tertiary), age (std), and employment status (working, in education, unemployed, retired/disabled, other). Robust standard errors clustered at regional level are shown in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

## 4.2 Endogeneity concerns

The main threat to identifying an unbiased connection between the regional share of foreigners and support for anti-immigrant parties is self-selection. Applied to my setting, self-selection means that people do not randomly sort into regions, but choose, at least to a certain extent, the locations they want to reside in.

*Confounding:* One major concern related to such self-selection is that immigrants might choose to live in regions that are economically more prosperous, so-called ‘welfare magnets’ (Borjas 1999). If individuals’ party support is contingent on the economic prosperity of the region they live in, the obtained negative association in my main analysis might be spurious. The results in Table 1 provide evidence against the ‘welfare

magnet hypothesis’, as they are robust to adding as potential confounders three proxies for economic prosperity: GDP per capita, unemployment rate, and the share of tertiary educated.

Furthermore, it is possible that foreigners’ location choices are driven by the welfare generosity of their location. As welfare policies are largely determined at the national level, I can rule out as far as possible this potential bias, since the country-wave fixed effects in the models control for any higher-level economic characteristics that regions from one country potentially share. My results are also robust to adding the region’s net disposable income relative to the average national income as another measure for economic prosperity, the number of hospital beds per hundred thousand as a measure for public good provision, and the crime rate as a measure of security within the region (appendix table **B1**).

*Reverse causality:* Another major concern related to self-selection is that immigrants might sort into regions where support for anti-immigrant parties is lower or that supporters of anti-immigrant parties themselves sort into regions with lower shares of foreigners, since they prefer to live in culturally homogeneous regions. In both cases, the estimated coefficient in Table 1 would be biased upward. I address this concern with a classical *shift-share* instrumental variable approach (for the construction of the instrument, see section 3). In particular, I regress support for anti-immigrant parties in ESS waves 5-9 on the instrumented regional share of foreigners in 2011. The advantage of the shift-share instrument is that it ”generates variation at the local level by exploiting variation in national inflows, which are arguably less endogenous with regard to local conditions” (Jaeger et al. 2018, p.5). Applied to my setting, the instrument relies on the assumption that past (2001) settlement of foreigners affects anti-immigrant support in ESS waves 5-9 only via its predictive power of the current (2011) regional share of foreigners.

Results of **Table 2** reveal very similar results for the OLS and 2SLS estimates. The slightly lower IV coefficient (around ten percent lower) could be the result of correcting the mentioned upward bias of the OLS coefficient. Furthermore, the first stage coefficient is large, has the expected sign, and is statistically significant. Lastly, the F-statistic

equals 104.93, which means that the IV estimate does not suffer from the issue of weak instruments. Overall, results of Table 2 provide further evidence against a self-selection bias that could have driven the negative association found in my main analysis.

Table 2: Shift share instrument - 2SLS estimates

	Anti-immigrant party support		Foreign share (log)
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) 1st stage
Foreign share 2011 (log)	-0.122*** (0.007)	-0.110*** (0.010)	
Foreign share 2011 predicted (log)			0.654*** (0.002)
IV F-statistic		104.93	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.196		0.955
Observations	116,965	116,965	116,965

*Notes:* Each model includes country-wave fixed effects, regional controls, and individual controls. Dependent variable in models 1-2 is a standardized (std) scale of support for anti-immigrant political parties (with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one) and in model 3 the regional share of foreigners in 2011 (log). For a description of control variables included, see table 1. Given data limitations, countries not included are DK, GR, and RO. Robust standard errors clustered at regional level are shown in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

An important criticism of the validity of the exclusion restriction is that past regional foreign shares from specific country origins might be endogenous to unobservable regional characteristics, and these unobservable characteristics, in turn, could have persistent confounding effects on anti-immigrant support in 2011 (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. 2020). This criticism, however, is less valid for the situation of Europe where the composition of foreigners by origin varies strongly over time. This is particularly the case for the time period between 2001 and 2011, since the EU Eastern enlargements in 2004 substantially increased the share of foreigners from Eastern Europe in their Western counterparts. Due to this immigration shock the shifts of foreigners between 2001 and 2011 should not (or at least much less likely) be serially correlated. Furthermore, the IV estimates are not driven by any specific country of origin, as they are robust to constructing the instrument by excluding one country of origin at a time (see appendix table **B8**). Although the data at hand do not allow me to address other relevant criticisms (Adao et al. 2019, Borusyak et al. 2022) of shift-share IV applications, my results strongly suggest a negative

causal connection between the regional share of foreigners and support for anti-immigrant parties.

*Measurement error:* Parties' cultural and economic positions overlap to a certain degree. Therefore, the found association between support for parties along the anti-immigrant dimension and the regional foreign share could be driven by parties' economic position instead. I test this by including a covariate in the models, which measures the support for parties along their position towards redistribution (ranging from pro- vs. anti-redistribution). Parties' anti-redistribution position is based on the following four items in the CHES: parties' position on (i) *economic issues in general* (extreme left (0) to extreme right (10)), (ii) *taxes* (strongly favors improving public services (0) to strongly favors reducing taxes (10)), (iii) *deregulation* (strongly opposes deregulation of markets (0) to strongly supports deregulation of markets (10)), and (iv) *redistribution* (strongly favors redistribution (0) to strongly opposes redistribution (10)). I then sum up parties' scores on each item, divide it by the number of items (correlation >0.9, see appendix table **A2**) and assign this scale to each individual in the ESS based on the political party they claim to support.

Table 3: Foreigners and support for anti-redistribution parties

	Anti-immigrant	Anti-redistribution		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Foreign share (log)	-0.085*** (0.021)	-0.004 (0.024)	-0.038 (0.034)	-0.027 (0.027)
Anti-redistribution	0.562*** (0.024)			
Observations	235,066	235,066	235,066	235,066
R <sup>2</sup>	0.447	0.034	0.039	0.113
Country-wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional controls	Yes		Yes	Yes
Individual controls	Yes			Yes

*Notes:* Dependent variables are standardized (std) scales; in models 1-2 a scale of support for anti-immigrant political parties (with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one), and in models 3-5 a scale of support for anti-redistribution parties. For a description of control variables included, see table 1. Robust standard errors clustered at regional level are shown in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Results in column (1) of **Table 3** reveal a robust coefficient of the association between regional foreign share and support for anti-immigrant parties, when additionally including anti-redistribution party support. The slightly smaller estimate (relative to the main estimate of  $-0.101$  in the full model of Table 1) could in fact be driven by the correlation between parties' cultural and economic positions. As a placebo test, I regress support for anti-redistribution parties directly on the regional share of foreigners. Columns (2)-(4) reveal much smaller, though negative, and statistically insignificant coefficients. This finding additionally confirms that my main estimates reveal support for parties along the anti-immigrant dimension (and not along the economic dimension). It also shows that Europeans do not react to foreigners in their support for anti-redistribution parties the same way they do in their support for anti-immigrant parties.

### 4.3 Additional robustness checks

I conduct several additional robustness checks for my finding of a negative association between the regional share of foreigners and support for anti-immigrant parties in Europe.

*Foreigners' origins:* Some studies focus on immigrants from specific origins or find heterogeneous effects across, e.g., foreigners from Western and non-Western countries (e.g., Gerdes and Wadensjö 2008; Brunner and Kuhn 2014; Mendez and Cutillas 2014; Becker and Fetzer 2016; Harmon 2017; Edo et al. 2019). Therefore, I test if foreigners from different origins drive the results. I cluster foreigners into four broad country groups (EU, Asia, America, Africa) and find no evidence that any of these specific origins drive the results (appendix table **B2**). However, the association is significantly more negative for foreigners from other EU countries relative to the rest of origins. This finding suggests that contact with foreigners who are geographically (and thus often culturally) closer to oneself strengthens social bonds with each other.

*Party families:* Studies so far have analyzed election outcomes for parties from specific party families, e.g., moderate or radical right parties. Therefore, I test if any specific party family drives the results by excluding supporters of specific party families (radical left, moderate left, liberal, regionalist, moderate right, radical right, and other). I exclude

each party at a time from the sample and find a robust association between the foreign share and support for anti-immigrant parties (appendix table **B3**). Most relevant here is that the main results are not driven simply by supporters of the radical right, which comprises parties with the strongest anti-immigrant position (see Fig. 1 in section 2).

*Wave-specific foreign shares:* One potential caveat of my empirical strategy is that I merge nine ESS waves with only two census years. I tackle this concern with intercensus and register data collected for most of the countries from national statistical offices.<sup>14</sup> Merging the nine ESS waves with the specific regional foreign shares within each wave reveals a similarly high, negative, and statistically significant coefficient as in the main analysis (appendix table **B4**). The robustness of my results might also stem from the fact that the foreign shares across regions do not vary much over time.

*Regions:* Due to the skewed cross-regional distribution of foreigners, I test if regions with specifically high or low foreign shares drive the results. I find robust coefficients when excluding regions with foreign shares lower than one, two, or up to five percent or when excluding regions with more than ten, 20, or 30 percent of foreigners (see appendix table **B5** for this and the following results). Furthermore, the number of regions varies between three (in ESS waves 1-4 for Belgium) and 40 (in ESS waves 1-4 for the Netherlands) per country-wave and therefore some regions comprise low numbers of respondents within a region. My main results are not sensitive to these regions, since I find robust coefficients when excluding regions with less than 100 or 200 respondents. Lastly, Dustmann et al. (2019) find an urban-rural divide for Denmark in the political response to immigration. In particular, urban regions seem to respond, if at all, positively towards refugee inflows, i.e., causing lower vote shares for anti-immigrant parties, whereas rural regions respond negatively. To test for this driver, I exclude all capital regions (those most densely populated) from the sample and find robust coefficients.

