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**Article — Accepted Manuscript (Postprint)**

## The Persean Ethic: Consistency of Belief and Action in Managerial Practice

Human Relations

*Suggested Citation:* Raelin, Joseph A. (1993) : The Persean Ethic: Consistency of Belief and Action in Managerial Practice, Human Relations, ISSN 1741-282X, SAGE Publications, London, Vol. 46, Iss. 5, pp. 575-621,  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/001872679304600502> ,  
<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/001872679304600502>

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/268734>

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THE PERSEAN ETHIC: CONSISTENCY OF BELIEF AND ACTION IN  
MANAGERIAL PRACTICE

(Revised)

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DRAFT MANUSCRIPT RE-SUBMITTED TO:  
*HUMAN RELATIONS*

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## Acknowledgement

The author would like to thank the Management Development Division of the Management School, Lancaster University, for making this research possible, especially, Dean David Ashton, Rick Crawley, Julia Davies, and John Mackness. Thanks also to Jonathan Gosling for his good-natured sustenance throughout the data gathering process. Appreciation is also extended to "Safi" Safizadeh and David McKenna for their technical assistance, to Deirdre Heisler, Steven Katz, and Laura Beck for their research assistance, and to the many reviewers of the manuscript among whom should be named Jean Bartunek, Marty Roth, and especially Chris Argyris.

## Abstract

The Persean ethic in managerial practice refers to the willingness of managers to follow through on their espoused beliefs with others in their immediate working network. It is considered to be among the most important of managerial practices since through it managers can monitor their beliefs to ensure that their actions are consistent with otherwise salutary espoused theories. In order to assess the dependent variable of Persean conduct, or consistency of belief and action, the core respondents' immediate work set, including their superior, peers, and subordinates were surveyed as well as themselves. In an attempt to create an explanatory model of Persean conduct, individual personality and background factors, situational characteristics, their interaction, and learning factors were evaluated. Respondents were found to vary on Persean conduct, the Persean ethic was found not to be unidimensional, and although each of the independent variable clusters was represented in the predictor list, personality factors dominated as explanatory variables.

Key Words: consistency of belief and action, humanistic principles, democratic organisation, perception, attribution, and feedback

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## The Persean Ethic: Consistency of Belief and Action in Managerial Practice

So over the sea rich-haired Danaë's son,  
 Perseus, on his winged sandals sped,  
 Flying swift as thought.  
 In a wallet of silver,  
 A wonder to behold.

-Edith Hamilton

For those who remember their Greek mythology, Perseus, the young and proud son of Polydectes' wife-to-be, Danaë, promised this wicked tyrant the head of Medusa. It was considered to be a rather foolish boast by all those in the court for it was known that anyone who looked at Medusa would be turned instantly into stone. Nevertheless, Perseus held to his beliefs and convictions. By assembling a noble following, no less than the gods Hermes and Athena, and by inquiring with others, especially with the oracle at Delphi, he learned how to slay Medusa. He successfully acted on his beliefs.

It has become apparent that in the post-modern post-industrial era, most managers have begun to espouse a belief of involvement with their subordinates. In particular, most managers not only want their subordinates to feel that they're an integral part of the work environment, but that they should be treated with fairness and dignity. A number of labels have been used to characterize this managerial approach - e.g., democratic, humanistic, emancipatory, people-centered, Theory Y, Model II, participative - and the theory behind it suggests that it is appropriate in most managerial situations and nearly at all managerial levels. A leading determinant of this development has been the growing sophistication of the labor force which has become increasingly less tolerant of authoritarian behavior. Consequently, managers, trained through business degree programs as well as through experience and contact with colleagues, generally espouse the need to treat their subordinates with dignity, to involve them in decisions affecting them, and to afford them opportunities to grow and experience change. Yet, it has become equally apparent that the actual practice of management does not reflect this espoused theory. In fact, the theory-in-use seems to map dominant control as the preferred style of managerial behavior in most corporate situations.

What Perseus did was to act in accordance with his noble beliefs, to act consistently. It is not enough to be consistent on behavior, however. Consistency is not equivalent to inflexibility. For example, one can treat people differently and yet be consistent with egalitarian values. Consistency between inadequate or negative values and action,

or inconsistency derived from low espousal but sufficient action depict dimensions of behavior that can undermine the "moral authority" of the manager (Durkheim, 1933). Moreover, inconsistency derived from ideals which are not carried out, though not as serious as contrary behavior, can nevertheless lead to cynicism in the work environment regarding the true motives of the manager. To achieve consistency on an ethic of involvement means that one is willing to face scrutiny and feedback on one's espoused values and on the values governing one's operation (Keeley, 1983; Freeman and Gilbert, 1988). It is inconsistency between such values and improper action that, once discovered, can serve as a positive stimulus to change (Argyris and Schön, 1974). Crouch and Yetton (1987), for example, show that it is not enough for managers to practice group decision making in handling conflict in the group; it is also critical that they encourage group members to be open about their opinions. As another example, consider the case of a manager who was known to be forty years ahead of his time in his administrative methods (Singer and Wooten, 1976). This man practiced modern methods of management, such as collegial decision making, which served to create such a motivating environment for its managers that it resulted in one of the most efficient industries known to the world at that time. The only problem was that the man did not necessarily espouse humanistic belief systems. He was neither willing to face any challenge to the governing values underlying the operation over which he was responsible. You see, the man was Albert Speer, the industry was war production and armaments, and its employees were forced laborers, concentration camp inmates, and prisoners of war.

Why is it that consistency of belief and action appears to be so seldom practiced in the workplace? Does it disappear with age or experience? Remember that Perseus was a youth when he set out to slay Medusa. Or are there other attributes shaped by one's personality and one's surrounding culture that predispose managers to act inconsistently? In this paper the reasons for the inconsistency between managerial belief and action will be examined so as to recommend the most responsive conditions to develop consistency in managerial practice. But first, we must develop a model which might specify the principal reasons why managers either consciously or unwittingly distort their behavior in bureaucratic settings. We must find out whether "The Persean Ethic," as we shall call it, or Persean conduct for short, is actually practiced by at least a critical mass of managers. If so, we must then determine what makes these Perseans act the way they do.

### Background of the Principal Study Variable - "The Persean Ethic"

Of all the humanistic values which have been discussed in the literature, without question most attention has been paid to the idea of participation in decision making (see, for example, Cotton et al., 1988). However, few studies ever consider incorporating the notion that participation in beliefs may not convert to participation in deeds (see Haire, Chiselli, and Porter, 1963, for an exception). Further, there is not universal acceptance of the view that acting on one's beliefs, leading to open questioning of the values underlying one's positions, is superior as a managerial practice compared to guarded or even closed interactions. Kanter (1982) in discussing the dilemmas of participation suggests that there are contingencies when authoritative and unilateral actions by managers make sense, for example, when there is a "hip pocket" solution, when presumably affected persons are not really involved or knowledgeable, when sharing serves no useful purpose, when there is a time crunch, or when people prefer to be left alone. Vroom and Yetton (1973) and Vroom and Jago (1988) offer yet additional contingencies, such as decision quality and commitment, subordinate development, problem structure, and subordinate acceptance. In a review of the participation literature, Neumann (1989) estimated that two-thirds of our workforce remain non-participants, which implies that managers interested in talking about their values might find a rather apathetic audience. Yet, it is not talking about but rather acting on humanistic values that makes a difference to employees. Aktouf (1992) has questioned whether some of the new people-centered concepts of management embodied, for example, in such concepts as corporate culture or total quality, are really humanistic at heart. To truly humanize a firm, according to Aktouf, managers must practice "candor, symmetry, equity, and sharing" (p. 424).

In some instances, it might be advisable to take a developmental approach to accomplish an ultimate mission of involvement. In other words, managers in envisioning a democratic work environment might see the need to exert external controls and reinforcers to instill in their workers a taste for self-leadership (Manz and Sims, 1989). They should not be subtle about this approach, however. Those who advocate the strategic use of ambiguity (see, for example, Williams and Goss, 1975; Goodall, Wilson, and Waagen, 1986; Eisenberg and Witten, 1987; Sussman, 1991) intentionally distort consistent behavior in the service of "higher" values. Unless it is espoused as an intermediate process to establish liberating conditions for ultimate democratic practice (Torbert, 1991), subtlety of this kind, though of potential benefit to the actor, is likely to be lost on the audience.

Consistency of action with democratic values is thus resistant to subtlety in that it requires a high degree of trust

between manager and associate. Trust is likely to evolve when individuals learn to confront themselves and each other (Kahn, 1990). Indeed, moral knowledge and ethical behavior are thought to arise from diversity of opinion (Srivasta and Barrett, 1988). In developing an ethics scale, it is interesting that David Campbell (1991) reported that low scorers were not seen as dishonest as much as they were not candid or straightforward.

Hence, Persean managers who act consistently on their democratic values are seen as fair. They maintain dignity in the workplace since they demonstrate that people must be true to themselves even if their beliefs conflict with dominant organizational values. When the values they espouse entail inquiry, they also become approachable and thus are able to promote decision making which tends to engender commitment from those involved. And, having organizational members committed to learn (inquire) rather than acquiesce to pre-determined objectives has enormous implications for organizational adaptability (Morgan, 1986; Senge, 1990).

Perhaps the most eloquent spokesperson for the view that participation and other forms of employee involvement may not succeed unless the skill to detect discrepancies between one's espoused theories and theories-in-use is learned has been Chris Argyris (see, for example, 1976, 1982, 1985, 1989). He distinguishes between what he calls Model I and Model II theories in use. In Model I, managers rarely question the governing variables of their encounters with colleagues in order that they may unilaterally control the situation and save face in the event they are wrong. Model II, on the other hand, institutes those processes which purposely call for reflection on the governing values underlying our behavior. Argyris believes that far fewer than 1% of the population sincerely practice Model II; thus, there is little need to classify Model II behavior empirically. We should be more concerned with changing standard Model I theories in use.

