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The impact of alternative childcare policies on mothers' employment in selected EU countries

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Abstract

This paper contributes to the debate on the revision of the Barcelona targets on childcare, as promoted by the European Commission in 2022, that aims to provide childcare for children below the age of 3. Using EUROLAB, a structural model of labour supply that can also account for labour demand constraints, we estimate female labour market participation reactions to alternative scenarios of formal childcare policies in European countries with very low child care provision for children below 3. We quantify the potential increases in the labour supply of mothers (at the extensive and intensive margins) in the case of fulfilling potential new targets of childcare provision (40%, 50%, 60% and 65%). Achieving these targets would lead to significantly increased labour supply of mothers especially in countries like Hungary and Poland where the current share of formal childcare and/or female labour participation is low. In countries like Portugal, that are far beyond the existing childcare target, changes in labour supply incentives are instead expected to be moderate. We further show that when accounting for labour demand, the expected final employment effects will be less pronounced, but still positive.

JEL-Code: J20, J22, J23, J13

Keywords: Labour market equilibrium, labour supply, labour demand, structural models, discrete choice, childcare

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1. Introduction

In March 2002, the European Council decided in Barcelona to set targets for providing childcare in the EU, with a view to increase female labour market participation. Member States agreed to provide childcare by 2010 to at least 33% of children under 3 years of age and to at least 90% of children between 3 years old and the mandatory school age. In 2016, the target of 33% of children under 3 years of age, although met for the EU as a whole, was reached by only 12 Member States (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden). As for the second target, again, only 12 Member States had met it (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden). A European Parliament resolution on “care services in the EU for improved gender equality” adopted in November 2018, invited the European Commission “to revise upwards, in consultation with the relevant actors including the Member States, the Barcelona targets on early childhood education.” In her 2021 State of the Union speech, President Von der Leyen announced a European care strategy in order to support men and women in receiving the best care in different life stages and finding the best work-life balance for them. The initiative consists of a Commission Communication on a European care strategy accompanied by two proposals for Council Recommendations, one on the revision of the Barcelona targets on early childhood education and care (ECEC), and the other on long-term care (LTC).

The aim of this paper is to support the identification of the most appropriate design for the new Barcelona targets by simulating a set of hypothetical scenarios of formal childcare policies¹ and their impact on female employment. We rely on the extensive literature examining the effects of childcare reforms on the participation of mothers in the labour market in Europe. The main factors that this literature identifies to explain households’ preference for childcare are the availability

¹The definition of formal childcare used in this paper follows the definition of formal childcare in the EU survey on Income and living conditions (EU-SILC), which are the reference data for the computation of the indicators used for the Barcelona targets, i.e. childcare services that cover preschool or equivalent education, as well as professional childminders and centre-based childcare services.

([Carta and Rizzica, 2018](#)) and quality of childcare services ([Herbst, 2018](#)) and the related costs for the families ([Huebener et al., 2020](#)). Similarly, a strong association between childcare coverage and access and the participation of mothers in the labour market is shown for Norway ([Andresen and Havnes, 2019](#); [Kunze and Liu, 2019](#); [Stahl and Schober, 2018](#)), Belgium ([Dujardin et al., 2018](#)) and Germany ([Bick, 2016](#); [Müller and Wrohlich, 2016](#)). Other papers ([de Muizon, 2020](#); [Müller and Wrohlich, 2020](#)) examine the impact on employment of childcare targeted subsidies.

For this analysis, we use the EUROLAB model ([Narazani et al., 2021](#)) to simulate female labour supply reactions to different formal childcare policies, as well as the final employment effect of such reforms, after taking account of the labour demand side. EUROLAB is a labour supply-demand discrete choice model for the EU. It is based on EUROMOD, the non-behavioural tax-benefit microsimulation model of the EU countries [Sutherland and Figari \(2013\)](#). EUROLAB relies on a discrete choice model based on the random utility maximisation approach and adds two novelties to the traditional discrete choice models in a cross country perspective ([Bargain et al., 2014](#)). First, the model extends [Dagsvik and Strøm \(2006\)](#) and it is based on a multi-dimensional choice set that covers not only the alternatives of number of working hours but also other job peculiarities such as employment/self-employment statuses and occupational sectors. Second, it takes into account the labour demand side and the labour market adjustment towards the new equilibrium following the policy reforms under consideration, following the approach proposed by [Colombino \(2013\)](#). We simulate the impact on household disposable income and public finances of the different scenarios using EUROMOD following previous analysis in both from a country-specific [Figari and Narazani \(2020\)](#) and cross-country perspective [Hufkens et al. \(2020\)](#). Furthermore, the model has been also used for analyses of Member States' economic and social situation in the European Semester framework that deal with childcare policies and their role to enhance female labour market participation.

The analysis covers eight EU countries representing different childcare systems with different ini-

tial female participation rates: Estonia, Hungary, Austria, Finland, Italy, Ireland, Poland and Portugal. The simulated formal childcare policies consist in providing formal childcare to 40%, 50%, 60% and 65% of children under 3 (i.e. new Barcelona targets) keeping unchanged the existing structure of childcare fees for the countries involved in the analysis. Simulation results show that achieving these targets would lead to significantly increased labour supply of mothers especially in countries where the current share of formal childcare and/or female labour participation is low (like Hungary and Poland). In countries like Portugal, that are far beyond the existing childcare target, changes in labour supply incentives are instead expected to be moderate. Overall, employment effects will be less pronounced when a new labour market equilibrium is achieved (ie taking into account the demand side).

Our contribution to the literature is manifold. Our first contribution is to provide a concrete empirical analysis to a Commission policy that would impact the life of many mothers across the EU. Second, we contribute to the existing literature by providing new insights on maternal labour supply from a cross-country perspective in the EU. With few exceptions ([Hufkens et al. \(2020\)](#)) most studies on maternal employment and childcare provisions are performed at country level. Third, we contribute to the labour supply literature with childcare option modelling by incorporating for the first time, to our knowledge, the reactions of labour demand side after second round effects.

The paper is organised as follows. Section [2](#) provides a literature review while Section 3 gives an overview of the methodological approach and the extension of EUROLAB developed to carry out this analysis. Section [4](#) describes the extension of EUROMOD and the EU-SILC data. In Section [5](#), results for the policy options analysed are discussed. The last section concludes.

2. Literature review

There is an extensive literature examining the effects of childcare reforms on the participation of mothers in the labour market. The main factors that this literature identifies to explain households'

preference for childcare are the availability and quality of childcare services and the related costs for the families. The opening of the public kindergartens for children under five in the US during the 1960s and 1970s led to a significant increase on labour supply of single mothers but not for other mothers (Cascio, 2009). Similarly, increases in maternal labour supply were triggered when full-time kindergartens were extended to all five-year old kids in the Canadian province of Quebec in the 1990s (Baker et al., 2008). When considering childcare reforms implemented in Europe, mixed findings are provided by a large literature. For example, the assessment of reforms to increase the availability of formal childcare services (Carta and Rizzica, 2018) has shown a positive impact on the participation of mothers in the labour market in Italy. Similarly, a strong association between childcare coverage and access and the participation of mothers in the labour market is shown for Norway (Andresen and Havnes, 2019; Kunze and Liu, 2019; Stahl and Schober, 2018), Belgium (Dujardin et al., 2018) and Germany (Bick, 2016; Müller and Wrohlich, 2016).

