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Can pensions save lives? Evidence from the introduction of old-age assistance in the UK

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Philipp Jaeger

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Introduction of Old-Age Assistance in the UK**

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Philipp Jaeger¹

Can Pensions Save Lives? Evidence from the Introduction of Old-Age Assistance in the UK

Abstract

I study the impact of old-age assistance on mortality using the introduction of public pensions in the UK in 1909 as a quasi-natural experiment. Exploiting the newly created pension eligibility age through a difference-in-difference as well as an event-time design, I show that elderly mortality in England and Wales declined after the pension was introduced. The estimated mortality decline is economically relevant, more pronounced in counties with a higher share of pensioners and is driven by fewer deaths from infectious as well as non-infectious diseases. An analysis of full-count individual-level census data points to a reduction in residential crowding and retirement, especially from occupations associated with high mortality rates, as likely channels.

JEL-Codes: H55, I12, J14, J26

Keywords: Old-age assistance; mortality; retirement

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1 Introduction

Throughout most of history, humans typically died before their 40th birthday. Today, life expectancy at birth has surpassed 80 in many advanced economies. A large literature has studied the drivers behind the historical mortality decline (for overviews see e.g. Cutler et al., 2006; Costa, 2015). The most prominent explanations include more or higher quality nutrition due to rising incomes (McKeown, 1976), public health interventions (Szreter, 1988) and medical progress. The role of social security—and old-age assistance in particular—has received less attention,¹ even though the emergence of the European welfare state in the late 19th/early 20th century coincided with an accelerated reduction in mortality rates.

In this paper, I use the Old-Age Pension Act of 1908, which introduced means-tested public pensions for everybody in the UK aged 70 or older,² as a quasi-natural experiment to study the impact of old-age assistance on mortality. Using aggregate national mortality data for England and Wales from 1901 to 1913, I show that elderly mortality (age 75+), relative to middle-aged mortality (age 45-64), declined after the pension was introduced. Event-time estimates suggest that the mortality decline started after the first pensions were paid and became larger over time. Using regional-level data, I also show that the decline in elderly mortality was bigger in counties with a higher share of pensioners. Depending on the specification, I estimate that elderly mortality fell by 2.7% to 12.5% after the pension was introduced. Taking these estimates at face value, the introduction of old-age assistance could explain a substantial share of the overall elderly mortality decline happening in the UK between the beginning of the 20th century and World War II. Combining these findings with the welfare analysis conducted in Giesecke and Jäger (2021) leaves little doubt that the introduction of public pensions in the UK increased societal welfare.

I argue that the pension improved health outcomes by reducing residential crowding, thus impeding the spread of infectious diseases, and inducing retirement, especially from occupations associated with high mortality rates. First, I document, based on national-level cause of

¹Notable exceptions are Bauernschuster et al. (2020); Bowblis (2010) and Winegarden and Murray (1998), which, however, have focused on the role of health insurance.

²Despite high mortality rates, the UK already had a sizable elderly population at that time (in the 1911 census more than one million people were 70 and older in England and Wales alone).

death data, that the mortality decline was driven by lower elderly mortality from infections and non-infectious diseases (and not by fewer violence-, accident-, or suicide-related deaths). Secondly, exploiting full-count individual-level census data, I show that the average household size, as a proxy for residential crowding, substantially declined for people aged 70+, relative to people aged 69, after the pension was introduced. The decline is mostly driven by fewer elderly people living in poorhouses, which were typically very crowded institutions. Third, following the findings of Giesecke and Jäger (2021) that the pension reduced elderly labor supply, I document that the labor supply reduction was especially large for people working in occupations associated with very high mortality rates. Consistent with my mechanism story, I show that, both, mortality and residential crowding declined more in urban compared to rural areas. I also find that the mortality decline was roughly similar for men and women, although pension reciprocity rates were substantially higher for women. I argue that men benefited to a similar degree, despite fewer transfers, because they responded more in terms of crowding and labor supply than women.

So far, econometric studies drawing on the Old-Age Pension Act to study the impact of pensions on health are missing, which is surprising because the historical setting has several unique advantages. First, the reform allows me to estimate the mortality effect of moving from no program to an old-age assistance scheme that covered a large part of the elderly population. This approach extends previous work that has typically focused on reforms that either affected only certain regions (Huang and Zhang, 2020; Cheng et al., 2018; Aguila et al., 2015; Galiani et al., 2016), ethnicities (Case, 2004) or were based on changes in benefit levels of existing pension systems (Jensen and Richter, 2004). The only existing evidence on the mortality effect of the first-time introduction of a public pension scheme stems from studies on the US (Balan-Cohen, 2008; Stoian and Fishback, 2010; Galofré-Vilà et al., 2021) and Canada (Emery and Matheson, 2012). In contrast to these programs that were introduced in the aftermath of the Great Depression, old-age assistance in the UK was established in a period of stable economic conditions which ensures that the effects are less confounded by macroeconomic shocks (at least until 1914) or the expansion of other social spending.

Second, the reform enables me to study a very early public transfer program. This setting has the advantage that mortality was still relatively high, old-age poverty widespread and other public social assistance largely absent, making it more likely for mortality to respond to means-tested pensions. So far, the only evidence on the role of pensions on health before World War I comes from studies on civil war veterans (Salm, 2011; Eli, 2015), which are a selected group.

Third, digitized micro-level data allows me to explore the underlying drivers behind the pension-mortality nexus. Therefore, I use full-count individual-level census data for England and Wales to study the effect of a newly introduced pension on crowding and retirement adding to the literature on pensions and living arrangements (Costa, 1999, 1997) as well as labor supply (Fetter and Lockwood, 2018; Giesecke and Jäger, 2021).

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the historical and institutional details of the reform. Section 3 describes the research design and data. Section 4 presents results, which are discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes.

2 Historical Background

Old-age assistance in the UK was introduced to alleviate the pressing problem of old-age poverty. Following the election victory of the liberal party in 1906, old-age assistance was implemented via the Old-Age Pension Act, which passed Parliament in August 1908.³ The reform provided means-tested pensions starting from January 1909 for every British citizen aged 70 or older and was financed by higher income taxes on the very rich (roughly the top 1%). Coverage was high despite the pension being means-tested. Almost 60% of the population 70+ was granted a pension in England and Wales in 1911 (613,873 out of 1,068,486 based on Department of Labour Statistics, 1915, p. 184). The pension was fixed to 5 *shillings* per week,⁴ which, according to Feinstein (1990), amounted to approximately 22% of average full-time earnings at the time.

³See Giesecke and Jäger (2021) for more details on the Old-Age Pension Act.

⁴In theory, pensions were granted based on a gliding scale. However, the overwhelming majority (93% in 1911) received the maximum pension of 5 shillings per week.

Prior to the pension, poor elderly people had to rely on poor law relief, which was associated with considerable stigma (including the loss of voting rights) and was often tied to a residence in a poorhouse.⁵ Poor law benefits, for those who were allowed to stay in their own homes, were on average only half as much as the pension.⁶ Thus, the share of elderly people (70+) receiving some form of poor relief was much lower (23.3% in 1906 according to Boyer, 2016) than the share of elderly people receiving a pension (57.5% in 1911).

At the time the pension was introduced, private pensions were largely absent and public health and unemployment insurance non-existing. Public health and unemployment insurance, however, was introduced in the period under study via the National Insurance Act of 1911.⁷ The National Insurance Act does not challenge the general findings in this paper for two reasons. First, health and unemployment insurance only became effective at the very end of the sample period when the first benefits were paid out in 1913. Second, both insurances only covered working-age people and not the elderly. If anything, health and unemployment insurance improved health outcomes of the working-age population⁸ (and not the elderly), which would bias the difference-in-difference model against finding a positive effect of the pension on elderly health.

⁵According to Boyer (2016), for instance, more than 60% of elderly poor relief recipients in 1908 London were relieved in poorhouses

⁶According to Pugh (2002), average weekly poor law relief was around 2 shillings and 6 pence.

⁷Health and unemployment insurance was contribution-based and subsidized by the state. The main benefits involved paid sick leave, access to a general practitioner and free treatment at tuberculosis sanctuaries (health insurance) as well as unemployment benefits (unemployment insurance). Coverage was much higher for health insurance (13.4 million or 46.7% of the population aged 16-65) than for unemployment insurance (2.3 million), since unemployment insurance was only compulsory for some occupations (shipbuilding, engineering as well as building and construction). For more details see Thane (2011).