*Models and samples:* To account for differences in party support between native and non-native respondents (those with an immigrant background), I added dummies in the

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<sup>14</sup> I could not obtain data for respondents in waves 3-5 from Bulgaria, in waves 2-4 from Estonia, in waves 2 and 4 from Greece, in wave 4 from Ireland, in wave 3 from Latvia, in waves 4 and 6-9 from Lithuania, in both waves from Romania, and in waves 2-4 from Slovenia.

main analysis denoting if a respondent’s father and mother is native. I additionally restrict the sample to only respondents with a citizenship of the country they reside in (close to 98 percent) and find a robust coefficient (see appendix table **B6** for this and the following results). I also control for potential differences due to sampling error and potential non-response bias. Applying (design and post-stratification) weights reveals a robust coefficient. Results are also robust to using the non-log regional share of foreigners and to adding a quadratic function. For the latter, I find a robust coefficient for the non-quadratic term, but a coefficient that is zero and statistically insignificant for the quadratic term. The insignificance of the quadratic term reveals that the association between support for anti-immigrant parties and the regional foreign share is not contingent on the specific size of the latter. In contrast, the findings suggest a linear relationship between the regional share of foreigners and support for anti-immigrant parties. Lastly, I also conduct robustness checks for the IV estimations. The IV results are robust to using the non-log regional share of foreigners, to excluding all regions with missing data from the sample (appendix table **B7**), and to excluding one country of origin at a time in constructing the instrument (appendix table **B8**).<sup>15</sup>

#### 4.4 Group contact

The negative association displayed in Table 1 is consistent with group contact theory (e.g., Allport 1954; Blumer 1958; Pettigrew 1998; Brown and Hewstone 2005; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006; Paluck et al. 2019). The theory’s basic idea is that individuals who are in contact with foreigners interact with them, learn about them, and, due to these interactions, reduce their prejudices towards them. While this theory was initially developed in psychology to analyze prejudicial attitudes and behavior, my results reveal that it might also have explanatory power for individuals’ political preferences. In particular, individuals who live in regions with larger shares of foreigners are less willing to support parties that promote more restrictive policies towards immigrants.

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<sup>15</sup> Missing data on country origins exist mostly for regions where the number of foreigners from this origin is close to zero. For that reason, I included these regions in the main estimations as regions with zero number of foreigners from this country of origin.



One problem with my application is that contact theory was originally developed in small-scale settings, where individual contact is directly measurable. For instance, Allport (1954) studies interactions between white and Black U.S. Americans on a U.S. navy military boat after desegregation of the U.S. military. In contrast, I investigate individual attitudes who live in regions with around 100 thousand inhabitants (like Tauragė county in Lithuania) up to regions with populations of close to 20 million (like North Rhine-Westphalia in Germany). Some may doubt that for these large-scale regions intergroup contact is actually measurable.

To further corroborate the interpretation that group contact could drive the results, I use more fine-grained individual level data in the ESS. Waves 1 and 7 include rotating modules on immigration where respondents were asked whether they have any immigrants as friends: "Do you have any friends who have come to live in [country] from another country?" in wave 1 and "Do you have any close friends who are of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?" in wave 7. Though the content of these questions differ somewhat from one another, answer categories are the same (several, a few and zero) and answers provided to both questions are quite similar for each country between wave 1 and wave 7. Thus, I treat both questions as effectively measuring contact with foreigners in their circle of friends and code it as a dummy, denoting one if individuals have several or a few foreigners as friends and zero if they have none at all.

In a first step, I regress this 'friends dummy' on the regional share of foreigners. Results in column (1) of **Table 4** reveal a statistically significant positive association, which is also robust when additional regional and individual control variables are added to the model (column (2)). Focusing on the full model, a one standard deviation increase in the log regional share of foreigners (standard deviation: 1.37) increases the probability to have foreigners as friends by around thirteen percentage points. This result provides evidence that the regional share of foreigners can be interpreted, at least partly, as an indicator for intergroup contact.

In a second step, I regress support for anti-immigrant parties on the friends dummy. Results in columns (3) and (4) show that individuals who state having foreigners as

Table 4: Foreigners as friends and support for anti-immigrant parties

	Foreigners as friends		Anti-immigrant support	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Foreign share (log)	0.131*** (0.010)	0.093*** (0.015)		
Foreigners as friends			-0.196*** (0.018)	-0.121*** (0.015)
Observations	48,325	48,325	48,325	48,325
R <sup>2</sup>	0.080	0.160	0.114	0.168
Country-wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional controls		Yes		Yes
Individual controls		Yes		Yes

*Notes:* Dependent variable in models 1-2 is a binary denoting one if respondent has foreigners as friends and zero otherwise and in models 3-4 a standardized scale of support for anti-immigrant political parties (with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one). For a description of control variables included, see table 1. Countries not included in either wave 1 or 7 are BG, LV, RO, and SK. Robust standard errors clustered at regional level are shown in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

friends are by 0.121 standard deviations less supportive of anti-immigrant parties. This second finding validates my interpretation that intergroup contact in fact reduces support for anti-immigrant parties. Although I cannot establish a definite mechanism between immigration and party support, results in Table 4 are strongly suggestive of intergroup contact driving the negative association shown in my main estimation.

## 4.5 Heterogeneity

In this section, I test if individuals with specific socio-demographic characteristics or attitudes drive the negative association found in my main estimation between immigration and support for anti-immigrant parties. Taking as baseline the full model in Table 1, I interact in **Table 5** the log regional share of foreigners with different socio-demographic indicators, which are often used as explanatory factors for political party support (full set of coefficients from the interactions, see appendix table **A5**).

Results in columns (1)-(5) reveal that the negative association is stronger among respondents who are tertiary educated, in the labor force, live in the city, are female, and younger. The findings on education are in line with studies showing lower prejudice

Table 5: Heterogeneity across socio-demographics

	Anti-immigrant support				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Foreign share (log)	-0.093*** (0.029)	-0.094*** (0.029)	-0.093*** (0.029)	-0.089*** (0.028)	-0.111*** (0.029)
Foreign share (log) x Tertiary educ.	-0.030** (0.012)				
Foreign share (log) x Labor force		-0.010*** (0.006)			
Foreign share (log) x City			-0.033*** (0.009)		
Foreign share (log) x Female				-0.021*** (0.005)	
Foreign share (log) x Older age					0.021*** (0.007)
Observations	235,066	235,066	235,066	235,066	235,066
R <sup>2</sup>	0.167	0.166	0.167	0.167	0.167

*Notes:* Each model includes country-wave fixed effects, regional controls, and individual controls. Dependent variable is a standardized (std) scale of support for anti-immigrant political parties (with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one). The logarithm of the regional share of foreigners is interacted with a dummy denoting 1 if respondents are tertiary educated (ref. primary/secondary), are in the labor force (ref. in education/retired/disabled/other), live in the city (ref. suburban/rural), are female (ref. male), and are older than median age in the sample (ref. below 51 years). For a description of control variables included, see table 1 (excluded controls are 'education' in model 1, 'employment status' in model 2, and 'age' in model 5, as the dummies are used instead). Robust standard errors clustered at regional level are shown in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

towards immigrants among higher educated individuals (e.g., Dustmann and Preston 2007, Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007, Rustenbach 2010). Though scholars have found no systematic differences between women's and men's attitudes towards immigrants (for an overview, see Dražanová 2022), the detected gender gap is consistent with studies reporting a gender gap in support for radical right parties (e.g., Immerzeel et al. 2015). The results on respondents' residence and labor market status are consistent with group contact theory, since the likelihood of contact increases at work and when living in more densely populated regions. Lastly, the different association along age confirms results of previous studies that find an age gap in individual party support; specifically, a higher propensity to vote for authoritarian and populist parties (Norris and Inglehart 2019).

The association is negative and significant among all sub-groups, which means that intergroup contact plays a role across different social positions in society. This is in line

with the present state of research, which shows low correlations between respondents' economic characteristics and their attitudes towards immigration (for an overview, see Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014).

Table 6: Heterogeneity across attitudes

	Anti-immigrant support		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Foreign share (log)	-0.110*** (0.029)	-0.100*** (0.028)	-0.091*** (0.028)
Foreign share (log) x Anti-redistribution pref.	0.106*** (0.009)		
Foreign share (log) x Political trust		-0.005 (0.006)	
Foreign share (log) x Religiosity			-0.011 (0.009)
Observations	235,066	235,066	235,066
R <sup>2</sup>	0.162	0.164	0.163

*Notes:* Each model includes country-wave fixed effects, regional controls, and individual controls. Dependent variable is a standardized (std) scale of support for anti-immigrant political parties (with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one). The logarithm of the regional share of foreigners is interacted with a dummy denoting 1 if respondents have anti-redistribution preferences (ref. neutral or pro-redistribution, those who neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree with the statement that the government should take measures to reduce income differences), are politically trustful (ref. politically mistrustful, those who score 5 or lower on the political trust scale), and are quite religious (ref. not very/not at all religious, those who score 5 or lower on the religiosity scale). For a description of control variables included, see table 1 (excluded controls are 'anti-redistribution preferences' in model 1, 'political trust' in model 2, and 'religiosity' in model 3, as the dummies are used instead). Robust standard errors clustered at regional level are shown in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table 6** shows heterogeneity across attitudes by interacting the log regional share of foreigners with different attitudes (full set of coefficients from the interactions, see appendix table **A6**). Results in column (1) reveal a negative and significant association between the regional share of foreigners and support for anti-immigrant parties among respondents who hold pro-redistribution preferences. In contrast, the association is significantly smaller and close to zero among respondents with anti-redistribution attitudes. The result could mean that individuals who are in favor of sharing with others in society, by advocating a state that ensures redistribution, are also more willing to share resources and goods with outsiders. Lastly, columns (3) and (4) show no significant differences

along respondents' political trust or their religiosity.

## 5 Conclusion

Europe will remain an important destination for immigrants. One important reason for this are the globally rising refugee inflows: By May 2022, the number of people who had fled their country due to war, persecution, or human rights violations exceeded the 100 million mark.<sup>16</sup> This upward trend has been greatly driven by the displacement of many Ukrainians, who have fled their country after the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24 2022, and of which three million already took refuge in the EU (as of December 2022). Another major factor is the labor shortage within the EU, in particular the gap in labor demand and supply of skilled workers (Eurofound 2021). This shortage has steadily increased over last decade, with job vacancy rates at an all-time high of 2.3 percent in 2019. Given the fact that Europe is becoming increasingly culturally diverse, how do European citizens react to this immigration?

