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## Research Report

The impact of the socio-cultural structures of the Kambata, Ethiopia on their economic development: An interdisciplinary and cultures comparing approach to discuss the issue of economic development

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**Belachew Gebrewold-Tochalo**

### **The Impact of the Socio-Cultural Structures of the Kambata/Ethiopia on their Economic Development**

**An interdisciplinary and cultures comparing approach to discuss the issue of economic development**

*April 2001*

# **ÖFSE *F O R U M***

**19**

**Belachew Gebrewold-Tochalo**

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**April 2001**

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# **The Impact of the Socio-Cultural Structures of the Kambata/Ethiopia on their Economic Development**

**An interdisciplinary and cultures comparing approach to discuss the issue of economic development**

## **Dissertation**

in the Faculty of Social Sciences and Philosophy

**Presented to the Graduate Faculties of the University of Hamburg/Germany in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Philosophy (Ph.D.)**

Presented by: Belachew GEBREWOLD-TOCHALO

Born in Kambata/Ethiopia

Hamburg/Germany April 2001

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## Introduction

Economic development has become one of the highly discussed branches of studies today. Not only the social sciences, but also the human sciences are concentrating on this issue more than ever. In light of this, not only the implementation of development is difficult, but also its definition. Development as freedom *form* oneself and the community *for* oneself and the community<sup>1</sup> encompasses various branches of studies. There are different views on the causes of development or “underdevelopment”. Many social scientists do not seem to have found a common definition, concept and aim of development. Moreover, some maintain a view that there are societies who reject development and want to remain forever in their traditional, cultural<sup>2</sup> and social structures<sup>3</sup>. Axelle Kabou is one of those who hold this position.<sup>4</sup> This assertion does not have any scientific basis. It is innate in every individual and society to develop itself. Since I believe that economic development or “underdevelopment” is determined partially<sup>5</sup> by social and cultural structures, I would like to limit the scope of my research to the social and cultural structures in relation to economic development.

This kind of analysis leads us to different theories, evolutionist or deontological<sup>6</sup>, culture-essentialist (culture-centred, ethno-centric) (Max Weber, Huntington) or extra-cultural context of development (D. Senghaas). How can one explain the development of the West and the “underdevelopment” of Africa? What are the causes? What is development? Does development have an ultimate goal? In order to answer these and the following questions, my paper focuses on the political, religious, social and cultural philosophical perspectives of development.

As one can see in the bibliography of this paper, very little research has been done on Kambata. The shortage of written materials and the poor statistical availability in the region make a thorough research very difficult. Even the interviews with the aged people are not always plausible. Since the historical facts, which these people narrate, are transmitted only orally, most of the historical facts are got lost. Moreover, since these people belong to different clans, they usually tend to brighten up the historical and social background of their own clans. Concerning the lack of significant data, it is strange that the Kambata intellectuals who have got good opportunities to study abroad as well as in Ethiopia have not made any significant effort to do some research on this region and its people. The significant references that I found on Kambata are mostly done by foreign scholars such as Norman Singer, Ulrich Braukämper. In spite of the cultural and linguistic advantages, many Kambata intellectuals (except Tesfaye Habiso and some very few) do not seem to show any significant effort to analyse the culture, anthropology, traditional political system, language of the Kambata.

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<sup>1</sup> See section 1.1 below.

<sup>2</sup> I define culture as the social principle of order and action based on religion, norms, customs, tradition, language, history, etc. (see 1.3 below)

<sup>3</sup> Social structure is the sum of culture, the respective level and situation of economic development and economic relations, and the political system. (see section 1.2 below)

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Axelle Kabou 1995, 29.

<sup>5</sup> My analytical concentration on cultural structures (endogenous factors) does not play down the impact of exogenous factors such as colonialism and cultural, political and economic neo-colonialism that impede economic development of poorer societies.

<sup>6</sup> Deontological derives from Greek “to deon” which means “binding” The deontological position – as it will be discussed – contends that economic activities can successfully take place and be rational only in the cultural and social frame. Therefore, it maintains that there is a binding interconnection between culture and economic activities.

These branches of studies are indispensable, especially in the face of present cultural and political globalisation and cultural marginalization of the poorer societies.

Which of the new findings are useful for the future developmental activities and scientific researches on Kambata? Are there any cultural challenges in this context? Are there any positive elements in the political, social and economic system of the Kambata that the future developmental activity should take into consideration? In spite of the shortage of the written material, I have tried to discuss this issue extensively. Without claiming completeness as regards content and methodology, I have done an attempt to understand the significance of culture and social structure of the Kambata in relation to their economic development. Since I am not an economic scientist, my emphasis is not on econometrics or similar fields that discuss economics. The method of research in this paper is comparative and interdisciplinary. Through the help of a comparative analysis I have discussed various political theories and thoughts of the western thinkers such as Aristotle, Rousseau, Hobbes, etc. Moreover, since my interest is to understand the issue of economic development of the Kambata from an interdisciplinary point of view, my analysis also includes cultural anthropological, sociological, philological, theological and philosophical approaches.

This paper consists of two parts: The first part is theoretical and the second one descriptive. The theoretical part discusses different theories and possible causes of economic development determined by social structure and culture. Especially, the development policy theory of Dieter Senghaas is extensively discussed.<sup>7</sup> The second theory, which is very briefly discussed in the first part, is the theory of Samuel P. Huntington (political scientist in the United States), *The Clash of Civilisations*, whereby - inter alia - he maintains that culture is the engine of economic development. The importance of Huntington's theory for this paper is his essentialisation of culture, not the conflicts of civilisations.

According to Senghaas, culture has only a non-essential influence on the economic development. It is rather the social structure, which determines economic development, peace and conflict of a society. His systematisation of development and peace theories through the help of civilisation hexagon<sup>8</sup> is extensively broached. The reason why I have discussed the development theories and the civilisation hexagon of Dieter Senghaas is the following: some social scientists maintain that his civilisation hexagon applies only to the industrialised and "democratic" societies, hence not relevant to the developing and not-yet-democratic societies. In my view this assertion has the following weaknesses: 1) The socio-economic development is not conceived as a process, rather as a result of isolated events in the development history; 2) this conception can lead to the rejection of the significance of the own positive cultural elements for economic development; 3) as a consequence, the developing countries have either to copy the western civilisation system as the only solution; 4) or in the face of today's western metaphysics of democracy and human rights, the developing countries have to fight against this cultural imperialism. Therefore, I maintain that the substance of the civilisation hexagon is inherent in the culture of the Kambata as it does in every society. The constituents of the civilisation hexagon must not necessarily be 6 in the case of the Kambata; they can be less or greater than that. If these values were not inherent in the culture of the Kambata, it

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<sup>7</sup> D. Senghaas is a researcher of peace, conflict and development, and he teaches at the university of Bremen (Germany).

<sup>8</sup> The interaction of power monopoly, rule of law, political self-control, democratic participation, welfare state and political culture. For detailed information see section 2.1 below.

would be useless to talk about the process of democratisation, which is a misleading terminology and wherefore I would prefer political reorganisation to democratisation. Moreover, the westernisation of human values is hindering intercultural dialogue and understanding. These cultural values are neither western nor African; they are human values, even though they appear in various cultures in different forms. Therefore, our scientific and political attempts should concentrate on how to reorganise the already existing human values, rather than westernising and trying to implant them in the developing countries.

In the third chapter I have tried to synthesise the contradicting theories of Huntington and Senghaas and draw my own conclusion. Here I have tried to critically analyse Huntington's overemphasis of the significance of culture for economic development, and Senghaas' trivialisation of the impact of the cultural structures on economic development, in case this economic development is approved of and striven for.

The second descriptive part of the paper deals with the specific situation of the Kambata. Kambata is a small and densely populated region in the southern Ethiopia. I have tried to apply different theories to the actual situation of the Kambata. It is ethnographically heterogeneous and had its own political history until the Ethiopian Empire expansion took place towards the end of the 19th century. The fourth chapter deals with the historical and ethno-genetic facts of the region. Moreover, political (for example, concerning territorial disputes) and economic (exchange of goods and know-how) relations and conflicts with other ethnic groups are also included in this chapter. Some of the statistical data are separately presented for each district so as to simplify the overview of different economic and social trends in different areas of Kambata.

Since my attempt is to understand social structure and economic development from the backdrop of sociological, anthropological, philosophical and theological perspectives, I have discussed the socio-economic aspect in the fifth chapter from an interdisciplinary point of view. Many sociological and socio-philosophical elements of the culture of the Kambata determine their political and economic activities. I have tried to compare the theories of the communitarians (like Etzioni) with the socio-political and socio-philosophical understanding of the Kambata. In this context the sixth chapter contains a thorough discussion about the impact of social stratification on the social mobilisation and participative development. The seventh chapter briefly deals with the present economic situation of the Kambata in the Ethiopian context after the fall of the Ethiopian Empire and communist take-off.

Whereas the politics of the Ethiopian monarchy and of the communist regime had a centralised policy, the present constitution of the Ethiopian State declares – at least theoretically – a decentralised form of government. About the rights of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples the Article 39 of the constitution says the following:

- (1) "Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession.
- (2) Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has the right to speak, to write and to develop its own language; to express, to develop and to promote its culture; and to preserve its history.
- (3) Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has the right to a full measure of self-government, which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the territory that it inhabits, and to equitable representation in state and Federal governments.

- (4) The right to self-determination, including secession, of every Nation, Nationality and People shall come into effect:
- (a) When a demand for secession has been approved by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Legislative Council of the Nation, Nationality or People concerned;
  - (b) When the Federal Government has organised a referendum which must take place within three years from the time it received the concerned council's decision for secession;
  - (c) When the demand for secession is supported by majority vote in the referendum;
  - (d) When the Federal Government will have transferred its powers to the council of the Nation, Nationality or People who has voted to secede; and
  - (e) When the division of assets is effected in a manner prescribed by law.
- (5) A "Nation, Nationality or People" for the purpose of this Constitution, is a group of people who have or share large measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identities, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory.”<sup>9</sup>

I do not want to discuss here the present Ethiopian constitution as regards the state of the formal and material state of the federalism, since this is not the central point of the paper. However, this does not mean that the relation between the central state and the regions (in the language of the constitution: Nations, Nationalities and Peoples) were irrelevant. On the contrary, the intensity, interactions and repercussions of the centripetal and centrifugal policies of a state play the decisive role in the political and economic development of a society. In addition to the issue of democracy, the problematic of formal and material federalism in Ethiopia is one of the central points in the criticism against the present government since there is a conspicuous lack of congruence between the formal and material freedom, democracy and federalism.

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<sup>9</sup> Federal Negarit Gazeta, No.1, 21<sup>st</sup> August 1995, page 13.

## **Part I: Socio-Cultural and Socio-Structural Dimensions of Development Processes**

# Chapter 1: Development, Social Structure and Culture

## 1.1 Development and the problems of its concept

Where is the development of the world, or better of man leading to? The "developed" do not know where their development is leading to any more. The inner discontent of the "developed" is increasing more and more. The symptoms are social isolation, individualism, loneliness, heartlessness, one-sided material prosperity, spiritual poverty, fear, pessimism, etc. Development towards aimlessness and senselessness then?

The dangers for man on an individual, social, global and ecological level become more and more striking. The conventional and non-conventional arms which are capable of destroying the whole world, natural disasters and man-made ecological crises such as the greenhouse effect, the hole in the ozone layer, the destruction of tropical rain forests etc. relativise the material development. This relativisation and discontent is evident on a personal as well as on a social and global level. The trend seems to go from evolution to destruction, from development to decadence. The rich ("developed") are not content with their prosperity any more; the poor are not happy with their environment and culture in their attempt to westernise themselves.

Development in fact has reduced itself to economic growth: "Development has been put on a level with increase of output, economic growth, in particular industrialisation and the resulting urbanisation."<sup>10</sup> While using everything to reach his goals, man has become *homo oeconomicus*. This *homo oeconomicus* mistakes economic growth for development. This leads to a narrowing of the concept of development. Economic growth implies the increase of the gross national product or rather the increasing per-capita income of a country.<sup>11</sup>

Today the question "What is development?" goes hand in hand with the question "What is man?". It is an existential question. The question that relativises development does this also with the sense of man's existence as man is retreating as mere *homo oeconomicus*. The Platonic philosophy denied the reality and trueness of matter because of its transience. The real intellectual being is opposed to the world of unreal deceiving material being. In a material world, there is beginning and end, birth and death, nothing unchanging and therefore nothing real. According to this philosophy, the inter-dependence of spirit and matter has not been recognised. Or matter has rather been seen as prison of spirit. The state of salvation is beyond the material world through the liberation of the spirit from matter.

Today's capitalistic philosophy is moving into the opposite direction. What counts is only material and economic gain maximisation. Values like human rights and democracy are merely instrumentalised. They are the conditions for working in terms of third world development policy. Such values are not being considered as essential but instrumental by exogenous forces.<sup>12</sup> This is called the political conditionality. This means that human rights are respected with regard to aid to developing countries, but not as spiritual values per se.

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<sup>10</sup> Ulrich Menzel 1992, 17.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Gerd Reinhold et al. , 1997, 713.

<sup>12</sup> *Endogenous forces* in this case are the nation's own government and different national organisations, which work in various areas. *Exogenous forces* are different countries and organisations that can have influence in third world aid policy.



The "developed" man of our time will have to be asked whether he is developed at all and what development means for him. "This question has often been asked but has never been answered satisfactorily. Either we refer to the various catalogues of institutions which have defined the aims of development in a narrower sense as the satisfaction of the basic needs (food, housing, medical care, education), or we see it in a wider sense also as granting of the human rights, political participation and the preservation of nature... Or rationalisation (M. Weber), social differentiation and mobilisation (Parsons), division of labour (Smith), developing the productive forces (Marx) or raising of the productive forces (List)... Or we are governed by the misunderstanding that certain strategies or rather instruments like world market integration versus dissociative development strategy (Abkoppelung) are already identical with the aim of development."<sup>13</sup>

Modern science has radically changed the people's view of nature. Through science the man's religious<sup>14</sup> relationship with nature has been called into question. Nature with its huge local sub-units has been functionalised, as it seems to be a mere product. Nature is being analysed, explored, put together or taken apart. This epistemological violence will go on until the mundane<sup>15</sup> world makes a contract with nature. "Those who lived outside in rain and wind, whose actions starting from local experiences to long lasting civilisations, the peasants and sailors, have not been asked at all; this speech is ours, we managers, journalists and scientists, all of us the kind of people of short term visions are ingeniously specialised, partly responsible for the global climate change because it was us that thought up and promoted the means and instruments of powerful, efficient and charitable as well as harmful inventions, and we are incapable of finding reasonable solutions."<sup>16</sup>

Asking the critical question what development is and what its aim, I do not want to glorify, romanticise or stylise the traditional society and to play down poverty and hunger or to speak ill of the "developed" societies. The point is that these developed societies are less and less satisfied with their development themselves.

Meanwhile, it is often pointed out that satisfying the basic needs is a precondition and a pre-stage of development. But the questions are "When will this level be reached?" "The socio-cultural alienation of the South is, of course, not only an inevitable consequence of the self-interest of the North, but is as well based on the unquestionable *attraction* of the Western model of welfare. Therefore, it is all too understandable if the majority of the Third World countries, instead of following an independent development model which is designed for their needs, at least in fact strive for a 'catching-up development' according to Western example and advice. This option for a 'capitalistic model' and promises, which many dream of, has its dark side which is suppressed most of the time..."<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Ulrich Menzel, op. cit., 49-50.

<sup>14</sup> If we are talking about the religious dimension of the relationship with nature, we are talking about man's close existential dependence on nature. Religion means "to turn towards something again and again", to observe something thoroughly. In this close existential relationship man turns towards nature with all his heart: seeing, wanting, feeling. Another important point of this religious dimension is the community. Religion cannot only be private matter of a single individual. Religious life can only blossom in community. (Cf. Walter Bruggen 1992, 325)

<sup>15</sup> In this context, "mundane" is a term coined by Michel Serres. From the late Latin "mundanus", "mundane" describes the local earthly, human world of cultures and social sciences, i.e. "this world". Thus he differentiates between "mundane" and "mundial" worlds. The latter describes the cosmic, universal world of things and natural sciences, i.e. the "other world". (Cf. Michel Serres 1994, 114)

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 56f.

<sup>17</sup> J. Müller 1997, 46f.

Another question would be, "Who can set the standard - if it can be set at all - what is the fulfilment of the basic needs"? Some organisations as the ILO or the UN have tried to define the satisfaction of the basic needs, thus pointing out the essence of development:

- ILO: "Meeting the basic needs includes covering the minimum private need of a family regarding food, housing, clothes. Furthermore, it includes claiming vital services as providing healthy and clean water, sanitary facilities, means of transport, health and education centres and the requirement that every person able and willing to work is provided with a job that is paid appropriately. Finally, it should also include the fulfilment of more qualitative needs as a healthy, humane and satisfying environment as well as a participation of the people in decisions that concern their life, living and their individual freedom."<sup>18</sup>
- UN Human Rights Conference, Vienna (1993): "The core of the right to development consists of the following rights: physical integrity, the right to an appropriate minimum of food, clothes, living space and medical treatment, the right to a minimum guaranteed security and inviolability of the individual, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, the right to political participation which is essential for exercising the other named rights. We agree with those who see the right to development as a combination of already defined human rights connected with the thought of progress and the development of the societies and their individual members."<sup>19</sup>

These two quotations point out that development based on the satisfaction of the basic needs has reached a qualitative position of human progress. What is high-quality life? Who leads life in quality? The developed who may not know what to do with their abundance anymore? The poor who suffer from hunger? The traditional societies that do not seem to have anything in common with modern society? The aborigines in Australia? The so-called "optimistic Africans" whose society meanwhile is being idealised or stylised by many of the "developed"? Or the Indios in America?

The question "who leads a good life?" goes hand in hand with the question "who is developed and what is development?" In the case of development there must not be discrepancy between the individual, society and environment. That means overemphasising the individual at the expense of society or the society at the expense of the individual and the arbitrary exploitation of the human living space can lead to the downfall of man's integral development. Therefore, I understand development as the fulfilment and realisation of man's material and spiritual values and dispositions, which materialise in the framework of the socio-ecological responsibility. The most important components of this definition will show why it is holistic:

1. *Fulfilment and realisation of material and spiritual values*: unduly external limitations, interference and dependence hamper human development. Development is freedom from factors, which hinder the possibilities of obtaining sufficient, and balanced diet. Unless these material preconditions are fulfilled, people affected by these shortages cannot develop their spiritual faculties, since they struggle for their physical survival. By operationalising intellectual faculties,

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
<sup>18</sup> Quotation according to F. Nuscheler, op. cit., 185.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 185f.

man's material basic needs can be satisfied. The man's intellectual faculties can develop only if he is free from unjustified external limitations of the socio-cultural structures. In this dialectic relationship between matter and spirit man is following the "law of complexity and conscience" (Teilhard de Chardin) of development. The determination to work, justice, human rights, equality, love, community, formation of social cohabitation, peace, etc. is not a mere idea. It should be realised through the employment of man's social and individual capital.

2. *The socio-ecological framework*: because of structural interdependence man is not only dependent from his fellow human beings, but also from the eco-system. "Man cannot see himself completely outside of mankind, nor mankind outside of life, nor life outside the universe."<sup>20</sup>

Franz Nuscheler's "magic" pentagon of development can be constructed as follows:



**Diagram 1: Nuscheler's magic pentagon of development**

- 1) Growth: through a policy of redistribution and employment,
- 2) Work: as basic element of development:
  - socially: an abundant social resource,
  - individually: a precondition for people to be able to develop their abilities, to overcome poverty and create social integration,
  - ethically: an intrinsic value as it enables self-development through fulfilling one's responsibility,
  - internationally: the only promising preventive measure against the pressure of migration and the endangering of peace;
- 3) Social justice: not only for moral reasons, but also for economic growth;
- 4) Participation: economic and political participation;

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<sup>20</sup> Teilhard de Chardin 1994, 21

### 5) Independence.<sup>21</sup>

About the self-development within development process the Nyerere report (1991) says the following: "Development is a process that enables people to develop their abilities, to gain self-confidence and to lead a full life that is fit for human beings. Development is a process that liberates people from the fear of poverty and exploitation. It is the way out of political, economic and social oppression. Only through development does political independence gain its real significance... therefore development is equal to growing individual and collective independence."<sup>22</sup>

Development is independence from endogenously and exogenously caused obstacles that put a stop to the self-realisation of an individual, a group, a society or a nation. This determination to self-realisation is innate and existent in every organism. In this sense evolution is also development towards self-fulfilment and self-realisation. For this development the social and ecological environments are preconditions as well as obstacles. They are preconditions as man can only develop in harmony with these environments; they are obstacles as man is part of structural interdependence and therefore has to accept certain social and ecological limitations. Exactly this paradox - the interaction of preconditions and obstacles - is the basis of development. The social and ecological challenges push the people to look for solution to their social and economic crises. This leads to the re-evaluation of the social and ecological state of the society.

Traditional societies have not dealt as much with the problematic of individual freedom as have modern societies. Being dependent on each other was natural. Based on economic development individualism is growing constantly. Although people are existentially dependent on each other - in economic, political, social and ecological dimensions - today, when dealing with development, we talk a lot about economic freedom. Misunderstanding freedom leads to political and social splitting. Independence does not mean social and political cutting off, but guaranteeing unity in diversity. The fundamentalist and nationalist movements, which put development and therefore independence on a level with isolation, dream of an unrealistic world.

Even on the global level this aspect is becoming a very urgent issue. The interconnections in today's world show that even or particularly the richest countries are dependent on other countries in terms of output market, trade relations, mutual exchange of experiences in the fields of economy and politics, information exchange, computer networks, the fight against terrorism, etc. On the one hand, man wants to develop himself within the global social and ecological environments - because it cannot be any different - on the other hand, however, man creates unfair structures which lead to the downfall of development within these social and ecological environments.

Development is relativised not only regarding ethics but also regarding its quantity and quality. The "developed" compare their development with the "undeveloped" and vice versa. The poor have not seen themselves as "absolutely poor and underdeveloped" before they came in contact with the "rich and developed". I suppose the rich North sees itself as rich because it looks back its situation in the past. I do not think that it would have seen itself as underdeveloped then. Today, if we say that the people of 2000 years ago were not civilised,

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<sup>21</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 188ff.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 197.

this is today's judgement. The people then certainly did not see themselves as uncivilised or underdeveloped. This shows that development is a variable, which is dependent on space and time: "Development is a concept that changes its meaning with different contexts and that can hardly be grasped by definition. The difficulty of definition to meet the logical demand for a term to be clear, unambiguous and inter-subjectively verifiable lies, first of all, in the non-static character and in the sense of the word 'development', i.e. the concept, like an object, is subject to continuous changes. Secondly, each concept of development is a normative one, dependent on individual and collective ideas of time and space, because it does not relate to a static condition, but to an aim."<sup>23</sup>

Development also means developing human talents. Challenged by his difficult situation or spurred by his success and his achievements, man begins to instrumentalise his knowledge and his understanding in order to overcome difficulties or to create the best of all worlds possible for himself. Thus he creates the best socio-cultural structures possible which, in this form of development, realise his ideas and objectives. Therefore, socio-cultural structures are not isolated realities that exist per se. They are rather achievement and invention with an instrumentalistic function.

Concepts as development, dependence or independence are relative matters, dependent on time and space. "Development in the sense of changes is a fundamental manifestation of life... The earth and its inhabitants have changed, but the sense of perceiving changes is also subject to influences. The term 'development' is neither universally comprehensible nor forever codifiable. From different points of view development means something different and has to be regarded in context with the respective spirit. The concept of development (normative character) cannot get around the subjectivity. When the state or process of development is laid down or described (positive character), objectivity is requested, on closer examination, however, it cannot be maintained. The chosen indicators and the questionably causal relationships give way to subjectivity."<sup>24</sup> Development does not have an absolute aim. Development is achieved by establishing and improving social, cultural and ecological structures. But these structures will also be established and improved by development. Each development highlight is looking towards another aim. This is the process of development.

With the reached level of development society maintains social and cultural structures. Based on these structures new structures are developed. This is the process. And this process proves man's determination for development. When a society has reached a certain level of development, it can evaluate whether the socio-cultural structures support or impede development, i.e. the socio-cultural structures in their turn bring about development and the given socio-cultural structures can be evaluated by this development. That is mutual interaction.

If human existence seems to be endangered by no socio-ecological challenges, the changes or development processes of the socio-cultural structures slow down. As long as this cultural and socio-structural development processes are not challenged by certain environmental factors – social crises, famine, draught or other natural or man-made disasters and war - it will not be necessary to think up new strategies. Development is built on the given socio-cultural structures. This development process corresponds to the so-called

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<sup>23</sup> Quotation according to Dirk Halm 1997, 39.

<sup>24</sup> Martein Kaiser/Norbert Wagner 1986, 60.

Lamarck development theory: "According to Lamarck's model, the advantage of society, economy, politics or science compared to a corresponding other unit is due to the growth of an existing structure, with its own work and effort leading to success. If this is the case, continuing these efforts on a basis of the structures so far can be expected to be the best preconditions for further successful development. Suggesting the change of a structure which is the basis of one's own success would not be very promising."<sup>25</sup>

Catastrophes, war and other similar threats destroy existing social and cultural facts by destroying the economic, political and social fundamentals. What now can serve, as a way out of this challenge is not growth of the existing structures any more but spasmodic cultural and socio-structural changes. This model corresponds to Darwin's theory of evolution: "In Darwin's model of evolution the existing structures are subject to periodic changes. Continuously mutants appear and, according to the changing conditions, some of them assert themselves."<sup>26</sup>

For "growth" according to Lamarck as well as for "change" according to Darwin contextuality of the structures is indispensable. The determination of the species to survive is the starting point of development. For the survival of the species the socio-ecological inclination is indispensable. "The survival of a species presupposes the existence of an ecological niche. The survival of a paradigm reveals a structure of reality."<sup>27</sup> In history there have always been attempts to universalise the development model of successful societies; and there are still such attempts. The time-space conditionality of development is being played down. "Whenever dissatisfaction with a situation is based on comparison with successful societies, sciences or economies, it is often recommended to adopt their structures... Often underdeveloped countries have been recommended to adopt the social structures of the developed countries. If they see their own situation as a negative one, they will hardly adopt a Lamarck development model according to which the existing structure is to be developed further, but a Darwinistic one according to which development is reached by changing the existing structure."<sup>28</sup> Questioning universalism has nothing to do with relativising eco-sphere and common global responsibility. However, freedom, independence and contextual development must not be played down.

Modern understanding of development has two important features:

- (1) The focus lies on economic development;
- (2) Development is said to be the problem of the poor or of those who are on the way to "development" because they are not developed yet.

ad (1): Economic development is the ultimate goal. In this case the darwinistic model can be applied. Not the one who asserts himself survives, but only the one who asserts himself best. His survival is not just survival; he also has the power to determine everything. This begins with satisfying basic needs, followed by surplus, gain maximisation, in compatibility with the environment, dominance over the weaker, politicisation of economic power and universalisation of this method.

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<sup>25</sup> Ivo Dubiel 1984, 171.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 170.

<sup>27</sup> Quoted according to ibid., 170.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 171f.

ad (2): The "developed" feel "developed" because they know that there are no other societies that are more developed than they are. That is relativity of development. As development does not have an ultimate goal, it does also not have an end. May be the "developed" at present do not know how to develop themselves further; but that does certainly not mean that they have reached the goal of development. The "global consciousness" that meanwhile has become popular must not be seen as a result of failing continuous development and growth: "Consciousness changed against a backdrop of an increasingly menacing situation in fields as population, hunger, unemployment, energy policy and environmental pollution. Prompted by world models which did not only forecast growth limits, but which showed that mankind had reached a turning point, a rather global consciousness was created in respect of the idea of development. In the industrial nations the quality of life has become the burning question. In relation to the developing countries a new situation emerged: not the quantity of giving but its quality is becoming more and more important."<sup>29</sup>

Today we live in a polarised world: North vs. South, poor vs. rich, developed vs. underdeveloped, peripheries vs. centres, etc. This gap can only be overcome by national and international participative effort. Participation in its turn requires plurality, freedom, equality, justice, tolerance, learning from each other, etc. "Therefore, development as a process that comes from within and is supported by everyone, cannot be achieved without mobilising the masses. However, if all are to participate in this development process, all have to be informed about this process and have to be able to have a decisive say in this matter. The basic objective of participation implies sharing material goods and cultural values as well as participating in the field of politics."<sup>30</sup> Thus development does not only aim at satisfying the basic needs, but also at providing the basic goods as rights, freedom, equality and justice. Hunger, war and destruction on the one hand, and demonstration of economic and political power on the other hand, prove that the structural network of the world with its structural violence is still far from its aim of development.

While broaching the question of development, various suppositions are made as to what could be the reason for "underdevelopment". For some the cultural structures are most important for development (e.g. Samuel P. Huntington), for others it is social structures (e.g. D. Senghaas) or the will (determination) to development (Axelle Kabou). "In contrast to earlier centuries, when poverty was often still seen as fate, today man has enough resources and the necessary means to enable all people a life fit for human beings. What is lacking in reality is the political determination to introduce and carry out the necessary reforms for a development policy aimed at the poor."<sup>31</sup> In this context J. Müller and A. Kabou claim that the political determination to introduce and carry out the necessary reforms for a development policy aimed at the poor is lacking. But this does not answer the question what the reason for "underdevelopment" is. Another question can be asked, "Why do these leaders not have the good will to help their own people and their own country to development?" Some would answer the following: The cultural or social structures impede development. A further question could be: "Are these structures being imposed on them by any foreign power, or has

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<sup>29</sup> Martin Kaiser/ Norbert Wagner, 61.

<sup>30</sup> Martin Kaiser/ Norbert Wagner, op. cit., 63.

<sup>31</sup> J. Müller 1997, 17.

the society created these structures on its own within the process of its development? Why have some societies developed more favourable structures which promote their economic, political and social development and why not others?"

The determination to development is a biological and evolutionary fact. The existing structures and those to be created will have to correspond with their determination, which precedes the creation of the appropriate structures.

The problem of underdevelopment is being globalised and bringing global consequences. Therefore, this problem can only be solved globally. The co-operation of industrial nations and developing countries in the field of development is often seen as "charity". The industrial nations do not have any other options than solving today's global challenge in a global sense, and to do that in their own interest. The situation of the poor cannot be blamed only on them and cannot be explained by the various endogenous factors.

By discussing the history of the concept of development, Franz Nuscheler and Dieter Nohlen lean on Kant's interpretation of development: "... 'That all dispositions of a creature are already determined to develop themselves completely and effectively one day'; man, however, has to achieve development with his own effort some day."<sup>32</sup> Nohlen and Nuscheler support this idea: "Development cannot mean to become developed; instead it means to develop oneself (and also the unwrapping of one's own abilities that have been wrapped up by development aid)."<sup>33</sup> This statement does not mention the exogenous factors, which affect development. Even if an exogenous power cannot impose development, it can lead to the downfall of development. There are various reasons why and different forms how this exogenous power can interfere with self-development and self-realisation. Among the different factors undermining development in the field of global economic policy and therefore self-development and self-realisation are: unequal exchange in the world economic relations, high indebtedness, international protectionism, unduly foreign intervention and dependence in the field of economic policy, consequences of colonialism (e.g. forming of elite), etc.

Apart from that, there are, in fact, numerous endogenous factors which hinder development. First, climatic and ecological problems:

- The relations of climate change and environment destruction are interconnected. Through the destruction of environment (desertification, emission of dangerous gases) the climate is rapidly changing; and the consistently changing climate endangers man's existence and his living space.
- The second factor is population growth. As an impeding factor for development it is a disputed topic. For different reasons some societies do not regard it as a development barrier. I will discuss this point in the second part of this paper.
- Being captivated by traditionalism is the third factor. Often tradition is put opposite to modernism or socio-cultural tradition is fatalistically seen as something from which these societies cannot liberate themselves; or this socio-cultural tradition is seen as taboo. Sometimes this tradition is condemned by outsiders as a decisive development barrier. These two positions are in sharp opposition to each other and will have to find a compromise.

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<sup>32</sup> Cited according to D. Nohlen/ F. Nuscheler 1993, 58.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 58.



- The fourth factor is the socially, economically and politically divided society: a society whose small part is "modernised" and whose major part is still living traditionally. This discrepancy hinders the mutual development support. In the long run this major part of society which is living traditionally develops a socio-psychological inferiority complex. Thus an economic and structural heterogeneity develops a social division that leads to a marginalisation of the poor and traditional society.<sup>34</sup>
- The fifth factor is illiteracy. With education people can analyse and evaluate their (individual and social) values, standards, attitudes, knowledge and abilities; they can develop new ones and operationalise the more favourable ones in the course of the development process. Therefore education is an integral part of development and self-realisation.
- The sixth factor is socio-structural dissimilarity. This can be noticed in two ways: On the one hand, the gender based inequality and unfairness; on the other hand, the discrimination of certain ethnic groups in the socio-culturally heterogeneous societies

These six factors create regional, national and global economic and political structures, which hamper development. The *negative* and *positive development theories* point at the local, regional, national and global structural change. The *negative development theories* define development as "redressing the worst deficiency symptoms, overcoming hunger and disease" (Nohlen/Nuscheler 1995, 57). J. Müller defines development in this sense: "Development can be defined from the perspective of a 'negative dialectic' as man's liberation of all forms of suffering. In other words, every development policy and all development efforts must aim at overcoming human suffering in all its forms and dimensions or at least at keeping it within limits as much as possible."<sup>35</sup>

If development policy is limited to the negative development theory, it would only be a question of the "animal existence minimum" ("animalisches Existenzminimum", Nohlen/Nuscheler 1993, 57). Therefore, development is more than just satisfying the basic needs. In evolutionary and revolutionary terms man is directed towards higher and higher self-development and self-realisation. This is *positive development* theory. Health; unpolluted environment; sustainable development; suitable housing; appropriate education open to everyone; economic, political and social equality of both sexes, all races, ethnic groups and nations; respect of human rights; freedom; ecological and social responsibility, etc. are at the same time pillars and outcome of development.

The development process is revolutionary as well as evolutionary. When seen as *revolutionary*, the existing social and political orders will be changed drastically; when seen as *evolutionary*, the social, political and economic changes happen gradually. Evolution and revolution, however, are dialectically inter-dependent. Evolution is always aimed at the better and more complexes. The level of development reached by an evolutionary process inspires revolutionary cultural and socio-structural changes. In this development process man's creative power and inherent laws are dialectically present.<sup>36</sup> Because of the inter-dependence

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<sup>34</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 40ff.

<sup>35</sup> J. Müller, *op. cit.*, 105.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 99.

of both phenomena there is no incompatibility of these facts, i.e. in order to materialise development man's revolutionary creative power is based on inherent laws. And these inherent laws and developing human faculties in their turn are the guidelines of the creativity and formation of the human development dynamic.

## **1.2 What is Social Structure?**

Social structures determine the formation of a society and the social stratification of its members. As Blau says, the concept of social structure bases itself on simple and concrete definitions of parts and their relationships. These parts are groups and classes of people, for example, men, women, ethnic groups or socio-economic classes; in short, it concerns the positions of people in different groups and social strata. The ties among the parts are the social relations of people, which are manifest in their social interaction and communication.<sup>37</sup> Max Haller says: "The political system of a country and the political attitude of the citizens are determined by the respective social structure. 'Social structure' means all those characteristics of a society which are the consequences of the peculiar political and social institutions. The structures of employment, education, division according to sex, age, forms of family, types of budget, etc., are the central elements of social structure. Moreover, they are the results of specific institutions such as the national education system."<sup>38</sup>

Therefore, the constitutive elements of social structure are the political, economic, cultural, religious, psychological norms and conceptions. They constitute a society. It is called "structure" because of the inter-connection and interaction of these elements. Certain regulations and patterns of relations and actions characterise the phenomenon of social structure. To ensure that the social life of a society functions well, the latter needs general norms and patterns of action. The fact that the elements which are mentioned above develop and change themselves causes the social structure to change and develop according to the respective social situation. The social structure is, on the one hand, the factor that causes changes and development or that maintains a respective situation; on the other hand, it is the result of these changes and development. The following realms of social structure are the integral parts of this process: socio-political system, economic system, population structure and settlement system.<sup>39</sup>

### **1.2.1 Socio-political system**

Socio-political system is the structure of the set-up of a state, of a government, of a society, of an organisation, of a party, etc. This structure shapes their identity, which they acknowledge and through which they show themselves to the outside world. This system is regulated by socio-political institutions. Institutions<sup>40</sup> are the pillar of social structure. According to Manfred Schmidt, sociologically, institutions are "long term regulations of

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<sup>37</sup> Cf. Peter M. Blau 1978, 203.

<sup>38</sup> Max Haller, in: *ibid.*, 37

<sup>39</sup> Gerd Reinhold u.a., 1997, 618.

<sup>40</sup> Institutions are mentioned and defined differently in a wide and general sense or in a narrow sense. In the narrow sense, institutions can be organisations, associations, etc. Here, they are concerned with a structure to which persons belong. In the wide sense, they are conceived as procedures, which regulate behaviour. Therefore, they include associations, organisations, etc. whose functioning depends on the respective regulations. In this paper I shall concentrate mainly on the concept of institutions in the wider sense. (Cf. M. Schmidt 1995, 428.)

social action which stabilise human behaviour. They pre-structure the management of fundamental social reproductive problems such as generative reproduction, the supply of economic resources and the regulation of the socio-political system. Institutions are the result of social actions, but they are not results envisaged by each individual, instead they are a non-pre-programmed outcome of the actions of the social members. Institutions encompass the action of the individual when the latter internalises the social values and norms. At the same time, they prescribe how to behave and act. Therefore, institutions have regulations and norms which manifest themselves in formal and informal rights and obligations which simplify the social exchange and interaction of the individuals and groups so that they [the latter] enable the set-up of stable expectations in relation to the action of the others."<sup>41</sup>

In the framework of these institutions different interests come together. Institutions are regulations, guidelines, and barriers, which determine the freedom of an individual or a group in a society. They regulate not only what is to be done, but also how it may be done. The institutions of a political system also influence the process of political action. "The political system includes the political conceptions and the guidelines of action, the political authorities, institutions and regulations which aim at guaranteeing a peaceful and ordered life in the society and the protection of the citizens."<sup>42</sup>

Through the help of this system a course will be set for the functioning of the social structure and for the distribution of desired resources in the face of different social demands. In connection with the question of the distribution of resources, the problem of majority and minority in a socio-political system becomes one of the central points. While broaching the problems of minority, one is automatically concerned with prejudices, latent and open discriminations, suppressions, migration and expulsion of the minority by the majority. The minority is described as physical and territorial minority. Usually, the opposite is majority. Majority is a group, which has the social, economic and political power. Most importantly, the decisive factor here is not the quantity (territorially or numerically), but the possibility of exerting political, military and economic power. The precision of this differentiation will be discussed later on. But first I would like to return to the problem of minority.

The characteristics of the minorities within the group are internal unity and solidarity, which are based on ethnic background, cultural tradition and belongingness. But in relation to the majority and the outside world they are characterised by social exclusion, economic disadvantages and eventual physical extermination. A physical-territorial majority (a quantitative majority) can become an intellectual minority (qualitative minority); or a physical-territorial minority (quantitative minority) can become an intellectual majority (qualitative majority). In my opinion, in the first case, despite their numerical density, the members of this group are a minority. In a pluralistic society, by discriminating certain groups and by making the possibilities to qualify themselves difficult, the social system excludes the minorities from its socio-economic resources. Through this discrimination they are not only excluded from economic resources, but also the socialisation process and qualification chances are impeded. But the majority can possess attributed as well as acquired qualities. "Qualification generally means acquiring certain qualities; they are gained qualities. This conception applies to some extent to the concept of the elite: as far as qualification means

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 428.

<sup>42</sup> Hans-Rudolf Peters 1987, 9.

acquiring certain qualifying abilities, it highlights the individual achievement, which helps us to understand the concept of elite. In this context the concept of the elitism does not contain the qualities (such as power, prestige) of a group which are not acquired but attributed. The attributed qualities are privileges, which do not require personal qualification. They are gained through a special relation to the influential authorities or the social system and its values."<sup>43</sup>

In my opinion, a minority can be neither elite by birth (because of the descent), nor elite through social values (because it does not have an individual or a group qualification), nor elite through socio-political power (because its economic, military, political and cultural power is insignificant).<sup>44</sup> Therefore, I do not want to limit the concept of elitism to the holders of the top social positions in a society, as it would also apply to the chances of all members of the majority. By impeding socio-economic and socio-political self-fulfilment, qualification and success, the political system (a government, state, and a party) creates social structural inequality. This inequality is manifested by creating socio-economic strata and groups which base themselves on ethnic descent, race, sex, religion, region, patterns of organisation, division of labour, etc.<sup>45</sup>

The aim of development policy should be an active participation of all social members in the social, economic and political set-up of a society. The development policy of a state, government or party should encompass the institutional frameworks in such a way that these institutions further individual and collective creativity.<sup>46</sup> An efficacious formation of a political system contains two dimensions:

- The vertical dimension: democratic participation and rule of law, which enable an effective socio-political formation of a society.
- The horizontal dimension: justice, equality of all members, ethnic groups, religions, organisations, sex, etc.

Social stratification, political and economic structure characterise the respective social structure of a society. This structure and its political system are judged in regard to social equality, justice and democracy, which are the components of political culture. Therefore, the aim of social structure analysis is to discover the equality or inequality in a socio-political system. Moreover, this analysis concentrates on the functional interconnection of the political and economic system.

### **1.2.2 Economic system**

Economic system is the structure of regulating the use of common resources and organising the exchange relations of the private property. It is concerned with forms of labour and production, the structure of occupation and employment, which are preconditions for the micro- as well as the macro-sociological development.<sup>47</sup> "The economic system includes the subjects of economic development, the right to production and communication means,

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<sup>43</sup> Hans P. Dreitzel 1962, 66.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Gerd Reinhold et al. op.cit., 127f.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Johannes Müller, op.cit., 132

<sup>46</sup> Cf. ibid., 128.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. Gerd Reinhold et al., op.cit, 618.

economic principles of order, mechanisms, regulations in relation to general economic co-ordination system. In this system the interaction of the economic subjects should aim at a rational reduction of the scarcity of resources and the optimal fulfilment of basic material needs."<sup>48</sup>

Social equality or inequality, i.e. the structural homogeneity or heterogeneity, depends on the political system. That means, the respective political system can impede or further the economic development. Profession and education play the central roles in the theory and practice of development policy. These two factors not only determine the class stratification and formation of elite in the society, but are also the result of the latter in structurally heterogeneous societies. "The differences between age groups, generations and regions are not as conspicuous as those differences between education and professional classes. Even sex based differences are not as resistant as the differences in the context of profession and education."<sup>49</sup> In this sense, profession and education are not only factors which further the micro- as well as the macro-sociological development, but are also the indicators of belonging to a certain social class. Peter Blau elucidates this fact through his socio-economic parameter analysis. He differentiates between the interacting nominal and gradual parameters. The nominal parameter divides the members of a group without inherent stratification, even if empirically the membership has sometimes features, which point out the differences on the basis of social status. Sex, religious group, racial identification, profession and neighbourhood exemplify the nominal parameters. The gradual parameter differentiates the people according to status stratification. Basically, this stratification is continuous. Education, age, income, prestige and power belong to the gradual parameter.<sup>50</sup>

In connection with profession and education, this parameter analysis should be understood in the context of structural heterogeneity and inequality. Shortly, the analysis of the nominal parameter is concerned with belonging to a group, whereas the gradual parameter deals with the status. In this sense the first parameter analysis deals with inter-group relations. As an example, Blau contends - based on empirical discoveries - that the social relation between blacks and whites is not as frequent as within these groups. The status-role relationship-analysis, namely the analysis of gradual parameter, concentrates on the fact that the differences in the socio-economic status have negative consequences for friendship relationships and social contacts.<sup>51</sup>

What is the interaction between these parameters which points to the structural heterogeneity and inequality? Here it deals with the correlation of nominal and gradual parameters. In some cases there is a perfect correlation. Groups differentiate themselves in the setting of their respective status as well as in their belonging to a group, especially when a stratification of groups institutionalises itself. Casts are a good example of this institutionalised stratification of groups. Another example is the administrative structure of an organisation, which divides the members or employees in official grade differences with varying authority and personal rights.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Hans-Rudolf Peters 1987, 9.

<sup>49</sup> Anke Wahl 1997, 27.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Peter M. Blau, op.cit., 205

<sup>51</sup> Cf. ibid., 205.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. ibid., 207.

Because of the institutionalised limitations of contact between members of different groups, according to Blau, quasi-cast societies can emerge. The belonging to a group can earn either prestige and privilege or be a stumbling block for opportunities in profession and education. The structural functional fact, which is caused by parameter correlation, can penetrate all realms of social life. This social life is highly influenced by socio-economic prestige, education, income, wealth and power. As it is empirically seen in many societies, the repercussions are not only limited to the economic and political dimensions. The inter-group demarcations also determine marriages between the groups. This fact impedes the social co-existence and participative development.<sup>53</sup>

As it is shown above, the analysis of the economic system deals with labour, production, occupation and chances of occupation. All these factors are broached in the framework of preconditions of the socio-economic activities. The inter-group heterogeneity and inequality can be elucidated through the help of these preconditions. Social inequality means lasting socio-economic preconditions, which enable only some individuals of a society to attain their life goals. These privileges, at the same time, exclude the others from participating in the social and economic resources.<sup>54</sup>

Bernholz and Breyer call economic science the scarcity science. If each individual had all of what he needs in abundance, there would be no economics.<sup>55</sup> As Hradil says, in the context of economic development, the union of all generally accepted and desired human needs is a legitimate and universal aim, which everyone strives for. While working for this aim, some have better chances than others so as to realise this goal. This is the central focus of socio-economic inequality studies. Therefore, the economic policy deals not only with the material scarcity, but also with unequal social, political and economic chances. The already existing or the envisaged economic system and structures are some of the pivotal points of an economic policy. Since each individual has the right to social and natural resources - at least theoretically - labour division, distribution of resources, occupation, production and chances of profession play a central role in the development policy. In the face of social responsibility, the above mentioned resources also pertain to future generations. In the context of economic development policy and the political system and structure, the following questions should always be kept in mind:

1. "Which resources should be produced and in what amounts? How much should be produced?
2. Should we exploit more resources now or in the future? How much should be saved, how much should be invested?

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<sup>53</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 208.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Wahl, *op. cit.*, 57.

<sup>55</sup> In my opinion, there are two types of scarcities: absolute and relative scarcity. *Absolute scarcity* is a geometrical scarcity, which cannot be extended. Human beings can lessen the ecological dangers through an appropriate and conscious usage of the natural resources, but they cannot extend its geometrical size in the face of the limited natural resources. This limitedness is independent from the behaviour of the users. The *relative scarcity* is subject to the economic psychology. The modern liberal economic system is characterised by the economic competition. The natural resources are *declared* scarce. These resources must not be objectively scarce, nor the competitors poor. Only in relation to the other competitor one feels himself poor; he believes that what he has is less than what the competitor has; he wants to have more than the competitor has. In the face of these comparative economic relations, the competitors *declare* the material resources as scarce. (Cf. Büchele/Kitzmüller. In: Dumouchel/Dupuy 1999, 13ff). However, describing economics as science of scarcity does not negate this position. The economics can also be the science of this *invented* and *relative scarcity*. According to its psychology, the economics should invent this scarcity and it should be able to convey that the natural resources are scarce. Therefore, the economic ethics should deal not with the question 'if the economics is the science of scarcity', instead 'why it is the science of scarcity'.

3. How should the product and the necessary labour be divided? How should the income distribution be regulated?
4. Who takes major decisions by solving the problems enumerated questions 1-3?
5. What kind of regulations for decisions are given?"<sup>56</sup>

Since the social, political and economic systems can be understood only in the context of socio-political equality and justice, it is difficult to realise a good economic system without the inclusion of political decisions and interventions. The political system deals with the lebensraum of man and its conditions; therefore, the political decisions, ecological and economic policies are factors that are functionally inter-dependent. Because of the fact that natural resources are limited resources, and certain economic challenges such as the supply of public resources, security, clean air and water, care for the environment, etc., cannot be solved by the market mechanism, the inclusion and consultation of political decisions regulate the economic policy behaviour.<sup>57</sup>

The economic system and the economic order are usually conceived only in the context of economic growth; whereas, holistic human development is often not taken into consideration. But concepts such as social structure, social system and social order concern all realms of one's life. Therefore, the political decisions, which regulate the economic system and activity, have to be understood in the context of the basic social system and order. "If the supply of public resources and the meeting of individual needs can only be realised by the help of political decisions, the science of scarcity which deals with the minimisation of this scarcity cannot attain its goals without the inclusion of political decisions. Even leaving aside the existence of public resources, the central economic problems and the political aspect are so interwoven that one cannot trivialise this fact. In economic activity it should be regulated to whom the different pieces of land, buildings, machines and other resources belong; what kind of rights the owner of different objects has. Moreover, the procedures of acquiring and inheritance need political decisions. The functioning of pure market economy presupposes, hence, the existence of right to ownership, inheritance, etc."<sup>58</sup>

The regulative precautions and the legal system through the central government should not be conceived as a totally centralised planned economy. An unreasonable intervention of the central government can impair economic, political and human development. Political and economic freedom, social equality and justice in distribution of existing resources are the constituent elements of social order. The sociological and political dimension of the economy points to the social aspect of economics.<sup>59</sup> The three pivotal points in the development policy and economic system are:

- individual desire,
- scarce public resources and
- the distribution of these resources: distribution of income and resources, enabling different economic and political chances for different groups (which are based on sex, age, class, organisation, etc.).

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<sup>56</sup> Peter Bernholz/ Breyer Friedrich 1993, 12f.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 14.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 16.

The systemic interdependence of the social, political and economic factors are analogous to the functional inter-dependence of justice, development and peace. Freedom is, moreover, one of the most important factors in political and economic achievement. Let us take into consideration this factor in the framework of the "generally accepted aims of a society" (Hradil, 1987, 144). However, one should differentiate between the concepts "general" and "common". Here, "common" means a single aim of all, whereas "general" means similar aims with common elements.

In the economic and development policy the "generally accepted aim" is the reduction of the shortage of material wealth. The freedom from external constraints and the possible maximisation of the individual freedom are its preconditions. Freedom does not necessarily mean equality. Depending on different preconditions, equally free individuals can have quite different economic levels. In order to guarantee this, the liberal economic policy maintains that state and political organisations can intervene and to some extent determine the freedom of citizens only in order to enable freedom to each individual, to protect their political and economic rights and to settle and regulate conflicts. Even if the liberal political economy rejects a counterproductive intervention of the central government, its aim is to politically secure the economic development.<sup>60</sup> "The liberal economic theory concentrates on the prevention of political and economic restriction by individuals or groups which could have negative repercussions on the economic activity of the others. The right to private property helps to protect the individual in its private sphere and to enable its personal and economic development."<sup>61</sup>

It is the central point of the concept of freedom that certain rights of the individual are guaranteed. In the context of social inequality and injustice, Bernholz and Breyer differentiate between formal and material freedom. The freedom of a person cannot be determined only through constitution and legal system (formal freedom); but the appropriate room to move (material freedom) also decides the scope of freedom.<sup>62</sup> According to Bernholz and Breyer, material freedom is characterised by following points:

- "enough space for each individual to decide on its own interests;
- the participation of all in cases of decisions which pertain to numerous individuals,
- the reduction of dependence on other persons or groups as far as possible."<sup>63</sup>

Justice is the fundamental element of labour and production forms; it is indispensable for the significance of occupation and structure of profession, hence for the economic system. Equal chances and respect for the rights of others are essential elements of justice. To grant each individual equal right, and to treat each member equally means to create homogeneous structures. Moreover, those who are naturally disadvantaged should be helped in a special way.<sup>64</sup>

Another decisive fundament in economic systems is security and equality. In the face of striving to meet individual life aims, social inequality and macro-sociologically and legitimately recognised life goals, Hradil differentiates between economic and social

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<sup>60</sup> Cf. Günter Hedtkamp 1974, 47-48.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 48.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. Bernholz/Breyer, op. cit., 21.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 22.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. ibid., 22.



dimensions of inequality and the task of the welfare state. The economic dimension deals with the primary life goals, such as the meeting welfare needs and success; while, profession, income and education are the integral factors. The second life goal in an economic system is, according to Hradil, the dimension of overcoming social inequality. This life goal is concerned with the integration of marginalised groups and to further their struggle for emancipation and self-development. The third goal is to establish a welfare state. The welfare state secures the needs of existential security, i.e. ensuring safety in the crisis of unemployment and poverty, establishing favourable labour, leisure, settlement and ecological preconditions and the formation of democratic institutions.<sup>65</sup> Therefore, the central aim of the welfare state is social, economic and political security. This manifests itself in the stability and balance of the socio-economic system. "A system that, in spite of different unforeseen socio-economic irregularities, tends to social balances is capable of adaptation and proves stability. This fact helps to avoid lasting and influential fluctuations of income, supply of resources and distribution of jobs, and as a consequence, it increases security. Security means to guarantee the position of the members of a society and to prevent the emergence of social unhappiness, tensions, consequential upheavals and revolutions. These facts can interactively destabilise the security."<sup>66</sup>

### 1.2.3 Population structure

As we have seen, the production relations determine the social behaviour of the individual as well as of the community. And the production relations and the right of the individual to material and immaterial resources cannot be understood if they are separated from population structure and generative behaviour. In these social behaviour and relations culture functions as the principle of action and it limits the scope of the activities and freedom of the individual and collective unit. Usually, it is expected to act only with the help and under the control of the collective ratio. That is why the Kambata say - if confronted with an unusual behaviour of an individual or a group – *mannu ma yano* (what would the people say if you behave like that).

The socio-cultural and socio-structural situation involves male-female-relationships, family and kinship structures, the structures of age and class, number of children, fertility and its significance. "The generative behaviour means the attitudes of the members of a society which determine the number of children in a social group and family. These attitudes help to compare and indicate the different inter-cultural fertility level."<sup>67</sup>

Through its birth in a certain socio-cultural structure and through the personalisation of the social values, norms and socialisation of itself into the community, the individual begins to grow and actively participate in the already existing social institutions. By personalising the social structures and as a consequence, by becoming a part of them, the individual guarantees their existence. Hence, by caring for their existence, the individual makes these structures meaningful. "Individuality develops itself through the confrontation of the Ego with questions of the meaning of life in the process of personality development. The

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<sup>65</sup> Cf. A. Wahl, op. cit., 57f.

<sup>66</sup> Bernholz/Breyer, op. cit., 23.

<sup>67</sup> Kiefl und Schmid 1985, S.18). (Cited according to, Yvone Schütze 1992, 170.

meaning of life of the individual depends not only on the individual alone; its direction and coherence are also determined by the society. But ultimately, it is the individual itself, which forms and experiences it. Even if the individual takes on the socially recognised values and norms from the social institutions, it is each individual, which makes them meaningful. Values such as reproduction would be meaningless if they were not accepted and internalised by the individual. Otherwise they are ineffective and abstract. The individual should substantiate the values of generative behaviour. Otherwise, they are mechanisation of the existing patterns; or in this case, the individuals follow a blind biological instinct."<sup>68</sup>

In relation to generations' relation and generative behaviour, the economic dimension is one of the determining factors of the conditions of behaviour. In generative behaviour the number of children is the central issue that is determined by cultural norms and preconditions. Therefore, it has to be discussed as part of social structure. The issue of the number of children is a fact that depends on the respective time and region. This conditionality can have either negative or positive repercussions on generative behaviour. In the following sections I would like to discuss the economic dimension from various perspectives.

### **1.2.3.1. Negative generative behaviour**

The personal decision in favour of or against having children is an individual matter.<sup>69</sup> In the face of socio-economic structures, an individual personalises the social prescriptions, which determine the behaviour of the members of a society. These prescriptions are coined by legal regulations, social models, economic perspectives and regional life circumstances. In relation to generative behaviour, this personalisation grants the society a structured profile: the socio-demographic structure. The socio-demographic structure deals with the capability of biological adaptation, which develops itself to socio-economic and socio-cultural structure.

In many economic approaches of demographic studies the rationalisation of industrial societies is considered as the main reason for the demographic decrease.<sup>70</sup> Yvone Schütze calls this factor, which is based on this rational choice, the economic factor. Socio-psychologically, a woman evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of having a child before she decides to give up her profession. Kiefl and Schmid describe the economic-individual behaviour and negative attitude of men and women towards having children as follows:

- "Children cause material costs.
- They cause physical and psychological exhaustion for the parents. Moreover, they take up parents' time for leisure, holidays, etc.
- They cause housing problems.
- Because of children a woman would have problems with her professional activity.
- Especially, in difficult times such as war, ecological catastrophes, etc., those with children have more problems and responsibility."<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid., 196.

<sup>69</sup> Even in the traditional societies where the clan structure exerts a considerable pressure on each individual to have children, primarily, it is the individual, which wants to materialise its will to self-realisation (socially, politically, economically, and religiously). Although it gives the impression that the individual in the traditional societies lives for its community, it is the individual, which needs the community to attain its various goals. (cf. Section 5.2.1 below)

<sup>70</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 171.

<sup>71</sup> Cited according to *ibid.*, 172.

Hence, having children is negatively conceived on the grounds of economic and personal rationalisation. Children, which are a hindrance for economic development and personal self-realisation in the developed world, are *the* economic engines in the developing countries. I shall come to this point later on. But now I would like to return to the situation of the developed world.

Basically, even the people in the developed countries are not against having children. As many data and empirical studies show, the wish to have children has not decreased. In spite of this, it is the competition of values, which became a big challenge for having many children. Yvone Schütze maintains that the change of values in modern societies considerably determines generative behaviour, especially of women. On the one hand, the wish to have children; on the other hand, the strive for independence, happen to contradict each other. According to Schütze, this conflict of values does not necessarily lead to the decrease of the wish to have children. If there are good facilities for the care of children, enough kindergarten or similar favourable conditions which reduce contradictions between professional and family activities, the wish to have children, even in the industrialised societies with plural values, will not abate in spite of the level of education which is usually conceived as the main impediment to having children.<sup>72</sup>

There are also individuals who say they do not want to have children in this world which is overwhelmed by an exaggerated consumption desire. Through this attitude they want to protest against the society which is only directed by material wealth.

Obviously, the plurality of values, the struggle for independence, the desire for the self-fulfilment of women can influence the population structure and generative behaviour. These factors base themselves on *methodological individualism* (Nauck 1992). The backbone of this methodological individualism is the *expansion of the biographical universe* (Birg 1992). That means, the biographical freedom and possibilities are considerably increasing. This is enabled by economic competition, specialisation, etc., which multiply the possibilities of economic existence and which are the characteristic features of the capitalistic economy. "In the modernisation process the biographical universe is expanding itself. As a consequence of the high tendency to specialisation - which is caused by the obligation to choose a specific professional activity -, the inter-sequential biographical mobility is abating. The result of this is avoidance of any lasting biographical pinning, for example, in families. Therefore, the reproduction rate has considerably decreased, and because of this a big amount of population migration into the developed countries will be necessary."<sup>73</sup>

According to Birg, in the modern economic system that is characterised by economic competition, the risk of irreversible biographical pinning is the main challenge of generative behaviour.<sup>74</sup> Birg maintains this theory from the perspective of the rational choice model. This is a strategy of evaluation of losses and gains in generative behaviour. According to Birg, in a modern society with multiple values, the point is not the *change of values* (Schütze 1992), instead the *change of behaviour*.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 180ff.

<sup>73</sup> Herwig Birg 1992, 206.)

<sup>74</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 213f.

<sup>75</sup> In this differentiation between "changed behaviour" and "change of values" it should be noted that the approach to different values has changed; but the previous values are not replaced by new ones. (Cf. Bernhard Nauck 1992, 245.)

One of the important characteristics of the present economic system is the attempt to raise production through specialisation and professionalisation. The technical development and scientific discoveries are exerting a heavy pressure on people. This trend demands a socio-economic and socio-psychological fitness from each member of the society. The process of industrialisation has become the process of rationalisation. Dreitzel calls the rationalisation in connection with social structure the scientification of economic and social life, which professionalises the occupation.<sup>76</sup> According to Dreitzel, the industrial society finds itself in a social structure of élitism through which occupational ability and occupational achievement have become the decisive productive means. In this social structure of élitism the rise to a higher social status has become a decisive socio-economic parameter. But this takes place only when additional achievements and qualifications are possessed<sup>77</sup>. In the face of this fact, an irreversible biographical pinning (such as children) impede the individual rationalisation process.

### **1.2.3.2 Positive generative behaviour**

#### **1.2.3.2.1 A political-expansionistic perspective**

The starting position of a political expansionistic perspective is the conception of social Darwinism. It can be observed in many traditional societies that many lineages and clans are convinced that they can survive only if they organise themselves as a single group. This survival philosophy is caused by the fear that if they are numerically smaller than others, they could be swallowed by them. In the societies where polygamy is practised, this perspective plays an important role. Taking into consideration the history of slavery in many African societies, the women played a decisive role in this context. They could *provide* children for their husbands and lords, since the prestige of a man depended on the number of children he had; they are the symbol of his socio-political power. The interaction between having many children and lineage members, political power and wealth can be briefly depicted as follows: When a lineage became powerful, its members could go to rob more slaves. For example, in the societies where gold mines were widely practised, to have a big number of slaves meant, to accumulate big gold reserves. This gold reserve established the internal power of the eldest of the group and facilitated the chances of robbery of more slaves. Those who had many slaves could clear a big piece of land covered by rain forest and produce food in surplus. This food surplus enhanced the productive force, which was indispensable for production of more gold; those who owned more gold had also more internal power and more slaves. This shows the interdependence of political-expansionistic and economic-utilitarian perspectives.

