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## A Policy Output Model of Interorganizational Relations

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A POLICY OUTPUT MODEL  
OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONS

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A POLICY OUTPUT MODEL  
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ABSTRACT

A model is proposed for studying the effect of interorganizational relations upon the quality of network performance under mandated legislation, in this case, the United States Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973. The research applies interorganizational constructs to a substantive public policy setting. In particular, it is concerned with the nature of interorganizational relations among actors which have been brought together on the basis of a legal-political mandate. Secondly, the study's emphasis is on public policy implementation; specifically, it focuses on the effectiveness of a network of actors in implementing a large-scale national program of employment and training. The findings are presented and serve as the basis for reconstructing a policy output model of interorganizational relations.

A POLICY OUTPUT MODEL  
OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONS

Although the field of interorganizational relations has progressed to a point where theoretical frameworks are able to represent a variety of real-life phenomena (see, for example, Van de Van et al. 1974; White 1974; Benson 1975; Aldrich 1979; Zeitz 1980), a number of interorganizational contexts require additional application. One of these contexts is the area of public policy and, in particular, its implementation. Little research has been done, Whetten (1974) being one exception, which examines the effective implementation of substantive policies under interorganizational conditions. This paper will critically study whether interorganizational attributes affecting the linkages among organizations in a mandated network are associated with the ultimate performance of that network in carrying out its policy mandate.

To begin, it is necessary to define what is meant by the terms "mandated network." Hall and his associates have classified interorganizational networks into three bases (Hall et al. 1977). Most IOR (interorganization relations) research has concentrated on transactions among organizations under a "voluntaristic" interaction bases, typical of exchange contexts (see, for example, Selznick 1949; Levine and White 1961; Dill 1962; Litwak and Hylton 1962; Reid 1964; Guetzkow 1966; Klorgan et al. 1969; McDonough 1971; Vacin 1972; Cook 1977). Exchange describes any voluntary activity between two or more organizations which interact in order to realize respective goals. The object of research is perforce the nature of the interaction among organizations or actors

interested in exchange. The dependent variable almost always concerns the behavioral or attitudinal manifestations of interaction, i.e., coordination, competition, or conflict. Schmidt and Kochan (1977) have suggested the incorporation of a second basis of IOR, called the "power-dependency" approach. Under this basis, not all of the potential actors are interested in interacting, so a powerful or dependent organization(s) must induce the others to interact.

Though resembling the second basis more than the first, the "legal-political mandate" (Raelin 1980) assembles units into a network by a mandate, rather than under the inducement of a particular actor or set of actors, in order to accomplish a designated task(s). It differs from the exchange basis in that although the interacting organizations are expected to be willing participants, the motivation to interact is provided by the mandate rather than by the parties under mutual consent. The mandated basis also differs from the power-dependency basis since an element of mutuality is provided by the mandate, thereby reducing the overriding concern with power as the motivation for interaction.

Turning to the public policy implementation focus, as stated earlier, the present study is concerned with the interorganizational conditions which affect policy output. A framework for this kind of approach is provided by Wamsley and Zald (1973) wherein policy is depicted as the independent variable and policy output (effectiveness) as the dependent variable. Called the "political economy" approach to effectiveness, this framework selects organizational (n.b., not inter-organizational) structure, processes, and strategies as an intervening variable between policy formulation and policy output. The public policy

implementation literature has essentially adopted this approach initially through the depiction of some well-documented case studies (see, for example, Derthick 1972; Pressman and Wildavsky 1973; Jones 1975). However, these cases, although rich in detail, necessarily overlook the integrative conceptual link which could serve to generalize their findings to diverse political settings. More recently a number of efforts have been undertaken to provide some conceptual integration (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975; Rein and Rabinovitz 1976; Berman 1978). In perhaps the most comprehensive effort to date, Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) distinguished three categories of independent variables leading to stages of implementation. These three categories were: (1) the tractability of the problem(s) being addressed by the organizing statute; (2) the ability of the statute to favorably structure the implementation process; and (3) the net effect of a variety of "political" variables on the balance of support for statutory objectives. The focus of the integrative studies has been macro-institutional and the treatment variables have been by in large political. For example, in the Sabatier and Mazmanian study, substantial attention is devoted to the originating statute and the groups affected by the policy. In mandated networks, although institutional and political conditions are important for a complete implementation analysis, the immediate concern transfers to the performance and disposition of the micro units which are assembled to carry out the mandate. Therefore, it is imperative to identify the interorganizational factors associated with the effective implementation of the designated statute (Bardach 1977; Wilson and Rachal 1977).

In the present study the objects of analysis are networks, in this case, of manpower organizations. Therefore, the study is by definition a field or network study (Warren 1967; Turk 1970; Aldrich 1976; Laumann and Pappi 1976; White et al. 1976; Burt 1977; Stern 1979). Relations among multiple organizations within a given network are investigated, rather than organizational pairs, and the results are compared across other networks. The study also includes political units as participants in the interorganizational network. Thus, an intergovernmental point of view is added to a field, micro IOR analysis wherein the dependent variable is policy effectiveness.

Substantive Context: Manpower Policy

The substantive context of the study is the manpower field and, in particular, the employment and training title of CETA. The overall goal of this component of U.S. manpower policy is to develop and create job opportunities and specifically to provide training, upgrading, re-training, education, and other services to individuals to enable them to secure and retain employment.