This paper challenges the view that there is virtually no differentiation among managers when it comes to natural or developed ability to act consistently with espoused democratic values. Donald Schön (1987) has demonstrated how some professionals develop the so-called artistry of reflection-in-action. What managers must do in addition to private reflectiveness is practice "public reflectiveness," since, by virtual definition, their work involves others beyond themselves in getting things done in organizations. Accordingly, they must be willing to test their espoused beliefs with others in their immediate working network.

A complete test of public reflectiveness and thus of the theory of action presented in the work of Argyris and Schon (1974) would entail no less than five steps, as shown below in Figure 1. First, the core individual advocates his or her values and beliefs. In this espousal, it is also preferable that the core uses illustration of the values as well as their underlying assumptions, in other words, how he or she sees it. In step 2, the core's colleagues observe the core's



behavior and provide feedback on whether the resulting action was consistent with the espoused values. This colleague feedback then induces the core in step 3 to suggest how he or she thinks colleagues saw him (her), testing, in effect, the inherent theory-in-use. (Note that in Argyris' experimental work, cores also gather anticipatory perceptions of colleagues' responses even before they act.) In step 4, the colleagues offer their perception of how they think the core saw himself or herself, invoking a further reality test on the core's values. By step 5, which constitutes private reflection, the core collects all the data from the dialogues incorporating the prior steps for a final examination of self, leading to espousal of re-interpreted or new values.

Naturally, the process of public reflectiveness does not flow as smoothly as these five steps suggest. Managers also need to use discretion in conducting publicly reflective dialogues since their overuse or poor timing could make them nonproductive. But in depicting the process in this way, we can see the role of Persean conduct in stimulating public reflectiveness since it essentially constitutes the first step. It calls for the manager to make his or her values explicit and then act upon them.

The need to work through the full cycle of public reflectiveness as depicted in Figure 1 is reinforced by the extensive social psychological literature on subjective construal, social inference, and attitude-behavior consistency. First, from social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) and self-perception theory (Bem, 1967, 1972), we know that espousers are themselves inconsistent, that they often change their views when they launch into action or that their public espousals may differ from their private opinions. However, most espousers are willing to have their beliefs, opinions, and actions conform as they consider "social reality," that is, the attitudes and abilities of their peers.

With regard to the formal study of consistency by social psychologists, the issue of whether attitudes can predict behavior has been subjected to close scrutiny for about sixty years (LaPierre, 1934). The sense of the literature is that attitudes and behavior can correlate under certain conditions. For the purposes of this study, two findings from this literature are especially noteworthy. First, although behavioral intentions have been found to moderate attitude-behavior consistency (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980), it is most critical that these intentions be well-formed and held with conviction, which is another way of suggesting that they have become values (Bagozzi and Yi, 1989). Second, the publicness of intentions seems to be critical since actors wish to appear consistent in the eyes of their observers (Stults and Messé, 1985). Unfortunately, observer perceptions are relatively unstable since construals tend to be egocentric and affected by such subtle cues as labels, stereotypes, timing, and prior biases (Griffin and Ross, 1991). The only way to overcome attributional bias is to exercise constraint in drawing conclusions about others' or our own actions until we have

completed a full feedback cycle (Mabe and West, 1982; Ashford and Cummings, 1983; Ross and Nisbett, 1991).

The assessment of Persean conduct admittedly falls short in evaluating Model II theory or the even more ambitious public reflectiveness model. For example, although we can determine whether the core's espoused values matches his or her observed behavior, we may not be entirely certain that colleagues interpreted the core's values in the same way. We may also not know how inquisitive the core manager was in soliciting full inquiry regarding his/her espoused values and subsequent behavior.

Yet, it is a first step. To begin a test of any theory of action, it is preferable to match espoused values against others' perceptions of actual behavior rather than conduct purely cognitive routines (see pp. 24-28 of Argyris and Schon, 1974). Of course, perceptions of behavior are not always stable predictors of behavior (Reeder, Fletcher, and Furman, 1989), though this study will seek to minimize method-based observer error. Further, direct measures of behavior, whether inobtrusive or self-reported, especially when single acts are being recorded, are notoriously inaccurate particularly when being compared to attitudes or beliefs (Ajzen, 1982). Finally, since we are testing democratic values, it is unlikely that any core receiving a high rating on consistency would not be engaging his or her colleagues in subsequent dialogues commensurate with some of the other steps in the full model of public reflectiveness.

So, if Persean conduct in managers can be differentiated, we might begin by exploring conditions which could serve as testable hypotheses in developing a full model of public reflectiveness. In seeking an explanation for such differentiation, personality factors (i.e., self-esteem, locus of control) may offer the most promising avenue for investigation. Yet, a full explanatory model of the Persean ethic would have to incorporate additional demographic properties of managers, situational conditions in the manager's work unit and organizational culture (pressure to conform, working style expectations, vertical relations, and the like), and their interactions (see, for example, Viljoen et al., 1990). In other words, when faced with cognitive dissonance regarding behavior not corresponding to beliefs, conformity to governing patterns is likely to emerge from interactions as well as from independent powerful forces in both the individual's background and personality as well as the situation he/she is in. In addition, it is possible that learning environments which are explicitly concerned about the value of consistency of belief and action can shape managers in the way of Persean conduct. Other factors which might impact managerial inconsistency but fall outside of our present research agenda include: family background and socio-economic characteristics, community considerations, including environmental and public policy forces, and cultural impacts arising from national predispositions. Before even considering the variables, the study must first seek to identify and measure Persean conduct. We also need to know

whether there is sufficient variation on this form of behavior such that a search for explanatory properties makes sense. If there is sufficient variance, the study can turn to an exploration of the factors which account for Persean conduct. In this phase of the analysis, as it would be premature to offer concrete hypotheses, the study would concentrate on isolating the clusters and the variables which matter most in explaining the Persean ethic.

## Review of the Literature

### Individual Factors

#### Background

As indicated in the previous section, this review will consider individual, situational, personality-situation interaction, and learning determinants of Persean conduct. First, we turn to evidence of explanations of the Persean ethic based on background factors. This class of variables has already been shown to relate to job involvement, which, in turn, is known to be associated with personality values (Ruh, White, and Wood, 1975). Siegel and Ruh (1973) found that education, for example, was able to distinguish workers interested in job participation. Similarly, older workers have been found to be more involved in work (Hall and Mansfield, 1975), prouder of their craftsmanship (Susman, 1973), and yet more accommodating to the policies of their organization (Raelin, 1980). Likewise, other background factors, such as gender, seniority, and work unit and organizational size could establish important conditions distinguishing Persean conduct. For example, might women in their struggle for equality in the workforce be more predisposed than men to solicit inquiry on egalitarian values, or conversely, might they purposely hold back on such inquiry in order to disconfirm sex-role stereotypes (Schein, 1975)?

#### Personality

Douglas McGregor (1967) once acknowledged that managers, profoundly influenced by their cosmology and identity, tend to assimilate the style characteristic of their organization. If consistency of behavior is treated ambiguously in the organization, cognitive dissonance theorists might suggest that managers would be unlikely to place themselves in dissonance with the prevailing style. Even if they were to change their behavior temporarily (say, as a result of a short-term training program), they may quickly rescind it or later uncommit themselves (Wicklund and Brehm, 1976). So, what kind of individual is likely to espouse and actually follow through on democratic means of behavior and thus

resist pressures to conform to standard hierarchical organization? A likely first candidate would be a person with high self-efficacy and self-esteem. Self-efficacy differs from self-esteem in that the former is not inherently evaluative. Whereas self-esteem reflects a judgment of self, self-efficacy represents a perception about one's capability of performing a specific task (Gist and Mitchell, 1992). People with high self-efficacy are known to more readily perceive novel situations as opportunities (Bandura, 1989; Gecas, 1989), and those with high self-esteem tend to rely less on environmental cues and more on self-perceptions to guide their work behavior (Tharenou, 1979; Weiss, 1977). From Vroom (1960), we also know that low authoritarian persons and those with high independence needs tends to be favorably disposed to participative modes of behavior. The same disposition is likely to be found in open-minded individuals or those considered non-dogmatic (Rokeach, 1960; Haiman, 1967). In contrast, individuals placed in leadership positions who maintain low interpersonal trust (Rosenberg, 1956; Rotter, 1967, 1971) are less apt to permit freedom of action in their subordinates.

Individuals known to behave inconsistently sometimes engage in what is known as "perceptual defense" in order to protect their self-esteem (Byrne, 1966). For example, they might talk about the need for openness in their group but actually discourage it for fear that someone might discover a weakness in their management style. Better adjusted individuals attempt to maintain mastery over inconsistent situations by inquiring about them or by differentiating or symbolizing those aspects of themselves and their environment which may be inconsistent. Those who sustain high ego-involvement in any given value or issue are less likely to change their position to suit the dominant environmental condition (Crow, 1967). They might attempt to assimilate new experiences by expanding their self-system, though at the price of a momentary increase in anxiety. Unfortunately, the more familiar tack to take, especially when the new experiences are threatening, is to engage in perceptual defense, constrict the self-system, and become resistant to the new information or experiences (Staub, 1980).

In a similar vein, individuals with an internal locus of control are less likely to accept environmental influences without giving them due deliberation whereas externals are more predisposed to accepting them as given. Internals are also known to prefer participation rather than directive environments (Mitchell, 1973) and are inclined to persist in a task especially when they believe that personal failures have come about due to insufficient effort (Diener and Dweck, 1978).

It is also expected that moral development will play an important role in distinguishing individuals capable of engaging in Persean conduct. Integral to theories of moral development is that individual moral behavior follows identifiable patterns and that these patterns tend to change in a predictable progressive manner (Loevinger and Wessler,

1970; Lickona, 1976; Blasi, 1980, Colby and Kohlberg, 1987). Individuals at lower levels of moral development tend to conform to existing rules and laws whereas those at higher levels tend to operate on the basis of internalized principles. The Persean ethic appears to require a sense of personal conviction and even nonconformity which would tend to characterize high moral developers.