The fact that a society sees a potential enemy in the others is a social psychological fact and it bases itself on the projection of its own hatred. The expansionistic wishes express this fact. Social Darwinism becomes the survival philosophy. Steinecke comments on the attitude of some medical doctors in the NS-era as follows: "The fight for existence namely to survive or to be exterminated was the existential question. There were some who occupied themselves with the idea that only those who exterminate others, seize their lebensraum,

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<sup>76</sup> Cf. Hans P. Dreitzel 1962, 76.

<sup>77</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 80.

articles of food and needs of life, who impose their will and secure the welfare of their group and who own the ingenious and creative beings with moral virtues can survive and become powerful. The war is a part of this strategy."<sup>78</sup> Therein, Steinecke says that politicians and many doctors in Germany had warned the German people against the dangers of decreasing population and the consequential extinction of the German people. The Blacks and Slavs were seen as the biggest threat, but not the British or the French. Furthermore, Steinecke says that many participants of the discourse wished a population of between 90-100 million as counterweight to Slavs and Blacks for Germany.<sup>79</sup>

#### **1.2.3.2.2 The economic-utilitarian perspective**

This perspective deals with how the children foster economic growth by contributing to the family budget when they are old enough to perform physical work. When the parents become old, they are old age security.<sup>80</sup> In the context of generative behaviour, Nauck differentiates between the traditional, irrational and blind conformism which is guided by understanding cultural inheritance on the one hand, and economic utilitarian rationalisation of having children, on the other hand. It is rational if the investment costs do not exceed the yielded advantage.<sup>81</sup> The aim of the economic utilitarian rationalisation is to alleviate the economic burden through performance of labour and increasing of income.

Obviously, in the economically and industrially developed countries the economic utilitarian rationalisation of having children does not play a role any more, since financially, the parents are hardly dependent on their children. Even the political expansionistic perspective has no significance any more in these societies. But in patriarchal and patrilineal societies, which are not yet industrialised, the economic utilitarian perspective plays an important role. That is why this perspective is connected with the privileges of male children.<sup>82</sup>

The other side of the political expansionistic objective is the expectation of economic utilitarian advantages. In the traditional pre-industrial societies, which practise polygamy, it is the socio-economic strategy, which determines the generative behaviour and the generation relation. In polygamous societies men have many wives in different distant places. These wives and their children guarantee the economic power of the husband and the family as a whole. Therefore, this sociological behaviour aims at economic utilitarian expansion as its objective. The high reproduction rate enlarges the political influential sphere, secures the maximisation of economic advantages and raises the social status.

These factors have a functional relation with the success of reproduction, hence the material resources; and they set a course in striving for prestige, esteem, power, which are the symbolic capital.<sup>83</sup> The functional relation here is the interaction between reproductive success, property, power and prestige. "The human beings do all they can in order to maximally reproduce themselves in comparison to their rivals. They realise this by taking

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<sup>78</sup> Verena Steinecke 1996, 245f.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 244f.

<sup>80</sup> Cf. Nauck, *op. cit.*, 246.

<sup>81</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 244. 248.

<sup>82</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 248f.

<sup>83</sup> Cf. Michael J. Casimir and Aparna Rao 1992, 272.

advantage of all socio-economic possibilities in the respective society. The different individual successes on this socio-economic basis can influence the reproduction rate of each member of the group."<sup>84</sup> However, even if both successes are interdependent, concerning prestige, esteem, power and respect, the economic success plays the dominant role and reproductive success the secondary role. A poor man does not enjoy any social esteem, even if he has many children. Not even his own relatives respect him.<sup>85</sup>

#### **1.2.3.2.3 The socio-psychological perspective**

According to Nauck, the expectation of psychological satisfaction from children is not rational. He substantiates his assertion that psychological satisfaction can also be attained with few children. If one has many children, the economic problem increases, since in generative behaviour the economic dimension plays the dominant role. At the same time, he underlines that in cases of childlessness the psychological satisfaction will not be met.<sup>86</sup> According to Nauck, the non-rationality of expectation of psychological utility from children is that the quantity of children and the psychological satisfaction do not have direct proportionality. One or two children can meet the psychological satisfaction as equally as four or more do it.

The analysis of Schütze holds another position. By analysing the advantages and disadvantages and taking one's decision - if one should have children and if, how many -, an individual acts rationally. The rationality bases itself on the calculation of "opportunity costs" (Opportunitätskosten), i.e. on the potential economic and psychological gain.<sup>87</sup> She quotes the result of the research of Kiefl and Schmid as follows: "Having children, the parents feel that they have become mature. Through birth and upbringing of children the parents begin to avoid egoist interests and develop social feelings and responsibility. To have a family means an emotional protection from frustration. It helps to overcome the a-personalisation in the modern industrial society. Children can help as objects of common care and affection to stabilise the parents' partnership. The birth of a child causes changes in the life of the parents and makes it more interesting. They experience their childhood again. Children can secure in the developing countries the power, influence and prestige of the parents. The expectation of economic advantage is an important utilitarian perspective which, however, does not exist any more in modern societies."<sup>88</sup>

Social psychologically, children intensify the relation in the family such as preventing divorces. They increase the affective family formation. In many societies the number of children increases the social status of the parents. For different cultural philosophies and religious attitudes the "name" and nature of a person have the same value. Through children, especially male children, the "name" of their fathers and family will be eternalised.<sup>89</sup> If one takes into consideration the different traditional societies and their cultural philosophies, there are interesting ideal contradictions. When is an action rational? In our context, a rational

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<sup>84</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 273.

<sup>85</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 275.

<sup>86</sup> Cf. Nauck, *op. cit.*, 248.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. Yvonne Schütze *op.cit.*, 171f.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, 172.

<sup>89</sup> Cf. Nauck, *op. cit.*, 246.

action is based on a conditional imperative, not on a categorical one. That means, the theories of rational action are related to the means (to attain the envisaged goal), but not to the aims of an action as such. Hence, an action is rational if someone does something, which he believes it is the best for him.<sup>90</sup>

One could understand it in such a way that children are merely instrumentalised. The assertion of Nauck according to whom psychological satisfaction can be attained even with two or more children is disputable. Many empirical cases prove that the number of children play a decisive role for psychological satisfaction. This fact can be observed in some traditional societies in which the striven social status and, along with it, the psychological satisfaction are not yet attained after two or three children. As conclusion of the question to which extent the generative behaviour and the generation relation influence the population structure and social structure, the following statement can be concluded: In the cases of political expansionism, economic utilitarianism as well as social psychology, the action of man is determined by utilitarian expectations. The inter-generation relations and generative behaviour, which are influenced by the respective cultural ways of thinking and economic situation, can be discovered by the advantage-disadvantage-analysis.

In their generative behaviour the members of a society act rationally in order to cope with their different economic and social problems. The economic dimension of social generative behaviour cannot be understood isolated. The settlement system is a part of the social behaviour, which shows what strategies the members of a society invent to cope with their socio-economic problems.

#### **1.2.4 System of settlement**

One of the focal points of the social structure analysis is the social inequality. Social structure points out *per definitionem* social patterns of action and their regularities. Here the conceptual danger is the concept; "structure" entails conventionality.<sup>91</sup> The kernel of social inequality is the non-conventionality of the political and economic system, which touches and determines the structure of population and the forms of settlement. This is the anthropocosmic structure of man's life: man is affected in his totality, since his intellectual self-fulfilment is determined by the physical circumstances.

Settlement forms and settlement structures are the consequences and manifestations of the situation of social positions, of political participation and of the economic level of the respective people. This fact characterises the centre-satellite-model whose consequences have geographical, economic and social repercussions. "The centres are geographically the agglomerations, economically the industrialised areas and socially the higher classes. The satellites are peripheries around the big cities where the poorest people live and the hinterland. In the industrialised societies it is the agricultural, mountainous areas and southern Europe. In the developing countries the peripheries are the neglected hinterlands, the slums around the big cities, the marginalised and the unemployed who have come (been brought) from the countryside to the cities."<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> Cf. Gerd Reinhold et al. Op.cit., 515.

<sup>91</sup> Conventionality points here to fixed regularities of behaviour, mutual agreement and common consent of different groups, societies or stratification.

<sup>92</sup> Rodolf H. Strahm 1985, 27.

This social inequality manifests itself in the settlement forms and social segregation. The factors mentioned above, especially the economic factor, characterise the inequality, which is caused by the settlement system whereby the problem is rather the general social structure and its priorities than a lack of economic dynamic.<sup>93</sup> The central problem of settlement structure is urban bias, migration from the hinterland and the creation of slums. They have also an interactive relationship. Korff writes the following about the origin of urban bias: "In the 1960s urbanisation was considered as a precondition for modernisation and a sign of modernity. The institutions and persons who were indispensable in the modernisation process and the capital necessary for industrialisation were concentrated in the cities. The material infrastructure necessary for economic development such as ports, airports, railways were constructed in and around cities. The ethnically heterogeneous states with artificial boarder lines made the cities their economic and political basis. Almost all new states faced separatism and civil war after their independence. In these states the central government controlled mostly the capital city. The capital city was the basis of national integration and territorial control and the centre of national institutions and national symbols (national museums, monuments, etc.). The cities were considered as kernel of change, of modernisation and of innovative impulse towards the hinterland."<sup>94</sup>

Lipton describes urban bias as a one-sided development of economic and political systems. This development characterises a systemic tendency to favour only some sectors.<sup>95</sup> We have already described this phenomenon as structural heterogeneity. The theories of Korff and Lipton support the same position that because of over-centralisation, the urban bias can be called capital city bias, even if with the growth of other cities and with their political and economic significance, the over-centralisation of the capital cities abates. However, the perennial effects of capital city bias cannot be played down. The fact that in some countries, for example, the well-qualified teachers teach in the cities and the teachers with low educational level are sent into the countryside is a proof of this structural heterogeneity. This structural preferential treatment incites an inferiority complex in the population of the countryside. This fact creates a psychological as well as economic and political gulf.

Concerning urban bias, imbalance between sectors is the central phenomenon. The secondary economic sector is extended at the cost of the primary one, especially in the export-import-orientated societies. The population of the countryside has hardly any access to the production and consumption of the secondary economic sector products. Lipton calls this the industrial bias, even though he prefers urban bias to industrial bias.<sup>96</sup> The consequence of urban bias is urbanisation, which is the result of structural heterogeneity. This is one of the main reasons why people migrate from the countryside.

Hence, the second central problem of the settlement structure is migration from the countryside. The multidimensionality of the cause of migration from the land bases itself on metropolitanisation policy of big and capital cities, which extensively furthers the infrastructures of these cities. In the poor developing countries, articles of food coming from

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<sup>93</sup> Cf. Manfred Wöhlcke 1989, 86.

<sup>94</sup> Rüdiger Korff 1997, 140.)

<sup>95</sup> Cf. Michael Lipton 1977, 44.

<sup>96</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 60.



abroad as food aid are firstly distributed in the cities,<sup>97</sup> not because the majority of the poor people of the country lives in the cities, but rather because the infrastructures to distribute the aid goods are more convenient in the cities than in the countryside. The fact that many government buildings, the seats of international organisations and embassies are built in the capital and big cities incites a superiority complex in the people of the cities, in relation to the ones of the countryside. Hauser writes, about the cause and effect of these facts as follows: "The push-factors are: bad occupational possibilities in the countryside, unfavourable combination of relations of inadequate production, property and sales and increasing population pressure. Moreover, peoples migrate from the countryside in order to escape the traditional restraints of life in villages and clan community or 'inferior' labour in the countryside. The pull-factors are for example better income possibilities, educational chances, health service."<sup>98</sup>

According to Hauser, additional social factors, which cause the people to migrate from the countryside, are the attractions of urban life, where there is lack of control by law, police and clan system. That means, migrants will enjoy their freedom in the slums.<sup>99</sup> This is a very disputable argument. In many cities just the opposite is true. Many countries do not have police control in the countryside, and policemen strictly watch the slum-dwellers. The second social advantage, according to Hauser, is the mutual help in the slums when the members from the same ethnic, religious and cultural group come together and continue to live their traditional social system.<sup>100</sup> In my opinion, this cannot be the cause of migration; it rather facilitates the life in the slums.

Hauser discovered that mainly the productive group migrates from the countryside. The age of the migrants is mostly between 15 and 29, and they have relatively good educational level. In relation to the psychological variables, he classifies them as a class, which likes taking risks. In the face of this fact, he maintains that the rural sector suffers from a brain drain since the most capable, intelligent, productive and physically and psychologically healthiest desert the countryside.<sup>101</sup> Better income and employment aim not only at economic success, but they also give these young people a feeling of a better socio-psychological personal value and social esteem.

The third central problem in the settlement structure is slum and squatter settlements. Usually, there is a locative-qualitative and legalistic difference between the slums and squatter settlements. "Squatter settlements are illegal outskirts' settlements which expand themselves unhampered on the occupied land. Their severe need of lodging causes the homeless to occupy some areas to dwell in. They are outside of the infrastructure and development of the nation. Their legal status is uncertain. Even though the real slums are impoverished quarters, they are legal settlements."<sup>102</sup> The UNO documents of the beginning of the 70s describe the squatter settlements as uncontrolled settlements. The locative as well as the qualitative differentiation between slums and squatter settlements becomes more and more difficult. In

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<sup>97</sup> Cf. Korff, op. cit., 143f.

<sup>98</sup> Jürg A. Hauser 1991, 506.

<sup>99</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 506.

<sup>100</sup> Cf., *ibid.*, 507.

<sup>101</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 498-503.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, 514.

many cities the slum quarters become the birthplaces of squatter settlements. Control by policemen is easier in the outskirts (squatter settlements) than in the slum areas. The relatives or friends of those who already live in the slums build their huts of clay, straw, corrugated iron, wood and plastic in these slum areas.<sup>103</sup> Since there is no hygienic control, no sewage and waste disposal and no control of water quality in the slum areas, they are cut off from the supply of infrastructures. Most of the slum houses were in former times luxury houses of rich people and built according to the city master plan. These slums develop themselves to squatter settlements, and are being built even on pavements.

The migrants - because of their age and their socio-economic challenge - develop a considerable ingenuity and creativity. Such communities have good social structures and security nets.<sup>104</sup> The prohibitions by the executive authorities usually did not solve the problem. Amelioration of life conditions<sup>105</sup> and employment chances in the countryside are the only solutions of the problem.<sup>106</sup> "(1). An effort should be made to minimise the imbalances of employment possibilities and general life conditions between the countryside and the city. (2). The creation of jobs in the urban areas does not solve the problem of unemployment in the cities. On the contrary, more jobs in the urban areas can lead to high urban unemployment, because for every new created job two or three labour forces migrate from the rural areas. (3). An uncontrolled expansion of education sector leads to new migration and unemployment."<sup>107</sup>

A segregation settlement policy and structure is like racist societies wherein on the grounds of the social origin and ethnic belonging, the social demarcation determines the qualitative-locative life. The settlements of the rich are quarters of villas, whereas the ones of the poor are impoverished districts. These divisions are directly related to the respective income. The quarters of the impoverished are usually high-density settlements, and those of the rich citizens are known as low-density settlements.<sup>108</sup> This socio-structural settlement heterogeneity characterises the life circumstances in many metropolitans of the poor countries, and the socio-economic differences, which show the extreme contradictions. "The global integration of metropolitans characterises the global similarity of architecture of trade quarters, hotels, supermarkets, apartment houses and the similarity of problems with which the metropolitans are confronted. More than any other cities, they typify diversity and heterogeneity caused by local, national and global concentrations and differences. In many metropolitans' there are modern economies; global finance markets; international banks; money lenders who march in the slums to collect their debts; multinational pieces of land, settlements, houses and apartments and international development managers and experts on one hand; and informal sectors and huts of migrants on the other hand, who exist side by side. It is amazing to observe how these structures normalise themselves after catastrophes such as civil war, massacre, earthquake, etc."<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> Cf. Folker Fröbel, Jürgen Heinrichs and Otto Kreye 1974, 60

<sup>104</sup> Cf. Hauser, op. cit., 516.

<sup>105</sup> Cf. Norbert Kersting 1994, 7.

<sup>106</sup> Cf. Hauser, op. cit., 513.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid., 532.

<sup>108</sup> Cf. Kersting, op. cit., 21.

<sup>109</sup> Korff, op. cit., 144.

### 1.3 What is culture?

Which realms of human life does culture concern? Is culture limited only to the human lebensraum or does it concern the human being itself? In the daily language culture is conceived as theatre, opera, art, music, architecture, etc. Since culture generally concerns the man's capability of adaptation and his disposition, it touches all realms of human life. Goethe asserts that "everything that the human being does 'cultivates' him".<sup>110</sup> Man's deeds influence, enrich or restrain his self-fulfilment. In a simplified form, culture has to be understood as the totality of the typical forms of life of a society including the fundamental spiritual dispositions and value systems.<sup>111</sup> That means without social group there is no culture. At the same time no society can exist without culture. Culture and society are essentially and functionally interdependent. In order to systematise my thoughts, I would like to define culture as the social principle of order and the social principle of action, and discuss these definitions separately. In the definitions, the thoughts of Rousseau about society will be briefly discussed.

But before presenting the definitions I would like to explain why I have chosen to discuss the thoughts of Rousseau, especially the *social contract*, for the culture analysis, and which similarities there are between the Kambata understanding of culture and the thoughts of Rousseau. In his social contract Rousseau emphasises that the people themselves, the sovereign, are the only lawmakers. The legislative power is not representable at all. The power of the people can be handed over only for executive purposes; i.e. the executive authorities are just agents and commissioners of the legislative power of the people. I call this the *legislative restriction*. But by conferring the power to materialise the legislation the social members endow the agents and commissioners with the *executive legitimacy*.<sup>112</sup>

The culture of the Kambata contains a similar idea. When the Kambata speak about the term *annakkanne wogu/ayyanu* (the law, habit, culture of our fathers) they are re-actualising the laws enacted by their forefathers. It is not a static remembering; it is rather re-actualisation, perennial application and supra-generation recognition of the enacted laws. These laws are not conceived as something written by previous generations. Any following generation is not a passive recipient of the laws; instead it identifies itself with these supra-generation laws, habits and culture. When one says to his fellow Kambata, *annakkanne woga baissot* (don't violate the law of our fathers) he is taking care to maintain the perennial applicability of the law of his forefathers. The term "our fathers" does not refer to any particular individuals who lived somewhen. It means instead, the people who had determined the history of the Kambata. Therefore, these fathers are not historically definite individuals but are those who enacted laws and guaranteed their supra-generation applicability. At the same time each member of each generation is a lawmaker within the social framework and with his social members. In the face of any violation of laws, it is said as an admonition, *badu ma yano* (what would the people, country, village say!). The social members are not only making laws, but are also judging whether or not the individual behaviour suits the cultural norms. Through the inter-generation social contract the inter-generation laws are legitimised.

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<sup>110</sup> Cf. Richard von Weizsäcker 1978, 7.

<sup>111</sup> Cf. Senghaas 1998, 150.

<sup>112</sup> Cf. Rousseau, social contract, Book II, Chapter 1.

However, the general will of the Kambata bases itself on unjust socio-cultural structures. As we shall see in the second part of this paper, the society of the Kambata consists of hundreds of clans with different social status. Because of this inequality it is not easy to compare with the democratic idealism of Rousseau, according to which the *total alienation*<sup>113</sup> and social equality are the pillars of the *social contract*.

Even if there are no legislative representations in the society of the Kambata, one should differentiate between the macro-sociological and micro-sociological levels. On the macro-sociological level there are no representations. Even the potters and slaves participate in different meetings and express their ideas although they cannot be elected as executive agents of the Kambata legislation. On the micro-sociological level the family-father or the eldest represents the interests of the family. He consults or informs his wife and/or children. The quality of the micro-sociological democracy varies from family to family. In the language of Rousseau this representation by the family-father or the eldest is called natural aristocracy.<sup>114</sup>

Today the political situation is changing the culture of the Kambata. The inherited inequality is being superseded by the acquired inequality, i.e. through the modern education system the eldest and family-fathers are becoming more and more insignificant. Their traditional political role is taken over by their educated sons and daughters. This issue will be discussed in the second part of the paper.

In my opinion, the studies on the democratisation process of the African societies should concentrate on the problematic of the democratic representation in many African traditional cultures. Through the example of the Kambata I am tempted to assert that many of the African conflicts are caused by the fact that a macro-sociological representation is against the African culture. In the micro-sociological representation there is a kind of supernatural power, which legitimises the authorisation of the representatives. This power is the common spirit of the forefathers. This is a gerontocratic political system where the elders, those who fully possess the spiritual power of the elders, can legitimately represent a family, lineage or clan. But the problem of the representative legitimacy on the macro-sociological level is that there are no extensive and common democratic interest articulations, since many traditional groups have built a specific clan oriented social system of small groups. In the modern nation building system these different groups are put together without having established common articulations of interests and without a common supernatural bond.

In order to explain the super-naturalised politics, I would like to mention another example of the socio-political system of the Kambata, which will be discussed in details in the second part of the paper. There are two main traditional associations of the Kambata: *ilami sera* and *hera*. The first one is the association of the clan members with a strong political identity. The second one is a burial association whose central elements are imposing sanctions, assistance in cases of economic crises, etc. Whereas the first one is legitimised by

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<sup>113</sup> It is a total entrustment of the individual to the community. By entrusting itself to the community the individual gains his freedom and equality. If all entrust themselves to the members of the social contract totally, there cannot be any injustice and exploitation in the socio-political system. "Each of us puts into the common pool, and under the sovereign control of the general will, his person and all his power. And we, as a community, take each member unto ourselves as an indivisible part of the whole." (Ibid., Book I, Chapter 6). Rousseau's thought of total alienation as well as the cultural demand of the Kambata for this total alienation of the individual are not only unrealistic, but they are also counterproductive, since they overdo the necessity of the community on the account of the individual. That means, there is no balance between the role of the individual and that of the community in the economic and social interaction.

<sup>114</sup> Cf. Ibid., Book III, Chapter 5.

the supernatural power of the forefathers, the second one is not based on supernatural power, since members of different clans belong to it; therefore, it has no political identity. Parallel to Rousseau's democratic understanding they are characterised by frequent meetings.<sup>115</sup> All the above mentioned inter-individual interactions are the fundamental constituents of the culture of the Kambata.

### 1.3.1 Culture as the social principle of order

The typical characteristic of communitarian man according to Rousseau's theory is the mutual dependence of the members of the communitarian society. Mutuality is dependence. According to Rousseau, man is weak if he is dependent. The dependence, weakness or strength of man can be understood in the context of man in the society. These facts point to the relative functional relation. The strong members are dependent on the weak because their political and economic power bases itself on the disadvantages of the latter. The weak ones are dependent on the strong since their survival is at the mercy of the latter; hence, they are existentially dependent.

The love for the material (object-related love) on the one hand, and the strive for esteem and acceptance (self-related love) on the other hand, determine the social situation. According to Rousseau, the scarcity of the natural resources caused by certain nature catastrophes, and along with it, the ownership and the necessity to work, are the realities, which created the social life. Hence, this life had to be regulated in order to protect the weak from oppression. Culture had to bring a regulating justice. The so-called *political culture* is, therefore, the regulation of the social life.

Culture envisages to establishing or maintaining social order and to forming a reality. Häberlin divides the cultural possibilities of man into three components: aesthetics, logic and ethics.

Aesthetics: "The formal side of the idea, i.e. the idea of order as such forms the principle of aesthetics. The object is beautiful by representing the eternal order; it will be seen as beautiful if in it the eternal harmony of all things is visible. In the aesthetic conception the special quality of an object can be even more perfectly abstracted; it will be considered only in this sense."<sup>116</sup> The material aesthetic dimension of culture works on the fact that the human society expresses its fantasy and sense of beauty through the help of feasts, games and art.<sup>117</sup>

Logic deals in this dimension of principle of order with the cognition, which determines the place of an object in relation to its world. By occupying its proper place, an object forms an orderly world.<sup>118</sup> The third component of culture, ethics, deals with the meaningfulness of all beings. When a thing is abused, it is stripped of its value. The subject, who observes, considers, meets and treats an object, manipulates the value of the object. If the object does not correspond to the expectation of the subject, it will be considered as bad object.

These aesthetics, logic and ethics of an object can analogously apply to the social aesthetics, logic and ethics. By establishing social order through mutual help and harmony

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<sup>115</sup> Cf. Ibid., Book III, Chapter 13.

<sup>116</sup> Wolfgang Stegmüller 1978, 332.

<sup>117</sup> Cf. ibid., 332f.

<sup>118</sup> Cf. ibid., 334ff.

(aesthetics), through the right localisation of the being and its acceptance (logic), through justice and the avoidance of egoistic interests (ethics), the social man fulfils his cultural duty in the community. The communality and common interests of handling individuals and the object of the common activity foster the individual. Hence, the individual is the life of the culture in which it acts.

In its positive<sup>119</sup> phenomenon, culture is a unifying principle of the self-organisation of human society.<sup>120</sup> This unity is possible only if the members agree to obey the principles of social self-disciplining. According to Freud, this social self-disciplining and order can take place only if the socially sanctioned values are internalised.<sup>121</sup> Furthermore, Freud stresses that the central task of the culture is the controlling of aggression and possibly a peaceful regulation of social relationships.<sup>122</sup> By treating culture as a principle of order, culture itself is the cause and effect of this order. By growing in a certain culture, an individual socialises itself and takes over the cultural principles. By respecting social norms and values, it guarantees the existence of culture. Through this socialisation and personalisation the social world will be created. Thurn calls culture the meaningful set-up of social world. The individual can only step by step seize this social world by thinking, feeling and handling.<sup>123</sup>

The interaction between the handling man, the existing nature and the way of handling (social structure) makes culture. Through this functional relation the acting individual obtains its identity. "The individual makes use of his intellectual dispositions and acts in the nature. This setting in action of mind and feeling is originally psycho-genetic. But for its realisation it needs a socio-genetically-determined communicative milieu. Only when the acting man succeeds in reconciling the dualism of nature and culture, setting the individual cognitive and affective capability of transformation into action and leading to the triad of culture, nature and social structure, can he obtain his identity."<sup>124</sup>

The human being not only makes use of the existing nature, but brings also order and sense into his thinking, actions and feelings. This unity within oneself is the basis for the creation of the social world. According to Thurn, fostering of reason - in relation to the philosophy of enlightenment - and taming of the feeling and instincts of man are the preconditions so that the culture expands itself also to the non-intellectual dimensions of man. This is a holistic formation of man. In this sense culture is nothing but self-cultivation of man, in order to create a meaningful social world, to form and perfect the existing nature and to make use of it.

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<sup>119</sup> Various oppressing structures can emerge in a culture. By treating culture in relation to the fact that it is the principle of order, I do not mean that the economic, social and political inequalities are automatically eradicated by culture. Competition, strive for power, esteem, etc., are results of the cultural man. The aim of culture is the establishment of social order, but the individual interests do not always correspond to the common interests. Moreover, the determinants in structuring a culture are mostly the rich, intellectuals, political leaders and the powerful. The poor and weak ones are subordinate to these influential individuals and they have to accept the social structure set up by the latter. Furthermore, those who belong to other cultures, religions, races and those have different views will be disadvantaged or even exterminated in the name of culture.

<sup>120</sup> Cf. Hans Peter Thurn 1976, 31.

<sup>121</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 48.

<sup>122</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 49.

<sup>123</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 105.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, 106.

### 1.3.2 Culture as the social principle of action

Through the essays of Rousseau on the origin of social symbiosis I have tried above to describe the beginning of culture. Brugger defines culture as the cultivation and fostering of human talents beyond the primitive state.<sup>125</sup> Hence, culture is intellectual formation. Rousseau holds that man did not have the reason in the primitive state. And Kierkegaard maintains that the man of the primitive state of justice had only a dreaming spirit. If we put the assertions of Rousseau and Kierkegaard together, the formation of intellect is the formation of culture.

If the nature is something positive (existing) and culture means the action of man in the nature, this action of man in the nature presupposes - so that it is free and conscious - the intellect. The intellect can be formed and developed when the talent to create a culture is formed. The origin and basis of this talent is nature itself. To complete the human-innate as well as the ecological-positive nature is the goal of culture.<sup>126</sup> The cultivation of man which is orientated towards the person itself as well as towards the objects contains personal culture (such as language, community, science, ethical norms and religion) and an object-related culture (such as technique and art).<sup>127</sup> Hence, culture spans all realms of human life, and the intellectual formation of man elucidates all spheres of his activities. "What is culture? It is the quintessence of the development of man and humanity in all realms and all dimensions as far as they favour the intellectual perfection of each individual. The instinct to strive for progress in all spheres and dimensions is the result of an optimistic human perspective. This perspective accepts the world and life as something worthwhile. Only through this optimistic perspective can the value of the being be complete and perfect. The activity, will and hope which aim at the amelioration of the individual as well as that of the society, people and humanity are the result of this optimistic perspective. They then lead to the dominion of the intellect over the nature; to the completion of the religious, social, economic and practical socialisation of man, and to the intellectual perfection of the individual and the totality."<sup>128</sup>

The human cultural activity is an ethical life and world affirmation. Ethics is a macro-sociological way of handling, whose fundament is the individual perspective and interpretation of the world. By mobilising the intellect and the feeling of man - holistically and synthetically - the culture, which encompasses all spheres of human life, facilitates the self-perfection and the intellectual and material progress of man.

The analysis of culture, which we have seen until now, shows that culture is the result of man's struggle to survive. According to Schweitzer's assertion, the aim of cultural activity is the ethical perfection of the individual. The cultural handling, i.e. the struggle for survival, makes the reason superior to the nature.<sup>129</sup>

The acting man has first of all to work on himself. The formation and cultivation of the personal Ego is the decisive fundament of the socio-ecological action. This is the basic precondition for personalisation and socialisation. Thurn tries to explain culture by making the historic development of the concept of culture precise. The interactive relation between individual (*cultura animi*), society (*cultus vitae*) and environment (*agricultura*) characterise

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<sup>125</sup> Cf. Walter Brugger 1992, 207.

<sup>126</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 207.

<sup>127</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 207.

<sup>128</sup> Albert Schweitzer 1960, 103f.

<sup>129</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 35.

the culture. The *cultura animi* describes the fostering of spirit and soul in the process to attain the goal of self-perfection. The *agricultura* means to become the master of nature. The *cultus vitae* is the general concept of the activity of the individual; by aiming at the meaningful creation of the outside world.<sup>130</sup>

By being active in his environment, man is working on himself. Through utilising the nature, he obtains the self-cognition. In this sense, Thurn calls this process the auto-reflexive expression. Through the auto-reflexive impact and the anthropogenetic achievements, the human being forms and organises the natural and social environment. In this process he exposes himself to the changes which emanate from himself and his deeds. Because of this process we can conclude that the individual, the social environment and the nature change themselves. Therefore, culture is never static. The ethics of culture oblige human beings to overcome the antagonism between nature and culture, says Schiller.<sup>131</sup>

Contrary to the instinctively acting animal, man acts actively. That means, as Claude Lévi Strauss' theory of culture says, through his modifying activities - bestowing norms, values, etc., to the ways of his doing -, man is culturally confirming his activity.<sup>132</sup> In this complex process, the social values obtain general validity; consent between these values and social activities are made; and as a consequence, these values develop themselves.

After human beings realised that they are dependent on nature, and that natural resources are scarce, they wanted to make themselves independent of nature. That is why human beings invented the culture. In this sense Thurn calls culture the substitute nature (Thurn 1976). "The main motivation of all cultural efforts is to secure survival by overcoming the insecurities and limitations caused by the scarcity of natural resources and by securing the lebensraum of man in the long term. This became possible only through the acquisition and constant application of technical ingenuity, which helped man to influence nature and to adapt himself physically and spiritually to the changed life conditions. Therefore, the cultural process in its modifying activity strives to make use of the natural world; to satisfy the needs of man on the one hand, and to manage the self-control of the human nature on the other hand."<sup>133</sup>

Diligence, curiosity, constant accumulation of knowledge, ingenuity and mastering the environment characterise the man of culture. Where there is action and knowledge, there is culture as well; where there is culture, there is also human community.<sup>134</sup> Through his active action (on the contrary to the animal reactive action) the human being endows its activity with meaning and significance. Human beings differentiate themselves from animals not because they are social beings - even if without intellect, animals are also social beings -, instead because they are cultural beings. The culture as a pragmatic principle or codex of human behaviour is not only a phenomenon which is embedded in the human spirit, but is also the model of human behaviour which normalises and organises human behaviour.<sup>135</sup> "Culture includes everything, which is the result of human action and which, therefore, has meaning.

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<sup>130</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 10ff.

<sup>131</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 18.

<sup>132</sup> Cf., *ibid.*, 86.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*, 102f.

<sup>134</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 104.

<sup>135</sup> Cf. Samuel N. Eisenstadt 1990, 8f.



This is the fundamental meaning of culture. All our deeds and their products, such as the material and symbolic culture and the spiritual and social events, are cultural phenomena, since they have meaning; and everything which has meaning belongs to culture."<sup>136</sup>

When the convictions, understanding, world views, ideas and ideologies - which the members of a society either actively take part in or passively respect and accept - normalise themselves, they manifest the approach of the subject to the object and the attitudes and conditions of his action. This normalisation is the origin of meta-generation immaterial culture, hence, the metaphysical dimension of culture.<sup>137</sup>

The culture as a pattern of action determines the participation of the individual or group in social formation. The social parameters such as age, sex, status and privilege characterise the cultural social heterogeneity; and each individual acts in this context. The handling man as a cultural being develops and outlines only values, which correspond to the cultural expectation of the society. Through this cultural outline he fixes his needs and interprets the reality. By fixing his needs and interpretation of the reality, he determines the profile of the culture. In this situation culture and the system of social values are in a constant process of change and development. "These change and development processes are:

- the emergence of new values,
- the return of vanished values,
- the neglect of some existing values and
- the vanishing of values."<sup>138</sup>

We have seen in the above section the aim of culture as a principle of order. By regulating the principle of action, culture insures that this society establishes or maintains its order. Hence, culture as principle of order and culture as principle of action is just two sides of the same coin. In this sense Rousseau understands compassion - which is a result of cultural action - as a positive and reciprocal action which is the fundament of the mutual preservation of the whole species. However, for him the maxim which says: "Care for your welfare with as little harm as possible to the others!" is more useful than the maxim: "Don't do to others which you do not want them to do unto you!" because the second one is a rationalised justice. Rousseau's principle of action, hence, favours a conscious compassion rather than a rationalised justice.

According to Freud, the origin and significance of culture has two dimensions: on the one hand, the struggle for absence of pain and against lack of enthusiasm; on the other hand, strong feelings of pleasure. However, the aim of both dimensions is to attain happiness;<sup>139</sup> and they regulate the behaviour of man. But in the face of the threatening power of nature, his frailty and the insufficiency of available resources, man discovers his weakness. Therefore, the mutual relation of human beings in the family, society and state has to be regulated.<sup>140</sup>

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<sup>136</sup> Friedrich H. Tenbruck 1990, 27.

<sup>137</sup> The metaphysical dimension means here the exclusion of time-conditionality: principle, abstraction, logic and universality. Generalisable norms are the pillars of culture. Hence, the culture is characterised by total penetration by the ideals of social order. Giesen and Schmid maintain that "norms appear as abstract, i.e. as regulations which are independent from concrete personal expectations and from practical performance of an action. These regulations originate from above, from outside and ancient times. Culture appears as tradition and orientation of value, as principle and model, which have unconditional and non-violent validity. This unconditionality demands correspondence to and continuity with the validity of the past." (Bernhard Giesen/Michael Schmid 1990, 98.99).

<sup>138</sup> Hans Haferkamp 1990, 166.

<sup>139</sup> Cf. Sigmund Freud 1995, 208.

<sup>140</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 137.

Since the human being wants to have as little indifference and pain, and as much feeling of pleasure as possible, this creates the culture that, however, does not solve the problem. According to Freud, the aim of cultural achievement is overcoming the threatening natural forces. The sum of making use of natural resources, the protection of man against nature and the regulation of relation among human beings is culture.<sup>141</sup> Taking into consideration the human technical skill and science, Freud calls the human being prosthetic God. In this sense, the uncomfortableness of culture is, according to Freud, that the man of culture is not at all happy in spite of his being like God.

If man begins to act, in order to attain pleasure and gain, and if there are no social regulations, he is exposed to the tyranny of the individual. "The human cohabitation is possible only when the majority which is stronger than the individual comes and unites against the individual. The power of this community becomes 'right' and protects itself from the tyranny of the individual. This substitution of the individual's might by the power of the community is the decisive cultural progress. Its nature constitutes that of the members of the community who control themselves in their possibilities of meeting their needs, whereas the individual as such does not know these limitations. The next cultural demand is that of justice, i.e. the guarantee that the existing legal system is not violated for the sake of the individual."<sup>142</sup>

According to Freud, the victims of instinct are the precondition for the social contract. Furthermore, says Freud, that justice should limit the individual freedom in the society (of culture). However, according to him, freedom is not the achievement of culture, because it existed even before the state of culture. The man in the primitive state was not able to defend it. However, this idea of Freud is disputable, because the man in the primitive state was not dependent on anybody; therefore, he did not know anything about freedom nor he possessed it. He was neither free nor not free, since freedom means to be free *for* something and *from* something.

The phenomena of cultural society, i.e. mutual dependence, competition, tendency to aggression, love, etc. must be controlled by ethics, law and taboo in order to enable a peaceful life possible. That is why Freud describes the cultural development as the struggle of humanity for survival.<sup>143</sup> In this struggle for survival man exercises on himself heavy cultural burdens which Freud calls the discomfort of culture (*das Unbehagen der Kultur*). "The command 'love your neighbour as yourself' is the strongest repulsion of man's aggression and an excellent example for the non-psychological action of the cultural super-Ego. The command is too difficult to fulfil; such a tremendous inflation of love can only devalue it, but it does not eliminate the need. The culture neglects all these. It exhorts only: the more difficult the prescriptions are to follow, the more commendable it is."<sup>144</sup>

What the people usually understand as culture such as art, opera, music, architecture, etc. are expression, illustration and symbolisation of human culture; and they are a later development. At the beginning of culture there was protection of rights and justice. This protection demanded a social contract. Hence, the original aim of culture was the

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<sup>141</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 138.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, 225.

<sup>143</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 249.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*, 268.

establishment and maintenance of social and political order. Political formation, education and experience are integral components of culture. In relation to justice, culture tries to secure peace through certain normative maxims and trials of solving problems. At the same time, different and unequal rights and approach to socio-ecological resources create socio-structural heterogeneity in the process of cultural development. The cultural intellectuals, i.e. elders, educated, men, rulers, etc determine this cultural profile. This is the beginning of unjust social structure, which roots in culture.

With its positive as well as negative profile, culture is a macro-sociological instrument of communication. By describing science as an action of communication, Habermas backs up the broad concept of culture. According to him, science is part of culture and life. Therefore, we can say that culture is conceptualised in the rationalisation process of life.<sup>145</sup> The rationalisation process<sup>146</sup> of life has its origin in the creation of society and human symbiosis. The first strategy of society in process is the creation of culture. In this sense the essay of Rousseau about the origin of society and, as a consequence, the beginning of culture is worthwhile to reflect on.

### **1.3.3 The beginning of society according to Rousseau**

As has already been emphasised, society is the origin and *patria* of culture. "First of all, culture exists only in the society so that the human being is generally the creator of culture; but concretely, he is the creature of a specific culture which is transmitted from generation to generation. Culture cannot exist without society, or society without culture. With both concepts we are dealing with different aspects of the same phenomenon as if they were totally separated realms. When we call some phenomena 'social', others 'cultural', we are underlining respective aspects in which we are interested. In principle, the given phenomena are inter-related, and we can classify and conceive them according to their cultural as well as social dimension."<sup>147</sup> In order to find out the causes of social inequality and to systematise his essay, Rousseau divides the history of man into two evolutionary social phases: the state of nature and the social state.

#### **1.3.3.1 The state of nature**

According to Rousseau, man of the natural state was an absolute being who possessed an unconditional and independent self-love. The harmony with God and nature had characterised his cosmic relation. Hence, according to Rousseau, he was a being of order. "The man of the natural state was an 'existence absolu', but he was at the same time embedded in the 'natural (divine) order'. Therefore, he made himself neither consciously the centre of the universe nor virtuously fit himself in the universe; instead he was unconsciously determined by the universal order. This is the origin of his goodness and innocence."<sup>148</sup>

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<sup>145</sup> Cf. Ullica Segerstråle 1990, 347f.

<sup>146</sup> The rationalisation process means here the implementation of reason of the *homo societatis*, in order to bestow a better and rational profile to his socio-political and economic actions. This social rationalisation process presupposes the social contract. By bestowing this metaphysical profile to the community by universal ethics, norms and ways of behaving, the symbiosis will be rationalised.

<sup>147</sup> Friedrich Tenbruck 1990, 28.

<sup>148</sup> Iring Fetscher 1968, 59.

His unity with others existed only in the framework of sensuous attraction, physical need and physical love.<sup>149</sup> This physical dimension and the will to self-maintenance characterise the natural state and self-love.<sup>150</sup> The man of this state owned neither consciousness nor reason. "Consciousness was non-existent in him who compared nothing and did not know his relation to others and to complete reality. The man of this state knows only himself. He does not see any contradiction or correspondence between his welfare and that of the others; he neither loves nor hates anything; he is limited merely to his physical instinct of self-maintenance, he is nothing and also a wild animal..."<sup>151</sup>

The man of natural state had only his instinct. His soul knew only "to-want" or "not-to-want", "to-desire" or "to-fear".<sup>152</sup> The desire limited itself, however, only to the desired object. This characterised *amour de soi*. The desire did not go beyond the physical need.<sup>153</sup> The man in the natural state as well as the *amour de soi* did not know the spiritual love, neither the *moral de l'amour*; it was not orientated to a specific object, since it was not a comparing love. The man of the natural state did not have the capability to admire. The important thing for him was that he had *something*, not *that* thing.<sup>154</sup> To be in-himself characterised the man of the natural state and of the *amour de soi*. He did not strive to have more than necessary for his self-maintenance.<sup>155</sup>

### 1.3.3.2 The transition from the natural state to the social state

As we have seen above, the man in the natural state was interested only in physical matter and existence. His will to self-maintenance was the kernel of his action. He was dependent on no one. The products of the earth provided him with necessary means to survive. His instinct caused him to make use of them.<sup>156</sup> The man in the natural state took everything for granted.

According to Rousseau's conception, the origin of the *amour-propre* and socialisation of man were the natural catastrophes, which affected everyone equally. "Hunger and desire made him to try different ways of life... The more human beings multiplied themselves, the more difficulties and complaints emerged. The differences of soils, climates and seasons caused them to lead different ways of life depending on these factors. Infertile years, long and heavy winters, and burning summers demanded new skills from them."<sup>157</sup> In order to overcome these difficulties, they were obliged to make a social contract. Through this social

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<sup>149</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 60.

<sup>150</sup> The essay of Rousseau on the origin of inequality in the society differentiates between the primitive state and self-love (*amour de soi*) on one hand, and social state and self-love (*amour-propre*) on the other hand. *Amour de soi* means the will to self-maintenance in the primitive state. The man of this state did not want to possess something, since the will has not yet developed. Since it was an absolute being, it did not know anything other than the biological existence whereas the *amour-propre* means the self-love in the state of competition of the social man. After he became a member of society and knew his dependence on the others, he became conscious of the scarcity of natural resources. He conceived property and possession as a security of existence; social acceptance and esteem obtained their own dynamic. Therefore, maximisation of profit, which excludes the others, became indispensable. This is called *amour-propre*.

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*, 67f.

<sup>152</sup> Cf. Rousseau 1998, 46.

<sup>153</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 47.

<sup>154</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 66.

<sup>155</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 151f.

<sup>156</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 74.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, 74, 75.

contract and socialisation they became aware of their dependence on the others. This is the beginning of being conscious of the scarcity of nature. But in the social state, because of the scarcity (real or invented), the natural resources became common resources; everybody has the right to everything. Hence, the right to property and community are the two characteristics of man in the socialised state.

Rousseau understands the transition in connection with the activity of the reason. When the human being makes the transition from the physical attraction to the spiritual love (*moral de l'amour*), the reason, which spiritualises the matter and bestows on it a new shine, is active.<sup>158</sup> According to Rousseau, the transition from the natural state to the social state is nothing other than the formation of the spirit. The freedom of will and being free from the dominion of instinct and the perfectibility of man are the criteria which contributed to leaving his pre-rational state.<sup>159</sup> The abating dominion of the instinct and, as a consequence, deserting the natural order, becoming iniquitous and the process of perfection were the development phases which man experienced in his transition from the natural state to the social state. The whole transition process can be summarised as follows: In the face of the consciousness of the scarcity of nature, social relations and the emerging rights of ownership, the amour-propre, which excludes the others, develops. This development is possible through the help of reason and the formation of spirit.<sup>160</sup> The more social acceptance and esteem the amour-propre has, the more it needs it. "When the members of the society begin to intensify their relationship because of the mutual need and when the spirit begins to foster and illuminate itself, it [the spirit] becomes active, seizes more objects, makes more relations, investigates and compares. During this action of comparing, it forgets neither himself nor his equals, nor loses touch with the position, which he demands among them. If one has once begun to compare himself, he will never stop; and the heart does not occupy itself with anything else other than to bring the whole world under our control. It is especially the educated people who possess intellect who have the strongest amour-propre and who usually tend to love little and to hate a lot."<sup>161</sup>

### 1.3.3.3 The social state

"The amour-propre is only a relative and artificial love, and is a feeling which emerged in society. It pushes each individual to make itself more important than the others. It incites all evil in the people which they inflict on each other; and it is the real origin of glory."<sup>162</sup> According to Rousseau, the rational, virtuous and commendably moral man differentiates itself from the natural man; and his goodness is different from that of the instinctual man. By obeying his "ratio", he is "evil" and "untruthful".<sup>163</sup> Rousseau holds that socialisation and living together are the origin of the amour-propre. The living together of man or the disposition to live together and socialisation are at the same time his innate dispositions to emulate. Hence, culture is nothing other than inter- and intra-generation emulation.

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<sup>158</sup> Cf. Fetscher, op. cit., 60ff.

<sup>159</sup> Cf. Rousseau, op. cit., 110.

<sup>160</sup> Jean-Jaques Rousseau 1978, 421.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid., 421.

<sup>162</sup> J.J. Rousseau, Abhandlungen... 1998, op. cit., 151.)

<sup>163</sup> Cf. Fetscher, op. cit., 48.

Concerning the instinct, Rousseau maintains that animals are superior to man. But by being able to imitate, the human being could compensate its instinctual lack. The fact that the human being did not have a peculiar instinct was a big advantage.<sup>164</sup> By comparing himself with animals, man developed ingenuity. This was the beginning of man-man-emulation, competition, comparison, envy, pride, hatred, vanity, etc.<sup>165</sup> The social man needs his co-humans. Because of his dependence on others, he realises his weakness. Since he became weak and dependent, he develops love, sense of beauty, cunning trick, etc.<sup>166</sup> "After he had experienced that love is the only motive of human action in order to attain his welfare, he realised that he had to count on the help of others; moreover, he realised that the competition made him suspicious of them. In the first case, he freely unified himself with the others so as to meet his temporary demands, which created this unity. In the second case, everyone strove to gain his advantage either through open violence if he was strong enough, or through ingenuity and cunning trick if he felt himself weak."<sup>167</sup>

Through cohabitation, the emulation becomes more and more intensive; and the emulation intensifies the similar desire of all. Something is desired which cannot be enjoyed or shared by all at the same time. This scarcity of the desired object causes discord and envy.<sup>168</sup> The original love (*amour de soi*) which based itself merely on the basic necessity, i.e. the love of one's own existence and being, becomes an exclusive love: *amour-propre*. The original love of self-maintenance becomes the psychological love of social status and esteem. The damaging of something physical which belongs to someone becomes a psychological offence. Hence, man believes that he is substantially damaged in his totality. "As soon as men had begun to appreciate each other and to develop in their spirit the idea of respecting others, everyone demanded his right to it. This is the origin of civilised behaviour even among the primitive people. Hence, any kind of deliberate damage of the property of others implied the despise of his personality; this was even more severe than the damage itself. Everyone began to revenge this violation in his own way, according to his feelings regarding the gravity of the transgression; therefore, the action of revenge became horrible, and men became bloodthirsty and cruel."<sup>169</sup>

According to Rousseau's depiction of the *amour-propre*, not only are material resources scarce, but also the psychological ones. In other words, material resources can even be the source of the psychological ones. The need of private property re-valued the material resources. By increasing their value, men have devalued them. That means that the object to be possessed is peripherised and the competitors became the centre of the competition. Rousseau calls this psychological love which has peripherised the physical need the *moral de l'amour*. The privileged and desired object obtained a new quality. It is not anymore what it has been before. Therefore, this psychological love creates an artificial feeling, which is described as *sentiment factice*.

<sup>164</sup> Cf. Rousseau, Abhandlung..., op. cit., 36.

<sup>165</sup> Cf. Rousseau, Emil..., op. cit., 251.

<sup>166</sup> Cf. Rousseau, Abhandlung..., op. cit., 70.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid., 77.

<sup>168</sup> Cf. ibid., 81.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid., 82.

According to Rousseau, the "ratio" is the trigger of this process. It revealed in man all his qualities and talents. Through the help of reason, man learnt to evaluate nature. The self-presentation of man, whose aim was social esteem, became more and more important. There emerged a discrepancy between the being and appearance of man. By evaluating the others and by being evaluated, he degraded himself from the absolute to the relative being. He had no more being; he had to acquire it. "Now our capabilities are developed; the memory and power of imagination, the amour-propre and ratio are active; the spirit has almost entirely reached its completeness. All natural qualities are now mobilised. The status and fate of each individual is fixed; this is not only in relation to the quantity of resources and power to make use of or to damage something, but also in relation to the spirit, beauty, power, ingenuity, merit or talents. Since these qualities were the only ones, which brought respect, it became necessary to own or to pretend to own them. For the sake of his advantage, man had to appear better than he was in reality."<sup>170</sup>

In the socialised state man has to draw the people's attention to himself; he has to be the centre of everything so that others are interested in him. According to Rousseau, the amour-propre manifests itself in ambition, competition, rivalry and in all desires which cannot enjoy something in common. The competitor should be exterminated.<sup>171</sup> Rousseau describes the relativity of property, glory and esteem as follows: "I would finally prove that if one sees a handful of mighty and rich people on the summit of splendour and happiness, whereas the majority lives in darkness and misery, this means that the first ones appreciate what they enjoy only as far as the latter lack them. They would not be any happier and enjoy their possession if the majority would cease to live in this misery."<sup>172</sup>

According to Rousseau, alienation of the socialised man bases itself on the fact that he lives on the opinion of others. He obtains his existence only when the members of his society positively evaluate him. That means he does not live in himself, instead in his co-humans.<sup>173</sup> That is why Rousseau calls this kind of life of the amour-propre a deceptive, external and superficial life: glory without virtue, reason without wisdom and enjoyment without happiness.<sup>174</sup> The social man of amour-propre obtains his identity doing his best so that the social inequality is maintained and guaranteed.

According to Rousseau, the amour-propre is the will to accumulate power, to make oneself the centre of all; to be superior over all, envy, resentment and hatred.<sup>175</sup> The amour-propre meets its needs from the misfortune of others.<sup>176</sup> In this state the necessary is superseded by luxury. In the process of realising this luxury, the ones who have already achieved it impede the others from possessing the material resources as well as attaining the socio-psychological esteem. "In the socialised state of mere material needs there emerged a new, psychological need which the absolute and independent man of nature did not know: the need for esteem of the unsure self. In the socialised state the human being loses the absolute

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<sup>170</sup> Ibid., 88.

<sup>171</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 94.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid., 108.

<sup>173</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 112.

<sup>174</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 113.

<sup>175</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 56.

<sup>176</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 57.

and independent self love and it always needs the opinion of the others, in order to ascertain its being and value."<sup>177</sup> The reason that, on the one hand, spoiled everything and whereby the human being differentiates between good and evil and acts respectively is, on the other hand, the illumination of the socialised man so that he comes to the higher self-love (order). The attitude of the amour-propre is, hence, overcome by the higher self love; but for this, man needs to develop consciousness. In order to achieve the higher love, first of all, the consciousness has to be illuminated. The love manifests the final aim - which is order - to the consciousness.<sup>178</sup> However, according to Rousseau, in relation to his moral behaviour man has to obey his conscience, not his ratio.<sup>179</sup> The conscious principle of order of the socialised state (of culture) is in the Freudian language the cultural super-Ego.

Culture is the social truth that is based on the continual system. The continuity of the system protects the people from anomy (uncertainty of law and ideals). The social anomy creates social fear. Through the continual legal system the society creates a power which guarantees the existence of the society. My definition of culture as the principle of social action and principle of social order is to be understood in this context.

Culture is the collective consciousness. The social members notice the dangers, which can be caused by the co-social members while using the common natural resources and cultural values. This has caused Hobbes to maintain *homo homini lupus*. The individual hates those it needs. The intensity of enmity between the individuals has a direct proportionality to the mutual dependence of the individuals. This negative consciousness has moved the social members to develop a positive consciousness of the existential importance of the others. The contradiction between different interests and common resources and values needs an institution, which is indispensable for organised societies. Therefore, the creation of a social principle of action and order I call culture.

Rousseau essentially interconnects the evil and society by saying that the society creates evil. I would say instead that the society makes the individual conscious of the evil. That means that the individual becomes conscious of the potential evil, which can be realised, in the inter-individual interdependence. In light of this fact, culture means the process of creating compatible interests from contradictory interests. Through the cultural communality the common law and right are sanctified. Sanctification is a substantial transformation. The fallible individual interests become infallible after they have been transformed to the collective interests. Through this infallibility the collective interest has the full power to impose sanctions (social promotion) or to punish aberrating individual or group interests from the principles of the social contract (social degradation).

Culture is the legalisation of social behaviour. It is an interaction of legitimacy and legality: the social members endow the common interests with legitimacy, and the group interests determine the framework of the individual action and behaviour, which I call legality. The combination of these two realities I would term social order. Moreover, culture is the moralisation of social behaviour. The mutual social prescriptions determine the scope of the action of the individual. Something is bad if it violates these prescriptions and trespasses over the contractual scope.

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<sup>177</sup> Ibid., 58.

<sup>178</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 68f.

<sup>179</sup> Cf. Rousseau, *Emil...*, op. cit., 300ff.



The consciousness of social dependency is the preparatory state of culture. In this sense I understand, unlike Rousseau, the state of nature as well as the state of society as an alternating and co-existing psychological phenomenon, not as a historical consecutive fact. The fully developed human being is endowed with an innate and perennial consciousness of natural state. If the moment of his action and consciousness are not determined by an immediate social behaviour of the others, he is in the natural state of *amour de soi* in which his action and consciousness concentrate only on his needs. But if these needs can be met only in relation with his social fellows, he is already in the social state; his actions and consciousness are socialised. Therefore, for a psychologically and anthropologically fully developed human being there is neither solely a state of nature nor solely a state of society. Depending on the availability of natural resources and human needs either the natural state or the state of society dominates.

Culture is the systematic regulation of private property rights. I think Adam's right (in the Bible) to govern the earth and its creatures is the expression of the innate will of the individual to possess. This individualism is not negative in itself, because there is a personalised individualistic tendency in each individual. Culture and religion endeavour only to regulate the human behaviour while materialising this individualistic disposition. "Individuals appropriate goods from the as-yet-unclaimed abundance of nature and mix their labour or 'person' with it, giving them an exclusive property right to it."<sup>180</sup>

According to different religious thoughts, religious salvation is a new culture where the individualism is limited but not rescinded and where peace among the competing individuals takes place. Because of this innate individualism Hobbes ontologises the enmity between the individuals, whereas Rousseau ontologises it in the society. Rather than Rousseau's ontologisation of the evil in the society, I would like to stress its potentiality. In my view, in the face of this potentiality, the social contract is the process of balancing between the individual interests and social interests whose contradictions could lead to the outbreak of social evil. The society is a state in which – at least ideally - man should love his neighbour as himself, not more and not less. Therefore, the aim of social contract and culture should be to create a better individual.

The saying of the Kambata, *badu ma yano* (what would the people say!) implies to the conviction that their social behaviour makes their individual being: the being is dependent on the behaviour. Any action and behaviour within the cultural framework is justified, and therefore, it favours the human development. Those who act against the cultural norms are acting against their own development. Rousseau's thought of *social contract* explains the cultural phenomena to some extent. But his ontologising of the social evil, the individual innocence and historicizing of the natural and social state make his thoughts disputable.

Hobbes' pessimism towards the individual and Rousseau's ontologisation of the social evil neglect the constructive dimension of culture. Hobbes' socialisation is a coercive escape from the evil individual. Rousseau's society is the breeding ground for the evil that perverts the individual. Hobbes' society is the solution for the *homo homini lupus*, whereas Rousseau's society is the source of the *homo homini lupus*.

These two positions neglect the free will of the individual to build society in order to attain its socio-political and economic goals as easily as possible, wherein culture as principle

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<sup>180</sup> W.T. Cavanaugh 1999, 187.

of order and action requires the free will - although limited – of the individual. The individual develops its various faculties through the help of these principles of order and action. It is innate in the human being to socialise and develop itself. As material and immaterial cultures cannot be totally separated, the development study should consult the immaterial values of the society and analyse the structures and principles of social action and order, since social structures cannot be separated from the cultural structures. Therefore, it is appropriate to discuss some development theories that deal with the problematic of culture, social structure and economic development. In the following chapter I would like to discuss the theories of Dieter Senghaas and Samuel Huntington.


## **Chapter 2: An Analysis of the Development Theories of Dieter Senghaas**

The economic studies of today are taking the non-economic categories and other fields of social and human sciences seriously. It is becoming clearer that isolated economic studies without integrating different disciplines would be not only ineffective, but also counterproductive for the human holistic development and for the quality of development itself. A functional-structural analysis of a society helps to understand the social structure better. Only with a better understanding can rational development policies be made. Since I understand the social structure as the sum of the culture, political structure and the respective development level, I think it is the right procedure to analyse culture, social structure and the conception of development separately and then to depict their interdependence and their functional relation.

In his different researches Senghaas emphasised the decisive importance of social structure. In the following sections I would like to discuss his theory about a successful economic development. The aim of this analysis is to find out how important the social structure for economic development is, in order to find out if there is any applicability of this theory in respect to the situation of the Kambata. The theory of Senghaas is meant for nation states, not for a society within a state. The reason why I chose this theory for the situation of the Kambata is that my research paper concentrates on the time when Kambata was not yet part of the present Ethiopia (see section 4.2!) It was an independent kingdom. This period before the south-expansion of the Ethiopian Empire has determined the social and political understanding of the Kambata. Different emperors and governments after the expansion have been trying to introduce a new political system and structure. Up until 1975 there was no significant change of the traditional political structure of the Kambata. After this period the communist regime had intensified its action to replace the traditional political and social structure through the communist political system. However, one can still see that the traditional social and political structures characterise the social and political interaction of today, even if Kambata is part of Ethiopia. Therefore, my analysis has to be read from the backdrop of the former history and the cultural heritage of the Kambata.

Of course, there are some aspects of the theory, which cannot apply to Kambata as an isolated region. For example, developing the internal market, producing inputs for the agricultural economy, etc. have to be understood in the Ethiopian context.

## 2.1 The civilisation hexagon of D. Senghaas and his development theory



**Diagram 2: Civilisation hexagon of Senghaas**

Source: Senghaas 1997, 573

As a peace and conflict researcher and thinker of development policy, Senghaas attempts to discover the interaction of peace/conflict and socio-economic development. In his various essays and publications, these three elements of social events are pervasive.

In what sense, according to Senghaas, are development and peace/conflict interconnected? For Senghaas, development policy is equal to peace policy and vice versa. Hence, peace comes through development and development is attained through peace. Peace and development are factors that depend on the *dynamic process* of the respective policy. “Policy” is a definite course or method of action selected from among alternatives and in light of given conditions to guide and determine present and future decisions. Moreover, peace and development are social strategies that serve as an important function of human being in achieving evolutionary success. With the term *dynamic process*, I mean this evolutionary success, which is the result of the present and future decisions of a society. Therefore, institutional order (polity), dynamic process (politics) and decision-making (policy) characterise the social interaction of a social group.

The peace and development theory of Senghaas bases itself on the comprehensive social strategies and policies, which are elementary for the formation of a state. "At least six components contributed to the formation of a state: "Power monopoly [legitimate coercion], rule of law, systemic interdependence (in the areas of economy, information, communication and contact with the result of affect control), democratisation, welfare state, and political culture..."<sup>181</sup>. Senghaas calls these components the *civilisation hexagon*. "...States and societies which cannot fully fulfil the criteria of this civilisation hexagon disintegrate and cannot survive. In cases of disintegration which can be observed in many parts of the world the ethno-politicization of politics has got a catalysing function."<sup>182</sup>

Huntington conceives culture and religion as the cause of the world peace crisis of today. Senghaas tries to disprove this position, stating that "cultural and in principle religious factors are seldom initiators of a conflict escalation. Instead, the socio-economic problems without any hope of a solution play a decisive role. These problems are mainly social and economic discrimination which reiterate itself on cultural and political level."<sup>183</sup> Hence, according to Senghaas, civilisation crisis is development crisis, and development crisis means peace crisis. Therefore, a systematic analysis of development and peace through the help of his civilisation hexagon is an important step. Since a stable state consists of these six components, it should guarantee their existence. If this does not occur, there emerges development crisis, which undermines the legitimacy of a state.

In the face of the international interdependence, Senghaas discusses his development policy theories on the national as well as international level. On the national level, a state or different groups eliminate development and peace crisis through the help of the civilisation hexagon. Because of the international interconnections, foreign relations, foreign security policy, geo-political stabilisation policy, economic relationships, cultural and technological exchange, and etc., a quasi-one society is emerging. This fact requires an international policy.