As one of the few special revenue-sharing programs in existence in the United States today, CETA affords the researcher of interorganizational relations a virtual laboratory in which to examine relationships among a diverse set of organizations and actors involved in policy formulation and implementation. Special revenue-sharing differs from general revenue-sharing in that while the latter simply channels federal tax dollars to state and local governments to use as they see fit, the former targets those federal dollars for specific purposes and often



under a number of requirements and restrictions. The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973, although an amalgam in its substantive focus of many of the programs and experiments of manpower policy in the U.S. conducted since 1962, concentrated on the structural contributions of special revenue-sharing. As an element of the Nixon Administration's "New Federalism" concept (Susskind 1974), the focus in intergovernmental relations moved from federal control administered through categorical grant programs to the fiscal authority of state and local governments. In the case of the implementation of manpower programs, units of general local government - cities and towns - would be responsible for developing a manpower program responsive to the needs of the respective state or local labor market. The governments - referred to as "prime sponsors" - receiving the manpower funds were required to represent jurisdictions over 100,000 people.

CETA mandated the participation of certain actors in the prime sponsor's comprehensive manpower program. Although a multitude of groups affected or were affected by the implementation of local manpower policy, this study recognizes six actors as the principals in carrying out the public manpower function. They include the chief elected official - the executive authority in the prime sponsorship, i.e., the mayor, responsible for carrying out the purposes of the act; the manpower planning office - the department within the local government assigned to assume the principal planning and operational functions of CETA; the manpower advisory council - the representative body of mandated participants and clients which assists in the planning and monitoring of the comprehensive manpower program; the federal

regional office - the decentralized arm of the federal government assigned on-sight responsibilities; the Employment Service - an established federal agency of manpower services; and the subcontractors - program operators, many of them community-based organizations, which solicit the manpower planning office for service contracts.

### Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework, referred to as the IOR-Policy Output Model (see Figure 1), contains a set of variables from which preliminary propositions are drawn in order to map the linkage patterns in the prime sponsor network. The model essentially depicts an array of bivariate relationships which establish a set of conditions for program effectiveness in a mandated network. Relationships are expressed between independent variables and effectiveness. The variables are also clustered into four blocks: IO (interorganizational) Structure, IO Perception, IO Interaction, and Effectiveness. IO Structure refers to network characteristics which are formalized or relatively permanent. Although more transient situational characteristics exist in networks (see Giddens' description of "structuration" (1976) for an alternative conceptualization), IO Structure is defined as cross-sectional for empirical purposes.

IO Perception contains sentiments which are predominantly shaped by personalistic dispositions as opposed to structure which represents organizational or network properties. Although perception is influenced by the actual experience of interorganizational relations, it also affects and mobilizes interaction. IO Interaction, influenced by perception and by the structural constraints of the network, describes

the nature of contact among network organizations. Effectiveness, as the dependent variable, designates the quality of performance of the network as a whole in carrying out its mandate. The focus, then, is on policy implementation which is measured by short-term process and output indicators as compared to impact analysis which relies upon longer-term measures (Cook and Scioli, 1975).

Although the data analysis of this study concentrates on bivariate relationships with the dependent variable alone, relations among the individual variables within the clusters or between clusters are empirically interesting. Some of these are indicated in Figure 1 with broken lines. Solid lines represent vectors initially explored in this study. Assuming sufficiency of data, some of the more complicated relationships could be explored with the use of such multivariate techniques as canonical correlation (Anderson 1958: chap. 12) or path analysis (Duncan 1966), particularly a variant of the latter referred to as the block-recursive design (Sullivan 1971).

Besides the clusters mentioned above, the IOR-Policy Output Model includes the variables of macro environment and intraorganizational behavior. Both are recognized as essential contributory ingredients associated with effectiveness. The former, identified by Osborn and Hunt (1974), referring to the socioeconomic and cultural influences of the network organizations' geographical area, is deliberately controlled in the selection process in order to reduce the likelihood of its impact on the dependent variable. The latter, representing intraorganizational determinants of effectiveness, is beyond the scope of this research, but includes such properties as formalization, communication, efficiency, job satisfaction, task structure, stratification,

etc. Interested readers may consult such studies as those by Aiken and Hage (1968, 1972), Klongan and Paulson (1971), Paulson (1974), among others in the Aston group.

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Insert Figure 1 about here  
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### Method

The methodology employed in this study is referred to as a controlled case study. Through this method both quantitative and qualitative data are generated principally through structured interviewing within a limited number of networks, the selection of which is carefully controlled.

The selection of cases served as the means by which the networks to be studied were categorized according to labor market characteristics and effectiveness. Categorizing the prime sponsors by the former established the macro-environmental control referred to earlier. Initially, all New York State prime sponsors were matched on a number of labor market characteristics. These included labor force size, unemployment rate, manufacturing establishment indices, median family income, etc. Four cases were ultimately selected for analysis constituting two matched pairs of prime sponsors. The members of each pair resembled each other in overall labor market characteristics. They differed, however, in their degree of effectiveness. One member of each pair was rated as satisfactory in the performance of its prime

sponsor function for FY'76, the other was rated as marginal or unsatisfactory in its performance. The ratings were derived from a combination of institutional and survey instruments. In the former instance, the actual assessments conducted by the Area Operations unit of the Federal Regional Office of the Employment and Training Administration were consulted. Prime sponsors, according to these assessments, were rated on six criteria: grant management, management information system, financial reporting, performance, adherence to regional office's directives, and adequacy of advisory council. To receive an overall satisfactory rating, prime sponsors had to be rated satisfactory on each of these six criteria. Marginal and unsatisfactory ratings were indicated by a more complicated formula involving performance on selected criteria. These written evaluations were combined with informal surveys of performance for the prime sponsor networks in question completed by high-level officials in charge of operations. The net results were further adjusted to account for some problems which were thought to affect the validity of the federal assessment procedures. These included: inaccuracy of performance data, discrepancy in the quality of the federal compliance officers' efforts, and an emphasis on monitoring rather than evaluation. The final ratings were reviewed and approved by the principal federal administrator in charge of New York State operations as the closest approximations to the actual performance of the respective four prime sponsors.