This paper presents evidence that Europeans who are in contact with foreigners are less supportive of parties that promote anti-immigrant policies. My finding is in line with group contact theory, which states that contact between members of different groups enhances mutual understanding towards each other, and suggests that inter-group contact also affects Europeans' political preferences. The negative association between the regional share of foreigners and support for anti-immigrant parties is driven by respondents with pro-redistribution attitudes and is stronger among those who are tertiary educated, live in the city, are in the labor force, younger, and female.

Due to the fact that immigrants usually sort into regions with existing peer networks, regional disparities in voting behavior might become more and not less severe in the future. This will aggravate already existing polarization across and within European states. To tackle these disparities, the EU could, e.g., invest more resources into policy instruments such as the Cohesion Fund, which supports economically less prosperous

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<sup>16</sup> “UNHCR: Ukraine, other conflicts push forcibly displaced total over 100 million for first time” (<https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2022/5/628a389e4/unhcr-ukraine-other-conflicts-push-forcibly-displaced-total-100-million.html>, accessed November 28, 2022).

regions. Investment could make these regions more attractive to foreigners, increase their cultural diversity and – as a result of inter-group contact – make their citizens less supportive of anti-immigrant parties.

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


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## Appendix A: Additional Results



**Fig. A1:** Mean values of support for anti-immigrant parties (standardized) by party family

Table A1: Summary statistics

Variables	Mean	SD	Min	Max
<i>Individual level</i>				
Anti-immigrant party support (std)	0	1	-2.34	2.36
Anti-redistribution party support (std)	0	1	-2.26	2.36
Anti-redistribution preferences (std)	0	1	-1.12	2.69
Political trust (std)	0	1	-2.17	2.45
Religiosity (std)	0	1	-1.55	1.79
Age	50.61	17.50	14	103
Living in city	0.32	0.46	0	1
Working	0.55	0.50	0	1
In education	0.05	0.21	0	1
Unemployed	0.05	0.21	0	1
Retired/disabled	0.29	0.46	0	1
Other	0.06	0.24	0	1
Primary	0.25	0.44	0	1
Secondary	0.45	0.50	0	1
Tertiary	0.30	0.46	0	1
Female	0.52	0.50	0	1
Perceived economic security	0.79	0.40	0	1
Mother native	0.91	0.29	0	1
Father native	0.91	0.29	0	1
Foreigners as friends	0.49	0.50	0	1
<i>Regional level</i>				
Foreign share (log)	1.25	1.28	-3.54	3.99
Foreign share	6.16	6.22	0.03	54.20
GDP per capita (log)	9.96	0.79	7.09	11.63
Unemployment rate	8.67	5.21	1.30	30.10
Tertiary educated share	16.94	6.47	3.38	34.73
Population size (log)	14.10	1.15	10.24	16.71
Population density (log)	4.96	1.35	0.69	8.87

*Notes:* The table shows summary statistics for all individuals in waves 1-9 without missing data (N=235,066) and for the respective regions they reside in. Data for the variable "Foreigners as friends" exists only for wave 1 and 7 (N=48,325). 'std' means the variable is standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. 'log' means the logarithm is taken of the variable.

Table A2: Cross-correlations of party positions

Positions on...	v1	v2	v3	v4	v5	v6	v7
immigration policy (v1)	1.00						
multiculturalism (v2)	0.93	1.00					
ethnic minorities (v3)	0.88	0.89	1.00				
economic issues (v4)	0.51	0.48	0.47	1.00			
improving public services vs. reducing taxes (v5)	0.54	0.51	0.5	0.95	1.00		
deregulation of markets (v6)	0.41	0.38	0.36	0.95	0.93	1.00	
redistribution of wealth from rich to poor (v7)	0.50	0.48	0.47	0.95	0.94	0.93	1.00

*Notes:* The table shows cross-correlations of party positions on immigration and redistribution.

Table A3: Predictors of support for political parties

	Party support (ref. no)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Foreign share (log)	-0.000 (0.006)	-0.011 (0.009)	0.004 (0.007)
Observations	343,904	343,904	343,904
Country-wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes

*Notes:* This table shows results of linear probability models. Dependent variable is a dummy denoting one if a respondent supports any political party and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at regional level are shown in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table A4: Coefficients of control variables in Table 1

	Anti-immigrant support		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Foreign share (log)	-0.118*** (0.018)	-0.111*** (0.031)	-0.101*** (0.028)
Gdp per capita (log)		0.010 (0.061)	0.012 (0.054)
Unemployment rate		-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.011*** (0.003)
Share tertiary educ.		-0.003 (0.003)	0.001* (0.003)
Population size (log)		0.024 (0.015)	0.018*** (0.014)
Population density (log)		-0.024 (0.015)	0.002 (0.014)
Anti-redistribution preferences			0.141*** (0.008)
Perceived security (ref. not secure)			0.045*** (0.009)
Political trust			-0.063*** (0.008)
Religiosity			0.109*** (0.007)
Female			-0.129*** (0.008)
Father native (ref. foreign born)			0.158*** (0.016)
Mother native (ref. foreign born)			0.111*** (0.015)
Living in city (ref. suburban/rural)			-0.103*** (0.009)
Secondary educated (ref. primary)			-0.006 (0.010)
Tertiary educated (ref. primary)			-0.204*** (0.018)
Age			0.016*** (0.006)
In education (ref. working)			-0.175*** (0.017)
Unemployed (ref. working)			-0.041*** (0.011)
Retired/disabled (ref. working)			0.034*** (0.008)
Other (ref. working)			0.069*** (0.010)

*Notes:* The table shows results of Table 1, including the full set of control variables. Robust standard errors clustered at regional level are shown in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .



Table A5: Coefficients from interactions in Table 5

	Anti-immigrant support				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Foreign share (log)	-0.093*** (0.029)	-0.094*** (0.029)	-0.093*** (0.029)	-0.089*** (0.028)	-0.111*** (0.029)
Foreign share (log) x Tertiary educ.	-0.030** (0.012)				
Tertiary educ.	-0.158*** (0.016)				
Foreign share (log) x Labor force		-0.010*** (0.006)			
Labor force		0.022** (0.009)			
Foreign share (log) x City			-0.033*** (0.009)		
City			-0.062*** (0.014)		
Foreign share (log) x Female				-0.021*** (0.005)	
Female				-0.103*** (0.007)	
Foreign share (log) x Older age					0.021*** (0.007)
Older age					-0.018* (0.010)
Observations	235,066	235,066	235,066	235,066	235,066
R <sup>2</sup>	0.167	0.166	0.167	0.167	0.167

*Notes:* The table shows the full set of coefficients from the interactions in Table 5. Robust standard errors clustered at regional level are shown in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table A6: Coefficients from interactions in Table 6

	Anti-immigrant support		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Foreign share (log)	-0.110 (0.029)	-0.100*** (0.028)	-0.091*** (0.028)
Foreign share (log) x Anti-redistribution pref.	0.106*** (0.009)		
Anti-redistribution pref.	0.106*** (0.014)		
Foreign share (log) x Political trust		-0.005 (0.006)	
Political trust		-0.046*** (0.012)	
Foreign share (log) x Religious			-0.011 (0.009)
Religious			0.178*** (0.014)
Observations	235,066	235,066	235,066
R <sup>2</sup>	0.162	0.164	0.163

*Notes:* The table shows the full set of coefficients from the interactions in Table 6. Robust standard errors clustered at regional level are shown in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

## Appendix B: Robustness Checks

Table B1: Robustness - further regional controls

	Anti-immigrant support			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Foreign share (log)	-0.100*** (0.034)	-0.111*** (0.037)	-0.109*** (0.037)	-0.123*** (0.042)
Observations	213,378	177,758	109,706	97,835
R <sup>2</sup>	0.171	0.177	0.199	0.208
Income (log)	Yes			Yes
Hospital beds (log)		Yes		Yes
Crime rate (log)			Yes	Yes

*Notes:* Each model includes country-wave fixed effects, regional controls, and individual controls. Dependent variable is a standardized (std) scale of support for anti-immigrant political parties (with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one). 'Income (log)' is the logarithm of the average net disposable income at regional relative to the national level. 'Hospital beds (log)' is the logarithm of the regional number of hospital beds per one hundred thousand inhabitants. 'Crime rate (log)' is the logarithm of the regional crime rate. Model 1 does not include waves 1-4 of DK, waves 3-4 of IE, and waves 1-9 of EE, LV, LT. Model 2 does not include waves 1-4 of DK, FI, waves 5-9 of NL, and waves 1-9 of EE, IE, LV, LT, UK. Model 3 does not include waves 1-4 of all countries, and waves 5-9 of GR, IE, UK. Model 4 does not include waves 1-4 of all countries and waves 5-9 of EE, LV, LT, NL, GR, IE, UK. For a description of control variables included, see table 1. Robust standard errors clustered at regional level are shown in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table B2: Robustness - foreigners' origin

	Anti-immigrant support			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Foreign share (log)	-0.067** (0.030)	-0.091*** (0.034)	-0.123*** (0.034)	-0.087*** (0.031)
Foreign share EU (log)	-0.044** (0.022)			
Foreign share Africa (log)		-0.020 (0.018)		
Foreign share Asia (log)			0.037* (0.026)	
Foreign share America (log)				-0.022 (0.023)
Observations	235,066	227,066	230,828	231,324
R <sup>2</sup>	0.167	0.167	0.165	0.165

*Notes:* Each model includes country-wave fixed effects, regional controls, and individual controls. Dependent variable is a standardized (std) scale of support for anti-immigrant political parties (with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one). Different sample sizes result from missing values for some regions on the origins of foreigners. For a description of control variables included, see table 1. Robust standard errors clustered at regional level are shown in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table B3: Robustness - party family