An interesting research carried out for Spain relying on a natural experiment framework finds a positive effects of offering full-time public childcare for 3-year-olds on maternal labour supply, in particular for mothers not younger than 30 years and those with two children (Nollenberger and Rodríguez-Planas, 2015). The authors emphasize that as the reform was implemented in a period of low labour demand in Spain, the estimated impact may be lower than expected when the the supply of jobs is high. Similarly, the introduction of a generous reform on childcare subsidies in the Netherlands over the period 2004–2009 (Bettendorf et al., 2015) were estimated to have a modest impact on employment. On the other hand, the reform was confounded with an increase in the earned income tax credit for parents with young children that presumably led to an increase on the labour supply of the group.

Other papers (de Muizon, 2020; Müller and Wrohlich, 2020) examine the impact of targeted subsidies for childcare. Müller and Wrohlich (2020) show that there is a significant causal effect of the availability of childcare on mothers' employment, in particular on part-time employment. The

effect is mainly driven by mothers with medium education. Mothers with high and low education did not react to the expansion of childcare. [de Muizon \(2020\)](#) analyse a reform in France, where a short stay-home subsidy for first-time mothers wishing to take-up parental leave was introduced, complemented with an increase in childcare subsidies for parents using public child care. While in the short-run the reform had no big effects. In the long-run though, first-time mothers and often low-educated women used the leave subsidies to reduce their labour market participation. However, this freed up formal childcare places and allowed especially middle-class mothers to use this new available childcare subsidies and therefore increase their labour market participation.

The effects of childcare reforms on labour supply of fathers are examined in a few studies which typically show no significant impact on fathers' employment rate ([Andresen and Havnes, 2019](#); [Ravazzini, 2018](#); [Vikman, 2013](#)). ([Andresen and Havnes, 2019](#)) show for a staggered expansion of child care facilities across municipalities in Norway following a large child care reform from 2002. They show that the expansion of early child care increases employment of mothers, which has only a small and insignificant impact on tax revenues on the additional income. The labor supply of fathers was largely unaffected. Similarly, ([Ravazzini, 2018](#)) used a staggered expansion of childcare in cantons of Switzerland. They show that in cantons with expanded childcare, mothers labour supply increases substantially. However, the reform stimulated especially part-time employment. Additionally, they show that the expansion of childcare particularly affected women with two children and upper-secondary education.

Most of these studies investigating the impact of childcare education on maternal labour supply are based on ex-post evaluation of childcare reforms whose impact can be hardly disentangled from other changes affecting the fiscal system like child or family benefits or tax credits. The drawback of this approach is that it is very sensitive to the methodology used. In fact, similarly to [Nollenberger and Rodríguez-Planas \(2015\)](#) for Spain, the results of [Akgündüz et al. \(2021\)](#) related to the effects of increasing preschool availability in Poland turn from statistically insignificant and

negative when using the DD (difference-in-difference) model to significant and positive when using the DDD (difference-in-difference-in-difference) model.

Therefore, ex-ante analysis are more appropriate and add additional value when assessing the pure effect of childcare reforms on maternal labour supply. Such examples of ex-ante analyses are manifold. The European Commission in its analyses of Member States' economic and social situation in the European Semester framework, which also monitors progress towards the Barcelona targets, has dealt with childcare policies and their role to enhance female labour market participation. For example, the 2018 European Semester Country Report for Italy highlights that "The proportion of women participating in the labour market remains in fact one of the lowest in the EU. The main reasons include the difficulty of reconciling work with family care due to the limited availability of affordable childcare". Based on the EUROMOD model, a budget neutral replacement of the fragmented childcare related welfare system is implemented with a single permanent in-work benefit only for low-income working mothers. Results show that this reform would result in a substantial increase in mothers' labour supply and an increase in aggregate labour supply by around 2.3%, corresponding to an impact of 0.4% of GDP over five years compared to the baseline². In 2022, childcare issues were mentioned in the recitals of five countries (CZ, HU, PL, RO and SK) and Austria received a Country Specific Recommendation to "boost labour market participation of women, including by enhancing quality childcare services".

EUROMOD has also been used to simulate different scenarios of availability and affordability of childcare services in the EU, both from a country-specific and cross-country perspective. For example, [Hufkens et al. \(2020\)](#) simulate different scenarios of increasing subsidized childcare slots and mothers' employment for a set of EU countries using EUROMOD. From a national perspective, [Figari and Narazani \(2020\)](#) use the model to analyse the effects of relaxing existing constraints in terms of childcare availability and costs in Italy. The results show that, overall, the

²See the Box 4.1.1 on "Effects on labour supply from rationalising childcare benefit", [Commission Staff Working Document, Country Report Italy 2018](#).

increase in childcare coverage is estimated to be more effective in improving incentives to work than reducing existing childcare costs, at the same budgetary cost.

3. Empirical modelling approach

Similarly to [Figari and Narazani \(2020\)](#), [Haan and Wrohlich \(2011\)](#) and [Kornstad and Thoresen \(2007\)](#), we develop a discrete choice model of labour supply and childcare that relies on [Aaberge et al. \(1995\)](#) and [Van Soest \(1995\)](#) to estimate the labour supply responses of mothers to changes in the childcare availability. Discrete choice models belong to the family of random utility maximisation models ([McFadden, 1974](#)), which allow the utility function to be random. A convenient specification of the random component (the extreme value distribution) is used to determine the optimal alternative in terms of utility level associated with each choice [Aaberge and Colombino \(2018\)](#).

Three novelties characterise our approach: i) the choice set includes both labour supply and childcare alternatives; ii) childcare fees are considered to derive household disposable income at each choice; iii) labour demand constraints are modelled to derive a new labour market equilibrium.

First, in the definition of the choice set and to account for the possible interaction between labour supply and childcare choices, we extend [Figari and Narazani \(2020\)](#) who started from the framework initiated by [Aaberge et al. \(1999\)](#) focused only on the labour supply decisions of couples, to render endogenous the choice of childcare usage. For the purpose of this specific analysis on formal childcare, we exploit the multi-dimensionality feature of EUROLAB ([Narazani et al., 2021](#)) and model the type of childcare as an additional dimension of the choice set that mothers would face when deciding to work. In this way we treat childcare usage as an endogenous variable, so that each mother can choose from an individual-specific opportunity set that combines childcare alternatives and labour supply choices. While the choice set of labour supply includes part-time and full time working arrangements characterised by a given quantity of hours, a wage rate and

other non-pecuniary attributes, the choice set of childcare consists of formal, informal and mother childcare, without distinguishing between part-time and full-time arrangements. This is due to the low relative frequency when combining labour supply choices with time-dependent childcare choices (especially in countries where the sample of mothers is small).