⁸The positive health effect of early health insurance has been documented for instance in Winegarden and Murray (1998) and Bauernschuster et al. (2020)

3 Empirical Strategy & Data

3.1 Identification Strategy

3.1.1 Mortality Effect of the Pension

To analyze the relationship between pension eligibility and health, I employ two complementary research designs. First, I compare mortality rates above and below the newly created eligibility age of 70 in a difference-in-difference (DiD) and event-time framework using data at the national level from 1901 to 1913. Second, I exploit variation in pension reciprocity rates at the county level to investigate whether the treatment intensity is associated with changes in mortality rates. The resulting estimates might not necessarily represent the causal effect of the pension on mortality, however, I argue in A.1 of the online appendix that plausible confounders (e.g. spillover effects) are unlikely to invalidate my main results. In both research designs, people aged 75+ (age groups: 75-84, 85+) are coded as treated while 45 to 64 year old's (age groups: 45-54, 55-64) serve as a control. I use a narrower age definition as a robustness check. Since mortality data is only available in 10-year age brackets in official statistics, I drop the age group 65-74 because I cannot separate treated from non-treated.⁹

On the national level, I run the following DiD:

$$\text{Detrended } \log(\text{mortality}_{agt}) = \alpha(\text{eligible}_a) + \beta_t + \gamma(\text{eligible}_a * \geq 1909_t) + \varepsilon_{agt} \quad (1)$$

and event-time model:

$$\text{Detrended } \log(\text{mortality}_{agt}) = \alpha(\text{eligible}_a) + \beta_t + \sum_{k=1901}^{1913} \gamma_k(\text{eligible}_a * \text{year}_t) + \varepsilon_{agt} \quad (2)$$

where a denotes age-group, g gender and t calendar time in years. eligible equals one for the age groups 75+ and zero otherwise, $\geq 1909_t$ is one from 1909 onwards and zero before. β_t denotes time fixed effects. I am interested in the estimated DiD ($\hat{\gamma}$) and event-time coefficients ($\hat{\gamma}_k$). To

⁹Recently digitized death certificate data by Cummins (2021) allows to calculate death rates at single ages. However, I show in the online appendix A.2 that reporting bias (due to age heaping) prevents me from using single age group data for my analysis.

account for differential mortality pre-trends between treated and control (see figure 1), I detrend mortality by regressing $\log(\text{mortality})$ on age-group- and gender-specific linear time trends (and their interactions) in the pre-treatment period (1901-1908) and subtract these fitted trends from all data points (1901-1913) in the spirit of Bhuller et al. (2013) and Goodman-Bacon (2021). I estimate equation 1 and 2 using all-cause mortality as well as by different causes of death. Mortality is measured using the crude death rate, dividing the number of deaths by the size of the population in the respective year.

For the county-level analysis, I run a triple interaction model of the following form:

$$\begin{aligned} \log(\text{mortality}_{agt_c}) = & \alpha(\text{eligible}_a) + \beta_t + \gamma(\text{pension rate}_c) \\ & + \delta_t(\text{eligible}_a * \text{year}_t) + \lambda(\text{eligible}_a * \text{pension rate}_c) \\ & + \mu_t(\text{year}_t * \text{pension rate}_c) + \rho_t(\mathbf{eligible}_a * \mathbf{year}_t * \mathbf{pension rate}_c) + \varepsilon_{agt_c} \quad (3) \end{aligned}$$

where a denotes age-group, g gender, t calendar time in years and c county. eligible , as in equation 1 and 2, equals one for the age groups 75+ and zero otherwise. pension rate_c is the share of pensioners relative to the elderly population (70+) and serves as a proxy for the treatment intensity at the regional level. I do not detrend mortality, which would be challenging with two pre-reform data points only, and instead focus only on the estimated triple interaction coefficient $\hat{\rho}_{1911}$.

3.1.2 Mechanism

I analyze two potential transmission channels, crowding and retirement, using full-count individual-level census data in a difference-in-difference design. To identify the causal effect of pension availability on housing arrangements and labor supply, I take advantage of the more granular micro-data, which allows me to compare people slightly above with people slightly below the newly created pension eligibility age.

Specifically, I estimate for every age between 60 and 80 a 2x2 DiD equation of the following form:

$$y_{at} = \alpha(\text{age}_a) + \beta(\text{year} = 1911_t) + \gamma(\text{age}_a * \text{year} = 1911_t) + \varepsilon_{at} \quad (4)$$

where age 69 always serves as a reference group, and the regression is estimated for the census wave t 1901 (before) and 1911 (after). The coefficients of primary interest, γ , measure the percentage point change in the outcome variable (between 1901 and 1911) of the ages 60 to 80 compared to the reference age 69. The identifying assumption is that people slightly below or above the age of 69 would have behaved as people aged 69 without the pension. I discuss potential threats to identification and why they are unlikely to apply in A.3 of the online appendix. Using graphical DiD evidence for the age groups 75+ and 45-64, I investigate whether the estimated local DiD also has implications for the age groups studied in the mortality analysis.

I use three main variables to operationalize crowding: 1) The household size, 2) The share of people living in collective dwellings such as poorhouses, and 3) The number of rooms per person. To study retirement patterns, I follow Giesecke and Jäger (2021) and use labor force participation (LFP) rates derived by the gainful employment concept as the main outcome.¹⁰ I estimate the LFP-DiD for four different occupational groups based on their occupational-specific mortality rates.

3.2 Data

To study the impact of pensions on health, I use national-, regional- and individual-level data for England and Wales. I rely on England and Wales for two reasons. First, age information is more reliable in England and Wales since birth registers (and birth certificates) existed at least since 1837. In contrast, age verification was more difficult in Scotland and especially

¹⁰People are considered to be part of the labor force (LFP = 1) if they report to have an occupation or to be unemployed. They are coded as outside the labor force (LFP = 0) if they state they have no occupation or are retired. Therefore, I sometimes have to adjust the "labforce" variable from IPUMS international (2020) using values from the "inactiveuk" variable. Specifically, I make sure that people who, based on the "inactiveuk" variable, are "Retired" (inactiveuk=1) or "Pensioner, annuitant or superannuated" (inactiveuk=4) are not coded as part of the labor force in my analysis.

challenging in Ireland. Second, digitized individual-level census data, which I use to investigate the mechanism through which the pension affected mortality, is only consistently available for England and Wales.

The national mortality sample starts in 1901 when the data from Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (1994) (which provides me with cause of death data) begins and ends in 1913 due to the potential confounding mortality implications of World War I. Mortality data for England and Wales at the time can be considered to be of high quality and has been frequently used for empirical analyses (see for instance Beach and Hanlon, 2018; Cummins, 2021; Hanlon et al., 2021). For the regional analysis, I use data from the three census years 1891, 1901 and 1911. The regional analysis consists of the 42 English counties only, because county-level mortality information is not consistently reported for Welsh counties over the three decades.¹¹ The individual-level analysis relies on full-count census data for up to three decennial waves (1891, 1901, 1911). Figure D.1 in the appendix shows the number of observations for every age between 50 and 90 for the two censuses used in the main analysis (1901, 1911). Table 1 summarizes the variables and data sources of the study.

Table 2 provides summary statistics. I group deaths into six different causes of death categories (based on more than 400 individual causes), which should have been easily distinguishable given the medical technology at the time. Based on the death certificates at the time, most elderly people have died due to old age (or senile decay),¹² which I include in the non-infectious disease category, followed by bronchitis, which is coded as an infectious disease. Together, old age and bronchitis, make up almost half of all elderly deaths. Drug and violence-related deaths mostly include liver cirrhosis (as a proxy for alcoholism) and to a smaller degree homicides. Accident-related deaths are overwhelmingly caused by falls and "Others" mostly consist of ill-defined or not specified deaths.

¹¹Focusing on English counties only is likely to be of limited concern since 94% of the population from England and Wales lived in England in 1911.