It is imperative to emphasize, here again, that effectiveness as defined by this study is a short-term, mostly institutional, assessment of performance according to a planned legislative mandate. It does not

measure efficiency in a cost-benefit sense nor does it assess impact in the sense of long-term societal benefits. Transference of the findings to other policy networks is therefore constrained to the extent of comparable measurement of effectiveness.

The primary data collection methodology, as pointed out earlier, consisted of structured interviews with the leaders and key boundary personnel of the units isolated for study. For the most part, this included the directors and their central staff of the manpower planning offices, subcontractors, and employment service agencies; top aides of the chief elected officials; chairmen of the advisory councils; and federal representatives of the regional offices. Besides the interview schedule, data were also collected from the planning records, known as "program narratives," of the four selected prime sponsors.

As indicated previously, the study concentrated on six organizations or actors in the prime sponsor network. However, this number was increased by including more than one subcontractor per network. Further, where possible, the researcher attempted to interview more than one leader or boundary-spanning individual from each organization or actor. The purpose of this procedure was to elicit a balanced perception of a particular organizational position vis-a-vis its relationship with the other organizations in the network. In all, 58 interviews were conducted, 28 from one of the pairs, 30 from the other.

The data from the interviews were organized using both quantitative and qualitative techniques. The intent of the analysis was to determine whether or not a particular proposition could be supported by the data.

The quantitative analysis was conducted at both aggregate and disaggregate levels. In the case of the former, aggregate measures were derived by summing the values for all the actors in the network on a given variable, producing a network characteristic. Disaggregate measures were derived by obtaining separate values for each actor within the network on a given variable. Most of the measures were taken as perceptions of each organizational unit in the network vis-a-vis the other units in the network. A partial listing of the interview schedule with the appropriate questions corresponding to the principal treatment dimensions is provided in the Appendix.

Next, the values, which consisted of raw frequency, percentage, or mean scores, compiled from coded responses of each interviewee, were compared across the two network types - effective vs. marginal. Tests of significance were performed for different probability levels, using the one-tailed T-test or chi square techniques. Fisher's exact test was applied in instances where recoding had resulted in 2 x 2 tables for which there were fewer than 21 cases.

The qualitative analysis essentially provided the details and explanations for the quantitative findings. It principally consisted of a thematic analysis of the commentary of respondents in response to open-ended interview questions.

### Results

The results are arranged according to the participation of each independent variable, with its accompanying dimensions, in the IOR-Policy Output Model. The preliminary propositions are first listed,

relating the respective dimensions to effectiveness, and are followed by a descriptive analysis of the findings. Tables 1 - 3 outline some of the data findings according to the dimensions of the three clusters of the IOR-Policy Output Model. Due to space limitations, the conceptualizations and findings reported are substantially condensed from the original research. For example, only one of the study's pairs of cases is reported. For extensive detail, consult Raelin (1978), Chaps. 3 and 5. In the next section, the results will be revised into a corrected model.

#### IO STRUCTURE

##### Power propositions:

- 1.1           A state of power relations, characterized by narrow power dispersion among network actors and evidenced by many instances of either power compulsion or power restriction, is negatively associated with effectiveness.

Power is referred to as the ability to control or change the flow of resources in the face of opposition. The measure of power dispersion consisted of the standard deviation of the internal power ratings provided by each network organization with respect to the other network organizations. The network power dispersion score was simply the mean of the standard deviations derived for each respondent in the network. A high score would indicate a network state of concentrated power or narrow power dispersion.

A major assumption behind the above and the following propositions is that power relations are less prevalent in mandated networks than in power-dependency networks which are based upon asymmetric interdependence (Pfeffer 1972), wherein power is by nature distributed unequally



(Aldrich 1979). Where power relations do emerge, they impede network performance. This is because it is likely that actors who are struggling for a power shift in networks which had heretofore either worked out or been imparted their exchange relationships will not manage their interorganizational relations effectively.

The findings (see Table 1) only tentatively support this first proposition. Power dispersion was found to be too static a measure to capture the state of power relations. The direction of the findings for power compulsion and power restriction, however, is confirmatory. Power compulsion refers to that state wherein organizations impede, whereas power restriction refers to that state wherein organizations are restricted from doing what they feel they ought to be doing. Most responses are indicative of the bureaucratic authority arrangement in the network. For instance, those units granted oversight responsibilities are the ones which report occasional needs to compel certain actors to upgrade their performance. As an example of this normative power compulsion and power restriction, in one of the effective cases, the chief elected official was reported to be keenly aware of the manpower funds being funnelled into his jurisdiction, particularly due to a financial accountability problem in the CETA grant which had occurred during a prior year. He consequently performed extensive oversight -- significantly more than the typical executive authority -- of the manpower planning function within the prime sponsor network. Since this oversight responsibility was not only imperative but within his privilege as chief elected official, it became a key ingredient in the subsequent satisfactory rating received by this network in the formal federal assessments.