Second, in order to construct the counterfactual interacted choices and derive the corresponding budget sets, we extend EUROMOD ([Sutherland and Figari, 2013](#)) with information on fees for subsidised and unsubsidised childcare services. After building the counterfactual choice set, we estimate the parameters capturing women’s preferences on childcare and labour supply in this setting. Drawing on these parameters, increases in the formal childcare slots (assumed to be fully taken) are simulated in order to achieve different targets of childcare provision (i.e. Barcelona targets on childcare) keeping unchanged existing childcare fees. Changes in labour supply triggered by the achievement of the new targets of formal childcare coverage are then estimated. These changes in labour supply as a reaction to the childcare policy are often referred to in the literature as “second-order effects”. These refer to pure changes in the desired participation in the labour market and working hours, disregarding the demand side of the labour market.

Third, we account for labour demand constraints adopting a partial labour market equilibrium in line with [Colombino \(2013\)](#). Depending on the labour demand elasticity, the final interaction of supply and demand determine the final employment effect when the market reaches its new equilibrium.

3.1. Discrete choice of labour supply and childcare

We assume that mothers face a finite set of feasible discrete alternatives Ω that is the Cartesian product of a finite set of job alternatives (H), characterised by a given number of elements h (working hours), and a finite set of feasible childcare arrangements (S) characterised by a given number of elements s (childcare types). The choice set of working hours (H) includes non-market “jobs” (with H and earnings w_h equal to zero) and market jobs (with positive H and positive earn-

ings w_h). The set of childcare arrangements (S) includes formal childcare alternatives (subsidised and unsubsidised) with respective childcare fees, informal and mother care alternatives without fee. The Cartesian product $\Omega = (H, S) = H \times S$ contains $h \times s$ elements.

More specifically, the choice set based on two dimensions – four hours of work and four childcare alternatives – would have a size of 4×4 . However, we assume a "fixed link" between labour supply and childcare (Ilmakunnas, 1997) in the sense that formal or informal childcare is needed in the case a mother works, excluding in this way three combinations of alternatives from the choice set Ω (short part-time job/maternal care, long part-time job/maternal care and full-time job/maternal care). Ideally, the assumption of "fixed link" should also be made between full-time employment and full-time childcare, because full-time care is needed whenever a mother works full-time. In order to do so, it would be necessary to distinguish between part-time and full-time childcare arrangements, but we do not take this into account in our analysis because of the relative low frequency when it comes to combine labour supply choices with childcare choices based on time (especially in countries where the sample of mothers is small).

If we further define Ω_n^* as the set of all elements of the Cartesian product Ω that are not feasible for all individuals, then the final choice set for mothers is equal to $\Omega_f = \Omega - \Omega_n^*$ which includes 13 possible alternatives.

Given a policy regime τ (a vector of tax-benefit rule parameters) - that transforms an endowment with earned (w_h) and unearned income (I) into a net income C - and given a vector of childcare fees for formal childcare arrangements (X), a rational mother characterised by a vector of attributes Z (age, number of children, education, migration status, ...) selects the alternative that yields greatest utility $U(H, C, X|Z)$. In addition, we assume that the utility attained by a mother i when choosing job type j and childcare option k can be expressed as the sum of a systematic component $V(\cdot)$ and a random component ϵ_i

$$U_{i,j,k} = V(C_{i,j,k}, T - h_j, s, \gamma_i) + \epsilon_{i,j,k} \quad (1)$$

where

$C = \tau(w_{ij}h_j, X_k, I) - X_{ik}$ = net available net income according to the tax function τ and childcare fees X_{ik}

$T - h_j$ = hours of work required by the job j

s = childcare arrangements

γ_i is a vector of parameters that characterise the preferences of mother i for job type j and childcare k .

$$\epsilon_{ijk}$$

= random component. Assuming an extreme value distribution for the random component $\epsilon_{i,j,k}$ we can obtain the probability that mother i is willing to accept a job and take up a childcare arrangement (h, s) , and estimate the utility parameters γ_i through a straightforward analytical solution following [McFadden \(1974\)](#):

$$P_{i,j,k} = \frac{e^{V(C_{i,j,k}, T - h_j, s, \gamma_i)}}{\sum_{j,k \in \Omega} e^{V(C_{i,j,k}, T - h_j, s, \gamma_i)}} \quad (2)$$

Probabilistic choice (Equation 2) ignores the density or demand of certain types of jobs or availability of childcare types and this can lead to an over-prediction of some alternatives. To correct for this bias in prediction, we follow [Van Soest \(1995\)](#) and [Aaberge et al. \(1995, 1999\)](#) and include alternative specific dummies for different types of jobs (part-time and full-time) and childcare types (subsidised and unsubsidised). The idea behind this is that women can face different availability of

job types because some labour markets are able to provide more jobs with market hours in a certain interval. At the same time they can face different availability of a specific childcare arrangement depending on country-specific childcare policies. The density or relative frequency of alternatives of job type j and childcare option k for mother i can be denoted by the function g_{ijk} and referred to as the opportunity density function. Adopting a convenient specification of the function g_{ijk} , we obtain the probability that mother i is willing to accept a choice (j, k) :

$$P_{i,j,k} = \frac{g_{i,j,k} e^{V(C_{i,j,k}, T-h_{j,s}, \gamma_i)}}{\sum_{j,k \in \Omega} g_{i,j,k} e^{V(C_{i,j,k}, T-h_{j,s}, \gamma_i)}} \quad (3)$$

$$P_{i,j,k} = \frac{g_{i,j,k} e^{V(C_{i,j,k}, T-h_{j,s}, \gamma_i + D_i(j,k)\delta_i)}}{\sum_{j,k \in \Omega} g_{i,j,k} e^{V(C_{i,j,k}, T-h_{j,s}, \gamma_i + D_i(j,k)\delta_i)}} \quad (4)$$

The vector $D_i(j, k)$ with $1[\cdot]$ denoting the indicator function, contains two sets of variables that capture: i) the hour ranges $[5 \leq h < 25]$ and $[30 \leq h < 42]$ corresponding to part-time and full-time jobs, respectively and ii) subsidised and unsubsidised childcare choices.

The systematic part of the utility function $V_{i,j,k}$ is specified as a quadratic functional form on net household income and leisure where leisure is defined as total weekly hours minus working hours. The main arguments of the utility function are household disposable income (C) and individual leisure of the mother ($T - h_F$):

$$V_{i,j,k} = \alpha_C C + \alpha_{CC} C^2 + \alpha_F (T - h_F) + \alpha_{FF} * (T - h_F)^2 + \alpha_{CF} (T - h_F) C \quad (5)$$

where

$$\alpha_C = \alpha_{C0} + \alpha_{C1} X_C$$

$$\alpha_F = \alpha_{F0} + \alpha_{F1}Z$$

X_C = household size

Z = mother's characteristics (children, age, age squared, education level, Migrant, Mortgage holding, in couple).