¹²The analysis in Reid et al. (2015) suggests that many deaths attributed to old age were actually caused by cardiovascular diseases or cancers. However, medical technology as well as the motivation to distinguish between different (non-violent) causes of deaths for the elderly was limited.

4 Results

4.1 Mortality

4.1.1 National Level

I argue in this section that the introduction of public pensions in the UK reduced elderly mortality. Purely descriptively, figure 1 documents a trend break in elderly mortality rates after the pension was introduced. Both, crude death rates (deaths per 1000 people) of the treatment group (left panel) and the ratio of crude death rates between treatment and control (right panel) show an increase in elderly mortality (absolute or relative to middle-aged mortality) before the pension became effective in 1909. After 1909, elderly mortality declined. I document in appendix figure D.2 that there is no evidence for a trend break in mortality rates after 1909 for any other age group.

Figure 2 illustrates the key takeaway of figure 1 using a more formal event-time model. Assuming that the pre-pension trends would have continued in absence of the pension,¹³ elderly mortality would have been almost 8% lower in 1913 compared to 1908. Contrasting the entire post-reform period (1909-1913) with the pre-treatment period (1901-1908), detrended elderly mortality fell on average by 2.7% (table 3) after the pension was introduced. These estimates are consistent with an economically relevant health bonus of the pension (see also 5.1 for a discussion of the effect size).

Turning to causes of death shows that mortality from infectious as well as non-infectious diseases declined after the pension was introduced (table 3). The decline was strongest for infectious diseases, which is in line with the hypothesis that the pension reduced crowding by making it less likely to catch an infection. Deaths from non-infectious diseases declined as well, which is consistent with the idea that the pension allowed people to retire from jobs characterized by hard manual labor or hazardous workplaces. I find no statistically significant change in mortality related to risky behavior such as drug abuse and violence (mainly alcoholism and

¹³Given that treatment and control mortality are clearly on differential pre-trends, I subtract the extrapolated pre-trends (based on the period 1901-1908) from all data points (1901-1913), see section 3.1.1 for details. I discuss the constant trend assumption in appendix section A.1.

homicides) or social isolation (proxied by suicides in the spirit of Stoian and Fishback, 2010) which might at least partly be driven by too much statistical noise due to the relatively low number of deaths associated with these causes of deaths (table 2). The rather surprising finding that accident-related mortality increased after the pension was introduced could be driven by the possibility that a reduction in work-related accidents is overcompensated by accidents at home (which I cannot disentangle in the data). Another potential explanation is that the pension allowed elderly people to live in private households (see section 4.2.1), instead of being monitored in a poorhouse or other collective institution, which might have increased the risk of accidents.

4.1.2 County Level

The county-level estimates presented in table 4 support the national-level finding that the introduction of pensions was associated with a decline in elderly mortality. The coefficient of the triple interaction ($\hat{\rho}_{1911}$ of equation 3) is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level which suggests that elderly (relative to middle-aged) mortality declined more strongly in counties with a higher treatment intensity. The estimated coefficient of -0.245 implies that an increase in the reciprocity rate from 0% to 57.5% (the national reciprocity rate in 1911) is associated with a mortality decline of 12.5%. Thus, the county-level estimates suggest an even stronger positive health effect of the pension than the national DiD analysis. The coefficient $\hat{\rho}_{1891}$ of the interaction of $eligible_a * (Year = 1891)_t * (pension\ rate)_c$ is negative and insignificant indicating that the result is not driven by pre-existing trends.

4.2 Mechanism

4.2.1 Residential Crowding

One channel through which the pension likely decreased mortality is by reducing residential crowding, thus, impeding the spread of infectious diseases. Previous studies have shown that crowding was associated with higher mortality rates at the time, both, in the UK (Hanlon and Tian, 2015) and the US (Ager et al., 2020). I confirm the positive and statistically significant

correlation between crowding and mortality in the UK at the time by running a simple bivariate regression at the district level of elderly mortality rates (75+) on my main proxy for household crowding, the average household size¹⁴ (results see table C.2 in the appendix).

Consistent with historical evidence from the US (Costa, 1997, 1999), I argue in this section that the introduction of public pensions in the UK altered living arrangements. The left panel of figure 3 shows descriptively that the average number of people living in a household declined at the newly introduced eligibility age after the pension was introduced (1911), while it used to increase before the pension was available (1901). Figure 4, plotting 20 2x2 DiD coefficients, shows the argument more formally. While the average household size of people aged 60 to 69 moved in tandem between 1901 and 1911, the average household size for people aged 70+ decreased significantly relative to people at age 69. The estimated decline in the household size of up to 14 people is economically relevant given that it implies a reduction of the average household size of more than 20% compared to 1901. A placebo test, presented in appendix figure D.4, documents that the average household size for people 70+ has mostly evolved like the average household size for people at age 69 in the pre-treatment period (between 1891 and 1901). The reduction in crowding that took place only after the introduction of pensions is also visible for the larger treatment group (75+) used in the mortality estimates (figure D.11 in the appendix), especially if compared to the mortality control group (45-64).

The decline in household size is mostly driven by fewer people residing in poorhouses or other collective dwellings and living in private households instead. Collective dwellings, also known as group quarters, include, among others, correctional institutions, hospitals, military barracks, boarding schools, convents and most importantly in this setting, poorhouses. Poor- or workhouses, based on the centuries-old poor law system, were institutions that offered accommodation and employment for people who were unable to support themselves financially.¹⁵

¹⁴The average household size is also positively and statistically significantly correlated with population density as a more traditional measure of crowding

¹⁵I code a person to be part of a poorhouse if he or she lives in a collective dwelling (also known as a group quarter) where at least one person states an occupation that is related to the poor law (e.g. poor law officer). The share of people 70+ living in a poorhouse based on this definition (4.2%) is very close to the share derived from administrative statistics (4.6%, Great Britain Parliamentary Papers, 1913). I also tried an alternative definition based on the building type as available via IPUMS international (2020), however, the overall share of elderly people living in poorhouses based on the building type definition is far too low (<1%).

The fact that household size increases with age (as shown in the left panel of figure 3) is mostly driven by elderly people who lose the capacity to work and move to a poorhouse to receive governmental support (right panel of figure 3). Poorhouses were typically very crowded. Based on the census in 1911, elderly people (70+) in poorhouses lived together with on average 760 other people, while elderly people residing in private households, as more than 90% of them did, shared their home with, on average, 3 other people (see figure D.3 in the appendix).

Figure 5, using the same DiD design as in figure 4, indicates that both, the share of people living in poorhouses and people living in other group quarters declined after the pension was introduced. The decline, however, is much stronger for poorhouses and amounts to around 1.5 percentage points implying a reduction of more than 30% compared to 1901. The finding of a substantial reduction in the share of people living in poorhouses is in line with administrative statistics showing that the absolute number of elderly people (70+) in poorhouses declined by almost 20% from March 1906 to January 1912 (from 61,378 to 49,370 according to Great Britain Parliamentary Papers, 1913). The reduction in the share of people living in poorhouses is likely a mix of elderly people leaving poorhouses and elderly people not moving to a poorhouse in the first place. The fact that many people remained in poorhouses even after the pension was introduced suggests that other non-financial factors, e.g. sickness, also played a role in the decision to leave a poorhouse. I find only limited evidence for a reduction in crowding conditional on living in a private household or group quarter (figure D.6 in the appendix), which is likely driven by the fact that the composition (fewer people in group quarters, more in private households) changed at the newly created retirement age.

Looking at a more direct measure of household crowding—the average number of rooms per person—supports the previous findings. The number of rooms for a given household is only available for a large number of households since 1911, thus, estimating a DiD specification is not feasible. Figure 6, however, demonstrates a clear increase in the average number of rooms per person at age 70.¹⁶ The visible increase is likely even downward biased because the number

¹⁶The increase is also statistically significant based on a regression discontinuity design assuming a linear age-rooms per person relationship and a bandwidth of 5 years to the left and right like in Giesecke and Jäger (2021).

of rooms is often missing for group quarters, which are typically more crowded than private households.¹⁷

4.2.2 Retirement from Physically Intensive or Hazardous Jobs

The second probable channel through which the pension reduced mortality is by enabling elderly people to retire from physically intensive or hazardous jobs. Previous studies suggest that physically intensive jobs, especially executed in old age, worsen health outcomes (Coenen et al., 2018; Saporta-Eksten et al., 2021) and that retirement from these jobs can reduce mortality (Giesecke, 2019). We know from Giesecke and Jäger (2021) that the pension has reduced overall elderly labor supply. Combining this finding with the fact that most jobs in the early 20th century UK were manually intensive¹⁸ and work hours typically much longer than today (Huberman and Minns, 2007), already strongly suggests that the pension benefited elderly health.