Whereas in the above case, power compulsion was exercised in accordance with bureaucratic requirements, its utilization by actors which are not expected to carry such weight can have a reverse effect in terms of network

performance. For example, in one of the marginal cases, an agency which had subcontracted to perform manpower services was exercising power compulsion. This practice is unusual, first of all, since subcontractors are not seen as power brokers in the conceived functional arrangement of prime sponsor responsibilities. Furthermore, the findings also revealed that this same subcontractor was competing with the designated administrator and focal organization of the CETA program -- the manpower planning office -- for network operational control. This bifurcation of top-level administrative authority resulted in confusion and conflict which contributed to deterring effective performance in the network in question.

1.2                      Both internal and community network power  
                            are positively related to effectiveness.

The thesis behind this proposition is that as actors bring more internal control (Tannenbaum 1968) as well as control over community resources into their network, they create more favorable conditions for the effective performance of network activities. This thesis is rejected on both accounts by the data (see Table 1). The measures represent mean scores of each respondent's internal and community power ratings of all organizations in the network. For both internal and community power, the marginal performer, as depicted in the table, has a higher rating than the satisfactory performer. However, the locus of power in the marginal case was not within the specifications of the normative power distribution of the mandate. In particular, the diverse power of a number of subcontractors proved to be an impediment to coordination among them, since each considered itself sufficiently independent to conduct its own activities apart from the others. Moreover, as shall

be elaborated later, the lack of coordination under conditions of high interdependence can lead to a reduction of effectiveness in managing network functions.

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Insert Table 1 about here  
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Authority proposition:

- 2.1 Prime sponsors will be more effective in networks in which the authority structure resembles a wheel configuration with the manpower planning office at the hub, than in those characterized by all-channel or chain configurations.

Authority, defined here as legitimate power, can be mapped in networks as a configuration characterized by such basic types as the wheel, the chain, and the all-channel (Evan 1972). A normative configuration can then be drawn. The findings, as revealed by a separate sociometric analysis, demonstrated that the wheel configuration, wherein there is an identified focal agency, is the dominant and most appropriate form in prime sponsor network structure. The reason is that the manpower planning office, as the focal organization, is the formal administrator of the mandate according to legislation and regardless of past structures, will organize an effective network to the extent that it can mobilize the respective loyalties of the other participant actors. These other actors, in turn, must look to the focal unit as the authority source since it controls the necessary operational resources, such as funds, personnel, and time.

**Size proposition:**

- 3.1                    Size is curvilinearly associated with effectiveness. In particular, medium-sized networks constitute the most appropriate structure for effectiveness.

In this study of prime sponsor network organization, size is construed as the number of agencies contracted to perform manpower services in the prime sponsorship. Although the sample size precludes any definitive hypotheses in connection with the size variable, preliminary qualitative findings reveal that the impact of size is in each case largely explained by the status of coordination in the network. Whether large, medium, or small, networks which had either insufficient or improper coordination (to be explained later) were less effective in implementing network tasks than those networks exhibiting adequate coordination. However, large size is still viewed as a structural condition which imposes a major constraint against the effective coordination of task functions in mandated networks. This premise, adapted from Litwak and Hylton (1962) and borne out here, is explained by the fact that in large networks, important functional linkages are often bypassed by actors who are accustomed to performing their tasks relatively independently.

**Domain Distribution and Ideological Disposition propositions:**

- 4.1                    Effective networks are characterized by wide distribution of domain functions, and no one actor other than the focal organization unevenly dominates the network domain.
- 5.1                    Effective networks will display a more opinionated ideological disposition than ineffective networks.

Neither structural variable, domain distribution nor ideological disposition, appears to have much impact on the dependent variable as revealed by the results of the study. Domain, in a network sense, refers to the allocation of task functions across network actors. The findings disclose that the width of domain, or the amount of different functions performed in the network by the various network actors - measured either in the aggregate or by organization - is not particularly relevant to effective implementation of these functions. This runs counter to the proposition which reasoned that domain ought to be widely scattered throughout the network, ensuring a relative equality of contribution from all concerned parties. Rather, what is important is that those actors which are supposed to perform certain activities in the network effectively do so. Where there is an imbalance between the expected and the normative distribution of domain, the network in question will have more difficulty in implementing its tasks.

With regard to the concept of ideological disposition, which refers to the attitude of network leaders towards the nature of the task or the appropriate approaches or values connected to the task, the data were inconclusive. Only in one of the sample pairs did the effective case display a more active or opinionated ideological disposition than the marginal case.

Network Leadership propositions:

- 6.1                   The greater the acquaintance among leaders in the prime sponsor network, the greater the effectiveness of that network.

The premise of this proposition rests on the assumption that personal acquaintance has positive interorganizational implications; i.e., that leaders of organizations who know one another will coordinate their network tasks more effectively. In turn, this higher quality of coordination will lead to a greater degree of performance of network tasks. The results, however, lend no support to the proposition and, in fact, point to a reverse trend (see Table 1). Particularly where leadership roles are of a symbiotic character, personal acquaintance can impede a healthy critical climate, sometimes necessary in order for a network to control itself.

6.2

The more a given network can identify specific individuals from whom leadership functions are discharged, the greater will be its opportunity for effective performance.

The assumption behind this proposition is that networks in which boundary personnel are unable to identify specific leaders are less likely to have strong network leadership than those in which specific individuals are named. The rationale for the indicator is that individuals in networks who have experienced various forms of leadership, or who have perhaps even exerted it, are prone to identify specifically the source of that leadership. And, where the conduct of leadership is noticeable, leadership factors considered vital to network task performance, such as direction, representation, and support (see Bowers and Seashore 1966) will be apparent. The findings (see Table 1), which are based upon percentages of total responses indicating network leadership sources which are specific rather than general, support the premise of this proposition.