### **2.1.1 Power monopoly**

#### **2.1.1.1 Power monopoly on the national level**

The *para pacem*-maxim of Senghaas implies the state power monopoly. The state acts in the name of its citizens. Through this action, it ensures that no uncontrolled violence of all against all occurs in the society. This means that it embodies a universal law without partiality. This central power must be neutral and objective power. The basis of this objectivity is rule of law.

What is the relationship between development crisis and power monopoly? A state, which cannot centralise the power monopoly and legitimate coercion, is damned to disintegration; it is threatened by violence of all against all, leading to an uncontrolled violence. The repercussions of such chaos are not only limited to political and social areas; it has also severe consequences for economic development. In this context, Thomas Hobbes depicts the vehemence of this situation in his "Leviathan". "Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of warre where every man is enemy to every man; the same is

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<sup>181</sup> D.Senghaas 1994, 96.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid., 96

<sup>183</sup> D. Senghaas 1998, 141.

consequent to the time, wherein men live without their security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them with all. In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."<sup>184</sup>

Basing itself on the rule of law, according to Senghaas, peace does not mean a mere harmony in the society that suppresses or plays down conflicts. Peace means a constructive conflict management and regulation. If there is a crisis, it should be reduced to an acceptable level. Peace is the ability of a society to organise itself.<sup>185</sup> Each civilisation step of a society contains conflicts. Interests and generation differences, socio-cultural changes, international relations, modernisation, individual identity which is fostered by education and economic and political independence, economic development or regression, intercultural connections, and etc. are factors that challenge social order. In the face of these challenges a society creates peace by organising itself and managing its conflicts.

Through the help of its power monopoly, a society has a regulating power at its disposal. The springboard of this central power is the conception that peace is not an individual-psychological phenomenon. Peace orientates itself to intra-societal and international power and conflict potential.<sup>186</sup> A democratic state tries to regulate through law and constitution that there is less injustice and partiality. This encompasses all social, political and economic regulations. Through its power monopoly it insures that no justice takes weapons into its hands: "A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all; since armed injustice is the more dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with arms, meant to be used by intelligence and virtue, which he may use for the worst ends. Wherefore, if he has not virtue, he is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of men in states, for the administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society."<sup>187</sup>

How can we understand peace policy as development policy in the context of power monopoly of the state? In the societal and political development, war is a concomitant of human development history, i.e. - paradoxically - war plays a significant role in human being's development history. No society wars against another just for the sake of war. The reason why human beings fight against each other is in order to survive. A presumed enemy could endanger the life and space of the other. Most of the time, the trigger of war is the projection of one's own hatred. That means that my neighbour, whom I trust, can become my enemy. He can hate and hurt me. In this situation, by trying to be faster than the other, human beings create war.

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<sup>184</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Part I, Chapter XIII, 62.

<sup>185</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1974, 9.

<sup>186</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 9f.

<sup>187</sup> Aristotle, *Politics*, Book I, 2. In: *The works of Aristotle* ed. by W. D. Ross Volume X., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1961.

Each of the conflicting parties is in an ambivalent situation. On the one hand, the conflicting parties believe that their will to self-realisation is possible only when they mobilise everything at their disposal to become victorious over their adversaries. On the other hand, each party knows that war is never the solution of the conflict, and in long term, no one can totally control the opponents. Therefore, there is an innate desire to have someone who guarantees the existential security and safety. The warring brothers should make a contract. Their interests, limitations, amount of freedom, and etc. are determined by this contract, wherein not the content of the contract but rather the contract in itself as principle is decisive.

Thomas Hobbes writes the following about the importance of this contract whose consequence is power monopoly: "The final cause, end, or design of men, (who naturally love, liberty, and dominion over others,) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, (in which we see them live in commonwealths,) is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of warre, which is necessarily consequent to the natural passions of men, where there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and tie them by feare of punishment to the performance of their covenants and observation of those lawes of nature... For the laws of nature (*as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and (in sum) doing to others, as we would be done to,*) of themselves, without the terrour of some power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like. And covenants without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore, notwithstanding the lawes of nature, (which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely,) if there be no power erected, or not great enough for our security; every man will, and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men"<sup>188</sup>

In the process of the emergence of state according to Thomas Hobbes, there are some characteristic elements of social contract and power monopoly: unity, mutual support, collective protection from a common enemy and mutual injustice, peace, and security.<sup>189</sup> A person or an association represents the contracting collective individual and its will. The members of the contracting collective individual transfer the power to the representing organ.<sup>190</sup> Hence, peace reigns in this circle because a public power represents the parties and controls them if every individual keeps the contract. Through the act of making the contract and establishing a public power, the members disarm themselves. "The state power monopoly is a very important factor, because it is the disarmament of the citizens and prevention of self-administered justice. Only through it can potential and actual conflicting parties be pushed to solve their problems through argumentative and constructive conflict management method in the public."<sup>191</sup>

<sup>188</sup> Hobbes, op.cit., Part II, Chapter XVII, 85.

<sup>189</sup> However, even if I have figured out similarities between the concepts of power monopoly of Hobbes and Senghaas that does not mean that they were congruent. According to Hobbes, it is the dangerous conflict potentiality of human beings, which coerces them to make social contract without which the violence of all against all would exterminate humanity. Although Senghaas correctly grasps the immanence of danger and conflict potentiality in society, his springboard is not overshadowed by pessimism as that of Hobbes. Senghaas' understanding of power monopoly starts from the intention to secure peace and advance development, since development crisis means peace crisis and vice versa.

<sup>190</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 144f.

<sup>191</sup> Dieter Senghaas 1997, 13f.

### 2.1.1.2 Power monopoly on the international level<sup>192</sup>

The international economic and political interconnections and different conflicts are the starting point of international power monopoly. There are conflicts in which the adversaries have something in common. On the international level inter-state or inter-group conflicts destabilise the world order. The international community must act to solve conflicts for its own sake. There are many cases, which need a joint action of different nations, organisations and international community. In many parts of the world, different conflicts caused by territorial disputes, religion and ethnicity are emerging. Mass migration and refugee movement is another aspect of destabilisation on the global level. Political migrants, economic refugees and migrations caused by desertification, etc. are internationalising national problems and lack of good governance. Moreover, there are the so-called trans-boundary ecological hazards: transport of nuclear materials, hazardous waste and drug trafficking, and smuggling of human beings. All these military and non-military challenges need a collective global response. In the face of this fact, different nations and organisations should build collective and co-operative security. Nations and organisations must overcome the vestiges of earlier confrontation and competition and strengthen mutual trust and co-operation. The fate of the future global community is in its capacity to organise mutual consultation, co-operation, joint decision-making, and joint action against the military and non-military threats.

The Paris Treaty between NATO and the Russian Federation (27 May 1997) shows that there is an international will to collective determination in order to solve global problems together. Some of the plans of the treaty included:

- “conversion of defence industries;
- developing mutually agreed co-operative projects in defence related economic, environmental and scientific fields;
- conducting joint initiatives and exercises in civil emergency preparedness and disaster relief;
- combating terrorism and drug trafficking;”

International confidence building measures, disarmament (elimination of militarily significant weapons and reduction of their numbers) and arms control (measures designed to slow down, stop or reverse arms race) are international reactions to the global threats. The Petersburg Declaration of WEU (Union of Western Europe) emphasises its obligation in humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.<sup>193</sup> The Amsterdam-Treaty of 1997 stresses the

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<sup>192</sup> The power monopoly of international community is something very difficult to realise. Only a state has real power monopoly and legitimate coercion. An international organisation (union) lacks this sociological point. Common security and foreign policy, co-operation in justice and internal policy are some of the important elements that could help towards setting up a kind of international power monopoly. But up until now there is no an international union that claims to have a full international power monopoly. However, an international union can be a political system, if it has the following characteristics:

- stable and clear institutions of collective decision making;
- citizens and social groups seek to achieve their political desires through political system;
- collective decisions in the political system have a significant impact on the distribution of the economic resources and allocations of social and political values;
- continuous interaction between the decision-making organs and the citizens (input-output-interaction).

In this process, it could develop itself towards possession of a quasi-international power monopoly.

<sup>193</sup> Cf. Council of Ministers, Petersburg Declaration, Bonn, 19 June 1992, 142.



implementation of a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy,

- "to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter;<sup>194</sup>
- to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security;
- to promote international co-operation;
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedom."<sup>195</sup>

These objectives can only be pursued through mutual political solidarity: common foreign and security policy, common strategies, joint action, common positions and systematic co-operation between member states.<sup>196</sup> This co-operation should prevent hegemonisation and dominance of one or few countries. Otherwise, in the face of the globalised economy, on the one hand, the social mobilisation and the importance of cultural and national identity; on the other hand, hegemonisation, concentration of power and dominance of the richest countries would incite different types of conflicts. "For the world powers, the real challenges with long term consequences are caused by changes in the social structure of international system in general. This structure is experiencing a basic change, and the general image of the international system, including the Third World, is quite different than it was 30 or 40 years before: Since decades, the number of literate world population is growing. Urbanisation is increasing. Even today, in 50 percent of developing countries, farmers are just the minority. Industrialisation will be carried on, in spite of the serious problems of industrialisation process in most of the developing countries. People who are able to write and read and who do not live in subsistence economy anymore, but who live in urban agglomerations and who are dependent on the employment possibilities (besides private economy), sooner or later become politically conscious. They will begin to organise their interests and to politicise their social, economic and cultural necessities."<sup>197</sup>

By consolidating their economic potential, certain states gain socio-political and cultural consciousness. This consciousness is not only the result of the achieved development, but also its precondition. Senghaas underlines that in relation to the development nationalism (especially in the tertiary development nationalism<sup>198</sup>), development crisis can have severe international consequences, which can destabilise the world order.

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<sup>194</sup> Co-operative Security (such as OSCE) may not oppose the values and procedures of Collective Security (UNO).

<sup>195</sup> Treaty on European Union, Amsterdam 1997, Title V, Article 11.

<sup>196</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, Article 12.

<sup>197</sup> (D. Senghaas 1988, 21f.

<sup>198</sup> Senghaas divides the *development nationalism* on three levels:

1. The *primary development nationalism*: in the world of those societies which organised themselves as OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), there was a kind of balanced combination of 'anti-attitude' and own national project. The 'anti-attitude' was directed at the first historical take-off society and economy: England".
2. The *secondary development nationalism* is contained in the decolonisation attempts and post-colonial development projects.
3. The *tertiary development nationalism* is a reaction to the failure of secondary development nationalism. It is the starting point of a militant reculturalisation of politics. (See. D. Senghaas, 1998, 160-168.)

Senghaas and Huntington agree by maintaining that the international power monopoly (which requires international justice and rule of law) for global security is usually confused with western universalism. This universalism and exaggerated interventionism is very counterproductive and can have serious consequences. In case direct negotiation between conflicting parties is not possible, instead of partiality, the third party should be able to clarify the facts (investigation and inquiry), to offer negotiating facilities (becoming a good officer), to mediate (offering non-binding proposals, suggestions, solutions; confidence building; intellectual contribution by preventing selective perceptions and misconceptions), to conciliate (by institutionalising the procedures), to arbitrate (by binding laws) and to adjudicate (by giving a kind of judicial sentence or decision to the matter of the conflicting parties). This procedure points out the common interest and values of the international community.<sup>199</sup>

Even if Senghaas rejects "The clash of civilisations" while discussing international conflicts, he does not play down its potentiality. However, his theory bases itself on development crisis: "Even if there is not a generalisable clash of civilisations, the all clear cannot be sounded: the development crisis, which is pervasive in the cultural conflicts of some societies, has got a long-term character. Although international relations cannot be the scene of the internationalising cultural conflicts, it cannot ignore disputes which yield different cultural conflicts in the developing regions of the world."<sup>200</sup> This shows that, according to Senghaas, the starting point for the wish of international power monopoly is the potential internationalisation of development crisis and world disorder. Therefore, Senghaas tries to find out the relationship between the international power monopoly, internationalisation of development crisis, and potential world disorder. The intra-state disarmament of citizens is equivalent to the international disarmament of states. The international power monopoly enables the required control.<sup>201</sup>

By broaching international conflict formation, Senghaas did not limit his scope to the bi-polar context of the international conflict during the cold war. "Because of its conspicuous heterogeneity, the image of international system must be multi-structured. Therefore, the chances to overcome collective violence in the international system are very different in various contexts. In each of them there are burning points to which the attention has to be directed: political integration among the western countries; détente and co-operation between East and West and within the socialist world; development in the North-South-Relations and co-operation or collective self-reliance in the relations among the southern states."<sup>202</sup> Since peace depends on the ability of a society to organise itself, it insures the existence of political and social freedom, justice, and order. In this sense, Senghaas understands peace as civilisation achievement.<sup>203</sup>

Even during the cold war, the conflict formation was not always directed by the respective ideology. That means that concerning their economic interests those states that belonged to the communist or capitalist bloc were not always free conflict with each other.

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<sup>199</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 147.

<sup>200</sup> D. Senghaas 1994, 115.

<sup>201</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1997, 15.

<sup>202</sup> Senghaas 1988, 24f.

<sup>203</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 13.

Therefore, Senghaas systematises and divides the phenomena of conflict formation in the international system as follows:

- (1) intra-European disputes were and are caused by colonial and imperial competitions,
- (2) the intra-socialist conflict formations were caused by: a) the ideological conflicts, i.e. the claim of leadership: which state was the genuine exegete of Marxism-Leninism; b) security dilemma: conflicts of security policies with the aim of territorial integrity and social identity; c) economic and political dependence: the supremacy claim of the core-state (USSR) became little by little insignificant because of its increasing economic weakness; d) the historically conditioned territorial conflicts within the bloc.<sup>204</sup>
- (3) the North-South conflict formation caused by the world economic order, international labour division, economic competition between unequal partners and peripherisation of the poor countries.

"As late as the agrarian-industrial revolution of England in the 18th century, the world economic system is characterised by enormous competence differences between the high and less developed societies. As soon as societies with unequal development level come together, there emerges a suppressive competition. The highly developed societies begin to peripherise the less developed societies."<sup>205</sup> In this context, Senghaas discusses factors which are indispensable for the realisation of development and implementation of competitiveness, which could save the less developed countries from the peripherisation pressure: structure and efficacy of agrarian-sector, pervasive internal market interconnection, coherence, homogeneity, maturity and international competitiveness.<sup>206</sup>

Do the aforementioned conflict formations have any interaction? Senghaas answers this in both the affirmative and the negative. He negates the interaction by maintaining that, in principle, some regional conflicts were just artificially inter-related to the East-West-conflict. Except the competitive arms trade, the impact was less intensive than it was usually contended.<sup>207</sup> On the other hand, he affirms the interaction that through internationalisation people are coming closer and closer together (cosmopolitan orientation). At the same time, nationalistic tendencies are increasing. The homogenisation of the world on the one hand, and its fissuring on the other hand, characterise the ambivalence of the world order, that is, moving closer together without solidarity.

The North-South conflict is a centre-satellite conflict. Senghaas describes this as follows: "The relationships among the highly industrialised societies, namely, the centres of the world economy, are characterised by tight exchange processes. Exchange processes of equivalent intensity are, however, lacking in the relationships among the satellites. This makes their situation peripheral in the world economy."<sup>208</sup> This conflict is a development conflict. Accordingly, Senghaas pleads for counter-power formation in the south and a new

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<sup>204</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 111-118.

<sup>205</sup> *Ibid.*, 126.

<sup>206</sup> Cf. Ulrich Menzel/Dieter Senghaas 1986, 179-195.

<sup>207</sup> Cf. Senghaas 1988, 187.

<sup>208</sup> *Ibid.*, 144.

international order: new order of maritime shipping order, technology, information and communication order.<sup>209</sup>

Colonialism and imperialism and, as a consequence, "internal colonialism" (political, cultural and economic discrimination of some groups), difficulties for politically consolidated states (because of colonial and pre-colonial history), and anti-regime wars are jeopardising the international peace. Senghaas sees the political trend of today, especially in the Third World, in two perspectives:

1. relative autonomisation, especially in relation to weapon industries,
2. incoherent and heterogeneous development, i.e. "amputated" industrialisation and inability to meet basic necessities (such as food). On the international level, there are geo-political rivalries, which stir up conflicts.

In the face of these economic and political challenges, what is the contribution of an international power monopoly? Through geo-political self-control and rational development policy, the international regimes can defuse conflicts and regulate them. "Plurality in peaceful unity - basing itself on empathy and solidarity - remains a distant goal which cannot be reached at the moment. The civilisation of international relations in many areas does not yet take place. To think and feel globally and to act properly nationally and locally is a challenging political task."<sup>210</sup> The international power monopoly sustains this ambition. Senghaas stresses at the same time that international community cannot be equated with national state, because the tightness of structures of organisation and interactions has quite different intensities. In spite of crisis, which the world community has experienced and still experiences, the international society exhibits some regularity. The goal of the international power monopoly is, therefore, to prevent anarchy and adversary structures.<sup>211</sup>

### **2.1.2. Rule of law**

#### **2.1.2.1 Rule of law on the national level**

"The power monopoly requires control by rule of law, otherwise it embodies a biased haphazard jurisdiction. From the perspective of constructive conflict management, rule of law has a considerable significance because it directs to conventional procedures and ways of actions. Since the modern society is characterised by substantial differences of identity and interest, conventional procedural modalities of conflict management are indispensable. These rules should be updated in the light of new problems; and it is the task of constitutional states founded on the rule of law to debate continuously and self-critically on their constitution, in order to guarantee their own stability."<sup>212</sup> The rule of law, according to Senghaas, contains three important elements:

- a) conventional procedures,
- b) rules,
- c) conflict management.

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<sup>209</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 146.

<sup>210</sup> *Ibid.*, 188f.

<sup>211</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 195.

<sup>212</sup> Dieter Senghaas 1997, 14.

These elements oppose any kind of haphazard jurisdiction. The civilisation achievement is, therefore, the formation of perennial and self-regulating political community. The aim of this civilisation process is peaceful co-existence.<sup>213</sup> Who can materialise this peaceful co-existence through his regulating power? "What are the constitutional conditions of perennial peace?"<sup>214</sup> The importance of necessity of rule of law can be observed especially in the pluralistic societies, i.e. in the state nations. As it was discussed under "power monopoly", here it deals with non-partiality of the state constitution.

Senghaas typifies the structural features of perennial peace, which apply to the national as well as international level as follows:

- 1) positive interdependence: interaction,
- 2) symmetrical interdependence: comparable competencies and chances,
- 3) homology: comparable political, social and economic structures, i.e. acceptance of other groups,
- 4) entropy: in economic, political and social co-operation a free choice of partner as enormous measure of self-regulation without centrally and hierarchically stratified guidelines,
- 5) common institutions: an institutional roof whose effect is to head, regulate and control.<sup>215</sup>

The central idea of these five points in the context of rule of law is structural homogeneity. Rule of law guarantees equality, freedom, and structural homogeneity. Senghaas, as well as Manfred G. Schmidt, describe rule of law as civilisation achievement. According to Schmidt, the significance of rule of law is "the systematic binding and control of state power and reliable limitation of its might, especially concerning the sphere of freedom of all social members and their social, economic and political associations."<sup>216</sup> The guaranteeing of structural homogeneity through rule of law has two levels:

1. horizontal dimension: equal rights for all groups,
2. vertical dimension: constitutional regulation of state power against the citizens, i.e. to prevent elitism and power abuse.

Rule of law regulates the social order through two strategies: *associative strategy* and *dissociative strategy*. This deals with how proper integration and isolation can be implemented.<sup>217</sup> Identity and isolation means, according to Senghaas, balance between identity and difference, proximity and distance, and unity in diversity. Equal rights for all is the starting point as well as the goal and basis of the social integration of different classes. Integration without equality and equal rights leads to structural heterogeneity and conflicts.

The associative strategy may not be confused with rescinding the structural plurality; social plurality (horizontal level) and representative responsibility (vertical level) should be guaranteed. This means that rule of law does not only regulate conflicts, but also the social organisation. Social organisation and order can exist only if there is a welfare state. In congruence to CSCE (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe), Senghaas

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<sup>213</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 560.

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*, 560.

<sup>215</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 562-564.

<sup>216</sup> Manfred G. Schmidt 1995, 808.

<sup>217</sup> Cf. Johan Galtung 1971, 235-246.

describes the characteristics of rule of law as follows: "There is consensus concerning basic principles of liberal order, pertinent institutional measures and attitudes which make the significance of human rights the centre of politics. Rule of law is not a mere formal legality, but is also justice, which is based on acceptance and complete respect of man's personality as the highest good. It is insured by institutions which provide a frame work for its comprehensive self-realisation."<sup>218</sup> As a summary, rule of law on the national level characterises the following elements:

- on the horizontal level:
  - (1) equal rights for all political and economic groups
  - (2) equal rights for all ethnic groups
  - (3) equal rights for both sexes
  - (4) protection of minority. Concerning protection of minorities, Senghaas mentions some dimensions: active minority protection; positive discrimination, i.e. to take measures and provide minorities with possibilities that are more than mere equality of chances; deep-rooted cultural autonomy; representation in political system, and guarantees of legal proceedings and protection of right, especially in the areas of education and culture.<sup>219</sup>
- on the vertical level: In this perspective, democratic rule of law eliminates elitist disparities and social, economic and political chicaneries and inequalities.

#### **2.1.2.2 Rule of law on the international level**

The starting point of international political order is the interdependence on the world level. This international dependence consists of two phases: dangers and chances.

##### **1. Dangers:**

- a) Arms race: In his action-reaction theorem, Senghaas elucidates this race as interactive escalation process.<sup>220</sup>

This process has two levels:

- competition between the super-powers, and
- competition in order to politically and economically monopolise third countries.

These two levels can be summarised as supremacy competition. Its aims are:

- ◆ economic interests,
- ◆ geo-political strategy, and
- ◆ political ideology.

- b) Suppressive competition: peripherisation of third world countries and unjust international labour division.<sup>221</sup>

- c) Search for identity and nationalism: In this politically and economically interconnected world, the peripherised societies begin to look for their identity. It is in this sense that Senghaas calls development crisis as decisive factor for re-

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<sup>218</sup> D. Senghaas 1992, 19.

<sup>219</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 131f.

<sup>220</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1974a, 37-40.

<sup>221</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1974b, 24f.

culturalisation and nationalism. "Ethno-politicisation is the political consequence of modern problem situation: collective experience of diminishing life perspectives as consequence of a blocked development or a threatening regression... Economically and socio-psychologically, ethno-politicisation is based on defensive reactions. Nowadays, these effects are stirring up anti-western politics. The post-colonial development project should be stemmed whose failure is conceived as responsible for own malaise. Moreover, the idea of laicised state should be stemmed: secular democracy, according to the western model, is conceived as contemptuous institutional nucleus of rejected post-colonial development project."<sup>222</sup>

- d) Availability and proliferation of weapons: through technological exchange and bi- and multi-lateral transactions and agreements, weapons production is increasing. This fact will be the breeding ground for national and international conflicts.<sup>223</sup>

2. Chances: Chances are the positive developments and facts, which are provided as alternatives in the face of these dangers, whereby these dangers can be eliminated or reduced. Through the help of interdependence on the global level, collective conflict management and security for the sake of common interest can be implemented instead of confronting constellations. "Such measures in the context of conflict resolution and collective security require a common understanding of a problem and an orientation to common principles."<sup>224</sup>

Peaceful conflict resolution does not only depend on the negotiating and intervening attitude of the world community and international organisations. They rather try to implement an effective political and economic order, international equality and justice. In his perspective, for the future of human society Galtung stresses the following points: "A pluralistic world society requires world wide planning of priority tasks. Since the mentioned equality concerns all of humanity rather than the members of a national state, there must be a central authority which is empowered to administer the plans for division of protein in the world, the protection of world nature; to draw up plans for supply and use of necessary resources (such as atmosphere, sea, universe, natural resources...). How this demand can be reconciled with the necessity of decentralisation is still a big problem."<sup>225</sup>

The international community can contribute to conflict resolutions in two ways:

- 1) by enacting negotiation and conflict resolution procedures
- 2) by supporting peace initiatives.<sup>226</sup>

Conventional procedures, rules, and conflict resolutions are important not only for those who are directly affected by the conflicts, but also for the international community itself. This international dimension of conflicts and their effects usually motivates the collective security intervention measures. That is why a collective security action is usually justified by the argument: "... this conflict destabilises international peace and security!" Through the international network and interdependence, the international community can, to some extent, eliminate the global structural heterogeneity. "If there is a homogeneous legal space in Europe where there exists a comparable legal understanding everywhere and

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<sup>222</sup> D. Senghaas 1994, 99.

<sup>223</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1989, 20-23.

<sup>224</sup> D. Senghaas 1992, 103.

<sup>225</sup> Johann Galtung 1971.

<sup>226</sup> Cf. Dieter Senghaas 1992, 108.

wherein the political orders are based on comparable principles of rule of law, the chance for a whole European peace order might be higher than in the old conditions of confrontational constellations."<sup>227</sup>

Conventional procedures, rules, and conflict resolutions contain, according to Senghaas, three measures: emergency mechanisms, peaceful conflict management and collective security.<sup>228</sup> For example, the international peace troops, which are deployed in emergency cases, attempt to secure peace and create collective security, and if necessary, take military actions. Senghaas asks critically how it can be possible to create peace through war. He describes this "peace-through-war-paradox" as follows: "Whoever wants democracy does not prepare dictatorship. If one prepares divorce while approaching wedding is absurd. It is the same to pollute the environment by striving for development. Concerning peace, a comparable absurdity has hardly been noticed through centuries. '*Si vis pacem, para bellum*' is the traditional maxim of peace securing, which is still accepted in many parts of the world: if you want peace, prepare war. This maxim is accepted as quintessence of real politics whereby peace is aspired through a skilful and militarily secured power management. In principle it does not take into account the circumstances under which violence potentials emerge and violence becomes virulent."<sup>229</sup>

International rule of law strives for international structural homogeneity, justice, equality, unity in diversity, international self-control, protection of minority, and fighting poverty, hence a New World order. Senghaas, Huntington and K  ng agree concerning international common features: "people in all cultures should look for institutions, values and practices and try to cherish what they have in common. One could think of the 'world ethos' of K  ng in this context..."<sup>230</sup>

### **2.1.3 Self-control**

#### **2.1.3.1 National self-control**

We have seen above that national and international justice and equality are the integral elements of intra- and inter-societal peace. The world ethos bases itself on this fundament. The process of civilisation demands a national and international self-control. Senghaas understands this fact as a geo-political and economic self-limitation.

1. Political self-control: In many multi-nation states, there is a high potential for conflict. Where cultural heterogeneity, religious plurality, and linguistic differences are prevalent, there is a tendency for minority discrimination and different conflict potentialities. The privileged classes and educated groups, those who were favoured during the colonial era and whose language and religion are official, tend to suppress the others. This kind of state could disintegrate into different autistic societies. Autism in this context means inter-societal, political, cultural and economic isolation. According to Senghaas, self-control of all parties and therapeutic intervention of a third party create an important atmosphere for ethno-nationalistic conflict resolution. "Since the ethno-nationalistic conflicts lead to mutually

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<sup>227</sup> Ibid., 18.

<sup>228</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 103-105.

<sup>229</sup> D. Senghaas 1997, 9.

<sup>230</sup> D. Senghaas 1998, 147.



exclusive enmity attitudes (autistic enmity), a special conflict management is required if one wants to contribute to a solution. This is called therapeutic intervention: influence on the conflicting parties. This influence does not impose any authoritarian solutions; it rather controls and analyses attitudinal and procedural orientations and makes them correctable. Its aim is to regain the lacking capability of communication and compromise."<sup>231</sup>

Another factor, which ignites conflicts in many developing countries, is the so-called "internal colonialism" which points to a national structure of heterogeneity. Most of the autonomy and secession attempts of the economically, politically and culturally discriminated groups aim at establishing their own identity and developing opportunities for themselves. One-third of all conflicts belongs to this category, says Senghaas.<sup>232</sup> Therefore, national self-control is the self-limitation of putting others at an economic disadvantage, cultural alienation, and the political deprivation of others so that all can realise their self-fulfilment.

2. Economic self-control: Societies with structural heterogeneity are the breeding ground for economic suppression. Freedom and democracy need to be guaranteed for economic activity. Unduly state interventionism and centralism hamper creativity and economic self-realisation. On the vertical dimension, a democratic rule of law regulates the power abuse by the authorities. At the same time, it reminds the citizens that the property of that state is their own property.

On the horizontal level, national self-control manifests itself in the mutuality of economic relationships and advantages. By creating structural homogeneity and coherence, different groups and individuals that are active in various sectors and areas can considerably contribute to economic progress. Senghaas calls this mutual dependence "systemic interdependence". This systemic interdependence requires national self-control. "The change from traditional to modern societies demands from everyone different roles because of which each individual receives different responsibilities in the face of long and multi-functional activity chains. This contributes in principle to fracturing of conflicts and self-control."<sup>233</sup> The systemic interdependence, according to Senghaas, deals with how different sectors, such as the economy, information, communication and transport, can be interconnected.<sup>234</sup> This interdependence is proof of the coherent development of a state.<sup>235</sup>

### **2.1.3.2 International self-control**

Even the international self-control can be divided into two dimensions: economic and political self-control.

1. Political self-control: In his *Regionalkonflikte in der Dritten Welt*, Senghaas broaches the supremacy competition of the USA and former Soviet Union in their south-relations. According to him, interest calculation and strategic intervention played an important role. "Serious problems for international relations can be created only through latent or manifest interventions of USA and USSR. However, there are massive differences in relation to the starting situations: Do both super-powers have a big interest in a specific regional

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<sup>231</sup> D. Senghaas 1992, 117.

<sup>232</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1989, 18.

<sup>233</sup> D. Senghaas 1998, 33.

<sup>234</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1994, 96.

<sup>235</sup> Cf. U. Menzel/ D. Senghaas 1986, 186.

conflict or not? Does this 'vital' interest come only from one side? Or are these 'legitimate' rights or interests denied by both?"<sup>236</sup> According to Senghaas, the central point of this geo-political rivalry is not only political gain or profit maximisation, but also the zero-sum-logic: the position gain of the one side is automatically the position loss of the other. In this context, Senghaas holds that the economic dimension does not play a significant role. The main factor is the "affective pinning" (affective Fixierung).<sup>237</sup>

Dissociation is indispensable for political independence and autonomy. This is an important basis for "auto-centred development" (autozentrierte Entwicklung). International self-control is a fundamental precondition for dissociation and auto-centred development. In relation to east-west-conflict, Senghaas explains this idea as follows: "If there is a kind of geo-political self-control, there are double political advantages: agreement and understanding between east and west and new *modus vivendi*. This would not be less significant than a treaty on disarmament and placing limitations on the arms race. It would create political interconnection and become a huge opportunity for a constructive influence on the conflict fields of the Third World. Even though the conflicts with internal causes cannot be solved externally, foreign influences could contribute to defuse them. This requires, however, that the super-powers do not intend to accomplish their own interests in these conflicts. Therefore, there must be a vital interest in international conflict resolution, without expecting any one-sided geo-political advantages."<sup>238</sup>

Racism and nationalism can be the result of lack of international self-control, which yields a superiority complex, and the eradication of others, such as Nazism in Germany.<sup>239</sup> But usually some of the phenomena of the international relations of self-interest are disputes on global or regional supremacy, ideological or leadership conflicts, security policy conflicts, economic policy conflicts, etc. In his "*si vis pacem, para pacem*" maxim, Senghaas underlines international geo-political and economic self-control. This self-control is a comprehensive political co-ordination.<sup>240</sup>

2. The economic self-control: This deals with international economic order. The economic order of nowadays is characterised by social Darwinism and the development of a tendency toward suppressive competition. This fact has two adversary phases:

- international economic interdependence
- unjust international labour division and suppression and marginalization of the Third World. "Since the penetration of Latin America, Africa and Asia by colonialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism of the European powers, USA and Japan, these continents have lost their political, economic and cultural independence and they are integrated into international labour division imposed by capitalist metropolis. Beginning with the robbery colonialism, the gradual labour division of the last centuries has created dependence relations which still characterise the societies of the Third World."<sup>241</sup>

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<sup>236</sup> Senghaas 1989, 19.

<sup>237</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 24.

<sup>238</sup> *Ibid.*, 27.

<sup>239</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1988, 16.

<sup>240</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1997, 11.

<sup>241</sup> D. Senghaas 1974b, 15.

The various forms of imperialism of the industrialised countries in the third world are cultural imperialism, communication imperialism, and political and economic imperialism.<sup>242</sup> The result of these imperialistic interventions, international labour division and suppressive competition is the under-development of the third world. "Underdevelopment [of the Third World] is the result of international economic system dominated by the capitalist metropolis. The development of these metropolis, the centres, and the history of underdevelopment of the Third World are complementarily interconnected in the international system."<sup>243</sup>

One of the important strategies of the imperialistic societies was that they created structural heterogeneity in the developing countries by educating some élite and advantaging them. Senghaas calls these privileged élite the "internationalised bridge-heads" (internationalisierte Brückenköpfe). They were the instruments, which prevented the collective protest of the developing countries against the metropolis and maintained the status quo.<sup>244</sup> Interference and imposition of economic strategies from the outside world is a considerable impediment to the development of the developing countries. Therefore, Senghaas pleads for dissociation from the world market and for an auto-centred development.<sup>245</sup> Self-control means acceptance and fostering of macro-sociological plurality and economic and political independence. Dissociation does not mean total isolation from international economic, cultural and political relationships. It is rather a balanced implementation of associative-dissociative economic and political measures, a balanced integration and self-reliance, proximity and distance, and unity in diversity.

## **2.1.4 Democratic participation**

### **2.1.4.1 National democratic participation**

As it has already been mentioned, peace and development parameters depend on democratic participation. "A conflict escalation can be observed, when a lack of political participation leads to conflict build-up. Therefore, democratic participation is an elementary precondition for lasting constructive conflict management: conflicts, which result from social change, must be solved through democratic participation. If this participation is undermined, the probability of a peaceful solution of problems is considerably low."<sup>246</sup> Democratic participation is not only a sign of political participation, but also the basis for economic development. Senghaas tries to prove this through the scheme of his civilisation hexagon. Identity problems and developmental crises are the consequences of the failed materialisation of the civilisation hexagon.

Social, political and economic mobilisation enables participation of all in the comprehensive set-up of society. This is called democratic participation. In this context, Galtung says the following: "The society should guarantee the individual the maximum of freedom while looking for the form of life in general and form of labour in particular. Accordingly, the society should be structured in a way that it enables equality through

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<sup>242</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 16.

<sup>243</sup> *Ibid.*, 18.

<sup>244</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 20.

<sup>245</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1977, 170.

<sup>246</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1997, 14.

mobility, right to withdrawal, etc. No social order should be structured in a way that some people exert an everlasting dominion over others..."<sup>247</sup>

How does the social restructuring take place? How does the transition from the traditional social system to modernisation come into being? What kind of role does democratic participation play? In his *Zivilisierung wider Willen*, Senghaas answers these questions through the help of some East-Asian examples: "Within few decades, the traditional societies have got a modern social profile. The modernisation of political system, especially pluralisation and democratisation are rapidly growing... Societies which are modernising and industrialising themselves are demanding faire participation in the public issues..."<sup>248</sup>

Senghaas warns against democracies without institutions, especially in the multi-national states.<sup>249</sup> Democracy, which is one of the most important aspects of equality, should be able to penetrate all areas of social life. Even if through democratisation not all inequalities can be eradicated - taking advantage of chances depends on the individual person - it enables the formation and consolidation of political will (formation of parties, association, etc.) corresponding to the theory of pluralism.<sup>250</sup> The concrete phenomena of pluralistic society are freedom of opinion, religion, press; plurality of culture; tolerance to all social groups; equality of chances; liberal economy; division of power (legislative, executive and judiciary) and rule of law.<sup>251</sup>

Therefore, democracy as "rule of the people" per definitionem requires equality and justice. On the basis of the consensus of CSCE-document of Copenhagen, Senghaas describes some elements of justice and democracy as follows: "Elements of justice and expression of innate human dignity and inalienable rights are: free election, right to political participation, representative political system, constitutional actions of governments, separation of government and parties, binding the government and administration to the rule of law, civilian control over police and military, preservation of human rights by laws, publicity, equality of citizens before the law, administrative jurisdiction, instruction of appeal in judiciary sentences, independence of judges, independence of public prosecutor, non-ambiguity in criminal proceedings, right to legal advisor in cases of criminal prosecution, right to open and fair legal proceedings, right to defence, legal proceedings only in cases of constitutionally regulated facts, presumption of innocence until the judiciary proof of guilt, and so on."<sup>252</sup> This means that democracy, rule of law, basic freedom, political pluralism, and respect of human rights are integral preconditions for peace, security, justice and co-operation. Co-operation and active inclusion of persons, groups, organisations and institutions are basic elements in order to secure progress in the pursuance of common goals. Democracy is the right of each individual to develop its own political, social and cultural ideals and desires.

Besides enabling the creation of one's own skills and creativity, the economic dimension of democracy creates a fair access to and participation in the economic surplus.<sup>253</sup>

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<sup>247</sup> Johan Galtung 1971, 194.

<sup>248</sup> D. Senghaas 1998, 162.

<sup>249</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 163.

<sup>250</sup> Cf. G. Reinhold et al. 1997, 107.

<sup>251</sup> Cf. Senghaas 1992, 191-212.

<sup>252</sup> D. Sebghaas 1992, 19.

<sup>253</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1988, 15.

In this context, the charter of Paris (21-11-1990) formulates the following: "Economic freedom, social justice and responsibility for the environment are indispensable requirements of welfare. The free will of the individual, which is expressed in democracy and secured by rule of law, makes a necessary basis for a successful economic and social development. We want to support an economic activity which respects and protects human dignity."<sup>254</sup>

#### **2.1.4.2 International democratic participation**

How democratic participation can be materialised at the international level is somewhat doubtful for Senghaas.<sup>255</sup> However, while Senghaas discusses the world order and international peace, international democracy plays a very important role: democratic formation of global interdependence. Concerning peace policy, democracy has got a conflict resolution dimension. This deals with the multi-structured policy of convention, co-operation and "civilisation of conflicts". According to Senghaas, where democracy is successful, there will emerge institutions, which support conflict resolution measures.

What shape do peace policy and conflict regulation and conflict prophylactics take on in the pluralistic and democratic political system? Diversity of opinion, distribution of power and rule of law have to be understood in the context of global pluralism, equality, justice and new economic and political world order. Recognition and implementation of these factors is the touchstone of international good will.

The ambivalence of present global politics encompasses on the one hand, an almost entire inter-link of the world, and on the other hand, structural heterogeneity. If democracy is to be conceived as politics of justice, there must also be comparable political, social and economic structures. That would be a homological recognition of comparable counterparts. These structures are indispensable for global democratic co-operation. Global democratic activity and global responsibility are the commitment for justice, security, peace, territorial integrity, political independence, etc. The Paris-charter formulates as follows, how these social, political and economic realms - basing on democracy - can be furthered and protected: "Our relationships must be based on democratic values, human rights and basic freedoms. Fostering democracy, respect and practice of human rights, equal rights of peoples, right to self-determination and territorial integrity of states are indispensable for stable peace and security. In order to solve economic, social, ecological, cultural and humanitarian problems, we emphasise the political consultation process and co-operation. These common determination and mutual dependence will contribute to overcome the long mistrust, to consolidate the stability and to set up a unified Europe. We need a Europe from which peace emanates, which is open for dialogue and co-operation with other countries, which is ready for exchanges and which participates in searching for answers in the face of challenges of the future."<sup>256</sup>

The charter broaches the prophylactic contribution of democracy to the protection mechanisms of conflicts. Moreover, an international democracy should dedicate itself to the

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<sup>254</sup> D.Senghaas 1992, 212f.

<sup>255</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1997, 16.

<sup>256</sup> D. Senghaas 1992, 214.

marginalised and discriminated minorities.<sup>257</sup> Democratic institutions and economic freedom (market economy) further economic and social progress. The international economic order is not democratic as far as it characterises an unequal international labour division. Senghaas points out that the unequal development processes between the producers of processed products, goods of production and investment, and technological equipment on the one hand; and producers of unprocessed raw materials, processed products of lower level, and agricultural goods, on the other hand, make the international labour division.<sup>258</sup> That is why Senghaas pleads for an auto-centred development, since, according to him, democratisation cannot be realised without economic and political development. "In a general sense, auto-centred development consists of the organic connection of following activities:

- "continuous survey of locally available resources;
- local utilisation of local resources;
- set-up of own industrial sector for the production of productive means;
- development of existing and invention of adjusted technology;
- productivity increase of agricultural economy;
- industrial production of public consumption goods."<sup>259</sup>

Therefore, democracy means political sovereignty and economic justice. Economic weakness yields political weakness, and vice versa. In this sense, as Senghaas maintains, unjust labour division causes structural enrichment of the centres and structural pauperisation of the satellites. Senghaas calls this fact the structural defect and social deformation.<sup>260</sup>

## **2.1.5 Welfare state**

### **2.1.5.1 National welfare state**

Briefly, the welfare state can be defined as just distribution and fairness. Power monopoly, rule of law, self-control, democratisation, and political culture have no efficacy, basis and legitimacy, if just distribution and fairness do not exist, due to the fact that all of these components are interconnected. "Democratic participation enables an active confrontation with problems of social justice which are immanent in the modern societies of market economy. Such societies produce more inequality than equality. For a civilisation of conflict nothing is more dangerous than when a society systematically privileges some and disadvantages others. This makes trust and hope for fairness illusory. This is the main hindrance for constructive conflict management and source of mistrust, hopelessness, violation of rules and violence escalation. On the contrary, attempts for social justice and fairness provide material substance for constructive conflict management."<sup>261</sup>

According to Senghaas, distributive justice is a proof of structural homogeneity. This structural homogeneity is one of the six facts which enable auto-centred development, and which Senghaas pleads for:

- "structure and efficiency of agricultural sector,

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<sup>257</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 216.

<sup>258</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1977, 27.

<sup>259</sup> *Ibid.*, 260.

<sup>260</sup> cf. *ibid.*, 28, 265.

<sup>261</sup> D. Senghaas 1997, 14f.

- opening up internal market,
- coherence,
- homogenisation,
- maturity, and
- international competitiveness."<sup>262</sup>

Concerning distributive justice, the aim of welfare state is not just to divide the wealth of the state to the poor, instead to create a balanced structure of sectors. Senghaas maintains here, the difference of contribution (employment, production) of a certain sector may not be enormously different from another sector, so that the social, political and economic development of a country is just and homogeneous.<sup>263</sup>

Intra-societal heterogeneity and unjust chances of production can be described as internal suppressive competition or social violence. Violence has two phenomena: direct or personal violence and indirect or structural violence. The structural violence (structural heterogeneity) can be observed in many developing countries as a result of shortcomings caused by social, economic and political injustice. In most of these areas there is a lack of a coherent way of development, which interconnects all sectors. Friedrich List depicts this fact as follows:" The agriculture of a country can blossom, the development for all future can be secured and protected against regression and crisis only if agriculture and industry help each other, only if their mutual relations are not interrupted by any political or natural causes, only if the manufacture industry develops and becomes perfect in all branches and only if production and consumption as well as agriculturists and manufacturers keep the balance."<sup>264</sup>

The aim of this interconnection of sectors is auto-centred development, which prevents unduly dependence. Dependence is not only the need for developmental aid, but it is also the inability to produce basic necessities.<sup>265</sup> Senghaas warns against misunderstandings when he pleads for dissociative auto-centred development. Auto-centred development is not a total isolation. He understands the foreign economic relation as the replenishment and continuation of internal market orientated agricultural and industrial production. Moreover, he maintains that auto-centred development is a good fundament for a just global interdependence in the context of self-sufficiency and self-reliance.<sup>266</sup>

Senghaas points out that growth and development are not the same. That means, growth does not necessarily signify equality and justice, since it is a measure in respect to GNP which does not show who has how much. In congruence to the speech of the World Bank President Robert McNamara in 1973, Senghaas contends that the growth in the world is characterised by structural violence due to the unjust distribution of income. In this context, structural violence implies that those who have the power and means to reduce unjust income distribution and high unemployment are not taking any significant measures.<sup>267</sup> The nature of the welfare state is social justice and its goal is: help against misery, protection from risks of income losses or cost overload especially in case of old age, invalidity, sickness,

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<sup>262</sup> U. Menzel/ D. Senghaas 1986, 179.

<sup>263</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 191.

<sup>264</sup> Quoted according to D. Senghaas 1977, 267.

<sup>265</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 270f..

<sup>266</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 282.

<sup>267</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1974b, 10-12.

unemployment, motherhood, etc. Moreover, its aim is to increase welfare and to support self-help and the capacity for the self-regulation of economic subjects.<sup>268</sup>

Economic and political inequalities have the following phenomena: mass migration, urbanisation, marginalisation, etc. The problems of the welfare state touch not only the economic facts, but also religious, cultural and social dimensions are included, since they are interconnected. Therefore, peace and development policies include a policy of justice and equality, hence, the policies of welfare state. "Minorities are pushed into marginal social and economic positions; their mobility towards development is blocked. This blockade of modernisation and development is hardly possible under present circumstances. At least education can be an access to social mobility of minorities through which they obtain new horizons and levels of demand."<sup>269</sup>

### **2.1.5.2 International welfare state**

Senghaas admits that the feasibility of the components of the civilisation hexagon is very challenging. However, he emphasises the indispensability of the welfare state on the international level for the maintenance of an international peace policy. "Distributive justice on the international level is a very disputed category. However, if this problem is ignored, political stability is cannot be materialised on the international level as well as within states or societies."<sup>270</sup>

As we have seen above, according to Senghaas, social, economic and political dimensions play an equal - because of their functional relation - and decisive role in the world peace policy. Therefore, the end of the Cold War does not necessarily mean total peace between East and West. "And if the democratisation process in the eastern part of the continent [Europe] would be successful, there remains another task: to overcome the economic east west differences. Historical and actual experiences as well as systematic peace theory reflections prove that one of the substantial reasons for politically virulent conflicts is based on economic cleft of societies and economic differences between societies."<sup>271</sup>

Concerning the consciousness of responsibility for the present social, political and economic disparities, McNamara admits the unjust structures on the world level. The international structural violence has considerably contributed to the disastrous situation of many countries in which development crisis is undermining the social order.<sup>272</sup> The international injustice can be concretised as follows:

- 1) unjust international labour division which creates structural heterogeneity in the dependent countries, and hinders coherence economic sectors,
- 2) torpedoing own and independent economic policy target and decision-making,
- 3) unjust international order (of world economy, international communication and information, sea-regime),
- 4) jeopardising political sovereignty,

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<sup>268</sup> Cf. Manfred G. Schmidt 1995, 886.

<sup>269</sup> D. Senghaas 1998, 141f.

D. Senghaas 1997, 16.

<sup>271</sup> D. Senghaas 1992, 57.

<sup>272</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1974b, 8f.



- 5) mono-cultural hegemony: transfer of western values and forms of life into the third world.

How is possible to implement a dissociative developmental policy without total isolation in the face of the dominant structures of industrialised countries? According to Senghaas, in the international interdependence and world economic order the hierarchical peripherisation has become an unavoidable fact, which the poor countries cannot escape. Therefore, implementation of dissociative development policy is indispensable for the survival of these countries. The task of international relations should be not only to respect the dissociative development model, but also to foster it; since the history of successful development (auto-centred development) was characterised by following factors:

- (1)"successful formation of identity of the individuals, of the collective and of the political culture in general,
- (2)growing capability to self-control and self-regulation of politics, society, economy and culture,
- (3)differentiated productive force development in all most important areas: agriculture, production means industries, invention and production of technology, public consumption industry, private and public services,
- (4)exchange with social units beyond own territory for mutual benefit. This relation should be at the beginning very selective, and then it can be enlarged."<sup>273</sup>

## **2.1.6 Political culture**

### **2.1.6.1 Political culture on the national level**

Peace has been defined above as the capability of the organisation of a society. This capability of organisation can be judged by its political culture. Senghaas calls this political culture constructive conflict management. "So that a political way of behaving results from the mentioned components. This political way of behaving not only contains the plurality of identities and interests as something essential, but it also conceives a constructive approach to conflicts as expression of civilised behaviour and civilisation achievement with special value and as quintessence of appropriate political culture of constructive conflict management."<sup>274</sup>

A political culture of peace is the non-violent management of conflict and the creation and maintenance of the coexistence of different ethnic, cultural and religious groups.<sup>275</sup> Many African countries are conglomerates of various ethnic groups. Those who do not belong to the ethnic group of the respective leader of the country feel disadvantaged. One of the political strategies of the leaders of the government is that they try to secure their government by appointing the members of their ethnic group to the key political positions. As a result, resentment toward these ethnic groups is not limited to the members of the government. All the ethnic groups whose members dominate the government are also hated. This creates socio-structural heterogeneity and political immaturity. Therefore, social conflict potentiality is enkindled and ethno-nationalistic violence prevails, when:

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<sup>273</sup> D. Senghaas 1977, 290.)

<sup>274</sup> D. Senghaas 1997, 15.

<sup>275</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1994, 96.

- a) one or more groups believe that the others are living at their expense and are not contributing to the development of the country;
- b) there is religious, confessional, cultural and linguistic swamping;
- c) an assimilation pressure is exerted on minorities.<sup>276</sup>

Senghaas contends that the core of ethno-nationalistic conflict is primarily not an interest but an identity conflict. In order to underpin this contention, one can pick up the mimetic theory of René Girard. At the beginning an object is desired by two or more parties; and it is at the centre of the struggle. But right after the conflict is intensified, the desired object is transposed from the centre to the periphery. That means that the object is no longer as important as it was at the beginning. The substantial question of the conflicting parties is who wins and who loses: zero-sum-logic. However, what does it mean to win or to lose? It is the identity, not the desired object (primarily) that the adversaries are going to win or to lose. Senghaas calls this identity the fundamental necessity. Conflicts, which touch these fundamental necessities, should be regulated by *therapeutic intervention*. "The background of a conflict should be clarified. That means, subjective and objective conflict circumstances should be argumentatively reviewed, in order to prevent exclusive enmities or the tendency to this exclusiveness. Its aim is to prepare and facilitate options of action. Therapeutic conflict resolution is orientated to the causes. Chances of solution are possible only when the adversaries find an intellectual and emotional breakthrough to the solutions during the revision of the conflicts."<sup>277</sup> In order to reduce conflict potential, to resolve conflicts and to enable coexistence, i.e. a civilised approach to the plurality of interests, intervention of a third party is effective and constructive, says Senghaas. Some of the components of this process are confidence building measures, empathy, mutual understanding, horizon enlargement and orientation to a solution of the problem.<sup>278</sup>

#### **2.1.6.2 Political culture on the international level**

Inter-state conventions and institutionalised co-operation play a decisive role in the conflict management mechanism. "To make peace means to create those prerequisites which enable a civilised conflict management through their mutual interaction. Conditions for enabling peace are more probable in the intra-societal context than on the international level. However, international peace is not an unrealistic category. As it can be observed in EU-Europe, there is a successful civilisation of political relations: agreement on common values; transnational communication and transaction should be significant everywhere; strong partners should be open for the difficulties of the weak; common economic activities should aim at common advantages, and common problems should be solved through amended capabilities for problem solution."<sup>279</sup>

Senghaas maintains that without comparable structures there is no intergovernmental or multi-level organisational co-operation. The White Paper of J. Delors for the EEC in 1985 can be taken as an example. Its aim was the removal of

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<sup>276</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1992, 116-121.

<sup>277</sup> Ibid., 135.

<sup>278</sup> Cf. ibid., 125-130.

<sup>279</sup> D. Senghaas 1997, 16.

- physical barriers: administrative control
- technical barriers: different technical standards
- fiscal barriers: taxation.

These are some of the aims of the EEC: free movement of capital, labour, services and goods. These transnational co-operations and supranational structures and institutions set a course for political culture, collective security, co-operative security and peaceful conflict management, which can be realised through negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication.<sup>280</sup> International disarmament measures and the actions of supervision and security authorities are determining step towards the international political culture. Senghaas understands the activities of the integrated peace troops (UNO) in this sense.

Which elements justify and further the collective security? Comparable legal understanding and principles of behaviour, institutionalisation of co-operation in political fields, fostering democratic institutions that are based on common interests and mutual recognition of borders are proof of an inter-state political culture.<sup>281</sup> Senghaas calls the transition from conflict relation to new forms of conflict resolution the "process of civilisation" in which the mutual intimidation are destroyed, a limited co-operation will be implemented and an interactive and co-operative peace formation take place.<sup>282</sup> The contention of Senghaas concerning the international "process of civilisation" in relation to the east west conflict applies also to other international conflicts:

1. Political order and ideological dimension: The following principles can be applied as basis for international civilisation and political culture: "Maximum amount of equality and respect of rights which are the integral part of sovereignty; restraint from violence; territorial integrity; peaceful regulation of conflicts; non-interventionism in internal affairs; respect of human rights and basic freedom including freedom of opinion, religion, conviction, press; equal rights and self-determination of peoples; co-operation between states; fulfilment of human rights obligations..."<sup>283</sup>
2. The security policy dimension: implementation of confidence building security structures instead of arms race.<sup>284</sup>
3. The dimension of foreign economic relations: transition from economic war to economic exchange; fostering positive interdependence, which is based on symmetry and mutuality.<sup>285</sup>
4. The humanitarian dimension: the inter-state contacts should not be limited to the economic and political relations; but inter-societal information, communication and cultural exchange should be fostered.<sup>286</sup>

Hence, Senghaas discusses various dilemmas of international relations in the context of political culture:

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<sup>280</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1990, 40.

<sup>281</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 47.

<sup>282</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 98.

<sup>283</sup> *Ibid.*, 100.

<sup>284</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 103f.

<sup>285</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 104-106.

<sup>286</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 107.

- ◆ Security dilemma: Projection of violence. A state considers other states as potential aggressors. This projection leads to arms race.
- ◆ Development dilemma: the phenomena of development dilemma are peripherisation and suppressive competition.
- ◆ Ecological dilemma: consequences of profit maximisation and egoistic self-interests. This can be described as common goods dilemma.
- ◆ Co-ordination dilemma: lack of co-operation for constructive international political culture.
- ◆ Politicisation dilemma: through social mobilisation a course will be set for political mobilisation. In spite of the present international interdependence, there are growing nationalism tendencies in the world. This is the product of social and political mobilisation.<sup>287</sup>

The sources of an effective political culture are the components of the civilisation hexagon. Without implementation of these factors, according to Senghaas, there is no development. Without development, there is no peace. However, the big question is, if development alone will suffice to create and maintain peace.

Social and political mobilisation cannot be understood outside of the cultural context. In the modernisation process the respective position of the individual - precisely of women and many socially despised groups – has to be taken into consideration, since any social stratification is part of the cultural structure. Therefore, it is appropriate to see the position that Senghaas allots to the cultural dimension in the socio-political and economic development process.

## ***2.2 Culture and development according to Dieter Senghaas***

### **2.2.1 Culture according to Senghaas**

Senghaas understands culture as the totality of the typical forms of life of a society including its basic frame of mind and collective values.<sup>288</sup> The instrumentality of culture concerning culture-development-interaction and inter- and intra-civilisation conflicts is one of the central theories of Senghaas. He criticises the cultural essentialism<sup>289</sup> of Huntington. On the global as well as on the regional and sub-regional level, unlike the contention of Huntington, the decisive factors for conflicts are rather the socio- and economic-structural heterogeneity.<sup>290</sup>

While observing the phenomena of culture, its instrumentality is the proof for the fact that culture does not play any essential role in social problems. The mutability of culture can be stated in relation to the social, economic and political challenges. In the context of cultural interaction, Senghaas depicts four forms of reactions exhibited by the developing countries to the Western culture:

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<sup>287</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1992, 142-155.

<sup>288</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1998, 150.)

<sup>289</sup> Cf. Ibid., 76.

<sup>290</sup> Cf. ibid., 141.

1. a modernistic-imitative reaction: within the foreseeable future the world political culture will be identical with the Western culture;
2. conservative reaction which preserves own tradition;
3. reaction of half-modernists: on the one hand, openness towards the West: on the other hand, rejection of "foreign" influences;
4. innovation through reconciling of modernity and tradition: combination of components from different cultures.<sup>291</sup>

According to the theory of Senghaas, the mutability of cultures has two features:

- internal conflict of culture in the face of interaction between the thrust of modernisation and the desire of preserving own tradition;
- the task of culture is to enable a lasting public order and social stability.

Therefore, according to Senghaas, culture is mainly a political culture. These two characteristics deal with rejection of foreign determination, imposition and intervention. "The anti-attitude is replenished by individual and social objectives connected with political innovation. This event touches the political, social and economic order. Culture is not only limited to the totality of spiritual and artistic dimensions; it also includes the rejected old and the desired new public order. Culture, which in this context deals with project and counter-project of public order is the quintessence of political order, because the respective imaginations aim at the active formation of diverse life, spheres. It is, therefore, political culture in the emphatic sense."<sup>292</sup> Hence, this cultural conception deals with the formation of public order, regulation of social conflicts, and implementation of economic and political strategies through the help of different economic, social and political perspectives. By analysing this fact, one can figure out the images of the society and peoples in the respective social unit.

By understanding culture as political culture and order, Senghaas comprehends the East-West conflict as clash of civilisations, although the religious dimensions in themselves do not play any significant role. In this sense he compares the different social and political order values of the Western world such as individualism, pluralism, division of power, conflict management, market economy, etc. with the values of the Eastern world such as collectivism; mingling of politics, society and economy; conflict suppression; collective property; planned economy; foreign trade monopoly, etc.<sup>293</sup>

Relativity and insignificance of culture can be explained through the help of his development policy theory of the civilisation hexagon. If a society is stable by implementing the monopoly of legitimate state power, rule of law, self-control, democratic participation, welfare state and political culture, culture is mutable. This is what makes culture an achieved, not inherited phenomenon. The Western capitalistic, individualistic, and pluralistic culture may not be understood as *essentially* and *genotypically* Western. It is the achievement of civilisation process. "Even in Europe, these achievements were result of a frictional history with tradition. Until they became part of the political culture, they were confronted with reluctance. Therefore, it would be totally false to interpret the civilisation of conflicts in the Western world as peculiarly *western*: neither the components of the civilisation hexagon nor

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<sup>291</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 36-49.

<sup>292</sup> *Ibid.*, 153.

<sup>293</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 157.

their combination were *genotypical*. Rationality, individualism, pluralism, etc., are value-orientations that are usually associated with "Europe" or "West". But they were always disputable in the past history. The idea of Husserl (1935) maintains that entelechy is innate in the Europeans and is prevalent in the European transformation. Moreover, according to Husserl, this entelechy gives the Europeans the sense of development towards an ideal formation of life and being as an eternal pole. This contention is, however, wrong."<sup>294</sup>

Culture is on the one hand, the driving force which creates public order and which aims at civilisation of conflicts; on the other hand, it is the result of the civilised conflicts. Since all cultures are exposed to conflicts between modernisation and tradition, their historical process shows certain comparability. The value-profiles in societies with comparable development level are similar; and the cultural differences do not play any significant role. Modernisation processes cause the reconstruction of the traditional society all over the world. In this process, societies are caught in conflicts; different identities and interests collide. The task of culture is to reconcile these traditional and cultural identities on the one hand, and modern plurality on the other hand. This task orientates itself *against own tradition* (Senghaas) in the development process: confrontation of culture with itself. Successful societies necessarily pluralise their political culture, though reluctantly, says Senghaas. This is called " *civilisation counter cultural reluctance* " (Zivilisierung wider Willen).

Another factor that helps to understand cultural relativity is that culture should be considered in the context of a given period of time, respective economic and political development level and social philosophical situation. Senghaas relativises the essentialist conception of common values of the collective which are absolutised as integral part of the culture in different societies. According to Senghaas, these common values are pre-existent in all traditional societies because the members of such societies of subsistence economy are absolutely dependent on each other. However, when the civilisation process begins to assert itself, the collective commences to dissolve. Therefore, Senghaas criticised the essentialised systemic antagonism that conceives the Western and non-western values as essentially antagonistic. He defends his criticism by saying that what is now taking place in many developing countries had already happened in the development history of Europe.

Re-culturalisation - revitalisation of cultural values and identity - itself implies that an essentialist conception of culture is a superficial theory. Many societies re-value their cultural values and identity, because, in the face of conflict between tradition and modernisation push, they are surrounded by many development crises, and this interaction is not civilised. According to Senghaas, the emphasis of culture and religion in many societies is just the instrumentalisation of culture for the sake of struggle for power.<sup>295</sup> Instrumentalisation of culture means utilisation of culture, i.e. through re-culturalisation a social group re-values the identity and cultural values of the group in order to gain political power but not for the sake of the culture itself. In a society wherein development is successful the culture itself becomes modernised. If, however, a society is in a chronic development crisis, intra-societal clash of civilisation is accentuated.

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<sup>294</sup> Ibid., 36f.

<sup>295</sup> Cf. Dieter Senghaas 1994, 100-107.

The pillars of culture, such as religion, are not homogeneous and free from conflicts. In Christendom as well as in other religions there are confessional and theological disputes and conflicts. In this sense, religion and culture can ignite more conflicts in the society than they solve social problems. Senghaas contends that the former symbiosis between politics and religion in the Western world was a decisive factor for the later secularisation movement. The present pluralistic society of the West is its result. Senghaas maintains that "this process would be the fate of all societies which are mobilising themselves. Even in the Islamic societies which now are passing through the process of social mobilisation, the socio-economic and socio-cultural pluralisation is not any more refutable. Consequently, a total isolation from the pluralised world is not possible. In the face of this fact, even the Islamic world does not have any other alternative than to comply with the modern plurality and its institutional measures."<sup>296</sup>

Basically, according to Senghaas, it is the economic development that determines the peace and conflict of a society. Culture can be merely ethnically, religiously and politically instrumentalised, if the economic development fails. Accordingly, the role of culture in the economic development process is insignificant, if there is no need of this instrumentalisation. If development is the creator of peace and solution of conflicts, it is worthwhile to discuss what development means for Senghaas.