The most extensive analysis of the personality factors impeding consistency in organizational behavior can be found in the work of Michael Diamond. Taking a psychoanalytic perspective, Diamond (1986) asserts that adopting consistency and inquiry modes of behavior may affect organizational members' self-esteem and invoke their security needs. The typical response, especially under organizational conditions requiring compliance and stability, is defensive wherein individuals attempt to alleviate anxiety by shutting out information or by discontinuing any behavior which might represent a threat to oneself. Even the most highly skilled professionals when faced with situations they cannot handle tend to despair (Argyris, 1991). Under increased or constant stress arising from unpredictable work-related or interpersonal events, individuals might even resort to neurotic behavior in order to avoid anxiety and try to maintain control. Diamond and Allcorn (1985) refer to five sets of psychologically defensive tendencies: perfectionist, arrogant-vindictive, narcissistic, self-effacing, and resigned. They also point to the tendency of intentionality which represents a normal, non-neurotic reaction to anxiety wherein the individual maintains self-esteem and deals intentionally with events.

## Situational Factors

### Job

We expect that the propensity for a manager to act affirmatively in behalf of involvement values will be associated with the level of autonomy afforded by the job itself (Miles, 1980; Ruh et al., 1975). However, as Abdel-Halim and Rowland (1976) and Steers (1977) caution, it is hardly a sufficient condition for Persean conduct since autonomy does not always convert into the sharing of influence. Nevertheless, jobs which afford not only autonomy but a number of other core dimensions, such as skill variety, task identity, task significance, and feedback (Hackman and Oldham, 1976), are thought to lead to intrinsically motivated workers. Further, although these jobs are thought to be conditioned by growth needs and other individual and situational differences, such as personal ambition and co-worker relations (Turner and Lawrence, 1965; Hulin and Blood, 1968; Hackman and Oldham, 1975), they are thought to be contagious in developing such values as caring about work (Steers and Porter, 1983). It seems logical that these same job properties which tend to

stimulate intrinsic values would also tend to stimulate consistency of action.

### Work Unit

Acute observers of organizational life believe that the flatter, informal-type organizations of the near future will require greater independence on the part of decentralized task-focused units (Drucker, 1988; Schein, 1989). With fewer service staff clogging up the middle of the organization, these units will be relatively self-sustaining and might develop subcultures quite different from the main organizational culture. Indeed, these subcultures might even conflict with the dominant culture (Martin and Siehl, 1983). Work units are designed to perform distinct tasks and functions; hence, it is only natural that they develop their own structures and personality. In fact, it is thought to be inappropriate to examine work units from a macro-organizational perspective (Van de Ven and Ferry, 1980).

Interpretations of organizational phenomena tend to be varied based on the different sources of information and vantage points from which to view organizational events (Tannenbaum et al., 1974; Reynierse and Harker, 1986). Even under circumstances when the chief executive of an organization espouses and practices humanistic doctrine, it is not axiomatic that all other unit managers in the organization will follow suit. Conversely, the top of the organization may practice high formalization to ensure, for example, financial accuracy among divisional units, yet encourage substantial flexibility and questioning at the unit level regarding how procedures get implemented.

We know from the attribution model of leadership (Calder, 1977; Rush et al., 1977) that high-level managers initially assess the worthiness of their followers and vice-versa before engaging them in responsible activities. Too, middle managers may be uncomfortable involving their subordinates if such behavior is subtly discouraged in favor of bottom-line performance (Hollander and Offermann, 1990). Nevertheless, as Herbert Simon (1944) once cautioned, superior control can only go so far, that it is the art of management to determine what should be reserved to the subordinate's discretion. Since some unit managers wish to understand the covert as well as overt influences affecting their subordinates' behavior, they might be inclined to disclose and even debate their espoused beliefs as well as their practices with their staffs (Davis and Luthans, 1979).

### Organizational Culture

It is conceivable that Persean conduct as an ethical stance derives from organizational culture. Reilly and Kyj (1990), for example, assert that otherwise upstanding individuals when acting as organizational agents merely play out

scripts prescribing appropriate behavior. The scripts in most extant organizations are thought still to be based upon hierarchy and bureaucracy, which rationalize and institutionalize the human control function (Argyris, 1985). Accordingly, bureaucracy subjects the definition and direction of work tasks, the evaluation of worker performance, and the distribution of rewards and imposition of punishment to an organized set of rules and procedures (Edwards, 1979). Thus laid out, the executive staff proceeds to control the organization without the need for much intervention or scrutiny by lower-level workers. Further, the routinization and reinforcement of work procedures leads to a rules orientation among the lower-level employees, dependability especially among the middle-levels, and great loyalty and allegiance at the top. These behaviors, however useful to technical efficiency and control have been shown through decades of research on the contradictions and unintended consequences of bureaucracy to contribute to organizational entropy. The bureaucratic system is purposely constructed to be nondiscussable. Rigid, impersonal adherence to rules ultimately leads to goal displacement wherein conformity to the rules takes precedence over achievement of purpose (Merton, 1940). The paramount rules, then, become unassailable regardless of the feelings of management. Control becomes an assumed managerial role even when the surrounding values promote democratic involvement.

A rules orientation has the further detriment of encouraging managers and employees to obscure issues that may put them in a bad light; hence, they tend to cover up conflicts over values and decisions which might run against the norms of the unit or the organization (Haire, Chiselli, and Porter, 1963; Klein, 1984 ). Frequently, members will create oversimplified interpretations of the situations in which they are dealing or present problems which already carry pre-formulated solutions (Morgan, 1986). They behave this way because they may question whether any loosening in the chain of command is a genuine transformation or a transparent means of merely giving low-level employees an opportunity to ratify already-made decisions at the top (Stein and Kanter, 1980). The natural result of these implicit processes is to increase the gap between what one espouses and what one does since people seek to convey an impression that they always know what they are doing - that they are in control.

Schwartz in a psychoanalytic account (1987) goes as far as to suggest that bureaucracy in upholding an organizational ideal requires a denial of any natural tendency by the subordinate to challenge the managers of the organization who specify the organizational ideal. While organizational culture has thus been targeted as a vehicle for subtle corporate control, its exponents see it as a benevolent tool to encourage employees to accept the goals and values of the organization's leaders. It also promotes a sense of belongingness and results in more productive, committed, and satisfied workers (Athos and Pascal, 1981; Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Martin et al., 1983). Whether the homogenization

of emotion and sentiment can cut through bureaucratic divisions among workers leading to intensified public discussion or whether it results in just another subtle form of totalitarian control has yet to be answered (Ray, 1986). Nevertheless, studies on dissent (Staw, 1977; Schilit and Locke, 1982; Graham, 1986) and on interpersonal trust (Ewing, 1977; Sgro et al., 1980) suggest that cultures which respect individual conscience and value continuous learning and innovation are likely to support self-scrutiny and consistency of belief and action. Gaines (1980) reported, for example, that such cultures increased the proportion of upward communication. Snyder and Swann (1976) were also able to show correspondence between attitudes and action in what was referred to as the "thinking person's environment," that is, where individuals were encouraged to adopt a contemplative orientation to choosing a course of action.

#### Personality-Situation Interaction

It may well be that there can be no authentic study of situational variables apart from personality factors in the study of such behavioral concepts as Persean conduct. Banner (1987) asserts that invisible mental structures of beliefs, concepts, and values are partially responsible for creating organizational structures. Further, existing external structures tend to reinforce beliefs, concepts, and values. One effect of this interaction is "bureaupathy," a term apparently attributed to Robert Merton meaning member behavior in organizations which resists any threat to job security and predictability. We also know from Milgram (1974) that most individuals, at least in Anglo-American society, respect authority to the extent that anxiety is generated when they reject or even question bureaucratic control. The interaction depicted here is essentially between the individual and society in which hierarchy represents an ideology the assumptions of which are taken as natural (Anthony, 1977).

Personality-situation interactions taken from an organizational perspective hold that organizations do not behave independently from the people whom they attract and select (Schneider, 1987). In fact, people are known to affect their situations, for example, their tasks (Kohn and Schooler, 1978; Miner, 1987). There is also evidence that they actively choose their situations and perform best in those that are most compatible to themselves (Emmons and Diener, 1986; Chatman, 1989). However, high levels of person-organization fit are not thought to be conducive to Persean conduct since fit can lead to conformity and homogeneity as people and organizations find themselves unable to adapt to new environmental circumstances (Janis and Mann, 1977; Kanter, 1987).



## Learning

Although formal management education might be viewed as a means of inspiring the practice of the Persean ethic in organizations, the "professional" model of management education in the U.S., personified through its venerable MBA degree, may not be adequate to train or socialize at least our full-time students in the necessary values to confront bureaucratic conformity (Leavitt, 1986; Raelin, 1990). The reason for this is that the flow of learning in American education tends to be one-way. The student is expected to absorb information from a teacher, a book, or even a case, but is deprived the opportunity to test out in real time the inherent principles (Porter et al., 1989). Management development offers more promise of exposure to practical experience especially given its use of experiential activities. Nevertheless, in a sense, management development could also be seen as passive in that it may require little effort on the part of the learner to see for him/herself the relevance of the presented material to personal situations. There is also doubt as to management development's capacity to alter the dominant corporate culture (Salaman and Butler, 1990).

Management education need not be deprived of an experience component. Indeed, where formal programs have made an impact, they have been reported to be interlaced with experience, to have occurred later rather than during the initial phases of one's career, to have dealt with general management issues surfaced through interaction with others managers, and to have offered insight through application to current problems (Davies and Easterby-Smith, 1984; McCall et al., 1988). The role of experience in MBA education is taken seriously in "action learning" programs. By action learning, we refer to experiential learning programs based upon the idea that managers learn most effectively with and from other managers and teachers while all are engaged in the solution of real-time problems (Revans, 1983). It is expected that such programs will positively affect Persean conduct since they are intrinsically self-critical and inquiry-driven (Dixon, 1990). According to Revans' conceptualization, the learning process requires insightful questioning and exploration of the unfamiliar in addition to the acquisition of current conceptual information (Korey and Bogorya, 1985). In tutorial groups, for example, students are asked to advocate their plans and ideas and then receive feedback from their peers on these plans including the inherent theory and values. Students often then change their assumptions and actions in light of the group discussion. Action learning, consequently, envisages a high degree of autonomy for students in their learning but not to the extent that teachers renounce their responsibility for offering alternative modes of theory and method (Fleming and Rutherford, 1984). Hence, throughout the process of action learning, there is constant questioning of one's ideas, one's values, and one's theories especially with regard to their effectiveness in solving real problems (Ashton, 1989).