This functional form assumes that the preference parameters assigned to linear terms of leisure are allowed to differ by a range of mother's characteristics such as age, education level, marital status and number of children. Additionally, we interact leisure with two dummy variables indicating respectively a) whether the mother is a migrant in order to account for labour market integration constraints, and b) holds a mortgage liability to control for other economic constraints like financial ones. Income is interacted with leisure and household size.

We choose to generate counterfactual working hours based on the observed distribution of hours because in this way the distribution of the potential alternatives respects the proportion of women observed to work a specific number of hours within each interval sampled from the observed distribution. As such, the working hours per week of mothers are divided into four intervals (0, 5–17, 17–29, 29–41) and their choice set of work (H) is made up of four alternatives: the actual choice (i.e. observed number of worked hours) plus other three potential alternatives.

The choice set of childcare options is built based on the information on the number of hours per week spent at formal childcare (i.e. centre-based services or day-care centre), with informal arrangements (grand-parents, others household members, friends, etc. . .) or with the mother (maternal care), as reported in the EU-SILC data. Although informal childcare is part of the choice set that mothers are supposed to face, the preference for this choice is not taken into account in our modelling approach observed sets of variables (e.g. proximity of grandparents or their employment status) due to the lack of specific information in EU-SILC data. Taking account of mothers' preferences for informal childcare can be important in southern European countries, such as Italy,

where many parents are still reluctant to use formal childcare services, as they can account for more reliance services that grandparents are expected to provide ([Del Boca et al., 2015](#)).

Furthermore, the formal childcare type is split into two choices – subsidised and unsubsidised one. We assign each child to the childcare arrangement prevailing in terms of number of hours per week, as reported in the EU-SILC data. Whenever the hours are equal across different childcare types, the formal childcare (subsidised or unsubsidised) is defined as the prevailing childcare arrangement. As such, the choice set of childcare (S) of each woman is made of four alternatives: the actual choice (i.e. observed childcare arrangement) plus the other three potential alternatives.

We start selecting mothers in working age (i.e. 18-60 years old), not receiving pension or disability benefits and with at least one child under 3 years at the time of interview. The final sample consists of mothers living or not with a partner and they can be employed, self-employed, unemployed or inactive.

3.2. Labour demand

Policies that affect the provision of childcare services may trigger behavioural changes in labour supply of affected individuals. These effects, often called as “second-round” effects, represent pure changes in the desired number of working hours or activity/inactivity status, disregarding the demand side of the labour market. However, depending on how elastic the demand side is, the attainment of a new labour market equilibrium may lead to a different employment level and wage rate. In our analysis, we account for the demand side of labour market through a representation of a partial labour market equilibrium in line with [Colombino \(2013\)](#) approach. In discrete choice labour supply modelling, the common approach is using dummy variables (accounting for part-time and full-time jobs) when calculating the choice probabilities with the intention to improve the predictability of the choice, in particular for the choice of part-time work. This dummy, often interpreted as reflecting a number of factors (such as fixed and search costs, commuting costs etc as surveyed and modelled by [Blundell et al. \(2007\)](#)), can be also interpreted as reflecting availability

or density of job types that are not represented by the systematic part of the utility function. As such, they can be used to link dummies' coefficients to the number of jobs available on the market (i.e. the demand side) and to develop a structural model that takes into account labour market equilibrium conditions (Colombino, 2013).

The method proposed by Colombino (2013) expresses the dummies coefficients or parameters δ_i of expression (4) as logarithmic functions of the number of jobs available in the market. Narazani and Colombino (2021) show that this method can be used also to model the effects of external sectoral labour demand shocks by considering behavioural reactions at the household level. In this paper we follow this later advancement to model the effects of positive shocks on childcare services accounting for labour market equilibrium. In case of a choice set consisting in working hour's alternatives and childcare types these dummies coefficients can reflect also availability or density of childcare options.

Let us consider a current childcare policy under which the share of formal childcare is ϕ and denote as K the total number of formal childcare slots under this policy. Assuming that households have identical preferences parameters (γ) and δ_s , we can express δ_s as a function of K .

$$\delta_s = \ln(A_k K) = \ln A_k + \ln K \quad (6)$$

where A_k is constant.

The introduction of a new childcare policy, for example an increase in formal childcare availability to ϕ^* , changes the choice probability (following equation 4) of taking up a childcare and working hour alternative. Let e^ν be the proportional change in K triggered by the new childcare policy ϕ^* , and $\delta_s(\nu)$ the changed value of δ_s :

$$\delta_s(\nu) = \ln(A_k K e^\nu) = \delta_s + \nu \quad (7)$$

Let the government set a new target of formal childcare equal K^* , possibly higher than the current usage of formal childcare. Under the assumption that the additional childcare slots will be fully taken by the households, the value of v^* , for which the total of formal childcare slots that the households are provided with, reaches the new target of formal childcare can be given as:

$$\sum_i \sum_s P(C_{is}, T - h_i; \gamma, \delta_s(v^*)) = \phi(v^*) \quad (8)$$

The new value of $\delta_s(v)$ determines new choice probabilities and changes in this way the probability of taking up a job. The new desired labour supply $E(v^*)$ can be calculated as follows:

$$\sum_i \sum_h P(C_i, T - h_i; \gamma, \delta_s(v^*)) = E(v^*) \quad (9)$$

However a job must be available to allow for a new match in the labour market, entailing an equilibrium conditionality between available jobs and desired labour supply. Let us further assume that the data represent a labour market equilibrium status or in very simple terms that the total number of people working have chosen jobs available in the market. The equilibrium condition requires that the number of available jobs J is equal to the desired labour supply at the ongoing wage.

A similar logic as in the case of childcare dummies can be used to show that the desired labour supply is affected by the available jobs through the term working hour's dummies (δ_h) that represent the density of jobs available in the market as $\delta_h = \ln(A_h * J)$, where J denote total number of jobs and A_h is constant.

Let e^μ be the proportional change in the total number of jobs J following the shift in the desired labour supply $E(v^*)$ (equation 9). We can rewrite the changed value of J and the changed value of δ_h as:

$$J(\mu) = J * e^\mu \quad (10)$$

$$\delta_h(\mu) = \delta_h + \mu \quad (11)$$

By assuming $J = J_0 w^{-\eta}$, where η is the elasticity of labour demand, we get the wage rate corresponding to the new labour demand $J(\mu)$:

$$w = J_0^{\frac{1}{\eta}} (J * e^\mu)^{-\frac{1}{\eta}} = w * e^{-\frac{\mu}{\eta}} w = K^{\frac{1}{\eta}} (J * e^\mu)^{-\frac{1}{\eta}} = w * e^{-2\frac{\mu}{\eta}} \quad (12)$$

The new values of $\delta_h(\mu)$ and $w(\mu)$ determine new choice probabilities.