	Anti-immigrant support						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	w/o RL	w/o ML	w/o L	w/o MR	w/o RR	w/o Reg	w/o Oth
Foreign share (log)	-0.117*** (0.030)	-0.075** (0.030)	-0.103*** (0.037)	-0.123*** (0.030)	-0.088*** (0.024)	-0.073*** (0.025)	-0.102*** (0.028)
Observations	220,000	153,081	195,271	172,226	210,355	230,896	228,567
R <sup>2</sup>	0.164	0.235	0.193	0.224	0.224	0.175	0.167

*Notes:* Each model includes country-wave fixed effects, regional controls, and individual controls. Dependent variable is a standardized (std) scale of support for anti-immigrant political parties (with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one). For a description of control variables included, see table 1. Excluded party families (from models 1-7) are radical left, moderate left, liberal, moderate right, radical right, regionalist, and other. Robust standard errors clustered at regional level are shown in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table B4: Robustness - wave-specific shares

	Anti-immigrant support		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Foreign share per wave (log)	-0.116*** (0.022)	-0.090*** (0.034)	-0.081*** (0.032)
Observations	215,063	215,063	215,063
R <sup>2</sup>	0.113	0.116	0.172
Country-wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional controls		Yes	Yes
Individual controls			Yes

*Notes:* Dependent variable is a standardized (std) scale of support for anti-immigrant political parties (with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one). Main explanatory variable is the share of foreigners for each wave in the ESS. For a description of control variables included, see table 1. Given data limitations, not included are respondents in waves 3-5 from BG, in waves 2-4 from EE, in wave 2 and 4 from GR, in wave 4 from IE, in wave 3 from LV, in waves 4 and 6-9 from LT, in both waves from RO, and in waves 2-4 from SI. Robust standard errors clustered at regional level are shown in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table B5: Robustness - regions

	Anti-immigrant support					
	(1) Reg>100	(2) Reg>200	(3) For>1%	(4) For>2%	(5) For>3%	(6) For>4%
Foreign share (log)	-0.149*** (0.037)	-0.174** (0.073)	-0.118*** (0.032)	-0.107** (0.043)	-0.135*** (0.049)	-0.176*** (0.060)
Observations	184,070	106,673	199,000	174,431	155,068	133,016
R <sup>2</sup>	0.159	0.157	0.164	0.164	0.168	0.168
	(7) For>5%	(8) For<30%	(9) For<20%	(10) For<10%	(11) For<1% =1%	(12) w/o Cap.
Foreign share (log)	-0.153*** (0.060)	-0.089*** (0.031)	-0.094*** (0.033)	-0.075*** (0.036)	-0.101** (0.028)	-0.104*** (0.032)
Observations	110,444	233,063	224,588	195,488	235,066	196,813
R <sup>2</sup>	0.170	0.166	0.169	0.177	0.167	0.160

*Notes:* Each model includes country-wave fixed effects, regional controls, and individual controls. Dependent variable is a standardized (std) scale of support for anti-immigrant political parties (with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one). For a description of control variables included, see table 1. Model 1 shows results for regions with at least 100 respondents in each country-wave, model 2 for regions with at least 200 respondents, models 3-7 show results for regions with a foreign share of at least 1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, and 5% or higher, models 8-10 show results for regions with less than 30%, 20%, and 10% of foreigners, model 11 shows results for re-coding all regions with a foreign share below 1% as 1%, and model 12 shows results for excluding all capital regions. Robust standard errors clustered at regional level are shown in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table B6: Robustness - weights, sample, and models

	Anti-immigrant support			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Foreign share (log)	-0.104*** (0.029)	-0.098*** (0.029)		
Foreign share			-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.018** (0.009)
Foreign share (sq.)				0.000 (0.000)
Observations	232,348	230,204	235,066	235,066
R <sup>2</sup>	0.168	0.166	0.167	0.168
Weights	Yes			
Natives only		Yes		

*Notes:* Each model includes country-wave fixed effects, regional controls, and individual controls. Dependent variable is a standardized (std) scale of support for anti-immigrant political parties (with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one). For a description of control variables included, see table 1. Model 1 excludes respondents from LV and RO in wave 3, due to missing data on survey weights. Robust standard errors clustered at regional level are shown in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .



Table B7: Robustness - 2SLS estimates with non-log and non-missing data

	Anti-immigrant support			
	Non-Log		Non-Missing	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV
Foreign share 2011	-0.014*** (0.003)	-0.012*** (0.004)		
Foreign share 2011 (log)			-0.171*** (0.037)	-0.166*** (0.046)
IV F-statistic		31.30		81.87
R <sup>2</sup>	0.196		0.182	
Observations	116,965	116,965	88,439	88,439

*Notes:* Each model includes country-wave fixed effects, regional controls, and individual controls. Dependent variable is a standardized (std) scale of support for anti-immigrant political parties (with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one). For details on the construction of the instrument, see section 3. For a description of control variables included, see table 1. Countries without missing data are AT, BE, CZ, EE, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, SE, CH, UK. Robust standard errors clustered at regional level are shown in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table B8: Robustness - 2SLS estimates with origins excluded

Anti-immigrant support						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	w/o BE	w/o DK	w/o DE	w/o IE	w/o GR	w/o ES
Foreign share 2011 (log)	-0.130*** (0.044)	-0.129*** (0.043)	-0.117** (0.043)	-0.127*** (0.044)	-0.128*** (0.043)	-0.127*** (0.043)
IV F-statistic	114.77	117.47	127.09	115.91	115.91	116.27
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	w/o FR	w/o IT	w/o NL	w/o AT	w/o PT	w/o FI
Foreign share 2011 (log)	-0.115** (0.044)	-0.099** (0.041)	-0.154*** (0.045)	-0.129*** (0.043)	-0.123*** (0.044)	-0.127*** (0.044)
IV F-statistic	118.57	104.54	114.24	115.06	116.99	112.70
	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
	w/o SE	w/o UK	w/o NewEU	w/o EFTA	w/o Eur	w/o NAfr
Foreign share 2011 (log)	-0.128*** (0.043)	-0.136*** (0.046)	-0.129*** (0.043)	-0.128*** (0.044)	-0.127** (0.059)	-0.135*** (0.047)
IV F-statistic	114.36	99.26	108.13	114.23	78.73	101.78
	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)		
	w/o Afr	w/o Am	w/o As	w/o Oc		
Foreign share 2011 (log)	-0.128** (0.046)	-0.131*** (0.044)	-0.145*** (0.045)	-0.127*** (0.045)		
IV F-statistic	103.85	100.21	110.77	99.69		
Observations	116,965	116,965	116,965	116,965	116,965	116,965

*Notes:* Each model includes country-wave fixed effects, regional controls, and individual controls. Dependent variable is a standardized (std) scale of support for anti-immigrant political parties (with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one). Excluded origins in constructing the instrument are (from models 1-22) BE, DK, DE, IE, GR, ES, FR, IT, NL, AT, PT, FI, SE, UK, new EU MS, EFTA, rest of Europe, North Africa, rest of Africa, America, Asia, and Oceania. For details on the construction of the instrument, see section 3. For a description of control variables included, see table 1. Robust standard errors clustered at regional level are shown in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

## Appendix C: Data

Table C1: Countries, waves, and regions

<b>C</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>R</b>	<b>Subdivision</b>	<b>NUTS</b>	<b>Notes</b>
AT	8	9	Bundesländer	NUTS 2	did not participate in wave 5
BE	9	3/11	Gewesten (Régions)/ Provinc(i)es	NUTS 1/2	NUTS 1 in waves 1-4
BG	5	28	Podregioni	NUTS 3	did not participate in waves 1, 2, 7 and 8
CZ	8	8/14	Oblasti/ Kraje	NUTS 2/3	did not participate in wave 3; NUTS 2 in wave 4
DK	8	5/15	Regioner/ Counties (pre-2007)	NUTS 2/3 (pre-2007)	did not participate in wave 8; pre-2007 NUTS 3 level in waves 1-3 (before counties were abolished)
EE	8	5	Maakond grouped	NUTS 3	did not participate in wave 1
FI	9	4/5/ 19	Geographic units/ Maakun- nat (Landskap)	Geo/ NUTS 3	Geographic units in wave 1 are 'Eastern', 'Uusimaa', 'Southern+Åland', 'Mid', and 'Northern'; geographic units in wave 2-4 are 'Eastern', 'Southern+Åland+Uusima', 'Western', and 'Northern'
FR	9	8/21	Départements/ Régions	NUTS 1/2	NUTS 1 in waves 1-4
DE	9	16	Bundesländer	NUTS 1	
GR	4	13	Perifereies	NUTS 2	did not participate in waves 3 and 6-9
HU	9	7/20	Tervezési- statisztikai régiók/ Megyék+Budapest	NUTS 2/3	NUTS 2 in waves 1-4
IE	9	7/20	Geographic units/ NUTS 3	Geo/ NUTS 3	Geographic units in wave 3 are 'Border+Midlands+West', 'Dublin', and 'Southern+Eastern'; Geographic units in wave 4 are 'Connaught+Ulster', 'Dublin', 'Munster', 'Rest of Leinster'
IT	5	5/21	Gruppi di re- gioni/ Regioni	NUTS 1/2	did not participate in waves 3-5 and 7; NUTS 1 in wave 9
LV	3	4/5	Statistiskie reģioni	NUTS 3	did not participate in waves 1, 2 and 5-8; no census data for region 'Pieriga' in 2001

LT	6	10	Apskritys	NUTS 3	did not participate in waves 1-3
NL	9	12/40	Provincies/ COROP-regio's	NUTS 2/3	NUTS 3 in waves 1-4
NO	9	7	Landsdeler	NUTS 2	
PL	9	15/16	Województwo	NUTS 2	no census data for region 'Łódzkie' in 2001
PT	9	5	NUTS II	NUTS 2	no ESS data on individuals residing in 'Região Autónoma dos Açores' and 'Região Autónoma da Madeira'
RO	2	8	Regiuni	NUTS 2	did not participate in waves 1, 2 and 5-9
SK	6	8	Kraje	NUTS 3	did not participate in waves 1, 7 and 8
SI	9	12	Statistične regije	NUTS 3	
ES	9	19	Comunidades, ciudades autónomas	NUTS 2	
SE	9	8/21	Riksområden/ Län	NUTS 2/3	NUTS 2 in waves 1-4 and 9
CH	9	6/7	Grossregionen	NUTS 2	in wave 1 data only on 6 regions, where 'Northwestern' and 'Zürich' are combined
UK	9	12	NUTS I	NUTS 1	

*Notes:* The table shows description and coding of variables by country (C), number of waves the country participated in the ESS (W), number of regions (R), region's territorial division (Subdivision), and NUTS-level (NUTS). Data stem from national censuses, obtained from Eurostat (2001: cens01rsctz; 2011: CensusHub2), national statistical offices for BE (statbel.fgov.be) and DE (genesis.destatis.de) in 2001 and from IPUMS (Integrated Public Use Microdata Series) for GR in 2001 (ipums.org).