## Method

### Overview of Program and Study

The survey was conducted during a four-month period while the author was on sabbatical at Lancaster University in the U.K. The Management School at Lancaster is widely known for its innovative approaches to formal graduate management education, particularly its post-experience programs. These programs enroll seasoned managers most of whom have already established themselves in their organizations. The specific programs examined in this study were three of the part-time MBA programs, two of which are company-based - one with a major London-based company, the second with a large northwest company - the other a consortial program consisting of 6 organizational partners. Although the programs have their distinctive elements and their own program director, they are rather compatible in program content - each requires week-long substantive modules followed by company-based projects and assignments; in program duration - each takes about two years to close out a cycle or cohort; in their action learning focus - each requires extensive tutorial sessions devoted to support the students in their completion of course assignments and projects; and in assessment - each requires an extensive project dissertation.

As has already been mentioned, since the study endeavors to assess consistency between beliefs and action, it has incorporated surveys of colleagues of the managers, namely, their superior, two subordinates, and two peers. This approach was designed to reduce common method variance and, in particular, to ensure that any managerial beliefs reported by these managers, henceforth to be referred to as "core respondents," be assessed beyond the espoused level. In particular, questions were designed to determine not only the importance attributed by the core respondents to fundamental humanistic values and beliefs but whether and to what extent these beliefs were actually practiced, not according to them but to their colleagues. Beyond the measurement of consistency of beliefs and action, assessment of personality and situational constructs by multiple respondents would contribute to measure validation, as will be detailed later.

Separate instruments were used for the core respondents and colleague-respondents, respectively. All colleague-respondents received virtually the identical survey form except reference to the core respondent was changed depending on whether he or she was a subordinate, peer, or boss. Although some questions were repeated, core respondents were generally asked more and different questions to aid in subsequent construct validation of the composite scales. Cores, as students in the program, could also afford to commit additional time to the survey. Core respondents

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were interviewed in every case, whereas colleagues completed the survey form either as a questionnaire or as an interview depending upon their preference and schedule. Interviews were conducted by two researchers.

### Sample

A total of 41 "networks" were assembled to participate in the study. A network constitutes a core respondent and his/her respective colleague respondents. The responsibility for volunteering the network was placed on the core respondent with whom the survey was initiated. Not every student in the part-time MBA programs at the Management School could participate because many of them had changed jobs or had had associates change jobs during the course of the program. In the latter instance, it would have been impossible for the core respondents to find five associates who could comment reliably on changes in their managerial practices, let alone those changes affected by the graduate learning experience. Hence, the survey team requested that core respondents have served no less than one year in their company and have been in the MBA program minimally for six months. Correspondingly, a criterion for colleague-respondents was that they have known the core respondent for a period of no less than a year. The 41 networks constituting the sample for this study represent students from "older" cohorts, that is, those in existence for at least a year. Managers on more recent cohorts would simply not have had enough exposure to learning content to effect any discernible change in their management practices, at least from the program. Some of the managers from these cohorts were briefly surveyed, however, as were those who, for the reasons cited earlier, could not serve as full survey respondents. The purpose of these surveys was to collect non-respondent data on individual and organizational characteristics for subsequent scale construction and replication.

Of the 41 networks, 19 or 46% were complete. A complete set would contain 6 completed survey forms, one for the core respondent and five for each of his/her colleagues. The remaining networks had one, two, or three respondents missing. The response rate in this setting was calculated as 86.6%, computed as  $(n \times P)/a$  where:

$n$  = no. of networks (41)

$P$  = possible respondents (6)

$a$  = actual no. of respondents.

Only two of the 41 networks had three missing respondents. The responses of the four colleague-respondents from these two networks were compared to those supplied by all other colleague-respondents. The pattern of responses was not

found to differ significantly.

The final sample included 213 respondents of which 41 were core respondents, 73 subordinates, 64 peers, and 35 bosses. Females constituted 21% of the total sample and the average age was 40. Among the 41 cores, 9 were female, 32 were married, 14 had been in their current position under one year, while 23 had held their job between one and three years. The average amount of time spent in the program by the time of the interview was 17 months, the average number of years with the same organization was 14, and the average number of positions held in that organization was 6.

When the demographic data are compared to the nonrespondent pool, we find a fair degree of consistency. Among the 46 nonrespondents, 10 were female, 34 were married, 14 had been in their position under one year, and 12 had been on their job between one and three years. Their average tenure was 10 years and the average number of positions held in the same company was 6. However, as expected, the nonrespondents did differ in the time spent in the program since among these volunteer respondents were students from the most recent cohort of the consortial program who had participated in only two modules (equivalent to approximately four months).

## Measures

Most of the constructs in the study, except for the demographic variables, were prepared using Likert-type value ranges. Multiple indicators were employed to the extent possible. It is interesting to note that virtually none of the familiar scales used in the survey survived the reliability parameter used in the study which was the computed Cronbach's  $\alpha$ . Hence, most of the original scales had to be revised to incorporate only those items which passed an Alpha test of .70 (one at .68 and two at .69 were also accepted). Items were occasionally recombined into new scales, but in these instances, factor analyses were performed to establish unidimensionality. In addition, recombinations were not accepted until maximum scale reliabilities and minimum interscale correlations were obtained. In instances when scales failed to pass the reliability test, the single indicator which correlated highest with the remaining items was chosen to represent the expected construct.

It might be useful to speculate why some of these well-known scales which have received a fair amount of norming in the literature did not fare well in this survey. Two explanations seem plausible. First, the study was done entirely in England, and the norms for most of the instruments were established in the U.S. Second, some of these instruments, for example, Litwin and Stringer's Organizational Climate Questionnaire (1968) and Rokeach's dogmatism (D) scale (1960)

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have perhaps become dated or generation-specific. However, in the case of the D Scale, the items used, which were selected by Haiman (1964) for a revised open-mindedness scale, were expressly devoid of current event-type questions which has made the widely known California F Scale (Adorno et al., 1950) obsolete.

Table 1 lists all the study's empirical measures and notes the respondent classification, whether core, colleague, or both. It also indicates the type of variable and, if composite, cites the number of component variables and Alpha reliability coefficient. Further explanation of the variable clusters is offered below.

#### Background

Background factors were tabulated from records and from direct respondent probes. One of these items, the query regarding how long the colleague-respondent had known the core, was included to control for halo effect bias. The background measures are self-explanatory except for education which is actually more variable than would be expected from an American sample. British MBAs do not necessarily require a four-year bachelor's qualification.

#### Personality

The personality measures deploy a fair number of familiar scales, although components were occasionally deleted or recombined as explained above. Core respondents were given Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale as revised by Haiman (1964), Rotter's Locus of Control Scale (1966), an interpersonal trust scale (Hochreich and Rotter, 1970), and a self-esteem composite derived from Rosenberg (1965). An original composite for core respondents emerged from a factor analysis and was entitled, "individual savvyness," constructed from two self-efficacy questions and a single indicator of security need. Colleague-respondents were also asked original questions from Diamond and Allcorn's (1985) six psychologically defensive tendencies. Three of these items (perfectionism, arrogance, and narcissism) loaded on a scale entitled, "neurotic defense." The remaining questions (self-effacement, resignation, and intentionality) were retained as individual indicators. As an example of these items, the perfectionism question asked the colleague to what extent he or she would characterize the core manager as (on a five-point scale): "belaboring things to the point of perfection and developing high standards for everyone to meet. As a consequence, s/he is inclined to denigrate others and elevate himself (herself)."

A confidence composite made up of two perceptual defense questions was also computed. The remaining items are self-explanatory with the exception of the moral development question. An attempt was made to capture the construct of moral development, based on Kohlberg's six-stage scale (Colby and Kohlberg, 1987), by presenting all respondents with a moral dilemma scenario and a set of six choices which they would rank depending upon how they (in the case of the core manager) or their colleague (in the case of colleague-respondents) would respond. Unfortunately, the measure proved

to be unstable and did not enter the analysis. This seems to suggest that the assessment of moral development requires a much lengthier and dyadic exchange between interviewer and respondent such that the assessor obtain a rich volume of data in order to fit the individual more reliably into a given classification.

#### Situation - Job and Work Unit

All of the job-related questions were asked of core respondents only and are derived in each case from Hackman and Lawler's model of "higher order need strength" (1971). According to this model, need strength moderates perceived job characteristics which are represented by six job dimensions: skill variety, autonomy, task identity, feedback, friendship opportunities, and task significance - the last one added in the 1975 version (see Hackman and Oldham, 1975). Challenge was also included in the original higher order need strength scale. Three sets of scores were computed: scores measuring the presence of job characteristics on these seven dimensions, scores representing needs on these seven dimensions, and corresponding difference or, what will be referred to here as, need strength scores. The original job characteristics items from Hackman and Oldham's "job diagnostic survey" did not all cluster successfully. This was not unusual given the difficulty other researchers have had over the years trying to reproduce the original factor structure. Idaszak and Drasgow (1987), however, were able to confirm a five-factor solution by substituting new questions for the original reverse-scored items. In this study, especially where the sample used British respondents, two scales for each of the seven dimensions were reconstructed after testing for multicollinearity and reliability. Each pair represented a distinct job characteristic, need, or need strength.

Acknowledging the difference in perception of the culture in one's work unit vs. that of the organization as a whole, separate questions were posed about the work unit to both core and colleague-respondents. Three of the core items formed a unit culture composite: perception of one's work unit as a culture of conscience, of learning, and of innovation. High values on this composite would be interpreted as indicating a "strong" unit culture. Two other composites associated with work unit culture were boss attachment (made up of three variables) and subordinate attachment (constituted of two variables).