Let $J(u^*)$ be the new labour demand given the childcare policy ϕ^* and the adjustment parameters μ and v . Then the equilibrium value u^* is such that

$$\sum_i \sum_h P(C_i, T - h_i; \gamma, \delta_h(\mu^*)) = J(\mu^*) \quad (13)$$

The left-hand side represents the total desired labour supply in terms of number of jobs that the households are willing to accept. The right-hand side represents the available jobs, or labour demand. The equality determines the equilibrium employment level (number of jobs). Note that the adjustment in the number of jobs through a change in the level of the wage rates is a movement along the labour demand curve.

To find the value of μ and v parameters, we build an algorithm that consists of the following steps:

1. Estimate the utility parameters (Appendix B) and the coefficients of in-work and formal childcare dummies. Compute the baseline labour supply as the total number of working hours predicted under the current system. Use this value to construct the baseline labour

demand, assuming that the labour market is in equilibrium before the childcare reform takes place.

2. Run the optimisation procedure to find the value of the parameter ν that correspond to the targeted formal childcare K^* . The iterated changes in the parameter ν affect the choice probabilities (equation 4) and consequently the aggregated formal childcare (equation 8) and the new desired labour supply (equation 10).
3. Run the optimisation procedure given the new formal childcare $\mu(\nu^*)$ and the new desired labour supply $E(\nu^*)$ to find the value of u that corresponds to a labour market equilibrium status under the childcare targeted policy. The new equilibrium is attained when the total number of jobs matches the total number of individuals willing to work at a given wage. The iterated changes in the parameter μ affect in-work dummies' coefficients (equation 11), wages (equation 12), choice probabilities and aggregated labour demand (equation 13).

The adjustment of the labour market is based on a single elasticity of labour demand (-0.5), taken from [Lichter et al. \(2015\)](#) a comprehensive meta-regression analysis on own-wage elasticities of labour demand in European countries. As they point out, due to insufficient empirical estimates is not possible to disaggregate the demand elasticity by skill levels or regions.

4. Data description

The analysis of this paper covers eight EU countries representing different childcare systems and different initial female participation rates: Estonia, Hungary, Austria, Finland, Italy, Ireland, Poland and Portugal.

For the purpose of this analysis we use EU-SILC, a European survey, representative of each national population, which collects comparable detailed information on socio-demographic characteristics and income from different sources at the individual and household levels. We use the 2016 release mainly because the ad hoc module “Access to services” implemented in this release pro-

vides information related to the affordability of childcare services needed to distinguish subsidised or free formal childcare from unsubsidised care. Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics on our samples, showing that the share of Children under 3 years of age enrolled in formal care services ranges from less than 10% in Poland to more than 40% in Portugal. Nevertheless, these data might have several shortcomings. First, the lack of distinction between private and public provision of childcare does not allow us to simulate direct increases in the availability of public provisions. Second, the sample size of families with children under 3 using formal childcare is small and data might be statistically unreliable (Meroni et al., 2016). Third, in some cases, the number of children in formal childcare care based on SILC data, which consider children under 3 at the time of the interview, does not correspond to formal enrolment of children reported by official statistics based on administrative data such as those provided by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). As noted by Sirén et al. (2020), the difference might be explained by the misunderstanding of questions by the respondents.

Table 1: Formal care shares (over the total number of children under 3 years of age) based on EU-SILC and formal enrolment based on UNECE, 2016

	Own calculation (based on EU-SILC)	UNECE	Total observations	Paid fees	Full fees	Subsidised care
Italy	38%	23.0%	866	n/a	n/a	n/a
Estonia	27%	30.0%	445	n/a	n/a	n/a
Ireland	31%	0.3%	320	55%	45%	11%
Austria	21%	24.0%	374	97%	43%	53%
Hungary	16%		394	33%	33%	62%
Finland	33%	25.0%	723	90%	3%	96%
Portugal	43%	39.8%	454	83%	60%	26%
Poland	8%	5.9%	850	93%	36%	55%

Note: Own elaborations are based on the sample of children under 3 years of age. Few observations for Italy and Estonia. “Paid fees” means that families pay for childcare. “Full fees” means that families pay full fees for childcare. “Subsidized care” means that childcare is subsidized by the Government. The shares of paid fees, full fees and subsidised care are calculated with reference to the formal care.

At each alternative of the choice set, we need to specify the earning available on any particular job (h) which depends on the wage rate of that type of job. This information is available only for the observed chosen job and therefore we have to estimate the wage rate for the other types of jobs. We specify the wage equation as a logarithmic function of observed wage rates that depends linearly on

a set of conventional explanatory variables such as education, work experience, work experience squared and some regional dummies. To estimate the wage rates of employed and self-employed we follow [Dagsvik and Strøm \(2006\)](#) that assume a correlation between the random variables in the wage and selection equation to a common latent ability factor. Under the assumption, they show how the parameters of the wage equation for sector j can be estimated consistently and asymptotically efficient by OLS on the sub-sample of women that work in sector j by means of the regression equation where selection bias is controlled by including $\log P_j$ as an additional explanatory variable in the wage equation. P_j is the probability of being in sector j , $j = 0, 1, 2$ (where $j = 0$ means not working, 1 means working as an employee and 2 working as self-employed) and is calculated running a multinomial logit model where the dependent variable is the type of sector and employment status.

Finally, to construct the budget constraints for each choice we make use of EUROMOD ([Sutherland and Figari, 2013](#)) which simulates cash benefit entitlements, direct tax, social insurance contribution on the basis of the tax-benefit rules in place in each country. Non-simulated benefits (mainly contributory pensions), as well as market incomes, are taken directly from the input datasets. The tax systems simulated refer to 2015, the same reference period as monetary variables included in the underlying data which come from the EU-SILC 2016. Moreover, in order to construct the counterfactual choices of childcare and derive corresponding budget sets, we extend EUROMOD with information on childcare fees for subsidised and unsubsidised childcare services. A detailed description of the imputation method of childcare fees can be found in [Narazani et al. \(2022\)](#). It is important to note that parental leave benefits are not simulated in EUROMOD and therefore they are not taken into account while imputing childcare fees. This limitation of our modelling approach can lead to upward bias in expected labour supply effects especially in Eastern European countries (like Hungary) characterized by high parental leave benefits and duration. The extended version of EUROMOD considers the earnings of the mother and any other source of family income as well as childcare expenditures to derive the household disposable income corre-

sponding to each possible combination of labour supply and childcare alternatives the woman can opt for.

5. Simulation methodology and results

After running EUROMOD and simulating the budget constraints for each counterfactual choice set, we estimate the parameters characterising women's preferences on childcare and labour supply as described in Section 3 for each country of analysis. Country-specific utility estimates reported in Table 2 are satisfactory overall in terms of statistical significance and economic significance. Preference parameters for the marginal utility of leisure seem to be positive and declining for all countries. The other parameters related to the various interactions of leisure and mothers' characteristics (age, education level and country of birth) show different levels of significance from one country to another, except for the age variable which is overall insignificant due to fairly similar age of mothers with children under 3 years of age. Women with a high level of education have a higher preference for work over the rest of the sample but differences are not significant for Estonia, Hungary and Portugal. It is interesting to note that migrant mothers have less preference for leisure time compared to natives, this difference is only significant for Italy. Similarly, partnered mothers seem to have a higher preference for work but this difference is statistically significant only for Finland and Poland.