Table C2: Wave-specific regional data

<b>C</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>NUTS</b>	<b>Def.</b>	<b>Source</b>	<b>Link</b>
AT	8	NUTS 2	birth	Statistik Austria	<a href="https://statcube.at">https://statcube.at</a>
BE	9	NUTS 1/2	citizen	StatBel	<a href="https://statbel.fgov.be">https://statbel.fgov.be</a>
BG	2	NUTS 3	birth	National Statistical Institute Bulgaria	<a href="https://www.nsi.bg">https://www.nsi.bg</a>
CZ	8	NUTS 2/3	citizen	Czech Statistical Office	<a href="https://vdb.czso.cz">https://vdb.czso.cz</a>
DK <sup>1</sup>	8	NUTS 2/3 (pre-2007)	citizen/ birth	Statistics Denmark	<a href="https://statbank.dk">https://statbank.dk</a>
EE	5	NUTS 3	birth	Statistics Estonia	<a href="https://andmed.stat.ee">https://andmed.stat.ee</a>
FI	9	Geo/ NUTS 3	birth	Statistics Finland	<a href="https://pxdata.stat.fi">https://pxdata.stat.fi</a>
FR	9	NUTS 1/2	birth	EU LFS	code: lfstrlfsd2pwc
DE	9	NUTS 1	citizen	Statistisches Bundesamt	<a href="https://destatis.de">https://destatis.de</a>
GR <sup>2</sup>	2	NUTS 2	citizen	IPUMS/ Eurostat	<a href="http://ipums.org/">ipums.org/</a> CensusHub2
HU	9	NUTS 2/3	citizen	Hungarian Central Statistical Office	<a href="https://ksh.hu">https://ksh.hu</a>
IE <sup>3</sup>	8	Geo/ NUTS 3	citizen/ birth	Central Statistics Office/ EU LFS	<a href="https://data.cso.ie">https://data.cso.ie</a>
IT <sup>4</sup>	5	NUTS 1/2	birth	Istat/ EU LFS	<a href="https://istat.it">https://istat.it</a>
LV	2	NUTS 3	citizen	Official Statistics Latvia	<a href="https://data.stat.gov.lv">https://data.stat.gov.lv</a>
LT	1	NUTS 3	citizen	Statistics Lithuania	<a href="https://stat.gov.lt">https://stat.gov.lt</a>
NL	9	NUTS 2/3	birth	CBS-Statistics Netherlands	<a href="https://opendata.cbs.nl/">https://opendata.cbs.nl/</a> statline
NO	9	NUTS 2	birth	Statistics Norway	<a href="http://ssb.no">ssb.no</a>
PL	9	NUTS 2	citizen	Eurostat/ Statistics Poland	<a href="https://stat.gov.pl">https://stat.gov.pl</a>
PT	9	NUTS 2	birth	EU LFS	
SK	6	NUTS 2	birth	EU LFS	
SI	6	NUTS 3	citizen	Republic of Slovenia Statisti- cal Office	<a href="https://pxweb.stat.si">https://pxweb.stat.si</a>
ES	9	NUTS 2	birth	Spanish Statistical Office	<a href="https://ine.es">https://ine.es</a>
SE	9	NUTS 2/3	birth	Statistics Sweden	<a href="https://statistikdatabasen.scb.se">https://statistikdatabasen.scb.se</a>
CH	9	NUTS 2	citizen	Federal Statistical Office	<a href="https://bfs.admin.ch">https://bfs.admin.ch</a>
UK	9	NUTS 1	birth	Office for National Statistics	<a href="https://ons.gov.uk">https://ons.gov.uk</a>

*Notes:* The table shows the country (C), number of waves (W), NUTS-level (NUTS), definition of foreigners based on either citizenship or country of birth (Def.), and sources for the wave-specific regional data used in the robustness checks. Data stem from national statistical offices (either obtained directly on their website or thankfully sent after contacting their staff) and in some cases from the EU LFS. I did not obtain access to regional level data for respondents in waves 3-5 from BG, in waves 2-4 from EE, in waves 2 and 4 from GR, in wave 4 from IE, in wave 3 for LV, in waves 4 and 6-9 from LT, in both waves from RO, and in waves 2-4 from SI.

<sup>1</sup> Foreigners in wave 1-3 defined by citizenship.

<sup>2</sup> Data for wave 1 stem from IPUMS, data for wave 5 from national census 2011, obtained via Eurostat.

<sup>3</sup> Data for waves 6 and 9 stem from the EU LFS. Foreigners in waves 1 and 5 defined by citizenship.

<sup>4</sup> Data for waves 2, 6, 8 and 9 stem from the EU LFS. Foreigners in wave 1 defined by citizenship.

Table C3: Description and coding of variables

Variable	Coding
Anti-immigrant party support	scale constructed from variables IMMIGRATE POLICY (0= strongly opposes tough policy .. 10= strongly favors tough policy), MULTICULTURALISM (0= strongly favors multiculturalism .. 10= strongly favors assimilation), and ETHNIC MINORITIES (0= strongly supports more rights for ethnic minorities .. 10= strongly opposes more rights for ethnic minorities) in the CHES and assigned to individuals in the ESS based on the party they affiliate with (PRTCLxx) or, in case of a missing value, the party they voted for in the last national election (PRTVTxx)
Anti-redistribution party support	scale constructed from variables LRECON (0= extreme left .. 5= center .. 10= extreme right in terms of ideological stance on economic issues), SPENDVTAX (0= strongly favors improving public services .. 10= strongly favors reducing taxes), DEREGULATION (0= strongly opposes deregulation of markets .. 10= strongly supports deregulation of markets), and REDISTRIBUTION (0= strongly favors redistribution .. 10= strongly opposes redistribution) in the CHES and assigned to individuals in the ESS based on the party they affiliate with (PRTCLxx) or, in case of a missing value, the party they voted for in the last national election (PRTVTxx)
Anti-redistribution preferences	agree strongly (1) .. disagree strongly (5) to statement that "The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels" (GINCDIF)
Political trust	scale constructed from variables TRSTPRL (trust in country's parliament), TRSTPLT (trust in country's politicians), and TRSTPRT (trust in political parties), ranging from no trust at all (0) to complete trust (10).
Religiosity	answer to question "how religious would you say you are?" (RLGDGR), ranging from not at all religious (0) to very religious (10)
Age	constructed from respondent's birth year (YRBRN)
Living in city	answer to question in which area respondent lives (DOMICIL), coded as a dummy (1= a big city/the suburbs or outskirts of a big city; 0= a town or a small city/a country village/a farm of home in the countryside)
Foreigners as friends	answer to question "Do you have any friends who have come to live in [country] from another country?" (IMGFRND) in wave 1 and to question "Do you have any close friends who are of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?" (DFEGCF), coded as a dummy (1= Yes, several/Yes, a few; 0= No, none at all)

Employment status	working (PDWRK), in education (EDCTN), unemployed (UEMPLA or UEMPLI), retired/disabled (RTRD or DSBLD), other (DNGOTH, HSWRK, or CMSRV)
Education	primary (ISCED 0-2), secondary (ISCED 3-4), tertiary (ISCED 5-6) (EDULVLA)
Perceived security	answer to question "how you feel about your household's income nowadays?" (HINCFEL), coded as a dummy (1= living comfortably/coping on present income; 0= finding it difficult/very difficult on present income)
Father native	Father born in [country] (FACNTR)
Mother native	Mother born in [country] (MOCNTR)

*Notes:* The table shows description and coding of variables based on the ESS and CHES.