#### Situation - Organizational Culture

The colleague-respondents were administered five of the nine scales from Form B of Litwin and Stringer's Organizational Climate Questionnaire (1968): structure, responsibility, risk, conflict, and identity. This instrument, though not labelled a "culture" survey, nevertheless is well-established and captures many of the characteristics thought critical in the concept of organizational culture. Indeed, the 1960s and 1970s literature on climate is thought to have

contributed to the more comprehensive conceptualization of organizational culture commonly used today (Ott, 1989). Furthermore, some writers still see climate and culture as conceptually interchangeable (see, for example, Lippett, Langseth, and Mossop, 1985).

As was indicated earlier, the five scales chosen from this instrument did not pass a minimum Alpha test and thus were reconfigured into three scales, renamed: organizational risk, organizational clarity, and organizational commitment. The remaining indicators, provided they were not multi-collinear and loaded on distinct factors, were kept as individual variables. Core respondents, meanwhile, were asked separate questions consistent with the prior discussion of the literature on bureaucratic organization. Nine of these formed a conformity composite, represented by a question such as: "It is advisable around here not to make waves." The other composites contained fewer components and represented such constructs as incremental change, rules, and loyalty. Seven other individual indicators rounded out the organizational culture cluster.

#### Personality-Situation Interaction

To test directly for interaction between personality and situation, a number of explicit questions were posed to the core respondents. Three, having to do with change interaction, formed a composite. The type of question asked in this case was (on an agree-disagree scale): "This organization has changed its personality fairly recently and I have changed along with it." The remaining two interaction variables were of the fit type, represented by a question such as: "This organization seems to make best use of my strengths and seems able to overlook my weaknesses."

#### Learning

Besides finding out how long the core respondents had been in the program and how many modules they had taken, the primary vehicle for assessing learning was a set of 12 questions, asked of both cores and colleagues, regarding the effect of the program on the manager's work behavior. These 12 items were then clustered into two composites, one dealing with questioning behaviors affected by the program, the other with more conventional managerial behaviors affected, such as interpersonal, implementation, and evaluation skills.

#### Persean Conduct

The principal dependent variable - consistency of belief and action - was measured by computing a difference score between the espoused values of the core respondent and the actual behavior of the core manager as indicated by each of his/her colleagues. The score for the core managers themselves was computed as the difference between the core's values and the average of all his/her colleague perceptions. However, the score for colleagues was merely the actual difference

between the core's values and the respective colleague's perception of his/her behavior. Consideration was given to using the average difference score for all respondents producing a single network score, but this approach would have created both conceptual and technical difficulties. First, Persean conduct measures consistency between a core's espoused values and behavior as reflected by each individual in his/her network. What is critical is Persean conduct in relation to each colleague in the network not average consistency. The dyadic relationship between core and colleague also maps reality far better than an average score since consistency varies, and hence is best predicted, at the individual level. Secondly, as this study incorporates colleague-respondent as well as core respondent data, computing identical scores on the dependent variable for each colleague-respondent in a given network would cause restriction of range on that measure producing superficially inflated coefficients.

The questions used to compute the Persean ethic score correspond to seven explicit values generally associated with humanistic principles of management. Essentially, they measured theory and practice on the dimensions of openness, personal growth, acceptance of emotions, public testing of ideas, participation in decision making, pride, and dignity. Besides these seven values, core respondents were encouraged to supply up to four additional values which they considered to be extremely or very important to them. Interestingly enough, these values also corresponded to humanistic beliefs. The most oft-cited were treating people as individuals, teamwork, frank communication, and assignment flexibility. Core respondents indicated how important these values were to them as espoused beliefs, on a seven-point scale, and colleagues were asked to what extent their colleague actually practiced these espoused values, also on a seven-point scale.

A serendipitous interim finding was the number of negative difference scores produced. A negative score is computed when colleague respondents report behavior that actually exceeds the core's espoused values. If colleagues perceive the action of the core to be equivalent to the importance ascribed by the core to the respective value, the difference score would be zero. It was expected that there would be few negative scores since across most cultures it was thought that individuals would be more inclined to espouse salutary theories than to practice them. However, the average number of negative scores was 35 per cent (not including the individually supplied values which were expressly chosen as very important by the core respondents). Hence, the old Confucian axiom, "A superior man is ashamed if his words are better than his deeds," at least appears to apply in this instance of British culture in which a not insignificant number of managers preferred to remain reserved about public espousal of beliefs and values and let their actions do the talking.

The inter-cultural question raised here requires a good deal more inquiry than can be afforded in this paper. The



critical issue for the study was how to handle the negative difference scores or cases where espoused responses were low to begin with. A suspicion that the negative and positive difference scores represented distinct concepts was borne out by a series of discriminant analyses performed on the dependent variable data. For example, -1 respondents were compared to +1 respondents, and so on. Indeed, significant discriminant functions were derived. Hence, it was concluded that negative difference respondents could not be merged with the positive difference respondents, for example by computing absolute values scores. In fact, the only way to treat the negative difference scores as well as the low-espousal values was to save them for a separate analysis. In this study, consequently, they were expressly deleted from the respective dependent variable where they were derived. (It should be noted that with the exception of the public testing variable, low espousals accounted for only three additional deletions over and above those already deleted from the negative score data).

Fortunately, not a lot of data were lost in the general Persean ethic score due to a transformation in computing the indicator. Reliability and factor analyses permitted a clustering of six of the consistency difference scores: openness, acceptance of emotions, participation in decision making, dignity, and two of the core respondent's selected values. The Alpha coefficient for the resulting composite was .79. To compute the general Persean ethic score, a mean value was calculated for the six components. Missing values were declared only where three or more out of the six components had missing values. Consequently, the general score for the Persean ethic had only 15 missing values. The three remaining consistency measures - pride, personal growth, and public testing - did not cluster on the general scale, thus suggesting that Persean conduct is not necessarily unidimensional. Their measures, which were based solely on individual differences scores, suffered more attenuations than the general Persean ethic score. Frequency tabulations for all four variables are shown in Tables 2 and 3. As is plainly evident, Persean conduct, among those who strongly espouse humanistic values, varies quite normally.

#### Measurement Validation and Replication

In an exploratory study such as this one which purports to develop theory and which might lead to subsequent theory specification and testing, it is critical that the measures in use receive substantial scrutiny so as to facilitate their verifiability. This section will first consider questions of reliability, to be followed by attempts to establish validation and replication of the measures.

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### Reliability

A great deal of care was expended to produce a reliable set of instruments. The surveys were initially pre-tested on several MBA students in the full-time program at the university. The preliminary drafts of the survey were also examined by staff associated with the Management Development Division at Lancaster University. Not only did these staff suggest changes based on cultural considerations, but they essentially served as competent judges to review the content of each question (hence, lending a degree of content validation to the measures). The surveys were administered to the core respondents in well-controlled, similar conditions - during either tutorial sessions or during regular classes while away from the job. As indicated earlier, both questionnaire and interview formats were used, and in the case of the interviews, two researchers conducted the sessions, first together and then separately, after they adopted compatible styles. Instructions regarding transmission of survey forms to colleagues were reviewed to ensure that procedures were clear and unambiguous. The identity of the colleague-respondents was known to the survey team (primarily as a basis for follow-up), but coded formats were employed to ensure that the responses of the colleague-respondents would be held in strict confidence. Although data were gathered during one period in time, the core respondents were actually at different points in their progress toward the degree. Finally, the raw data were keyed into a computer file by two coders who checked each others' work. A listing program was also used to help spot outliers or invalid entries.

### Discriminant Validity

As was described earlier in this section, separate questions measuring compatible constructs were posed to core and colleague-respondents depending upon the credibility of the data source. For example, a question inquiring about the core respondent's neurotic tendencies was obviously not asked of the core respondents themselves. The variables produced from these questions afford the study a useful means to examine the discriminant validity of the measures. Table 4 presents a cross-respondent correlation matrix of some independent variables expressly selected because of their expected paired relationships (Mitchell, 1985).

All but one of the significant correlations are in the expected direction although nonsignificant findings, for example between neurotic defense and dogma, between clarity and conformity, and between commitment and loyalty, are disappointing. Significant correlations would have been obtained if components of some of the composite scales were to have been used. Some further explanations for these findings follow.

The neurotic defense perceptions appear to display interactive tendencies. Those cores who are perceived to be neurotically defensive in turn perceive their organization and work unit to be less healthy. Core respondents seen as more

generically defensive (assessed by a single perceptual defense indicator correlated at .20 with the neurotic composite) also perceive their work unit to be weak, to be more dogmatic, and less likely to change in concert with changes in their organization. Finally, those cores perceived as being sensitive to criticism perceive their work unit to be weak, but also tend to see their organization as slow to change and not very conducive to an expression of loyalty.

Regarding structural constructs, organizations characterized by colleagues as generating commitment tend to employ more dogmatic cores who see their company as not adapting to their needs or personality. Those organizations characterized by colleagues as having clear policies and standards are also seen by cores as not adapting well to their needs nor are these organizations likely to produce strong work unit subcultures. Finally, organizations depicted as risk-taking, though antagonistic to incremental change, change interaction, and the emergence of strong subcultures, are depicted counter-intuitively by cores as also conformist. Although every other relationship presented seems reasonable (for instance, a high risk macro culture could produce less independent sub-cultures), one would clearly expect risk and conformity to be orthogonal. Unfortunately, neither component analysis nor partial correlation analysis deploying several control variables could sufficiently account for the positive risk-conformity relationship.