### **2.2.2 Development according to Senghaas**

The most important development policy theories of Senghaas are contained in his civilisation hexagon. Senghaas tries to inter-relate peace policy and development policy in his research. Without a lasting peace and constructive conflict management there is no development. If a society is anarchic, if it does not have common rules, if everyone is allowed to do what he wants, political participation of the citizens is blocked, the society is characterised by social injustice and conflicts are not constructively regulated; as a consequence, this society is overshadowed by intra-societal disintegration, and no development is possible in it. Development means for Senghaas symmetric interdependence, political independence, viable national economy and solid cultural identity.<sup>297</sup> Successful economic and political development is a solid basis for cultural identity.

According to Senghaas, international labour division and association (integration), peripherisation process, suppressive competition, and asymmetrical dependence are responsible for the global development problems:

- a) Unjust international labour division and association (integration): the developing countries are producers of raw materials and the industrialised countries produce processed products. Hence, the developing countries are not able to process their products since they cannot develop themselves technologically. As a consequence, these conditions intensify structural heterogeneity, since the inter-connection of primary and secondary sectors cannot take place.

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<sup>296</sup> D. Senghaas 1998, 90.

<sup>297</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1988, 148.

- b) Peripherisation pressure: a social formation and economy can be described as periphery when the economic system is characterised by specific structural defects that are induced from and orientated towards outside.<sup>298</sup>
- c) Suppressive competition: the international economic order contains paradoxes: on the one hand, the developing countries are integrated into the global economic relation; on the other hand, the global economic relations contain unjust structures and framework. That means, the economic relations, information exchange and technical co-operation among the industrialised countries are substantially higher than between the industrialised and developing countries and among the latter.
- d) Asymmetrical relationships: "The consequences of the mentioned factors is pauperisation and underdevelopment of the developing countries. The asymmetrically structured relationships between the metropolis and satellites show the structures of international dominion and economy which systematically (with reliability and regularity conditioned by the structure itself) further a cumulative enrichment of the metropolis, and cumulative, relative and even absolute pauperisation of the satellites."<sup>299</sup>

In the face of this fact, development cannot be realised because the imposition from outside, structural dependence, interference, penetration, etc. characterise the economic relationships between the industrialised and developing countries. Therefore, Senghaas pleads for a dissociative auto-centred development model and objectives. This would be a balanced combination of "anti-attitude" towards foreign interference and national development projects and model. The case of the East Asian countries is the best example for a successful development policy staging: a simultaneous "anti-attitude" and openness to the western development model.

The successful East Asian countries have modernised their political system: pluralisation and democratisation have taken place. In combination with the modern, efficient and international competitive economy the East Asian values are conceived as expression of a specific "Asian modernity". The non-successful societies are, however, plunged into structural heterogeneity: on the one hand, the political authorities and higher classes; and on the other hand, frustrated, politicised and socio-economically mobile middle class and the class of marginalised poor population which is growing in number.

While discussing world economic order, Senghaas criticises the associative, i.e. the world market integrative development policy. He describes the conventions of associative development such as the convention of Lomé as non-effective global development policy. Hence, the development policy plea of Senghaas is based on dissociation and selective co-operation. "The theory of the necessary dissociation of the satellites from the capitalistic world market and selective co-operation is the result of practical experience of associative conventions and a world market integrative policy in general; moreover, from a theoretical and empirical analysis of the consequences, this makes obvious the integration of the Latin-American, African and Asian societies in an unequally structured international labour division and in the framework of capitalistic world market."<sup>300</sup> In order to prevent misunderstandings,

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<sup>298</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1977, 14.

<sup>299</sup> D. Senghaas 1974b, 18f.

<sup>300</sup> D. Senghaas 1977, 15f.



Senghaas emphasises that dissociation does not mean autarky (in the sense of isolated self-sufficiency). Therefore, he inter-relates dissociation and selective co-operation.

Even though Senghaas rejects the associative development policy, he recommends the European development model as the most effective model for the developing countries. This contention of Senghaas is based on the conception that the European development model is not peculiar to the European cultural area. This means every society should follow this model not because it is a European model; instead, because it is *the* development and industrialisation model. "The dynamic which is induced in non-European civilisations through European modernity would have been easily absorbable, if the European development model had been followed. Even if some thinkers believe that the failure of development projects in the non-OECD areas is caused by Euro-centrism, the fact is something else: the typical development models in the third world do not follow the pervasive development models of European (and non-European) societies. If the 'developing world' had repeated the European development model in its postcolonial era, the typical problems of the Third World countries would have most probably not existed. No development model inside and outside of Europe was successful, for example, if a pervasive production increase of agriculture did not precede the industrialisation. Agricultural and industrial development must be functionally interconnected until the industrialisation develops own dynamic process of growth. Otherwise the result is 'urban bias' that is conceived as the basic evil of development policy."<sup>301</sup>

As we have seen above, according to Senghaas, it is the economic development that determines the fate of a society concerning peace and conflict. Senghaas has relativised the significance of culture for the materialisation of economic development. Concerning this materialisation of economic development, Senghaas underlines the significance of social structure for economic development whereby he seems to separate culture and social structure.

### ***2.3 Social structure and development according to Senghaas***

The socio-political and cultural structures that have an impact on peace or conflict also have an impact on development or failed development. The civilisation process and components of the civilisation hexagon are the fundament of economic development. The social structure that is the integral part of development can be understood only in this context. By emphasising the importance of social structure for economic development, Senghaas underlines the insignificance of culture in relation to development. However, his ideas have some inconsistencies.<sup>302</sup> Hence, according to Senghaas, the respective social structure is responsible for development or underdevelopment. "If societies who have resources at their disposal managed to productively assimilate the growth impulses that come from the developed societies in the integration of international economic relationship and to implement own development progress, this depended substantially on the respective institutional framework and socio-structural preconditions."<sup>303</sup>

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<sup>301</sup> D. Senghaas 1994, 109f.

<sup>302</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 73ff.

<sup>303</sup> Dieter Senghaas 1988, 128.

### 2.3.1 Intra-societal social structure and auto-centred development

The transition from raw material production to the production of refined products is one of the important processes of economic development. In this sense, the socio-structural backbones of economic development are: Structure and efficiency of agricultural sector and its interconnection with the industrial sector,

- ◆ opening of the internal market,
- ◆ coherence (interconnection and balanced operation of different sectors). The aim of coherence of sectors is that raw materials are not exported unprocessed, and the consumption goods are not imported from outside as processed products on which the population is utterly dependent),
- ◆ homogenisation (abolition of structural heterogeneity, congruency of sectors: balance between different sectors so that not just some sectors blossom and are advantaged while the others are neglected),
- ◆ socio-economic maturity (qualified human capital: education, know-how, social competence and modernised productive means), and
- ◆ international competitiveness.<sup>304</sup>

The core elements of these factors are a coherent economic system and an extensive internal market opening. The salient feature of an incoherent and dualistic economic system is, according to Senghaas, the national incapability of producing food articles: the country has to import food and luxury goods (for the elite). A dualistic economic system implies, hence, import of finished products and export of raw materials. The regression of subsistence economy and unduly growth of export orientated 'exclave' economy are the characteristic phenomena of structural heterogeneity. Such an economic trend is one of the important factors, which contributed to the urban bias, and negligence of hinterland in many developing countries.<sup>305</sup> Senghaas enumerates the following consequences and symptoms of these structural defects and partial modernisation:

- "an increasing incapacity to productively integrate the majority of the population in the economic activity;
- a growing incapacity to feed the population with locally produced food articles;
- the incapacity to produce their own accessories and technological equipment and to adapt foreign know-how to local conditions;
- the incapacity to control the population growth which is the result of socio-economic shattering;
- the incapacity to start own technological progress which is related to local problems and situations, and to change traditional structures;
- the incapacity to stop internal cleft and to reverse it;
- the incapacity to grant democratic rights to the people;
- the ecological shattering."<sup>306</sup>

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<sup>304</sup> Menzel/Senghaas 1986, 40f.

<sup>305</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 178-198.

<sup>306</sup> *ibid.*, 35.

Social mobility, education, competence of state bureaucracy, solid agricultural reform and inter-sector homogeneity are some of the decisive prerequisites for the interconnection of export and internal market production. Import substitution and export diversification determine the effectivity of an economic system.<sup>307</sup> Import substitution limits dependence on imported goods. Export diversification reduces a mono-cultural export production and economy. The aim of this economic policy is a successful abolition of structural heterogeneity, peripherisation pressure. Inter-sector relation, distribution of material goods and distribution of immaterial goods (participation) are indispensable so that all sectors function efficiently and interconnected, the material and immaterial capital is competently implemented and not the inherited but acquired competitiveness takes place.

The extensive internal market opening consists of three important elements: increase of demand, increase of national product and the volume of internal market; the higher the income of the population, the bigger the volume of the internal market. The demand of the population can increase only when the income increases. The increase of this income presupposes the justice of distribution. This shows the causal relation between development and distribution. The mass consumption goods are demanded at first. Therefore, this need should be met. At the same time, Senghaas emphasises that the demand should be tendentially transferred from the goods of mere basic necessity to sustainable consumption goods.<sup>308</sup> The reorientation of production apparatus towards public consumption goods achieves an important contribution to the absorption of labour power and to the reduction of technological dependence of the satellites. "An important precondition for the set-up of production apparatus in the industrial sector are fundamental structure reforms in the agricultural sector. The interconnection of industrial production apparatus and the needs of a restructured agriculture (providing with production means, all kinds of agricultural inputs, etc) and the orientation of agriculture to industry (providing of labour power with agricultural goods, raw materials, etc.) can create internal market development which enables a solid basis for a gradual socio-economic development process and integration of urban and rural population."<sup>309</sup>

In relation to the history of development policy, according to Senghaas, the de-feudalisation, which signifies distribution of land, is the fundament of coherent development process. In this situation political power distribution (participation), land reform and mobilisation of local competence are some of the important factors.

Creation of technology, mobilisation of locally available resources and on-site utilisation of these resources are basic preconditions for sustainable development. "Auto-centred development consists of organic interconnection of the following activities:

- continuous survey of locally available resources;
- local utilisation of local resources;
- set-up of own industrial sector for the manufacture of productive means;
- development of existing and invention of adjusted technology;
- productivity increase of agricultural economy;

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<sup>307</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 56.

<sup>308</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 183.

<sup>309</sup> D. Senghaas 1977, 59.

- industrial production of public consumption goods."<sup>310</sup>

Extensive internal market integration (on the national level) and selective co-operation (on the international level) are the central development theories of Senghaas. Hence,

- ◆ a differentiated productive force development in all sectors: so that a society successfully develops itself, there should be no inequality of sectors and structures. That means, it is not enough that different sectors are interconnected (coherence); but also each sector should get equal chances of production (homogenisation);
- ◆ there should be a growing capability to self-control through political power distribution and participation - concerning socio-political, economic and cultural mass mobilisation; formation of individual and collective identity which is the basis of constructive conflict management and political culture;
- ◆ while a society becomes socio-politically and economically mature by implementing these factors, it begins to become capable to form its transnational economic and political relations. Capability of selective exchange is a sign of international competitiveness.<sup>311</sup>

Social structure means production structure. The positive inter-sector interaction is dependent on interconnection of different ways of production. Therefore, according to Senghaas, the local consumption of production of one sector fosters the consumption of the products of the other sectors. This mutual consumption interconnection increases not only the will to production, but it also abolishes a dualistic economic system. Senghaas says the following about the inter-sector interdependence: "The task of the agricultural sector (production of enough food articles for local and national need and enough raw materials for the processing in the national industrial sector) and the task of the industrial sector (production of industrial inputs for the increase of productivity of the agricultural economy and enough amount of industrial consumption goods for the local market) are complementary. In the face of the situation that the majority of the population in the peripherised economy is living at subsistence level, it is doubtless that the interconnection of industry and agriculture has an enormous development potential."<sup>312</sup>

According to Senghaas, the industrialising industrialisation (de Bernis), i.e. forward and backward inter-link of different sectors and their mutual supply of products and the production interdependence should be orientated towards the production of basic goods of public consumption so that

- the basic needs of the population are met,
- socio-structural heterogeneity is abolished,
- the ways of production are not limited to the consumption goods of luxury (for the higher social classes), and
- the productivity of all interconnected sectors is increased by mutual interdependence.

A suitable social structure is the fundament for transition from mono-cultural or dualistic economic system to a coherent economy. In this sense, according to Senghaas, the agricultural societies are per definitionem the societies with low development level, because

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<sup>310</sup> Ibid., 266.

<sup>311</sup> Cf. Senghaas 1982, 402.

<sup>312</sup> Senghaas 1977, 268f.

innovation and transformation of the existing socio-economic structures are not yet implemented. The agrarian constitution (latifundium, partial leasing system, etc) of the respective society play a decisive role. De-feudalisation is the determining factor for capability of innovation and transformation of the existing social structure in such societies.<sup>313</sup> The result of these de-feudalisation, transformation and innovation is a just distribution of income resources. The frameworks for these social changes must be created through social engagement. This social transformation depends on the human capital. The latter can develop itself as far as the socio-political power diffusion takes place.

In the interconnection of agricultural and industrial sectors Senghaas differentiates between three levels, which are the result of systematisation of the interaction between local (traditional and small) industry, agriculture and modern (highly technological) industry:

1. The first level: the modern industry supplies necessary technologies for the local industry without having a direct influence on the agriculture. The interdependence between agriculture and local industry is, however, mutual, because the agricultural sector produces raw materials for the local industry, and the local industry supplies productive means to the agricultural sector.
2. The second level: in this interaction not only the purchasing power, which is the result of growing agricultural productivity, will increase; but there will be also a high absorption of the labour force in the agricultural sector as well as in the local industry. This process enhances the qualification of the local industry and supply of more products to the modern industry.
3. The third level: this qualification intensively interconnects the local and modern industry through which the agricultural sector is mechanised more efficiently.<sup>314</sup>

In this sense, Senghaas underlines the political preconditions for a successful development policy. Social consciousness is one of the important preconditions. The population should be convinced that its own resources are used, needs are going to be met and the people are mobilised. The politics sets a course for this process by enabling the participation of the poor people and by creating an efficient, decentralised and democratic administrative structure.<sup>315</sup>

The following points can be added to the development policy thoughts of Senghaas that we have seen until now:

- even if he pleads for a welfare state, Senghaas emphasises the necessity of a slight inequality of distribution of natural resources. That means, a total equality of distribution of resources and income does not allow (or only partially) the emergence of public markets.
- false priorities in educational systems (emphasising social sciences and neglecting technical studies) have negative impacts on development.

Concerning the task of self-sufficiency in food articles production, Senghaas pleads that the agricultural sector should be well equipped and furthered by the national economic policy. Senghaas maintains this in the context of urban bias that is caused by the "city-inhabitants" who almost entirely determine the political direction and situation in many

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<sup>313</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1988,129.

<sup>314</sup> Cf. Senghaas 1977, 271-273.

<sup>315</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 284.

developing countries. The following agricultural policy objectives should be materialised in order to meet the national food needs and to foster the agricultural production:

1. increasing agricultural productivity through the promotion of technical progress and optimised factors of production,
2. enabling a fair standard of living for the agricultural community,
3. stabilising markets,
4. availability of supplies, and
5. ensuring that the products reach consumers at reasonable prices.

### **2.3.2 The international interlink and a dissociative development**

The human being needs not only human community for his development, but he is dependent also on goods and properties of the others. We have seen in the theory of Rousseau that the scarcity of nature has played an integral role in the process of formation of society and culture. It was a necessary desire and obligation of each individual that this society had to be regulated and bound by cultural law. Hence, to economise means to regulate the individual and social attitudes concerning the scarce goods, which everyone needs. Scarcity of natural resources is the origin of intersocietal interlink. In the face of the international interlink, it can be asserted that, because of various differences of chances such as physiological, ecological, social advantages or disadvantages, some develop themselves quickly and others remain on the level of subsistence economy. The international and inter-societal inter-link did not always lead to the amelioration of the situation of the economically underdeveloped. An international inequality and structural heterogeneity is rampant because of the asymmetric dependence.

In the face of the growing internationalisation of capital and labour, an unequal exchange characterises the international relations. This unequal exchange consists of making the labour power cheaper. The consequences are weak purchasing power, low motivation of production, undermining of extensive internal market integration, unequal international labour division, deformed reproduction, internationalisation of labour and capital, and unequal development between the metropolitans and satellites.<sup>316</sup> "An abolition of unequal exchange and unequal development of metropolitans and satellites can only be possible if the structural deficiencies of the peripherised economies can be eradicated; that means, if the population of the peripheries is productively integrated into the general economic reproduction process. The structures of the peripherised economies provide a cheap labour force..., the metropolitan economies are almost in no area orientated to remove the defects of the peripherised economies nor to enable a coherent social and economic structure in the peripheries..."<sup>317</sup>

The international labour division and inter-link can be summarised as follows: the industrialised societies are providers of processed products of high values such as machines, technologies, films, TV-programmes, scientific theories, etc.; whereas the developing countries are suppliants of market to these products and supplicants of unprocessed food and luxury articles and mineral. The economic cleft between North and South is, hence, the

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<sup>316</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 183.

<sup>317</sup> *Ibid.*, 184.

product of these different chances and conditions.<sup>318</sup> According to Senghaas, these facts are the main trigger of international conflicts. Senghaas calls this the conflicts of distribution. Therefore, *dissociation* from and *selective co-operation* with the *metropolitan capitalism* is the basis of extensive and coherent mobilisation of productive force, with the aim of meeting the needs of the population. Basically, the world economy is integrating only the higher socio-economic classes of the Third World. Therefore, the international conflict of distribution takes place between these elite and the industrialised nations. That means, the poor population is de facto excluded from the international competitiveness, and it is the victim of the conflict.<sup>319</sup>

The aim of selective co-operation and dissociation is de-hierarchisation, i.e. regionalisation and sub-regionalisation of the international economy so that there is national self-reliance and development of national confidence. "Self-reliance excludes exploitative trade structures and dependence on external influences and powers which exert a political pressure. There is, of course, the need of freedom for technology transfer; but the stress should be on adjustment and invention of local technologies. These entail, moreover, the decentralisation of the world economy and even of the national economy in order to increase the feeling of personal participation. The conception includes, in addition, the importance of international co-operation for collective self-confidence, in order to control and increase the economy and to create one's own life style."<sup>320</sup>

The regionalisation, according to Senghaas, must be underpinned by regional co-operation of the poor countries. This counter-action against fragmenting of the peripheries enables them to undermine the international economic political imbalances and to implement a horizontalisation of relationships among the peripheries. This fosters an inter-regional collective self-reliance. It consists of mutual structural relationships among societies and economies with similar problems and challenges of development, in order to dilute the political power concentration in the industrial societies and to establish a multi-centre structured international economy through horizontalisation of relationships.<sup>321</sup>

In order to materialise this, they need common and suitable inter-regional infrastructures: common information, communication and service system (common news agencies; integration of surface, water and air transportation, common insurance) and common policy of resources.<sup>322</sup> Only this inter-regional co-operation and convention as well as suitable social structures can enable the developing countries to create an international counter-power and to counteract the economic and political power concentration in the industrialised countries. Senghaas call this the *politicisation of the North-South-relationship*.<sup>323</sup>

Even if Senghaas does not play down the importance of the international economic and political relationship, the probability of a successful development depends mainly on national, intra-societal, inter-societal and inter-regional co-operation, competence and policy. Concerning this point, Senghaas quotes W.A. Lewis: "It is true that the prosperity of the

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<sup>318</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 144f.

<sup>319</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 215.

<sup>320</sup> (Quotation according to *ibid.*, 282. This is the declaration of Cocoyoc. Cocoyoc declaration is the result of consultation of an international group of social scientists that met in October 1974 in Cocoyoc, Mexico.)

<sup>321</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1979, 397f.

<sup>322</sup> Cf. Senghaas 1977, 283.)

<sup>323</sup> Cf. Senghaas 1988, 149.

developing countries depended on what they were selling to the industrialised societies in former times. The developing societies have all resources, which they need for their development: oil, fibre, iron, copper, bauxite, etc. Through common exchange they can meet their agricultural needs; and they do not need to beg the USA to buy more tea and coffee, in order to be able to pay back the American grain while they could produce more grain for themselves. The developing countries lack only skill. But they can learn this and can carry out all industrial processing by themselves. With the exception of these skills, the development of Asia, Africa and Latin America will continue, even if the rest of the world should submerge in the sea. If it is so, these countries have the solutions to their problems in their own hands, and they should cease to think of what they can sell to the industrialised countries or what they want to buy from them."<sup>324</sup>

Furthermore, Senghaas tries to substantiate his plea for dissociation on the grounds that, in the face of the existing socio-structural difficulties in the peripheries, the international interlink has destructive consequences. The lack of homogeneity of sectors, structural coherence and extensive internal market integration characterise the economic situation of the peripheries. But without these basic elements there can be no successful "catch-up development". Mono-cultural and dualistic exclave economy prevents an intra-societal competence building, economic maturity, a constructive international competitiveness and collective self-reliance.

## **2.4 A critical appraisal of the theories of Dieter Senghaas**

Senghaas writes in his book 'Konfliktformationen im internationalen System' about the dangers of transferring European development concepts into the developing countries<sup>325</sup>. But in his book 'Wohin driftet die Welt?' he pleads that the developing countries should follow the Europeans footsteps.<sup>326</sup> This and the following contradictions imply either Senghaas' theoretical development and change, or an inconsistency in his theory.

Ulrich Menzel and Senghaas decisively negate the interdependence of culture and economic development.<sup>327</sup> According to them, the significance of culture for the development of any society is marginal; the social structure determines economic development. But in his book 'Wohin driftet die Welt?' Senghaas approves that the Jewish-Christian legate furthered economic development.<sup>328</sup>

Senghaas understands the ideological conflicts as clash of civilisations and of cultures. However, one should pay attention that only by instrumentalising culture, a conflict becomes a conflict of cultures. The focal point of this conflict is not culture as such. Civilisation - in the sense of material culture - takes advantage of the cultural identification, and it instrumentalises it. This instrumentalisation of culture takes place only when economic development fails.<sup>329</sup> For Senghaas the East-West-conflict is a clash of civilisations. But the problem here is, if the conflict of different political ideologies is characterised as clash of

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<sup>324</sup> Ibid., 152.

<sup>325</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1988, 143.

<sup>326</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1994, 109f.

<sup>327</sup> Cf. Ulrich Menzel/ Dieter Senghaas 1986, 73ff.

<sup>328</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1994, 104f and 108.

<sup>329</sup> Cf. Senghaas 1998, 141f.



cultures and if the political ideologies change their direction, does that mean that culture does not have an entity which is independent from the respective political ideology?

On the one hand, Senghaas sees the detrimental consequences of the colonial time for the developing countries;<sup>330</sup> on the other hand he plays down the colonial background in relation to the present political problems in many colonised developing countries.<sup>331</sup> Senghaas maintains that the economic dimension of the third world was insignificant in the East-West-conflict.<sup>332</sup> At the same time he says that the relations of economic exchange among developing countries were systematically hindered by industrialised countries. This South-South co-operation could be an important basis for political solidarity of the third world against the industrialised metropolis.<sup>333</sup>

By describing culture as a political culture, Senghaas widens the concept of culture; but by saying the role of culture for development is not significant – instead the social structure – he narrows its concept. The main reason for Senghaas' exclusion of culture from the development process is to discard the culture essentialism, which understands that the European development achievement is due to the *genotypical* disposition<sup>334</sup> of the European culture.

There is no culture, which is totally independent from social structure, nor social structure, which is totally independent from culture. Unlike the right wing conservative thinkers of development theory who tend to see the origin of the western economic development in the nature of the western culture (culture essentialism), Senghaas differentiates between culture and social structure by maintaining that only the latter has significant repercussions on economic development. Senghaas does not deny that there is an intrinsic relation between social and political systems and traditional culture. Moreover, he maintains that in traditional societies – unlike in industrial societies – the culture works as a functional binder for respective social and political order by religiously and mythologically underpinning it. He admits that in the mentioned conditions any culture can hinder or slow down development. But if the social and political order changes and the productive forces are released, according to Senghaas, the repercussions, which hinder the development, are no longer significant.<sup>335</sup> However, the question still remains unanswered, how the political and social order change takes place and whether the culture contributes anything to this change.

Even if Senghaas does not completely deny some minimal contributions of culture for economic development, his method of argument is a “yes... but” structure. In this method the affirmative statements have a marginal significance. The statement, which follows the „but“, contains the central thoughts of the arguer. The “yes” sentence is the condition mentioned above concerning the cultural repercussions on the economic development. The “but” sentence contains the pivotal ideas of Senghaas. It stays together with the “yes” sentence to negate or weaken it (in the above case); or it stays alone as an independent sentence by

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<sup>330</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1988, 164f; D. Senghaas 1974b, p. 15, 17; D. Senghaas 1989, p. 17f

<sup>331</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1994, 98

<sup>332</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1989, 24

<sup>333</sup> Cf. D. Senghaas 1974b, 15

<sup>334</sup> Cultural genotypical disposition means a culture has innate development-hindering or development-furthering elements. According to this assertion, the western culture is essentially a development-promoting culture, whereas the African culture is essentially a development-hampering culture.

<sup>335</sup> Cf. Menzel/Senghaas 1986, op. cit., 79f.

putting forward the theory of the arguer. “One can bring whatever arguments he wants, but the decisive factor of the development of the East Asian economy is not the culture, instead the social structure.”<sup>336</sup> From these texts I draw the conclusions that Senghaas shows a clear tendency to separate culture and development. However, to separate it from the economic development dimensions would mean to endow it with a socially isolated entity. That means, by his attempt to avoid cultural essentialism Senghaas tends to endow culture with an isolated entity.

I understand social structure as the sum of culture, the political system and respective development level. The development and change of culture depend on the critical appraisal of the social members towards the respective social structure. During an internal (social) conflict between the commitment to economic development and the social structure to change the existing social structure, the culture does not remain neutral. If I may personify the culture, since it knows that it is the principle of social action and of social order it preconceives that it is going to be modified and updated. After this modification which is caused by the changed new social structure and achieved economic level, the culture realises that it is going to be the new principle of social order and action. This shows the dialectical relationship between culture and development. Senghaas has correctly conceived the dialectical culture and development process, but he has isolated and mispositioned culture: culture has taken merely a minor role in the economic and socio-structural drama.<sup>337</sup>

As expounded in detail in the analysis of his political and development theory, Senghaas stresses the importance of developing the productive force of the agricultural sector prior to the secondary sector. But the production of the primary (agricultural) sector depends on the amount and quality from the side of the secondary sector. If the secondary sector is not taken equally into consideration, where do the industrial inputs, which are indispensable for a better agricultural production come from? Should they be imported from somewhere else? But wouldn't that mean an economic structural heterogeneity and maintaining the dependence from the outside economy? As Tetzlaff justly criticises, how can the primacy of the agriculture and internal market development be justified in the societies which do not have wide opportunities for agricultural production depending on unfavourable geo-physical situations?<sup>338</sup>

In this chapter I have tried to show the position and contribution of Senghaas to development studies, especially concerning the role of culture in the developmental activities. I have discussed that, according to Senghaas, culture does not play any significant role in the economic development process. As a counter position to this assertion I would like to briefly analyse the position of Huntington according to whom culture plays the essential role for economic development, mass mobilisation and creation of collective identity.

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<sup>336</sup> Menzel/Senghaas, 1986, 76. Concerning these ideas of Senghaas confer this book pp.78, 79, 80.

<sup>337</sup> Cf. Ibid., 80.

<sup>338</sup> Cf. 1994, 149f.

## ***2.5 Culture and development according to Samuel P. Huntington.***

### ***Culture as the mobilising factor for the economic development?***

"The human history is the history of civilisations. It is impossible to think of the development of humanity in any other terms. The story stretches through generations of civilisations from ancient Sumerian and Egyptian to Classical and Mesoamerican to Christian and Islamic civilisations and through successive manifestations of Sinic and Hinduic civilisations. Throughout history civilisations have provided the broadest identifications for people."<sup>339</sup> Huntington's understanding of civilisation is based on his conception of culture. Civilisation is understood as the fruit of culture. Civilisation consists of all cultural achievements such as technical development and collective value systems, which further the economic development. Therefore, civilisation means all achievements of human beings in their history. Hence, in the Anglo-American society culture and civilisation mean more or less the same thing.<sup>340</sup>

The characteristic element of Huntington's theory is cultural essentialism. Cultures are essential not because they mean the total ways of life of people, nor because they imply the values, norms, institutions and ideologies, which are, standardised and accepted by different generations. The understanding of Huntington essentialises culture by superficially conceiving its transformability.

Unlike for Senghaas, for Huntington culture is a decisive factor for development. The economic success of the East Asians is rooted in their culture. Not only is the development dependent on culture, but the socio-political difficulties are caused and determined by culture. According to Huntington, democracy cannot find its feet in the Islamic world because its culture is not suitable for democracy. The European, industrial and individualistic culture is for him essentially European culture, and not the result of the civilisation process. On the contrary, the starting point of Senghaas is a universal civilisation culture, which we have seen above in the context of civilisation hexagon and the facts of auto-centred development. According to Huntington, there is no universal civilisation culture. Development can take place only when the western civilisation and its culture is rejected, since the components of this civilisation structure are essentially Western. "Developments in the post-communist societies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are shaped by their civilisation identities."<sup>341</sup>

Hence, culture shapes the model of economic and political development. The religious-cultural revolts of nowadays are led in order to set free the culture through cultural consciousness. According to Huntington, the suppressed culture is the cause of underdevelopment. Culture almost always follows power. This power consists of two

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<sup>339</sup> S. P. Huntington 1996, 40.

<sup>340</sup> Cf. Gerd Reinhold, et al. op. cit., 748.

<sup>341</sup> Huntington, op. cit., 29.

phenomena: economic success and military power. These two factors incite in the respective societies the feeling of political, social and ideological exclusive correctness. That means, one's own political, social and ideological standpoint will be conceived as absolute.

There are two kinds of powers: "hard power" and "soft power". The hard power signifies the economic and political power; where as the soft power implies the cultural consciousness that is caused by the hard power. In congruence to the theory of Joseph Nye, Huntington emphasises that culture is the integral part of economic success. While the hard power bases itself on economic and military power, the soft power is based on the wealth of a state and in relation to its culture and ideology. Moreover, the latter tries to make itself attractive and to convince others that the model of this state or civilisation is applicable to all. What makes ideologies and civilisations attractive? They are attractive when they can demonstrate their material success and influence.<sup>342</sup>

According to Huntington, religion is the constitutive part of culture. Therefore, even religion is a decisive factor for development. Movements of religious revival are anti-secular, anti-universal and anti-Western. However, urbanisation, modernisation, development, capitalism, natural science and technology - which are, according to Huntington, Western achievements - are not rejected; instead only Westernisation is refuted.

By quoting Al-Turabi, Huntington underpins the importance of religion for economic and political development: religion is the driving force of development. This contention can be compared with the "Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism" (Weber). The economic success on the one hand (for example, the Asian states), and the social mobilisation and high population growth on the other hand (for example, the Islamic societies) reinforce the search for identity.<sup>343</sup> "While Asians became increasingly assertive as a result of economic development, Muslims in massive numbers were simultaneously turning toward Islam as a source of identity, meaning, stability, legitimacy, development, power, and hope epitomised in the slogan 'Islam is the solution'... Islam is for us not just a religion but a way of life. We Saudis want to modernise, but not necessarily Westernize."<sup>344</sup>

Huntington compares the Islamic resurgence with the Protestant Reformation. Both are reactions to the stagnation and corruption of the existing institutions. Their goal is the return to a pure and demanding form of their religions. They preach hard work, order and discipline and they address their speeches of mobilisation to the dynamic middle class.<sup>345</sup>

Blood, language, religion and way of life are, according to Huntington, the components of culture. However, religion is the central element. When the desired development and modernisation are achieved, the people begin to look for their identity and peculiarity. As a result of making the religion the cornerstone of culture and social events, sacred fundamentals are paved for the social order: cultural renaissance through de-secularisation.

Religion is the unifying power to discover the peculiar identity. According to Huntington's theory, this unity is indispensable for development; it is a cultural unity. However, cultures not only foster the development, but they also contain a high conflict

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<sup>342</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 136f.

<sup>343</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 95-101.

<sup>344</sup> *Ibid.*, 109f.

<sup>345</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 109-111.

potentiality. Where there are no cultural similarities and commonalties, there is no economic co-operation. For a successful economic co-operation, hence, cultural commonality is an indispensable precondition. Cultures develop by instrumentalising their political, economic and religious organisation and production. "They prescribe institutions and behaviour patterns to guide humans in the paths which are right in a particular society."<sup>346</sup>

According to Huntington, civilisation is the biggest cultural unit, which comprises language, history, religion, customs and institutions. These are the primary factors of the collective identity. Without religion these factors are still sterile. They become vivacious and concrete only when they are arched over by religion. The fact that religion is the best means for mass mobilisation is based on the fact that it does not allow partial devotion. Through partial devotion no one can attain his identity. Therefore, Huntington says one can be half-French or half-Arab but not half-Muslim or half-Catholic.<sup>347</sup>

The attempt of cultural universalisation is its dilution by blurring cultural borderlines, which make the collective identity. Therefore, Huntington exhorts the USA and the Europeans to abandon the universalisation of their culture and to recollect their cultural similarities and values.<sup>348</sup> In Huntington's politicisation of religion and mythologisation of politics the economic interests do not play the primary role for the conflict trigger and mass mobilisation. People fight and die in the name of their religion and cultural identity.<sup>349</sup> "As people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are likely to see an 'us' versus 'them' relation existing between themselves and people of different ethnicity and religion... Differences in culture and religion create differences over policy issues, ranging from human rights to immigration to trade and commerce to the environment... Governments and groups will increasingly attempt to mobilise support by appealing to common religion and civilisation identity."<sup>350</sup>

According to Huntington, culture consists of different views. "The people of different civilisations have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy."<sup>351</sup> These views reveal the identity and the consciousness of belongingness. The group, which one belongs to, makes what he is. The economic success is secured only when economic regionalism is rooted in a common civilisation.<sup>352</sup>

By stressing the culture and religion for economic co-operative organisations Huntington has touched an aspect which could apply to the Kambata as well. Most co-operations among the Kambata are based on the common ancestry. The micro-sociological as well as the macro-sociological conflicts are war of deities.<sup>353</sup> Conflict is the process of

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<sup>346</sup> Ibid., 318.

<sup>347</sup> Cf. Der Spiegel 48/1996, 178.

<sup>348</sup> Cf. Ibid., 185.

<sup>349</sup> Cf. Ibid., 186.

<sup>350</sup> Samuel. P. Huntington, The clash of civilisations? In: Foreign Affairs 1993, 29.

<sup>351</sup> Ibid., 25.

<sup>352</sup> Cf. Ibid., 27.

<sup>353</sup> Every conflict has a religious element. Even a conflict between two individuals can have a religious dimension. If two individuals of the same clan among the Kambata fight, they curse the *ayyana* (*ayyana* is spirit. See section 5.3.4) of the antagonist by saying *ayyanuhe ba'u*, *ayyanuhe urrunka*, *ayyanuhe qe'rru*, (may your spirit, luck disappear!). This spiritualisation of the conflict legitimises all means to be used against the antagonist. A family has its own *ayyana*

differentiation and categorisation of friends and enemies. "Groups or states belonging to one civilisation that become involved in war with people from a different civilisation naturally try to rally support from other members of their own civilisation."<sup>354</sup> Therefore, cultural similarities further economic and political co-operation.

What Huntington calls "kin-country syndrome" can be called in the case of the Kambata "kinship-syndrome". Through the super-naturalisation of the political relations the common interests are legitimately substantiated and the individual actions within this framework are legalised. Even if the Kambata do not have specific gods<sup>355</sup> and religions for each clan, the clan structure contains religious elements based on respective ancestry. In this sense Huntington's emphasis of religious culture for economic co-operation is not baseless. Nevertheless, there is a big difference between the cultural religion of the Kambata and the theory of Huntington. The Kambata have only one culture; therefore the conflict is macro-sociological and intra-societal, whereas the theory of Huntington concentrates on the global and inter-societal conflicts.

The clash of civilisations of Huntington can be described as clash of developments. Development is, according to his theory, freedom from dependence, alienation and foreign determination; the same is the aim of the clash of civilisations. Both the achieved development, on the one hand, and the social mobilisation and demographic explosion, on the other hand, ignite the civilisation rebellion. This means,

- ◆ culture follows the successful economic power, or
- ◆ culture and religion are just instrumentalised to mobilise the people against alienation because development failed.

"The most obvious, most salient, and most powerful cause of the global religious resurgence is precisely what was supposed to cause the death of religion: the process of social, economic, and cultural modernisation that swept across the world in the second half of the twentieth century. Longstanding sources of identity and systems of authority are disrupted. People move from the countryside into the city, become separated from their roots, and take new jobs or no job. They interact with large numbers of strangers and are exposed to new sets of relationships. They need new sources of identity, new forms of stable community, and new sets of moral precepts to provide them with a sense of meaning and purpose. Religion, both mainstream and fundamentalist, meets these needs."<sup>356</sup>

## 2.6 A critical appraisal of the theories of Samuel P. Huntington

Joining the opinion of Senghaas one can pose this question to Huntington: How is it possible that a culture, which could not bestow any chance until then and whose social members lived in poverty, can suddenly become the breeding ground for hard and soft power? Huntington sees in culture only the dimension, which furthers development and stirs up

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descending from the ancestors; a clan has an *ayyana* of the common forefathers. Therefore, to fight against someone means to fight against his respective *ayyana*. In this fight the total identity (*ayyana*) of the individual, of the family and of the clan is endangered. By invoking the respective *ayyana* they have got a supernatural power which not only legitimises their means of the fight, but also gives them the power to fight whole-heartedly and which needs the total devotion of the individual or the group. Through this measures the war is sanctified and the identity is solidified and deified because the deities are involved in the human activities.

<sup>354</sup> Ibid., 35.

<sup>355</sup> However, there are no significant studies available on this topic.

<sup>356</sup> S. P. Huntington 1996, 97.

conflicts. While the theory of Huntington deals with religion, culture, conflict and development, it is equating religion and culture. Their striking profile according to his illustration is their conflict potentiality.

On the one hand, Huntington speaks of the religious resurgence, which is taking place worldwide; on the other hand; he speaks of the indifference of the Europeans concerning their religion and Christian tradition. If religion should be the most important factor, which initiates inter-civilisation war, how can it take place in the face of the social, cultural and economic irrelevance of religion in Europe? Are the Europeans going to become religious suddenly, in order to fight for their religion? Evidently Huntington overlooks the internal heterogeneity (religiously, ideologically) within the same civilisation group.

In my opinion, the theory of Huntington contains a superficial comparison of Christianity (Protestantism) and the Islam. According to him, the resurgence of Islam and the reformation of Protestantism are reactions to the stagnation and corruption. However, reformation was an *intra*-civilisation matter (within the West), whereas Islamic resurgence was an *inter*-civilisation revolt (against the West).

The main problem of the theory of Huntington is his culture essentialism. He believes in a superficial cultural change: "Cultures can change, and the nature of their impact on politics and economics can vary from one period to another. Yet the major differences in political and economic development among civilisations are clearly rooted in their different cultures."<sup>357</sup> Besides this essentialisation of culture, he ontologises conflicts.

In order to prove the significance of culture for economic development, he picks up the East Asian culture in an invariable perspective. But as we have seen above, economic development can change the culture radically. The industrial and individual culture is (for Huntington) a European culture, not the result of an economic process. His conception that democracy is not possible in the Islamic world, is a proof for his culture essentialism. Huntington understands urbanisation, modernisation, development, capitalism, natural science and technology as something western.

According to Huntington, cultural consciousness (self-confidence) and politics of confrontation follow material and economic success (East Asia vs. the West). At the same time, inter-civilisation clash can take place because of development failure (Islamic world vs. the West). That means, by managing to develop their economy, the non-western countries obtain not only an economic and political, but also a socio-psychological power, which enables and moves them no more to put up with the political and economic pressure of the industrialised countries. At the same time, Huntington believes that because the economic development could not take place, the developing societies begin to revise and appreciate their cultural norms and values, which allegedly further their economic development. By re-evaluating these values, the socio-cultural differences between the developed and underdeveloped become crystallised. This is the second initiator of the inter-civilisation conflict. Hence, one can sum up the theory of Huntington as follows: According to Huntington, conflict is something ontological. There is a conflict because of the successful development (East Asia vs. the West) as well as because of the failed development (the Islamic World vs. the West). Those who managed to develop themselves economically assert their socio-cultural values that helped them to contrive the economic development (in the case

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<sup>357</sup> Ibid., 29.

of the East Asians). Those who did not manage to bring about this economic success instrumentalise the socio-cultural values, which are alleged fundament for the striven development (in the case of the Islamic world). Hence, cultural identity through economic success, or economic success through cultural identity? The theory of Huntington seems to confirm both of them. The danger of this theory is an inter-civilisation conflict ontology.

Huntington interprets the world economic co-operation in the light of cultural similarity between the partners. This is a very contestable thesis. Material accumulation is one of the new religions in the present world. The developed countries see their economic development as an integral part of their collective identity and “rationalised” culture. To gain profit seems to be the absolute goal of the modern homo oeconomicus. As long as cultures are not instrumentalised – in case of political and economic crises and as a consequence, socio-cultural crises and inferiority complexes – the god of economy is not interested which religious and cultural group a country belongs to; instead the important thing is, where the best economic profits are to be gained.

However, this relativisation of culture does not intend to separate culture from the social facts. The human being thinks and acts in its social system. Any social system cannot be separated from the respective culture. What is the role of culture as social principle of action and order in co-ordinating the common interests of the community and materialising the individual’s determination to physical and intellectual self-fulfilment? What kind of social structures emerge from the freedoms and limitations of the individual in a given principle of action and order while striving for its physical and mental self-fulfilment? What kind of impacts does the individual self-confidence have on the existing political, economic and social structures and fundamental cultural principles? In the following chapter I will discuss this issue by analysing the functional and structural interactions between culture, social structure and economic development.



## Chapter 3. Functional and structural interactions between culture, social structure and economic development

Culture, community and social structure are structurally and functionally intertwined. The members of a community must have a common interest, if they want to build a community, which again needs structures, rules and norms. "In his history the human being has made an effort to update his labour tools, in order to ameliorate his life style. This happened in all society forms, and as soon as a number of individuals have built a community - whatever type it was - regulations were introduced, which had to form the living together of these individuals."<sup>358</sup> Economic dimension plays an integral role in this context. In the face of the rare resources, the members of the community realise their detrimental dependence on one another. Hence, everybody in his existential interest should contribute to the construction of extensive regulations and comply with them. The socio-cultural structures and economic development deal with the following concepts: economising, rare resources and sociality.

In my definition of development the starting point was the holistic dimension of development. Every activity and achievement should contribute to the development of human being in the global and ecological framework.

Culture is relative not only in relation to the other cultures (against universal applicability = culture essentialism); it is relative even within its geographical area and communitarian-spiritual sphere. That means, on the one hand, it influences the history, the economic activity, the social relations and the material and spiritual activities of a society in a given period of time. This time-relativity makes up the cultural history of that society. On the other hand culture is just the manifestation of the happenings and activities of a society. That means, the society receives its historic profile from the socio-economic and ecological challenges, scientific and economic innovations and confrontations with other groups. The result is culture. This shows that culture is not something foreseen; it is just the result of historical events. Hereby - in relation to its time-relativity and in the perspective of intra-communitarian culture relativism - the essential and ontological comprehension of culture can be disproved. Cultures can be compared with living beings. They grow, age and decay. The human beings that claim to be the creators of culture are the tools of the soul of their culture that pre-programs the destiny of the soul. It is the original. Only in this cultural scope, which is founded for every human being from the very beginning, man thinks, feels and creates.<sup>359</sup>

Since we think and judge in relation to a short period of time - which, nevertheless, seems very long to us - we say there is no substantial change in the history of culture. If there were no cultural changes and development, there would be no social, economic and scientific development: no human development. Dickel understands culture as something condemned to dying. Or to be more precise, at first the culture grows, develops and ages. And then it dies and is replaced by civilisation. "When the climax of the possible is reached, the culture begins to grow stiff. The creative power of mind wanes. The mind, which observes, classifies and

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<sup>358</sup> Abdaramane Diarra 1993, 16.

<sup>359</sup> Cf. Otto Dickel 1921, 6.

arranges the reality, gains now its right and becomes gradually monocratic."<sup>360</sup> Civilisation means the waning of culture.<sup>361</sup>

According to this assertion the present civilisation of the industrialised countries is the climax of their history. While dealing with 'what is culture', I have tried to describe culture as a social principle of action and order. As long as human society exists, it needs these social principles. Mutual dependence in the face of rare material resources demands these principles. In this process civilisation can be the result of cultural endeavouring but not its substitute. That means, in spite of its civilisation level human society needs more cultural principles and regulations than ever, because the mutual dependence becomes more and more intensive.

Political culture is a constructive dealing with and management of conflicts. Political participation and social mobilisation, which are the integral part of social structure, reflect cultural institutions. Theories of economic development interpret this fact as a springboard for its realisation. If cultural institutions do not favour this process, they are hindering the economic development. For sure one would ask, why these societies have created such unfavourable institutions. In my view, there are some reasons and possibilities: firstly, since the beginning of social community, personal interests of the dominant ones decided the institutional structure of that society; secondly, different wishes and demands of different individuals in the community are difficult to fulfil; thirdly, the socio-economic activity of a certain society is a *trial and error* process. That means, if it is seen in a context of a long period of time, every human history has passed many socio-economic ups and downs, failures and successes. But it learns from its history; and sooner or later it ameliorates its socio-economic structures. Political culture is one of the characteristics of this social rationalisation. "The political authority would not claim sacrally and hierarchically legitimised position and obedience any more; instead it is subjugated to the free will and consensus of the citizens. There emerge new areas of political function (right, military, and bureaucracy), which were influenced by a single political authority before. By granting the right to vote, participation in political decisions now includes groups, which before were only bound by indirect political decision processes."<sup>362</sup>

Do we understand concepts like political culture and social culture in a general context? Senghaas avoids this general concept in order to understand economic development in connection with social structures and social and political culture. He rejects the economic ethnocentrism and culture essentialism. "Even if one should avoid generalisation, the non-western cultures are not characterised by insurmountable elements that would hamper development. Only in connection with innovation hindering ruling and social orders and with mismanagement of energy and resources, which are based on those orders, the cultural value orientations can have an effect, which continuously blocks development. At least the experiences in the development policy 'experiment field' in East Asia assert this position; some old experiences in and outside of Europe are comparable with that experience."<sup>363</sup> Social culture for him is the political aspect of culture. "Certainly, in the traditional societies, there is an important connection between ruling and social order on the one hand, and

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<sup>360</sup> Ibid. 7.

<sup>361</sup> Cf. ibid. 9.

<sup>362</sup> Klaus-Gerog Riegel 1976, 22.

<sup>363</sup> Quotation according to Franz Nuscheler 1995, 79.

traditional and high culture, on the other hand. It is indisputable that in the traditional societies - different from the highly industrialised societies, which are characterised by labour division - cultures have an effect as functional binding agents for the stability of that particular ruling system and social order. The transparency of the ruling relations in traditional societies, i.e. the direct relation of landlord and peasants, of bureaucracy and peasant, of ruler's house and peasants were cemented by myths, cults, religions etc., which again maintained the existing ruling system and social order. In this function every culture can have an effect, which blocks development... But when it comes as a consequence of lengthy social conflict to the changing of ruling and social order in the direction of setting free of the forces, which overcome the status quo, the traditional culture falls behind".<sup>364</sup>

Thinkers like Franz Nuscheler and Dieter Senghaas reject the theories of "modernising thinkers" who say, for example, the economic problems of the African societies are rooted in their traditional cultural mentalities. The failure of the penetration of the spirit of capitalism for Max Weber, signifies the failure of freeing the world from traditional magical conjuration (*Entzauberung der Welt*). However, for Dieter Senghaas the socio-cultural and politico-cultural aspects are decisive. Weber's comprehension of culture is (here) essentialist, ontological and static. According to me, he overlooks the time-relativity of culture. If the culture of Europe has essentially and ontologically favourable elements for the economic development, why was Europe not industrialised one thousand years ago? If one understands culture essentially, the European culture of one thousand years ago should be exactly the same with the one of today.

In many traditional societies political culture is the pillar of the cultural life. Regarding constructive conflict management, the members of that society refer back to the harmonic time of their forefathers. In their justice system the ancestors play a significant role. When some clan conflicts occur, the elders narrate in an *anamnetic*<sup>365</sup> way the endurance, patience, wisdom and their spirit of constructive conflict management.

In a narrow sense, this anamnetic representation of the ancestors has an exclusively religious significance. The living sons and daughters are the realisation of the eternal desire of the deceased. Through their biological existence and the anamnesis of their ancestors the children revivify their ancestors. This intergeneration relationship with its religious dimension has a familiar significance. But when we look at the social importance of the intergeneration relationship, we become aware of the significance of this relation for intra-clan and inter-clan constructive conflict management process. My description of culture as a social principle of order and social principle of action is to be understood in this sense. The various kinds of social stratification are to be interpreted in this context. However, one should remember that the qualitative aspect of a social and justice system is not decisive. That means, it will not be asked how just the system is; but the important question is: 'does the society live together', without explicit and direct violence? Here the structural violence still exists even if it is repressed. By mythologically substantiating the discriminating social stratification, the members of some traditional societies in a given period of time understand this fact as normal

<sup>364</sup> Ulrich Menzel/ Dieter Senghaas 1986, 79f.

<sup>365</sup> This word derives from Greek and means: remembering. I use this word, since it says not only an intellectual act of remembering. It is a kind of re-actualising memory, which by narrating renews the bond between the narrator, and the one whom it is narrated of.

cultural element, which is an integral element for their socio-cultural and religious harmony. Hence, political and social system cannot be understood outside of cultural context.

Apart from intra-societal structural violence, which is backed up by unjust social stratification and structural heterogeneity, a society tries to implement peace culture (Galtung) with the help of political culture, which is the integral part of social structure and economic development. "We only have peace when a creative and non-violent conflict transformation takes place."<sup>366</sup>

One of the decisive obstacles for economic development is socio-structural heterogeneity and chance inequality, without denying the personal industriousness and individual predisposition of each person. The prerequisites for this development, which bases on self-reliance, are as Diarra says: self-confidence, responsibility and confidence in one's own ideas, abilities and means. In a politically and economically interconnected (globalised) society the following demands are sine qua non for the realisation of the above mentioned conceptions:

- uncoupling from the world market and dissociation from the international labour division;
- pole-changing from export oriented economic sectors to the developing of and caring for domestic market;
- relinquishing of foreign trade as engine of economic development;
- not utter autarky, but reduction of co-operation with the foreign countries to the extent necessary only for developing a viable domestic structure;
- setting up of a proper processing industry, mass production for mass needs;
- mobilisation of marginalised mass as productive force;
- furthering small-scale enterprises and co-operatives;
- structuring interconnected economic cycles."<sup>367</sup>

The ideas of Dieter Senghaas, Rudolf Strahm and Abdaramane Diarra (among others) agree on the significance of structural heterogeneity as an impediment for economic development. If one looks at intra-societal structural heterogeneity, the economic and social discrepancies are striking. Diarra describes this as exploitation of the peripheries by the centre.<sup>368</sup> A structurally heterogeneous society manifests itself according to Strahm as follows: intra-societally as well as globally the centres are, conurbation (geographically), the industrialised areas (economically) and the upper classes (socially).<sup>369</sup>

By highlighting the aim of appropriate technology, Diarra touches some decisive points, which are constructive elements of economic development. "What is the goal of appropriate technology?

- fulfilling the needs of basic necessities;
- reduction of dependence on import and export;
- taking the scarcity of capital resources into consideration;
- taking advantage of the high disposability of labour force;

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<sup>366</sup> Johann Galtung 1998, 458.

<sup>367</sup> Abdaramane Diarra op.cit., 8f.

<sup>368</sup> Cf. ibid. 7.

<sup>369</sup> Cf. ibid. 8.

- carrying on of development projects by the beneficiaries themselves;
- taking cultural independence and tradition into consideration;
- furthering the emancipating political, economic and social structures, and
- not affecting the ecological cycle."<sup>370</sup>

According to me, the global economic, political and cultural interconnection is not something accidental. It is a natural necessity in the human development history. The political, economic and cultural delimitation begins to blur, since different societies begin to realise their dependence on the others. In our time, this process is called globalisation. Globalisation is neither an invention of our modern time nor a mishap of the international society. It is an ineluctable constituent of human development history. The question should be how to deal with globalisation so that the best possible international political, economic and cultural justice is achieved.

In the early societies each village had thought, the world and cosmos were only what they could see and experience and where they lived. The innate will of man has pushed and enabled him to leave his environment and to experience the extensiveness of his natural environment beyond what he could see with his mere eyes. This is an innate human inventive avidity. This internal disposition of man is the fundament of his development. That is why I call it a natural necessity.

The advocates of an independent development model plead for rejection of implementation of the achievement of the industrialised countries. The reason is the inapplicability of this development model for the developing countries. Of course the negative social and ecological effect of the development model of the industrialised countries is not to be played down. The danger of this position lies in the fact that it ontologically interconnects the present economic and political achievement of the industrialised countries with their culture. "Here the question arises, if the aspects of modern life should be taken up by an autochthonous African society. The construction of buildings, the introduction of mass media, the urbanisation, increasing of per capita income characterise an industrial society, since they grant new employment possibilities. For an autochthonous African society the just mentioned aspects of modernisation processes disturb the economic development, because such measures are transferred into centres and make the land migration easier. They facilitate the construction of slums at the peripheries of the centres, which leads to the increase of criminality. Instead of increasing the per capita income, the unemployment rises through the changing of the living areas, since those who migrate from the countryside to the centre do not develop the ability to integrate themselves in these new centres, which are erected by urbanisation."<sup>371</sup> The imposition of the political and economic ideologies of the industrialised countries on the developing countries connotes this fact. Consequently, the industrialised and poor countries are developing in themselves superiority and inferiority complex respectively.

Many anthropologist and thinkers of development policy warn of the disappearing of the pillar of the African culture and society - communitarianism - which is caused by the penetration of the western civilisation into African society. That means, individualism<sup>372</sup> is

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<sup>370</sup> Ibid. 11.

<sup>371</sup> Ibid. 17.

<sup>372</sup> Throughout this part and even in the paper as a whole, when I reject a categorical conception of "European individualism" and "African communitarianism", I do not want to moralise this different socio-economic concomitants. If I would moralise, I would reject the individualism and favour the communitarianism, or just the opposite. My aim will be just to

growing vastly. In the face of this trend, the clan significance that is very important for socio-economic and political survival is vanishing. But one should take into consideration that the importance of lineage ties is the result of political, economic and social dependence of this big family. If one goes deep into the mentality of many traditional societies, the relevance of family bondage cannot be understood outside of this context. Those who idealise or treat the African cultural background in connection with economic development overlook this utilitarian dimension of the cultural value. The communitarianism of the traditional societies has apart from political, economic and social aspects also a religious dimension. Mythologies, cults and different religious institutions and ceremonies aim at social order that is embodied by social structure. This shows that social structure cannot be understood unless it is in a cultural context.

Neither is individualism a European culture or communitarianism an African culture. They are just manifestations of different political, economic and social situations in a different period of time in relation to socio-political and economic situation. The increasing individualism among the rich and socially independent Africans witnesses the relativity of communitarianism in Africa.

In order to prove wrong the categorical "African communitarianism" and the "European individualism" I will differentiate individualism in two perspectives: collective individualism and individual individualism.

- 1) Collective individualism is the arising of a social group to defend its interest from rivals. The common interest of the group is the bondage of the unity. In the face of this rivalry one lineage [speaking in the context of traditional societies] pursues its interest as an individual. Its members have to arise together. When one recalls the history of slavery within the African societies, this fact would be clearer. The ethnological factor "lineage" played a decisive role in conquering a territory and making its owners slaves. The common interest, which unifies the members of the lineage, is the conquest and the presumed gain.

Concerning this inter-group and international relation, which has a history of exploitation, Rodney is worthwhile to quote: "Man has always exploited his natural environment in order to make a living. At a certain point in time, there also arose the exploitation of man by man, whereby a few people grew rich and lived well through the labour of others. Then a stage was reached by which people in one community called a nation exploited the natural resources and the labour of another nation and its people. Since underdevelopment deals with the comparative development of nations, it is the last kind of exploitation that is of greatest interest here - i.e., the exploitation of a nation by another nation. One of the common means by which one nation exploits another and one that is relevant to Africa's external relations is exploitation through trade. When the terms of trade are set by one country in a manner entirely advantageous to itself, then trade is usually detrimental to the trading partner. To be specific, one can consider the export of agricultural produce from Africa and the import of manufactured goods into Africa from Europe, North America, and Japan. The big nations establish the price of agricultural products and subject

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show that neither individualism belong to Africa nor communitarianism to Europe/West/industrialised countries categorically. In this sense, I discard copying of the "*European individualism*" as well as idealizing the "*African communitarianism*". As an interconnected world, our global society has to look for a global ethos (Hans Küng) which safeguards the individual self-fulfilment as well as global communitarian welfare.

these prices to frequent reductions. At the same time the price of manufactured goods is also set by them."<sup>373</sup>

- 2) Individual individualism: Where there is no common enemy or rival there emerges an individual individualism. The "narcissism of minor differences" theory of Sigmund Freud illustrates this fact. Where the common enemy disappears, the collective individualism ceases to exist. Those who fought together will now fight against each other, in order to defend their own individual interests.

Diarra says that wealth and property are not considered as values in the African societies; instead, giving and dividing render more prestige to the African individual than collecting and heaping. But Diarra does not see the expectation of the giver of service in return in case of political, economic and social difficulties. If there are people in the industrialised societies unwilling to share with others, it has to be understood in this context. They are unwilling to do that because they believe that they do not depend on anybody. Collecting and heaping is not an essentially characteristic sign of the industrialised societies, but it is a sign of the surmounting of dependence and subsistence economy.

Diarra continues emphasising the act of dividing of economic achievement and production as a moral gesture of the African culture.<sup>374</sup> Even if it should be a moral gesture, it is to be understood in political, economic, religious and social aspects, which implicitly signify the set up of social order. This social action with the aim of social order manifests itself as a cultural value. The socio-economic crisis as well as the successes are seen as deeds of a supernatural power that rewards or punishes the social members for their deeds; i.e., the society is mythologically substantiating the social position of the members and interconnecting culture, religion and social structure in order to safeguard the social order that is essential for the social welfare. Economic, political, administrative and religious activities were embedded in complex social relationship. Moreover, they were part of localisation of the individuals in the society and means to this complex purpose. They were not seen isolated as goal in themselves".<sup>375</sup>

The fact that the whole world is interconnected is not the fruit of colonialism or capitalism. The human beings, in the face of the rare resources, inventive avidity, seek of more knowledge about the whole world, had to come in contact with the others sooner or later. This is an essential human disposition. The problem was and is that this interconnection bases on unjust and unequal fundamentals.<sup>376</sup> This interconnection took place among individuals with quite different development levels. The will to dominate others and to profit for oneself by common goods is empirical facts of the tendency of the human beings. "When two societies of different sorts come into prolonged and effective contact, the rate and character of change taking place in both is seriously affected to the extent that entirely new patterns are created. Two general rules can be observed to apply in such cases. First, the

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<sup>373</sup> Walter Rodney 1981, 22.

<sup>374</sup> Cf. *ibid.* 24.

<sup>375</sup> Quoted according to Wolfgang Hein 1998, 112.

<sup>376</sup> "African economies are integrated into the very structure of the developed capitalist countries; and they are integrated in a manner that is unfavourable to Africa... Indeed, structural dependence is one of the characteristics of underdevelopment. Most progressive writers divide the capitalist/imperialist system into two. The first is the dominant or the metropolitan section, and the countries in the second group are often called satellites because they are in the orbit of the metropolitan countries. The same idea is conveyed by simply saying that the underdeveloped countries are dependencies of the metropolitan capitalist economies." (*Ibid.* 25)

weaker of the two societies (i.e., the one with less economic capacity) is bound to be adversely affected - and the bigger the gap between the two societies concerned is, the more detrimental the consequences are. For example, when the European capitalism met the indigenous hunting societies of America and the Caribbean, the latter were virtually exterminated. Second, assuming that the weaker society does survive, then ultimately it can resume its own development model only if it proceeds to a level higher than that of the economy that had previously dominated it..."<sup>377</sup>

The reasons for this economic success or underdevelopment of the industrialised or poor countries lay in their ecologically more challenging or relatively favourable climatic situations respectively. Those who had environmental challenges and who came into contact with others earlier could develop their economy earlier and faster than the others; because, in the face of rare resources, inter-societal connections and growing population number, the society had to be regulated economically and politically. The fact is that we find ourselves in a world with an unjust political and economic system.

In the face of this fact, Senghaas pleads for international economic dissociation. According to him, in the present international production relation the development of the poor countries does not seem to be materialised. In a production relation of individuals with striking differences of economic development level the rich ones become richer and the poor even poorer. Andre Gunder Frank sees the problems of world economic situation today in the incorporation and integration of the poor countries in the capitalist system. "In reality, the now underdeveloped countries have long since been incorporated and integrated into the single world embracing the capitalist system, to whose development they contributed and still contribute with cheap labour, raw materials or, in a word, with investable surplus capital. In this process - that is in the process of capitalistic development in Europe and North America - the social physiology of Africa, Asia, and Latin America has been totally and uniformly changed into what it is today, the structure of underdevelopment which was ... created and still consolidated by the development and structure of the world capitalist system... It is in capitalism then, not in population growth or inertia and traditionalism that the fundamental cause of underdevelopment resides. This is equally true of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, which are distinguished by their remarkable uniformity of their structure of underdevelopment rather than by differences of nationhood, fatalism, and institutions."<sup>378</sup> This is an unjust international social structure, which impedes the development of the majority of the incorporated members of this system.