Table C4: List of parties

C	ID	Party	Fam	Pos	No	W1	W2	W3	W4	W5	W6	W7	W8	W9
AT	1301	SPO	ML	4.44	8	35.44	34.59	35.76		37.28	34.38	32.86	35.38	34.17
AT	1302	OVP	MR	7.36	8	37.15	40.44	39		25.35	33.93	29.01	25.91	35.73
AT	1303	FPO	RR	9.57	8	6.46	5.68	7.28		14.01	11.07	15.4	19.91	17.81
AT	1304	Grune	ML	1.90	8	19.63	19.13	15.82		19.43	18.18	16.92	14.51	9.35
AT	1306	LIF	L	1.52	8	1.32	0.17	0.32		0.58	0.81	4.03	2.52	2.94
AT	1307	BZO	RR	8.85	5			1.82		3.34	1.26	1.07	0.3	
AT	1310	Team Str.	Oth	7.32	3						0.36	0.72	1.48	
BE	102	PS	ML	2.79	9	9.39	15.51	13.91	15.44	13.22	16.6	15.27	13.94	14.56
BE	103	SP/SPA	ML	3.29	9	12.54	13.12	11.59	11.48	10.71	11.49	6.87	9.07	6.85
BE	104	ECOLO	ML	1.74	9	4.56	5	5.22	6.19	5.55	5.6	3.98	5.32	6.62
BE	105	AGALEV	ML	2.06	9	9.82	4.55	4.71	4.33	5.62	5.39	6.37	7.57	8.64
BE	106	MR	L	5.69	9	7.02	11.78	11.09	10.51	10.11	9.79	12.01	10.79	10.36
BE	107	VLD	L	5.93	9	19.21	14.91	14.42	12.3	9.35	9.29	7.81	8.55	8.18
BE	108	CDH	MR	4.05	9	4.82	5.59	5.43	6.64	5.02	6.17	5.64	3.15	4.05
BE	109	CD&V	MR	5.62	9	19.82	14.91	21.01	10.59	12.31	13.97	14.11	12.82	14.02
BE	110	NVA	Reg	7.77	9	3.16	2.31	2.17	11.86	21.43	16.81	20.48	19.87	18.3
BE	112	VB	RR	9.64	9	8.16	10.14	9.49	7.23	4.79	2.91	2.68	3	3.66
BE	115	FN	RR	9.93	9	0.35	1.27	0.72	0.45	0.23	0.85	0.51	0.45	0.16
BE	117	LDD	Oth	8.70	5				2.91	0.61	0.35		0.6	0.08
BE	118	Spirit	L	2.86	4	0.35	0.89	0.22	0.07					
BE	119	PVDA	RL	1.51	6	0.79				0.84	0.71	3.33	4.12	4.05
BE	120	PP	RR	8.83	5					0.23	0.07	0.94	0.75	0.47
BG	2001	NDSV	L	4.51	4			6.63	5.82	1	0.17			
BG	2002	ODS	MR	4.73	5			8.55	9.85	3.75	2.04			1.92
BG	2003	BSP	ML	6.00	5			52.53	35.46	22.45	31.15			29.88
BG	2004	DPS	L	3.35	5			8.2	10.04	8.35	5.45			14.79
BG	2005	BMRO	RR	9.56	3				1.69	0.23	0.85			
BG	2007	Ataka	RR	9.70	5			12.22	9.47	4.44	2.89			4.59
BG	2008	DSB	MR	5.05	5			3.49	4.6	1.99	1.11			0.44
BG	2009	BNS	Oth	5.49	4			1.75	0.94		0.26			0.74
BG	2010	GERB	MR	5.90	5			6.63	21.48	56.78	53.28			43.64
BG	2012	RZS	RR	7.46	3				0.66	1	0.85			
BG	2013	DBG	Oth	4.13	1						0.94			
BG	2014	NFSB	RR	9.20	2						1.02			1.48
BG	2016	ABV	ML	5.83	1									1.04
BG	2017	Volya	RR	7.83	1									1.48
CH	3601	SVP/UDC	RR	9.18	9	20.44	28.34	23.64	25.96	24.71	22.93	25.61	26.14	25.65
CH	3602	SP/PS	ML	1.95	9	34.85	30.89	29.57	25.37	24.94	23.38	25.95	24.36	23.54
CH	3603	FDP/PLR	L	6.09	9	21.81	17.44	17.7	16.81	20.12	14.65	15.03	16.5	23.05
CH	3604	CVP/PVC	MR	5.95	9	10.95	11.46	13.3	12.68	13.88	13.31	12.58	13.29	8.43
CH	3605	GPS/PES	ML	1.56	9	7.39	7.48	10.81	11.01	7.76	8.61	7.91	9.3	9.54
CH	3606	GLP/PVL	L	3.50	6				3.83	4	8.61	7.13	4.1	5.33
CH	3607	EVP/PEV	Oth	5.78	9	1.92	1.91	2.39	1.77	1.18	1.9	1.45	1.55	1.98
CH	3608	EDU/UDF	RR	8.54	9	0.64	1.35	0.77	0.79	0.59	0.56	0.45	0.66	0.25
CH	3609	PdA/PST	RL	2.85	9	0.91	0.64	0.96	0.69	0.35	0.34	0.22	0.55	0.25
CH	3610	LdT	RR	8.67	8	0.18		0.38	0.49	0.35	0.22	0.45	0.89	0.62
CH	3611	CSP/PCS	Oth	5.02	7	0.91	0.48	0.48	0.59	0.24	0.22	0.11		
CH	3612	BDP	MR	6.90	5					1.88	5.26	3.12	2.66	1.36
CZ	2101	CSSD	ML	5.26	8	34.94	26.05		38.39	33.12	38.32	30.21	26.44	14.44
CZ	2102	ODS	MR	6.93	8	27.3	36.62		34.37	18.75	22.2	8.08	9.51	14.52
CZ	2103	KSCM	RL	6.78	8	13.01	18.35		12.38	12.47	16.47	12.36	11.43	8.21



CZ	2104	KDU-CSL	MR	6.59	7	14.14	12.53		7.74	5.4		5.78	6.37	4.97
CZ	2105	US-DEU	MR	2.58	2	3.39	0.54							
CZ	2106	SNK-ED	MR	3.11	2	4.24	3.04							
CZ	2107	SZ	ML	2.50	4	2.97	2.86		7.12	3.57				
CZ	2109	TOP09	MR	5.16	5					16.04	14.72	10.67	12.04	6.55
CZ	2110	VV	L	6.70	2					10.64	8.29			
CZ	2111	ANO2011	Oth	6.48	3							28.91	29.49	29.68
CZ	2112	USVIT	RR	9.56	2							3.99	4.71	
CZ	2114	Pirates	Oth	3.21	1									12.31
CZ	2115	SPD	RR	9.83	1									5.68
CZ	2116	STAN	L	4.59	1									3.63
DE	301	CDU	MR	6.53	9	34.74	33.7	31.71	34.48	34.68	37.78	31.17	36.04	34.75
DE	302	SPD	ML	4.40	9	36.36	34.96	37.15	31.08	28.08	28.56	33.8	27.57	21.84
DE	303	FDP	L	4.63	9	7.36	5.91	7.76	8.36	8.8	4.65	3.24	4.72	7.3
DE	304	Grunen	ML	1.79	9	13.25	13.78	12	13.82	16.62	16.36	13.53	13.98	19.58
DE	305	REP	RR	9.42	6	0.59	1.26	0.62	0.81	0.26	0.34			
DE	306	LINKE	RL	3.26	9	7.7	9.59	9.63	11.06	10.9	9.21	11.6	10.42	9.05
DE	309	NPD	RR	9.67	8		0.8	1.13	0.38	0.66	0.64	0.74	0.19	0.11
DE	310	AfD	RR	9.50	3							4.47	5.99	7.19
DE	311	Piraten	Oth	1.93	4						2.45	1.44	1.07	0.17
DK	201	SD	ML	6.09	8	32.77	26.39	27.13	26.56	24.77	24.29	20.79		28.11
DK	202	RV	L	2.44	8	5.52	8.31	8.69	6.75	5.69	11.72	9.91		7.13
DK	203	KF	MR	7.13	8	7.72	7.63	9.75	10.45	7.24	4.28	5.32		4.59
DK	204	CD	L	6.20	3	1.36	1.2	0.57						
DK	206	SF	RL	3.16	8	9.59	10.37	10.07	16.55	17.06	10.18	9.51		6.41
DK	210	KRF	MR	5.40	8	1.87	1.97	1.54	0.8	0.7	0.86	0.89		1.19
DK	211	v	L	7.09	8	32.43	33.68	32.17	26.42	27.57	28.31	26.19		23.12
DK	213	EL	RL	1.67	8	2.12	2.31	3.17	1.74	2.49	8.73	7.82		7.52
DK	215	DF	RR	9.14	8	6.62	8.14	6.9	9.29	11.76	8.47	14.26		13.06
DK	218	LA	L	4.76	5				1.45	2.73	3.17	5.32		4.35
DK	219	A	ML	2.08	1									4.51
EE	2201	IRL	MR	7.38	8		29.1	22.84	16.47	14.99	13.18	13.31	10.45	8.05
EE	2202	EK	L	3.81	8		30.15	38.01	33.16	27.37	32.38	38.58	29.6	31.02
EE	2203	ER	L	5.62	8		20.61	24.82	29.88	33.57	30.57	26.45	28.38	30.08
EE	2204	SDE	ML	3.52	8		9.9	7.66	9.08	13.39	20.03	19.12	15.64	15.25
EE	2206	ERL	Oth	6.42	4		10.24	6.67	2.53	5.09				
EE	2207	EER	ML	4.81	6				8.87	5.59	2.18	1.35	1.45	1.86
EE	2208	EVE	MR	6.62	2								7.78	3.64
EE	2209	EKRE	RR	8.75	4						1.66	1.18	6.71	10.08
ES	501	PSOE	ML	4.05	9	42.63	49.59	47.2	52.65	48.61	31.11	26.99	26	34.8
ES	502	PP	MR	7.46	9	37.84	33.88	34.25	31.1	33.69	41.18	33.11	28.65	19.56
ES	504	IU	RL	2.49	9	6.23	6.73	6.21	4.95	6.17	10.52	6.2	2.97	1.5
ES	505	CiU	Reg	5.90	7	5.99	2.86	3.19	4.17	4.29	4.1	2.72		
ES	506	EAJ/PNV	Reg	6.09	9	0.96	1.33	2.22	2.05	1.7	2.58	1.1	1.52	1.4
ES	507	EA	Reg	4.71	3	0.12	0.31	0.27						
ES	511	ERC	Reg	3.98	9	1.92	2.14	2.04	1.55	1.61	2.05	2.8	3.37	4.31
ES	513	BNG	RL	3.18	8	0.84	0.82	1.6	2.61	0.89	0.8	0.51		0.6
ES	516	PA	Reg	4.43	3	1.08	0.71	1.24						
ES	517	CC	Reg	5.52	7	1.08	0.31	0.53	0.28	0.36			0.56	0.4
ES	518	ICV	ML	2.04	3	0.96	0.92	0.98						
ES	520	CHA	RL	3.68	3	0.36	0.41	0.27						
ES	523	UPyD	L	5.70	4				0.64	2.68	5.44	3.14		
ES	524	Amaiur	RL	3.47	4						0.53	1.44	0.56	1.1
ES	525	Podemos	RL	1.79	4						0.62	15.87	19.18	14.84