Furthermore, the pension especially induced retirement from jobs associated with high mortality rates. To document this, I extend the analysis of Giesecke and Jäger (2021) by estimating male labor supply response depending on occupational-specific mortality rates. I focus on men because occupational-specific mortality rates are not available for women.¹⁹ I group all men aged 60 to 80, which I could match to an occupational-specific mortality rate (70% of men with an occupation), in four (almost)²⁰ equally sized mortality groups. I then run 20 DiD models for each of the four sub-groups.²¹ The mortality differences between the mortality quartiles are pronounced. Average occupational mortality in the lowest mortality quartile amounts to around

¹⁷The average number of rooms per person for elderly people in collective dwellings for which data is available is 0.7 compared to an average of 1.6 rooms per person in private households.

¹⁸Almost 60% of elderly people (70+), who still were actively working in 1911, were engaged in agriculture, crafts or elementary occupations (e.g. common laborers).

¹⁹Male mortality rates by occupation were collected by Registrar General (1923). Mortality rates are calculated for the average of the years 1910 to 1912 in the age group 25 to 65 and thus should not be directly affected by the pension. All occupational rates are calculated relative to the average mortality rate of all men aged 25 to 65.

²⁰Because mortality data is only assigned at the occupational level and some occupations; e.g. farmers, common laborers, carpenters or shoemakers; are very frequent, the mortality groups are not exactly of the same size. The largest mortality group (quartile 2) is around 20% larger than the smallest group (quartile 3).

²¹Since occupational information is only available for a selected subset of retirees, I follow Giesecke and Jäger (2021) and use the share of people working in one mortality group relative to the total population as dependent variable (for more details, see Online Appendix C.2 in Giesecke and Jäger, 2021). Since the share of people across the four mortality groups are not exactly of the same size, I, similar to Giesecke and Jäger (2021), rescale the estimates by the share of people working in the respective mortality group at age 69.

60% of average male mortality (for the same age group) and more than 200% in the highest mortality group.

Figure 7 shows that the decline in labor force participation rates, as estimated via a DiD design, is strongest in occupations with the highest occupational mortality rate. In the quartile with the highest mortality rates (quartile 4), male labor supply in the age group 70 to 80 declined by on average 20.9% compared to age 69. The majority of people in the highest mortality quartile were working in elementary occupations mainly including general laborers. Retirement from elementary occupations; which were likely physically very demanding, stressful and poorly paid; has plausibly contributed to a reduction in elderly mortality rates. The decline is smaller (ranging between 2.9% and 14.4%) in the groups with lower mortality rates. The large labor supply reduction in the first mortality quartile is driven by farmers, who had relatively low mortality rates, likely driven by not being exposed to crowded cities with poor sanitary conditions. Given that agricultural work at the time was also physically intense, the finding of large labor supply responses in the first mortality quartile is not a odds with the general conclusion that the pension allowed people to retire from physically intensive jobs. Figure D.12 in the appendix shows that elderly labor supply more generally, measured based on the larger treatment group (75+) as used in the mortality analysis, has shown a continued decrease in their labor market participation compared to the middle-aged (45-64).

4.2.3 Other Potential Channels

More or higher quality nutrition also likely contributed to the mortality decline. The diet of poor people in the UK at the time was characterized by insufficient levels of vitamins and minerals (Gazeley and Newell, 2015) and a pension of 5 shillings could buy a considerable amount of food.²² Due to the lack of data, I am not able to evaluate the contribution of nutrition empirically. The finding that the mortality decline was roughly similar for men and women

²²Pugh (2002, In footnote 79) presents a potential living budget that the pension could buy in Bristol. 1 shilling (s)= 12 pence (d): rent of one room 1s 3d; coal, oil, matches 8.5d; 0.5 pound cheese 3.5 d; 0.5 pound bacon 3.5d; 0.25 pound tea 3.5d; 1.5 pound sugar 3d; 1 bar soap 2d; 1 tin milk 2d; 0.75 pound bread daily 6.25 d; meat (1 pound butcher's cuttings) 4d; packet crushed oats 1d; 2.5 pounds potatoes 1.25 d; salt, pepper, vinegar, mustard 0.75 d; fish (bloaters or kippers) 2 for 1.5 d, mixed vegetables 1.5 d; 0.25 pound dripping 1.5 d; sundries (cotton, pins, needles) 1d.

(4.3.1), although men responded more in terms of crowding and labor supply, however, suggests that another channel, most likely nutrition, also played an important role.

Another potential mechanism is that the pension allowed elderly people to spend more on heating. I test this hypothesis using data from Hanlon et al. (2021), who provide weekly death counts by age together with temperature data for London. Running a regression with the number of elderly deaths (aged 65+) as the dependent variable for the period 1901 to 1913, I find that elderly mortality increases if the minimum temperature falls below 0 degrees Celsius. However, the temperature-mortality nexus does not change significantly after 1908 suggesting that additional spending on heating has played only a minor role (see table C.1 in the appendix).

Improved medical care was probably also less relevant because medical technology was still limited. Although some vaccinations; e.g. against smallpox, rabies or the plague; had already been invented, the mortality implications of these vaccines were likely limited (Cutler et al., 2006). Antibacterial medications such as sulfa drugs or penicillin were not widely used before the 1930s and 1940s. Effective treatment against diseases associated with old age such as cancer or cardiovascular disease only started to emerge after World War II.

4.3 Heterogeneity

4.3.1 Gender

Table 5, showing the mortality DiD estimates separately for men and women, documents that the estimated mortality decline was slightly larger for men, which is also supported by the DiD event-time-estimates (see figure D.13 in the appendix). Given that male mortality is more volatile than female mortality, standard errors of the estimate, however, are higher for men rendering the overall coefficient insignificant. The finding of a similar sized or even slightly larger mortality effect for men is nonetheless surprising, given that pension reciprocity rates were higher for women (63% of women 70+ received a pension in 1911) than for men (49%).²³

²³According to Department of Labour Statistics (1915), 218,158 men and 395,715 women received a pension in 1911.

The potential paradox is resolved by the fact that observed behavioral responses were larger for men. Both, residential crowding and labor supply fell more for men than for women. Figure 8 documents that household size and the share of people living in poorhouses show a stronger reduction for men, which fits to lower male mortality from infectious diseases after the pension (table 5). Moreover, more men than women retired as a response to the reform (figure 9), which potentially contributed to lower mortality from non-infectious diseases.

4.3.2 Rural vs. Urban

The estimated mortality decline is larger in urban compared to rural areas (table 6 and appendix event-time figure D.14).²⁴ The larger impact in urban areas is plausible because mortality in cities was typically higher than in rural areas at the time (a fact known as the urban mortality penalty), which was at least partly driven by higher residential crowding (see for instance Davenport, 2020). Figure 10 shows that the pension reduced crowding in both, rural and urban areas, however, the reduction was much more pronounced in urban areas, supporting the finding of a larger mortality decline in urban areas. I find no evidence for differential effects on labor supply (Figure 11).

5 Discussion

5.1 Effect Size

My estimates of the mortality decline following the pension range between 2.7% (national-level DiD), 8% (national event-time estimate for 1913) to 12.5% (county-level analysis). The estimated decline is sizeable given that the overall life expectancy gains for the elderly were modest before World War II. Average elderly (75+) mortality rates in the 1930s were only around 12% lower than in the 1890s (calculated using data from Human Mortality Database,

²⁴For details how rural and urban mortality rates are constructed see appendix B. Overall, the estimated mortality reduction is larger in the urban and rural sample, compared to the baseline estimates, due to the simpler inter- and extrapolation of the population data, which does not take births, age-specific deaths and the details of the age distribution into account.

2020). Thus, my estimates suggest that a substantial share of the elderly mortality decline happening between the beginning of the 20th century and World War II could be driven by the introduction of public pensions.