Superstructures as social beliefs and ideologies cement the particular social system and institutions. That means, the non-economic activities are the fundamental basis for economic activities. And the non-economic activities are again influenced by superstructures, which are based on socio-cultural convictions. These social beliefs and convictions are conceived as something indispensable for the socio-cultural harmonic existence. This reality can be observed strikingly in many traditional societies. The social philosophy "identity in the community" hampers individualism, furthers communitarianism and maintains that particular socio-cultural structure. The fear of uncertain future favours the continuity of the existing unjust structure because nobody knows where the new attempts will lead. In this sense the

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<sup>377</sup> Ibid. 11.

<sup>378</sup> Quoted according to Richard L. Harris 1975, 4f.



particular social forms and class relationships constitute the social structure<sup>379</sup>. “Any society necessarily institutionalises particular goals and values, patterns of social relationship, and ways of doing things requisite to the continued operation of that social system; in sociological language, it prescribes patterns of normative conduct in a system of structured roles. Where these patterns of working and living, acting and reacting, seeking and believing become so widely accepted as 'legitimate' that conformity with them is generally accepted and is supported by moral sanctions, they can be called the ‘institutions’ of that society. In any society these institutions are highly interdependent. The patterns of family relationships or of social rankings or ultimate values, for example, necessarily bear in upon patterns of economic activity.”<sup>380</sup>

A human being contributes to the continuity of a social structure in a similar way. As he internalises (personalises) the social norms and values, he takes care of the existence of the social structures. In the same way he maintains the cultural norms and values until they are gradually changed and substituted (through cultural evolution) by other norms and values. Conformity with the existing institutions is taken for granted; and it is expected from each individual to comply with. Social sanctions and police action exert their pressure on the individuals so that they comply with the social norms and values. The rational choice of the individual is suppressed to some extent.<sup>381</sup>

In some traditional societies there are different lineages that are living together as a society. Because of various reasons some lineages become influential in that social system. This lineage obtains a socio-cultural and religious significance. Because of this socio-cultural significance they have political power and social esteem. These two factors are an essential breeding ground for economic success. This is one of the points of unjust socio-cultural structures and structural heterogeneity. The second parameter is the religious significance of these successful lineages. To their members some supernatural qualities are attributed: they are the ones who inaugurate cultural and religious ceremonies, who grant blessing, invoke the spirits, cure the sick, etc. They are not ordinary human beings. They are chosen by the spirits; and these spirits expect from the commoners that they give due respect to the supernaturally chosen ones. Hence, socio-cultural and economic structures base on these believes. I believe that each society has passed this cultural stage of hierarchy of hereditary status. "A society historically rooted in knighthood, seigniorial agriculture, and dependent tenure tended to establish as permanent a system of social rankings based on birth and place, not simply dividing men into the larger categories of those who prayed, fought, and worked, but institutionalising an elaborate hierarchy of hereditary statuses. To birth and status it also tied property, occupation, training, and social function in the widest sense. The craftsmen or villagers as well as the count tended to identify himself, his skills, and his heirs with a given place in the social hierarchy."<sup>382</sup>

In every society those who had and have an access to education, business, etc. were and are those who are culturally and socially influential ones, because they have the necessary money. Patterns of stratification and social values favour only the upper classes. Professions

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<sup>379</sup> Cf. John E. Sawyer 1971, 402.

<sup>380</sup> Ibid., 403.

<sup>381</sup> Cf. *ibid.* 403.

<sup>382</sup> Ibid. 406.

and state services are mostly restricted to those having the proper kinship connection. Those from humble origins are denied such privileges.<sup>383</sup>

Especially in the traditional societies, the population identifies itself with the political organisation of the society in referring to culture, which is the collective memory.<sup>384</sup> But in a structurally heterogeneous society there are two kinds of tensions. Hirsch calls these tensions development tension and class tension. The development tension points out unequal division of material and immaterial resources on the international level, whereas the class tension means unequal division of resources for different groups and social classes. In this sense the problem of international development demands international responsibility and international ethos.

In his development policy theory Senghaas stresses the importance of dissociation and self-centred development (*Dissoziation und autozentrierte Entwicklung*) which are to be materialised through self-confidence (*Selbstvertrauen*), self-determination (*Selbstbestimmung*), self-responsibility (*Selbstverantwortung*) and confidence in one's own ideas, power and means. This is the fundament of the social structure on which economic development bases itself.

In the economic relation with the foreign countries a big number of countries is almost utterly dependent on the proceeds of the export of one or two products (production concentration); moreover, these countries are dependent on one or some few import countries (partner concentration), through which also a strong political dependence is cemented.<sup>385</sup> The process of national development as a precondition for international peace is realisable only if there is a favourable global social structure. The aim as well as the effect of this national as well as international development process should foster the self-reliance of the nations. Therefore, the economic policy-makers should take the following aspects into consideration:

- uncoupling (*Abkoppelung* – Senghaas - ) the development countries from the world market, which reflects an unjust international labour division (the poor countries produce raw materials and the industrialised countries process these raw materials and thereby they develop their technology);
- developing domestic markets instead of fostering the export oriented economic sector;
- co-operation with other countries should aim at the development and interconnection of all economic sectors. "For example, the food producing sector must be so that workers would be healthy, and agriculture on the whole must be efficient so that the profits (or savings) from agriculture would stimulate industry. Heavy industry, such as the steel industry and the production of electrical power, must be present so that one is capable of making machinery for other types of industry and for agriculture. Lack of heavy industry, inadequate production of food, unscientific agriculture - those are all characteristics of the underdeveloped economies. It is typical of underdeveloped economies that they do not (or are not allowed to) concentrate on those sectors of the economy which in turn will generate growth and raise production to a new level altogether, and there are very few ties

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<sup>383</sup> Cf. *ibid.* 408.

<sup>384</sup> Cf. Guido Hirsch 1987, 71.

<sup>385</sup> Hein 1998, 75f.

between one sector and another so that (say) agriculture and industry could react beneficially on each other."<sup>386</sup>

- self-centred development (autozentrierte Entwicklung) should enable the decrease of food import, i.e., the production of enough food for the national need;
- appropriate technology and a local processing industry should produce what is needed for the population instead of importing luxurious goods for high class consumption;
- political and economic participation mobilises the productive force, which leads to self-sufficiency.<sup>387</sup>

The biggest challenge of the international community today - more than ever - is to create a homogeneous international social structure. That means, our globalised world needs just transnational infrastructures. Concerning the significance of the international economic justice, I tried to describe the political and economic theory of Dieter Senghaas on the macro-level, where he pleads for dissociative development (dissoziative Entwicklung), so that first the national economy flourishes. This development is to realise only through an inter-sectors connection and through abolition of social, political and economic dualism. Regarding this socio-structural dimension of development Franz Nuscheler writes as follows:

- "the economic and technological dualism characterises the incoherently side by side existing capitalistically organised, capital intensive, mostly export oriented 'modern sector', which is dominated by foreign capital; and a 'traditional' subsistence sector, which works with primitive techniques and which is loosely interconnected with the national goods and money market;
- the regional dualism characterises the contrasts between the developed and neglected regions, between the industrialised centres and the marginalised hinterland;
- the social and cultural dualism characterises the contrast between the affluent class and impoverished mass, between the westerly educated elite and the illiterate population majority."<sup>388</sup>

Müller widens the problem of this factor and picks up the situation of some socio-culturally-disadvantaged groups. "Special attention should be paid to structural inequalities which exist above all between regions, between towns and countryside, between strata (classes, castes), between ethnic groups as well as between men and women... if there are population groups which are repeatedly disadvantaged, for example poor women, if they belong additionally to an ethnic minority or if they live in a poor region."<sup>389</sup>

The interaction between social and cultural structure would be evident if one looks at some traditional cultural structures. One of the striking examples in this context is the social position of women. Some societies favour men because of many religious (supernatural), social, political and economic utilitarian reasons. Without any moralising judgement (neither condemning nor justifying it) the following are reasons for this utilitarian belief:

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<sup>386</sup> Rodney, op. cit., 18.

<sup>387</sup> Cf. Nuscheler, op. cit., 253ff.

<sup>388</sup> Ibid, 70.

<sup>389</sup> Johannes Müller 1997, 25.

- ⇒ the supernatural reason: the perpetuation of the lineage is only guaranteed through male individuals;
- ⇒ the political reason: through their physical disposition men guarantee the biological existence of the family, by protecting the family members from enemies;
- ⇒ the sociological reason: in exogamous societies girls are taken to other clans. In the face of this, only men are taking care of the quantitative expansion of the lineage, which again implies powerfulness of the lineage;
- ⇒ the economic reason: men are the ones who can conquer as a big piece of land as possible, who can subjugate others as slaves and who are more effective in physical work (because of their physical disposition).

This utilitarian perspective is anchored in the traditional religious convictions of the society. Those who are passing judgement on it as outsiders say that it is an unjust socio-cultural structure. But for those who live in it, it is socio-cultural matter of course. However, I do not see this fact like those who interpret the underdevelopment of the poor countries in the light of their traditional culture (Max Weber). I see the respective economic achievement of a certain society that is the result of the interconnection of social and cultural structures in its time-relativity. The institutions of the cultural structures are not everlasting constants. Since they are time-conditioned variables, the old cultural structures will be superseded by the achievement of a cultural evolutionary process, which makes the respective existing cultural structures just interim.

Many development policy theories try to substantiate the reason of the underdevelopment of many poor countries by connecting the problem with climatic and ecological facts. As Nuscheler says, the impact of the ecological situation on economic development cannot be played down. Some thinkers say, Africa is underdeveloped because of the subtropical and tropical climate. It might be true that the soil fertility in Europe is higher than in Africa. But it is false to say that the main problem of the African economic development lies there. On the contrary, the ecological challenges should further innovation and invention. According to Johannes Müller, the economic problems of the poor countries are caused by ecological unfavourableness and challenge: "Many countries in the south tropics and tropics suffer from very unfavourable climatic conditions, for example, extreme heat, cyclone, drought,... which become a considerable burden for the health of human beings and animals, for the economic performance and ecological conservation..."<sup>390</sup> Nuscheler disproves of such kind of standpoint on the basis of racist connotation. "Climatic theories fall into dangerous interconnection with race theories, if they make conclusions hastily from the socio-geographical and economic-geographical facts:

- that most of the industrialised countries lie in temperate zones and most of the developing countries in the tropical and subtropical zones;
- that the third world is identical to a great extent with the black world;
- that in the industrialised enclaves or successful agricultural economies in the southern hemisphere (Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Southern Latin America) the whites are at the helm.

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<sup>390</sup> Ibid. 86.

Isn't that a temptation to assert the superiority of the white race and the inferiority of the black race?"<sup>391</sup>

Basilius Doppelfeld maintains an assertion that Africa was the only best starting point for the development of human race because of its climatic favourableness. "There were probably nowhere on the earth such exceptional starting positions for his [human being] way to the world than in those savannahs, which extend between the Ethiopian highland and the Cape along the East Side of Africa. The climate of eternal spring, the good watering, the rich bush, which could protect the naked and unarmed Adam against the superior beasts - all this made the savannah an ideal trial area where the further development run of human being could take place."<sup>392</sup> Doppelfeld continues: "What was the reason that in the other parts of the world the technique developed than in black Africa? Why did the later cultures and civilisations develop high cultures? In looking for an answer, the 'catastrophe theory' should be mentioned: where the outer living conditions prove to be ideal and if these conditions are not subjected to any substantial change, the human being is not challenged to become innovative. On the contrary, incisive changes demand... new responses in form of changes in behaviour, nutrition, dwelling, etc."<sup>393</sup>

The human being is a social being. It has to act according to the regulations of its social group, which obtains its identity within and through culture. And different social institutions constitute culture. Each member of the group has to act and behave according to these institutions. The institutions for economic activity are part of this cultural structure. The goal of these social regulations is to maintain social order. By forcing each member of the society to comply with, an institution restricts the freedom of its members. The regularities of behaviour, which in the long term become matter of course, are institutions<sup>394</sup>. According to Kusch the social regulations also set the course in economic dimension for the successful integration of individuals into society. The other aspect of institutions is that they allocate some roles and social positions to certain individuals. After a certain period of time this differentiation - through regularities of behaviour - becomes anchored in the social system and an institutionally prescribed specific behaviour expectation emerges<sup>395</sup>.

Concerning the significance of superstructures such as ideologies and social beliefs for economic development Rodney says the following: "One of the most difficult questions to answer is exactly why different peoples developed at different rates when left on their own. Part of the answer lies in the environment in which human groups evolved and part of it lies in the 'superstructure' of human society. That is to say, as human beings battled with the material environment, they created forms of social relations, forms of governments, patterns of behaviour, and systems of belief, which together constituted the superstructure - which was never the same in any two societies. Each element in the superstructure interacted with other elements in the superstructure as well as with the material base. For instance, the political and religious patterns affected each other and were often intertwined. The religious belief that a certain forest was sacred was the kind of element in the superstructure that affected economic

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<sup>391</sup> Nuscheler, op. cit., 76f.

<sup>392</sup> Quotation according to Basilius Doppelfeld 1994, 47.

<sup>393</sup> Ibid. 47.

<sup>394</sup> Cf. Andreas Kusch 1993, 20.

<sup>395</sup> Cf. ibid. 20

activity, since the forest would not be cleared for cultivation.<sup>396</sup> While in the final analysis the breakthrough to a new stage of human development is dependent upon man's technical capacity to deal with the environment, it is also to be born in mind that peculiarities in the superstructure of any given society have a marked impact on the rate of development."<sup>397</sup>

Classifying the socio-cultural institutions into following perspectives would help to understand the impact of the cultural background for economic development:

- \* the status oriented society: social prestige, status, ethnic belongingness, age and sex decide one's position in the society. The position of the higher social classes is an attributed, not an acquired quality which the socially and "supernaturally" privileged members enjoy. This kind of social system hinders the free social and economic self-fulfilment of the social members from the lower social classes. The latter are denied of education and similar social facilities which are key for human development.
- \* the achievement oriented society: achievement principle, determination and success determine one's social status. This achievement principle characterises the social structure for members of the society, who are neither socially nor supernaturally privileged. It is an acquired social status. In this system everyone can work for his self-fulfilment. One can mobilise his potentials since there is no hindrance or imposition from outside.<sup>398</sup>

To comply with the social institutions means to internalise its norms. Internalisation of or revolt against these norms is followed by positive or negative social sanctions respectively<sup>399</sup>. Radcliff-Brown defines sanctions as follows: "A sanction is the reaction of a part of the society or of a considerable number of its members to behaviour, which will be approved (positive sanction) or disapproved (negative sanction) by it."<sup>400</sup>

Revolts in the society are the result of different ideologies, deviations from social norms and values. Social institutions and sanctions can extend from hampering economic activities to threatening one's life. These are some of the reasons for national and international migration. In this sense migration can be an escape also from cultural institutions that impede a free self-determination.

In pursuing its cultural identity, a social group can either deflect attention from the intra-societal economic and social responsibility and shift the responsibility to someone else, or because of the economic disappointment, it begins to detest its own culture. The ones who have developed a cultural inferiority complex believe that they are poor because of their culture; and this conviction is always in comparing one's own culture and economic level with the culture and economic situation of the industrialised countries. This is the beginning of a cultural collective suicide.<sup>401</sup> Identity crisis on the individual as well as on the collective level

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<sup>396</sup> This theory is only applicable if Rodney understands this belief in a context of time-relativity and in relation to the respective economic situation. Many traditional societies, who had such a belief, for example, 100 years ago, are now discarding it to some extent. In the face of rare natural resources and their utilisation and growing population, they begin to rationalise their approach to nature. Hence, the respective belief applies only to that period of time and particular economic state. Otherwise Rodney too falls into the essentialisation of culture.

<sup>397</sup> Rodney op.cit., 9

<sup>398</sup> Cf. Kusch op.cit., 21

<sup>399</sup> Cf. ibid. 22

<sup>400</sup> Quotation according to ibid., 23

<sup>401</sup> Cf. Galtung 1998, 230

is the beginning of this decadence. "It is in line with racist prejudice to say openly or to imply that their countries are more developed because their people are innately superior, and that the responsibility for the economic backwardness of Africa lies in the generic backwardness of the race of black Africans. An even bigger problem is that the people of Africa and other parts of the colonised world have gone through a cultural and psychological crisis and have accepted at least partially, the European version of things. That means the African himself doubts his capacity to transform and develop his natural environment. With such doubts, he even challenges those of his brothers who say that Africa can and will develop itself through the efforts of its own people. If we can determine when underdevelopment came about, it would dismiss the lingering suspicion that it is racially or otherwise predetermined and we can do little about it."<sup>402</sup>

In everyday life as well as in scientific studies we hear that the culture of the industrialised countries, which is coming along with modern technology, import, tourism, etc., is superseding local culture. Hereby we are confirming the assertion that culture has something to do with economy. However, depending on different theoretical standpoints the opinions can differ from person to person. Nevertheless, according to me, the necessity of favourable cultural and social structures is indispensable preconditions. Otherwise a direct or an indirect violence (Galtung) threatens the social order. Whereas the direct violence points to war, upheaval, etc., the indirect violence implies unjust social structure. The migration problem can be picked up in this context: disadvantageous socio-cultural structures, rare disposability of natural resources, political persecution, ethnic and class discrimination, etc. Those who are causing brain drain and migration of productive force are inflicting indirect violence to their social group. These politically forced migrants are being denied their freedom to work for their nation and social group.

The powerful nations should passively as well as actively enable the developing nations to grow. By refraining from unnecessary and biased economic and political intervention and imposition of their private interest, they passively further development of the poor nations. Their active contribution would be creating a fair macro-social (global) structure and ceasing to create national structural heterogeneity. "The presence of a group of African sell-outs is part of the definition of underdevelopment. Any diagnosis of underdevelopment in Africa will reveal not just low per capita income and protein deficiencies, but also the gentlemen who dance in Abidjan, Accra, and Kinshasa when music is played in Paris, London, and New York."<sup>403</sup>

The global political and economic interconnection in the future will be even more intensive. The developmental activity of a social group is the result of its phylogenetic (species) development will, in and through which the ontogenetic (individual) development will can be realised. For the success of this process every social group has to work on its cultural and social structures that have a functional relation.

Concerning the economic development I start with the statement that each individual and society wants to develop itself. However, there are many thinkers who maintain that many traditional societies do not want to develop themselves. They even dare to say that they reject it. If one says they do not want to develop themselves, this would mean that the

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<sup>402</sup> Rodney op. cit., 21

<sup>403</sup> Ibid. 27.

possible climax of the economic development is known a priori, since they cannot reject what they do not know. In my opinion, there cannot be the highest point of development, since the experience of development is a posteriori: we can estimate where the economic development can lead us to, but we cannot know the ultimate goal of development. If we know this ultimate goal, this would mean

- a) there would be no further development step after attaining the pre-cognised economic level, or
- b) this, a priori conceived development strives for an unrealistic and unattainable development goal of creating a heaven on the earth.

The communist economic and political system is a good example for the second type. The mistakes of this a priori conceived development model are contained in the mistaken materialisation process of the development ideal. In the communist system the abolition of the private property, the forced collectivity, the lack of appropriate individualism and a priori conceptions of development predetermined the collapse of the communist political and economic system.

In comparison to the above mentioned weaknesses of the communist system the capitalist system has got two advantages:

- a) it has not fixed its development ideal a priori. That means, it is an a posteriori economic and political system without a binding utopia;
- b) the freedom of the individual plays the key role in its political and economic system. This system does not contain a compulsory collectivism. If collectivism is forced, the collectivity loses its value. The collectivity should not be the goal of the social contract. Therefore, I define collectivity as a temporary sublimation of the individuality in relation to a common object, and as a transmission of power to a super-Ego which is the collective spirit. The temporariness signifies the instrumentality of the collective, which is used by the individual in order to act rationally. Therefore, collectivity is not the aim of the individual. The people come together in order to attain their goals as easily as possible, since all members of the social contract have similar interests; and there is an object which each individual has the right to share from; and therefore, its utilisation has to be regulated. The contracting members need a central power, which represents the interest of all. Through this process the individual person is de-individualised and the central power, the super-ego, is personified. This is what I mean with the sublimation of the individuality. In this collectivisation the sublimation of the individual particularity is transubstantiated to the collective soul. In this transubstantiation process the individual fallibility is transformed to a collective infallibility. Even though, in this perspective, the capitalist system is more realistic than the communist, one of its real and/or potential weaknesses is that it can guarantee freedom but not economic equality. In the liberal economic system the individuals are free but – depending on different preconditions such as the availability of human and natural resources – in spite of the political freedom the economic equality and extensive development cannot be materialised.

While discussing interactive interdependence between culture, social structure and economic development the intensity of distinction or inter-connection between politics and religion of a society is the central point, i.e. how the doctrines of the faith and along with it



the cultural precepts permeate the secular life.<sup>404</sup> According to some thinkers such as Huntington, Weber and others, the propitiousness of a religion or culture can be judged in comparison to its capability to foster the individual responsibility and non-fundamentalist and non-dogmatic attitudes. If a religion contains a tradition of rebellion against established authority and a less tendency to control the lives of the members, it creates a culture that furthers economic development. Hence, privatisation of religion and secularisation of society are the starting position of this development. But through the claims of universalisation religion penetrates the individual and community life; as a consequence, commonality and collectivism supersede individualism; the result is that religion, state and people form one body.<sup>405</sup>

"Any religion provides a frame for fulfilment for development in certain kinds of situation when there is much social separation and obstacles to other forms of mobility."<sup>406</sup> By including elements such as fatalism, luck, etc. in religion, Pitt tries to assert the importance of religion in economic development. This position could explain economic development on individual or on small group level, but it will not have, in my opinion, any significant effect on the societal level. Moreover, there is no any static religion. Not only religion has impact on development; but also development itself has impact on religion: the respective educational and development level of the society modifies and forms religion. Therefore, particular religion corresponds to the respective social, economic and political situation and is purified and rationalised through the historical process of the society. In this sense a tendentious process from traditional religious collectivism to individualism is - at least latently - present in every society and its social philosophy.

Concerning the interdependence of development and cultural backgrounds there are two contradictory positions: the romantic traditionalists maintain that it is because of secularisation and loss of religious and cultural values that the poor countries are underdeveloped. Many modernists contend that the developing countries are poor because of their culture and religion. "That traditional society does not provide adequate incentives for individual endeavour or acquisition... The individual is caught up in a web of kinship obligations and reciprocities which do not allow him to accumulate goods or to seek profit, mobility or advantage."<sup>407</sup> In this cultural structure the freedom of the individual is limited. Therefore, it would be a big error to maintain that the members of such societies live in an idyllic happy-go-lucky world. This would mean to neglect the social evolutionary aspect and to essentialise culture. Culture and religion are just manifestation of the respective social, economic and political level. All of them are exposed to permanent growth and transformation, and every step is the product of the process without any envisaged and pre-cognised goal.

The negative impact of the culture of the Kambata on their economic development is evident in its exaggerated community structure. The individual does not live for itself among the Kambata. It has a strong social responsibility. It should be a morally good example for the others; it is expected to share with others what he has. This strong community structure and

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<sup>404</sup> Cf. Axel Hadenius 1992, 118.

<sup>405</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 118f.

<sup>406</sup> David Pitt 1976, 78.

<sup>407</sup> *Ibid.*, 85.

community responsibility contributes to the corrupt political system in Kambata because it is culturally expected in the clan structure that those who are politically and economically successful should help their relatives. Therefore, one can easily observe that the members of one or few clans can occupy many political positions. In the face of the existence of hundreds of clans this fact can easily lead to different conflicts.

The Kambata expression *mannu/badu ma yano* (what would the people say!) limits many free actions of the individual. The unwritten traditional law, which prescribes the slaves and the potters to marry only among themselves, limits the freedom of the individuals. The counterproductive socio-cultural structure in Kambata can also be observed on the gender level. The social position of women is not equal to that of the men. Women are, for example, not supposed to express their ideas in the meetings of men. They have to keep quiet and listen to what the say. Many of the discriminating differences are culturally and religiously cemented. Through these two factors (culture and religion), which are meant to guarantee the order of the society and to legitimise the action of the members, the discriminations are almost justified.

A religion can have a negative impact on development by supernaturalising the fundamentals of social relations. One of the key elements of many religions in their attempt to maintain social order is that they create and keep social differences. The question of social status is one of these phenomena. "Status is ascribed rather than achieved and those individuals of lower status have again little incentive to accumulate because of the control over goods (particularly land its products) exercised by the upper classes and élite. ...[There are also] restrictions on an individual's labour and its rewards. The world of kin, village and chief encapsulates the individual, prevents him dealing with the outside world from where goods, services, ideas, innovations, etc., emanate. The individual is caught in the web of time as well as space; looking to the tradition and conformities of the past, frightened of change. Some would see in the traditional ethos a ... way of thought based on magico-religious influences rather than science, pre-logical and pre-rational. Traditional modes of thinking therefore inhibit the adoption of technological, medical and educational innovations which are so much part of development."<sup>408</sup>

As Pitt correctly points out, many thinkers believe that the underdevelopment of the poor countries is caused by their communalism. But would it be possible that they are not communalists? Communalism is an integral part of their development process and history. However, it is not a metaphysical factor, but a temporary necessity. Communalism is the forerunner of individualism. But for an extensive and holistic development a society needs a balance between communalism and individualism. That means that individualism must not be understood as replacement of communalism. Hence, development is - in a balanced communalist and individualistic social structure - freedom for self-fulfilment. A society can develop itself, on the one hand, by criticising its own cultural traditions, and on the other hand, by appreciating and cherishing the cultural values so as to foster socio-cultural self-confidence. Only in this context it can assimilate some useful foreign elements and reject alienating events, which cannot apply to the respective area, culture and social life.<sup>409</sup>

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<sup>408</sup> Ibid., 86.

<sup>409</sup> Cf. Mir A. Ferdowsi 1994, 18.

Ferdowsi understands culture as the engine of development. The core of his theory "culture as motor of development" is the interaction between cultural identity, basic needs and self-reliance. Fostering cultural identity mobilises the people to work hard in order to meet the basic needs, and implementation of strategy of self-reliance development can be underpinned by cherishing cultural identity. Striving for meeting the basic needs strengthens the cultural identity, and a development strategy, which aims at meeting of basic needs, furthers self-reliance. A development strategy which is based on self-reliance sustains the cultural identity, and a development strategy of self-reliance completes the social strives for meeting basic needs.<sup>410</sup>

Those who say "culture has very little to do with development but mainly the social structure" (Senghaas) as well as those who substantially interconnect culture and religion and economic development (Huntington, Weber) are essentialising culture. The former essentialise culture by conceiving it as an isolated and self-centred element: culture is dependent neither on economic, social or political situation. The latter essentialise culture by allotting it an exaggerated social, political economic significance as the primary social mobilising factor.

Culture consists of not only art and literature, but also of the totality of the peculiar spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional aspects of the society; moreover it is a compound of forms of life, basic rights, value systems, traditions and beliefs. Therefore it is difficult to separate culture and social structure, since norms, values and social behaviour are catalysts of social action.<sup>411</sup> "Culture is a phenomenon that finds itself in a continuous change that is tightly connected with economic and social environment, development level of productive forces and production conditions of the society. Through a separation culture would become a void formula which is superfluous and limited to the mere symbolic level."<sup>412</sup>

Uwe Simson works out three fundamental elements for development in relation to culture: the 'will to development', competence and homogeneity. The 'will to development' means the interest of the people to develop themselves; competence means the qualification of the decision-makers and the people; and homogeneity means an extensive participation of the beneficiaries in the developmental activity and mass mobilisation.<sup>413</sup> Like Axel Kabou there are some thinkers who believe that traditional societies do not want to develop themselves because of their culture. There is not any scientific proof that some societies reject development. In every individual there is an innate will and interest to develop itself. This is a human evolutionary fact. Even those societies, who look economically and politically static or even regressive and who are plunged in different crises, find themselves on development process.

In this context of interconnection of culture and development, Erika Dettmar differentiates between evolutionist and deontological positions. The evolutionist position maintains that Europe is the model in economic as well as cultural perspective. Hence, the tradition of the poor societies is the decisive hindrance of development. Therefore, not only

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<sup>410</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 18f.

<sup>411</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 26.

<sup>412</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

<sup>413</sup> Cf. Uwe Simson 1994, 50ff.

the structural adjustment is necessary for development, but also a cultural adjustment. The deontological<sup>414</sup> position contends that economic activities can successfully take place and be rational only in the cultural and social frame. Therefore, the social organisations and economy should be adjusted to the cultural adjustment programmes.<sup>415</sup> The weakness of the evolutionist position is not only its Europe-centrism, but also its cultural essentialism. Even the deontological theory takes an essentialist position by over-stressing the cultural dimension.

As Apter contends it is usually believed that "traditional factors seem to create immobility in social structure that abort or minimise innovation."<sup>416</sup> However, I would say the big and constructive challenge in development process is how to mediate innovation within the social system and link it with antecedent values and new goals.<sup>417</sup> "What is important is the range of activity endowed with transcendental values. In some societies virtually all activities have a mystical and transcendental side and a special meaning attached to them, whether they are simple actions like washing one's hands or more complex ones like invoking the spirit of one's ancestors... When ritualisation, ceremony and symbolic behaviour are intertwined, political as well as social life is affected."<sup>418</sup> In this context concerning the question "why some traditional systems accept innovation more easily than others?" Apter differentiates between "*instrumental*" and "*consummatory*" systems. According to Apter, "instrumental systems are those characterised by a large sector of intermediate ends separate from and independent of ultimate ends; consummatory systems are those characterised by a close relationship between intermediate and ultimate ends."<sup>419</sup> Furthermore, he illustrates the difference between these two values as follows: "Consider two traditional systems, one consummatory and the other instrumental in types of values. Both are short hand-hoe cultures, and an effort is made to introduce new agricultural techniques, in particular, the use of tractors. In the consummatory systems, the change from the short hand-hoe system will so disrupt the ritual of hoe-making, the division of men's and women's work, the religious practices associated with both, and the relationship between agricultural rituals and the authority of chiefs that it will be impossible for the leaders to consider a tractor only in terms of increasing agricultural productivity. In the instrumental system, by contrast, the tractor will be viewed simply in terms of its ability to expand agricultural output and will not affect the ultimate ends of the system. In the first instance, such an innovation represents a threat to the system; in the second, it is far likelier to strengthen the system by increasing farm income."<sup>420</sup> However, basically, not only the instrumental system, but also the consummatory system aims at economic growth and social orders because every cultural system aims at the welfare of its members. Therefore, in any culture there is not a deliberate and categorical rejection of innovation and development.

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<sup>414</sup> "to deon" derives from Greek and means "binding".

<sup>415</sup> Cf. Erika Dettmar 1994, 147f.

<sup>416</sup> David E. Apter 1965, 82.

<sup>417</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 83.

<sup>418</sup> *Ibid.*, 84.

<sup>419</sup> *Ibid.*, 85.

<sup>420</sup> *Ibid.*, 85.

Every collective human action contains religious aspects (religion in a wider sense), and all religious and cultural systems are exposed to social evolutionary and revolutionary processes. That means, out of any society there always emerges a group of individuals who are creative and revolutionary to prove themselves (to themselves, as well as to their fellows), to gain power and to vent their rage at the élite who have caused their troubles.<sup>421</sup> Revolutionary and evolutionary development are the result of this dialectical relationship between these rebelling individuals in different periods and their innate determination for innovation and change on the one hand, and the respective socio-cultural structures, on the other hand.

The individual's will to self-fulfilment is the basis of development. Only in order to materialise his individual interests, the individual needs others. Social interaction and relationships and regulation of these relationships are just to enhance the individual self-fulfilment. Élite emerging from various groupings or strata, such as ethnic groups, social classes, or functional skill groups can impede the self-fulfilment of the mass. "Elite status is basically defined in political terms by possession of influence or power, or participation in the formation and execution of policy."<sup>422</sup> Élitism is one of the characteristics of traditional societies. As Tachau says, "changes in the élite structure, composition, value commitments, skills and behaviour reflect changes in the society."<sup>423</sup> In this context and in the postcolonial era the internal conflicts are one of the key reasons for underdevelopment. Therefore, the underdevelopment of many societies is caused by absence of common history, common revolution and common political culture (organising interests, exchange of ideas and resources, and conflict management).

Culture and social structure are not only interconnected, but social structure is also the result of cultural structure. Every culture has created élitism and structural heterogeneity in different periods of its history. Even in the modern mass mobilisation the educational systems of many developing nations act to increase rather than to decrease income inequalities.<sup>424</sup> Concerning the situation of education, Todaro underlines a very important point in relation to culture and social structure. In the poor countries students from middle and higher social classes are highly represented in the higher studies. This case has two reasons: economic and social. Economically, the poor families do not have enough money to fulfil the school requirements; moreover, the children have to assist their parents in their labour of subsistence economy. Because of malnutrition they fall asleep in class and fail the exams. Socially, in the case of the Kambata, for example, the Fuga (cf. Chapter 6 below) are despised, and therefore, they do not go to school because nobody sits with them in the classroom. There are some people of the lower social classes who even believe that their children do not understand what is taught in the class; and they believe that their cognitive abilities were genetically inferior; as a consequence, they do not send their children to the school; and without a good school certificate there is no job. "First, the private costs of primary education (especially in view of the 'opportunity cost' of a child's labour to poor families) are higher for poor students than for more affluent students. Second, the expected benefits of primary education are lower for poor

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<sup>421</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 87f.

<sup>422</sup> Frank Tachau 1975, 4.

<sup>423</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>424</sup> Cf. Michael P. Todaro 1989, 346.

students. Together, the higher costs and lower expected benefits of education mean that a poor family's 'rate of return' from investment in a child's education is lower than it is for other families. The poor are, therefore, more likely to drop out during early years of schooling."<sup>425</sup>

Urban bias is another consequence of these economic inequalities. Rural population is agriculturist and lives on subsistence economy. Urban population is active in secondary and tertiary sectors with relatively well off economic level. Hence, the above mentioned educational system perpetuates concentration of income within certain population groups.<sup>426</sup>

"The inegalitarian nature of many Third World educational systems is compounded even further at the university level where the government may pay the full costs of tuition and fees as well as provide university students with income grants in the form of stipends. Because most university students already come from upper-income brackets (and were so selected at the secondary level), highly subsidised university education utilising public funds often amounts to a subsidy or transfer payment from the poor to the wealthy - in the name of 'free' higher education!"<sup>427</sup> As Todaro correctly contends, this outcome is not the result of the educational system per se but of the institutional and social structure within which that system must function and of the cultural backdrops.<sup>428</sup>

By discussing educational system we have come to a crucial issue: the political participation. No cultural and social structure can permanently prevent the revolutionary and evolutionary development. If it does so it cannot exist. In the evolutionary and revolutionary modernisation process social groups which did not exist before will be created; the relationship of existing social groups with one another will be changed; it will be decided who will enter politics; and social differentiation (of age, income, sex, occupation, ethnic belonging in the states of multi-nationalities) will be evaluated and re-structured.<sup>429</sup>

Development process in certain cultural and social structures yields the following changing patterns of political participation: relative deprivation and status reversal. *Relative deprivation* connotes unfulfilled expectations. This deprivation results when individuals or groups perceive that others have better access to the advantages of the society, or in case of unsatisfactory want/get ratio. *Status reversal* means the psychological problems of those social groups who lose status as a result of the modernisation process.<sup>430</sup> In this context of development process a very important point is the degree of openness of antecedent social and cultural values and social, economic and political élite for the changes of the modernisation process.

Work is considered as a fundamental human need for improving and increasing motivation and developing each human being's greatest potential and economic efficiency. Participation means removal of the hierarchy in the political sense and creation and guaranteeing of equal rights for all so that each person can develop his or her personality. Cultural and social structures can be judged at their facilitation of work-centred participation

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<sup>425</sup> Ibid., 346f.

<sup>426</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 347.

<sup>427</sup> Ibid., 347.

<sup>428</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 349.

<sup>429</sup> Cf. Myron Weiner 1971, 167f.

<sup>430</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 168f.

as well as power-centred participation.<sup>431</sup> In this sense I call development as freedom for self-fulfilment.

Description of development as freedom is the idea of Amartya Sen. Growth of GNP; growth of individual incomes; social and economic arrangements (e.g. facilities of education and health care); avoiding deprivations as starvation, under-nourishment, escapable morbidity and premature mortality; political and civil rights (e.g. the liberty to participate in public discussion and scrutiny); industrial and technological modernisation expand substantive freedoms<sup>432</sup>. Hence, "development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or over-activity of repressive states."<sup>433</sup> Development is a revolutionary and evolutionary freedom from the existing unfavourable cultural and social structures through the formation of individual and collective consciousness. This consciousness is the beginning of innovation. According to Amartya Sen, the following two reasons make freedom central to the process of development:

- 1) *"The evaluative reason:* assessment of progress has to be done primarily in terms of whether the freedom that people have is enhanced;
- 2) *The effectiveness reason:* achievement of development is thoroughly dependent on the free agency of people."<sup>434</sup>

Sen works out the following five elements that constitute instrumental freedoms:

- political freedoms (civil rights): people determine who should govern and on what principles, and they scrutinise and criticise authorities;
- economic facilities: utilisation of economic resources for the purpose of consumption, production, or exchange;
- social opportunities: arrangements for health care, education;
- transparency guarantees: guarantees of disclosure and lucidity;
- protective security: reduction of misery, starvation and death.<sup>435</sup>

As Nowak and Sen stress, development has a lot to do with conception of human rights. Especially in former times, the culture of the Kambata has institutionalised the social, economic and political discrimination and deprivation. For example, it was not considered *unjust* that slaves, potters and other lower classes were deprived of economic resources and social status. An action against them was unjust only if the political, economic and social élite trespassed their sphere and mistreated these groups. That means, this discrimination and differentiation was socially and culturally justified and a slave is *free* in his state of slavery: there is a socially *required* and *justified* limit of enslavement and mistreatment. The one who neglects these values violates the prescriptions of the ancestors. Therefore, the conception of human rights corresponds to the conception of cultural values.

The first aim of human rights in the modern society is the protection of individuals from the state. By implementing different public interests such as maintaining internal security and fighting against criminality and terrorism, the state organs violate human rights

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<sup>431</sup> Cf. Janez Prasnikar 1991, 3f.

<sup>432</sup> Cf. Amartya Sen 1999, 3, 36.

<sup>433</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>434</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>435</sup> Cf. ibid., 38ff.

and try to cover up these violations.<sup>436</sup> The so-called *first generation rights* imply three layers of human values: physical integrity (right to live, liberty, no-slavery, no-torture), private sphere (freedom of belief, of expression, of opinion) and participation in political life (to build political parties and the right to be elected). The so-called *second-generation rights* are the economic rights (the right to work), the social rights (integration, equality) and the cultural rights (education). The so-called *third generation rights* are rights to self-determination (political independence, etc.). The aim of these rights is to enable individual and collective self-fulfilment by creating a socio-cultural homogeneity.

Any culture or social structure that ties the members of a society in servitude to ignorance, other people, misery, institutions and dogmatic beliefs makes them unfree and underdeveloped. Todaro describes development as the minimisation of external constraints in the pursuit of some social goal in order to materialise the freedom for self-fulfilment.<sup>437</sup> "All peoples and societies seek some basic form of self-esteem, although they may call it authenticity, identity, dignity, respect, honour or recognition."<sup>438</sup> Hence, development has also a psychological value: "As long as esteem or respect was dispensed on grounds other than material achievement, it was possible to resign oneself to poverty without feeling disdained. Conversely, once the prevailing image of the better life includes material welfare as one of its essential ingredients it becomes difficult for the materially 'underdeveloped' to feel respected or esteemed... nowadays the Third World seeks development in order to gain the esteem which is denied to societies living in a state of disgraceful 'underdevelopment'. Development is legitimised as a goal because it is an important, perhaps even an indispensable, way of gaining esteem."<sup>439</sup>

It is a known reality that different cultures have different cosmological understandings. In order to overcome their daily problems and to form their social order in their own way, they develop certain methods, social prescriptions and political and economic guidelines. By enacting social laws, a society obtains a political, social and economic profile. In its run of implementing these laws and methods it realises whether these culturally conditioned social structures are hampering the development or furthering it. Hence, in my view, the development of culture and of social structure go hand in hand; culture, social structure and economic development have a dialectic relation. Culture changes and grows if economic and political structures change.

Since development has also an international character, I would like to briefly mention the impact of the international political and economic structure on the developing countries. Concerning the economic cleft between the developed and developing countries, the *dependency school* holds that the growth potential of the developed countries is supported by their dominant position in the world economy,<sup>440</sup> whereas the *modernisation theory* contends that the main causes of the failure to development of the less developed countries are the traditional or backward social structure.<sup>441</sup> However, "national development cannot be

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<sup>436</sup> Cf. Manfred Nowak 1996, 219.

<sup>437</sup> Cf. Todaro, op. cit., 90.

<sup>438</sup> Ibid., 89.

<sup>439</sup> Quoted according to ibid., 90.

<sup>440</sup> Cf. Volker Bornschier/ Christopher Chase-Dunn 1985, 1.

<sup>441</sup> Cf. ibid., 3.



explained by looking at isolated countries, but rather a country's position in the larger world division of labour and power structure must be taken into account in order to explain the nature and rate of national development."<sup>442</sup>

In the face of *bad governance* in many developing countries the international co-operation is determined by *political conditionality*.<sup>443</sup> Nowak sees a functional identity of human rights and development in their goals and values. In this context he points to the conditionalisation of human rights in development co-operation with the world which many countries criticise and reject as interference in internal affairs and as neo-imperialism and colonialism. The unjust world economic order is conceived by the developing countries as violation of human rights and prevention of meeting basic needs.<sup>444</sup> Hence, the international relations are characterised by political and structural paradox: the developed countries demand from the developing countries democracy, market economy, justice, guarantee of human rights; on the other hand, they are maintaining unjust international political and economic structures. It is an ethical, economic and political question if global development, freedom and self-fulfilment are realisable in present international structures.

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<sup>442</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>443</sup> Cf. Rainer Tetzlaff 1994, 169.

<sup>444</sup> Cf. Nowak, op. cit., 220.

## **Part II: The economic and political situation of the Kambata and their socio-cultural structures**

## Chapter 4: Some short general notes on Kambata

### 4.1 The geographical and climatic conditions of Kambata

In the time of Emperor Haile Sillase (1930-36, 1941-74) Kambata belonged to Shewa, one of the 14 provinces of Ethiopia, in the south of the country. During the communist regime, after the end of the Ethiopian Salomonic Dynasty, the province Shewa itself was subdivided into four parts, and Kambata belonged to the southern Shewa. The present government of Ethiopia has developed other political administrative strategies, and Kambata belongs to the southern nations, nationalities and peoples administrative region whose capital city is Awasa, around 275 km to the south of Addis Abeba. Even if the Kambata language is spoken outside of the Kambata region, its present political territory consists of the districts *Qadida Gamela*, *Qacha-Bira* and *Hangachcha woredas*. The scope of this paper will be limited to these three districts.

Rivers and valleys more or less demarcate the territories between Kambata and its neighbouring peoples. In the Southwest the Omo/Gibe River and in the east Blatte/Warra and its valleys fix the Kambata boarders.<sup>445</sup> Apart from the Omo/Gibe in the west and Blatte/Wara in the east there are no significant rivers or lakes in the region. The Ajjora waterfall of Sanna River in the Southwest of Kambata is one of the natural attractions. Since most of the underground consists of volcanic rocks, the valley slopes are threatened by erosion.<sup>446</sup> The tropical red soils are very favourable for plantation.<sup>447</sup>

Even if Kambata has only two big climatic seasons, the climatic transition periods are not significant. That means, the transition periods between summer and winter, or winter and summer are slightly different so that one can ascribe them neither to summer nor to winter. In Kambata summer and winter are dry and rainy seasons respectively. The climatic transition period between the rainy and dry season is characterised by blossoming flowers and plants and gentle wind blowing from east to the west and light and sporadic clouds in the sky. The main rainy season is from June until September. The climatic transition period after this rainy season is around between October and middle of November. In this time usually it does not rain. Around between the middle of November and beginning of March is the hottest period in Kambata during the day. In the night it can be very cold and frosty. The transition period (March-May) between the high summer and the main rainy season is characterised by sporadic rainfalls which are, however, usually enough for cultivation of barley, maize, sorghum, beans, potatoes, etc. Generally, during the rainy season and the transition period between the high summer and the rainy season the wind direction is west east, whereas during the high summer and the transition period between the rainy season and high summer it blows from east to the west.

Like many other regions in Ethiopia Kambata has different climatic conditions which depend on the geographical situation. "Ethiopia is distinguished ecologically by having two main eco-systems, that of the cool, temperate high plateau between around 2100-4000 m, and

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<sup>445</sup> Cf. Ulrich Braukämper 1983, 4.

<sup>446</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 4.

<sup>447</sup> Cf. *ibid.* 5.

that of the lowlands to the west and east, in particular that part of the Great Rift Valley known as the Afar Rift. The Ethiopian plateau experiences two rainy seasons a year and has been intensively cultivated by mixed farms for a very long time. In the northern parklands and grass savannah the emphasis is on cereals - tef [*tef-eragrostis*], barley, wheat and finger millet together with pulses and legumes. In the southern part and on the south-east Plateau, much of which is a mosaic of forest and grassland..."<sup>448</sup> Because of different geographical situations within Kambata itself, it is difficult to make a comprehensive temperature and rainfall data. However, the following statistics of the government bureau in Kambata can be taken more or less as an average climatic and rainfall data for each district.

**Table 1: Geography**

	<u><b>The districts</b></u>			
	<i><b>Qadida-Gamela</b></i>	<i><b>Qacha-Bira</b></i>	<i><b>Hangachcha</b></i>	<b>Total/average</b>
Area in km <sup>2</sup>	317.77	324.4	398.22	<b>1,040.39</b>
Population /km <sup>2</sup>	499.4	412.6	436.6	<b>449.5</b>
Altitude in m	1700-3028	1600-2500	1800-3058	<b>1600-3058</b>
<b>The geo-physical situation</b>				
Mountain in %	10	7	20	<b>12.33</b>
Plain land in %	45	69	20	<b>44.66</b>
Hills in %	45	24	60	<b>43</b>
<b>The climatic conditions in %</b>				
Lowlands	—	3	10	<b>4.33</b>
Temperate areas	93	71	50	<b>70.13</b>
Highlands	7	26	40	<b>24.33</b>
Rainfall/year	1275 mm	1175 mm	950 mm	<b>1133.33 mm</b>
Temp. in °C	18-28	15-22	20-28	<b>15-28</b>

Source: Planning and Economic Development Department, Durame 1999

In the highlands especially during the rainy season it happens very often that the areas are blanketed by fog and the weather becomes very cold and sleety. Apart from sporadic bad weather the highlands of Kambata are not afflicted by any significant plant diseases. Especially *Inset (inset edulis)* grows in the highlands usually without any plant disease, whereas in the lowlands it is very often exposed to Inset-disease, locally called "*Aloyya*", which is a kind of fungus-disease. This disease is usually disseminated in the areas below 2200 m a.s.l. Around 1966 it destroyed the plant vastly. It was probably transmitted from banana plant<sup>449</sup>.

Concerning the vegetation of Kambata the following trees are can be seen frequently. However, most of them have been almost totally eradicated in the last two decades: a good amount of *Mimosaceae*, *podocarpus*, *juniperus procera*, *pygeum africanum*, *olea hochstetteri*, *croton macrostachys*, *syzygium guineense*, *erythrina*, *ekebergia*, *hypericum*, *erica arborea*,

<sup>448</sup> John Desmond Clark 1988, 55

<sup>449</sup> Cf. D. Karsten 1968, 60.

*schefflera abyssinica*, *hagenia abyssinica*, *eucalyptus globulus*, *ficus gnaphalocarpa*, etc.<sup>450</sup> Along with the eradication of the trees the following wild animals are as well more or less eradicated: *papio anubis doguera* (baboon), *ceropithecus aethiops* (guenon), *colobus abyssinicus* (*colobus monkey* - Gureza), *phacocheirus aethiopicus*, *orycheropus afer aethiopicus*, *hystrix cristata*, etc.<sup>451</sup>

The geographical and climatic favourableness of Kambata is one of the key reasons which contributed to the high population density of the region, even if the geo-physical conditions such as mountains and hills are one of the decisive challenges to ameliorate the economic infrastructures facing the fact that the society was and is not prepared to cope with these challenges. "Moderate and gentle slopes cover 94% of the total area... There are fertile farmlands for crop production, and a physical environment conducive to settlement"<sup>452</sup>. "As a result the rural population density is one of the highest in Ethiopia, the average farm household owing less than half a hectare".<sup>453</sup> In the times of hunger catastrophes and epidemics Kambata is one of the less affected regions. As we shall in the ethnogenesis of the Kambata, the region was a big attraction for many migrants because they knew it was one of the climatically stable regions in northeast Africa. The cool highlands provided the migrants with economic security and protection from tropical diseases. Besides, it was well known by the neighbouring peoples that the life expectancy in Kambata was relatively high because of the favourable agricultural resources and lack of any threatening danger by epidemics<sup>454</sup>.

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<sup>450</sup> Cf. Braukämper, op. cit., 5, 7.

<sup>451</sup> Cf. ibid, 7.

<sup>452</sup> Alemayehu Lirenso 1984, 44.

<sup>453</sup> Ibid, 47.

<sup>454</sup> Cf. Braukämper, op. cit., 8.

## **4.2 A short political history of Kambata between the 16. and 19. century<sup>455</sup>**

The focal points of this chapter are:

- 1) Kambata is a society which consists of many different clans, originating from different parts of Ethiopia, and
- 2) the effects of the south-expansion of Emperor Minilik II (1889-1913).<sup>456</sup>

These two points will concentrate on the socio-institutionally-heterogeneous structures. Hence, it is not my intention to present historical details about Kambata.

Concerning the history of Kambata some scientists say: Kambata was mentioned for the first time in a written document in a praise song for Emperor Yishak<sup>457</sup> (1414-29), who in his governmental time went on campaign in southern and eastern territories of the Ethiopian empire... With these tributary territories between the Omo and Blate rivers is meant which is now denoted as Kambata in the historical map of Ethiopia.<sup>458</sup>

Kambata is one of the "Highland East Cushitic" ethnic groups. Scientists who study the history of Kambata rely mostly on oral traditions. These traditions consist of genealogies, dynasty lists, biographies, descriptions of different happenings and narration of some historical occurrences.<sup>459</sup> Kambata had a very organised political system, which enabled the living together of hundreds of clans who came from different parts of Ethiopia and built a single ethnic group.<sup>460</sup> The reason of this migration will be described later.

Because of the lack of enough historical research on the society of Kambata it is sometimes difficult to precisely date some happenings and ruling periods of different Kings of Kambata. King Hamelmal, for example, was the first officially known King of Kambata. Habiso says: "If we see the history of the Oyyata Kings, Hamelmal was the one who founded the Oyyata dynasty and who reigned for 60 years (1552-1612)."<sup>461</sup> And U. Braukämper says that Hamelmal reigned from around 1568-1620. If one compares the data of the both authors,

<sup>455</sup> I chose this epoch of the history of Kambata because of the following reasons: It was only in this time that Kambata had had its own political system which characterised its socio-cultural structure. From the beginning of its ethnogenesis until the south-expansion of the Ethiopian empire, Kambata was a dynasty. The social stratifications which emerged in that time, determined the socio-economic freedom or limitation of the clans. The different clans could act only in the setting of this socio-cultural limitations. It was a peculiar historic period which differentiated the Kambata from other peoples such as nomadic societies who did not have a centralized political system. After the south-expansion of the Ethiopian empire Kambata lost its dynasty and had more or less the same historic course like the other states of Ethiopia. Moreover the socio-cultural structures which were instituted at that time still characterise the socio-cultural profile of the Kambata of today, even if some social, economic and political discriminations or privileges are no more as striking as they were at that time. Therefore, I leave aside the historical facts of Kambata beginning from the time of Emperor Haile Sillase I until nowadays.

<sup>456</sup> The Name Minilik is written usually in a non-uniform way. Some write it Menelik, some write it Menilek. This is because there is not an equivalent for the Ethiopian "e" in the latin character. However, according to me is "Minilik" the nearest equivalent.

<sup>457</sup> Some write *Yeshak* but I prefer to write *Yishak*.

<sup>458</sup> Cf. Braukämper. op. cit., 17.

<sup>459</sup> Cf. ibid, 13.

<sup>460</sup> However, this living together was not always harmonic. There were different revolts from the side of the commoners against the oppressing yoke of the royal clan, the Oyyata. This matter will be treated later in the context of intra-societal structural heterogeneity.

<sup>461</sup> Tesfaye Habiso 1986 (Ethiopian calendar), 99.

N.B. The original text is in Amharic.

N.B. Ethiopia has its own calendar. The European calendar is till January 7 years and after January 8 years ahead of the Ethiopian calendar. The Ethiopian new year begins in the first half of the European September.

the years of the death of the King correspond to each other, if 8 years are added to the one of Habiso; and Habiso uses the Ethiopian calendar, which is here 8 years behind the European one. But the data of the beginning of his reign do not correspond to each other: if 8 years were added to the one of Habiso, he must have begun to reign in 1560, not in 1568. Such confusing data make it difficult to find out and date the exact beginning and the duration of the reign of different Kings.

For many researchers the significant begin for studies on Kambata, however, is King Hamelmal. It is believed that he came from a Semitic northern Ethiopia. But the other problem is that nobody can say with certainty that populated Kambata before the 15th century.<sup>462</sup> The historians and ethnologists ascertain that the different clans of Kambata originated from different parts of Ethiopia, and could settle there because of its agricultural propitiousness.

As we saw above Kambata is a relatively big region between the rivers Omo and Blatte. Different ethnic groups, which were tributary to the Ethiopian Empire, lived in this region. The Oromo who were well trained in their *gada-system*<sup>463</sup> could bring a halt to this tributary system in which the Ethiopian Empire lost its influence on the southern Kingdoms of that epoch. In the face of this, Kambata was disintegrated, and there emerged many small Kingdoms. "In the 17th century the government of the Ethiopian Empire could not collect the tributes from the southern Kingdoms and Kambata lost its central administration. This region was divided into different groups, which were led by their own Kings or war leaders. There emerged new free regions: Kambata, Tembaro, Donga, Dubbamo, Lokka, Soro, Lemo, Badawwachcho (Amsas Badawwachcho), Shashshogo, Enner, Mesmes, Indegagn, Azernet Berberre, Silti, Wulbarag, and Alaba."<sup>464</sup> This means, severing the connection between the Ethiopia of that time and the southern nations, the Oromo caused a new historical epoch in the southern regions. Different wars among these ethnic groups characterised their political development.

The politics of the government of the Ethiopian Empire, which demanded tributes from the southern Kingdoms, characterises one of the decisive happenings in the Ethiopian history. Especially, the Islamic Kingdoms of southern and eastern Ethiopia could protest against this politics. Many different revolts were registered beginning in the 15th century. The Islamic holy war of Ahmed Gagn (1524-1543) was the climax of this military campaign. This successful campaign of Ahmed Gagn cut off the influence of the northern government on the south. This was a good opportunity for the Oromo to migrate into Kambata, and they conquered some parts of Kambata of that time. "On the other hand according to some oral traditions and written documents after the Oromo campaign and migration, the Kingdom of Hamelmal [big Kambata] became a small Kingdom, between the Omo and Blatte rivers,

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<sup>462</sup> Cf. Braukämper, 18.

<sup>463</sup> "A generation-grading form of social organisation among the Oromo that produced automatically a warrior class; the significant factor in the 16th and 17th centuries migration-conquest of today's southern Ethiopia. *Gada* is 1) a concept standing for a whole way of life; 2) the institutional framework; 3) that period of 8 years during which one gada class stays in power. The latter limitation provided a turnover considered the most democratic among Ethiopian peoples. The new-born male child enters the grading system exactly forty years behind the father, regardless of the father's age, so father and son are always five grades apart. Women acquired status and privilege by virtue of their relationships with the men passing through the gada system. Each grade's responsibilities guaranteed that a man could not raise children nor hold office until he had shown an ability to produce food or herd cattle, and had been to war. Traditionally and still true of the Borena area a man may marry only in his 32nd year and only in his 40th may he raise a child and be elected by his peers to leadership as the Abba Gada." (Chris Prouty and Eugene Rosenfeld 1981, 73)

<sup>464</sup> Habiso 1986, 106.

which borders on Gurage in the north, Alaba in the east, Kefa and Janjero in the west, and Wolayta in the south. Moreover, in the epochs after the death of Hamelmal, because the political and religious relations with the north were cut off, this very small Kingdom was split into further small Kingdoms: Kambata, Tembaro, Donga, Dubamo, Mesmes, Indegagn, and Enner. And Weto-Gira Gudella (a part of the Hadiya ethnic groups) settled in the lowland areas between the Omo/Gibe and Blatte rivers as nomads".<sup>465</sup>

The fact that Kambata was already a part of the Ethiopian Christian Empire was one of the reasons for Ahmed Gagn to consider Kambata as one of the focal points of his invasion. As a consequence and because of its isolation from the north, Kambata gradually lost its political significance. Until then Kambata was politically, economically and religiously an important territory for the Ethiopian Christian Empire. "Until the beginning of the 17th century, Kambata like Gurage was considered as a part of Ethiopia. The relatively rich agricultural resources between the highlands of Omo and Blatte were of strategic importance for the expansion of the empire and the settlements of the population of Shewa."<sup>466</sup> However after the Ahmed Gagn invasion and Oromo-migration - until Emperor Minilik II (1892) annexed it into the Ethiopian Empire - it was an independent Kingdom. Because, firstly, there were many clans which originated from the Amhara territories of the northern Ethiopia and migrated into Kambata in different times; secondly, Kambata had a dynasty which claims to have originated from Gondar; and thirdly, Ethiopian orthodox Christianity was practised in Kambata, this region was not fully isolated from the northern Ethiopia even after the invasion of Ahmed Gagn.

Even if the language of Kambata was spoken outside the new small Kingdom,<sup>467</sup> its political influence could not expand significantly. Mount Hambarrichcho<sup>468</sup> - the symbol and shrine of the Kambata - and the vicinity gradually became the territory of the present Kambata. The Oromo invasion had caused that many Kambata had left Kambata and fled to the neighbouring regions and into the north. The Oyyata dynasty, however, continued to exist from 1560-1892,<sup>469</sup> which characterised the political, social, and economic history of Kambata.

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<sup>465</sup> Tesfaye Habiso/ Haile Daniel Magichcho 1984 (Ethiopian calendar), 36. (The original text is in Amharic)

<sup>466</sup> Braukämper, op.cit., 82.

<sup>467</sup> Cf. Habiso 1983 (Ethiopian calendar), 305.

<sup>468</sup> Some write Hambarrichcho "Ambericho", "Ambaricho" which is the Amharic way of writing. But I prefer this word and all the Kambata words that I have used in this paper to write how the Kambata pronounce them.

<sup>469</sup> According to Habiso 1560-1893, but according to Braukämper 1568-1893.



The following Oyyata Kings reigned in this period<sup>470</sup>:

**Table 2: The Kings of Kambata**

<b>The Kings</b>	<b>Time of their Kingship</b>
1) Hamelmal	1552-1612
2) Demmellash/ Deme	1612-1647
3) Ayyele/ Anno	1647-1682
4) Balla	1682-1715
5) Ketema	1715-1750
6) Dilabbo/ Dilabba	1750-1755
7) Hadallo	1755-1758
8) Gonjobbo	1763-1768
9) Waqo	1768-1803
10) Dagoyye	1803-1835
11) Dilbato	1835-1885
<b>The Balabbat<sup>471</sup></b>	<b>Time of their government</b>
12) Agago	1885-1888
13) Molliso	1888-1912
14) Bargano	1912-1939
15) Anniyyo	1939-1966 (the beginning of the communist revolution)

Source: Habiso 1983, 102

Because its geographical position was very propitious, the Kings of Kambata chose mount Hambarrichcho to use it as fortress, which made the attacks of the enemies very difficult. Hambarrichcho and its vicinity remained the seat of the government until it was moved to Hangachcha, - west of Hambarrichcho - by the administrators of the central government of Ethiopia (after the annexation of Kambata into the Ethiopia empire) because they were threatened by thunder and lightning on the mountain. Because of the well-organised political system of Kambata, the administrators of the central government of Ethiopia made Kambata the centre of their administrative areas: Kambata and Hadiya. Since Kambata is substantially smaller than Hadiya, the Hadiya were always against the term *Kambata and Hadiya*.

<sup>470</sup> This data is according to the Ethiopian calendar.

The listing of Gejiba does not mention king Gonjobbo. ( Cf. Worku Gejiba 1991[Ethiopian calendar], 10.)