Boundary Personnel proposition:

- 7.1 In effective networks, the boundary personnel of the member organizations are represented in relatively large numbers, are relatively well-educated in terms of formal pedagogical preparation, and exhibit relatively low organizational turnover.

Boundary personnel, for the purposes of this study, included all personnel in the participant network organizations who, as part of their job function, had some involvement with the other organizations in the network. The first part of the proposition, referring to numbers of boundary personnel, is comparable to Aldrich's conception of multiplexity of ties, which he asserts promotes network stability (Aldrich 1979). However, in contrast to Aldrich's findings and those establishing the important role of boundary personnel vis-a-vis organizational performance (Evan 1966; Thompson 1967; Pruden and Reese 1972), this study finds little support for their relationship, in terms of the cited dimensions, to interorganizational performance in mandated networks. The data, based upon probability distributions, produce no significant differences for any of the dimensions, although the differences for the educational dimension are all in the proposed direction. The boundary personnel structural concept is perhaps better explained by network leadership in this study. One exceptional finding suggested that granting a large number of personnel in the focal agency boundary-spanning functions was detrimental to the coordination of network functions.

## IO PERCEPTION

### IO Perception propositions:

Networks are more effective to the extent that they are characterized by:

- 8.1 High domain consensus
- 8.2 High ideological consensus
- 8.3 High performance evaluation, in terms of both member organizations and the network as a whole
- 8.4 High leadership evaluation
- 8.5 High linkage evaluation, in terms of the quality of communication between member organizations, the competence of boundary personnel in the network, and the working relationships among leaders in the network.

Findings for the first two IO perception variables are sufficiently insignificant to support Aldrich's declaration (1976) of the fruitlessness of domain consensus research but also of ideological consensus research in mandated networks. Where contributions to the task environment of networks are not voluntary but rather specified by a mandate, there is relatively high agreement by actors within the network as to the allocation of tasks and resources (domain consensus) regardless of the effectiveness of the network in question. Similarly, agreement on the nature or overall purpose of the network as well as its guiding philosophy (ideological consensus) is assumed. Actors which have differing ideologies from the network either do not enter it, or if they do, submit to a gradual socialization process producing relative conformity with the purposes of the network.

The evaluation variables in the IO perception cluster concern the assessment of three interorganizational characteristics: performance, leadership, and linkage. Performance evaluation considers



the assessment perceived by member organizations of not only each other organization in the network but of the network as a whole. It differs from the external, institutional evaluation of the network's mandate, which is the basis for the effectiveness measure. Leadership evaluation considers the assessment of the performance of key network leadership functions. Finally, linkage evaluation refers to the assessment of coordination in the network, determined for three dimensions. First, the quality of communication is considered followed by an assessment of the competence of the boundary personnel conducting the communication. Finally, working relationships among the leaders of the respective network organizations are considered.

In contrast to the consensus perception variables, the three evaluation variables were found to be very significantly related to the dependent variable (see Table 2). The findings are best highlighted at the disaggregate level. For example, in one of the study's matched pairs, respondents from the effective prime sponsor evaluated the performance of their manpower planning office much more highly than did respondents from the marginal prime sponsor. Whereas in the former case, the manpower office was viewed as the fulcrum of the network, in the latter case, it was perceived as being incapable of handling the responsibilities assigned to it by the prime sponsor. The effective case respondents also rated the quality of communication, working relationships, and competence of boundary personnel of the manpower planning office significantly more highly than the marginal case respondents.

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Insert Table 2 about here  
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## IO INTERACTION

Interdependence/Coordination proposition:

- 9.1            Coordination, balanced by both degree and kind  
                 in accordance with the interdependence of the net-  
                 work, is positively associated with effectiveness.

This proposition combines the concept of interdependence with coordination to form a notion of "balance," introduced by Thompson (1967: 54-56). According to his formulation, coordination, defined along the dimensions of standardization, coordination by plan, and coordination by mutual adjustment, is functionally effective or is balanced when it corresponds to interdependence along the respective dimensions of pooled, sequential, and reciprocal interdependence. In order to adapt Thompson's typology to a policy output model of mandated networks, a different paradigm is developed. In this study, balance is first determined from a perspective of degree, associating need for new or closer contact (interdependence) with initiation and/or frequency of contact (coordination). This perspective asks whether there is enough coordination to meet the needs of the network. Balance is also determined from a perspective of kind, associating reason for contact (interdependence) with nature and/or type of contact (coordination). This perspective asks whether the manner of coordination is appropriate to the network in question.

The gist of the proposition is that balance between interdependence and coordination establishes a favorable condition for effective performance of network tasks. The results, particularly from qualitative assessment, lend support to the balance paradigm. The quantitative findings, as in Table 3, are difficult to interpret in their own right. Therefore, an analysis is conducted below on the basis of the development of scenarios illustrating the relationship between interaction balance and effectiveness from the perspective of both degree and kind.

As an example of balance of degree, in one of the study's matched pairs, respondents in the effective prime sponsor indicated no need for closer contact with their manpower planning office. However, in the marginal prime sponsor, respondents indicated a significantly greater need for closer contact. Nevertheless, in terms of coordination, boundary personnel from the marginal prime sponsor actually maintained less contact with the manpower planning office than the effective prime sponsor.