ES 526	C's	L	6.14	4						1.07	6.11	15.57	8.32
ES 527	Vox	RR	9.38	1									11.03
ES 528	Pais	ML	2.24	1									0.9
ES 550	PdeCat	Reg	5.21	2								1.61	1.2
FI 1401	SDP	ML	4.52	9	27.74	26.4	28.45	22.19	19.05	18.28	16.96	15.12	17.04
FI 1402	KOK	L	5.13	9	19.36	21.85	22.8	25.64	25.25	24.66	22.61	21.42	22.33
FI 1403	KESK	L	5.80	9	25.07	23.88	23.61	19.39	20.68	14.81	19.25	20	17.67
FI 1404	VAS	RL	3.22	9	6.9	6.09	4.84	6.76	5.11	6.94	7	6.17	5.84
FI 1405	PS	RR	8.81	9	0.37	1.12	1.1	5.99	10.84	14.81	14.33	13.02	10.66
FI 1406	RKP/SFP	Reg	2.00	9	5.34	5.11	4.18	4.46	3.72	5.33	4.31	5.22	4.75
FI 1408	VIHR	ML	1.92	9	12.02	11.2	10.7	12.44	11.85	13.14	12.31	15.53	18.83
FI 1409	KD	MR	5.97	9	3.19	4.34	4.33	3.12	3.49	2.04	3.23	3.53	2.88
FR 601	PCF	RL	3.60	9	3.72	3.24	3.77	6.71	3.64	3.87	2.49	2.59	2.57
FR 602	PS	ML	3.97	9	37.57	38.17	36.79	31.58	30.63	34.62	30.6	29.67	16.86
FR 603	PRG	ML	4.01	6			0.71	1.23	1.77	1.83	0.96	2.51	
FR 605	EELV	ML	1.75	9	9.2	7.97	7.55	5.7	12.89	5.55	6.43	6.39	9.49
FR 609	LR	MR	8.01	9	26.73	25.81	26.34	34.32	30.91	29.07	28.76	25.95	17.48
FR 610	FN	RR	9.66	9	6.46	6.56	5.5	3.1	5.7	10.74	14.86	15.84	12.16
FR 612	MPF	RR	9.22	8	0.88	1.83	2.59	1.08	0.65	1.9	1.53	2.91	
FR 613	MoDem	L	5.44	9	8.21	7.14	8.96	7.5	6.16	5.48	8.11	6.47	2.93
FR 614	LO-LCR	RL	6.00	9	3.72	4.56	4.4	5.41	4.39	2.26	2.25	1.78	3.73
FR 615	DL	MR	5.92	5	0.88	0.58	0.16	0.43	0.93				
FR 619	CPNT	MR	7.88	5	1.53	3.32	1.81	1.44	1.31				
FR 620	MN	RR	9.71	3	1.1	0.83	1.42						
FR 621	NC	L	5.65	5				1.51	1.03	1.39	0.88	1.78	
FR 624	PG	RL	2.77	3						3.29	3.13	4.12	
FR 626	LREM	L	5.09	1									23.51
FR 627	FI	RL	3.37	1									9.14
FR 628	DLF	RR	9.44	1									2.13
GR 401	PASOK	ML	3.86	4	48.1	34.2		43.12	47.89				
GR 402	ND	MR	7.26	4	40.88	53.61		32.28	28.48				
GR 403	SYRIZA	RL	1.47	4	3.34	3.87		6.7	4.77				
GR 404	KKE	RL	3.14	4	6.69	6.32		10.61	9.79				
GR 409	DIKKI	RL	5.56	2	0.99	0.45							
GR 410	LAOS	RR	9.40	3		1.56		4.14	4.85				
GR 411	OP	ML	0.79	2				3.16	3.1				
GR 414	DIMAR	ML	2.52	1					0.64				
GR 415	XA	RR	9.98	1					0.48				
HU 2301	MSzP	ML	4.55	9	50	43.78	33.28	39.03	16.51	21.88	20.6	14.82	12.59
HU 2302	Fidesz	RR	7.70	9	40.8	47.89	54.82	52.73	61.86	59.09	46.19	63.65	56.42
HU 2303	MDF	MR	5.57	6	1.15	1	5.57	3.03	0.58	0.11			
HU 2304	SzDSz	L	3.83	6	5.27	5.11	4.37	2.91	0.47	0.42			
HU 2305	MIEP	RR	9.69	5	1.44	1.22	1.2	0.73		0.11			
HU 2306	CP	Oth	5.55	2	1.34	1							
HU 2307	KDNP	RR	6.66	5			0.45			0.63	0.37	0.35	3.03
HU 2308	JOBBIK	RR	8.73	7			0.3	1.58	13.14	8.46	20.85	13.18	12.59
HU 2309	LMP	ML	3.24	5					7.44	5.6	5.99	2.47	5.08
HU 2310	E14	Oth	2.45	4						2.96	1.5	0.71	0.73
HU 2311	DK	ML	3.16	4						0.74	4.49	3.88	7.26
HU 2314	MM	ML	2.75	2								0.94	2.3
IE 701	FF	MR	5.89	9	51.14	50.96	49.13	43.36	22.19	22.83	28.33	34.44	33.92
IE 702	FG	MR	5.80	9	22.26	25.03	25.8	34.88	48.9	43.52	38.64	38.77	39.87
IE 703	Lab	ML	4.00	9	12.96	11.21	10.38	11.9	15.76	16.39	11.74	6.9	7.15
IE 705	GP	ML	3.43	9	5.34	4.54	5.86	3.42	1.91	2.89	1.82	2.23	2.22

IE	706	PD	L	6.04	4	4.04	2.27	2.88	0.33						
IE	707	SF	RL	4.14	9	4.27	5.98	5.96	6.11	10.53	13.36	18.64	15.29	14.54	
IE	708	SP	RL	3.29	5					0.49	0.6	0.15	0.27	0.4	
IE	709	PBPA	RL	3.33	5					0.21	0.4	0.68	1.29	0.95	
IE	710	DS	ML	3.14	2								0.81	0.95	
IT	802	DS	ML	2.42	2	26.68	25.44								
IT	803	RC	RL	1.51	4	6.71	7.93				1.4		0.2		
IT	805	AN	RR	7.06	2	12.22	12.72								
IT	807	SDI	ML	2.98	1	0.34									
IT	808	VERDI	ML	1.46	2	2.58	3.03								
IT	811	LN	RR	9.10	5	2.24	4.32				1.2		11.73	25.87	
IT	813	RAD	L	2.37	1									1.06	
IT	814	UDC	MR	5.74	4	2.93	3.62				5.41		1.09		
IT	815	FI	MR	7.10	5	28.06	25.79				20.44		13.62	6.88	
IT	819	DL	L	2.96	2	12.22	10.04								
IT	820	LB	Oth	0.60	2	1.89	1.28								
IT	821	MS	RR	9.60	2	0.34	0.58								
IT	827	SVP	Reg	5.41	2		0.12							0.15	
IT	828	IdV	L	3.22	2	0.86	1.17								
IT	835	NPSI	Oth	5.00	2	1.2	0.82								
IT	836	PdCI	RL	1.62	2	1.72	3.15								
IT	837	PD	ML	3.04	3						39.48		36.58	22.39	
IT	838	SEL	ML	2.52	3						8.62		2.88	2.27	
IT	844	FdI	RR	8.63	3						0.4		3.48	2.72	
IT	845	M5S	Oth	5.30	3						23.05		30.42	38.65	
LT	2501	LSDP	ML	3.99	6					22.86	24.49	25.08	23.17	19.62	22.8
LT	2503	LRS	Reg	7.00	2					0.53	1.18				
LT	2504	NS	L	4.03	2					3.61	3.38				
LT	2505	LiCS	L	3.69	4					4.55	4.39	1.91	1.22		
LT	2506	TS	MR	5.96	6					19.79	22.3	15.86	15.96	21.65	24.67
LT	2507	LVLS	Oth	4.66	6					4.55	5.24	1.35	4.32	24.64	24.53
LT	2511	LLRA	Reg	3.39	6					4.41	3.21	5.51	4.77	7.89	2.27
LT	2513	JL-PKS	RR	8.60	6					0.94	1.01	0.34	0.44	0.36	0.13
LT	2515	TT	MR	6.61	6					11.23	8.61	12.04	9.53	11	7.73
LT	2516	DP	L	4.66	6					16.04	18.41	26.1	17.18	5.62	9.33
LT	2517	TPP	MR	4.67	2					5.21	3.38				
LT	2518	LRLS	L	3.54	6					3.48	2.03	4.39	13.08	5.98	5.33
LT	2519	FRONT	ML	3.79	4					0.8	0.51	0.11	0.22		
LT	2520	DK	Oth	6.55	4							1.69	1.66	0.24	0.4
LT	2521	LCP	Oth	8.32	6					2.01	1.86	5.51	8.31	0.72	0.4
LT	2522	LZP	ML	4.72	4							0.11	0.11	2.27	2.4
LV	2401	JL	MR	6.97	2					22.14	19.94				
LV	2402	LKS	Oth	2.82	3					3.94	9.83				1.12
LV	2403	TP	MR	6.44	2					19.14	16.38				
LV	2404	LPP	MR	4.14	2					6.94	7.12				
LV	2405	ZZS	ML	6.67	3					26.08	22.22				14.57
LV	2406	LNNK	RR	9.67	3					8.44	8.4				14.35
LV	2410	SC	ML	2.54	3					13.32	16.1				19.96
LV	2412	V	L	5.45	1										11.66
LV	2414	LRA	Reg	6.29	1										3.14
LV	2415	KPV LV	MR	6.16	1										8.97
LV	2416	JKP	L	7.56	1										14.8
LV	2417	AP!	L	3.67	1										11.43
NL	1001	CDA	MR	6.44	9	29.16	24.45	24.59	25.3	13.69	9.39	12.56	11.78	11.15	
NL	1002	PvdA	ML	4.33	9	19.44	29.23	23.51	21.68	16.59	22.65	13.99	15.48	8.6	