Between Hadallo and Gonjobbo there is a vacancy of six years where Habiso does not mention who reigned at that time. But Braukämper says as follows: "Kambata remained without king. Discords decimated the reigning clan. At the end Gonjobbo was chosen as a compromise candidate, a Oyyata, who was not a direct descendent of the king line... (Braukämper op.cit., 58)

<sup>471</sup> After the expansion of the Ethiopian Empire to the south, the 'Balabbat' were the contact persons between the administrators, who came on behalf of the central government, and the local people in the south, in our case Kambata. That means, after the annexation of Kambata into the Ethiopian Empire, Oyyata lost its dynasty. However, the administrators of the central government preferred to choose some members of Oyyata as *balabbat*. This might have been because otherwise they could have caused internal political problems, which could have created difficulties in their administration. Since Kambata was a politically and socially well-organised society, this administrators of the central government did not want to change some elements of its previous political system. (cf. Braukämper op.cit., 89)

Apart from some revolts against the expansionist politics of the Ethiopian Empire Kambata did not instigate any significant military campaigns against the neighbouring states. Even the revolts against the expansion of the Ethiopian Empire were mostly stirred up by the Oyyata who realised that their hegemonic privilege was threatened. One of the reasons for the lack of war-mentality could be that Kambata, as an agricultural society did not have a significant experience and history of war. Even in the post-expansionist period and communist regime it seldom occurred that any significant anti-governmental movements took place. This society of Kambata grew with the following historical backgrounds, which might be further reasons for the lack of war-mentality in Kambata<sup>472</sup> apart from some intra-Kambata conflict:

- Oyyata were defending the state as their own private property, and
- the commoners were in any case subjugated either by the Oyyata or the Amhara (after the annexation). They did not have an opportunity to develop in themselves the sense of responsibility to defend this state.

The oral tradition of Kambata narrates as follows, how the Oyyata-clan came to be a Kingly clan: "Hamelmal said: *the seven of Hambarrichcho*<sup>473</sup> need a strong leader. The leader must manage to pass seven days without eating and drinking anything. The leaders of the seven clans, the leader of the clan of the *Gulba*, of the *Fuga* and Hamelmal himself (representing the *Oyyata*) began to fast... The leader of the Oyyata was the only one who managed to fast for seven days [with some tricks] and he became the King of Kambata."<sup>474</sup> The story is long but I do not want to go in the details, since I will discuss it in the ethnogenesis of Kambata. The politics of Kambata developed gradually from a representative government to a monarchical dynasty until 1892. The political power was always in the hands of the Oyyata. Only the clan of *Gulba* had had a significant position in the political system, because its leader was the only one who managed to fast for six days and achieved the second place in the competition.

The historians of Kambata say that the society of Kambata experienced its political heyday in the time of King Dilbato. Dilbato was the one who introduced new rules and rights for the other clans because they were protesting continuously. In the time of King Dagoyye and Dilbato the military power of Kambata became very strong. In this system, as usual, only the Oyyata were favoured, except some Amhara clans and the *Gulba* who have enjoyed a relatively better social and political position. The fertile part of the land was given to the Oyyata. They were the only ones who could marry more than one woman. And many other social, economic and political privileges were reserved for them. Regarding this fact N.J. Singer writes as follows: "The Oyyata are the ruling clan of the Kambata. The Woma (King) traditionally is a member of the Oyyata. Since the defeat of the Kambata by the Amhara in 1892, the status of the Oyyata within the group has been enhanced because of the claimed genealogical tie to the Amhara Gondar dynasty. In fact the Oyyata domination actually reached its height during the reign of Woma (King) Dilbato, 1845-1892... Dilbato was responsible for annexing a great deal of land through his conquest of surrounding groups.

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<sup>472</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 95, 98, 106, 107.

<sup>473</sup> Before the arrival of Hamelmal (an Amhara from the northern Ethiopia), there were seven clans who lived there. They were called *Hambarrichcho lamala*, the seven of Hambarrichcho.

<sup>474</sup> Habiso 384f

Much of the annexed land taken by Dilbato was distributed to his own twenty-six male children and his principal advisors and generals. These individuals gained access to well over half of all the Kambata land. The Oyyata were awarded a considerably larger share than others, apparently on the basis of their rights by status alone. This led to the Kontoma-Oyyata distinction. This distinction was further exacerbated by a set of legal rules promulgated by Dilbato, which favoured the Oyyata. Among these rules was a restriction on the ability of all but the Oyyata to enter into polygamous relationship. The Oyyata were allowed to have as many wives as deemed necessary, whereas the Kontoma only one. The Kontoma were required to deliver the most savoured part of the beef cattle, the shenya (shana) to an Oyyata at the time of slaughter. The Oyyata were allowed to expropriate lands from the Kontoma on whim; only the Oyyata were allowed to fence their living compound; the Kontoma were not allowed plant shade trees; and only the Oyyata were allowed to ride on mules. All these rules enhanced the position of the Oyyata. Violations were punished severely."<sup>475</sup>

Since the territory of Kambata became very small after the invasion of the Oromo, the Kings of Kambata had been trying to enlarge this territory implementing different methods. The expansionist ideology of King Waqo was that he furthered the Kambata farmers indirectly to infiltrate the Hadiya territories little by little without employing an open military action. In the time of Dagoyye, Kambata experienced a *formative* (Braukämper 1983) political era. He began with a constructive diplomatic relationship with the Hadiya. He married women from the Hadiya and tried to create a special relationship with them and the Arsi in order to gain some warriors from them. In order to manage this, he gave horses and slaves to the Hadiya and Arsi as gift.<sup>476</sup> However, Dilbato was the classic King of Kambata who was famous for his socio-political organisation. His inter-state co-operation politics gave his government a significant profile. Like his father, he had been trying to gain warriors from the neighbouring states. In order to obviate possible conflicts with the neighbouring states, which could have hampered his expansionism, he married some wives from the neighbouring states. The strategy was to create a peaceful relationship with the neighbouring states and to set a new course for the territorial expansion.

In order to simplify the administration Dilbato created 30 administrative regions and further sub-regions.<sup>477</sup> "The political system is hierarchical in nature. It starts with the Woma at the centre and radiates out into the local village communities. The holy mountain Ambaricho [Hambarrichcho], up on which the Woma lives is located in the geographical centre of the tribal domain. From it radiate thirty sub-divisions known as the *Seju Gochu* [Sajje Gochchu]. Each of this Gochchu is subdivided into a number of districts, *Morichu* [Murrichchu]. Finally, each of the districts is divided into villages called *Hera*. At each level there is an administrative official who handles political affairs and legal matters."<sup>478</sup> Since the political system was very disadvantageous for the commoners, collective revolt was not to prevent until the system was changed or ameliorated. The privileges of the Oyyata clan became more and more unbearable for the commoners. In the face of the conflicts, which were emerging from time to time, many on both sides, lost their lives. Since Dilbato could not

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<sup>475</sup> Norman J. Singer 1980, 540.

<sup>476</sup> Cf. Braukämper op.cit., 62.

<sup>477</sup> Cf. Habiso 1983, 123ff.

<sup>478</sup> Singer 1980, 547.

see any other alternative, he had to change the political and economic system of the society and reduce the privileges of Kambata. The following are some of the improvements and reforms of the socio-political and economic institutions:

- "each clan can use the piece of land which it possesses,
- 20% of the possessed piece of land should be forested,
- the forest and the farm land should be separated by a canal (rampart) to protect the forest,
- in all four directions of Kambata territory roads should be constructed which connect all the 30 administrative regions,
- nobody should be hindered to bury his dead in cemeteries,
- confiscation and privileges (by the Oyyata) should be abolished."<sup>479</sup>

This was a significant break-through in the political, economic, and social history of Kambata. This reformation became more or less the basis for the co-existence of the clans of Kambata, which are more than 160.

#### **4.2.1 The ethnogenesis of the Kambata**

It is the tendency of many people to show that they have a good socio-cultural background, which they can be proud of. The aim is to gain an esteemed social position in the new environment and to show that they do not descend from a low social class. Therefore, mostly and indirectly they tell what they would like to be, not what they really are. While discussing the ethnogenesis and the origins of different clans, this point will be one of the important points, which a researcher will be confronted with.

Kambata is a conglomerate of clans from different parts of Ethiopia. The exact number of the clans is yet unknown. Some say they are more than 140 (Habiso 1983), others say more than 200 (Gejiba 1991). This numerical deviation might have the following reasons: The first reason might be that some have died out. The second reason could be that some *made up* their social position through some cultural initiation rites which are created for making up the social status of the very low social classes. This initiation and inclusion rite is locally called "*wozo*". The ones from the lowest social classes can choose another socially better clan and be admitted into this clan through the initiation rites. However, they cannot choose a Kingly or noble clan. The third possibility could be, that the ones of the lowest clans migrate within Kambata (because of social, economic, and political reasons), where they go, they tell that they belong to some other better clans, since nobody knows to which clan they really belong. This can be the case, especially if they are very small in number and all quit the region where they settled at the beginning. Moreover, the lack of profound studies on Kambata makes this issue very difficult to understand.

Historians and the oral tradition say that before the other clans began to settle in Kambata there were already the so called the 'seven of Kambata' *Hambarrichcho lamala* (the Proto-Kambata). Concerning which clans exactly they were, opinions of various authors are quite different.

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<sup>479</sup> Habiso 1983, 141.

**Table 3: The Proto-Kambata**

Author	The Proto-Kambata	
<i>N.J. Singer</i> <sup>480</sup>	Efegenna, Ebejenna, Gadenna, Goruta, Tazuta, Fuga and Heseseta [Hesese]	
<i>U. Braukämper</i> <sup>481</sup>	Oyyata, Gulba, Taza (Tazo), Hinnira (Ennara), Effegenna [Efegenna], Ebbejena [Ebejenna] and Fuga	
<i>W. Gejiba</i> <sup>482</sup>	Efegenna, Ebejenna, Tazuta, Fuga, Hinnira (Ennara), Saga and Goromo	
<i>R. Bayissa</i> <sup>483</sup>	Efegenna, Ebejenna, Tazuta, Fuga, Hinnira (Ennara), Saga and Kemaro	
<i>T. Habiso</i> <sup>484</sup>	<u><i>before the arrival of Hamelmal</i></u> Efegenna, Ebejenna, Tazuta (Tazo), Goromo, Hinnira (Ennara), Saga and Baza	<u><i>after the arrival of Hamelmal</i></u> <sup>485</sup> Oyyata, Gulba, Efegenna, Ebejenna, Goromo, Hinnira (Ennara) and Fuga

The different clans of Kambata who migrated from different parts of Ethiopia are usually classified as follows:

1. The Semitic groups who are in the socially leading positions, who migrated from the northern Ethiopia and enjoy political and economic privileges....,
2. the Omotic-groups,
3. the east-Cushitics, and
4. the Fuga<sup>486</sup>, which are excluded from interclan connubialism and commensalism.<sup>487</sup>

As I mentioned above, Habiso says that in Kambata there are more than 140 clans, and Gejiba says there are more than 160, whereas Braukämper enumerates 81. The following table gives some information about some clans of Kambata, where they came from and in which parts of Kambata they live today.

<sup>480</sup> Cf. N. Singer 1977, 2.

<sup>481</sup> Cf. U. Braukämper 1983, 36.

<sup>482</sup> Cf. W. Gejiba 1991, 7.

<sup>483</sup> Cf. Regassa Bayissa 1987, 3.

<sup>484</sup> Cf. Habiso 1983, 384, 385f.

<sup>485</sup> Which means after Hamelmal managed to fast for seven days, he became the king of Kambata. Since the Gulba achieved the second place they became special councillors of the Oyyata-dynasty. The rest were members of the central committee, which lost its meaning and influence after the government became a monarchical dynasty.

<sup>486</sup> The Fuga have been the oldest inhabitants of Kambata, according to Braukämper. (Braukämper 1983, 21)

<sup>487</sup> Cf. Braukämper 1983, 37.

**Table 4: Ethnogenesis of Kambata**

<u>The clan status</u>		<u>Clans</u>	<u>where they live in Kambata</u>	<u>their original places</u>	<u>approximate time of their settlement</u>
<i>Kingly clan</i>	1	Oyyata	Enano, Autanna, Geyyota, Majogo, Masafe, Wasara, Moggisa	Gonder	16th century
<i>noble clans</i>	2	Gulba	Challo, Bushulugga	Bulga, Shewa	16th century
	3	Innagos (Amhara)	Charama, Taza, Habo- ra, Geyyota, Majogo, Yabbu, Moggisa, Abbonsa	Amhara-Gaynt through Indegagn	beginning of the 17th century
	4	Innegar (Amhara)		Menz (Shewa) through Inner-Gurage	beginning of the 17th century
	5	Nurto	Benara, Mino, Mishigida, Autanna, Sodara, Sarara	Gonder	16th century
	6	Quntana [Quntano?]	Abbonsa, Fullasa, Taza, Qadida, Sasara [Sarara?], Bushulugga, Masafe	Gonder	16th century
	7	Sintanno [Sintaro?]	Fullasa, Sodarra, Taza, Danne [Dane?], Mishigida, Abbonsa	Gonder	16th century
<i>Commoners</i>					
<i>four of the hambarrichcho lamala</i>	8	Hinnira	Taza, Habora, Tadda'a	Ennaria through Wolayta	before the 16th century
	9	Taza (Tazo)	Yabbu, Qadida, Gosgola	Ennaria /Jimma	before the 16th century
	10	Efegenna	Qa'lamma, Angachcha, Taza, Bakkafa, Habara [Hawwora, Habora?]	Darasa	16th century
	11	Ebejenna	Majogo, Taza, Hangachcha	Darasa	16th century
<i>others</i>	12	Agawwa		Agawmidr in Gojjam	beginning of the 17th century
	13	Annashakko	Motoqqoma, Arsho, Dato-area	Alaba	around 1900
	14	Awda		Sidama	end of the 17th century
	15	Azara	Hangachcha	Azernet (east Gurage)	first half of the 18th century
	16	Badogo	Ta'lota	Dallo (Bale)	middle of the 16th century

<u>The clan status</u>		<u>Clans</u>	<u>where they live in Kambata</u>	<u>their original places</u>	<u>approximate time of their settlement</u>
<i>others</i>	17	Borajamalla		Gamu	
	18	Bubulla	Tadda'a	Wolayta	first half of the 19th century
	19	Dada	Mishigida, Tadda'a	Indegagn through Arsi	first half of the 19th century
	20	Damota	Mishigida, Qa'lamma, Masafe	Gadab through Damota area in Wolayta	first half of the 18th century
	21	Dareyye		Gamu	
	22	Dawaro	Mishigida	Menz (Shewa) through Dawaro in the eastern Arsi	first half of the 18th century
	23	Dawe	Gore, Tadda'a, Adilo	Arsi-Didda'a	first half of the 18th century
	24	Donga	Autanna, Enano, Moggisa, Qatta, Hadacho, Yayyamma, Leshomongonja	Donga	19th and 20th century
	25	Dubbamo	Dagoyyanna [Doyyoganna], Wagabata	Dubamo-Wosanoso	2nd half of the 19th century
	26	Dubbo	Mishigida, Sarara, Kuyya'a	Kuchcha through Dubbo near Aracka (Wolayita)	2nd half of the 18th century
	27	Endanna [Indeganna?]	Majogo	Ennariya through Endegayn	
	28	Ennerra [Hinnira?]		Sidama	
	29	Farzano		Albaso in the Arsi highland	the last one-3rd of the 18th century
	30	Gabara	Shalo	Arsi-Didda'a	1st half of the 18th century
	31	Gadenna		Arsi (according to Singer)	
	32	Gafat	Qachchabira, Zoggobba, Qachcha, Gamashsha, Funnamura	Gafat in Wollo	15th century
	33	Gaga		Gejja-area in the northern Gurage	1st half of the 18th century
	34	Galla	Jore, Tadda'a, Adilo	around the source of Wabi-Shebele	1st half of the 18th century
	35	Ganza	Hobbichcha, Dinnika, Funnamura	southern Ganz, Qabena	15th and 2nd half of the 18th century

<u>The clan status</u>		<u>Clans</u>	<u>where they live in Kambata</u>	<u>their original places</u>	<u>approximate time of their settlement</u>
	36	Jiga		Sidama	1st half of the 18th century
	37	Gonderoma		Tembaro, Donga	1st half of the 20th century
	38	Gora		Gimma (according to Singer)	
	39	Jora	Abbonsa, Tadda'a	Inner-Gurage	
	40	Gorakamo		Jimma (according to Singer)	
	41	Goromma	Jore	Wolayta	end of the 18th century
	42	Guji	Jore, Tadda'a	Guji-Oromo area	1st half of the 18th century
	43	Juma		Sidama	end of the 17th century
	44	Guna	Abbonsa	Guna in Lemo through Lenda in Alaba	middle of the 19th century
	45	Hajibbo [Hayyibba?] (Hatte-Amhara)	Mishigida, Qadida, Tadda'a, Yayyamma, Omoshora	Amhara areas	15th century
	46	Hambaraso	Geyyota, Tadda'a	Arsi	
	47	Hesesse		Sidama (according to Singer: Borena)	1st half of the 18th century
	48	Qarriso	Odame	Eka-Arsi east of the lower Blatte	2nd half of the 19th century
	49	Makuto		Gamu (according to Singer)	
	50	Malga	Sarara, Saddichcho	Arsi through Sidama	
	51	Moche	Adilo, Qadida	Badawwachcho-Hadiya	1st half of the 19th century
	52	Odoro	Iballa	Lemo-Hadiya	middle of the 19th century
	53	Omoshogora	East of the mount Shonkolla	Ennariya through Gurage-Innamor and Mesmes	1st half of the 18th century
	54	Ongota	Damboyya, Tadda'a, Mishigida	Amhara areas	15th century
	55	Saga		Gurage	short before 1600
	56	Tarachmanna	Chafe, Odame, north of the mount Dato	Shashshogo-Hadiya	2nd half of the 19th century
	57	Tembaro	Sarara, Funto, Enano, Geshgola	Tembaro	2nd half of the 18th century
	58	Tigre-Wolayta	Shamba, Jore,	Kindo and Qoy-	end of the 18th



<u>The clan status</u>		<u>Clans</u>	<u>where they live in Kambata</u>	<u>their original places</u>	<u>approximate time of their settlement</u>
		(Qawonna)	Majjogo	sha in Wolayta	century after the civil war in Wolayta
	59	Wereza		Qabena/Gurage	
	60	Wolleqa		Wollegga (according to Singer)	
	61	Womallo	Gubbanna, Hangachcha	Borena	beginning of the 18th century
	62	Werara	Mishigida, Wagabata	Werera in Arsi	2nd half of the 18th century
	63	Wesheshsha	Shinshichcho, Gameshsha	Wolayta through Donga and Danta	2nd half of the 18th century
	64	Yabbo	Shashshara, Qadida	Kallale around the Zway-seas	middle of the 18th century
	65	Zahe		Quchcha (Gamu-Gofa) (according to Singer)	
	66	Zato	Zato, Dato	Borena	2nd half of the 17th century
<i>clans of the Fuga-caste in the alphabetical order</i>					
			Taza, Durame, Angachcha etc.; dispersed over Kambata and neighbouring areas	Kambata and neighbouring areas in the west and north (Mesmes, Gurage, Ennariya)	mostly autochthonous, i.e. before the 16th century
	67	Annosso			
	68	Badagosso			
	69	Bedira			
	70	Boriyye			
	71	Bosha			
	72	Gachcha			
	73	Gajjichcho			
	74	Gashdessa			
	75	Gauwossa			
	76	Hokiya (Hogiyya)			
	77	Marenmanna			
	78	Masamasa			
	79	Negga'a			
	80	Tontosa (Dontosa)			
	81	Woyyoso			

Source: Braukämper 1983, 190ff

Since the studies on Kambata are not very thorough, it is not easy to find out the exact origins of some of the clans. One of the most important factors to identify the origins of the clans are the names of the clans themselves.<sup>488</sup> There are some differences between Braukämper and Singer in locating the origins of some of the clans. There is also a big difference in the number of the clans. While Singer enumerates only 26<sup>489</sup> clans, Braukämper lists 81 (see above).

The other clans, which are not to find in the list of Braukämper, are the following ones, which I found in the enumeration of W. Gejiba:

Adamogne	Adeososo	Agizza	Ajaremma
Ajjo-Galla	Akakoso	Alaboso	Allaqino
Amaneyya	Annichama	Anniymanna	Argama
Asaroso	Ashutoso	Awado	Azummura
Balta	Bamushoso	Bargage	Bazuta
Beqeta	Boddemana	Bohalmanna	Bonnooso
Borboro'o	Bosoanna	Bu'bu'leta	Chata
Chelomanna <sup>490</sup>	Chenqomanna	Chirechoso	Dagagmanna
Danta	Darbe	Doda	Dugurreta
Efata	Ekkata	Gajja	Gezomala
Girmeosu	Gonga	Guduro	Hadmoso
Hayyibba	Hirrita	Hizbo	Hiziyata
Hojjeta	Hurbarag	Indanna	Innegafa
Intekanna	Jiwaroso	Kanasa	Kennetto
Kinchichilla	Kino-oso	Kolmina	Laroso
Latabo	Lawoka	Libshmanna	Magara
Maredoso	Masqana	Meshera	Mirroroso
Mololicho	Mudiyoso	Odamano	Osheoso
Oshoanna	Ozobodota	Qa'na	Qu'nata
Sa'michcho	Sabardina	Sabola	Samina
Saworoso	Senko-oso	Shakonmana	Shameoso
Side	Sinitra	Torodo	Toromburo
Wateoso	Wayaboso	Wichcha	Wogaroso
Wolatamala	Womigira	Wongira	Yangaro
Zamina	Zubbamo		

Source: Worku Gejiba 1991 (Ethiopian calendar), 12f

As I mentioned above, war and scarcity of natural resources are two of the main important factors, which cause migration. Even if the clan list of Gejiba does not show the origins of the clans, most of them came from different parts of Ethiopia, which shows that

<sup>488</sup> "...many of the clans adopted names within the Kambata structure which serves to identify their place of origin..." Norman Singer 1977, 3

Concerning the origin confer also Habiso 1983 (Ethiopian calendar), 130f, 380

<sup>489</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 2ff

<sup>490</sup> The enumeration of Worku Gejiba does not include the Chelomanna.

Kambata is a conglomerate of mostly political and economic refugees.<sup>491</sup> The important point for me in the enumeration is not to exactly locate the origins of the different clans and their approximate time of immigration into the Kambata region. My focal points are the socio-cultural structures, institutions and their consequences and influences on the economic and political activity of the members of the society; that means, to discover if there is any connection between the origin of the different clans and their privileges or discriminations in their social, political and economic life.

Besides war and scarcity of natural resources an unfavourable and unjust socio-cultural structure can also cause migration. Even if it cannot be taken for granted that in the new social and ecological environment integration and acculturation would go easily and smoothly, those who feel that they are exploited, discriminated and despised incline to move to the areas which they consider advantageous for their social and individual self-fulfilment and where they can mobilise their potentials. Interestingly, many immigrants are successful in their economic achievement. This could be because in their new environment they are free from the hindering structures at home. They can now develop their capability and talents in the new areas where they are no more confronted with socio-cultural limitations. These migrants are no more in the old socio-cultural structures and not yet in the new ones, if at all they would take over the institutions of these new socio-cultural structures. This social anonymity would be compensated while the immigrants try to ameliorate their economic situation. "The role of the institutional conditions for the furthering or hindering of economic progress or of social development shows its consequences in connection with the economically dynamic minorities in the stationary societies... The Chinese, Indians, Lebanese, Palestinians, Jews, Yemenites, Greeks, etc. took advantage of the new situations and became layers of the westerly homo oeconomicus... Whatsoever the reason for the innovative activity of these minorities is - the lost social status, displacement, the will to self-maintenance - they took advantage of the new possibilities which their countries could not grant. This implies the deep influence of the socio-structural and institutional preconditions for innovative activity."<sup>492</sup>

In a similar way the oral traditions of Kambata bear witness that the unfavourable socio-cultural structures in their previous societies had caused some clans to leave their areas and to migrate to Kambata. Clans like Efejenna, Ebejenna, Goromma testify to this fact. These clans have been subjugated as slaves in the Oromo areas of the Guji. Their quitting of the competition of the *seven of Hambarrichcho* (after their settlement in Kambata) - rather to live as craftsmen than fasting for seven days - certifies this fact, because craftsmen belonged (and belong still to some extent) to the lowest social classes and along with this to the lowest economic classes. These clans are of the earliest clans who settled in Kambata<sup>493</sup>.

Probably the already reigning clan of Oyyata, whose forefathers came probably from Gonder, had favoured the further immigration of the Amhara. This has been strategically important for the dynasty to gain political support as a ruling class in an alien area. "Thus the creation of a single ethnic group known as Kambata came about through the incorporation of

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<sup>491</sup> Cf. G. L. Dilebo 1982 (Ethiopian calendar), 163f; Braukämper 1983, 25, 28, 35.

<sup>492</sup> Menzel/Senghaas 1986, 81.

<sup>493</sup> Cf. Braukämper 1983, 29.

migrants and defeated individuals."<sup>494</sup> Besides this political background from the side of the defeated individuals and migrants to Kambata, the clans inflow had had advantages which were politically and economically significant for the ruling class. The rulers took advantage of the good soil fertility, which the immigrants were looking for. To regain the former political significance of the state, the political rulers had to welcome as many migrants as possible. This must have been around after the first half of the 17th century.<sup>495</sup>

For the integration of the new ones, the readiness of the latter to accept the existing political and social structure was an important precondition. They had to swear to respect the institutions of the *seven of the Hambarrichcho*. This had to be visualised as follows: when the new-comers built a house they had to tie seven small branches from a tree to the top of the pillar of the house which stands out of the house. These seven branches symbolise the seven founder clans of Kambata and its institutions: *the hambarrichcho lamala*, the seven of Hambarrichcho<sup>496</sup>. This shows beforehand the maintaining of the existing socio-cultural structures in spite of the unfavourable conditions for the newcomers.

#### **4.2.2 Kambata and its neighbouring states and their socio-economic and political relationships**

Tembaro, Dubbamo, Donga, Alaba and different groups of Hadiya are the neighbouring peoples who could considerably determine the history of Kambata. Linguistic and ethnological similarities of the Kambata with them are remarkable. Between the Kambata and the Tembaro there are only small dialectal deviations. The Tembaro could defend their identity from the threatening Hadiya as an independent Kambata-speaking group. According to Habiso, between 1550-1570 seven groups from Tembaro entered into Kambata.<sup>497</sup> This could be one of the important reasons for the linguistic similarity between the Kambata and the Tembaro. Zato, Weshesha and *Hatte*-Amhara as the forefathers of Dubbamo and Donga imply historical and genealogical connections of Kambata, Dubbamo and Donga.<sup>498</sup> As a consequence, the linguistic similarities might have helped to make the region between Omo and Blatte a single state. "Kambata belongs to the Cushitic groups and has four dialects: Kambata, Alaba, Tembaro, and Qabena. Kambata is spoken in *Haiqochina Buttajra Awrajja*, *Alaba* (wholly) and in *Negele-Arsi Woreda*. In *Chebbonna Gurage Awrajja* in *Wolqitte* there are Kambata-speaking groups. There are Kambata in Sidamo in *Sha'manna*, *Qadida*, *Wondokosha*, *Wondatiqqa* and in some more areas. In some big governmental estates like *Wonji*, *Methara*, *Nuraera*, *Melkasadi Awash*, *Abadir*, *Ambash*, etc. there are a lot of Kambata-speaking workers. The reason for that is the high population density in the Kambata and Hadiya areas..."<sup>499</sup> However, in the following chapters my paper will concentrate only on the present political territory of Kambata.

<sup>494</sup> Singer 1977, 5.

<sup>495</sup> Cf. Braukämper 1983, 48f; Dilebo 1982, 163f.

<sup>496</sup> Cf. Habiso 1983, 380.

<sup>497</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 96.

<sup>498</sup> Cf. Barukämper 1983, 30.

<sup>499</sup> Habiso 1983, 305.

The settlement of the forefathers of the Dubbamo and Donga took place in southwest of Kambata, in the not yet settled areas of the highlands of *Ottoro* and *Dantta* of the Hadiya. "Since King Ketama's mother was a daughter of a Dubamo King, this King of Dubamo and his *hauzulmancho* [a spiritual councillor of the King with supernatural powers, his highest priest] must have stood by the King Ketema of Kambata."<sup>500</sup>

Like some Kambata clans, Dubbamo and Donga probably came from Qabena near Sidama/Darasa. Since the Dubbamo, Donga, and Tembaro settled in the Hadiya region and they were politically not very significant, it might have not been difficult for the Hadiya to threaten them. As a well-organised political unity it was not difficult for the Kambata to defend its political sovereignty. "While the Dubamo, Donga and Tembaro joined the Hadiya politically and ethnically in the last two centuries, the Kambata preserved their independence. They described themselves as *Kokata*, which signifies a federate unification in the ethnogenetic process."<sup>501</sup>

One of the important points in the history of Kambata is the different wars against the neighbouring peoples. "Kambata were fighting against Hadiya, Arsi, Wolayta, Guki, Wulbarag, Alaba, and Janjero... The different groups of Hadiya such as *Lemo*, *Soro*, *Shashshogo*, *Weto-Gira* and *Badawwachcho* were fighting against each other; and they were fighting again against Tembaro, Jimma, Jenjero, Kambata, Wolayta, Bosha, Kullo, Arsi, Wulbarag, Donga, Gurage, Silti, etc. And the Tembaro and Donga were fighting against the Hadiya, Kullo, Wolayta..."<sup>502</sup>

When Kambata became politically very weak - after the invasion of Mohamed Gagn (1524-1543) - the *Weto-Gira* were persecuting them. *Shashshogo*- and *Uruso-Hadiya* put an end to this persecution of the *Weto-Gira*.<sup>503</sup> In the face of such political and military problems, Kambata had to look for strategies to settle the conflicts with the neighbouring peoples. Marriage with these peoples was one of the important political and economic strategies: for peace, territorial expansion and alliance against other enemies. "In order to create diplomatic relationships and to extend his political power, Dagoyye married five wives from the noble families of the neighbouring peoples: one from the Wolayta-clan of the *Tigre*, one from the Arsi, two from the *Soro*, and his main wife Wotame from the *Lemo*-clan of the *Odoro* who was the mother of the successor Dilbato and his brother."<sup>504</sup> Even if this strategy had achieved good political and economic advantages, a marriage with a non-Christian Hadiya was scandal for the Christian Kambata State. However, Kambata was not a purely Christian state anymore, because in the socio-political structures and institutions and in the religious beliefs animism was playing an important role. Hence, it was a kind of syncretistic religion.

Other groups of the Hadiya whose territories border on Kambata are *Uruso* and *Badeoso*. Since they emigrated from Sidamo around 1720, they must have certain ethnological relationships with some Kambata clans. Since the *Badawwachcho* did not allow them to settle southeast of Kambata, they fled to the northwest of Kambata and settled there.

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<sup>500</sup> Ibid. 105.

<sup>501</sup> Braukämper 1983, 2.

<sup>502</sup> Habiso 1983, 122

<sup>503</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 105

<sup>504</sup> Braukämper 1983, 61.

"With the Kambata-speaking neighbours they lived harmonically. Their intensive relationship with the Tembaro led them to abandon their original Semitic language which belonged to the east-Gurage and to take over Kambata."<sup>505</sup> If the various groups of the Hadiya were unified and harmonic among each other, it could have been a disastrous threat for the existence of Kambata as a sovereign state. Therefore Kambata had to owe its existence to the inter-group conflict of the Hadiya.

In the era of King Dagoyye, Kambata offered many gifts to the Hadiya and Arsi, in order to gain military support from these peoples. Dagoyye had been trying to recruit some military forces from Alaba as well. Moreover, the aim of giving gifts was to set a new course for the expansion of the Kambata's political territory in the Hadiya areas. As nomads the Hadiya could not always realise the unnoticed infiltration and settlement of the Kambata in their territories. Regardless of the Kambata's strategic relation with the Hadiya, in the face of this infiltration and settlement, a conflict outbreak was not avoidable.<sup>506</sup>

Like his father Dagoyye, Dilbato (around 1845-1892) made it his main task to create peace with the Hadiya who were militarily stronger and had a wider territory than the Kambata. Dilbato understood that in the peace accord with the Hadiya it could not be enough to live neutrally in peace with them. For its own interest Kambata had to stand by the Hadiya in their conflict against the Wolayta who could have been a significant threat for the Kambata as well, if they had defeated the Hadiya.<sup>507</sup> That means, for fear that the Wolayta - after defeating the Badawwachcho-Hadiya (south-east of Kambata) - could have threatened the Kambata, the Kambata had to militarily support the Badawwachcho since the 1960s.<sup>508</sup> Like with the other neighbouring peoples the Kambata had had marriage ties with the Badawwachcho with the intention of territorial expansion to the south. "In spite of the marriage relationships and war brotherhood with the Badawwachcho, the Kambata secretly pursued an expansion of their territories at the cost of the Badawwachcho. Dilbato ordered to set up rampart systems in the pasture areas of the southern neighbours that these ones permitted with suspicion, because the Kambata argued that the ramparts were set up against the common enemy, the Wolayta, and therefore it was in the interest of the Hadiya as well. In this way the Kambata could freely expand their territories as far as *Adilo*, *Abbonsa*, and *Siqe* (inside Badawwachcho) before the Amhara occupation."<sup>509</sup>

The *Soro-Hadiya* was a great menace for the Kambata in the time of Dilbato. Together with the *Lemo-Hadiya* Kambata had to fight against the *Soro*, wherein both had to suffer heavy casualties. Even if the Kambata made an agreement with the Hadiya time and again, they could not keep the peace accord. Since Kambata was a highly populated society, it was always tempted to expand its territory. The allies of the Kambata, the *Lemo-Hadiya*, had helped the Kambata to occupy the east of mount Shonkolla and rampart it with dams as own territory around 1880.<sup>510</sup> However, the peace agreement reached before must have had a considerable significance for the settlement of the conflict. "When once again *Soro-Hadiya*

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<sup>505</sup> Ibid, 54.

<sup>506</sup> Cf. ibid, 62.

<sup>507</sup> Cf. ibid, 65.

<sup>508</sup> Cf. ibid, 70.

<sup>509</sup> Ibid, 71.

<sup>510</sup> Cf. ibid, 64

women came to the markets in Kambata, Dilbato ordered to close the gates so that those who were within the Kambata ramparts could not go out. When the Soro heard that their women were captured, they took their spears and wanted to free their women violently. However, they understood that using force could have been dangerous for their women. Hence, they had to look for another solution and asked the leader of the Lemo, Ashawiyeniye, for mediation. But he was the one who had advised Dilbato to capture the women, which the Soro did not know. Ashawiyeniye asked the messengers of the Soro if they were ready to accept his advice and the preconditions of Dilbato. After they had consented he ordered that they should swear by their spears - [this was for the traditional culture of the Hadiya a specially sanctioned oath] - not to fight against the Kambata anymore. He explained that the peace would be for the benefit of both parties, otherwise how could they receive articles of food from the Kambata, if they hinder the work of the farmers or even kill them! Secretly Ashawiyeniye went to Kambata and informed Dilbato about his mediation. After that the Soro-women were freed and could go to their people."<sup>511</sup>

The Kambata also had conflict with the Alaba, east of Kambata. As usual, the cause of the conflict was land. In the face of the high population density, Kambata was obliged to infiltrate the Alaba areas, which were used as pasture areas by the nomads of Arsi.<sup>512</sup> The Shashshogo-Hadiya to the north-east of Kambata played an important role for the Kambata when they suffered heavy casualties in the conflict with the Weto-Gira, who were treating the Kambata badly after this region became politically very weak after the invasion of Ahmed-Grangn. With the help of the Shashshogo the Kambata could free themselves from the oppressing joke of the Weto-Gira.<sup>513</sup> Even with the Shashshogo the Kambata had conflicts, because for Dilbato it was indispensable to expand the territory of his state to the north.<sup>514</sup> An interesting characteristic of Dilbato's politics was the set up of ramparts in the occupied areas of the neighbouring peoples. There was also a trade war between the Shashshogo and Kambata. Kambata had to import milk products and meat from Shashshogo, and the Shashshogo imported different grains and *Wese*-products (*inset edulis/inset ventricosum*) from Kambata.

With other peoples the Kambata also had had significant trade relations, even if they were considerably decelerated by lack of a propitious infrastructure facility. D'Abbadie writes about Kambata trade relations with the Sidama and the Jimma Sultans: "Au-delà des Arusi sont des Sidama qui viennent vendre du café dans Kambata. Ces Sidama portent aussi des perles de verre blanches et du cuivre rouge. Au retour ils emmènent des esclaves, des toiles et des ânes. Ce ne sont pas de Sidama qui viennent, mais des gens de Gergeda [Kambata-description for the Arusi] qui vont et viennent de Kambata au Sidama. Ces perles sont attachées au col, car on n'en met pas sur le vêtement des femmes qui est en cuir"<sup>515</sup>.

About the socio-political and economic relationships of the Kambata with the neighbouring peoples Habiso writes the following: "In this region between the Blatte and Omo (Gibe) rivers, which is called Kambata, the following peoples were living whose

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<sup>511</sup> Ibid, 67

<sup>512</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 68

<sup>513</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 68

<sup>514</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 68.

<sup>515</sup> A. d'Abbadie 1890, 186.

relationship was characterised by war and peace, marriage and trade: Kambata, Tembaro, Soro, Lemo, Shashshogo, Badawwachcho, Badogo, Mesmes, Haballo, Dubbamo, Donga, Lokka, Enner, Azernet-Berberre, Indegagn, etc..."<sup>516</sup>

The breeding of horses in Kambata, Dubbamo and Donga played an important role in the trade relationship with the Arsi even if in Kambata a permission of the King was indispensable for selling. The Arsi brought salt and ivory as price for the horses to Kambata. The Kambata not only consumed them but also merchandised them in Jimma, Wolayta, and Dawro.<sup>517</sup> In Kambata there were markets which were also important for the neighbouring Hadiya. Articles of food were the main trade goods. It was a kind of economic symbiosis: Products of *Wese* (*inset edulis*), barley, and other grains from the side of Kambata; and butter and meat from the Hadiya side.<sup>518</sup> "The Soro used *Dagoiyanna* [*Doyoganna*?] and *Danta* markets; the Lemo; *Tingira* and *Millisa*; Badawwachcho, *Taza* and *Millisa*. Goods exchange was done with the Alaba in *Qullito*..."<sup>519</sup>

In the face of the growing population density, the Hadiya nomads had to settle down in their territories. The nomadic life of the Hadiya abated, and the Hadiya gradually became farmers. Their relationship with the Kambata, who were experienced farmers, set a new course for their new agricultural life. Hence, Kambata became an attraction for the Hadiya. "The women of Kambata were highly desired by the Hadiya, so that the latter could learn agricultural activities from the women from Kambata. The Alaba used to say: the one, who has relatives in Kambata, will not hunger. Along with the agricultural technique the Hadiya learnt from Kambata the highly developed forms of neighbourhood aid organisation."<sup>520</sup> Concerning this point Bayissa says the following: "The Hadiya group that was predominantly pastorals gradually learnt cultivation from the Kambata."<sup>521</sup>

As a well-organised society the Kambata could offer good socio-political structures to the administrators of the central Ethiopian government after the south-expansion of the Emperor Minilik. That was why they usually chose the Kambata to make their political focal point. When Kambata became part of Arsi with Asella as the capital city, the administrative region consisted of Kambata, Hadiya, Alaba, Endegayn-Gurage and Azernet-Berberre-Gurage, from Omo to the Shalla Sea. The group was represented by the Kambata.<sup>522</sup> One of the main reasons for choosing it as their focal point was not only because the Kambata were well-organised, but it might have been also because it was a less revolutionary society in comparison with the Alaba, Arsi, Hadiya, etc. The reason could be that Kambata, as an agricultural society did not have a war mentality unlike most of the nomadic neighbours.

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<sup>516</sup> Habiso 1983, 122.

<sup>517</sup> Cf. Braukämper, op. cit., 81.

<sup>518</sup> Cf. ibid, 81.

<sup>519</sup> Ibid, 81.

<sup>520</sup> Cf. Braukämper 1983, 102.

<sup>521</sup> Regassa Bayissa 1985, 3.

<sup>522</sup> Cf. Braukämper, op. cit. 113.



#### 4.2.3 The Kambata civil war

The civil war of Kambata can be seen in two aspects:

- a) The intra-Oyyata conflict and
- b) The rebellion of the commoners against the Oyyata-regime

**Ad a:** The intra-Oyyata conflict was a struggle for power and economic advantages. The successor of King Anno according to Braukämper was Ketema.<sup>523</sup> After the King Ketema Dilabba, Hadallo, Gonjobbo, Waqo (around 1790-1810), Dagoyye (around 1810-1845) and Dilbato (around 1845-1892) subsequently were Kings of Kambata. Except Hadallo and Gonjobbo (descendants of Gebru whose brother was Ketema) the Kings were descendants of Ketema.<sup>524</sup> The facts that the descendants of Gebru lost their Kingly line to Waqo after the King Gonjobbo - a descendent of Ketema - had determined the inter-Oyyata struggle for power.

During the upheaval of the commoners against the ruling class there was already an intra-Oyyata conflict, which the commoners were hoping to profit from. After realising that this intra-Oyyata conflict would be very disadvantageous for the Oyyata, they gave up fighting against each other. When these rivalling Oyyata-groups made an alliance to fight the rebelling commoners (1885), the Gebru-Oyyata hoped to achieve better political and economic profits. But this hope was not fulfilled as they had expected. In dividing and assigning the commoners to the Oyyata the Gebru-Oyyata felt to have been discriminated against. Even the commoners themselves were in favour of the Ketema-Oyyata since the Gebru-Oyyata was too brutal in that war.<sup>525</sup> The politics of inheritance and of tax collection of Dilbato did not bring any advantages for the Gebru-Oyyata. Moreover, as we saw above, the latter had a painful remembrance of the lost Kingship line since they lost their political power to the Ketema-Oyyata.

Regarding the intra-Oyyata conflict Habiso says the following which is a bit confusing: "The Oyyata were divided into two antagonistic groups: descendants of Gebru and of Ketema. In this war many lost their lives. *The war ended while the King Dilbato and the descendants of Ketema were victorious...* In this intra-Oyyata war the non-Oyyata clans did not take part. However, slaves and captives and their chiefs were fighting for their respective party. The reason why the other clans did not take part in the war, as a third party was for fear that the Oyyata could abandon their internal war and become one party. Moreover, they hoped to attack the winner group right after the end of the war, before it had organised its military and political power. Since the Oyyata had realised this intrigue which could have threatened the Gebru-Oyyata as well as the Ketema-Oyyata, *they reconciled and made an alliance which promised to respect the rights and privileges of the whole Oyyata*".<sup>526</sup> Hence, either there must have been two different wars that ended differently; or, in the face of the threat from the side of the commoners, the second maintaining might be the right one.

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<sup>523</sup> But Habiso says that Balla had reigned between Anno and Ketema (cf. Habiso 1983, 102).

<sup>524</sup> Cf. Braukämper 1983, 45.

<sup>525</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 85.

<sup>526</sup> Cf. Habiso, *op.cit.*, 137f.

**Ad b:** The military and economic superiority of the Oyyata characterised the socio-political structure of its dynasty. Besides the Oyyata, all those clans from the north must have been relatively privileged. Additional to the economic and political discrimination and disadvantages, the non-Oyyata had to build ramparts, which were set up in the occupied areas of the Hadiya. This work must have been so unbearable that the non-Oyyata had to rebel against the politics of the King.<sup>527</sup> The recruited military forces from the neighbouring peoples and the noble clans had a relatively good political, economic and social position in comparison with the commoners. "While the noble clans won certain political significance, the commoners gradually became serf. The position of craftsmen became even lower. Since Kambata became economically, politically, and militarily significant and as a consequence could buy more slaves, the number of slaves increased considerably. In principle the noble clans could also own slaves but the majority was owned by the Oyyata."<sup>528</sup>

The privileges of the Oyyata at the cost of the rest, and as a consequence the socio-economic differences distinguish the centralised and organised political system of Kambata. The following points characterise the unjust political system and social-structure of the society:

1. "The tax burden was unbearable. Not paying in time had severe consequences, which brought heavy human tragedies.
2. The properties of the deceased were confiscated by the King. In case of immobile properties this was against the traditional rights of lineages, according to which the living are entitled to inherit the properties of the dead.
3. The Oyyata had appropriated for themselves the right to have sexual intercourse with any women of the commoners they liked. Since virginity had a very important social esteem during marriage, it was a big humiliation for the respective family.
4. Only the Oyyata, Gulba, and Amhara could build a house with double walls. In case a commoner had good material equipment, he risked that it would be confiscated.
5. The King ordered temporarily that it be forbidden to sell horses to the Soro and Wolayta so that their cavalry could not threaten the Kambata. Even if this measure was politically reasonable, it had significant economic disadvantages for the horse breeders, and as a consequence, articles like cotton became very expensive.
6. The commoners were not allowed to marry Hadiya-women, so that they could not gain potential military allies, which could have been very dangerous for the ruling class."<sup>529</sup>

Along with the land scarcity because of rapid population growth, life became more and more difficult for the commoners who were underprivileged anyhow. Their only alternative seemed to protest against the existing socio-political system. Many clans began to rebel. Therefore, King Anno solved the problem as follows: He consulted his councillors and friends concerning the problem. After he divided the land into kind of administrative regions.

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<sup>527</sup> Cf. Braukämper, op. cit., 71f.

<sup>528</sup> Ibid, op. cit., 72.

<sup>529</sup> Ibid, 73; cf. Habiso, op. cit., 131.

The representatives of each clan became administrators of the respective regions.<sup>530</sup> After the problem had been solved in this way, the people sang a covenant song for the King:

**The verse in Kambata language**

*"Womunne Annot"*<sup>531</sup>

*Maganunne Abba*<sup>532</sup>

*Tawunne Annita*<sup>533</sup>

*Yaunne Abbata*<sup>534</sup>

*Mosunne Ganshua*<sup>535</sup>

**Translation**

*Our King is Anno*

*Our God is Abba Sarechcho*

*Our duty is 'yes'*

*Our meeting is on Sundays*

*Our sickness is influenza.*

Dilbato was a classical King who organised his state not only in relation with the neighbouring states and peoples. In consolidating the political structure of the state his government assigned the different clans to differently stratified social, economic and political positions and classes. As the ruling class the Oyyata could consolidate their interest. Because of this socio-structural heterogeneity, the burdens of the socio-political system became more and more unbearable for the lower classes. "It was in the time of King Dilbato that the kingly clan, the Oyyata, consolidated itself and flourished. This was not only because it was the clan of the ruling class, but also the whole land was under the control of the Oyyata, because they were encouraged by the King to marry more than one woman, and this was forbidden for the other clans even in the time of King Dagoyye. This institution contributed considerably to the expansion of the Oyyata and the King's family. Hence, the Oyyata could possess the best parts of the land of Kambata. As a consequence the Oyyata imposed very oppressive structures on the other groups of Kambata. Then the society was divided into the landowners and without land. Oyyata, the King, the councillors of the King, and the generals possessed land, and the commoners became tenants. Since the land was under the full authority of the King, he was the only one who was empowered to give or forbid land to someone. Land, which could be inherited, was given only to the councillors (spiritual or political), generals, patriotic soldiers and Oyyata clans. Participating in war, paying yearly taxes, fulfilling any kind of obligations, and giving the due respect to the King was the duty of each individual. Socially, the clans were divided as follows: Oyyata (Kingly clan), Kontoma (commoners), Woqacha (blacksmith), Awado (tanners, drummers during the funeral ceremony) and Agizza (slaves)."<sup>536</sup>

There were even crasser situations. When a young Oyyata wanted to marry, he could choose the best part of the land regardless of who settled there before. That means the Kontoma who settled there had to leave the area to the Oyyata. They could go somewhere else and begin from zero, hoping that no other Oyyata would displace them again.<sup>537</sup>

<sup>530</sup> Cf. Habiso, op. cit., 104.

<sup>531</sup> Implies the full acceptance of the king by the commoners.

<sup>532</sup> He was a special consultant of the king and was outfitted with supernatural power.

<sup>533</sup> It means that total faithfulness to the king was promised.

<sup>534</sup> It seems the meetings took place on sundays.

<sup>535</sup> There are two versions of interpretation of this verse: According to the first version, the people might have meant that if they were utterly loyal to the king except some light sicknesses like influenza, they would never have dangerous disease (Cf. Habiso, op. cit. 104). The second version which seems more plausible to me means: if we believe in Abba Sarechcho and are loyal to the king, any kind of disease is as insignificant as influenza.

<sup>536</sup> Ibid, 129f.

<sup>537</sup> Cf. ibid, 135.

In addition to the economic disadvantages and political and social discriminations the abolition of the King Anno's reform - for whatever reason - aggravated the oppression of the Kontoma. In the face of this, the struggle for power between the Oyyata was seen as political dawn by the Kontoma. After this hope had vanished (see above!), the Kontoma realised that they did not have any other alternative than to fight for their rights. With following slogans they expressed their protest:

*"Down with the tax and King!*

*Down with the confiscation and the tax for the Oyyata!"*

In the face of the Kambata civil war, the diplomatic relation with the neighbouring peoples became a very useful political achievement of the regime of Dilbato. To fight against the Kontoma's upheaval, Dilbato received military support from the Badawachcho, Shashshogo, Soro (Dubamo), Sidamo and Arsi.<sup>538</sup> This war took place at Fandide; many from both sides lost their lives. Even when the war ended with the victory of the Oyyata, and the Kontoma surrendered, the political unrest did not end. The Kontoma continued to revolt. Dilbato and the councillors had to think of other better political solutions. Hence, Dilbato promulgated new decrees with political reforms, which had to ameliorate the social, political and economic situation of the Kontoma and create an enduring peace in the state.<sup>539</sup> "A series of internal disputes took place, and because the Oyyata were able to maintain their position of dominance, a two class society was established. Even today all non-Oyyata members of the Kambata society are referred to as Kontoma. As noted, Woma Dilbato changed the structure of the Kambata system by actually distributing land to members of the Kontoma who did not have any independent rights prior to his expansion of the Kambata lands in the mid-nineteenth century."<sup>540</sup>

However, in the course of time, many Oyyata were not happy with the reform. They began to violate the peace accord and the rights of the commoners. The latter began to flee to Lemo, Soro, Shashshogo, Badawachcho, Wolayta, Arsi, Alaba, Tembaro, etc. When these Kambata learnt that Dilbato became old, and the political situation became unstable, they decided to come back to Kambata and fight for their rights. Moreover, the resurgence of the struggle for power between the Oyyata seemed to set a new course for their political movement.<sup>541</sup> However, since the south expansion of the Ethiopian Empire brought a new phase in the history of Kambata, this dream could not be realised. That means, after the Kontoma learnt that the ruling class came into a close relationship with the central Ethiopian government, and realised that the Oyyata possessed modern weapons, they immediately abandoned their military operation. Finally, the state Kambata was annexed as a part of Ethiopian Empire.

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<sup>538</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 139.

<sup>539</sup> Concerning the reform politics see 4.2 above.

<sup>540</sup> N. Singer 1977, 5.

<sup>541</sup> Cf. Habiso, *op. cit.*, 142.

#### 4.2.4 The impacts of the south-expansion of the Ethiopian Empire on Kambata

One of the decisive points for the successful annexation of the southern peoples to the Ethiopian Empire was that Minilik was King of Shewa.<sup>542</sup> He knew the region between Blatte and Omo (in our case of Kambata) very well; he knew which peoples lived where, how strong their political power was, and what kind of socio-political system they had. The politics of expansion began already when he, as King of Shewa, annexed the whole Gurage-areas to the central Ethiopian Empire between 1875 and 1879.

As means for a successful expansion the central government conceived the following political and practical measures as integral factors:

1. "bringing the independent regional political systems and their war-generals under the control of the central government,
2. a national military force,
3. centralised power of the Emperor,
4. keeping the historical Ethiopian coasts free from the influence of the foreign powers,
5. abolition of the slave trade,
6. creating a sovereign relationship with the European governments, and
7. expansion of communication, trade, education, science, technology and industry works and developments."<sup>543</sup>

One of the important points for the annexation of Kambata to the central Ethiopian Empire was, until the invasion of Ahmed-Gragh Kambata had political, cultural, and religious links with northern Ethiopia. Because of these links the Ethiopian government saw this region as a part of its empire, with which it believed to restore the interrupted political, cultural and religious relationships. Moreover, because of that it believed to use Kambata as a strategic position to occupy the region (the neighbouring peoples). In addition to this, Kambata as an agriculturally well organised society contributed to the facilitation of the occupation by providing food reserve for the administrators and soldiers from the north.

In the annexation campaign Kambata did not surrender peacefully. Time and again there were some resistance fight.<sup>544</sup> After the Kambata and Hadiya were defeated and became part of the central government, they did not cease to fight against the policy of this government concerning taxes and land tenure. The transition period after the era of the Minilik government set a new course for the fights of Kambata for their rights against the administration of the central government. Since the officials and administrators were struggling for power in the central government, the Kambata could restore their land. The other opportunity for the Kambata to gain back their land was the occupation of Ethiopia by the Italians (1936), through which the central government lost its political influence.<sup>545</sup>

Even if the final and utter occupation of Kambata took place in 1892, the expansionist politics began about 1879 when *dejazmach Wolde Ashshagre* continued the subjugation

<sup>542</sup> However, the expansion-politics was not begun by Minilik. Even before him, King Tewodros II (1855-68), the predecessor of King Yohannes IV (1868-1889), had the vision of expanding the territory of his country. (Cf. Dilebo 1982, 263ff).

<sup>543</sup> Ibid, 261f.

<sup>544</sup> Cf. Braukämper, op. cit., 85.

<sup>545</sup> Cf. L. G. Dilebo 1975, 97. (The original text is in Amharic)

campaign to the south including Kambata. And then *ras Gobena Dachche* (1821-1889) became administrator of southwest Ethiopia. A kind of plundering expedition passed through between the mounts Hambarrichcho and Shonkolla. The occupation campaign was intensified when the troops of *dejjach Wolde Ashshagre* marched to Kambata from Gurage and subjugated the Hadiya-groups such as Lemo, Shashshogo and Soro, and Tembaro.<sup>546</sup>

To beat the troops of the central government who were militarily highly qualified was almost impossible for the Kambata who were fighting only with their spears. In the face of this threatening situation, King Dilbato had to negotiate with the Amhara. Even if the negotiation was relatively successful, a conspiracy of some Kambata against the occupation of the Ethiopian Empire brought disastrous consequences to the Kambata Kingdom in 1892.<sup>547</sup> *Dejjach Wolde Ashshagre* who led his troops to mount Dato in 1891 became the governor of Kambata.<sup>548</sup> *Dejjach Wodajjo*, son of Gobena Dachche, continued the subjugation. For the stabilisation and control of Kambata *Dejjach Tesemma Darge* was nominated. He wanted to subdue the Wolayta, south of Kambata, too. But he was defeated in this campaign. This defeat of 1891 seemed for many Kambata and Badawachcho to be the best time for attacking the conquerors from the north. However, because of the intra-Oyyata struggle for power (rivalry between the Gebru-Oyyata and Ketema-Oyyata) the conspiracy proved abortive. When *ras Mengesha of Arsi* was informed of the conspiracy by a member of the Gebru-Oyyata, the matter found its dramatic end and King Dilbato, his highest priest and relatives were brutally executed. "The intervention (military operation) of *ras Mengesha* put an end to the existence of Kambata as an independent state. With the execution of Dilbato in 1892 the Kingdom of 300 years of Oyyata-dynasty was ended. The Amhara nominated one of his sons, Agago, as *balabbat*<sup>549</sup> by which the continuity of the old government forms seemed to be guaranteed. The *balabbat* actually functioned only as receiver of commands of the new political chiefs and as a mediator between them and the local people."<sup>550</sup>

The defeat of the Kambata was worsened by epidemics and hunger catastrophes between 1890 and 1892. The military power of the people was considerably weakened. Even if the soldiers and administrators of the central government were also affected by this calamity, the plundering and tributes from the occupied territories helped them to continue their military operation.<sup>551</sup>

This long history of tension ended with the defeat of the southern peoples, and the expansion brought not only political, but also economic disadvantages for them. "It took *ras*

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<sup>546</sup> Cf. Braukämper, op. cit., 84.

<sup>547</sup> Cf. ibid., 84.

<sup>548</sup> Cf. ibid., 84.

<sup>549</sup> *Balabbat* was a chief of the government from the side of the local people. He was an aristocrat and landlord who worked as a mediating politician between the *gebbar* (tributary) (this terminology will be explained later on in details), and the administrators and the soldiers of the emperor. Besides the *balabbat*, there were also other organs (with considerably lower ranks) who were working as executives of the policy of the central government:

1. *Senga-Qoro*, who were being elected with agreement between the *balabbat* and the local people. They were in charge of 'Gochchu', administrative region of the political era of King Dilbato;
2. *Chiqa-Shum*, who were being elected with agreement between the *Senga-Qoro* and the local people. They were in charge of districts;
3. *Murrichchu*, who were being elected with agreement between *Chiqa-Shum* and the local people. They were in charge of sub districts (villages). (Cf. Gejiba, op. cit., 8).

<sup>550</sup> Braukämper, op. cit., 86.

<sup>551</sup> Cf. ibid., 87.

*Gobena, ras Darge, ras Mekonnen, ras Wolde, dejjazmach Wodajjo Gobena, dejjazmach Bashah Aboye, fitawrari Habtegiorgis* and the rest (in total 12), who were some of the best generals of *King Minilik*, 17 years of war (1875-1892) to make the peoples between Awash and Gibe (Omo) rivers tributary. As this was also being done in the other occupied regions, in the middle and southern Ethiopia Mareqo, Gurage, Alaba, Kambata and Hadiya peoples and states were defeated, their land was confiscated by the central government, and they became *gebbar* (tributary).<sup>552</sup>

The occupied territory became property of the empire, and the administrators and soldiers enjoyed considerable economic and political privileges. This occupation brought a new phase in the political, economic and social history of Kambata. The *balabbat*,<sup>553</sup> who descended from the Ketema-Oyyata line together with the administrators and soldiers from the north, belonged to the economically, politically and socially highest class. Together with the loss of the Oyyata-dynasty the Oyyata lost their absolute political, economic and social privileges. However, even as *gebbar* the Oyyata owned the largest and fertile pieces of land. Moreover, the commoners had to pay tribute to the representatives of the *balabbat* in the administrative sub-regions. Macro-sociologically, the administrators, soldiers and the *balabbat* on the one hand, and the *gebbar* (practically all clans of the society) on the other hand built the social stratum.<sup>554</sup> "The conquest brought about new production relations to the area which the conquering *neftegnas* [soldiers of the conquering Ethiopian empire] became economically and politically dominant to exploit the labour and resources of the region. In the newly emerging *neftegna-gebbar* system the soldiers were granted land, and a certain number of the indigenous people were assigned to them as *gebbars*. The Kambata and Hadiya communal land was gradually expropriated and distributed to officers and soldiers for the service."<sup>555</sup> In the face of this stratification, the *balabbat* must have lived in the following decision dilemma, according to Braukämper: on the one hand, the privileges of the *balabbat* depended on loyalty to the administrators.<sup>556</sup> And on the other hand, they did not want to betray their own people, which was a sign of solidarity and compassion with the members of their society.<sup>557</sup>

Concerning the duties of the *gebbar*, Braukämper writes as follows: "The soldiers of the central government owned different numbers of *gebbar* (together with their family), depending on the rank of the soldiers. The *gebbar* had to pay the following tributes: 4 Maria-Theresia-Taler in cash per year; during the feasts of the Holy Cross, Easter and Christmas two *temun* (silver coins in value of one-sixteenth of the Taler) for each feast; five to seven litres of grain (*barley, tef*); five litres of *Geshsha* (*rhamnus prinoides*), which is used as an ingredient

<sup>552</sup> Dilebo 1982, 95.

<sup>553</sup> From the end of the Oyyata-dynasty until the end of the Salomonic dynasty (Ethiopian empire) the following were the *balabbats* of Kambata: Agago (1892-1895), Molliso (1895-1919), Bargano (1919-1946) and Anniyye (1946-1974). The data information of the years are  $\pm 1$ . Since it is not easy to find out the exact month of their nomination, death or quit, and because the Ethiopian new year is in September, the deviation of the Ethiopian from the European calendar is seven or eight years (behind the European one!).

<sup>554</sup> Cf. Eike Haberland 1979, 11.

<sup>555</sup> Regassa Bayissa 1987, 6

<sup>556</sup> "On the other hand it was allowed the *balabbat* to choose the best part of the land; and this piece was called 'exquisite for *balabbat*'. This was given them so that they could collect taxes from the *gebbar* in time. It would have been almost impossible for the administrators of the central government to govern the *gebbar* and collect taxes from them without this help of the *balabbat*. Since this service was rewarded with considerable amount of land, they allied with the administrators from north." (Habiso, op. cit., 211) (The original text is in Amharic!)

<sup>557</sup> Cf. Braukämper, op. cit., 92.

in preparing a local drink; a bundle of firewood. They had to help building a house; they had to cut grass for their horses. In case of not paying in time, they were obliged to pay the double of the grain and were put in chains at Hosanna."<sup>558</sup>

The discriminating social differentiation could be visualised, for example, as certain ways of building a house were reserved only for the administrators and soldiers. The autochthonous Kambata were not allowed to build a rectangular house. They had to construct their houses in the traditional circular form.<sup>559</sup>

In the face of the military consolidation and building of a strong Ethiopia, the central government had to think over how to finance this big state project. Hence, the south expansion was also in the hope of maximising the economic potential of the country. Land and human capital (of the *gebbar* and tenants) were considered as source of income for the central government.<sup>560</sup> As Dilebo says, these two factors were basic and indispensable elements for the policy of Minilik.<sup>561</sup> "The *gabbar* [*gebbar*] had to give one-tenth of their produce to the state. From the remaining nine-tenth they had to pay their taxes to the *naftanna* [*neftegna*]."<sup>562</sup>

The importance of this economic and political system for the central government was, besides the income for the central government it alleviated the payment of the government for the administrators and soldiers. " Since these administrators and soldiers did not have any fee from the government, the creation of this *gebbar* system was the best solution for the government. Instead of governmental payment they were bestowed rights of administration and collecting taxes."<sup>563</sup>

In many traditional societies, whose religious systems were characterised by animistic religious beliefs, the introduction of new political systems with a different religious background brought a religious and cultural crisis. Even if in Kambata Christianity was already present, it was not a pure Christian belief. It was rather a syncretistic religion with more animistic elements.<sup>564</sup> For example, land did not only have a material-economic significance, but also a religious one. It was one of the media through which the members of the society communicated with their ancestors. After the south-expansion of the Ethiopian Empire, they could not own the land of their ancestors any more, and the intergeneration communication through their land broke down. "The south Ethiopian *gebbar* was obliged to give up the land of his ancestors to the government and its administrators; he was forced to pay tribute for the land of his own forefathers."<sup>565</sup>

Along with the territorial expansion (with political and economic intentions), the Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity also was spread in the south. Those who converted to the Ethiopian Orthodox Church had many advantages.<sup>566</sup> Priests and church administrators who

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<sup>558</sup> Ibid, 93; Cf. Habiso, op. cit., 176, 205.