As an example of balance of kind, a more complex phenomenon to observe, a different set of circumstances may be selected to describe relationships with the manpower planning office in the study's other pair of cases. As a reason for contact with the manpower planning office, respondents from both cases acknowledged that contacts were made to coordinate efforts or to give and receive information. Findings for coordination indicated that the effective case was in balance, while the marginal case was not. The CETA legislation, as interpreted by the federal regional office, calls for a participative,

two-way mode of coordination. In the effective case, not only did the constituent organizations coordinate efforts actively with the manpower planning office, but also most of the interorganizational contacts were shared among various network leaders. In the marginal case, on the other hand, contacts were initiated predominantly by the manpower director who also maintained tight control over the activities of the network. This dependence on a single source of contact, as cited in the latter instance, led to a number of informational problems which negatively affected the performance of the network in question.

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Insert Table 3 about here  
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Competition and Conflict propositions:

- 10.1            Competition, in terms of extent, nature, and intensity, is negatively associated with effectiveness.
- 11.1            Conflict, in terms of extent, nature, and intensity, is negatively associated with effectiveness.

The form of the network in question has a major bearing on the interpretation of the concepts in the case of competition and conflict. In voluntaristic networks, conflict, or at least partial conflict, has been depicted as essential to interorganizational activity (Litwak and Hylton 1962; Guetzkow 1966; Assael 1969; Turk 1977). In mandated networks, however, it is hypothesized that competition and conflict are detrimental to positive network activity.

Competition, according to White (1974), may occur when organizations in a network vie for a common pool of resources the allocative criteria of which are set by a third party. In the prime sponsor network, the disaggregate findings, not depicted here, suggest that this interaction form applies almost exclusively to the agencies subcontracting with the manpower planning office to conduct manpower delivery services, as they vie with each other for a limited source of funds. Subcontractors compete with one another also to the extent that they engage in like functions. Therefore, it is not surprising that placements and clients constitute the other major subjects of competition. In almost all instances, competition is negatively related to effectiveness.

In the case of conflict, resources are demanded in a network where no allocative criteria are set (White 1974) or, especially in mandated networks, where criteria and guidelines are specifically rejected. It may arise due to the authority structure or the power distribution or also due to differences in interorganizational perceptions (Mechanic 1962; Zald 1962; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Hollister 1970; Aldrich 1971). The effect which conflict has on interorganizational networks of the mandated type is predicted to be normally negative except in those instances in which the conflict serves as a catalyst for future constructive contact.

The dimensionalized results demonstrate the theme that the wider the conflict there is among actors in a mandated network, generally the more frequent, the more intense, the more harmful, and the less resolvable the conflict. In addition, the large majority of conflicts

are resolved informally. Conflict, like competition, is found to be negatively associated with effectiveness (see Table 3), although significant levels are not reached for either variable.

The qualitative findings also suggest that the negative relationship to effectiveness holds for both competition and conflict in spite of the fact that competition is occasionally evaluated as being beneficial to the network or that conflict is occasionally resolved satisfactorily. The reason for this is that in mandated networks the allocation of resources is determined beforehand by the mandate; therefore, competition is minimized and conflict is to be especially avoided. Where competition and/or conflict do occur, they affect the performance of network functions in a negative fashion. Any resolution of either the competition or the conflict can but very rarely, and only in the long-run, serve to bring the parties to a state of greater potential or actual accomplishment than that which preceded the competition or conflict. This conclusion has also been derived by Zeitz (1980) in the power-dependency case.

Revised IOR-Policy Output Model

On the basis of the findings, a revised IOR-Policy Output Model may be designed incorporating the necessary changes. The model, diagrammed in Figure 2, is also presented below as a verbal sketch of an ideal case. The intent of the sketch is to highlight the application of the model to problems of public policy implementation, especially in mandated interorganizational networks. The discussion will also point out avenues for further research,

-----  
Insert Figure 2 about here  
-----

The first consideration for, what we shall call, IDEAL Network is to compare its actual distributions of power, authority and domain among its member organizations with the normative distributions specified by its mandate. IDEAL should find that these distributions are in balance with normative specifications. These specifications are consulted by a review of relevant guidelines in the founding legislation, in agreements, or in other initiating regulations. Additional research is necessary to clarify under what conditions IDEAL's power, authority, and domain distributions can vary from the normative pattern.

IDEAL, coordinating a medium quantity of organization, is at an appropriate size given its task complexity. Smaller networks of its kind would also be appropriate. However, as it grows, IDEAL must develop a more sophisticated coordination format, as will be discussed below, in order to remain effective.

In IDEAL, the heads of the respective participant organizations do not necessarily know each other; in fact, their mutual acquaintance is of little consequence to the network's overall performance. There are also a limited number of boundary personnel in IDEAL. However, IDEAL is said to have leadership in that not only do the organizational heads carry out their specific mandated functions, but they are perceived by each other to be doing so, and doing so competently and effectively. In addition, network leadership exists in IDEAL in that various members at various times take on network leadership roles, such as: representing the network in outside functions, expressing satisfaction to network members with effective performance, introducing change in the network when needed, seeking network members' opinions

on various network activities, etc. More research is needed to distinguish these interorganizational leadership roles from intraorganizational roles.

In a general sense, the member organizations of IDEAL approve of the work of the other network organizations. Conformity to the network's task and operating philosophy is assumed as given according to the mandate. Network members are also generally pleased with the quality of communication and the working relationships in the network.

Coordination does not automatically take place in IDEAL among member organizations. It is rather a function, in both kind and degree, of the interdependence required by particular tasks. In other words, meetings are not held if memos can convey the necessary information. Certain authorities are not consulted on operational issues but rather request participation only on important contractual matters.