There is also a greater preference for working among mothers holding a mortgage, which indicates the importance of financial constraints in determining labour supply of women. This difference in preferences in relation to mortgage holding seems important for all countries except for Austria and Estonia. Utility parameters with respect to the availability of the various job opportunities and childcare options point to significant differences across countries in the estimated values. These differences reflect the heterogeneity in childcare infrastructure across countries as well different labour market structures and working-time patterns. For example, all countries show a more pronounced concentration of mothers around the corresponding full-time hours, but the estimate is

Table 2: Conditional Logit results

	Austria	Estonia	Finland	Hungary	Ireland	Italy	Poland	Portugal
Voluntary Part-time	5.703*** (9.11)	5.521*** (6.52)	4.490*** (6.43)	19.07 (0.02)	3.732*** (9.59)	5.326*** (11.10)	2.952*** (6.26)	16.79 (0.04)
Public childcare	-2.124*** (-10.24)	-1.534*** (-10.96)	-2.130*** (-13.72)	-2.327*** (-11.47)	-5.440*** (-12.03)	-1.662*** (-12.57)	-3.005*** (-14.35)	-2.882*** (-12.22)
Private childcare	-2.308*** (-10.39)		-5.295*** (-13.95)	-3.092*** (-12.14)	-3.561*** (-12.81)	-1.526*** (-10.02)	-2.071*** (-7.26)	-1.147*** (-4.78)
Informal childcare	-1.109*** (-7.43)	-1.810*** (-12.17)	-3.133*** (-17.89)	-1.397*** (-10.00)	-2.526*** (-9.75)	-1.505*** (-12.33)	-1.112*** (-9.14)	-1.909*** (-9.17)
In-work dummy	-3.304** (-2.89)	-5.474** (-3.23)	-1.689 (-1.63)	-6.198* (-2.18)	-2.354* (-2.08)	-6.910*** (-5.00)	-5.021** (-3.17)	-1.461 (-1.05)
Part-time dummy	-2.247* (-2.56)	-0.122 (-0.11)	-0.991* (-2.22)	-0.308 (-0.27)	-0.160 (-0.20)	-0.0546 (-0.14)	-0.688 (-0.99)	-1.001 (-1.39)
Full-time dummy	1.281 (1.52)	3.633** (3.17)	1.893*** (4.61)	3.994*** (3.78)	1.502 (1.80)	1.562*** (4.63)	2.139** (2.89)	2.355** (3.05)
Leisure	0.656*** (3.51)	0.666*** (3.31)	0.277* (1.96)	1.057*** (3.54)	0.251 (1.49)	0.460*** (3.40)	0.573** (3.12)	0.242 (1.36)
Leisure square	-0.0065*** (-4.37)	-0.0054** (-3.17)	-0.0026* (-2.25)	-0.0077** (-2.79)	-0.0029* (-2.17)	-0.0048*** (-3.63)	-0.0047** (-2.82)	-0.0022 (-1.46)
Leisure x age	0.0035 (0.97)	-0.0025 (-1.04)	0.0040 (1.39)	-0.0059 (-1.71)	0.0036 (1.26)	0.0012 (0.86)	-0.0019 (-1.32)	-0.00056 (-0.32)
Leisure x age square	-0.00004 (-1.09)	0.00003 (0.97)	-0.00007 (-1.64)	0.00006 (1.57)	-0.00004 (-1.35)	-0.00002 (-1.12)	0.00001 (0.84)	0.000006 (0.35)
High educ x Leisure	-0.0345* (-2.54)	-0.000582 (-0.07)	-0.0165** (-2.72)	0.00504 (0.42)	-0.0466*** (-4.76)	-0.0216*** (-3.82)	-0.0315*** (-5.43)	-0.0121 (-1.35)
Couple x Leisure	-0.00714 (-0.26)	0.00371 (0.17)	-0.0642* (-2.39)	-0.0252 (-1.11)	-0.0151 (-1.04)	-0.00753 (-0.76)	-0.0271* (-2.55)	-0.00797 (-0.74)
Leisure x #children	0.00142 (0.13)	0.000155 (0.03)	-0.00651 (-1.46)	-0.00635 (-1.10)	0.0100 (1.43)	-0.00428 (-0.86)	0.00220 (0.70)	0.0137** (2.94)
Leisure x Migrant	0.0155 (0.84)	-0.0111 (-0.72)	0.00698 (0.46)	0.763 (0.01)	0.0199 (1.67)	0.0306** (3.20)	1.316 (0.01)	0.0106 (0.72)
Leisure x Mortgage	-0.00096 (-1.16)	0.00029 (0.71)	-0.0012*** (-4.48)	-0.00064 (-1.52)	-0.0020*** (-4.77)	-0.00095*** (-3.44)	-0.00077* (-2.57)	-0.00098** (-2.66)
Net income	-0.0117 (-1.43)	0.00840 (0.88)	0.00255 (0.73)	0.000237** (3.27)	0.00718* (1.99)	0.0171*** (5.35)	0.00760*** (4.52)	0.00738 (1.54)
Net income square	0.000002 (0.73)	0.000003 (0.61)	0.000002 (1.30)	5.77e-10 (1.64)	-0.0000008 (-1.18)	0.0000005 (0.35)	-9.16e-08 (-0.27)	0.000002 (0.78)
Net income x hh size	0.00053 (0.29)	-0.00115 (-0.68)	-0.00118* (-2.08)	-0.00005*** (-3.86)	-0.000065 (-0.11)	-0.00267*** (-4.92)	-0.000303 (-1.12)	0.000797 (0.88)
Net income x Leisure	0.00006 (1.67)	0.00003 (1.04)	0.00008*** (3.72)	0.0000003 (1.00)	-0.000008 (-0.40)	-0.000009 (-0.39)	0.000005 (0.63)	0.00003 (1.09)
Observations	4043	3672	8034	4576	4966	9737	8918	5720
ll	-467.5	-569.8	-825.3	-471.0	-507.6	-1323.7	-883.2	-702.7
r2_p	0.414	0.364	0.479	0.478	0.482	0.311	0.498	0.377
aic	975.1	1177.6	1690.6	980.0	1055.3	2687.3	1806.3	1445.5
bic	1101.2	1295.6	1830.4	1102.2	1185.5	2831.0	1948.3	1578.5

not statistically meaningful for Austria and Ireland, both of which are characterised by relatively high part-time female employment.

We draw on these parameters to first simulate the effect of the increase in formal childcare availability (i.e. achieving higher Barcelona targets) on the labour supply of mothers assuming that additional childcare slots are fully taken and keeping unchanged the rules for determining child-

care fees. We follow the methodology described in Section 3 and make use of the estimated coefficients assigned to childcare dummies to capture the availability of subsidised and unsubsidised childcare choices. These dummies are interpreted to reflect availability of childcare types that is not captured by the systematic part of the utility function. Based on this interpretation we modify the coefficients assigned to these dummies to increase the availability of formal childcare for children under 3 years according to four alternative Barcelona targets, such as 40%, 50%, 60% and 65%.