<sup>559</sup> Cf. Braukämper, op. cit., 99).

<sup>560</sup> Cf. Dilebo 1982, 262.

<sup>561</sup> Cf. Dilebo 1983, 199.

<sup>562</sup> Braukämper, op. cit., 96.

<sup>563</sup> Habiso, op. cit., 205.

<sup>564</sup> Cf. Braukämper, op. cit., 102.

<sup>565</sup> Habiso, op. cit., 210.

<sup>566</sup> Cf. Braukämper, op. cit., 93.



came almost entirely from the north and middle Ethiopia enjoyed considerable privileges. However this Christianity was not welcome in Kambata because of its political links. Instead, the Catholics and Protestants were successful, may be because they set up health centres and schools.<sup>567</sup> Around the end of the 20th century the Protestants and Catholics intensified their missionary activities.<sup>568</sup>

Ethiopian Orthodox Churches were built when Dilbato was still alive. The first administrators set up the following churches in different places: Angechcha-Mariam, Qata-Michael, Dato-Medhane-Alem, Donga-Michael and Tembaro-Mariam.<sup>569</sup> Another advantage for the set up of the Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity was that it did not abolish any cultural traditions unlike the Catholics and the Protestants, although the Catholics seemed not to have been as rigorous as the Protestants. "The taking over of the monophysite-orthodox Christianity was not considered as breaking the tradition, since it was trying to integrate the pagan conceptions with its religious practices. Moreover, polygyny was not forbidden)."<sup>570</sup> Kambata is a predominantly Christian society, with an insignificant number of Moslems.

In spite of the christianisation the immaterial culture of the Kambata has maintained its own peculiar profiles. That means, as we will see in the following chapter, the cultural institutions, norms, values, ideas, etc. are not substantially influenced or changed by the christianisation process. This peculiarity of the immaterial culture in spite of the cultural and political south expansion of the Ethiopian empire has saved the material culture of the Kambata, even though one cannot deny that the Kambata have taken over some elements of material culture from the Amhara, Wloayta and Gurage such as agricultural techniques, house furniture and clothing.

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<sup>567</sup> Cf. Dilebo 1975, 98.

<sup>568</sup> Cf. Braukämper, op. cit., 103.

<sup>569</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 103.

<sup>570</sup> *Ibid*, 103

## Chapter 5: The socio-economic aspect

Material culture is a set of various elements of a culture inherited from previous generations such as tools, instruments of measurement and all products of human work.<sup>571</sup> The material culture is not only the product of immaterial culture; on its turn it also influences the immaterial culture. The level of development determines the way of thinking, the collective knowledge, the value system, norms and institutions. Material culture and economic development can usually be seen in this context.

### 5.1 Material culture

#### 5.1.1 Clothing and Ornaments

Hide played a very important role in the material culture of the Kambata. Before the Kambata took over the culture of woollen clothing from the Wolayta and Amhara, they were covering themselves with leather. Especially, the women were dressed in leather ornamented with pearls.<sup>572</sup> Usually, the genital parts were covered with leather, which was hanged around the hip with a cord. The upper part of the body of the Kambata women was not always covered. Whereas the young boys were going around naked, the young girls were covering their genital parts.<sup>573</sup> Working adult men too were covering only their genital parts. Shoes were not known.

The Wolayta as weavers played a significant role in the introduction of the culture of woollen clothing into Kambata. At the beginning, the woollen material was allowed as dress, especially to the socially higher classes. Moreover, since they could afford to buy this woollen material, because they were socially and economically privileged, it was a sign of socio-economic differentiation. When in course of time this material began to expand, men were the ones who wore it while women were still wearing leather. The processing of this leather was the profession of castes. We will see the social position and economic significance of this social group in details later on.

Nowadays, no body wears leather material. Only as bed sheet leather of cows and oxen still plays a significant role. Woollen, synthetic material, etc. now prevail in the region. But its production is not part and achievement of the Kambata culture. The traditional Ethiopian dress (especially for women) and European fashion has superseded the leather culture of the Kambata.

Like in many southern cultures of Ethiopia, mussel shell was playing a very important role to make ornaments. Different ornaments such as necklaces, bracelets, earrings, etc. were made of steel, cooper, leather, special grass and clay. Some of the ornaments usually made by children between the beginning of the Ethiopian New Year (around the 11th of European September) and the Masala feast have cultural significance and seasonal implication. The children make different kinds of bracelets out of a thin plaiting reed, which blossoms in this period of the year. These ornaments imply the approaching feast of Masala, which is

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<sup>571</sup> Cf. Reinhold et al. 1997, 375.

<sup>572</sup> Cf. Braukämper, op.cit., 80.

<sup>573</sup> Cf. Helmut Straube 1963, 21.

celebrated on the 27th of September.<sup>574</sup> The bracelets will be burnt on the eve of the feast. While burning the bracelets, the children recite some verses, which express the beginning of the New Year, which brings new hope for prosperity. That means, the burning of bracelets made of this thin plaiting reed of the preceding year signifies new life as a new creation and detachment from the past. They also make some ornaments out of clay that has a ring shape. They tie them around their necks with a cord. Especially, young girls were decorating themselves with different simple pearls, using them as necklace. There were, of course, many ornaments, which were used by the Kambata; but since my focus is on the socio-cultural structure, I do not want to go into the details of this branch of the material culture.

More or less up until the beginning of puberty the hair of the children is shaved by their parents. On the front part of the head of the boys they leave a bit of hair which usually differentiates boys from girls. Otherwise, adults shave their hair, only when a member of the family dies. On the arms of the elderly men in Kambata one can see a lot of tattooing. It was believed that one becomes strong, if he is tattooed. They tattoo with a kindled rag. This burning piece of cloth will be put on the arms of the person who is to be tattooed. Nowadays, this has almost completely been abandoned. In some parts of Kambata there are also women who are tattooed on their cheeks. Besides they scratch their cheek with thorny branches of some plants or with their fingernails when an influential relative or an aged member of the family dies. Women in most parts of Kambata usually do not have tattooing. However, this kind of tattooing cannot be counted as part of the material culture; it has rather symbolic culture significance.

### **5.1.2 Household objects, weapons and music instruments<sup>575</sup>**

This part of material culture shows the level of the technical development of a society. Up until the expansion of the Ethiopian Empire to the south the Kambata had household objects, weapons and music instruments which were made by the Kambata themselves, even if they exchanged their products and imported some articles through trade relationship with the neighbouring peoples.

Articles such as basket trays out of which several members of the community eat at the same time; different types of baskets to measure grain or to eat roasted grain during the coffee time, or small baskets which were used to milk cows, huge and flat fidgets, sieves, a kind of hollow grain measure but in its middle with a sieve (used usually to make local beer), etc. are the most important objects that can only be made by women during their free time after circumcision or wedding. They are made up of thin plaiting reeds. These are some of the items, which can be woven by every Kambata woman independent of her social class. Teshome Tadesse writes how the Wolayta make different baskets out of the thin plaiting reed, which is exactly the same as in Kambata, as follows: "The women... sew baskets from special grasses [*duffa (eleusine jaegeri)*]. The central coil consisting of a number of long grass stalks

<sup>574</sup> This feast has a christian origin but it in the meantime it has got a syncretistic feature.

<sup>575</sup> Since material culture is a huge area, I would like to mention only some of the important articles which were and are used in and made by the Kambata. Material culture needs its own specific studies if one wants to present its detailed components as part of cultural sociology. My aim is to show the technical development of Kambata, without going to deeply analyse the manufacturing process, since the focus of my paper is to discuss how socio-cultural structures determine economic development.

(the thickness varying according to the size of the basket) is worked round while being sewn with the stripes of grass. With each turnover the grass stripe is made to pass through a hole pierced with an owl through the coil next below binding the two coils together... If desired the baskets are decorated with coloured grass..."<sup>576</sup> Otherwise, most of the household objects are made by castes. Interestingly and paradoxically, these castes are considered as unclean; but the articles made by them are used by the Kambata irrespective of their social status.

Big wood-mortars (used to pound grains, roasted coffee, etc.), small wood-mortars (used to pound spices and pepper), *gonga* (a plane board on which the inset-product will be cut), grinding slabs (used to grind grain), wood-tubs which are used to make local beer, benches and different kinds of traditional stools were made by the commoners as well. However, for those clans who could own slaves, the latter were making these objects. The benches were made of a single piece of stem whose upper side was just flattened by a hatchet. The traditional stools with three feet were also made of a single piece of stem, but the part on which one sits is made a bit hollow. This method of making benches and stools has almost completely been abandoned because of the rare availability of the suitable trees, which were eradicated because of the over-population. In former times beds and benches were also made of clay. But nowadays beds are either made of timber or stems of young Eucalyptus trees. Wooden neck-supports for the sleeping time also belong to the material culture of the Kambata. Doors, windows, benches, chairs and tables out of timber have become common nowadays. In former times doors were made of bamboo which was split and woven.

These benches out of clay were immobile and were set up around the pillar of the house and the fireplace. On the benches and stools one used to lay hides. Material, which is woven out of dried inset-leaves, is still used as mats. The mats are around 4 meters wide and 1,80 meters long. There are always special mats of the highest quality for guests.

Nowadays - except pottery, which is still exclusively done by the *Fuga* - carpentry and black smith are being carried out by all social classes of the Kambata. In earlier times this type of work was done only by the socially despised groups: potters, tanners, carpenters and blacksmiths.<sup>577</sup> However, even today carpenters and blacksmith are not well esteemed, and potters and tanners are still socially discriminated. The work and social position of smiths, tanners and potters is more or less similar in different societies of southern Ethiopia. "The ...[were] making knives, swords, spear-blades and ploughshares... The leather workers preserved and tanned ox hides, and other animal skins successfully and manufactured bedding-mats, shields scabbards, useful articles of horn as well as saddles and halters for the mules and horses... Despite the existence of craftsmen among the Wolayta the crafts industry was not well developed and expanded. This owed a great deal to the condition of trade which did not induce these activities and the negative attitudes of society towards the craftsmen, particularly towards potters, iron smiths and tanners".<sup>578</sup> Spears, swords, knives, machetes, hatchets, axes, sickles, and big blades to cut the inset-product, etc. were some of the important products of the smiths<sup>579</sup>.

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<sup>576</sup> Teshome Tadesse 1984, 37.

<sup>577</sup> Cf. Habiso, op. cit., 130.

<sup>578</sup> Teshome Tadesse, op. cit., 23f.

<sup>579</sup> Cf. Schulz-Weidner 1963, 256.

While slaughtering, the slaughterers skin the animals very carefully so that the hides do not have any cuts, if they are assigned for smith purpose. Before being used by the smith, the hide has to be processed by tanners and worked in a one-side-closed tube form. A smith needs two of these hides. The upper part of both hides is bound together with a piece of stick. These sticks help to pull the hides and press them back alternately. There are plugs, which stick and hold the tube-hides fast. Two cow-horns with small iron tubes on their lower tip are bound to the lower part of the two hides. The horns with their iron tip transport air to the fire. The horns are protected from fire and heat by stones, which practically cover them. The metals, which are to be tooled, lie in the fire. The coal is manufactured from a special tree. During the processing the metal which lies in the fire will be formed according to the respective equipment.<sup>580</sup>

The products of the potters are one of the most important household articles. These objects are still made exclusively by *Fuga* clans, which are castes. While men of the *Fuga* work as tanners, women are the ones who make pots, griddles, water jars, clay amphora (very large pitcher used in making local beer), cupolas, *meteqenna* (three earthen-ware tripods on which the cooking pot rests above the fire), earthen-ware plates with different sizes and depths, kettles, coffee pots, special equipment to drink water, milk and local beer (in Kambata it is called *tenquta*), etc.

Since clay cannot be found everywhere, the potters have to look for suitable clay. They settle mostly there where clay exists abundantly. The process of pottery is shortly as follows: They collect clean clay, process it and form it according to the desired equipment. The formed articles will be let to dry for some days. After they are dry, they will be put in a pit where a special dry grass (*duffa – eleusire jaegeri*) is laid out. A big amount of pieces of wood is laid on the grass; the articles are then put over it. On these objects which are to be hardened while they are burnt, they again lay grass and branches of wood which usually does not burn off immediately; i.e. the burning process requires more smoke than flames. This process of burning takes several hours.<sup>581</sup>

This is a very tiresome work. Nowadays it is becoming less profitable. In the face of the modern equipment made of plastic and zinc, the traditional products of the *Fuga* are not appreciated among the Kambata any more, since they are brittle. Moreover, the influx of industrial products from abroad is inciting in the spirit of the people disdain of the own culture and its economic achievements. Additionally, the lack of *duffa (eleusire jaegeri)* and suitable tree branches is hampering the activities of the *Fuga*, since because of the overpopulation, the area where the *duffa* grows is completely cultivated and the natural forest eradicated.

Since the members of these clans were without land and despised by the rest of the Kambata, their only income source were tannery and pottery, and eventually carpentry and smithery. In former times as being property of non-*Fuga* clans the *Fuga* could live on the land which was possessed by the non-*Fuga*, however, without having any right to the land where they settled.<sup>582</sup> After the communist revolution they also own land, even if they possess substantially little in comparison to the other Kambata. Moreover, since their physical

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<sup>580</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 256.

<sup>581</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 257.

<sup>582</sup> Cf. Eike Haberland 1979, 18f.

appearance is clearly different from the rest of the Kambata (with more Negroid features), they are despised and discriminated as socially and humanly inferior.

The Kambata as an agricultural society depend almost entirely on what the farmers cultivate. Milk and milk-products, inset-product, different types of grain, vegetables and fruits are the main food articles<sup>583</sup>. Usually, meat is not eaten in Kambata very often. For many people it is very expensive. Since the *Fuga* also eat the flesh of non-edible animals died from natural causes, they are the ones who eat meat very often in Kambata. Therefore, if somebody likes meat very much he is despised as *Fuga*. Hence, meat is eaten in many Kambata families approximately twice in a month.

There are many alcoholic local drinks, which are made of a mixture of different grains; barley is a decisive component of them. The drinks in Kambata are called: *selu*, *sha'meta*, *gesha*, *haraqita*, etc.

Tanners play an important role in producing war shields and music instruments out of cows/oxen skin. The shields normally have an oval shape. Drums are widely spread and are a characteristic music instrument in the cultural life of the Kambata. There are two types of drums for two different occasions. The smaller cylindrical drums, which are made from clay, are covered with leather on the both sides. They are used:

- during the traditional dances and songs of the circumcision feast,
- during the traditional dances and songs of wedding feast,
- around the beginning of October, the time in which girls collect the thin plaiting reed to weave different household articles; the boys go there to dance and sing and to look for their future brides,
- when the young people go back home from the periodic markets in the evening.

There are also other huge drums. They are beaten only when a member of a prominent clan dies. They are beaten until the burial ceremony is over. Only the members of the *Fuga* clans are the ones who beat them, while the close relatives of the deceased dance around the drums and in front of the participants of the burial ceremony. These drums are not cylindrical. They have a kind of "V" shape; however, like the upper part neither the lower part is totally closed but covered with leather. Both sides are covered by cow skin. Whereas the cylindrical small drums are made of clay, the big ones are out of hollowed out tree stems especially *Cordia abyssinica*.

In former times the Kambata must have used trumpets made of big cow horns or special wood. But nowadays iron sheet trumpets are used all over Kambata. The following are some of the important occasions to blow trumpets:

- to announce the death of somebody,
- to announce that those, who go to the burial ceremony of somebody who died in a distant place, should prepare themselves,
- to announce political meetings,
- to announce the departure of a group of people who go to bring the bride,
- to announce the arrival of the bride, i.e. to go out and welcome the bride.

The other music instruments, which are common in Kambata, are the flute and an Ethiopian lyre with six strings. The former is usually played by shepherds. The lyre is played

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<sup>583</sup> The different agricultural products will be shown under section 5.1.4 below.

by the circumcised and brides during the time in which they are not supposed to do anything. The circumcised are exempt from work at least for two months, whereas brides abide in their nuptial house for around three months. The female circumcised and brides weave different articles out of thin plaiting reed in this period. During this time they hide themselves from publicity, especially from people with "evil eyes".

### 5.1.3 House construction and settlement

Kambata as a static agricultural society has a profound experience and know-how of traditional house construction. Consequently, Kambata is one of the regions in Ethiopia, which have beautiful traditional houses. The quality, number and bigness of the houses depend on the economic capacity of the family. The average radius of many Kambata houses of common people is around 5 meters. About 6 months before the beginning of the construction, the ground will be levelled. On the border of and around the circle with an average radius of 5 m a pit will be dug which is around 30 cm wide and 70 cm deep. Around 3-4 m long post will be erected in the pit very closely to one another. Posts from strong and termite resistant trees such as *juniperus procera*, *olea hochstetteri*, etc. are preferred. But since nowadays the mentioned trees are rarely available, many use *eucalyptus*. Transverse the posts Eucalyptus splits are bound to the posts with a dried branch of *inset-edulis*, with a dried bark of Eucalyptus or with a shoot of a creeping plant, in order to stabilise the posts.

After constructing the wall, a pillar will be erected exactly in the middle of the circle. The pillar is almost three times taller than the posts. A preferred tree for pillars is *juniperus procera*. Usually, milk or butter is poured on the pillar, which expresses the family's hope for prosperity and fertility as long as they live in this house. This is a kind of sacrifice for the spirits of the deceased ancestors who play a decisive role in guaranteeing the welfare of the family. Then a roof will be constructed between the top of the wall and the top of the pillar. However, about one meter of the upper part of the pillar has to stand out of the roof. The roof is constructed from cane, bamboo, young *eucalyptus*, etc., which are bound together transversely. The roof is covered by a special grass locally called *duffa* (*eleusine jaegeri*). Especially, the inner part of the wall is smeared carefully with clay.

In former times, only the houses of the higher social classes had two doors and a pillar of *juniperus procera*. It was a sign of differentiation between the kingly and the noble clans on the one hand, and the commoners and the rest on the other hand. In earlier times many houses did not have windows. Nowadays almost every house has them.

The inner part of the house is divided as follows: Either on the right or left side of the door along the wall the domestic animals are tied up to some posts that demarcate the stable. On the opposite side there are beds. Near the beds saddles and shields are hung. Sticks, lances and swords too are not far from the beds. Kitchen and equipment for cooking are fit up to the opposite of the main entrance. Above the stable and the kitchen there is a kind of upper room which is constructed to deposit some of the house equipment and grain. Chicken-roosts also belong to this upper room. From the pillar to the wall opposite of the stable there is another wall which hides the kitchen, and behind which usually children and women sit. Next to the door either left or right, or both left and right, there is a granary made of bamboo, which is smeared by cow-pat. The granary is set up either on ashes or branches of *juniperus procera*,

which hinder termites from destroying the grain. The granary can also be set up on a piece of timber, which lies on three, or four small posts (around 30 cm long).

The settlements of Kambata are very suitable for its agricultural life. There is no closed village system in Kambata. There are some reasons why the houses are built scattered. First, a practical reason: In case fire breaks out, it can be dangerous, if the houses are too near to each other, because the houses are built of wood and grass only. Second, a socio-religious reason: The living have the obligation to protect the piece of land, which belonged to the deceased ancestors. These ancestors are invisible protectors and owners. The living generation has to eternalise the *name*<sup>584</sup> of its ancestors. In the culture of the Kambata the *fundament* of a house and the piece of land, which the lineage's founder had owned, have the same word: *shohut*. The property of the lineage founder is transubstantiated. It is not only something material, it has also a strong spiritual significance which legitimises his omnipresent and omnipotent authority. This spirit takes care of the living, guarantees them prosperity and fertility and protects them from enemies and all evil. The *shoho* is protected by this spirit, and the spirit is called *ayyana*. The living swear on this *ayyana* when they make an oath. Slaves, potters, black smiths, etc. too swear on the *ayyana* of the lineage founder of the Kingly or noble clan or on the *ayyana* of the respective influential lineage on whose territory they live. While the settlers build houses in a scattered settlement system, they can control the land easily and keep the influential area of the *ayyana's* presence. Third, a familiar reason: Since in former times men of some clans could marry more than one woman, hostility between the wives and children of the different wives was very usual. The husbands, therefore, tried to keep away one family from the other. Fourth, a political reason: In case of enemies the close relatives had to ally in order to protect their common economic and social interest while defending their common political territory<sup>585</sup>. The advantage of scattered settlements is to occupy as big piece of land as possible, in order to prevent the temptation of the rivals to compete for the not yet occupied piece of land. Fifth, an economic reason: The agricultural system of Kambata needs a scattered settlement system. That means, each family needs its own *inset*, which is usually planted near the houses, so that it is easier to foster it. This is one of the main reasons why villagisation policy of the communist regime has failed.

The study of Haberland (Haberland 1979) on the agricultural life of the Hadiya presents a similar settlement and agricultural system of the society of Kambata. Even if the resettlement program of the Ethiopian government in 1984 was not bad in the face of the over-population of Kambata, it contradicts the traditional settlement system of the Kambata. This is also part of the impact of social and cultural structures on the activities of economic development. The resettlement program of the government will be discussed in the section of government developmental activities (see section 7.2 below).

The settlements are usually on the top of small hills, which are usually arable. *Inset-edulis*, coffee, maize, pumpkin, tobacco, onion, garlic, spices, cabbage, pepper, etc. are very often planted near the houses. Especially, *inset-edulis* is planted exclusively in the vicinity of the settlement. Since it needs ash and manure of the domestic animals, it is practical that this plant should grow not far from the house so that it is not too laborious for those who dispose

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<sup>584</sup> "Name" has here a religious significance. It consists of all qualities of a person, fame, esteem, wealth, social position and class, etc.

<sup>585</sup> Cf. Straube, op. cit., 23.



of the manure. The further reason is that the product of *inset-edulis* is the daily food for the Kambata, and many parts of the plant are used in everyday life; therefore, it is of practical reason to grow the plant in the vicinity. Another reason to grow *inset-edulis* around the house is that many believe that the smoke, which comes out of the house, is important for the flourishing of the plant.<sup>586</sup> The agricultural land structure of the Kambata can be divided as follows: House and backyard, *inset* plants, grain and vegetable field, grazing land and bush. In front of the house there is a place which is used to pasture the domestic animals for a short time,<sup>587</sup> where children play and adults and elders gather together and chat or negotiate in case of conflicts while sitting under the trees.

#### 5.1.4 Agricultural economy

93% of the Kambata live on agricultural economy. The agricultural life of the Kambata consists of animal husbandry, farming and trading. Besides its economic dimension animal husbandry has following significance for the socio-economic life of the Kambata: cattle is a measure of social value. Moreover, as I mentioned already, especially in the former times, to sell one's own land and cattle was unthinkable, for a good economic position and social esteem as being a sign of blessing for the lineage and its generation depended on the amount of the possessed land and cattle. Therefore, to sell one's land meant to split up the intergeneration relation.

Even if it is not on the same level cattle also plays a significant religious role yet. Some splendid domestic animals are a sign that the owner is blessed by his father and forefathers. That means, eternity in the religious conception of the Kambata manifests itself in the material culture. Sheep, goats, donkeys, horses, mules, cows, oxen and chicken are the domestic animals of the Kambata. Bee breeding also played a significant role in Kambata in former times. Nowadays, it is being abandoned, since Kambata is becoming botanically more and more inconvenient for bee breeding.

In nomadic societies cattle has a substantially higher social significance than in an agricultural society like Kambata. The Kambata plough exclusively by oxen. Cattle also play an important role in exchanging dowry. Dowry is not 'bride-price' which measures and decides how valuable the bride is. The meaning and importance of dowry has to be understood in the context of the economic significance of each individual for the family. When a family loses a member, it is going to have substantial economic disadvantages. The dowry, which is given by the bridegroom, is a kind of compensation for the "losses" which come along with the departure of the bride from her parents and family. It is actually not a devaluation of the young woman; on the contrary, it is a sign of her importance in the family. This explanation can be illustrated when we take into consideration the dowry, which her parents give her during the marriage. Depending on their economic situation they give dowry (horses, mules, cows, oxen) which in Kambata is called *gegeyya*. *Gegeyya* literally means *escorting*. This material support is a symbol, which implies that the family, i.e., her parents, brothers, sisters, uncles and aunts are escorting her into her future life. That is why the bridegroom gives the dowry not only to her parents, brothers and sisters, but also to her

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<sup>586</sup> Cf. Karsten 1968, 63.

<sup>587</sup> Cf. Haberland, op. cit., 12.

closest relatives like uncles. This fact has to be seen in the context of mutual responsibility of the relatives for each member of the family. However, dowry is being abandoned in Kambata little by little.

Animal husbandry and farming in Kambata are functionally interconnected. Animal husbandry without land-cultivation is impossible because cattle fodder is usually the remnant of agricultural products. To subsist only on animal husbandry is not possible any more, since there is an immense shortage of pasture because of over-population. To live only on farm products is impossible because of the need of milk and milk products, since milk cannot be bought in Kambata, and manure of the domestic animals is indispensable for the cultivation of some plants like *inset-edulis*, *cabbage*, etc. Moreover, as we have seen above, domestic animals have a big significance as social value measure. In the following pages, I would like to show in detail the agricultural situation of Kambata. The following chart shows the agricultural topography of Kambata:

**Table 5: Agricultural topography**

	<u>Districts</u>			
(unit: ha)	Hangachcha	Qadida-Gamela	Qacha-Bira	Total
<b>Area</b>	39,822	31,777	32,440	<b>104,039</b>
<b>Cultivated land</b>	27,916	22,559	25,585	<b>76,060</b>
<b>Pasture</b>	2,057	2,284	1,794	<b>6,135</b>
<b>Forest</b>	1,669.2	2, 376	1,969	<b>6,014</b>
<b>Arable land</b>	–	1,318.5	55	<b>1,373.5</b>
<b>Non-arable</b>	2,127	1,232	1,285	<b>4,644</b>
<b>Others</b> <sup>588</sup>	6,252.8	1,107.5	1,857	<b>9,217.3</b>

Source: Cf. Planning and Economic Development Department, Durame 1999

Agricultural experts have confirmed that Ethiopia is one of the few countries in the world where many grain varieties exist; although, nowadays, some of them are disappearing. The following tables show the agricultural activities of the Kambata and the varieties of grains and vegetables. In order to show the production trend, I would like to present the agricultural products in the course of the last five years.

**Table 6: Agricultural products**

District: <b>Hangachcha</b>										
Year	1994		1995		1996		1997		1998	
plant type	cultiv. in ha	produce in qtl <sup>589</sup>	cultiv. in ha	produce in qtl	cultiv. in ha	produce in qtl	cultiv. in ha	produce in qtl	cultiv. in ha	produce in qtl
<b>annual crops</b>										
<b>maize</b>	2021	44219	1319	21456	2100	33740	1800	33302	2300	43212
<b>sorg-hum</b>	220	3300	1650	23796	250	2750	550	6050	250	2255

<sup>588</sup> Cemeteries, roads, rivers, towns, market places, houses, etc.

<sup>589</sup> 'qtl' stands for quintal; 1 quintal is equivalent to 100kg.

District: <b>Hangachcha</b>										
Year	1994		1995		1996		1997		1998	
plant type	cultiv. in ha	produce in qtl <sup>589</sup>	cultiv. in ha	produce in qtl	cultiv. in ha	produce in qtl	cultiv. in ha	produce in qtl	cultiv. in ha	produce in qtl
tef <sup>590</sup>	2763	14000	2601	20710	1876	15006	1890	11754	2000	11650
wheat	5250	85120	7803	72546	6183	185504	6200	108377	6250	63573
barley	6245	92720	5321	65494	7000	94800	7000	82055	6800	56752
horse bean	2200	20525	926	11108	2400	28800	2100	12600	2500	22002
pea	1800	12807	287	2580	1400	11200	1400	9800	1000	5105
bean	223	4014	272	2691	270	2510	560	3710	280	2309
lentil	20	80	—	—	10	40	50	200	—	—
linseed	50	250	26	128	30	120	30	90	30	150
potato	620	21500	828	52000	1860	118400	2160	156980	2350	169814
vegetables	38	1467	48	3440	25	2675	27	3900	163	15336
pepper	30	210	20	140	30	240	30	240	35	254
<b>staple plants</b>										
coffee	—	—	62	248	—	—	—	—	—	—
chat <sup>591</sup>	—	—	32	352	112	1792	135	1485	125	1625
inset <sup>592</sup>	—	—	2199	228696	8784	966240	8796	879600	8796	967560
sugar cane	—	—	—	—	82	492	145	725	145	725
avocado	—	—	2	24	6	540	10	950	10	1100
orange	—	—	9	63	18	1170	18	720	18	720
banana	—	—	5	525	5	525	10	1100	10	950
gesho <sup>593</sup>	—	—	63	4410	93	7440	90	1670	90	7290
<b>Total</b>	<b>21480</b>	<b>300212</b>	<b>23473</b>	<b>510407</b>	<b>32534</b>	<b>1473984</b>	<b>33001</b>	<b>1315308</b>	<b>33152</b>	<b>1372382</b>

District: <b>Qacha-Bira</b>										
Year	1994		1995		1996		1997		1998	
plant type	cultiv. in ha	produce in qtl	cultiv. in ha	produce in qtl	cultiv. in ha	produce in qtl	cultiv. in ha	produce in qtl	cultiv. in ha	produce in qtl
<b>annual crops</b>										
maize	6420	76869	7538	114356	7546	72108	6949	126790	4909	67784
sorghum	315	1992	400	4626	330	3650	103	1236	98	882
tef	6068	25450	6457	42490	6424	58022	5397	16191	4370	18029
wheat	3171	28857	3406	60228	3828	61285	3923	37788	3426	29504
barley	2280	20740	2165	33795	2610	35890	2530	25375	2256	4688
horse bean	987	3800	1098	7505	898	6286	803	1284	898	7844
pea	537	1934	577	2708	519	3114	457	914	514	2827

<sup>590</sup> In the agricultural terminology "tef" is called *poa abyssinica* or *eragrostis abyssinica*.

<sup>591</sup> It is a slightly narcotic plant which scientifically is called *Catha edulis*.

<sup>592</sup> *inset-edulis*.

<sup>593</sup> It is a plant which is used to make local drinks. Agricultural scientists call it *rhamnus prinoides*.

District: <b>Qacha-Bira</b>										
Year	1994		1995		1996		1997		1998	
plant type	cultiv. in ha	produce in qtl	cultiv. in ha	produce in qtl	cultiv. in ha	produce in qtl	cultiv. in ha	produce in qtl	cultiv. in ha	produce in qtl
bean	25	80	228	972	300	1200	337	2022	184	1154
linseed	287	1034	280	1120	180	720	180	720	180	540
potato	—	—	260	18200	280	18200	365	23100	373	20029
sweet potato	4320	43200	1586	190320	2306	226320	2000	234000	2022	23487
vegetables	—	—	37	3947	30	4585	39	4617	34	2754
ginger	—	—	630	75600	637	76440	645	77400	950	95086
pepper	—	—	15	75	8	64	10	90	9	72
staple plants										
coffee	1574	5888	1526	6104	1685	6276	1685	6276	1685	6276
inset	—	—	300	30000	309	30900	309	30900	309	30900
banana	—	—	140	15400	144	96600	144	96600	144	96600
avocado	—	—	2	270	3	540	3	540	3	540
sugar cane	—	—	13	32500	10	2900	10	2900	10	2900
<b>Total</b>	<b>25984</b>	<b>209844</b>	<b>26658</b>	<b>640216</b>	<b>28047</b>	<b>705100</b>	<b>25889</b>	<b>688743</b>	<b>22374</b>	<b>411896</b>

District: <b>Qadida-Gamela</b>										
Year	1994		1995		1996		1997		1998	
plant type	cultivation in ha	produce in qtl	cultivation in ha	produce in qtl	cultivation in ha	produce in qtl	cultivation in ha	produce in qtl	cultivation in ha	produce in qtl
annual crops										
maize	6356	85860	6952	101254	7100	113151	6110	122519	7100	12347
sorghum	275	1375	161	1712	161	2898	161	3220	161	1610
tef	7230	7230	5216	34153	5211	33874	5206	26726	5206	31236
wheat	3650	5475	3949	52773	4100	53300	4405	63097	4405	53415
barley	1695	3265	1490	16495	470	6090	470	6110	471	4451
dagussa <sup>594</sup>	228	456	86	648	150	1050	150	1050	150	1350
horse bean	350	350	272	2052	450	3150	450	2941	889	7112
pea	200	200	138	902	80	400	80	440	80	432
bean	421	701	482	3108	625	3588	675	4725	650	4018
chick-pea	275	825	105	525	53	212	30	100	—	—
linseed	10	10	10	30	10	30	10	45	10	40
potato	342	28200	518	39640	650	28165	680	35856	650	33497
sweet potato	150	2250	308	42050	487	68724	137	16440	237	25940
vegetables	285	3665	331	15040	372	9803	372	29160	372	28754

<sup>594</sup> Scientifically it is called *panicum miliaceum*.

District: <b>Qadida-Gamela</b>										
Year	1994		1995		1996		1997		1998	
<b>plant type</b>	cultiva- tion in ha	produce in qtl	cultiva- tion in ha	produce in qtl	cultiva- tion in ha	produce in qtl	cultiva- tion in ha	produce in qtl	cultiva- tion in ha	produce in qtl
<b>pepper</b>	600	300	378	2996	455	3165	450	2700	450	2939
staple plants										
<b>coffee</b>	1305	5220	1330	5320	1410	5640	1410	5640	1410	5640
<b>chat</b>	—	—	126	5040	164	7380	164	7380	164	7380
<b>inset</b>	—	—	2940	235400	3167	316700	3167	316700	3167	316700
<b>banana</b>	—	—	33	—	33	5610	33	5610	33	5610
<b>sugar cane</b>	—	—	—	—	62	15500	62	15500	62	15500
<b>avocado</b>	—	—	5	85	6	1800	6	1800	6	1800
<b>Total</b>	<b>23372</b>	<b>145382</b>	<b>24830</b>	<b>559223</b>	<b>25216</b>	<b>680230</b>	<b>24228</b>	<b>667759</b>	<b>25673</b>	<b>559771</b>

Source: Agricultural statistics of cultivation and production in Kambata between 1986 and 1990 (Ethiopian calendar), Ministry of agriculture, Durame 1999

The farmers of Kambata depend exclusively on rainfall for there is no irrigation system at all in the region. Today's incalculable climatic condition is making agricultural society like Kambata substantially vulnerable. Since about fifteen years it rains either too much or too little. When it rains too much it destroys the harvest, and when it rains too little the farmers cannot cultivate their land. Because of the geo-physical situation it is not easy for the farmers to set up irrigation systems with their traditional agricultural technique. Even the central government is not taking any measures because of the following reasons:

- financial weaknesses of the central government,
- high military expenses in the last years,
- apart from taxes there is no worthwhile income which the central government expects from the Kambata, because
- the society is over-populated and almost each corner of the region is cultivated by farmers with subsistence economy, hence,
- no possibility to set up big estate farms, coffee plantations, etc.,
- insignificance of the region for military strategies.

As it is evident from the above tables of the agricultural activities of the Kambata there are many varieties of agricultural produces. Even if many of the plants are common to all three districts, cultivation intensity of some plants differs from district to district. That is why I chose to present the produces of the three districts separately. For example, the district Qacha-Bira is leading in maize production: 67,784 qtls, whereas Hangachcha and Qadida-Gamela produced only 43,212 and 12,347 qtls respectively in 1998. Hangachcha is leading in barley, wheat, horse bean and inset production (cf. the above tables). And the *Dagussa* grows significantly only in Qadida-Gamela. This intensity difference depends mainly on the slight climatic variations from one region to the other, even if there is a considerable production fluctuation which is caused by many different reasons: bad harvest and weak demand in the preceding year, delay of artificial fertiliser distribution which obliges the farmers to abandon the sowing of certain annual cereals, plants and vegetables.

Climatic condition and altitudinal range, therefore, determine the tendency of the respective district to develop its economic activity in the direction of cash-crop production, or to produce agricultural products which are mainly consumed within Kambata itself,<sup>595</sup> although nowadays, almost every produce has become cash-crop in the face of growing economic difficulties. For example, in former times it was not usual to bring inset-product to the market.

Besides the problem of rain there is also another factor, which influences and determines the production of the Kambata farmers: artificial fertiliser distribution. This distribution takes place usually short before the sowing period, and the farmers have to pay a deposit on the fertiliser, the biggest part of which will be paid right after the harvest time. Financially, the sowing period is the most difficult time for the Kambata farmers, since their produce has already been sold off for different reasons: to pay the debt of the *Masala* feast, school fee of the children, government taxes, debt of the artificial fertiliser of the preceding year, some contribution to the, *iddira* (*ilami iddira, etc.*), *hera, etc.* which are traditional self-help organisations. In order to be able to pay the debts the produces are sold in this time in which the agricultural produce is very cheap because of the abundant supply of the harvest right after the harvest time. The debtor prefers to sell his produce in this unfavourable time, for fear that he would not be able to pay his debts if the produce is finished by the consumption of the family. Since the creditor (government, organisation, individual...) knows that the farmer does not have any other means to pay back his debts other than his agricultural produce (except his cattle), he has to take advantage of this period of abundance of the agricultural product. Hence, the seasonality of production and the seasonality of farmers need for cash are structurally and functionally interrelated.<sup>596</sup>

In the face of the growing over-population, the land scarcity is becoming an existential problem. As it is obvious from the above tables, the cultivated land has increased significantly. According to the statistics of Planning and Economy of 1999, Kambata has 76,717 families with an average of 5.5 persons per family, and each individual has 0.28 hectares. The hard work of the people and the cultivation of *inset-edulis* (*ventricosum*) enable the Kambata to live on their agricultural economy in spite of the high population density. All cereals and plants, which are listed above, are also very important for private consumption as food article as well as to pay different taxes and fees to the central or regional government. Moreover, they enable the Kambata to have a relatively balanced diet. However, the *inset* is playing the most significant role in the agricultural life of the Kambata although its nutritive value is relatively poor.

*Inset-edulis* is a plant, which resembles the banana plant. Therefore, many call it *false-banana* which is a misleading description. The not being of banana is not the being of inset. Something either is or is not; but it cannot be the not being of something. Its botanical resemblance to banana does not justify its description as "false-banana".

The slip of inset is cultivated as follows: the pseudo-stem of the more or less two years old plant will be cut off some centimetres above the tuber. The upper side of the tuber (better the remaining part of the pseudo-stem) will be cut slightly and vertically in a transverse

<sup>595</sup> "The optimal altitudinal range for cereal crops in central and Northern Ethiopia is 1800 to 2400 meters for wheat and tef, 500 to 2000 meters for maize and sorghum, while it is 1800 to 2600 meters for inset, and 1300 to 2100 meters for coffee". (Alemayehu Lirensso 1984, 49.)

<sup>596</sup> Cf. Alemayehu Lirensso 1983, 8.

form.<sup>597</sup> And then the middle of the pseudo-stem, which has around 4-cm diameter and 5 cm of depth will be taken out. This hole will be filled with an old and dry leaf of the *inset*. The tuber will be buried, and manure will be laid on it so that after some months it brings a lot of new slips. After one or two years these young plants will be transplanted. In the process of *inset-edulis* cultivation, the young *inset* plants are transplanted three times.

Depending on the fertility of the area, on the amount of manure and the sort of the plant, *inset* can grow up to even 13 m high and 40-80 cm in diameter. The side of the plant also depends on the climatic situation of the area. In areas at an altitude of 1,700 m the plant can already be harvested after three years. It becomes ripe within a short time but its size and height are substantially smaller than that of the colder areas. At an altitude of 2,300 the plant will be ripe after five years, over 2800 m within five to nine years.<sup>598</sup> An optimal area for *inset* cultivation is usually an area at high altitudinal range, because in the low areas the plant is exposed to a fungus-disease called *aloyya*.

The plant has a layered stem. That is why it is called a pseudo-stem. The pseudo-stem as well as the tuber passes through a long process before they are ready to be consumed. After removing the outer layer, the pith of the plant is chopped up into very small pieces and the fibre will be separated. The pith of the tuber will also be grated and mixed up with the chopped part of the pseudo-stem and deposited in a pit whose walls are carefully covered up by the leaves of the plant. The tuber of some *inset* sorts can also be cooked and eaten as vegetable.

After some processes of pre-fermentation, the *inset* product is covered and let in the pit for some months. The longer it stays in the pit, the better the taste of the product will be when it is prepared to be consumed.<sup>599</sup> This process of preparing is always done by women, while men take care of the transplantation and cultivation of the plant as well as of any other crops. "Enset [*inset*] is a typical multipurpose crop of which every part is thoroughly used... Throughout it's growing period the leaves and pseudo-stem are used for various purposes. Cut leaves of *ensete* [*inset*] are indispensable for wrapping, thatching, sheeting the set, ... making containers, shading some crops and human beings from sunshine and also protecting from rain. Dried fibres are whitish and strong enough to make high-quality ropes. Most parts of the *ensete* [*inset*] plants are good fodder for livestock. Since the plant contains a lot of water in a cell-like structure it is to some extent drought resistant. Some *enset* [*inset*] are cut down for cattle feeding, especially in the dry season when grass is scarce..."<sup>600</sup>

Even if the *inset* plant is so useful, scientific analysis show that the nutritive value is relatively low. An analysis, which was made decades ago, shows the following results:

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<sup>597</sup> Cf. Straube, op. cit., 27.

<sup>598</sup> Cf. Karsten, op. Cit., 59.

<sup>599</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 60

<sup>600</sup> Quotated according to Eyasu Wako 1992, 33.

**Table 7: The nutritive value of inset plant**

<u>contents</u>	<u>nutritive value</u>			
	<u>test 1</u>		<u>test 2</u>	
water	16,00g	per 100g	21,80g	per 100g
protein	2,70g	per 100g	3,50g	per 100g
fat	0,73g	per 100g	0,44g	per 100g
carbohydrate	73,00g	per 100g	67,00g	per 100g
minerals	2,50g	per 100g	2,40g	per 100g
acids	43,0mg	per 100g	42,0mg	per 100g
vitamin C	2,6mg	per 100g	2,2mg	per 100g
crude fibre	3,9g	per 100g	3,2g	per 100g

Source: Karsten 1968, 61

The table shows that apart from carbohydrate the nutritive value of the contents of *inset* products is relatively low. That was the reason why even in the earlier times the Kambata were not only cultivating different crops, but also exchanging their produce with the neighbouring states who had beef and milk products in abundance (cf. above 4.2.2). Even if the *inset* product has little nutritive value, it made the economic life of the Kambata relatively stable and less vulnerable in the times of drought. The huge plant of inset enables the Kambata to live on their agricultural products, in spite of almost 500 inhabitants per square km which would be unthinkable in a society which cultivates crops only and whose infrastructure, agricultural technique and system are not modernised.

As already mentioned, handicrafts, trading, etc. were not esteemed economic activities in the traditional conceptions of the Kambata. Land cultivation was the only economic sector, which enjoyed a high social esteem. The Kambata see land not only from the material point of view. It is a communication medium for the living and dead. But in the face of the land scarcity, the socio-cultural identity is tottering and losing its fundament. All those social classes who could not imagine becoming merchants, carpenters, smiths, etc. and who derided these professions are now putting up with this kind of life. This is one of the radical social, economic and cultural changes in the history of the Kambata. In the economic activity of the Kambata trading is now playing a central role.

The aim and substance of trade is usually the integration of production and consumption.<sup>601</sup> The interconnection of trade and agriculture in Kambata is characterised by the following elements: seasonality of production, seasonality of farmers need for cash and geographical variations in production and demand. In the face of these geographical variations in production and demand, consumption requires storage and transport facilities.<sup>602</sup> Hence, trade enables the access to goods, which are not ubiquitous. From the above cultivation and production tables we can see which district needs to import which products from where. This dimension of trading is seen from the point of view of consumption relation. But there is also another important point, which substantially determines economic activities: insufficiency of the agricultural produce. "Trading is another important occupation of the population besides farming. The high rural density has resulted in scarcity of farmland and has induced an

<sup>601</sup> Cf. Lirenso 1983, 7.

<sup>602</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 7.



undefined number of rural households to engage in part-time trade. Our previous survey of the role of the part-time trade in rural-economic development has indicated that 89.9% of the part-time traders in rural periodic markets were farmers by profession and were engaged in part-time trade because their meagre farm incomes could not satisfy their growing cash needs".<sup>603</sup>

Marketing in Kambata includes:

- supplying of agricultural and non-agricultural products on the market,
- assembling agricultural products right after the harvest time of the respective crops,
- wholesale,
- retailing the collected products in times when they become expensive (for example during the sowing period),
- retailing products from different parts of Kambata itself,
- retailing products from other parts of the country,
- distribution of industrially manufactured items,
- bulking<sup>604</sup> and exportation of different products to different regions in Ethiopia or to the central market in Addis Abeba.

Periodic markets<sup>605</sup> are the most significant infrastructure facility on which the economic life of the urban as well as rural people depends. "Periodic markets are not only service centres for the local people but also outlets for commodities marketed and distributed by the government. The variety of goods and services required by the urban and rural populations are made available in different centres by private business men - who still have a real economic role in marketing and distribution fields. Our field survey has also revealed that the major day(s) are very important in the periodic exchange system. It is on these days that retail shops become active and the collection of marketed agricultural surpluses is materialised."<sup>606</sup>

Kambata exports the following goods to the neighbouring states or to the central market: coffee, ginger, wheat, barley, inset product, hide, etc. The Qacha-Bira and Qadida-Gamela districts exported the following amount of coffee between 1994 and 1998. Until 1998 in Qacha-Bira and 1999 in Qadida-Gamela processing machines for coffee harvest were not yet introduced. The following table shows the coffee production (amount in ton).

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<sup>603</sup> Lirensen 1984, 50.

<sup>604</sup> "Bulking entails several stages such as the collection, storage, grading, packing and transportation of larger parcels of an agricultural commodity". (Lirensen 1984, 9)

<sup>605</sup> Periodic markets are markets which take place only in certain days of the week.

<sup>606</sup> Lirensen 1983, 25.

**Table 8: Coffee production**

<u>Year</u>	<u>District: Qacha-Bira</u>		<u>District: Qadida-Gamela</u>	
	processed	unprocessed	processed	unprocessed
1994	0	205.105	0	74.035
1995	0	1401.471	0	171.785
1996	0	2678.477	0	642.949
1997	0	5267.407	0	1,226.955
1998	53.234	4,688.515	0	2,435.165
1999	312.819	3,641.400	107.976	2,733.640

Source: Statistical bureau of export (the ministry of agriculture), Durame 1999

Kambata has exported the following amount of hides in the course of the last 7 years:

**Table 9: Leather production**

<u>Year</u>	<u>type of the hide</u>		
	<u>cows/oxen skin</u>	<u>goat skin</u>	<u>sheep skin</u>
1993	6,167	45,807	49,428
1994	7,591	73,747	78,081
1995	12,164	76,581	89,353
1996	8,907	59,810	67,617
1997	5,229	91,565	82,330
1998	4,518	80,211	79,206
1999	3,740	56,332	47,302

Source: Statistics bureau of export (the ministry of agriculture), Durame 1999

## **5.2 Voluntary self-help associations and their economic and socio-cultural significance**

In the political discussions of today, liberalism, freedom and democracy are some of the pivotal points. For many political theorists these elements are indispensable for a successful economic development. Self-realisation is one of the important goals of the individual in the modern world. Traditional social and cultural structures are seen as an encumbrance for the achievement of these goals. Max Weber tries to explain the situation of economic development of our time in this context. In his book *"The Protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism"* (Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus) Weber tries to substantiate the economic success and failure of the industrialised and developing countries respectively. According to Max Weber, the traditional culture with its institutions, norms, values, labour division, communality, etc., is the main hindrance for economic development in the developing countries. The thesis of Karl Marx, "Religion is opium of the people", suits this position of Weber, since religion plays a very important role in the social, economic and cultural life of traditional societies. However, by abolishing the traditional communitarian relations, which are based on the respective culture, the Marxist ideology imposes a totalitarian collectivism so that there are no classes. In his *"The Wealth of Nations"*, Adam Smith emphasises the necessity of liberalism for economic success. The ideology of liberalism contains the priority of the individual for his self-realisation. Liberals such as Rawls represent the priority of the right over the good.<sup>607</sup>

Not only communitarians such as Michael Walzer, Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, Amitai Etzioni, Robert Bellah et al. try to rediscover the value of community for the social, economic, political and cultural life of a society. As we have seen in the first part of this paper, Samuel P. Huntington is fully convinced that sense of community is an indispensable factor for the existence of every society. Religion for him is a mobilising and unifying factor of a society. Being aware of outside enemies the members of a social group or a nation consolidate their unity. They develop a sense of belongingness, labour ethics and appreciation of their cultural values. Huntington sees the economic success of the East-Asians in the priority of the collective over the individual in the East-Asian culture. The primacy of group interests to the individual ones mobilises the members to strive together for their economic development. The consequence of this group strive is labour ethics which entails discipline, loyalty and industriousness. Huntington considers this ethics as an East-Asian philosophical standpoint that one's community, country or nation is far more important than the individual.<sup>608</sup> In the socio-economic dimension of religion, Confucianism plays a significant role for the whole region. Some socio-economic elements of this religion such as discipline, labour, family and thrift are appreciated by the whole region. By rediscovering this communitarianism, the East-Asians reject individualism and accept a "soft" authoritarianism and limited forms of democracy.<sup>609</sup> For the East-Asians their economic

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<sup>607</sup> Cf. Kenneth Baynes 1990, 62.

<sup>608</sup> Cf. Huntington 1996, 165.

<sup>609</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 166.

prosperity is the proof for their moral superiority. Therefore, the non-Westerns who strive for economic development should recognise the economic model of the East-Asians.<sup>610</sup>

Huntington tries to explain the "moral decadence of the West" in the drop of communality. Fall of "social capital", i.e. voluntary membership in associations and, along with it, decrease of interpersonal trust and labour ethics, and an increasing strive to fulfil personal desires prevail in the Western societies.<sup>611</sup> To back up his theory, Huntington quotes President Lee of Singapore, for whom the following socio-cultural elements are pillars of economic success:

- priority of community and society over Ego,
- family as fundament for society,
- the individual should be supported by community and
- racial and religious harmony.<sup>612</sup>

In this section I will try to treat communitarianism in details. By keeping the communality in mind, I would like to depict some voluntary self-help associations in Kambata. The aim of this section is to discuss the interaction of culture, social structure, economic development and political administration in the traditional society of Kambata. How communitarian is the society of Kambata? What are its characteristics? What are its advantages or disadvantages? Why are the Kambata communitarians?

In the course of this section we will see that the liberals and communitarian theories oppose one another. According to the liberals, communitarianism is based on religious and cultural institutions and it suppresses individual self-realisation; and according to the communitarians, individualism confines participation and solidarity. For both ideological groups the standpoint of the other is something which trammels economic, social and political development. Now, which one is the cause of economic "underdevelopment"?

Even if the society of Kambata is at least as communitarian as the East-Asian society, why didn't the economic development take place? If according to the liberals individualism would be the best solution, why did societies like Kambata not develop an individualistic-liberal structure? Exactly the same religious traditions, socio-psychological values, norms and sanctions that, according to Weber, Stucken et al. hamper the economic development,<sup>613</sup> are its engines for the Kambata. The Kambata are convinced of that. They cannot imagine developing their economy unless it is in this context. So, how can we reconcile this theoretical standpoint with empirical experience? Since the Kambata believe, they can socially and economically survive only when they build a community, they created different institutions and voluntary self-help organisations.

Two of the main motivations for creating voluntary self-help organisations are: Some difficult works which are to be finished in a short period of time, like harvesting, heavy works such as house construction etc., and the conception that voluntary self-help associations are the only social security. Both reasons base on the mutuality principle.<sup>614</sup> Since the fundamentals of the voluntary self-associations are cultural, religious, social, economic and political

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<sup>610</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 166f.

<sup>611</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 500.

<sup>612</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 527.

<sup>613</sup> Cf. Nohlen/Nuscheler 1993, 40.

<sup>614</sup> Cf. Braukämper 1983, 212.

institutions, norms, regulations, etc., the associations have a moral dimension: everybody has a moral obligation to belong to them. The following are some of the very important self-help associations in the socio-economic and cultural life of the Kambata:

- ◆ *geja*
- ◆ *gezimma*
- ◆ *dawa*
- ◆ *sera, and*
- ◆ *wijjo*<sup>615</sup>

*Geja* is a co-operative group which comes together to perform usually the same type of work for the members of the association. The members are mostly of the same age so that the rate of output is more or less balanced, since service in return is expected. There is no limited number of members; but they are usually not more than 10.<sup>616</sup> The kind of work they perform are cutting grass (especially young boys), harvesting *inset* (women and girls only), cutting the *inset*-products (women and girls in preparation for the *Masala* feast), fetching water (especially girls), chopping fire-wood (boys for example in preparation for the *Mesqel* feast, etc.), ploughing during the sowing season (men only), preparing arable land for cultivation (men only), weeding (men only), harvesting (men only), threshing (men only) transplanting young *inset* plants (men only), fencing (men only), etc. Each group work - weeding, ploughing, harvesting, threshing etc. - is accompanied by songs. The songs contain praises of good and heroic old days, wealth (cattle, land) of the former times, praises of the lineage founder, etc. These songs, especially the "*Drancha*", have a special educative value: By making *Drancha*, parents and elders tell their children the history of their clan and lineage, the social and moral values, the proper behaving manners, etc. That means, children have to follow the footsteps of their ancestors. Teshome Tadesse narrates a similar tradition in the Wolayta society: "During this [weeding] time people join in a collective weeding... Five or more persons from a group for teamwork, they cultivate one man's field, and so on until they clear weeds from all their fields..."<sup>617</sup>

*Gezimma* is similar to *Geja*. Etymologically the word *Gezimma* comes from "to pound together". Two people pound grain or *Geshsha* in a single mortar. Each individual has a pestle. They alternately crush the grain or *Geshsha* in the mortar with the pestles. This kind of work is called *Gezimma*. Threshing of grain with sticks is also called *Gezimma*. In some areas in Kambata *Geja* is called *Gezimma* that shows that there is no substantial difference between both associations, rather a dialectal variation. The number of the members varies according to the extensiveness of the work.

The third very important voluntary self-association is called *Dawa*. It is a co-operative group, which is called in by one who needs the help of friends and relatives. No service in return is expected. Concerning the *Dawa* and the penetrations of the whole social, cultural and economic life of the traditional societies by different institutions, Chiatti Remo writes the following about the Wolayta: "For all their work, ... they receive only food and drink, but no other reward. A man can always count on his clan in such matters. The only exception is when a man has been ostracised by the group because he has committed a crime against the

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<sup>615</sup> Habiso, op. cit., 393.

<sup>616</sup> Cf. ibid, 393.

<sup>617</sup> Teshome Tadesse, op. cit., 21.

clan solidarity, by breaking a taboo or marrying against the law of the clan, or insulting the elders of the clan. This exclusion from communal help is more than an economic sanction. It is also a ritual curse that withdraws from him the blessings of the clan and the protection of its ancestors. Again sacred and secular realms are completely intertwined."<sup>618</sup> The number of the participants in the *Dawa* is big. The one who summons the *Dawa* prepares good food for his working guests.<sup>619</sup> The main task of *Dawa* is mostly harvesting, preparing arable land for cultivation, cutting *Duffa* (eleusine jaegeri) for covering roof, etc. The participants are between 20 and 40 years old.<sup>620</sup> This association is only for men.

*Wijjo* is an exclusive association of women. Since Kambata is a static agricultural society, its main economic sector is land cultivation. Moreover, Kambata is a highly overpopulated region, which makes extensive animal husbandry practically impossible. Therefore, many Kambata have very few cows. Hence, women of 4 or 5 families make a group, collect their milk and give it each family for one week. The aim of this association is to have a big amount of milk and butter by collecting the milk for the person in turn.<sup>621</sup>

These voluntary self-help associations can be called as social security of the Kambata. *Sera* is apparently the most important social security. Widely speaking, *Sera* means institutions, laws, labour division, norms, etc. But my focal point is *Sera* in a narrow sense: the *Onna-Sera*. *Onna-Sera* is institutions, laws and regulations of the *Hera*. "The *Hera* refers to the village"<sup>622</sup> itself, whereas the *Sera* refers to the burial society which exists in each village."<sup>623</sup> In the *Onna-Sera* the institutionalisation is very strict. It has strong norms and sanctions. When somebody dies, the family of the deceased does not perform any kind of work for a long period of time unless the deceased is very young. The members of the *Hera* are supposed to provide the family with food, drinks, firewood, sowing if it is sowing season, hoeing, weeding, etc. Whereas water fetching and supplying of food is duty of the women of the *Hera*, the men provide firewood and perform the rest of the work. The latter have to put up tents for guests, dig the grave, make the coffin (out of timber), organise the burial ceremony, slaughter a cow, bring grain to the mill in order to cook for guests coming from distant places, etc.<sup>624</sup> Moreover, each family in the *Hera* contributes a bit of grain which will be roasted and eaten during coffee time. These performances in the *Hera* are called *Sera*. Not performing of these duties has heavy consequences for the members of the *Hera*. The sanctions of the *Hera* are mostly: confiscating different household items.<sup>625</sup> But the heaviest sanction is that the family will be ostracised. In a society like Kambata, which is absolutely dependent on the neighbours, being excommunicated from the community is what each Kambata fears. Therefore, the life of the Kambata is characterised by an existential dependence on the others.

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<sup>618</sup> Chiatti Remo 1984, 177.

<sup>619</sup> Cf. Habiso, op. cit., 393.

<sup>620</sup> Cf. Braukämper 1983, 213.

<sup>621</sup> Cf. Habiso, op. cit., 394.

<sup>622</sup> Singer describes *Hera* as village. But one should keep in mind that Kambata does not have villages in the settlement system of the Western societies. The Kambata settlements have scattered houses. Concerning the Kambata settlements see the above section.

<sup>623</sup> Norman Singer 1980, 547.

<sup>624</sup> Cf. Braukämper, op. cit., 215.

<sup>625</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 215.

The absolute indispensability of *Sera* in the *Hera* is common not only in Kambata. Many traditional societies have created different voluntary self-help associations to overcome different socio-cultural and economic problems. These organisations are the social security for them. When the Kambata say "*seru yobaich ay mogano?*" which means *who buries if not the Sera*, they emphasise not only the significance of the *Sera* during the burial ceremony, but also its indispensability in the social-cultural, economic and political regulations. Politically, *Sera* plays an important role by negotiating between different parties who have territorial disputes and if necessary by imposing sanctions on and excommunicating the guilty. Socio-culturally, the *Sera* guarantee the cultural values and norms of the Kambata. Economically, it is an organisation, which fosters mutual aid and co-operation. This economic dimension goes beyond the scope of the *Onna-Sera*. Here we speak of *Sera* in a wide sense, which means *Sera* prevails different aspects of the life of the Kambata.

As we saw in the historical section of the second part of this paper, King Dilbato played a significant role in institutionalising the socio-economic, political and cultural life of the Kambata. The famous "*Dilbato Sera*" was the achievement of this King as a result of the Kambata civil war. The different forms of *Sera* such as *Onna-Sera*, *Huje-Sera*, etc. are derived from the concept of *Dilbato-Sera*. They have to be understood in this context. Hence, they imply sanctions, laws, regulations, etc. Through these institutions the Kambata regulate their socio-cultural, economic and political life. That means every association has its own *Sera*. Two young boys who cut grass as well as 20 people who build a house for someone have *Sera*.

There are some elements, which oblige some members of the *Hera* to intensify their relationship: common roads, rivers, streams, bridges, bringing the sick to the hospital, etc. These elements do not need the co-operation of the whole members of the *Hera*. Therefore, these factors divide the members of the *Hera* automatically in different groups, however, without abolishing the membership in the *Hera* and duties in *Sera*. For example, the one who (husband of a family) does not participate in digging streams is not allowed to drink water from them, not only he, but also his whole family.<sup>626</sup>

*Huje-Sera* (*Sera* of group work) does not have sanctions, i.e., there are no compelling obligations to belong to it. But one is indirectly obliged to participate in it and help the needy, on the grounds that he could also need the help of the others. Apart from the economic advantages there is a kind of moral obligation to be a member of *Sera*,<sup>627</sup> since cultural values and norms are experienced in this community and organisation. If a house burns down, the members of the *Hera* come together and build a new one. This *Sera* is called *Mini-Sera* which is actually *Onna-Sera*. Another example, if a cow or ox of somebody dies accidentally, they collect money so that he can buy another. This *Sera* is called *Lali-Sera*. That is why I call it social security. However, *Onna-Sera*, *Huje-Sera*, *Lali-Sera*, *Mini-Sera*, etc., do not have kinship structures, since different clans live together in the same territory and are intermingled through marriage. "The *Hera* system is open to all members of the Cambata [Kambata] society including slaves, tenant farmers and Fuga who for all other purposes are not accorded status as ordinary citizens. As membership in the *Hera* is concurrent with *Sera*

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<sup>626</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 215.