Compared to studies on the US, the estimated mortality decline of the UK pension, however, is relatively small. Balan-Cohen (2008) estimates that the expansion of old-age assistance in the US following the 1935 Social Security Act reduced elderly mortality by more than 20% until 1955. More recently, Galofré-Vilà et al. (2021) suggest that the mortality effect was even larger reducing elderly mortality by almost 40% until 1944.²⁵ The larger estimated mortality declines for the US are likely driven by institutional and methodological factors. The reform in the US took place more than 20 years later and the retirement age was lower (UK: 70 vs. US: 65). Thus, medical technology, the health status and living conditions of the target population in the US were substantially different. Methodologically, the results presented in Balan-Cohen (2008) and Galofré-Vilà et al. (2021) are based on a substantially longer post-pension period. The event-time estimates presented in figure 2 of Galofré-Vilà et al. (2021) suggest that the mortality decline following the introduction of old-age assistance in the US became larger over time. Thus, restricting the post-pension period to 4 years, as in the case for the UK due to the onset of World War I, would substantially lower the estimated mortality decline for the US.

5.2 Price of Postponing one Death and Overall Welfare Implications

Taking the estimates at (causal) face value, the introduction of public pensions postponed between 2,903 (national-level DiD) to 13,438 deaths (county-level analysis) every year.²⁶ Based on annual pension costs of £7,253,222,²⁷ this implies a price for every postponed death of £2,499 to £540, which according to the Bank of England (Thomas and Dimsdale, 2017) translates into £206,514 to £44,607 measured in today's consumer prices. Estimates by Hugonnier

²⁵The larger mortality effect for the US is especially surprising because reciprocity rates among the target age groups were much higher in the UK (UK in 1911: $\approx 58\%$ vs. US in 1940: $\approx 22\%$), while benefit levels were roughly similar (UK: 22% of average full-time earnings vs. US: 25% of median earnings in 1939 according to Fetter and Lockwood (2018)).

²⁶Based on 107,506 annual deaths of people 70+ in the year 1908 (last year before the introduction of public pensions) multiplied by the estimated mortality reduction of 2.7% and 12.5%.

²⁷Average for the fiscal years 1910 to 1913 taken from Department of Labour Statistics (1915).

et al. (2022) for the US in 2017, show that the statistical value of a life today, even for people in poor health, is substantially higher than that, easily reaching more than 1 million US-\$. Thus, it is possible that, even though the pension likely postponed deaths by only a few years, the pension was welfare-improving based on the associated mortality decline alone.

The welfare analysis conducted in Giesecke and Jäger (2021) already suggested that the pension most likely improved societal welfare by redistribution money from the top of the income distribution to poor elderly people without large behavioral costs. Recently, Kang and Vasserma (2022) have argued that the welfare analysis of Giesecke and Jäger (2021) is based on very conservative assumptions implying that the welfare gains are bigger than presented in Giesecke and Jäger (2021). The welfare analyses in both papers, however, did not take into account that the pension also likely reduced mortality, making the welfare gains even larger. Taken together, the existing evidence leaves little doubt that the pension improved societal welfare.

6 Conclusion

In this paper, I have argued that the introduction of old-age assistance in the UK has postponed an economically relevant number of elderly deaths by reducing residential crowding and allowing elderly people to retire from jobs associated with high occupational-specific mortality rates. My estimates are consistent with the idea that the introduction of old-age assistance is responsible for a large share of the elderly mortality decline happening in the UK between the beginning of the 20th century and World War II. Thus, as one of few, this study highlights the potentially large contribution of early social security reforms to the historical mortality decline. My findings might be also relevant for today's developing countries that plan to introduce non-contributory (a.k.a. social) pensions. These countries often share some of the characteristics of the UK in the early 20th century such as a lack of a comprehensive welfare system, relatively high mortality rates, crowded living spaces and, at least in certain sectors, health-detrimental work environments.

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Appendix

Tables

Table 1: Data Sources

Variable (and level of aggregation)	Data Source	Years
All-cause Mortality (National)	Human Mortality Database (2020) ^a	1901-1913
Causes of Death Mortality (National)	Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (1994) ^a	1901-1913
Deaths (County)	Registrar General (1892, 1903, 1913)	1891, 1901, 1911
Population (County)	Higgs et al. (2013) via IPUMS international (2020)	1891, 1901, 1911
Pensioner (County)	Great Britain Parliamentary Papers (1913)	1912
Household Size (Individual)	Higgs et al. (2013) via IPUMS international (2020)	1891, 1901, 1911
Residence Poorhouse (Individual)	Higgs et al. (2013) via IPUMS international (2020)	1891, 1901, 1911
Residence Group Quarters (Individual)	Higgs et al. (2013) via IPUMS international (2020)	1891, 1901, 1911
Rooms per Person (Individual)	Higgs et al. (2013) via IPUMS international (2020)	1891, 1901, 1911
Work Activity (Individual)	Higgs et al. (2013) via IPUMS international (2020)	1891, 1901, 1911
Occupation (Individual)	Higgs et al. (2013) via IPUMS international (2020)	1891, 1901, 1911
Mortality by occupation (Occupation)	Registrar General (1923)	Mean 1910-1912

^a: Underlying data from Registrar General.

Table 2: Summary Statistics

	Control (45-64)		Treatment (75+)	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
National Crude Death Rate (1901-1913)				
All causes	21.2	7.6	192.7	65.5
Infectious Diseases	5.8	2.1	35.1	9.5
Non-infectious Diseases	13.8	5.5	153.7	55.3
Drugs/Violence	0.6	0.2	0.3	0.2
Suicide	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2
Accidents	0.6	0.4	3.2	1.3
Others	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.1
Observations	52 ^a		52 ^a	
County Level Data (1891, 1901, 1911)				
All causes crude death rate	20.9	9.0	210.5	79.6
Pension Reciprocity Rate			61.7	0.081
Observations	504 ^b		504 ^b	
Individual Level Data (1901, 1911)				
	Control (60-69)		Treatment (70-80)	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Household Size ^c	44.4	249.8	53.3	262.7
Share Poorhouse	0.027	0.163	0.042	0.200
Share Group Quarters (Except Poorhouses)	0.026	0.160	0.027	0.161
Labor Force Participation Rate	0.509	0.500	0.334	0.472
Observations	3,347,954		1,654,923	
Rooms per Person	1.6	1.0	1.7	1.1
Observations ^d	1,730,812		851,599	

Source: See table 1 *Note:* Crude death rate (deaths per 1000 people) are unweighted averages for the age-groups used in the estimation, e.g. the mean of the all cause crude death rate is the unweighted average of the death rate for people aged 75-84 (129.5) and 85+ (255.9). In contrast, figure 1 shows weighted averages. *a* = 2 age-groups * 2 gender * 13 years. *b* = 2 age-groups * 2 gender * 3 years * 42 counties. *c* = Household size is high due to few people living in group quarters with thousands of other persons. The median household size for the control group is 4 and 3 for the treatment group. *d* = number of rooms are missing for some households (mostly group quarters).

Table 3: Pension and Mortality: National DiD-Estimates

	Coefficient
Infectious Diseases	-0.050* (-2.25)
Non-infectious Diseases	-0.033** (-2.94)
Drugs/Violence	0.174 (1.25)
Suicide	0.134 (0.56)
Accidents	0.089* (1.79)
Others	-0.080 (-0.81)
All causes	-0.027** (-2.72)
Observations	104

Note: Coefficients from a difference-in-difference model (Interaction of post-treatment-period and treatment dummy). Dependent variable: Detrended $\ln(\text{mortality rates})$. Treatment age-groups: 75+. Control age-groups: 45-64 years. Years 1901-1913. Other causes include deaths related to pregnancy or birth and deaths with unknown or ill-defined cause. Standard errors clustered at the age-group level using wild-bootstrap and webb weights. t-value in parentheses. **, * denotes significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively.

Table 4: Pension and Mortality: County Level Estimates

	Coefficient	Observations
Treatment Intensity in 1911	-0.245* (0.144)	1,008
	Pre-Trend	
Treatment intensity in 1891	-0.043 (0.219)	1,008

Note: Coefficient of the triple interaction $\rho(\text{eligible}_a * \text{year}_t * \text{pension rate}_c)$. Dependent variable: $\ln(\text{mortality rates})$. Treatment age-groups: 75+. Control age-groups: 45-64. Sample consists of the census years 1891, 1901, 1911. Base year of the interactions: 1901. * denotes significance at the 10% level. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the county level.