Perhaps the best explanation can be offered by the often overlooked view that respondents from different levels and positions in an organization perceive their company or agency differently. According to Lawler, Nadler, and Cammann (1980), behavior occurs at individual, group, and organization-wide levels and these three levels interact with each other. Hence, behavior among individuals can vary at times even within the same group and organization; at other times, such behavior may be coterminous. This can be discerned in this study if we compare groups making up the colleague-respondents. When the situational variables were split by subordinates, peers, and bosses, it was found, generally speaking, that the superiors rated their respective organization more favorably. Indeed, they also evaluated their colleague - the core respondent - more benignly. Meanwhile, although subordinates and peers rated their organization somewhat similarly, subordinates tended to be tougher on their managers. Fortunately, core respondents and colleague-respondents as a group appear to have held comparable perceptions, as shall be reported in the next sub-section on convergent validity.

#### Convergent Validity

Since most of the measures derived from core respondents are self-reports, they suffer from a number of problems associated with this form of measurement, to wit: verifiability (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986), consistency (Eden and Leviatin, 1975; Phillips and Lord, 1986), and social desirability (Arnold and Feldman, 1981). Fortunately, in this study

some questions, especially those referring to personality dispositions of the core respondent, were also asked of their colleagues. Table 5 displays correlations between cores and colleagues on three measures each of two constructs - sensitivity to criticism and perceptual defense. Note that the diagonal displays convergence on every measure except CRIT3 which is significant only at the .1 level.

In a study such as this one using multiple colleague-respondents, there is the possibility that aggregating these respondents may mask cross-respondent differences. An examination of this technical issue revealed that correlations within respondents generally exceeded those found between respondents. For example, on the organizational risk composite variable, the correlation coefficient comparing the two subordinate groups was .32, whereas it was virtually zero when comparing both subordinates to both peers and to the bosses. For neurotic defense, the within-subordinate correlation was .48, whereas it was -.17 between both subordinates and bosses. The explanation for this difference is that the bosses find their subordinate (the core respondent) to be less psychologically neurotic than do the subordinates of their boss. This effect (though mild) does present a challenge to the practice of aggregating perceptions. However, it can also be argued that the overall perception of an individual is perhaps most accurately portrayed as an aggregate or sum perception. Nevertheless, it is beneficial that any differences along these lines occur more frequently in this study between rather than within respondents.

### Replication

Besides some of the efforts described above to establish construct validity, other efforts were made to counter problems associated with method variance, such as halo error, response bias, and social desirability (Fiske, 1982; Mitchell, 1985). In particular, the composite scales produced for core respondent data were replicated on the nonrespondent pool of managers (described earlier) who were also enrolled in the MBA program. The scales, organizational conformity, subordinate attachment, boss attachment, personality-situation interaction, organizational rules, organizational loyalty, self-esteem, and the job scales all replicated at Alpha reliability coefficients of .66 or above. The incremental change ( $\alpha = .75$ ), dogmatism ( $\alpha = .61$ ), and individual savvy ( $\alpha = .62$ ) scales sufficiently replicated with some addition or deletion of items. The locus of control and interpersonal trust scales could not be replicated at acceptable levels. It was decided in these two latter cases that single indicators, manifesting the highest item-scale correlation, would be entered into the analysis to represent the inherent constructs.

Another method used in the study to counter method variance was to expressly add control variables to the analysis to account for alternative explanations for Persean conduct among core respondents. In particular, colleague-respondents

were asked how long they knew the core respondent as well as what their tenure was both in position and in their company. Core respondents were asked how long they had been in the program and how many modules they had taken as well as what their tenure in position and in company was. The managerial level of the core respondents as well as the number of subordinates supervised were also included.

## Analysis

The research design calls for initially determining the identity and variation of the dependent variables comprising Persean conduct. Since sufficient variance has been demonstrated for these measures, the next task is to isolate effects among four variable clusters. The four independent variable clusters containing the individual and composite measures described previously are: individual background and personality factors, situational conditions, personality-situation interactions, and learning environment.

All independent variables were tested for multicollinearity. The statistical analytical tool which was used to distinguish effects on the dependent variables was multiple regression analysis using the ordinary least-squares criterion. A total of four regression equations were fit; one for general Persean conduct, the others for the three independent properties of personal growth, pride, and public testing consistency. Since this study purposely did not generate explicit hypotheses for any of the variables or variable clusters and rather sought to explore possible predictors of Persean conduct, the decomposition method for exploring each independent variable's contribution to the sum of squares was the standard, non-hierarchical method. On the other hand, as we are interested in discovering which of the variables are most important in explaining the phenomenon of consistency of belief and action, the analysis employed a stepwise inclusion procedure according to the following criteria: PIN (probability of entry) of .05, POUT (probability of deletion) of .1, and tolerance of .01. These criteria served to specify the F ratio of the mean square regression to the mean square residual. Naturally, besides examining the significant independent variables through their partial regression and standardized regression coefficients, the goodness of fit of the four regression equations was assessed using the  $R^2$  and adjusted  $R^2$  statistics.

Although not reported explicitly, residual analyses were performed to test for the linearity assumptions underlying the model, especially for the general dependent variable which was constructed, as denoted earlier, using a relatively liberal treatment of missing values. Any suspected outliers were scrupulously re-examined. Histograms constructed from standardized residuals revealed a high degree of normality.

## Results

Table 6 displays the multiple regression results for the general Persean ethic equation. Only predictors entering the equation are depicted. A fairly robust R square of .49 (.46 adjusted) was produced from the eight independent variables which entered. Given that a full Persean ethic model would incorporate other significant independent variable clusters not empirically examined in this study, the percent of variance explained with a F ratio of 16 is comforting.

As the Beta weights attached to the predictor list are expressed in standard terms, they should be consulted when comparing the independent variables to each other. The results show that each of the original four predictor clusters expressly examined in this study are represented in the equation. None of the control variables were found to be significant. Although the personality properties of neurotic defense and resignation enter first, the most powerful predictors are the change interaction composite and task significance. Managers who modify their behavior in concert with the perceived personality style of their organization are not relatively inclined toward Persean conduct. Those who perform jobs which give them a sense of worthwhile accomplishment, on the other hand, tend to be more consistent in their beliefs and actions. Another situational variable of note is individual independence. Organizations which encourage their employees to do their own work and not interfere in the work of others tend to discourage Persean conduct. With the exception of the second learning composite, representing managerial behaviors learned through the MBA program, the other predictors (representing half of the list) are of the personality type. Managers who are inclined to be perfectionist, arrogant, narcissistic, resigned, and dogmatic are obviously not auspicious candidates to exhibit Persean conduct. Those who know how to get things done in their organization, however, apparently feel comfortable in behaving consistently with their espoused beliefs.

Turning to the individual Persean equations, depicted in Tables 7 - 9, it is interesting to note that the significant predictor sets vary from one equation to the other. The amount of variance explained in these equations, however, is about the same (approximately 30%), though less than in the general Persean equation. However, recall that these dependent variable scores were more affected by missing value deletions due to negative consistency differences, and the public testing measure was further attenuated due to low espousal deletions.

Referring first to the personal growth Persean equation, strength of unit culture is the most important positive predictor followed by the healthy personality measure of intentionality and by educational level. Those managers who know how to take charge of their lives and those who have experienced a relatively high degree of education apparently are

inclined to support personal growth in others. Besides education, background factors also receive representation from organizational size which is a negative predictor. Another interesting finding is for boss attachment, which is negatively associated with personal growth consistency of action. Apparently, one is less inclined to sustain espousals of personal growth among one's subordinates when one feels attached to, perhaps dependent upon, upper management. Organizational savvyness is again a positive predictor. Finally, those organizations which support individual problem solving tend to reinforce managers who are consistent in their personal growth beliefs and actions.

Pride Persean conduct has just five predictors, all of which are in the positive direction. Self-esteem makes a strong contribution, as might be expected. Less obvious might be the unique effect of sensitivity to criticism, which also barely missed entering the prior personal growth equation. Those sensitive to criticism, perhaps when it is given in a nonconstructive fashion, might be interested in promoting and acting on pride Persean conduct. This effect might also point to a relationship for further study between ethical beliefs, ethical behavior, and sensitivity to criticism since the pride question contains a conventional ethical challenge: pride in things one would be willing to tell one's family about. Another important predictor of pride Persean conduct is need for task identity on one's job. Note that it is the need for more than the actual conditions of task identity that predetermines pride consistency of action. It is also interesting to note that pride espousal and action is more likely to emerge in laissez-faire organizational cultures. Finally, organizational savvyness makes its third appearance, suggesting a breadth of criticality in explaining overall Persean conduct.

The public testing equation is worthy of special note since it is most approximate to the broader concept of public reflectiveness which not only incorporates Persean conduct but also assesses whether the manager actively engages in inquiry with others in his/her work environment. Hence, the equation represents perhaps a primordial test of Argyris' Model II behavior. It is striking that the direction of the most important predictor - interpersonal trust - is negative. In other words, it is low trust which affects one's willingness to test or discuss one's ideas, be they discussable or perhaps even undiscussable. This finding is intriguing since it is doubtful that any exponent of public testing behavior would have counted on its usage because of a lack of trust in others in one's work environment. This is perhaps better understood when interpreted as circumspection rather than mistrust. Managers who publicly test against their actions do so because they are careful and reflective rather than impulsive. They may also engage in public testing behavior, alternatively, to open up an otherwise closed or mistrusting milieu. The other predictors are more self-explanatory. As in the general Persean equation, organizations which encourage individual independence are not conducive to public testing

consistency, nor are conformist organizations, as would be expected. Meanwhile, managers who express a need for challenge are prone to act consistently with public testing beliefs. Evidently, Persean conduct of this nature is either thought to induce challenge or requires a fair amount of courage which provides challenge in its own right. Finally, resigned individuals are not inclined to publicly test. It might be interesting to point out that subordinate attachment, which almost entered the equation at a  $F$  of 3.72, is positively associated with public testing consistency. Managers who feel close to their bosses might feel empowered to publicly test in their own work unit.

## Discussion

This study has sought not only to identify the ingredients of the Persean ethic of consistency of belief and action but its very identity as an important managerial property. Through the measurement methods employed, it appears that there is reasonable variation on this construct; thus, it can be identified and differentiated. Simply stated, some managers behave considerably more consistently with their beliefs than others. Nevertheless, Persean conduct is not a completely unidimensional phenomenon. Although a general scale was produced in this study from six of the nine Persean measures developed, three types of Persean conduct remained independent. These three measures - personal growth, pride, and public testing consistency - were found to be marginally correlated with the general scale and not significantly inter-correlated. Hence, it is not surprising that their regression equations incorporated different sets of predictors.