Finally, competition and conflict are held to a minimum in IDEAL. Resource allocations are specified initially by the mandate so little benefit can be obtained by conflict even if resolved satisfactorily. The emphasis in IDEAL is on prevention of conflict. Furthermore, adaptation is managed through normal channels which are provided for and specified in the mandate.

Summarizing the parameters of IDEAL, or the effective networks, vs. the marginals on the basis of the preliminary empirical findings, the effective cases have their power, authority, and domain distributions in accordance with normative mandate specifications, whereas the marginal networks display considerable variation from these distributions. The effective cases coordinate a medium quantity of organizations, whereas the marginals



are too large or lack a correspondent coordination format. Identified network leadership functions are expressly carried out in the effective cases, whereas in the marginals, many of these functions are non-attendant or perhaps are left to be carried out on the basis of personal acquaintance. There are high evaluations of performance, leadership, and linkage by most of the member organizations within the effective cases and coordination is in balance with interdependence, whereas evaluations tend to be mediocre within the marginals, and coordination is often not balanced in either kind or degree with network interdependence. Finally, there is considerably more competition and conflict among member organizations of the marginal cases as compared to the effectives.

Assuming the interorganizational parameters of IDEAL can be transferred to other networks, the legal-political mandate as an implementation vehicle has enormous public policy implications. Whether the application of such a network is preferable for new settings or whether existing exchange or power-dependency networks can be accordingly adapted remains a question for subsequent policy research. Nevertheless, armed with the rudiments of the policy output model, practitioners might be able to develop a set of guidelines and applied activities with the objective of improving existing mandated networks.

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Table 1

Differences Between the Cases  
On the Dimensions of IO Structure<sup>a</sup>

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Dimension</u>	<u>Effective Case (n=13)</u>	<u>Marginal Case (n=15)</u>	<u>T</u>
Power (mean scores)				
	Power dispersion	1.8	1.5	n.s.
	Internal network power	3.1	3.2	n.s.
	Community network power	3.1	1.5	<.05
Power (percentage scores)				
	Incidence of power compulsion	84.6	80.0	n.s.
	Incidence of power restriction	46.2	73.3	n.s.
Network Leadership (mean scores)				
	Nature of leaders' acquaintance	1.6	2.4	<.001
	Duration of leaders' acquaintance	.6	2.2	<.001
Network Leadership (percentage scores)				
	Network leadership identification	57.3	38.0	<.05

---

<sup>a</sup>In this table as well as for Tables 2 and 3, due to space limitations, only aggregate mean and percentage scores are reported and only for one of the two pairs of cases studied. Disaggregated findings by organization and findings for the other pair of cases are incorporated into the descriptive analysis where appropriate. A full account of the data methodologies and findings are reported in Raelin (1978).

Table 2

Differences Between the Cases  
On the Dimensions of IO Perception

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Dimensions</u>	<u>Effective Case</u> (n=13)	<u>Marginal Case</u> (n=15)	<u>T</u>
Performance Evaluation				
	Network performance evaluation	4.0	3.2	<.001
	Organizational performance evaluation	3.8	3.2	<.005
Leadership Evaluation				
	(not dimensionalized)	4.5	3.9	<.005
Linkage Evaluation				
	Quality of communication	2.9	2.2	<.005
	Competence of boundary personnel	3.1	2.6	<.01
	Working relationships	4.3	4.0	<.10

Table 3

Differences Between the Cases  
On the Dimensions of IO Interaction

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Dimension</u>	<u>Effective Case</u> (n=13)	<u>Marginal Case</u> (n=15)	<u>T</u>
Coordination (mean scores)				
	Frequency of contact	1.2	.9	n.s.
Coordination (percentage scores)				
	Pervasiveness of contact	61.5	53.3	$\chi^2$ n.s.
Competition				
	Extent of competition	38.5	53.3	n.s.
Conflict				
	Extent of conflict	61.5	86.7	n.s.

Figure 1  
IOR-POLICY OUTPUT MODEL





Figure 2

REVISED IOR-POLICY OUTPUT MODEL



## APPENDIX

### Interview Questions Corresponding To The Principal Treatment Dimensions

#### Internal network power

In any network of organizations, some organizations usually have more power over what goes on in the network than others. If we define power as the extent to which one organization can affect other organizations regarding what goes on in the network, how much power do you think each organization including your own, has in the CETA network?

1 = very high power

4 = low power

2 = high power

5 = very low power

3 = moderate amount

6 = no power at all

#### Preference for change in network power structure

Do you feel that one or more of these organizations should have more or less power than it currently has?

If so, could you cite the specific case(s)?

#### Incidence of power compulsion

Do you know of instances when your organization has had to compel one or more of the other organizations in this CETA network to do something which it was not doing and should have been doing?

If yes, can you describe these instances?

#### Incidence of power restriction

Have there been any instances when your organization has been restricted from doing something it wanted to do by one or more of the other organizations?

If yes, can you describe these instances?



### Community network power

In the last few questions, we have been talking about the power of the organizations inside the network relative to each other. Now, I would like to refer to the power of the organizations outside the network. How much power, then, do you think each organization, including your own, has in its outside, non-CETA activities?

- |                              |                     |
|------------------------------|---------------------|
| 1 = very high power          | 4 = low power       |
| 2 = high power               | 5 = very low power  |
| 3 = moderate amount of power | 6 = no power at all |

### Authority

When important decisions have to be made by your organization with respect to CETA, which of the other organizations in the network would you be most likely to consult with first?

Which of these organizations would you consult with second?

### Size

How many subcontractors are there in this network?