First we simulate the labour supply effects based on the sample of mothers with children under 3. Next, to avoid a mixing up of the effects of childcare and maternal leave generosity on labour market attachment of mothers, we restrict the sample to children under 3 years of age but older than the number of months in post-natal paid maternal leave or older than 6 months.

The length of maternity leave doesn't vary significantly across countries, with Ireland as an exception offering the longest period of paid maternity leave of 10 months (Table A.1). The restriction to children between 7 and 36 months is made to reflect the European Commission Directive 2019/1158 on work-life balance that establishes a minimum number of months of parental leave to all workers who exercise parental responsibilities in accordance with national legal systems. These estimated labour supply effects, called in the literature as "second-round" effects, represent pure changes in the desired number of working hours or activity/inactivity status and disregard the demand side of labour market or the possibility of a match between desired labour supply and available jobs. However, this match or the attainment of a new labour market equilibrium may lead to a different employment level, depending on how elastic the labour demand side is. We account for the demand side of labour market following the methodology described in Section 3 and estimate employment effects under a new labour market equilibrium.

5.1. Increase in formal childcare availability and usage: pure labour supply effects

Figure 1 (Table A.2) reports the predicted percentage changes in labour participation rates (right axis) of mothers when increasing the coverage rate of formal childcare to 40%, 50%, 60% and 65% of children below 3. The dotted lines show the expected changes in labour participation of mothers for each childcare target over countries indicating an almost linear positive association between increased labour supply and increase in the childcare coverage rate.

Figure 1: Participation rates of mothers' and percentage changes for different levels of childcare provision




Source: Own calculations based on the EUROMOD and EUROLAB models.

In particular, an increase in formal childcare provision to 50% of the children below 3 is expected to increase participation of mothers in the labour market from 4% in Portugal to 48% in Hungary. The impact on labour supply is small in Portugal because the formal childcare and labour participation of mothers are already relatively high in this country. On the contrary, the impact of childcare increase is highest in Hungary because current participation rates of mothers is very low

there. Reaching a more ambitious target of 60% would lead to increases in labour market participation ranging from 7% in Portugal to 61% in Hungary. Substantial increases are also found in Finland (41%) and Estonia (46%).

Responses in the intensive margin of labour are shown in Figure 2 (Tables A.3) that reports the predicted percentage changes in weekly working hours (right axis) of mothers when increasing the coverage rate of formal childcare to 40%, 50%, 60% and 65% of children below 3. Similar to the participation rates, the dotted lines indicate again an almost linear positive association between increased working hours and increase in the childcare coverage rate. Finland stands out as the country with the highest percentage increases in working hours for almost all scenarios, followed by Estonia and Austria.

Figure 2: Weekly working hours of mothers and percentage changes for different levels of childcare provision



Source: Own calculations based on the EUROMOD and EUROLAB models.

Restricting the sample to mothers with children under 3 years and over the number of months in maternity leave (Tables A.5 and A.6, Appendix C) the effect of the childcare provision increases is expected to be smaller for this sample of kids mainly because the current share of formal care is higher and mothers have higher labour market participation.

Applying another selection criterion -children between 6 and 36 months – (Tables A.7 and A.8) and comparing the predicted changes in labour supply with those reported here, we notice that the effects of formal childcare increase on labour supply are expected to be slightly smaller for most of the countries except for Ireland, Finland and Poland (selection of kids is made on months in paid post-natal maternity leave).

5.2. Increase in formal childcare availability and usage: employment effect accounting for labour demand side

Assuming an elasticity of labour demand of -0.5 (Lichter et al., 2015), the equilibrium model applies running an optimisation procedure to search in a first step the value of the change in the dummy coefficient related to the new childcare target (parameter v , Section 3) and in a second step the average wage (parameter u , Section 3) that corresponds to a new labour market equilibrium status under the new childcare target. The optimization procedure related to the attainment of a new labour market equilibrium is explained in details in Narazani and Colombino (2021). If equilibrium conditions are not taken into account, the increase in childcare target should boost the time available for work and shift the desired labour supply curve to the right. This shift to the right implies an increase in total employment of mothers. A new market equilibrium condition that requires consistency between the number of jobs available and the desired labour supply is achieved through a movement along the demand curve and an adjustment of the wage rate leading to a decrease in employment. In particular, as Table 3 shows, an increase in formal childcare to 60% would shift the desired labour supply to the right and increase total employment of mothers by 60% (Hungary) and 41% (Finland) if equilibrium conditions are not taken into account. However

Table 3: Predicted percentage changes in labour participation accounting for Labour Demand

	No Equilibrium				Equilibrium			
	40%	50%	60%	65%	40%	50%	60%	65%
Austria	15%	24%	32%	37%	11%	18%	24%	27%
Estonia	16%	32%	46%	53%	11%	20%	28%	32%
Finland	10%	26%	41%	49%	4%	10%	18%	22%
Hungary	27%	48%	61%	68%	23%	32%	41%	45%
Ireland	7%	16%	22%	25%	5%	8%	11%	13%
Italy	2%	8%	13%	16%	0%	3%	7%	9%
Poland	6%	17%	21%	24%	7%	10%	13%	14%
Portugal	-1%	4%	7%	9%	0%	2%	5%	6%

Note: The columns “Equilibrium” (“No Equilibrium”) refer to % changes in labour participation when labour market equilibrium is (not) considered.

Source: Own calculations based on the EUROMOD and EUROLAB models.

this increase will drop to 41% (Hungary) and 18% (Finland) once the labour market reaches a new equilibrium through a movement along the demand curve and an adjustment of wage rate. The offsetting effect of labour market adjustment is smaller in Portugal, Austria and Italy and higher in Hungary, Finland and Estonia.

6. Conclusion

This paper analyses labour market participation effects for mothers of hypothetical scenarios of childcare policies. The analysis covers eight EU countries representing different childcare systems like Estonia, Hungary, Austria, Finland, Italy, Ireland, Poland and Portugal.

We use EUROLAB, the EU labour supply-demand microsimulation model that is based on EUROMOD, to simulate female labour supply reactions, under demand side constraints, of formal childcare reforms based on a sample of women with children under 3 years of age extracted from EU-SILC 2016. For the purpose of this specific analysis on formal childcare, we exploit the multi-dimensionality feature of EUROLAB and model childcare as an additional dimension of the choice set that mothers would face when deciding to work. Furthermore, in order to construct the counterfactual interacted choices and derive corresponding budget sets, we extend EUROMOD with information on childcare fees for subsidised and unsubsidised childcare services. Drawing on these parameters, increases in the formal childcare usage is simulated for different targets of

childcare provision.