The explanatory model introduced in this study offers a plausible approach for the examination of Persean conduct. Employing only four of a number of alternative explanatory clusters, nearly 50 per cent of the variance in general Persean conduct was accounted for. Further, every variable sub-cluster was represented in the predictor list.

It is noteworthy that in the four equations illustrated in the analysis, personality factors dominate as explanatory variables. In fact, when combining them with the two background factors which entered, over half of all the predictor variables are accounted for. Although revealing, this finding is at the same time unfortunate when we consider that these individual factors are perhaps less controllable than the situational and learning variables. Defensive individuals clearly cannot be counted on to act on their espoused beliefs, but there are serious technical and ethical considerations regarding whether these individuals can be identified in the workplace and, if so, changed. We have reported, however, that organizational savvy is a key predictor and yet one that is perhaps subject to some control. Although savvy evolves with seniority, there are ample methods available to advance the process of acquiring organizational savvy,



such as orientation, socialization, and mentoring approaches. The results for organizational savvyness of course need to be interpreted with some caution since it is a single indicator. Nevertheless, the implications for savvyness can be more precisely deciphered when considering the powerful effect of the change interaction composite variable which suggests that managers who are tied to their organization's personality appear less likely to behave consistently with their beliefs. Methods to free individuals from the party line of their organizations, provided they do so within the constraints of their organizational culture, seem advisable. For example, we might appreciate the manager who can distinguish whistle-blowers, who have a legitimate grievance, from saboteurs, who might be just carrying a personal vendetta (see, for example, Bowie and Duska, 1990, pp. 72-77).

Meanwhile, the situational factors identified in this study provide change agents with ample opportunity to create work environments more conducive to Persean conduct. Work designs which establish task significance and meet the needs of managers for task identity and challenge should continue to be reinforced. Work units which permit the expression of individual conscience and which reinforce learning and innovation are also conducive to personal growth consistency of action.

The findings on organizational culture are intriguing in that they support a balance between autonomy and participation, two constructs that have received an inordinate amount of attention in the literature (Neumann, 1989). The positive direction of the individual problem solving situational variable combined with the negative effects of boss attachment in the personal growth equation suggests that managers enjoy work environments which encourage individual autonomy. Yet, other findings for individual independence and conformity suggest that it is not healthy in a Persean sense to work in isolated autonomy without involving others from time to time. In other words, as a public testing superior might do, staff should be encouraged to work on their own but voluntarily discuss and debate critical issues and decisions, especially when these issues and decisions involve others.

Although not a powerful effect, it is comforting that MBA education which concentrates on expanding the skills of interpersonal relations, implementation, and evaluation among already experienced managers in an action learning setting has a positive effect on general Persean conduct.

The findings cited in this study are generally reasonable in light of the literature except for two unexpected results, namely, that of the positive effect of sensitivity to criticism in the pride equation and the negative effect of interpersonal trust in the public testing equation. Further analysis of the former exception using an ANOVA design revealed that the highest score by far on pride Persean conduct was generated from those respondents who were both high on self-esteem and

sensitivity to criticism. Hence, it is possible that self-assured managers who are sensitive to surrounding and perhaps unconstructive criticism may actually use Persean conduct to change their organization or work unit to be more open in their dealings with others. An alternative explanation which emerges when one also considers the findings on interpersonal trust in the public testing equation is that managers who act consistently with their beliefs tend to be rather circumspect and reflective to begin with. Again, too, these results may not be exceptional insofar that they represent a cultural predisposition of British managers. Naturally, these conclusions merit further study and analysis.

### Limitations of the Study

As an exploratory study, the measurement methods and analytic tools used were only sufficient to begin the process of shaping or constructing a model of Persean conduct rather than testing it. The study was also cross-sectional and culturally and situationally dependent; hence, its findings may not be generalizable. Respondents came from a culture which appears to suppress bold espousals of beliefs, values, and feelings, perhaps as compared to the American culture. Unfortunately, many of the instruments chosen were of American origin and thus may not have translated well into British work settings.

With regard to the sample, bias may have occurred from the practice of allowing core respondents to hand-pick colleague-respondents. Further the number of observations from such colleagues, especially given that some networks were incomplete, may have been insufficient to accurately and fairly assess the interrelationships among the variables. There are also embedded intergroup effects to consider (Alderfer and Smith, 1982). The sample, first of all, was drawn from a captive and perhaps overly responsive management population, most of whom were fairly long-term employees. Moreover, the action learning component of the program required fairly close ties between the university and the sponsoring companies. For example, the companies initially put forward candidates subsequently screened by the university for admission. It may well be that the participants reflected the dominant male managerial style of their sponsoring organization, nullifying some possible situational effects. On the other hand, although inter-company differences were greater than intra-company differences, there was negligible restriction of range among the situational variables.

Unfortunately, there was some range restriction on age; for example, nearly one-fifth of the sample was between 39-41 years of age. This leads to another alternative explanation for some of this study's findings. Adult development

theory, especially the work of Levinson et al. (1978), suggests that primarily males in the predominant age range of the respondents of this study often face a mid-life transition. During this period individuals tend to turn inward, question their identity and accomplishments, and seek greater balance in their lives (Raelin, 1984: chap. 3; Smith et al., 1984). It may well be, consequently, that the findings of this study which emphasize personality might result from gender and age dynamics. In particular, middle-aged male managers who have already achieved some success in their careers might be more open to learning and change and their personalities might be more likely predictors of behavior than managers in more settled stages of their adult development.

Methodologically, although many tests were performed and adjustments made to augment the study measures' reliability and validity, problems of method variance, especially intra- and inter-colleague consistency, remain. In some instances, there was insufficiency of sample size to produce interpretable multivariate results, although adjusted R Squares were added in the regression tables to account for shrinkage. Finally, considering that the Persean ethic measure was constituted using colleague perception, we cannot be sure that colleague respondents (except for those interviewed) interpreted the values, which the core was presumably putting into practice, similarly.

#### Directions for Future Research

Nevertheless, a number of propitious avenues for further research emerge from this study, both from its accomplishments as well as limitations. The analysis was not sufficient to examine the full construct of public reflectiveness as a managerial practice. It has established some conditions for behaving consistently with one's salutary values and beliefs, but these same conditions may not apply to the next steps identified in Figure 1 which require substantial inquiry about one's actions in light of one's beliefs. These steps, which round out public reflectiveness, require examination of the feedback process contingent on one's theories and actions. Although a fair amount of research has recently begun on feedback seeking (see, for example, Larson, 1986; Ashford and Tsui, 1991), it has been guided as much by impression management (Morrison and Bies, 1991) as by genuine inquiry. We need to mount longitudinal studies which can gather clinical evidence on the inquiry-driven behavior of managers over time. This study has proposed that managers do vary in their consistency of action, but we now need to know which, how many, and under what conditions these same managers follow up on their ideals.

What can be indicated at this point is that there appears to be an association between Persean conduct and subsequent

dialogue between the core and his or her colleagues. A separate analysis found correlations of .50, .52, and .32 - significant at the .001 level - between general Persean conduct and reported participation, acceptance of emotions, and public testing behaviors respectively. This suggests that managers who acted consistently with their beliefs were also seen as having given their colleagues an opportunity to participate in decisions which affected them and to express feelings, even if negative. They were also seen as having tested their values with others in their work environment.

Although we have suggested a number of potential benefits of Persean conduct in its own right (e.g., fairness, dignity, trust, commitment, and adaptability in the workplace) we have no empirical or clinical evidence that these benefits not only occur but persist in the respective work units or organizations where it is practiced. We have also only proposed that consistency of belief and action leads to greater organizational benefits than mere democratic action alone. We also don't know whether the Persean ethic can be considered a favorable practice in the various international cultures where it might be taught and applied. Indeed, in the British culture, it appears that low espousal of beliefs may be considerably more common than in the American culture. Besides culture, there are also family and community considerations which, though proposed to affect Persean conduct, have not yet been studied.

The methods used in this paper also suggest further avenues of research. Perceptions of both personal and organizational phenomena were found to vary among respondents from different hierarchical levels. Further, subculture perceptions were not found to be always consonant with the dominant culture. Finally, person-organization interaction effects were sufficiently distinct to argue for their separate conceptual and empirical treatment in future studies.

The explicit findings from this study might now be considered for hypothetical examination. The powerful effects of the personality dimensions, especially defensive reactions, need verification. If they persist as critical predictors, more needs to be done to identify their users in the workplace. We also need to know how to help those managers who resort to such behavior, both in recognizing it and then in limiting its impact. We also need to know how to reinforce beneficial personality dispositions, such as organizational savvyness. There is also the speculation to be pursued that managers who are characterized as sensitive and circumspect might be more publicly reflective and might even deploy Persean behavior to change their work unit or organization to be more open, although these and other personality findings might reflect cultural predispositions or gender-age dynamics.

The situational findings are less striking if only because we have known the value of such intrinsic properties of job and work as task significance, challenge, and responsibility for a long time. The study also continues to clarify the requirements for both autonomy and participation if consistency of beliefs and action is to be achieved. We still need to

know, however, when to employ laissez-faire methods of organizing and how to create organizational units which value individual conscience, learning, and innovation. We also need to understand whether the plague of bureaucraty and its accompanying condition of organizational conformity are virtual mainstays of organizational life and an indelible construction of our own selves. If not, can we not learn how to rid ourselves of these curses?

Finally, especially in the U.S., there is so much more to know about action learning as a promising approach to advanced management education. If its students, who are already characteristically older and more experienced than the typical American MBA, in fact learn more about inquiry than about technique, then we have something to seriously think about and debate. But, of course, we must then act....consistently.