Table 5: Pension and Mortality: National DiD-Estimates, Men vs. Women

	Men	Women
Infectious Diseases	-0.052** (-2.67)	-0.049** (-4.51)
Non-infectious Diseases	-0.035 (-1.52)	-0.031** (-3.08)
Drugs/Violence	0.261 (1.02)	0.086 (1.04)
Suicide	0.309 (1.27)	-0.056 (-0.12)
Accidents	-0.009 (-0.84)	0.187** (2.52)
Others	-0.055 (-0.78)	-0.105 (-0.53)
All causes	-0.028 (-1.61)	-0.025** (-3.42)
Observations	52	52

Note: Coefficients from a difference-in-difference model (Interaction of post-treatment-period and treatment dummy). Dependent variable: Detrended $\ln(\text{mortality rates})$. Years 1901-1913. Equations are estimated separately for men and women. Standard errors clustered at the age-group level using wild-bootstrap. t-value in parentheses. **, * denotes significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively.


Table 6: Pension and Mortality: National DiD-Estimates, Urban vs. Rural

	Coefficient	Obs
Rural	-0.043 (-1.81)	104
Urban	-0.078* (-2.21)	104

Note: Coefficients from a difference-in-difference model (Interaction of post-treatment-period and treatment dummy). Dependent variable: Detrended ln(mortality rates). Years 1901-1913. The estimated mortality reduction is larger, compared to the baseline estimates, because of differently constructed population size data (inter- and extrapolation on the district level). Standard errors clustered at the age-group level using wild-bootstrap. t-value in parentheses. **, * denotes significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively.


Figures

Figure 1: Mortality Rates in England & Wales, 1901-1913



Note: Left panel: Crude death rates of the treatment group calculated as $\frac{Deaths(75-84)+Deaths(85+)*1000}{Pop(75-84)+Pop(85+)}$. Right panel: Crude death rate of the treatment group divided by the crude death rate of the control group $\frac{(Deaths(45-54)+Deaths(55-64))*1000}{Pop(45-54)+Pop(55-64)}$. The vertical line indicates the introduction of old-age assistance in 1909.

Figure 2: Pension and Mortality: National Event-time Model




(a) Only Treated: 75+

(b) DiD: Treated (75+) vs. Control (45-64)

Note: Coefficients (and 95% confidence bands) from an event-time model. Only treated: year dummies, DiD: Interaction of year and treatment dummy (1 if age \geq 70), both 1908 baseline year. Dependent variable: Detrended $\ln(\text{mortality rates})$. The vertical line indicates the introduction of old-age assistance in 1909. Standard errors clustered at the age-group-gender level using wild-bootstrap and webb weights.

Figure 3: Household Size and Share of People Living in Poorhouses, 1901 and 1911




(a) Household Size

(b) Share of People Living in Poorhouses


Note: The vertical line indicates the age-based eligibility threshold that was introduced by the pension in 1909.
Source: Own calculations based on individual full-count census data for England and Wales provided by IPUMS.

Figure 4: Differences-in-differences Estimates for Household Size



Note: Each dot represents a 2x2 difference-in-difference-coefficient (and 95% confidence bands) comparing the change in household size between 1901 (before) and 1911 (after) for each age (60-80) relative to the reference age 69. The vertical line indicates the age-based eligibility threshold that was introduced by the pension in 1909. *Source:* Own calculations based on individual full-count census data for England and Wales provided by IPUMS.

Figure 5: Differences-in-differences Estimates for Share living in Collective Dwellings




(a) Share Living in Poorhouses

(b) Share Living in Other Group Quarters


Note: Each dot represents a 2x2 difference-in-difference-coefficient (and 95% confidence bands) comparing the change in the share of people living in poorhouses (left panel) or group quarters except poorhouses (right panel) between 1901 (before) and 1911 (after) for each age (60-80) relative to the reference age 69. The vertical line indicates the age-based eligibility threshold that was introduced by the pension in 1909. *Source:* Own calculations based on individual full-count census data for England and Wales provided by IPUMS.

Figure 6: Rooms per Person, 1911



Note: Figure plots the average number of rooms in a household divided by the number of household members. The number of rooms is missing for many group quarters. The vertical line indicates the age-based eligibility threshold that was introduced by the pension in 1909. *Source:* Own calculations based on individual full-count census data for England and Wales provided by IPUMS.


Figure 7: Differences-in-differences Estimates for Male Labor Supply stratified by Occupational Mortality Rate



Note: Each dot represents a 2x2 difference-in-difference-coefficient (and 95% confidence bands) comparing the change in the share of people working in a job associated with a specific mortality quartile between 1901 (before) and 1911 (after) for each age (60-80) relative to the reference age 69. All estimates are scaled by the average share of people working in a job associated with the respective mortality quartile at age 69. The decline specified in the subtitles and represented by the red horizontal line measures the average coefficient for the ages 70 to 80. The vertical line indicates the age-based eligibility threshold that was introduced by the pension in 1909.

Occupations ranked by average male mortality rate based on Registrar General (1923) 1. quartile: Lowest mortality rate, 4. quartile: Highest mortality rate. *Source:* Own calculations based on individual full-count census data for England and Wales provided by IPUMS and Registrar General.

Figure 8: Pension and Household Size, Men vs. Women




(a) Descriptive

(b) DiD

Note: Panel b): Each dot represents a 2x2 difference-in-difference-coefficient (and 95% confidence bands) comparing the change in average household size between 1901 (before) and 1911 (after) for each age (60-80) relative to the reference age 69. Equations are estimated separately for men and women. The vertical line indicates the age-based eligibility threshold that was introduced by the pension in 1909. *Source:* Own calculations based on individual full-count census data for England and Wales provided by IPUMS.

Figure 9: Pension and Labor Force Participation, Men vs. Women




(a) Descriptive

(b) DiD


Note: Panel b): Each dot represents a 2x2 difference-in-difference-coefficient (and 95% confidence bands) comparing the change in labor force participation rates between 1901 (before) and 1911 (after) for each age (60-80) relative to the reference age 69. Equations are estimated separately for men and women. The vertical line indicates the age-based eligibility threshold that was introduced by the pension in 1909. *Source:* Own calculations based on individual full-count census data for England and Wales provided by IPUMS.

Figure 10: Pension and Household Size, Rural vs. Urban



Note: Panel b): Each dot represents a 2x2 difference-in-difference-coefficient (and 95% confidence bands) comparing the change in average household size between 1901 (before) and 1911 (after) for each age (60-80) relative to the reference age 69. Equations are estimated separately for rural and urban areas. The vertical line indicates the age-based eligibility threshold that was introduced by the pension in 1909. *Source:* Own calculations based on individual full-count census data for England and Wales provided by IPUMS.

Figure 11: Pension and Labor Force Participation, Urban vs. Rural



Note: Panel b): Each dot represents a 2x2 difference-in-difference-coefficient (and 95% confidence bands) comparing the change in the labor force participation rate between 1901 (before) and 1911 (after) for each age (60-80) relative to the reference age 69. Equations are estimated separately for rural and urban areas. The vertical line indicates the age-based eligibility threshold that was introduced by the pension in 1909. *Source:* Own calculations based on individual full-count census data for England and Wales provided by IPUMS.

A Threats to Identification (For Online Publication Only)

A.1 Mortality

The estimated mortality decline presented in section 4 of the main text does not necessarily represent a causal effect of the pension. I discuss potential confounders in this section and argue that they are likely not invalidating my results.

A.1.1 National Level

The identifying assumption of the national DiD and event-time model is that mortality rates of treatment and control age groups would have continued on their pre-treatment trends in absence of the pension, which is fundamentally untestable. Figure D.7 using a synthetic control group approach, comparing England and Wales to a range of potentially similar countries for which data is available at the time in the Human Mortality Database (2020) (Finland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland) shows that elderly mortality (relative to middle-aged mortality) did not decline in synthetic England and Wales after the pension was implemented. Although one should not overestimate the informational content of the exercise (synthetic England and Wales is chosen by the algorithm to consist of Switzerland only), it shows that it is not implausible to assume that elderly mortality would have continued its relative increase after 1909 without the pension.