The hypothetical scenarios of childcare reforms analysed consist in providing formal childcare to 40%, 50%, 60% and 65% of children under 3 for the countries involved in the analysis by increasing the number of childcare slots and assuming that these are taken by families at unchanged childcare fees. Simulation results show that achieving these targets would lead to significantly increased labour supply of mothers especially in countries where the current share of formal childcare and/or female labour participation is low, like Hungary and Poland. In countries like Portugal that are far beyond the existing target, changes in labour supply are expected to be moderate. Accounting for labour market adjustment mechanism following the increase in desired labour supply would make these employment effects of mothers less pronounced but still they remain sizable.

These incentive effects may be even lower when looking at the whole sample of women, depending on the share of mothers affected and the employment rates of the rest of the female population. Indeed, the overall participation of women in the labour market would go up very little by increasing the use of childcare services in countries such as Italy and Austria (less than 10% of women are mothers with children under the age of 3). However, it is important to note that our modelling approach is static and does not take into account the life cycle impact of childcare reforms. Besides the direct effect of the reform on mothers' labour supply when their children are entitled for childcare services, an additional cumulative effect can be envisaged due to an increased attachment of these women to the labour market, which would also have an impact on their lifetime earnings and future pension entitlements.

After summarising the main findings of our analysis, several caveats deserve to be addressed. One limitation concerns the fact that parental leave benefits are not simulated in EUROMOD and are therefore not taken into account in the imputation of childcare costs. As discussed above, this limitation of our modelling approach may lead to upward estimates of the expected female labour supply effects of the childcare reform scenarios compared to the baseline, especially in countries

(including Hungary) where such benefits are substantial and can be provided for more than 12 months. Another caveat of our analysis is that the difference between part-time and full-time types of formal childcare is not taken into account. Although micro data make it possible to distinguish between them in theory, the small frequency of the final combinations of childcare and labour supply (especially in countries where the sample of mothers is small) requires us to merge part-time and full-time childcare into one category. Moreover our analysis does not consider modelling preferences for informal care in some countries, due for example, to mistrust in formal services or greater chances of grandparents to contribute to childcare.

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Appendix A. Additional tables

Table A.1: Maternity leave (in months, post natal)

	months
Austria	2
Estonia	4
Finland	2
Hungary	5
Ireland	10
Italy	4
Poland	3.5
Portugal	1.5

Table A.2: Predicted labour participation probabilities, Labour demand not considered, unrestricted sample, Children under 3 years

	Target			
	40%	50%	60%	65%
Austria	0.307	0.329	0.352	0.364
Estonia	0.326	0.372	0.410	0.429
Finland	0.439	0.501	0.562	0.593
Hungary	0.237	0.275	0.300	0.312
Ireland	0.665	0.723	0.758	0.777
Italy	0.518	0.5626	0.591	0.606
Poland	0.606	0.667	0.692	0.705
Portugal	0.738	0.771	0.800	0.814

Table A.3: Predicted working hours, Labour demand not considered, unrestricted sample, Children under 3 years

		Target			
	Observed	40%	50%	60%	65%
Austria	7.579	12%	19%	27%	31%
Estonia	13.617	6%	15%	23%	27%
Finland	13.403	7%	22%	37%	44%
Hungary	11.326	8%	14%	19%	21%
Ireland	19.747	2%	9%	13%	15%
Italy	18.164	-2%	6%	12%	14%
Poland	23.376	6%	13%	17%	19%
Portugal	29.423	-2%	0%	3%	5%

Table A.4: Predicted labour participation probabilities, Labour demand considered, unrestricted sample, Children under 3 years

	Observed	Target			
		40%	50%	60%	65%
Austria	0.266	0.297	0.313	0.329	0.337
Estonia	0.281	0.313	0.336	0.359	0.371
Finland	0.398	0.413	0.438	0.468	0.485
Hungary	0.186	0.230	0.246	0.263	0.271
Ireland	0.623	0.653	0.670	0.690	0.702
Italy	0.523	0.526	0.535	0.545	0.550
Poland	0.570	0.613	0.627	0.642	0.650
Portugal	0.745	0.744	0.761	0.780	0.789

Table A.5: Predicted changes in labour participation rates, Labour demand not considered, Children under 3 years and over the number of months in paid maternal leave

	Observed	Target			
		40%	50%	60%	65%
Austria	0.259	13.37%	20.92%	28.77%	32.81%
Estonia	0.282	15.25%	27.81%	40.51%	46.91%
Finland	0.393	10.78%	26.02%	41.40%	49.14%
Hungary	0.181	31.76%	44.94%	58.15%	64.76%
Ireland	0.627	7.30%	12.05%	17.03%	19.61%
Italy	0.529	1.46%	6.95%	12.53%	15.36%
Poland	0.553	12.96%	17.46%	22.04%	24.35%
Portugal	0.738	-2.41%	1.51%	5.47%	7.45%

Table A.6: Predicted changes in weekly working hours, Labour demand not considered, Children under 3 years and over the number of months in paid maternal leave

	Observed	Target			
		40%	50%	60%	65%
Austria	7.507	12.51%	19.85%	27.67%	31.76%
Estonia	13.321	9.28%	17.15%	25.29%	29.46%
Finland	13.971	10.06%	24.27%	38.60%	45.79%
Hungary	11.517	10.99%	15.65%	20.38%	22.77%
Ireland	19.780	7.06%	11.68%	16.54%	19.07%
Italy	18.140	1.81%	7.08%	12.47%	15.21%
Poland	23.994	9.70%	12.79%	15.95%	17.55%
Portugal	29.918	-1.84%	1.15%	4.14%	5.64%

Table A.7: Predicted changes in labour participation rate, Labour demand not considered, Children between 6 and 36 months of age

	Observed	Target			
		40%	50%	60%	65%
Austria	0.27	12.79%	20.23%	27.98%	31.99%
Estonia	0.29	12.63%	24.69%	36.87%	43.01%
Finland	0.39	8.33%	24.12%	40.05%	48.05%
Hungary	0.18	30.15%	43.32%	56.57%	63.22%
Ireland	0.63	7.30%	12.05%	17.03%	19.61%
Italy	0.53	0.68%	5.96%	11.34%	14.06%
Poland	0.54	13.20%	17.92%	22.70%	25.12%
Portugal	0.74	-3.01%	0.23%	4.36%	6.44%

Table A.8: Predicted changes in weekly working hours, Labour demand not considered, Children between 6 and 36 months of age

	Observed	Target			
		40%	50%	60%	65%
Austria	7.7	11.95%	19.19%	26.91%	30.96%
Estonia	14.0	7.50%	14.85%	22.44%	26.33%
Finland	13.6	7.88%	22.83%	37.92%	45.51%
Hungary	11.7	10.20%	14.73%	19.33%	21.65%
Ireland	19.8	7.06%	11.68%	16.54%	19.07%
Italy	18.2	1.09%	6.23%	11.50%	14.17%
Poland	23.6	10.04%	13.30%	16.65%	18.34%
Portugal	29.8	-2.31%	0.18%	3.33%	4.90%