NL 1003 VVD	L	7.44	9	15.71	17.42	18.82	13.9	20.9	24.69	21.64	22.23	21.66
NL 1004 D66	L	2.93	9	5.36	4.78	4.96	5.42	8.77	8.91	13.99	12.8	13.69
NL 1005 GL	ML	2.05	9	7.09	7.17	6.05	6.18	9.37	4.97	5.39	6.91	14.41
NL 1006 SGP	RR	8.27	9	0.89	1.16	1.22	1.46	1.75	2.45	1.98	1.73	2.15
NL 1014 SP	RL	5.17	9	8.15	8.95	13.25	13.69	10.38	11.77	11.54	9.19	7.32
NL 1015 LPF	RR	5.44	4	11.77	3.62	3.67	1.39					
NL 1016 CU	MR	5.28	9	2.42	2.19	3.94	4.38	3.98	2.86	3.75	3.38	4.22
NL 1017 PVV	RR	9.72	7		0.41		4.59	13.01	8.03	11.26	11.15	7.4
NL 1018 PvdD	ML	3.54	7		0.61		2.02	1.55	2.31	2.53	3.38	3.82
NL 1020 50PLUS	Oth	5.56	4						1.97	1.37	1.96	2.31
NL 1050 DENK	Oth	1.23	1									0.72
NL 1051 FvD	RR	9.86	1									2.55
NO 3501 Ap	ML	4.29	9	25.71	28.39	31.31	35.55	34.8	34.51	35.77	35.89	29.22
NO 3502 FrP	RR	9.01	9	19.08	17.99	19.34	18.56	16.44	11.45	11.3	10.83	8.43
NO 3503 H	MR	5.99	9	19.73	19.64	18.05	19.81	22.59	28.56	28.29	27.46	26.96
NO 3504 SV	RL	2.09	9	13.74	14.82	11.62	9.48	8.06	7.16	4.5	5.72	9.48
NO 3505 Sp	Oth	6.17	9	5.98	6.41	6.36	5.01	5.51	6.63	6.29	5.65	8.43
NO 3506 KrF	MR	4.64	9	11.61	7.93	6.97	5.95	6.15	5.58	4.25	4.95	4.09
NO 3507 V	L	2.95	9	3.2	3.79	4.78	4.54	4.47	5.28	5.95	4.72	5.74
NO 3508 MDG	ML	2.49	3							2.38	3.4	4.52
NO 3509 RV	RL	2.01	9	0.95	1.03	1.57	1.1	2	0.83	1.27	1.39	3.13
PL 2601 SLD	ML	3.39	9	44.27	33.15	9.98	8.9	12.44	9.65	6.25	5.17	4.13
PL 2602 UP	ML	1.38	2	1.06	0.41							
PL 2603 PO	MR	4.22	9	8.81	20.05	31.1	50.42	48.79	46.06	47.96	24.92	29.03
PL 2604 S	Oth	6.94	5	10.51	12.14	10.56	1.54	0.55				
PL 2605 PiS	RR	7.47	9	7.43	9.82	40.73	29.66	31.94	30.31	34.1	42.56	46.47
PL 2606 PSL	Oth	5.81	9	8.49	5.73	3.17	6.52	4.85	6.2	6.25	3.7	6.26
PL 2607 LPR	RR	8.27	5	6.37	8.46	2.58	1.19	0.44				
PL 2608 AWSP	MR	7.50	2	5.63	2.59							
PL 2609 PD	L	2.75	3	6.69	5.59	0.82						
PL 2611 SDPL	ML	3.09	4		1.36	1.06	1.19	0.44				
PL 2612 SD	L	3.61	1				0.59					
PL 2613 RP	L	1.83	2						5.31	1.9		
PL 2614 KNP	RR	8.99	5	0.53	0.68			0.55	2.17	3.4		
PL 2615 PR	MR	6.18	3	0.21					0.3	0.14		
PL 2617 Kukiz	RR	7.80	2								10.35	6.13
PL 2618 Nowo	L	3.44	2								8.13	4.79
PL 2619 Konfed.	RR	9.43	2								3.27	1.46
PL 2620 Lewica	RL	1.52	2								1.9	1.73
PT 1201 CDU	RL	2.32	5					6.78	9.76	8.19	8.23	6.93
PT 1202 CDS-PP	MR	7.65	9	4.8	1.84	2.35	3.93	5.08	3.93	4.7	2.74	2.99
PT 1205 PS	ML	3.64	9	42.68	45.7	53.67	53.97	43.86	43.45	35.89	42.48	45.04
PT 1206 PSD	L	5.59	9	38.13	39.96	30.01	28.16	39.09	34.88	38.15	35.08	33.7
PT 1208 BE	RL	0.93	9	6.06	5.43	4.89	5.3	5.19	7.98	13.07	10.38	10.39
PT 1210 PCP	RL	2.10	4	8.33	7.07	9.09	8.64					
PT 1250 PAN	ML	2.73	2								1.07	0.94
RO 2701 PSD	ML	5.43	2			27.48	32.96					
RO 2702 PC	L	5.88	2			0.83	0.41					
RO 2703 PRM	RR	8.38	2			9.32	2.64					
RO 2704 PDL	L	4.80	2			11.63	43.61					
RO 2705 PNL	L	5.02	2			44.55	15.21					
RO 2706 UDMR	Reg	2.84	2			6.19	5.17					
SE 1601 V	RL	1.53	9	9.97	9.55	6.36	6.62	5.04	5.47	6.99	7.49	9.46
SE 1602 S/SAP	ML	5.20	9	41.36	40.61	33.62	38.55	27.14	32.77	30.11	31.15	29.9

SE 1603 C	L	3.71	9	6.42	5.76	7.03	6	5.76	4.66	6.45	7.49	10.6
SE 1604 FP	L	4.10	9	14.23	11.64	9.65	9.03	8.65	7.36	8.13	6.55	7.86
SE 1605 M	MR	5.04	9	15.06	21.91	29.4	29.17	35.23	29.73	24.66	25.63	19.07
SE 1606 KD	MR	5.09	9	7.75	5.76	5.56	4.14	4.16	3.11	3.56	3.31	5.26
SE 1607 MP	ML	1.65	9	5.21	4.77	8.37	6.48	10.17	11.28	11.16	8.04	6.71
SE 1609 JL	MR	4.99	1					0.08				
SE 1610 SD	RR	9.61	5					3.36	4.59	5.58	8.2	7.93
SE 1611 PIRAT	Oth	2.29	4						0.81	0.74	0.47	2.36
SE 1612 FI	Oth	0.73	5					0.4	0.2	2.62	1.66	0.84
SI 2901 LDS	L	2.28	6	43.78	24.07	27.32	5.45	9.56	2.78			
SI 2902 SDS	RR	7.59	9	13.51	38.83	33.01	25.07	29.35	25.2	15.78	21.58	25.27
SI 2903 SD	ML	2.83	9	8.78	14.61	14.29	36.78	31.74	25.2	14.92	15.83	15.5
SI 2904 SLS	MR	6.23	9	16.08	4.3	8.88	4.22	5.12	6.38	5.49	3.45	3.41
SI 2905 NSI	MR	7.21	9	8.51	6.16	6.8	2.45	3.92	4.42	6.86	8.63	8.22
SI 2906 DeSUS	Oth	4.55	9	4.19	4.73	3.88	8.31	11.26	8.51	10.63	9.93	4.19
SI 2907 SNS	RR	8.89	7	5.14	7.31	5.83	7.63	5.46	2.29			3.88
SI 2910 Zares	L	2.36	3				10.08	3.58	0.82			
SI 2911 SMC	L	4.27	3							32.42	29.78	8.06
SI 2912 Levica	ML	1.09	3							9.78	7.19	10.39
SI 2913 AB	Oth	3.99	3							1.54	1.73	2.79
SI 2914 PS	ML	2.84	4						24.39	2.57	1.87	0.31
SI 2915 LMS	L	4.76	1									17.98
SK 2801 LS-HZDS	Oth	6.46	3		28.82	7.07	8.15					
SK 2802 SDKU-DS	MR	5.24	6		17.91	18.8	16.78	18.48	10.64			4.59
SK 2803 Smer	ML	5.83	6		25.23	44.77	46.75	48.54	56.74			42.4
SK 2804 SMK	Reg	3.03	3		7.48	10.77	9.7					
SK 2805 KDH	MR	7.06	6		8.88	7.6	9.21	13.26	13.07			6.36
SK 2806 ANO	L	3.54	1		8.1							
SK 2807 KSS	RL	5.72	1		3.58							
SK 2809 SNS	RR	9.37	4			10.98	9.41	3.97				5.48
SK 2812 SaS	L	5.22	3					8.56	7.4			11.13
SK 2813 MH	MR	3.22	3					7.2	5.98			9.36
SK 2814 OLaNO	MR	7.07	2						6.18			10.6
SK 2816 Siet	Oth	5.76	1									2.47
SK 2818 Sme Rodi	RR	8.61	1									7.6
UK 1101 CONS	MR	6.91	9	29.5	28.14	30.51	35.15	39.21	35.57	33.56	38.71	40.08
UK 1102 LAB	ML	4.21	9	47.23	50.27	43.15	42.9	35.37	41.7	34.58	35.29	39.42
UK 1104 LibDem	L	3.46	9	18.01	17.03	17	16.03	20.31	15.79	10.46	9.06	9.33
UK 1105 SNP	Reg	3.57	9	1.99	2	2.24	2.04	1.68	3.03	3.8	3.79	3.68
UK 1106 PLAID	Reg	3.48	9	0.99	0.18	1.31	0.79	0.94	1.7	0.48	1.19	0.26
UK 1107 GREEN	ML	2.39	9	2.27	2.37	4.23	3.09	2.49	2.21	4.62	3.94	3.42
UK 1108 UKIP	RR	9.19	4			0.44				12.5	8.02	3.81
UK 1109 BNP	RR	9.95	1			1.12						

*Notes:* The table shows all political parties by their family (Fam: RL=radical left, ML=moderate left, L=liberal, MR=moderate right, RR=radical right, Reg=regionalist, Oth=other), their anti-immigrant position (Pos), the number of ESS waves they are present in the data (No) and their share of supporters by wave within each country (adding up within each country-wave column to 1). A blank space means that the party is not included in the respective wave (because it is not included in the ESS or in the CHES, the party did not (yet/any longer) exist, or the country did not participate in the wave).