Identification would also be threatened if the pension affected the mortality rates of people below the eligibility age. In the specific historical setting, such spillover effects are likely of limited concern. In fact, there is no evidence of a trend break in mortality rates after the pension was introduced for the age groups below the newly created eligibility age (figure D.2). I, nonetheless, discuss four potential spillover channels and why they are unlikely to invalidate my findings. The pension might have affected the mortality rates of people below the age of 70 for four reasons. First, pensions were financed via higher income taxes. Given that taxes rates were only raised for the very rich (approximately the top 1%) and remained low after the reform (marginal top income tax rate increased to 8.3%), there is little reason to believe that

the tax increase affected mortality rates. Second, public pensions might have replaced private transfers or were shared with other people (e.g. family members). In this case, the pension, indirectly, would have also increased resources for the non-elderly, which, if anything, would only upward bias the elderly mortality estimates. In fact, the small mortality dip in the age groups 45-64 and 65-74 after the pension was introduced (figure D.2) might reflect the increase in resources for middle-aged people typically caring for the elderly. Third, the fact that the pension allowed elderly people to leave the poorhouse could have reduced the overall number of poorhouse residents and therefore improved poorhouse conditions for the remaining inhabitants. There is little evidence for an overall reduction in the number of poorhouse residents nor the average number of people per poorhouse, though.¹ Fourth, young people could have altered their behavior in anticipation of a future pension. As shown in Giesecke and Jäger (2021), there is little evidence that the pension affected labor supply —the prime suspect for a behavioral reaction— below the pension eligibility age.

Another concern is that the results depend on the choice of treatment and control age groups. Figure D.8 plots the event-time graphs for different aggregated treatment and control age group choices. The general pattern remains, however, the magnitude of the mortality effect is dampened and the pre-trends are somewhat less convincing if the very old (85+) are dropped from the sample. Conducting a similar robustness check on the county level (table C.3), shows that the estimates are also affected by the choice of the age groups, however, the triple interaction coefficient also remains negative (and even becomes more negative if only the 45 to 54 year old's are dropped from the control group). The choice of using aggregated treatment and control age groups, consisting of at least ten age group years, was originally solely driven by data availability. Section A.2 argues that using aggregated age groups and omitting the age group close to the newly created eligibility (65-74) is also beneficial from an econometric point of view because it reduces the impact of reporting bias.

¹According to Department of Labour Statistics (1915) the total number of indoor paupers (poor law recipients relieved in a poorhouse) increased from 237,549 in 1908 to 245,638 in 1913. According to the census of 1901 and 1911, the average number of people living in a poorhouse was also higher after the pension was introduced (300 inhabitants in 1911) compared to before (284 inhabitants in 1901). The impact of the pension was limited because elderly people made up less than a quarter of the overall poorhouse population.

A.1.2 County Level

The county-level results might be confounded by the fact that pension reciprocity rates are not exogenous for at least two reasons. First, pension reciprocity rates are determined by the underlying fundamentals, such as the share of poor elderly people, which are likely correlated with mortality trends. The finding that counties which end up with high reciprocity rates in 1911 show no differential pre-trends, is somewhat reassuring that economic fundamentals are not the only explanation. Moreover, the bias would rather go against my findings since counties with a high poverty rate among the elderly (and hence a high reciprocity rate) would probably show worse elderly health trajectories. Second, reciprocity rates might be directly correlated with the health status of the population. A potential concern would be that healthy elderly people are *ceteris paribus* more likely to receive a pension either because pension committees, who decided on pension claims, were more likely to grant a pension to healthy people or because unhealthy people were too sick to apply. I consider both hypotheses unlikely. First, pension committees were generally inclined to generosity and would have likely been especially generous to elderly people who were unable to sustain themselves for medical reasons. Second, the pension application was extremely easy and was typically conducted at the local post office. However, physical presence at the post office was not necessary for sick or mentally ill people (Pugh, 2002). Most importantly, local Postmasters were not only paid for every pension application they handled, but also received an additional 1 shilling (20% of the weekly pension) for every accepted pension claim (Pugh, 2002), giving them a very strong incentive to look for every eligible pensioner in their area.

A.2 Age Heaping in Death and Population Data

The analysis relies on mortality data that is 1) aggregated by ten-year age groups and 2) omits the age group close to the newly created eligibility age (65-74). Originally, this specification choice was based purely on data availability. I argue in this section that this specification remains superior even if deaths are available on a single age group level (now available based on death certificates digitized by Cummins, 2021) because it reduces the impact of reporting

bias. The reason is that deaths occur disproportionately often at round ages (50, 60, 70 etc.), a phenomenon known as age heaping, which is common in demographic data and might be due to inattention or the unknown exact age of a person. Therefore, the number of deaths is typically overestimated at round ages and underestimated at ages slightly below or above. Given that age-heaping patterns are different in the population data, this error also translates to crude death rates ($CDR = \frac{deaths * 1000}{population}$). Relying on trends in single-age death rates can provide substantially misleading results because age-heaping patterns vary over the sample period. Thus, I use aggregated age groups which include a similar number of round ages.

Splitting the 65-74 age group into a treatment (70-74) and control (65-69) age group is problematic for a similar reason. While the death data continues to show pronounced age heaping at age 70, the population data becomes more evenly distributed over the sample period.² Therefore, crude death rates at age 70 are increasingly upward biased, while death rates below age 70 are downward biased. The resulting bias can be substantial. Assuming that age heaping in the death as well as the population data would be the same in 1911 as in 1901, the crude death rate at age 70 in 1911 would be 8.8% lower than actually observed.³ Therefore, I omit the 65-74 age group in the main analysis. Figure D.10, shows that even given this bias mortality of people aged 70+, shows a trend break after the pension was introduced (also compared to the control group of 45-69-year-olds).

A.3 Mechanism

The identifying assumption for the individual-level DiD is that crowding and labor supply for people slightly above and below the retirement age would have behaved similarly in absence of the pension. One natural test is to look for existing pre-trends by estimating a DiD using the sample 1891 from 1901 as a placebo test. Figure D.4 and figure D.5 show that there is no evidence that crowding for elderly people 70+ (relative to 69 year old's) was already on a

²Figure D.9 in the appendix, shows that age heaping at age 70 is very pronounced in the death data in 1901 and 1911. In contrast, the degree of age heaping at age 70 in the population data changes over time. It is very pronounced in the 1901 census but much less so in the 1911 census.

³This calculation is based on the assumption that Whipple's Index, a standard measure for age heaping, in the death and population data ($Whipple = \frac{deaths\ or\ population_{age=70} * 100}{\sum_{age=65}^{74} (pop_{age}\ or\ deaths_{age}) * \frac{1}{10}}$) would be the same in 1911 as it is observed in 1901.

downward trend before the pension was introduced. As argued above (A.1.1) spillovers are likely of limited concern. Moreover, Giesecke and Jäger (2021) have shown that age manipulation in the 1911 census is a minor concern and that there is no evidence for anticipatory retirement. Another concern is that occupational-specific mortality rates are simply a proxy for wages. However, over 90% of people in the lowest mortality quartile are employed in agriculture, which according to Feinstein (1990) was characterized by very low earnings.

B Details on the Construction of Rural and Urban Mortality Rates (For Online Publication Only)

To estimate the urban-rural split, I calculate national mortality rates for urban and rural areas and run equation 1 and 2 of the main text separately for both subsets of England and Wales. Therefore, I match annual district death counts between 1901 and 1913 digitized from death certificates by Cummins (2021) with district population data based on the census. I linearly interpolate district population figures between the census years 1901 and 1911 and then extrapolate the district-specific population trends until 1913. I define an urban area based on the population density of the district, which is measured by the population-weighted average of the associated parish population densities in the 1911 census. Population density on the parish level, a geographical sub-unit of the district, is measured on a 7-point scale (see IPUMS international (2020) for details). I assume a district to be urban if the average of the parish densities is above 5, whereby around 10% of districts are classified as urban. A parish density of 5 translates into a density of 12.5 to 33 persons per acre. The threshold is a trade-off between having a sufficiently high number of districts that are characterized as urban to conduct inference and only classifying really urban areas as "urban".⁴ Reassuringly, the results remain quantitatively similar, if I use 4 or 6, instead of 5, as the threshold.