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Figure 1

A FULL MODEL OF PUBLIC REFLECTIVENESS




Table 1

## The Study's Empirical Measures

<u>Category</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Respondent</u>
Individual Demographic	age	one individual	all respondents
	gender	one individual	core
	education	one individual	core
	time known core	one individual	colleagues
	company	one individual	all respondents
	seniority	one individual	core
	position	one individual	all respondents
	time in position	one individual	all respondents
	no. of subordinates	one individual	core
	size of the organization	one individual	all respondents
size of the work unit	one individual	all respondents	
Individual Personality	self-esteem	8-item composite ( $\alpha=.73$ )	core
	confidence	2-item composite ( $\alpha=.78$ )	colleagues
	locus of control	2-item composite ( $\alpha=.77$ )	core
	individual savvyness	4-item composite ( $\alpha=.78$ )	core
	interpersonal trust	4-item composite ( $\alpha=.72$ )	core
	core sensitivity to criticism	one individual	all respondents
	vulnerability	one individual	all respondents
	moral development	one individual	all respondents
	security with friends	one individual	core
	dogmatism	3-item composite ( $\alpha=.69$ )	core
	defensiveness	one individual	all respondents
	neurotic defense	3-item composite ( $\alpha=.69$ )	colleagues
	self-effacement	one individual	colleagues
	resignation	one individual	colleagues
	intentionality	one individual	colleagues
organizational savvyness	one individual	all respondents	
Personality- Situation Interaction	change interaction	3-item composite ( $\alpha=.74$ )	core
	fit interaction	two individual	core



Situation Job	need for task identify	2-item composite ( $\alpha=.70$ )	core
	task identity need strength	difference score	core
	need for feedback	2-item composite ( $\alpha=.70$ )	core
	feedback need strength	difference score	core
	variety	2-item composite ( $\alpha=.70$ )	core
	variety need strength	difference score	core
	need for autonomy	one individual	core
	autonomy need strength	difference score	core
	need for friendship	one individual	core
	friendship need strength	difference score	core
	job challenge	one individual	core
	need for challenge	one individual	core
task significance	one individual	core	
need for task significance	one individual	core	
Situation Work Unit	unit culture	3-item composite ( $\alpha=.77$ )	core
	individual independence	one individual	core
	individual responsibility	one individual	colleagues
	subordinate attachment	2-item composite ( $\alpha=.87$ )	core
	boss attachment	3-item composite ( $\alpha=.70$ )	core
	lack of direction	one individual	colleagues
Situation Organizational Culture	hierarchy	two individual	core
	rules	2-item composite ( $\alpha=.71$ )	core
	conformity	9-item composite ( $\alpha=.84$ )	core
	incremental change	3-item composite ( $\alpha=.70$ )	core
	clarity	3-item composite ( $\alpha=.68$ )	colleagues
	laissez-faire structure	one individual	colleagues
	planning	one individual	colleagues
	decision making speed	one individual	colleagues
	risk	12-item composite ( $\alpha=.81$ )	colleagues
	commitment	2-item composite ( $\alpha=.70$ )	colleagues
	organizational identification	two individual	colleagues
	loyalty	2-item composite ( $\alpha=.71$ )	core
	dependability	one individual	core
	fidelity	one individual	core
	culture of conscience	one individual	core
	individual independence	two individual	core
individual problem solving	one individual	colleagues	
Learning	time in program	one individual	core
	no. of modules taken	one individual	core
	questioning behaviors from prog.	7-item composite ( $\alpha=.77$ )	all respondents
	managerial behaviors from prog.	5-item composite ( $\alpha=.70$ )	all respondents
Persean Conduct	general Persean conduct	6-item composite ( $\alpha=.79$ )	all
	personal growth	difference score	all
	pride	difference score	all
	public testing	difference score	all

Table 2

## Frequency Tabulation for the General Persean Ethic Score

Value*	Frequency	Percent	Cum Percent
.00	5	2.3	2.5
.17	1	.5	3.0
.20	5	2.3	5.6
.25	4	1.9	7.6
.33	4	1.9	9.6
.40	6	2.8	12.6
.50	8	3.8	16.7
.60	10	4.7	21.7
.67	16	7.5	29.8
.75	7	3.3	33.3
.80	11	5.2	38.9
.83	12	5.6	44.9
1.00	35	16.4	62.6
1.17	7	3.3	66.2
1.20	12	5.6	72.2
1.25	4	1.9	74.2
1.33	8	3.8	78.3
1.40	2	.9	79.3
1.50	10	4.7	84.3
1.60	3	1.4	85.9
1.67	5	2.3	88.4
1.80	1	.5	88.9
1.83	2	.9	89.9
2.00	6	2.8	92.9
2.17	2	.9	93.9
2.20	1	.5	94.4
2.33	2	.9	95.5
2.50	2	.9	96.5
2.83	2	.9	97.5
3.00	1	.5	98.0
3.17	1	.5	98.5
3.33	1	.5	99.0
3.50	2	.9	100.0
missing	15	7.0	
Total	213	100.0	

Valid cases	198	Missing cases	15
Mean	1.06	Standard Dev.	.65

\* Corresponds to a mean derived from the positive difference scores of the six components of the General Persean Ethic Score

Table 3

Frequency Tabulations for the Personal Growth, Pride, and Public Testing Persean Ethic Scores

Personal Growth Persean Conduct	Value*	Frequency	Percent	Cum Percent
	0	61	28.6	36.3
	1	74	34.7	80.4
	2	28	13.1	97.0
	3	4	1.9	99.4
	4	1	.5	100.0
	missing	45	21.1	
		-----	-----	
	Total	213	100.0	
	Valid cases	168	Missing cases	45
	Mean	.87	Standard Dev.	.82
Pride Persean Conduct	Value*	Frequency	Percent	Cum Percent
	0	65	30.5	34.9
	1	77	36.2	76.3
	2	31	14.6	93.0
	3	9	4.2	97.8
	4	3	1.4	99.5
	6	1	.5	100.0
	missing	27	12.7	
		-----	-----	
	Total	213	100.0	
	Valid cases	186	Missing cases	27
	Mean	.99	Standard Dev.	1.00
Public Testing Persean Conduct	Value*	Frequency	Percent	Cum Percent
	0	38	17.8	28.4
	1	65	30.5	76.9
	2	23	10.8	94.0
	3	4	1.9	97.0
	4	4	1.9	100.0
	missing	79	37.1	
		-----	-----	
	Total	213	100.0	
	Valid cases	134	Missing cases	79
	Mean	1.04	Standard Dev.	.92

\* Corresponds to a positive difference score between core espoused beliefs and colleague-reported behavior

Table 4

## A Cross-Respondent Correlation Matrix of Selected Variables

Colleague Variables / Core Variables	Conformity	Incremental Change	Unit Culture	Change Interaction	Loyalty	Dogmatism
	Neurotic Defense	.18*	.15	-.21*	-	-
Defensive- ness	-	-	-.16	-.19*	-	.17
Sensitivity to Criticism	-	.12	-.12	-	-.24*	-
Commitment	-	-	-	-.13	-	.12
Clarity	-	-	-.15	-.14	-	-
Risk	.24*	-.13	-.13	-.15	-	-

N.B. Only significant correlations are reported.  
All are at the .05 level, except \*s are at the .01 level.



Table 6

Multiple Regression Results for the General Persean Ethic Score

Predictor	B	SEB	Beta	F	Sig F
Neurotic defense	-.073	.017	-.27	17.37	.000
Resignation	-.187	.055	-.22	11.79	.001
Organizational savvy	.100	.041	.16	6.01	.015
Change interaction	-.085	.016	-.38	25.32	.000
Task significance	.240	.051	.36	22.48	.000
Individual independence	-.156	.043	-.25	13.33	.000
Managerial behaviors learned	.031	.013	.15	5.19	.024
Dogmatism	-.036	.017	-.16	4.38	.038
(Constant)	.854	.654		1.70	.194

Multiple R	.70			DF
R Square	.49		Regression	8
Adjusted R Square	.46		Residual	136
Standard Error	.51		F = 16.11	Sig at .000

Table 7

Multiple Regression Results for the Personal Growth Persean Ethic Score

Predictor	B	SE B	Beta	F	Sig F
Organizational savvyness	.169	.064	.21	6.98	.009
Organizational size	-.068	.034	-.17	4.00	.048
Intentionality	.232	.073	.25	10.13	.002
Unit culture	.095	.027	.28	11.93	.001
Boss attachment	-.061	.022	-.23	7.42	.007
Education	.271	.093	.25	8.51	.004
Individual problem solving	.157	.065	.19	5.69	.019
(Constant)	3.801	.660		33.13	.000

Multiple R	.55				DF
R Square	.31		Regression		7
Adjusted R Square	.27		Residual		117
Standard Error	.76		F = 7.39		Sig at .000

**Table 8**

**Multiple Regression Results for the Pride Persean Ethic Score**

Predictor	B	SE B	Beta	F	Sig F
Laissez-faire structure	.169	.056	.23	9.10	.003
Sensitivity to criticism	.226	.061	.29	13.78	.000
Self-esteem	.070	.016	.34	17.65	.000
Need for task identity	.223	.067	.27	10.98	.001
Organizational savvyness	.205	.078	.20	6.78	.010
(Constant)	7.015	.929		56.93	.000

Multiple R	.53			DF
R Square	.28		Regression	5
Adjusted R Square	.25		Residual	126
Standard Error	.91		F = 9.97	Sig at .000



Table 9

Multiple Regression Results for the Public Testing Persean Ethic Score

Predictor	B	SE B	Beta	F	Sig F
Resignation	-.356	.120	-.27	8.80	.004
Individual independence	-.297	.076	-.38	15.40	.000
Interpersonal trust	-.280	.077	-.39	13.24	.000
Need for challenge	.540	.180	.30	8.96	.004
Conformity	-.036	.014	-.27	6.85	.010
(Constant)	1.089	1.116		.95	.332

Multiple R	.57			DF
R Square	.32		Regression	5
Adjusted R Square	.28		Residual	92
Standard Error	.83		F = 9.38	Sig at .000