### Domain distribution and consensus

Here is a list of functions that need to be carried out in any manpower planning and delivery system. Can you tell me which, if any, of the network organizations, including your own, is currently performing each function.

### Ideological disposition and consensus

There have been many goals and philosophies advocated for manpower programs. I'll mention four such goals. Using this scale, please tell me, from the point of view of your organization, how much you agree or disagree with each one:

Strongly							Strongly
Agree	1	2	3	4	5	6	Disagree

Nature and duration of leaders' acquaintance

Using this scale, how well do you know:

- |                    |                   |
|--------------------|-------------------|
| 1 = extremely well | 4 = just slightly |
| 2 = well           | 5 = not at all    |
| 3 = somewhat       |                   |

How long have you known \_\_\_\_\_:

- |                      |                      |
|----------------------|----------------------|
| 1 = more than 5 yrs. | 4 = 6 mos. - 11 mos. |
| 2 = 3 - 5 yrs.       | 5 = less than 6 mos. |
| 3 = 1 - 2 yrs.       |                      |

- 1 - chief elected official
- 2 - the director of the manpower planning office
- 3 - the chairperson of the manpower advisory council
- 4 - the federal representative
- 5 - the director of the Employment Service
- 6 - the director of - (subcontractor)
- 7 - the director of - (subcontractor)
- 8 - the director of - (subcontractor)
- 9 - the director of - (subcontractor)

Frequency of contact between leader

Approximately how often are you in contact with the other leaders?  
Would you say you are in contact:

- |                         |                           |
|-------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1 = hourly              | 4 = once or twice a week  |
| 2 = several times a day | 5 = once or twice a month |
| 3 = about once a day    | 6 = a few times a year    |

Lateral orientation

For the next question, I would like you to indicate your agreement or disagreement with several management approaches that leaders in CETA networks should take. In each case, please indicate on the scale how strongly you agree or disagree:

Strongly							Strongly
Agree	1	2	3	4	5	6	Disagree

- 1. The leader should encourage his subordinates to cooperate with the other network organizations.
- 2. The leader should act as a buffer for his organization against outside pressure.
- 3. The leader should attempt to influence the other network organizations.
- 4. The leader should attempt to open up lines of communication with the other network organizations.

### Leadership evaluation and identification

In any network of organizations, there are some overall leadership functions to be performed. For each leadership function to be named, please indicate on the scale the degree to which this function is performed at all in this network:

1 = to a great extent                      3 = to a small extent  
2 = to a moderate extent                4 = not at all

1. provides direction for mutual activities
2. represents the network in outside functions
3. expresses satisfaction to network members with effective performance
4. introduces change in the network when needed
5. seeks network members' opinions on various network activities

Who in the network performs each of these leadership functions?

### Boundary personnel

In each network organization, there are leaders and others who help link their organization with the other network organizations. How many such personnel are there in your organization who, as part of their job, spend some of their time in activities with other organizations in this network?

What are the titles and ranks of these boundary personnel (civil service grade)?

Regarding the educational level of these personnel, how many have:

1 = h.s. diploma, G.E.D., or more                      3 = Bachelor's degree or more  
2 = 2 years college or more                              4 = graduate degree

Regarding turnover, how many have held their position:

1 = more than 2 years                                      4 = 3 - 5 mos  
2 = 1 - 2 years                                              5 = less than 3 mos  
3 = 6 mos - 11 mos

### Network performance evaluation

I would like to ask you about your evaluation of the work done in this network.

Overall, how would you rate the performance of the network?

1 = very effective                                              4 = slightly ineffective  
2 = generally effective                                      5 = generally ineffective  
3 = slightly effective                                        6 = very ineffective

### Organization performance evaluation

How would you rate the performance of each of the network organizations, including your own?

- |                         |                           |
|-------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1 = very effective      | 4 = slightly ineffective  |
| 2 = generally effective | 5 = generally ineffective |
| 3 = slightly effective  | 6 = very ineffective      |

### Quality of communication

How would you characterize the overall quality of the communication process between your organization and each of the other network organizations? Would you say it is of:

- |                            |                           |
|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1 = very high quality      | 4 = generally low quality |
| 2 = generally high quality | 5 = very low quality      |
| 3 = average quality        |                           |

### Competence of boundary personnel

How would you describe the competence of the personnel who handle the information exchanged between their organization and the other network organizations in each of the other organizations? Would you say that:

- |                        |                        |
|------------------------|------------------------|
| 1 = all are competent  | 4 = few are competent  |
| 2 = most are competent | 5 = none are competent |
| 3 = some are competent |                        |

### Working relationships

On this scale, how would you rate your working relationship with \_\_\_\_\_ vis-a-vis CETA?

- |                         |                           |
|-------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1 = very favorable      | 4 = slightly unfavorable  |
| 2 = generally favorable | 5 = generally unfavorable |
| 3 = slightly favorable  | 6 = very unfavorable      |

### Interdependence

In performing the work of your organization, with which of the other network organizations do you need to be in contact?

Frequency of contact

I would now like to ask you about the coordination between your organization and the other network organizations. About how often are contacts (written or verbal) made between your organization and each of the others? Would you say they are made:

- |                         |                           |
|-------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1 = hourly              | 4 = once or twice a week  |
| 2 = several times a day | 5 = once or twice a month |
| 3 = about once a day    | 6 = a few times a year    |

Extent of competition

In some networks, organizations compete with each other for funds, for clients, for personnel, or for prestige. Do you see any of the other network organizations as a competitor with your organization?

Which one(s)?

Extent of conflict

Has your organization had disagreements or disputes with any of the other network organizations?

With which one(s)?