⁴IPUMS international (2020) classifies an area to be urban if the density is above 75 persons per acre, however, in this case only 9 out of more than 600 districts would be classified as urban, which I consider too low to run a useful heterogeneity analysis.

C Additional Tables (For Online Publication Only)

Table C.1: Elderly Mortality and Cold Weather in London, Before and After the Pension

	Coefficient
Below 0 °C	0.051*** (0.017)
Below 0 °C (1 Lag)	0.122*** (0.016)
Below 0 °C (2 Lags)	0.083*** (0.015)
Below 0 °C (3 Lags)	0.059*** (0.015)
Below 0 °C (4 Lags)	0.054*** (0.015)
After 1908	-0.112*** (0.012)
After 1908 X Below 0 °C	0.024 (0.031)
After 1908 X Below 0 °C (1 Lag)	-0.013 (0.035)
After 1908 X Below 0 °C (2 Lags)	0.042 (0.033)
After 1908 X Below 0 °C (3 Lags)	-0.005 (0.031)
After 1908 X Below 0 °C (4 Lags)	0.023 (0.028)
Constant	6.080*** (0.052)
Observations	674

Source: Weekly mortality and weather data from 1901 to 1913 from Hanlon et al. (2021) *Note:* Dependent variable: Logarithm of number of elderly deaths (Age 65+). Below 0 °C is a dummy variable indicating whether the respective week had subzero temperatures. Includes week dummies and controls for rainfall and heavy fog. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.

Table C.2: Elderly Mortality and Household Size

	(Coefficient)
Average Household Size	0.0002*** (0.0001)
Constant	-1.9920*** (0.0101)
Observations	1,255

Note: Dependent variable: $\ln(\text{mortality rate})$ of people aged 75+. Regression for 638 districts for the census years 1901 and 1911. Deaths at the district level are taken from death certificates digitized by Cummins (2021). Population and average household size comes from IPUMS international (2020). Standard errors clustered on the district level in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.


Table C.3: County Level DiDiD-Estimates, Varying treatment and control

	Coefficient	Observations
Treatment Intensity 1911: Treated (75-84) vs. Control (55-64)	-0.156 (0.146)	504
Treatment Intensity 1911: Treated (75+) vs. Control (55-64)	-0.372** (0.127)	756

Note: Coefficient from a triple interaction model of $\rho(\text{eligible}_a * \text{year}_{1911} * \text{pension rate}_c)$. Dependent variable: $\ln(\text{mortality rates})$. Sample consists of the census years 1891, 1901, 1911. Base year of the interactions: 1901. **, * denotes significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the county level.


D Additional Figures (For Online Publication Only)

Figure D.1: Number of Observations by Age (Census 1901, 1911)




Note: The vertical line indicates the introduction of old-age assistance in 1909 in the UK.


Figure D.2: Mortality Trends by Age, 1901-1913




(a) Age 0-14




(b) Age 15-44



(c) Age 45-64




(d) Age 65-74



(e) Age 75+

Note: Graphs show crude death rates for different age groups and a linear trend estimated based on the period 1901 to 1908. The vertical line indicates the introduction of old-age assistance in 1909.

Figure D.3: Household Size and Share of People Living in Private Households, 1901 and 1911




(a) Household Size for People who Live in Private Households

(b) Share Living in Private Households


Note: The vertical line indicates the age-based eligibility threshold that was introduced by the pension in 1909. *Source:* Own calculations based on individual full-count census data for England and Wales provided by IPUMS.

Figure D.4: Differences-in-differences Estimates for Household Size, Placebo 1891 to 1901



Note: Each dot represents a 2x2 difference-in-difference-coefficient (and 95% confidence bands) comparing the change in household size between 1891 and 1901 for each age (60-80) relative to the reference age 69. The vertical line indicates the age-based eligibility threshold that was introduced by the pension in 1909. *Source:* Own calculations based on individual full-count census data for England and Wales provided by IPUMS.


Figure D.5: Differences-in-differences Estimates for Share Living in Collective Dwellings, Placebo 1891 to 1901



(a) Share Living in Poorhouses (b) Share Living in Other Group Quarters

Note: Each dot represents a 2x2 difference-in-difference-coefficient (and 95% confidence bands) comparing the change in the share of people living in poorhouses (left panel) or in group quarters except poorhouses (right panel) between 1891 and 1901 for each age (60-80) relative to the reference age 69. The vertical line indicates the age-based eligibility threshold that was introduced by the pension in 1909. Source: Own calculations based on individual full-count census data for England and Wales provided by IPUMS.


Figure D.6: Differences-in-differences Estimates for Household Size, Private Households vs. Group Quarters



(a) Private Households (b) Group Quarters


Note: Each dot represents a 2x2 difference-in-difference-coefficient (and 95% confidence bands) comparing the change in the average number of people living in private households (left panel) or group quarters (right panel) between 1901 (before) and 1911 (after) for each age (60-80) relative to the reference age 69. The vertical line indicates the age-based eligibility threshold that was introduced by the pension in 1909. Source: Own calculations based on individual full-count census data for England and Wales provided by IPUMS.

Figure D.7: Mortality Ratio Treated vs. Control, England & Wales vs. Synthetic Control



Note: Crude death rate of the elderly (75+) divided by the crude death rate of the middle-aged (45-64). Donor pool for the synthetic control: Finland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland. The vertical line indicates the introduction of old-age assistance in 1909 in the UK.

Figure D.8: National Event-time Model, Varying Treatment and Control Age-groups




(a) DiD: Treated (75-84) vs. Control (55-64)

(b) DiD: Treated (75+) vs. Control (55-64)

Note: Coefficients from an event-time model (and 95% confidence interval). Only treated: year dummies, DiD: Interaction of year and treatment dummy (1 if age \geq 70), both 1908 baseline year. Dependent variable: Detrended $\ln(\text{mortality rates})$. The vertical line indicates the introduction of old-age assistance in 1909. Standard errors clustered at the age-group-gender level using wild-bootstrap and webb weights.

Figure D.9: Age heaping, Deaths vs. Population




(a) Deaths

(b) Population

Note: Based on death certificate data digitized by Cummins (2021) and census waves 1901 and 1911 from IPUMS international (2020). The vertical line indicates the introduction of old-age assistance in 1909.

Figure D.10: Mortality Rates in England and Wales, Varying Treatment and Control Age-groups




(a) Treatment: 70+

(b) $\frac{Treated(70+)}{Control(45-69)}$


Note: Based on death certificate data digitized by Cummins (2021) population size from Human Mortality Database (2020). The vertical line indicates the introduction of old-age assistance in 1909.

Figure D.11: Pension and Crowding: Age 75+ vs. 45-64




Note: Based on UK census waves 1891, 1901 and 1911. The vertical line indicates the introduction of old-age assistance in 1909. Source: Own calculations based on individual full-count census data for England and Wales provided by IPUMS.

Figure D.12: Pension and Work Activity: Age 75+ vs. 45-64




Source: Own calculations based on UK census (waves 1891, 1901 and 1911) and IPUMS. Note: The vertical line indicates the introduction of old-age assistance in 1909. Source: Own calculations based on individual full-count census data for England and Wales provided by IPUMS.

Figure D.13: Pension and Mortality, Men vs. Women



Note: Coefficients from an event-time model. Dependent variable: Detrended $\ln(\text{mortality rates})$. Treatment age groups: 75-84, 85+ years. Control age groups: 45-54, 55-64 years. The vertical line indicates the introduction of old-age assistance in 1909. Confidence intervals based on robust standard errors because wild bootstrap errors are not bounded.

Figure D.14: Pension and Mortality, Urban vs. Rural



Note: Coefficients from an event-time model. Dependent variable: Detrended $\ln(\text{mortality rates})$. Treatment age groups: 75-84, 85+ years. Control age groups: 45-54, 55-64 years. The vertical line indicates the introduction of old-age assistance in 1909. Standard errors clustered at the age-group-gender level using wild-bootstrap and webb weights.