<sup>627</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 217.

membership,<sup>628</sup> and the function of the *Sera* is to provide a proper burial for all members of the Cambata [Kambata] society irrespective of their social status, it follows that even persons who do not have status for other purposes will be considered equal under the Hera system."<sup>629</sup>

The *Sera* of the Kambata, on the one hand, does not exclude anyone from the *Hera*. Slaves, tenants, tanners, smith and Fuga are allowed to be members. But on the other hand, the members from lower social classes were never leaders of *Sera*. In order to back up this, the Kambata invented a proverb: "*butichchi lallabuha burzami gequha*" (which means nobody pays attention to the speech of a poor man, nobody is afraid of the glare of a man with cataract).

The person in charge of *Sera* is called *Seri Dana* or *Hera Dana*. In order to facilitate the *Sera*-administration, the members of *Sera* nominate also minor *Hera Danas*. These ones have intensive contact with different families who live in their vicinity. In cases of confiscating some items (if the respective family does not fulfil its responsibility of the *Sera*) the minor *Hera Danas* impose sanctions. Big sanctions like excommunication are usually imposed by the main *Hera Dana* and his councillors. Imposing sanctions, organising burial ceremonies and different kinds of works, etc. are executed by the *Hera Dana*. The *Hera Dana* has a great responsibility to settle disputes, which occur in the *Hera* if the disputes are "not arising out of kin-related matter".<sup>630</sup> The disputes arising out of kin are usually settled by the *Ilami*- or *Bokki Dana* (representative of the lineage and clan). The *Seri*- or *Hera Dana* usually handles the setting of the *Hera*, especially after a burial ceremony. "The *Sera*"<sup>631</sup> is convened only when a resident of the village dies or when there is an extraordinary event which calls for immediate legal action."<sup>632</sup>

As I mentioned above, the *Hera Dana* or *Seri Dana* is elected from higher social classes. Interestingly, he will be elected democratically. That means, tenants, tanners, slaves, smith and Fuga can elect a *Seri Dana*, but they cannot be elected. "The *Hera Dana* is generally appointed by the agreement of resident members of the *Hera*, although there are instances when the oldest son inherits the position. Actually, there is some overlapping between the *Hera Dana* and the *Ilemi* [*Ilami*] *Dana* or *Boki* [*Bokki*] *Dana* positions. In villages that have only one clan, the *Boki Dana* is usually the *Hera Dana* as well. If the *Dana* receives one position by birth, he will receive the other in same manner. In *Hera* of two or more Kontoma (commoners) clans, which as a rule, have more than one *Boki Dana*, the position is generally awarded to one of these judges. It is most useful in this situation to award the position to one person for life; when he dies a new person is appointed. The appointments are limited, however, to those who already hold *Boki Dana* positions in a vast majority of the classes. In the situations of this nature the general rule is that the position is passed on by consensus to the *Hera* clans on a rotating basis."<sup>633</sup>

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<sup>628</sup> Singer misunderstood the difference between Hera and Sera. Hera is a collective description of those who have common institutions, regulations and laws. These laws of socio-cultural, political and economic regulations are called Sera. Sera also signifies *Woga*, which means culture, custom, law, tradition, etc. In short, Sera is the principle of social, political, economic cultural and religious administration.

<sup>629</sup> Singer 1980, op. cit., 548.

<sup>630</sup> Ibid, 548.

<sup>631</sup> Singer should have written *Hera* instead of *Sera*.

<sup>632</sup> Singer 1980, op.cit., 548.

<sup>633</sup> Ibid, 548.



Not only in Kambata, but also in all societies cultural, religious, economic and political factors are interwoven. One of these elements can only be understood in the context of the whole. As we saw above *Sera*, is a covenant, which binds all members of the *Hera*. When King Dilbato instituted his famous *Dilbato Sera*, he made the different sub-districts to some extent autonomous. This self-administration is called *Hera*. No King was acting against the will of the *Hera*. Only when the representatives of the *Hera* could not settle a dispute, they presented the matter to the King, so that he took the final decisions. Otherwise, only in cases of grave crimes such as murder, he sentenced the guilty to death.<sup>634</sup>

The laws of the Kambata are not written. The way of life itself is their codex. The observance of *Sera*-regulations is expected from every member of the *Sera*. The political system of the *Sera* is a mixture of democratic elements and hierarchy. Each member of the *Sera* has the right to participate in every activity in the *Sera* and he has the right to express his petitions in front of the meeting of the *Hera-Ya'a* (*Hera*-meeting). However, grave cases are settled by higher instances such as *Hera Danna*, *Bokki Danna*, *Gochchi Danna* or the King and his councillors.

About the political and judicial significance of the *Hera* and its leaders, Singer says the following: "To institute a legal action, a petition is presented orally at a meeting of the *Hera*. These meetings take place on the second day<sup>635</sup> following the burial of a member or one of his households. Since all *Hera* residents who have been initiated into adulthood are required to attend the mourning ceremonies, petitions can be presented before the gathered assembly at the meeting on the second day following a death. The respondents are called to present their defences. If the matter cannot be settled by the assembly, a committee is appointed to sit with the *Hera Dana* in order to conduct a full inquiry. If that panel of mediators, known as *Sera Nubacho* or *Hera Nubacho* (village elders) do not fare any better, the case is referred to the head of the *Gochu*, the *Gochi Dana*, for resolution. If he fails to resolve the matter, it is then presented before the *Woma* [the King]."<sup>636</sup>

This political and judicial system of the Kambata is the proof for its very well organised social structure. Singer gives a good information about the socio-political system of the *Hera* even if he confuses *Hera* and village. As I said above, village is not to be understood in the sense of the industrialised societies. The territorial division of the Kambata can be divided roughly as follows: *Hegegu* (vicinity), *Ollo* (neighbourhood), *Murrichchu* (minor *Hera*), *Hera*, *Gochchu* (administrative region) and *Badu* (the Kambata state). In order to show the influential range of the respective authority, Singer writes the following: "If the parties to the dispute come from different villages within the same *Morichu* [*Murrichchu*], the person known as *Morichu* hears the case. If they are from the same *Gochu* [*Gochchu*], the *Gochi* [*Gochchi*] *Dana* presides. Finally, if they come from different *Gochu*, the make-up of the panel would depend on the type of dispute at hand. In land cases the *Gochi Dana* of the place

<sup>634</sup> Cf. Habiso, op. cit., 394.

<sup>635</sup> Because of practical reasons the members meet right after a burial, since it is usually not easy that all or most of the *Sera* members come together for the meeting on the second day; whereas, almost everybody comes to the burial ceremony since it is a socio-cultural obligation. Right after the burial ceremony they are told to stay. They meet either near the cemetery or go to the family of the deceased, and the meeting takes place in front of the house. For example, in case of theft, it is preferred to meet around the cemetery since the people believe that out of fear for death or heavy calamities, which will be afflicted by the deceased, the thief confesses his crime. Otherwise he will be cursed in the name of the dead. That means, after their death, the deceased have a supernatural power as judges who abhor injustice. In many socio-cultural contexts the deceased are loved and feared at the same time: loved because they are the relatives and beloved of the leaving; feared because they can see the heart of the living and punish them.

<sup>636</sup> Singer, op. cit., 548.

where the land is located would preside; in all other cases, the matter would be referred to the *Gochi Dana* of the defendant, but a supporting panel would be appointed composed of influential elders from each of the *Gochu* involved. In all of these cases appeals would go up through the hierarchical system which is parallel to the political system. A final appeal in all cases would lie with the *Woma*. In the last mentioned case, where the *Gochi Dana* is called on in the first instance, there would only be an original hearing and an appeal to the *Woma*. It is not unusual, however, in these cases where a settlement is not reached, for a second hearing to be called in which the *Gochi Dana* refers the matter to a different panel over which he presides. If these elders do not resolve the dispute, it would then go to the *Woma* for his decision."<sup>637</sup>

Speaking from a communitarian point of view, what is the significance of reconciliation for the Kambata? I quite often noted the absolute dependence of the Kambata on one another. This is the starting point of politico-judicial negotiations. Resolving the dispute is not enough for the Kambata. The parties have to reconcile. Absence of conflicts is not enough for the living together of the Kambata. They have to conciliate and pacify. For the Kambata peace is not absence of war. They should not endanger their mutual dependence. A conflict between two parties is contagious. Therefore, it has to be eradicated, since this contagiousness disturbs the social, political, religious and economic order. Through this conflict the whole community will be vulnerable. The whole community has to forgive the one who has violated the public order and *Sera*.<sup>638</sup>

Not only the presence of the living community is indispensable in this reconciliation assembly. Even the dead plays a very important role. The spirit of the prominent deceased lineage founder will be judging. The guilty can hide his crimes from the living, but not from the dead. Therefore, the assembly begins the meeting with a prayer in which the *ayyana* of the fathers is invoked. "The hearing begins with a prayer from the *Dana*. He blesses all those present and excuses men for their weaknesses in not being able to live together peacefully. His blessing is followed by others. The assembled group also presents proverbs to symbolise the ideas of cohesion and purity in Kambata society. The *Dana* allows the blessings and proverbs to continue until he feels all persons are mentally engaged in the process at hand. He then suggests that each party be allowed to present his case."<sup>639</sup>

One of the important procedures in settling disputes is that the panel does not impose on the parties to terminate the disputes.<sup>640</sup> Everything should be discussed and negotiated. There should arise a true and creative consensus out of common talk, common decision, and common work. This is to guarantee an active and enduring participation in the transformation of conflict through the creation of common consciousness and political judgement. Only at the end, after each party has said its part, the panel can intervene, bring normative prescriptions, present solutions acceptable to all (mostly with compromise) and punish the guilty if necessary. In the negotiation process the right procedure has to be followed so that the right of each individual is respected. In the Kambata language to violate one's right is called "*manni garita baisu*". In the Kambata language '*right*', '*justice*' and '*truth*' have the

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<sup>637</sup> Ibid, 548f.

<sup>638</sup> Cf. ibid, 550.

<sup>639</sup> Ibid, 551.

<sup>640</sup> Cf. ibid 550.

same word: "*garit*".<sup>641</sup> Not following the correct procedure means not only a violation of the truth and justice on which the right of each individual is based, but also disturbing the justice and truth of the whole community. A conflict between two individuals is not a private matter. The whole community is involved. Therefore, after the reconciliation ceremony both parties have to kiss not only each other, but also all those who take part in the reconciliation ceremony. Only if the number of participants is too big, do they kiss only the elders and key persons of the reconciliation ceremony who represent those who are present there and the whole community.

Moreover, the spirits of the dead, who punish the unjust, are observing how just the panel is settling the matter. The members of the panel are called "*nubabu*" which means '*elders*'. '*Nubabu*' is a term, which justifies the members as elders who are empowered with the *ayyana* of the forefathers and who have thorough life experiences. The *ayyana* of the influential lineage founder is a unifying spirit. Despite their clan differences, members of a village participate in his *ayyana*. This participation in the *ayyana* backs up interclan relations, voluntary associations, *Sera*, etc. In the inter-clan relations the *ayyana* of the lineage of the lower classes does not play any significant role. Not only the living members of the lower social classes are subordinate to the ones of the higher social classes, but also the *ayyana* of their lineage founder is insignificant in comparison with that of the higher clans.

The communitarian spirit prevails in all realms of life of many societies: politics, economy, religion, culture, sociology, philosophy, etc. Straube has observed this matter in his studies on different peoples in South Ethiopia. "In the whole of Ethiopia there is a working community which is locally based. This community comprises different families, which build a group of self-help associations. Men's voluntary self-help association consists of ploughing, house construction, harvesting and similar works that are heavy for a single individual... Families, which do not have men, will also be helped without a service in return is expected. Membership in such communities is voluntarily. If one changes the area, he will be member of the self-help associations of the new area. Even if there is no obligation to be member of such organisations, it is impossible not to join such communities, since its members are the ones who come to one's aid in case of death. For them it is unthinkable not to belong to a work community, and they answered my question concerning this matter, 'who should then bury such a man!'"<sup>642</sup>

### 5.2.1 Sumus ut sum

Are the Western societies essentially individualistic and the African societies essentially communitarian? Isn't the transition from a collective individualism to an individual individualism, from a clan, lineage, group solidarity to personal self-realisation, rather an ineluctable fact in the development process? Isn't the communitarianism of traditional

<sup>641</sup> The main aim of the moral norms and justice of the Kambata is to maintain the existing social order. In the society of the Kambata every injustice is not unjust. There are social injustices that are morally accepted. For example, social stratification such as noble classes, commoners, slaves, potters, etc., with strikingly different economic, social and political privileges or disadvantages, are objectively speaking unjust social structures. But since they are morally justified, moral justice is not always congruent to social justice. Therefore, the moral justice of the Kambata is not based on transcendental ethical values, rather on the maintenance of the social order and hierarchy that warrants the socio-cultural and political harmony. An action is only then unjust when it violates the property and right of the individual, no matter from which social class he is. Even the *ayyana* of the deceased does not care for the absolute justice, it rather watches over the religiously anchored social and moral norms and hierarchical positions.

<sup>642</sup> Straube 1963, 44.

societies like the Kambata a collective individualism? Is the communitarianism of the Kambata rational or irrational? It is irrational if they do not know why they want to be communitarian. Nyerere says that the traditional African families did it unconsciously and without knowing what a political sense it has.<sup>643</sup> It is rational if they deliberately prefer this political system to the atomistic individual one.

The characteristics of societies with mutual dependence are maintenance of the harmony between the individual and the community, the interdependence of the 'part' and the 'whole'.<sup>644</sup> "Human history is nothing but the history of conscious relationships of men with society and of peoples with nature."<sup>645</sup> Society is a place where human development change takes place. The individual realises itself in the community, and the community through the individual. The individual and the community should not replace or oppose, rather replenish each other. In such a political system neither the individual nor the community tolerates an individual exploiting his fellow human beings.<sup>646</sup> With this point we touch the religious and moral dimension of the social life.

I think, the material world in which the human being lives is the origin of his morality and religiousness. Would men have any transcendental ethical beliefs if there were no material world? Where do norms, laws, prescriptions, etc. which are the pillar of the social life come from? Who has created them? Why is it expected from each individual of the society to obey them? Even those who did not read the works of Rousseau know that they are the will of all. It is the obligation of the society not only to observe them, but also to create, renew, widen and change them, depending on the respective situation and time. The will of all is personified as society. This personified will demands active participation from each of its members. The obligations of the personified will are not only created by it, but they also guarantee its existence by giving it normativity and continuity.<sup>647</sup>

Bergson differentiates between law and command as follows: law is an order, which pertains to nature, whereas command is the order of the human society. But because of its universality the law of nature obtains the character of a command, which each individual should obey. The command of the society and the law of nature meet each other in us when we internalise them. In this meeting the law of nature and the commands of society share their qualities. Hence, the law receives a bidding character from the command, and the command obtains ineluctability from the law. Therefore, any kind of violation of the social order is considered something unnatural.<sup>648</sup> Bergson sees in the social imperative the religious commands. According to him religion played a significant role in the social order. Religion supports and strengthens the demands of society. Bergson describes analogically the similarity between an organism and its cells on the one side, and society and its members on the other side. As an organism lives only as long as the cells function together, society exists through solidarity of the individual.<sup>649</sup> In this structure the moral obligation becomes a

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<sup>643</sup> Cf. Doppelfeld, op. cit., 105.

<sup>644</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 206.

<sup>645</sup> *Ibid*, 206.

<sup>646</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 206.

<sup>647</sup> Cf. Henri Bergson 1992, 9.

<sup>648</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 10.

<sup>649</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 11.

necessity. Hence, for Bergson, obligation does not come from outside. It is already inside of each individual. "Everybody belongs to the society as much as he belongs to himself." (Bergson 1992, 11). The solidity of the individual is possible only in solidarity with the others. Our obligation to fulfil our social duties means fulfilling our individual duties. Shortly, social solidarity is the meeting between the social and individual Ego. Bergson sees moral fear as a disturbance of the relationship between the social and individual Ego.<sup>650</sup>

When in the society of the Kambata fathers say to their children, "*annakkahe ayyanu qorabohe!*" which means, *may the ayyana of your ancestors protect you*, they are renewing and re-actualising the bond between the dead and living. It is not only a blessing but also a profession of their faith to their omnipresent *ayyana* that unifies the living and the dead. The living have to follow the footsteps of their ancestors. This unity draws up the programme of society. Unity and programme automatise the observance of the obligations.

Which are the sanctions against the tendency to individual deviations? By internalising the social Ego by the help of its prescriptions, norms, prohibitions, etc., the individual develops moral consciousness: he internalises the "totality of the obligations" (Bergson 1992, 18). This totality of obligations is expressed in the Kambata culture as "*mannu ma yano!*" = "what would the people say!" This is a social moral consciousness. In cases of deviation of an individual from the social norms, the Kambata say "*mannu ma yano!*" Through the internalisation of the social norms the social sanctions and rewards are branded in the hearts and minds of the people. While sanctions are actively imposed, rewards are passive. Sanctions should be visualised, in order to prevent the contagion of social deviation and violation of norms that can destabilise the social order. In this system nobody should act differently than according to the prescribed social bounds. The potential subversive emulation should be prophylactically suppressed.

Through the help of these anti-individualistic institutions, the significance of hierarchy is to guarantee socio-cultural order by maintaining the functional relations between material culture, social ethics and religious rituals. Besides its moral character, the phrase "*mannu ma yano*" also has a religious significance. For example, as we saw above, the unity between the living and the dead is an integral aspect in the social life of the Kambata. If an individual violates certain social norms and regulations, the spirits of the dead are also touched. These spirits, which rejoice when one follows the social prescriptions, will be disturbed if one does not observe them. When the Kambata say, "*ebalo osut hittita ikko'i yenno*", which means, '*the people would say, the descendants of ... are behaving like this*', they are expressing a direct involvement of the ancestors in the social order. By including the *ayyana* of the ancestors, the social norms, prescriptions and regulations obtain a transcendental character. In the same way, it is a traditional religious and political right and obligation of the village eldest to supervise the individual behaviour. In case of deviation it will be exhorted by the eldest. Hence, moral and religion play a crucial role in the social life of the Kambata. The way of life of the society will be indisputably automatized and internalised by each individual.

The automatization of social life is a moral habituation. This automatization is a categorical imperative, which commands "*it must be because it must be!*"<sup>651</sup> Bergson calls these moral habits "the totality of obligation". Since, according to Bergson, obligations imply

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<sup>650</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 13.

<sup>651</sup> Bergson, *op. cit.*, 21.

freedom, he prefers to describe the social system and its morality as necessity. This necessity of unity of the members in relation to the possible enemies, according to Bergson, can only be found in the traditional societies. The "civilised" societies know no more this kind of unity. He calls it the primitive instinct.<sup>652</sup> This position is, of course, disputable. The unity of a group is guaranteed by possible exterior enemies, common economic interests, common religion and culture, etc. For the unity of the civilised societies an exterior enemy is as indispensable as it is for the traditional societies.

"The cell lives for itself as well as for the organism to which it brings vitality and from which it receives this vitality. If necessary, the cell would sacrifice itself for the whole [organism]. If it had consciousness, it would for sure say to itself, it lives for itself."<sup>653</sup> Such kind of interdependence has the principle 'unity in diversity'. The limitation of space intensifies economic interdependence.<sup>654</sup> The traditional religion and moral of the Kambata is not outward-oriented. Its aim is not to expand its moral and religious ideologies to the outside world. Apart from territorial expansions, the Kambata did not have any missionary inclinations to propagate their moral and religious values in the neighbouring states or peoples. The lineage, clan or ethnic solidarity was tolerant towards the uniqueness of the neighbouring peoples or states, but not tolerant towards deviation by some individuals or groups in the lineage, clan or ethnic.<sup>655</sup> Continuity and harmony of the society is an existential essentiality for the Kambata. This fact justifies the conservative ethical behaviour, prescriptions and traditions.<sup>656</sup> The social philosophy of the Kambata is concretised in their proverbs. By saying "*mahichchi mannu abba*", which means "*fellow human beings are above everything*", they are professing their radical rejection of atomistic individualism. Here the words "fellow men" do not mean "anybody". They refer to concrete people such as family members, relatives and friends. The word "*mahichchi*" in the above phrase implies private property, wealth, etc. Without community all these things are considered as worthless.

However, the African individual does not live for the sake of community. Sacrificing one's self for the community is not selflessness. By sacrificing one's self for the community, the individual is living for himself as well. By living for the community, the individual of Kambata is living for itself. J. Mbiti idealises the communality of the African societies by saying "we are, therefore, I am". If there were no individual interests, community would never exist. Community has, therefore, not an ontological but rather an instrumental significance. J. Mbiti's "summus, ergo sum" and J. V. Taylor's "participio, ergo sum" are apparent anti-thesis of Descart's existentialism "cogito, ergo sum". However, they overlook the functional rationality of the communality for the individual. In my view, the apt description of the Kambata social and existential philosophy would be "participio, *ut* sum" or "summus, *ut* sum". The analogous participation (Sundermeier) and consubstantial existence (J. V. Taylor) of the traditional societies with the nature and material world should also be understood in the context of functional rationality.

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<sup>652</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 26.

<sup>653</sup> *Ibid*, 30.

<sup>654</sup> Cf. Theo Sundermeier 1988, 13.

<sup>655</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 14.

<sup>656</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 13.

The society of Kambata is penetrated by religion. From the point of view of the Kambata's sociology of religion I would say: *religio ancilla societatis*. Where there is community, where there are taboos that impose strict sanctions, there is religion as well<sup>657</sup>. Of course, the interesting question will be whether this intermingling of religion and society has a transcendental ethical fundament or just an instrumental ethical function, or both. In any case, for the transcendental as well as for the instrumental ethics, community is the pivotal point. A saying in Latin "vox populi, vox dei" which depicts the will of the majority as an absolute measure for political decisions can apply to the society of the Kambata, but in a very different sense. The one, who disturbs the social contract and voice of the community, disturbs the religious order. The society receives its orders from religious regulations. The communities of the living and the dead are so intertwined that one cannot imagine social harmony without involvement of one of these elements. Since the traditional religion of the Kambata is primarily concerned with maintaining the social order, there is no substantial difference between "vox populi" and "vox dei". The community of the living and the dead help human beings to be more human.

By saying, "*mannu manna ihanohu manninet*", which means, "*the human being becomes human being through his fellow human beings*", the Kambata are interpreting themselves and their existential dependence on the others. As Sundermeier witnesses, exactly the same proverb is to be found in the Zulu language.<sup>658</sup> In the communitarian language this can be called "self-interpretation". Commenting on the idea of Taylor, Mulhall and Swift say the following: "...I can define who I am only by defining my relations to other selves, by establishing where I speak from in the family tree, in social space, in my intimate relations to the ones I love, and so on."<sup>659</sup> Further, Sundermeier observed a situation which depicts the importance of being in and with the community. The following are two very important reasons to always remain in the community:

- a) If an adult does not talk and share his situation with the community, it is very suspicious. He might be possessed by evil spirits or become a witch doctor. Reserved and quiet children are sometimes even beaten by their parents so that they play with other children. Those who are not active in the group do not belong to the community of normal human beings. This "normality" is very important. Somebody who juts out and who is unique is suspicious and not "normal".
- b) Only in the community one can learn the norms, values, prescriptions, etc. of the society, the history of the lineage and clan, how many relatives one has and so on. Therefore, community is the school of the society. The younger ones should hear what the elders say and share their experiences among each other.<sup>660</sup>

How wide is the range of communality of the Kambata? Many Africanists idealise the communality of the African societies by ontologising their communitarian life. The society of the Kambata is not ontologically communitarian. The unity and solidarity of a clan is also in view of dangers that might come from other clans. The phrase "*ebalo osut hittita ikkoi yenno*" (the people would say, the descendants of so and so are behaving like this), which implies the

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<sup>657</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 207.

<sup>658</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 208.

<sup>659</sup> Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift 1992, 110f.

<sup>660</sup> Cf. Sundermeier, *op. cit.*, 208.

animosity of the members of a clan, is expressed always in relation to the other clans. By pointing to the others and possible dangers, they are maintaining their unity. The others are potential enemies. Therefore, they have to take care of their unity. This is the bond, which unites them against the others. In the same way, the different clans of Kambata as an ethnic group have to unite against external enemies. Violence should be canalised to the outside world. Others and outsiders, who are enemies, are at the same time the means of peace. "Open violence, in the sense of revenge, has been transformed into a form of structural violence that helps to create peace inside the city, but can be used against foreign enemies and internal trouble-makers at any time."<sup>661</sup>

Palaver backs up the idea that civil war has to be overcome by enmity to the outside world, by quoting a Greek drama *Aeschylus Eumenides* in which Athena recommends political friend-enemy-relations as an antidote to internal bloodshed<sup>662</sup>: "So do not cast on my realm keen incentives to bloodshed, harmful to young hearts, maddening them with a fury not of wine; and do not, as if taking the heart out of fighting cocks, plant in my people the spirit of tribal war and boldness against each other. Let their war be with foreign enemies, and without stint for one in whom there will be a terrible passion for glory; but I say there will be no battling of birds within the home."<sup>663</sup> The same applies to the Kambata. The narcissism of minor differences (S. Freud) prevails the social philosophy and psychology of the Kambata. Many of the tribal conflicts in Africa can be explained in this context. Anybody outside the clan or ethnic group is an enemy. Communality applies only to the extent that the individuals have something in common and they have a common enemy. It might have been that originally they had conflicts among each other until they developed a political culture, which canalises the internal enmity to the outside. The colonial and post-colonial political system brought the peoples together which had not developed a common political culture and sense of belongingness. Therefore, the communality and many socio-political values apply only to those who are neighbours and on whom one is dependent.<sup>664</sup>

### 5.2.2 The communality in Kambata and the modern communitarianism

Up to now I have tried to show the communality of the society of the Kambata in the realms of economy, politics, culture and religion. Now I would like to turn to some socio-philosophical theories about communitarianism in relation to individualism. Many sociologists and social philosophers are trying to analyse the interconnection of moral life of a society and its economic activities. As Cladis says, these functionally interconnected aspects of society cannot be abstracted from each other.<sup>665</sup> Cladis quotes Durkheim as follows: "One cannot comprehend the moral maxims pertaining to property, contracts, work, etc., if one does not know the economic causes from which they are derived; and, on the other hand, one would form a very false idea about economic development if one were to neglect the moral causes that influence it. For morality is not absorbed by the political economy; rather all social functions contribute to produce this form to which economic phenomena have had to

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<sup>661</sup> Wolfgang Palaver 2000, 17.

<sup>662</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 18.

<sup>663</sup> *Ibid*, 18.

<sup>664</sup> Cf. Sundermeier, *op. cit.*, 215.

<sup>665</sup> Cf. Mark S. Cladis 1992, 31.



submit while contributing to it."<sup>666</sup> According to Durkheim, religion is the product of habit. He defines the latter as "an assembly of ways of acting fixed by custom"<sup>667</sup> "When we have repeated the same action a certain number of times, it tends to be reproduced in the same manner. Little by little, by the effect of habit, our conduct takes a form that imposes itself on our will with an obligatory force. We feel ourselves obliged to cast our action always in this same mold... Morality and law are nothing but collective habits. Even economic life is made of established customs constituting 'moral phenomena'"<sup>668</sup> Unlike Durkheim, I would say, religion is not only the product of habits, but also their cause. It is religion, which substantiates and justifies the normativity and continuity of habits. By saying "*annakkanne woga baissot!*" which means "don't violate the habit, custom, law and tradition of our ancestors", the Kambata are including the *ayyana* of their forefathers. This religiousness legitimises the necessity of the habits.

The theory of the contemporary liberals is just the contrary of the view of the Kambata. Exactly what the Kambata want to avoid is the goal of the contemporary liberals: an abyss between the individual and the community. "A central feature of contemporary liberalism is its assertion of the priority of the right over the good. One principal motivation behind this claim is the belief that the questions of right or justice should outweigh or trump considerations of social utility for the common good, thereby securing a domain of thought and action free from intrusion by others for individuals. Individuals are guaranteed a right to develop their own identities freely and, in turn, to participate in the democratic process as autonomous citizens."<sup>669</sup> Concerning how the liberals justify their theory, Baynes says the following: "For many liberals, however, the assertion of the priority of the right over the good is also based on a second, deeper motivation. It suggests that the concept of right is to be defined prior to and independent of a conception of the good. According to this view, individual conceptions of the good are invariably particular and diverse and thus cannot provide a suitable basis for justifying principles, which define the basic terms of social co-operation. Rather, the questions of justice are supposed to be neutral with respect to alternative conceptions of the good."<sup>670</sup> For the communitarian life of the Kambata there is no individual right or justice outside of the community. The good of the community can never be a reality where there is no respect of individual right and justice. Social justice for the society of the Kambata is a moral imperative.<sup>671</sup> The community has to guarantee it for its own sake. Bergson's analogy of cell-organism-relation explains this fact aptly.

Like Durkheim, Bellah sees a functional interconnection of morality and politics. This interconnection can be described as political morality and moral politics.<sup>672</sup> The goal of a community according to Bellah is, to be a *good* group. A community strives to become *good* because its members have common values and goals. Bellah describes Jonathan Boswell's "*Community and the Economy: The Theory of Public Co-operation*" as *democratic*

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<sup>666</sup> Ibid, 31.

<sup>667</sup> According to *ibid*, 33.

<sup>668</sup> Ibid, 32.

<sup>669</sup> Baynes, *op. cit.*, 62.

<sup>670</sup> Ibid, 62.

<sup>671</sup> Cf. Philip Selznick 1998, 61.

<sup>672</sup> Cf. Robert N. Bellah 1998, 19.

*communitarianism*. Even if Bellah, like other communitarians, stresses communality, he qualifies the individual as sacred. "Anything that would oppress individuals, or operate to stunt individual development, would be contrary to the principles of democratic communitarianism. However, unlike its ideological rivals, democratic communitarianism does not think of individuals as existing in a vacuum or as existing in a world composed only of markets and states. Rather, it believes that individuals are realised in and only through communities, and that strong, healthy, morally vigorous communities are the prerequisite for strong, healthy, morally vigorous individuals."<sup>673</sup>

For Selznick, as well as for Bellah, participation of the individual in the community is one of the integral aspects. Selznick calls favourable social institutions a community investment, which enables personal responsibility for the common good. Therefore, according to him, the four basic principles of social justice are equality, mutuality, stewardship and inclusion.<sup>674</sup> Equality for him has a moral value. His starting point is the dignity of the community's fundamental constituents, who are individual persons. "All persons have the same intrinsic worth. They are unequal in many ways - in talents, in contributions, in authority, in power, in valid claims to rewards and resources. But no person's well being is inherently more worthy of consideration than any other's. Everyone who is a person is equally an object of moral concern."<sup>675</sup> According to Selznick, in the face of interdependence, reciprocity and self-interest, mutuality creates moral infrastructure of co-operation such as trust, good faith and reliance. Stewardship is reconciliation of interests, or even giving to each his due. Therefore, according to Selznick, it binds social power to moral ideals.<sup>676</sup> The fact that individuals are treated as members is the fourth basic principle of social justice. Selznick calls it inclusion.

The main aim of the communitarians is to reconcile the individual and the community. Phillips quotes the idea of MacIntyre and says, "...a community whose primary bond is a shared understanding both of the good for man and of the good of that community and where individuals identify their primary interests with reference to those goods."<sup>677</sup> The idea of Sandel, concerning individual and community, backs up the statement of Bergson that the individual acts in the community for its own sake. "To say that the members of a society are bound by a sense of community is not simply to say that a great many of them profess communitarian sentiments and pursue communitarian aims, but rather that they conceive their identity - the subject and not just the object of their feelings and aspirations - as defined to some extent by the community of which they are a part."<sup>678</sup>

For the modern sociologists as well as for the traditional societies shared history and common traditions are the pillars of communality. Bellah and his associates call this aspect *community of memory*. "A community of memory does not forget its past. In order not to forget that past, we are told, a community is involved in retelling its story, its constitutive narrative, and in so doing, it offers examples of the men and women who have embodied and

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<sup>673</sup> Ibid, 18.

<sup>674</sup> Selznick, op. cit., 62.

<sup>675</sup> Ibid, 63.

<sup>676</sup> Cf. ibid, 68.

<sup>677</sup> Derek L. Phillips 1993, 10.

<sup>678</sup> Ibid, 11.

exemplified the meaning of the community."<sup>679</sup> This aspect of communitarianism plays an integral role in the culture of Kambata. By saying "*annakkanne ayyanu qorabohe!*" "may the *ayyana* of our ancestors protect you", the Kambata are re-actualising the presence of their ancestors in their middle. This remembrance is a social memory which re-actualises and represents the events of the past, the good deeds of their ancestors, their social and moral values. Theologians would call it *anamnesis*, which comes from Greek and means remembering. But is not just an intellectual act. It is rather re-actualising and renewing the faith of the living in the *ayyana* of the dead. In many perspectives, modern thinkers, like the communitarians, are confirming the traditional concepts of the Kambata. "In a communitarian society values are handed down from generation to generation rather than invented or negotiated."<sup>680</sup>

In the works of MacIntyre, Sandel, Taylor, Bellah et al. the following four particular characteristics can be extracted as central to community: a common geographical territory, a common history and shared values, widespread political participation and a high degree of moral solidarity.<sup>681</sup> As we saw above the goal of a community is to become a good group and the goal of a good group is to create a good individual. In his essay on '*Building a responsive community*', Gardner says the following about a good community: "A good community fosters an atmosphere of co-operation and connectedness. There is recognition and thanks for hard work, and the members are aware that they need one another. There is a sense of belongingness and identity, a spirit of mutual responsibility."<sup>682</sup> According to Taylor there is not even a human dignity outside of community. Nobody can claim his right if not in the community. With this, Taylor is opposing the atomistic individualistic theory of the liberals: the priority of the right over the good. The "obligation to belong" (Taylor 1985, 198) cannot be abstracted from the right.<sup>683</sup> According to Taylor, the right and the obligation to the community, which is the good, are of equal importance. The "obligation to belong" does not annul freedom, dignity and claim of the citizens to govern themselves.<sup>684</sup> Four preconditions for a democratic communitarianism are solidarity, participation, mutual respect and functioning economic order.<sup>685</sup>

The thesis which says the goal of a good group is to create a good individual is precisely elucidated by the proverb of the Kambata "*mannu manna ihanohu manninet*" which means the human being becomes human being through his fellow human beings. That means there is not a "ready-made" human being. He has to be made a human being through his fellow human beings. According to the Kambata, the economic, political and social dependence of the individual is not its limitation but the means for its development and self-realisation. If one wants to understand the Kambata, he should be able to understand their proverbs, which contain the essential social life philosophy. Therefore the methods I have used for my research are - besides data collection of written materials - observing discussions

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<sup>679</sup> Ibid, 13.

<sup>680</sup> Amitai Etzioni 1996, 93.

<sup>681</sup> Phillips, op. cit., 14.

<sup>682</sup> John Gardner 1995, 171.

<sup>683</sup> Cf. Walter Reese-Schäfer 1994.

<sup>684</sup> Cf. ibid, 37.

<sup>685</sup> Cf. ibid, 39.

during different sessions, the analysing of proverbs used in daily life and making various interviews.

In order to prevent any kind of consumption and submerge of the individual by community, Etzioni divides the individual into two parts. "The uncommunitized parts of personhood are sources of creativity and change for the community and personal expression for the person. The communitized part of the person is a source of effective psychological stability and one source of personal and social virtue."<sup>686</sup> This idea corresponds to the one of Bergson, which maintains the existence of social Ego in each individual. Concerning this social and individual Ego, Etzioni speaks of centrifugal and centripetal forces in the community, which take care of the balanced existence of the group. Analogously speaking, in a community there is a kind of centrifugal force which wants to separate itself from the community. Hence, the community needs gravity, which prevents an atomistic individualism. On the other hand, there is a centripetal force, which tends to absorb and consume the individual. Therefore, there must be an appropriate pressure in the community, which should hamper a totalitarian collectivism.<sup>687</sup> "If one accepts that communities and individuals do best when these two forces are well in balance, it follows that the role of those who are able to discern such tilts (because they themselves are not swayed by them) is to seek to argue for balance and urge fellow citizens, leaders and policy makers to take the needed measure to restore balance."<sup>688</sup> Etzioni would call this balance *inverting symbiosis*: the relation and balance between ordering and autonomising formations are the constituent elements of communitarian societies.<sup>689</sup> "The new golden rule", according to Etzioni, "requires that the tension between one's preferences and one's social commitments be reduced by increasing the realm of duties one affirms as moral responsibilities - not the realm of duties that are forcibly imposed but the realm of responsibilities one believes one should discharge and that one believes one is fairly called upon to assume."<sup>690</sup> Since, according to Etzioni, the order of good communitarian societies requires normative means, it needs moral order.<sup>691</sup>

The communitized and uncommunitized personhoods (Etzioni) are a crucial aspect in discussions on individualism-liberalism and communitarianism. The most important and challenging task is to keep balance between the two. In discussions concerning development policy, 'deviation' is ineluctably included, since development processes require social deviations to some extent for innovation and deviation are more or less interconnected. Innovation demands some changes of existing social structures, institutions, prohibitions, orders and values. "It was assumed that whenever people did not conform to the dictates of their socially prescribed roles, they were 'deviants'. In this way, all innovation and dissent could be characterised as endangering societal well-being."<sup>692</sup>

Finally, I would like to quote some questions of Steven Kautz with which I conclude this section: "How far can liberals, who seek to secure the rights of individuals, accommodate

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<sup>686</sup> Amitai Etzioni 1995, 18.

<sup>687</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 19.

<sup>688</sup> *Ibid*, 19.

<sup>689</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 18.

<sup>690</sup> *Ibid*, 12.

<sup>691</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 13.

<sup>692</sup> Etzioni 1996, 6.

the idea of community? And, on the other hand, how far can communitarians, who seek to revive a politics of the common good, accommodate the rights of individuals?"<sup>693</sup> How far can the social structure of the Kambata guarantee the uniqueness of the individualism, without atomising and economising the human being?

### ***5.3 The kinship structures and their cultural, political and economic significance***

In the above section we have seen the importance of communitarianism in the social, political, economic and cultural life of the Kambata. Community does not eradicate or supersede the individual. In the society of Kambata communitarianism begins in the family, and then within the clan or lineage or with those who identify themselves with certain clan or lineage. Identification with and belonging to certain clan or lineage are for the Kambata not merely a matter of culture. They essentially determine their political and economic mould. For example, some of the main reasons for the failure of the villagisation and resettlement policy of the communist regime in Ethiopia were the unwillingness of many Kambata:

- to leave the land of their ancestors: supernatural value,
- to leave the clan and lineage structures: socio-cultural value,
- to go to an unknown land: economic and political value.

In order to depict the kinship structures and their effects on the political, cultural, social and economic realms, I would like to discuss this section from the following perspectives:

- 1) Parents, Primogeniture, gerontocracy and hierarchy,
- 2) Lineage and clan solidarity,
- 3) Significance of "Name",
- 4) Ayyana and community psychology,
- 5) Blessing and curse as communication, and
- 6) Corruption and kinship structures.

#### **5.3.1 Parents, Primogeniture, gerontocracy and hierarchy**

In the culture of the Kambata, the family is the first and fundamental school of the social life. The family is the place where the growing children learn to internalise the social virtues and norms, and as a consequence, socialise themselves. It is up to parents, elder siblings and relatives to enhance this socialisation and internalisation. In many traditional societies one can find similar social responsibilities. "The socialisation of youth in Hadiya is not confined to family and age groups, but also kinship and community contributes much. The community socialises youths towards accepted norms, customs and values of the wider ethnic group. It also instils directly or indirectly the sense of belonging to an ethnic group and

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<sup>693</sup> Steven Kautz 1995, 2.

mutual assistance. Revering and obeying adults and elders is the most accepted norm in the Hadiya tradition."<sup>694</sup> The most important aims of socialisation are:

- "to ensure family cohesion through mutual love and consideration for family members,
- to maintain good reputation and proper social standing in one's community,
- to bring up worthy inheritors of the family tradition and to ensure that the family lineage will be carried on,
- to ensure the security of parents during old age by means of proper upbringing and socialisation."<sup>695</sup>

To make the growing children "adjusted" social members is an important value for those who are responsible for them. The Kambata children are expected to respect not only their closest relatives, but also all relatives and neighbours on whom the member of the society is indispensably dependent. Before being socialised with the macro-sociological social members, first they have to be socialised in the family. For example, the children of a family drink out of the same glass and eat out of the same dish together or in groups if the family has many children. This is a pedagogical symbol of growing together and rejection of selfishness and greediness. Furthermore, the upbringing, socialisation and internalisation are put in concrete terms by dividing duties and responsibilities between the young boys and girls. Sometimes, the fathers let their male children attend the meetings of the men, whereas the mothers let their female children go along with them to their different sessions which is in both cases an indirect preparation for their future life.

In the family, this co-ordination is not the task of the parents only. The elder siblings are automatically empowered to co-ordinate, especially when the parents are not present or are dead. They take care of the younger ones. This fact considerably contributes to developing their sense of responsibility. By looking after cattle, collecting firewood, helping the father while ploughing, weeding, sowing, fencing, etc., the young boys are little by little introduced into the roles of the father: control over the land, live-stock, dwellings, agricultural produce and other properties, financial responsibility, decision making, assigning the duties of the others, cooling down conflicts among the children in the family, participating in community and co-operative works and paying governmental and non-governmental taxes. The young girls come to know the duties of woman in Kambata: consulting the husband and giving him suggestions while he decides, preparing food, fetching water, cleaning the house and taking care of the children.<sup>696</sup> Not fulfilling these responsibilities will be punished by the parents or elder brothers.<sup>697</sup>

Another very important dimension of socialisation of the Kambata children is teaching the history of one's own lineage and clan. The method of teaching is by narrating some stories about the lineage and the clan or through some improvised traditional songs that stories and deeds of the ancestors and relatives or family members. The songs are usually sung by the parents or closest relatives. Tessema writes the following about the Hadiya, which is almost

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<sup>694</sup> Dessalegn Tessema 1983, 27.

<sup>695</sup> Ibid. 9.

<sup>696</sup> Division of work can vary from place to place even within Kambata itself. In some areas girls collect firewood, or boys too fetch water.

<sup>697</sup> Cf. Braukämper 1983 225.

the same among the Kambata: "Particularly grand parents disseminate the cultural values of the community through songs known as *Drancha*. Through *Drancha* the elders recite the ethnic origin of the people and the heroic individuals of the community past and present. This is mainly done to motivate the youth to follow the path of ancestors and imitate heroic persons. In addition, it is to warn the youths against undesirable behaviour that could disgrace the honourable names of their ancestors. Furthermore, elders often teach children to watch against immoral talks, loose practices and interactions. Gossip, slander, talks related to sexual affairs and abuses are considered unnecessary, and youths are told by the elders to avoid such talks. The elders of Hadiya family also warn the young boys and girls against much intimacy and playfulness with the opposite sex. This is done to protect the youths from sexual relation before marriage. When boys and girls enter into such intimate relationship, it is the family that is disgraced and blamed in the first place. This is particularly the case when it involves a young unmarried girl."<sup>698</sup>

As mentioned above, some of the main aims of socialisation are to preserve the reputation of the respective lineage and clan (especially in the cases of higher social classes) and to bring up the children as "adjusted" social members. Parents, family members and relatives of the respective children have to inculcate them not only with the macro-sociological norms, prescription, values, etc., but also with the peculiarity of the lineage and clan. Especially, in times past, the children of the Oyyata and commoners were forbidden by their parents to play with socially despised groups such as slaves and the Fuga. Playing together with children from these groups was considered as disgrace for the families, relatives, ancestors, lineages and clans of the higher social classes. This is an excluding and a dissociative socialisation.

Mechanisms of socialisation are performed by simple and concrete measures. Through rewards or punishments the mechanism of socialisation is put into concrete terms. Imitation of the good reputation of neighbours and ancestors is a decisive measure for the education of the children. Tessema writes the following about the mechanism of socialisation in the society of the Hadiya. The rewards are:

- "material: the family offers good clothes, good food and assigns more wealth for obedient and respectful children,
- moral: the family appreciates and blesses the well-behaved child and encourages him or her to keep it up."<sup>699</sup>

Concerning the punishment, he says:

- ◆ "physical: the family, particularly the father and mother, beat the child with stick, fasten the hands or legs with a rope and against a log, pinch severely and the like.
- ◆ moral: the family punishes by lowering the dignity or importance of the child in the family.
- ◆ material: it punishes the child by denying food, cloths and inheritance of wealth.
- ◆ social: the family punishes by cursing and ostracising the child from the family as well as from neighbours and close relatives."<sup>700</sup>

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<sup>698</sup> Tessema, op. cit., 12f.

<sup>699</sup> Ibid. 16.

<sup>700</sup> Ibid. 16.

As it was already stressed in the above section, the structure functionalism plays a decisive role in the society of the Kambata. Even if the community as such is not the goal, each individual should contribute to the welfare of the social system. By exerting a remarkable authority on their children, the parents not only socialise them; but they also are decisively influencing the future of their children. It very often happens that children are obliged to direct their plans of life according to the wishes of their parents. Especially in former times, when there was arable land in abundance, some parents forbade at least some of their children (especially the first-born) to go to school so that they inherited the possessions of their parents. Parents and relatives influence the young boys and girls not only in this economic realm; in the society of Kambata one was not free to choose a social partner. This interference by the parents and relatives is substantiated by the following reasons:

- he/she should marry from a socially equal or higher class so that the parents, relatives, lineage and clan have a good "name" (see 5.3.3!),
- he/she should marry someone who is economically well-off,
- in order to choose such kind of partner he/she needs help and decision of the parents and relatives.

Treating the children in this way does not mean that the parents want to oppress their own children. On the contrary, they believe that their children cannot develop themselves materially or spiritually without being instructed by them in this manner. While treating gerontocracy in Sidamo (Southwest Ethiopia) John H. Hamer maintains "in the father son relationship the stress is on respect rather than on friendship".<sup>701</sup> From my own experience in Sidamo for two years as well as from the linguistic and cultural similarities between the Kambata and the Sidamo, I doubt this assertion of Hamer. In Kambata as well as in many traditional societies there is no respect, friendship or love for individual person in the family. Everybody should be loved, respected or considered as a friend in the family context, without denying the special affection for each individual of the family. In Kambata, for example, the husband does not have an individual love for his wife or vice versa. There is not an individual love of the parents for their children or vice versa. Love exists only in the family context. That is why nobody says to a member of the family "I love you". The family as a whole should be loved. To love it means to work for its functioning.

Parents are persons with authority. They have automatically higher positions. In the culture of Kambata, the children address their parents in the second person plural form. This implies on the one hand, hierarchy and deference, and on the other hand, the role of the parents as masters of their children who teach them family and social norms. When the parents come into the house, the children should stand up and leave their seats to them; they should wash their feet, those of their elder siblings and of guests. Tessema writes the following about the hierarchy in the family of the Hadiya: "Social respect is expressed in various ways:

- 1) Addressing elders respectfully,
- 2) Giving them priority for food,
- 3) Giving them priority in seating order,
- 4) Giving them priority in making statements and talks,

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<sup>701</sup> John H. Hamer 1972, 16.



- 5) Giving them first chance in making prayers,
- 6) Allowing the first born or elder male-child the choicest land and larger share while sharing inherited properties,
- 7) Giving the elders the hunch of a cow or bull whenever one is slaughtered."<sup>702</sup>

In a hierarchical social system, attributed (innate) as well as acquired (gained) qualities decide the social position of an individual. In the first case, Primogeniture, belonging of the parents to a higher social class are characteristic qualities. In the second case, achievements of an individual by implementing his mental and physical dispositions are characteristic. Possession of these attributed and acquired qualities has considerable advantages for the appointment of dignitaries and chiefs. "Personal qualities, such as military ability, hunting, entrepreneurial spirit, wisdom, self-control and talent in mediation, were the most important factors for achieving a position in the local community. But other factors also count: being first born, being married and having children, being of noble birth and being wealthy."<sup>703</sup>

The significance of hierarchy for the Kambata is to keep the social differences on which the socio-cultural and economic harmony is based. Eradication of these differences would mean social disorder and chaos. These differences are visualised when children show respect and deference to their fathers and grandfathers. The children kiss the feet, the knee and the inner side of the hand of their grandfathers. Kissing the feet implies obedience and humility, kissing of the knee is a symbol of power, and kissing of the hand points to blessing that, according to the Kambata, streams from the hands of the one who blesses. Orent writes the following about the Kaffa in South Ethiopia: "He [a boy] must never speak to his father unless he is spoken to first. He cannot wear any of his father's clothing, nor use his gun without the latter's permission. He often addresses his father as master as opposed to my father. He always walks behind his father even when a young boy becomes a man, if there is no household servant, he will still carry his father's gun... In this case the behaviour differentiates the subservient position of the son and the dominant position of the father."<sup>704</sup>

Orent misunderstands in the above quotation the significance of hierarchy. For the Kambata as well as for the Kaffa the important thing is that the social differences are overt. The members of the traditional societies mythologize their social life and attribute the elders a quasi-supernatural quality. The goal of the mythologisation and attribution of the elders is to prophylactically regulate the possible social, economic and political conflicts. Max Gluckman's *"Essays on the ritual of social relation"* illustrates this fact: "In discussing why political office should have mystical attributes, they start from the fact that a fundamental conflict arises out of the common interest which society has in the fertility of fields and flocks and women, while precisely it is over fields and flocks and women that men come into competition and dispute... Ritual was now seen as arising out of situations in which co-operating groups had to deal with radical conflicts in their very constitution."<sup>705</sup>

Owing to the importance of social rank and difference, the Kambata created some taboos, which justify differences between social classes. Orent depicts a similar situation

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<sup>702</sup> Tessema, op. cit., 10.

<sup>703</sup> Chiatti, op. cit., 482.

<sup>704</sup> Amnon Orent 1969, 297.

<sup>705</sup> Quotation according to ibid. 296.

concerning taboos, which differentiate male and female. Like in Kaffa, the women of Kambata never slaughter an animal, not even a chicken. Only men are allowed to pour blood. Among the Kaffa, a food prepared by a woman during her menstruation is believed as dangerous for the husband, since she is "pouring" blood that only men are authorised to.<sup>706</sup> Especially in former times, the women of the Kambata enter a house through the small door which men usually do not use. In earlier times the commoners and the others were not allowed to construct a house with two doors; therefore, it was very difficult for women to get in, if men were sitting in the house. If women had to come in, they go very quickly into the house and sit in a hidden part where usually women sit. The reason of rushing is not because they will be seen by the men, it is rather to compensate that they used the same door, which is used by men which means rescinding social differences.

We have already seen above that the traditional societies always try to prevent the temptation of certain members to trespass the cultural and religious bounds of the community. Trespassing is contagious. It causes social disorder by revoking the social differences. Sundermeier has observed the reason of incest taboo in some African societies, which takes care of the maintenance of the social order. Moreover, the following analysis of Freud elucidates this fact: "Incest taboo does not have a biological reason... It has apparently something to do with the order of the social life. That would destroy hierarchical stratification of the family. If one has sexual relation with his daughter and a child from her, he is the father-in-law of himself and the grandfather of his own child at the same time; his own child is his grandchild; his wife is his mother-in-law and his daughter is both his daughter and his wife. The order is rescinded; the law of inheritance is revoked. It is the same chaos if sister and brother have a child. The parents are uncle and aunt of their own child; the grandparents are at the same time parents-in-law. The order comes to a standstill..."<sup>707</sup>

For the Kambata individual its life is not merit. It is a gift of the ancestors and parents. Therefore, it should be grateful to his parents and ancestors and respect seniority and kinship structures.<sup>708</sup> The authority of the elders, parents, relatives and ancestors are supernaturally substantiated. Hence, it has to obey them. Primogeniture and gerontocracy characterise the hierarchical structure of family system. In societies where having a child has a very important social value, the first child is a sign of the bond between the husband and wife. Fertility of the wife is proof of the benevolence of the spirits towards the family. The benevolence is not only manifested through the child, but also the child also embodies something supernatural: the blessing and spirit of the forefathers; it is this benevolence in person. That is why in Kambata many first-born children have special names implying the mentioned situations.

Hamer narrates an interesting myth of the Sidamo concerning the power of the first born and the mythological origins of Abo and the Holo and Garbicho clans: "To begin with Abo quarrels with his younger brother, both of whom are sons of one of the two founding fathers of the Sidama. The basis of the dispute is jealousy by the younger of his older brother's power. This younger brother finally tricks Abo into committing the tabooed act of eating meat slaughtered by a member of another clan. Using this act as an excuse the younger sibling objects to his older brother performing the prescribed burial ritual at their father's death, on

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<sup>706</sup> Ibid, 300.

<sup>707</sup> Sundermeier 1988, op. cit., 222.. (Regarding this point confer also "Inzestscheu in: S. Freud 1974, 295ff.)

<sup>708</sup> Cf. ibid. 125.

the grounds that Abo became ritually unclean after having eaten meat slaughtered by a member of another blood line. In dismay and anger the latter decided to leave his siblings and strike out on his own. When he set out on his journey in search of new farm and grazing land Abo took with him a powerful bull which has symbolic importance in the myth and for subsequent development of elderhood ritual. His younger brother possessed a less powerful bull and earlier in the story Abo sought to overcome the latter's jealousy by exchanging animals. But when the exchange took place the power was also reversed, implying that the power of the bull was inherently proportional to that of the owner. In the course of his wanderings Abo had several adventures which involved his bull in feats of daring and strength. These events resulted in combat with bulls of other descent groups in which Abo's, despite its emaciated appearance, always emerged the victor and as a consequence the people agreed to render tribute to him. Ultimately he was led by the bull to the side of a mountain where digging into the ground the animal uncovered a poisonous snake and an underground stream. The latter proved to be the source of the Gidabo River, and it is here that Abo decided to settle.<sup>709</sup> The climax of the myth is the narration of how Abo used his power and skill to eliminate his enemies and his brother.<sup>710</sup> In the case of Abo the power and skill are attributed qualities since he is Primogenitor; otherwise, this qualities should be acquired.

The first born have in many societies a privileged position. They can inherit the rank of their father. They are rendered a special respect. One asks them for their advice in cases of important decisions. They are considered as leaders of the clan. They are the ones who inaugurate a ceremony, slaughter a sacrificed animal.<sup>711</sup> They are the first ones to taste the newly brewed local beer. Therefore, they are put almost in an equal position with the spirits whom the best part of the drink is sacrificed to. Everybody should obey them, as Haberland describes this fact among the Dizi (Southwest Ethiopia), they are "like God".<sup>712</sup> Among the Dizi, all men shave their hair whereas chieftains never shave it as a sign of supernatural power.

Eloquence and ability to speak in sessions, skill in solving conflicts that arise within communities or descent groups, restraint from the violence of military action, economic achievement and diligence, courage, truth, justice, care for continuity of tradition, etc. are some of the important qualities which one should possess in order to be recognised as an elder.<sup>713</sup> Moreover, any socio-political position is predicated on age and property. That is why the Kambata say: *"butichchi lallabuha burzami gequha"* which means *nobody pays attention to the speech of a poor man, nobody is afraid of the glare of a man with cataract*.

In the Kambata language the eldest is called *"bahiru"*. This terminology has a symbolic meaning: the first, the best, the beloved, etc. As I mentioned above, the religion and culture of the Kambata is syncretistic (mixture of Christianity and natural religion). That is why the significance of the chieftains is not overt. However, the proverb of the Kambata

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<sup>709</sup> John H. Hamer 1976.

<sup>710</sup> Cf. *ibid*.

<sup>711</sup> "It is the oldest surviving men in the assembly of elders who are always deferred to in the decision making process. Also, it is generally the oldest man present on ritual occasions who is called upon to cut the throat of the animal, sprinkle blood upon the gathering, and pronounce his blessing. The underlying assumptions behind these customs are that the older the man the greater his wisdom and the more efficacious his ritual performance." (Hamer 1972, 18.)

<sup>712</sup> Cf. Eike Haberland 1993, 226.

<sup>713</sup> Cf. Hamer 1972, 18f.

which says "*woaha womaha lagnoba'a*" which means, *there is no bad King or bad water*, (the first one is the symbol of order and the second one is the symbol of life) and points to the animistic element of the Kambata culture, implies the sacrosanctity of a King. This idealisation of the status of the chieftains and elders is also manifest in the burial ceremony: the older and richer the deceased is, the longer and elaborate the burial ceremony will be.

Elders are not only privileged; they also have to follow the precepts of the society, taboos, purification rituals, etc. more strictly than ordinary members of the society do.<sup>714</sup> They have to set a good example for their juniors and children. Even after their death they have the responsibility to take care of the welfare and order of the society. But they demand a service in return: it has to be sacrificed on their graves, and trees should be planted on them. Trees are a symbol that they live even after their death. Not only the trees on their graves, but also those in front of the house imply that the deceased continue to live even after their death; through those trees they communicate with the living. In some societies echoes in the forests and around graves are believed to be the voices of their deceased.<sup>715</sup>

Although Kambata has religiously (Semitic-Christian and Cushitic-animist) and politically (dynasty and gerontocracy) a mixture of cultures, the role of chieftainship is not as apparent as among the purely animistic cultures. The way of behaving when a young person sees elderly people is based not only on respect for the elders, but also has a supernatural dimension in the purely animistic cultures. The fact that the younger ones should not look at the eyes of the elderly people is for fear that the latter have a power which streams from their eyes and could endanger the physical, mental and economic welfare of the former. In Kambata as well as in many other Ethiopian societies, the younger ones while talking should lower their eyes in front of elderly people and strangers. I would like to quote here Haberland's work about the Dizi, a society in which the good as well as the bad are conceived as an achievement or a failure of the chieftains respectively.<sup>716</sup> "One feared the look of the chieftain. His eyes were too strong, especially for the serfs. Owing to this he had to be careful and ought not to see something meticulously. That was, otherwise, bad for the cattle and plants, especially for children. Women had miscarriages. The people lowered their eyes when the chieftain blessed them in order not to look at his eyes."<sup>717</sup>

Primogeniture, hierarchy and gerontocracy take care of the social order, which is based on social differences. Even if the members of the society believe that they have a supernatural value, their main aim is to maintain the social order. Concerning the importance of social difference, Hamer touches a very important point in the myth of Abo. "The legend further relates how he married and then fell in love with his wife's 'beautiful' younger sister. Though sororal polygamy is defined as incestuous, Abo's wife suggested a means for overcoming this difficulty. She instructed her husband to marry a third wife with whom he should always have intercourse between intercourse with the two sisters. In terms of frequency this made the two sisters equivalent to the one stranger wife. The first wife gave birth to sons who became the founders of Holo lineages while one of her younger sister's sons

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<sup>714</sup> Cf. *ibid.* 228, 229, 277.

<sup>715</sup> Cf. Hamer 1976, *op. cit.* np.

<sup>716</sup> Cf. Haberland, *op. cit.*, 274.

<sup>717</sup> *Ibid.* 274.

became the father of the Garbicho."<sup>718</sup> By mentioning only the equivalence of frequency Hamer overlooks a very important point in the myth. The third wife with whom Abo had to have intercourse between the intercourse with the two sisters has another significance: she is a sign of distinction between the sisters. The blood of the two sisters should not be mixed up. To have intercourse with one of the sisters directly after having had it with the other would mean revocation of social differences. That is what the elder sister wanted to hinder.

### 5.3.2 Kinship solidarity

We have seen above how important the social order is for the Kambata. Hierarchy establishes the order by guaranteeing the continuity of communality. Clan and lineage solidarity is used on the one hand, to prevent clan and lineage disintegration, and on the other, hand to defend itself against the other clans. Hence, the Kambata kinship legal attitudes are divided into: *bokki ya'a/bokki danna* and *ilami ya'a/ilami danna*.<sup>719</sup> The former refers to lineage sessions and lineage chief, whereas the latter refers to clan sessions and clan chief.<sup>720</sup> Solidarity within a lineage and clan as well as with other clans characterises the socio-cultural, political and economic system of the Kambata. Besides the help regarding socialisation and education of children and its indispensability as social security, lineage encompasses the following realms of the Kambata's socio-cultural, political and economic life. "The lineage system is a central part of the daily reality and a guarantor of continuity of social structures. Moreover, it also implies an ideology, the ways of life, laws of succession and marriage, labour division, accumulation and division of properties; in the wide sense, it establishes the socio-economic events and it takes into account the psychological security demand of the society. Among the Kambata, the 'we'-consciousness and the solidarity within the minor lineage have the highest value among all corporate units."<sup>721</sup>

Their politico-legal system is supposed to protect the common interests of the lineages and clans. Any politico-legal system, which does not guarantee the intra- as well as the inter-clan solidarity, is not welcomed by the Kambata. "The Kambata favour their own method of settling disputes and refrain from using governmental courts. They feel that the process used in the courts does not help settle the dispute. Even after the adjudicative process is completed, antagonism continues between the parties, usually at a heightened level. A supplementary hearing within their own traditional system is often needed in order to truly resolve the dispute... the Kambata feel that they would rather not refer their cases to a tribunal that is not attuned to the social values. In the traditional system, their own leaders hear the disputes and make the decisions, which bind their future conduct. These leaders understand the rules of the society and concomitant individual needs... The process of dispute settlement among Kambata is conciliatory - that is, the litigant plays a significant role in the settlement of his own dispute. He has to be willing to give in order to receive, but more importantly, he has to understand social standards around which he conducts his position for recognition of his legal claim. In the process, the mediator, or conciliator, also plays a leading role, as he is

<sup>718</sup> Cf. Hamer 1976, op. cit. np.

<sup>719</sup> Concerning their politico-legal significance, cf. Singer 1980, 542ff. and Habiso 1983 (Ethiopian Calendar), 394ff.

<sup>720</sup> Cf. Norman J. Singer 1973, 368.

<sup>721</sup> Braukämper 1983, 204.

responsible for providing the disputants with an indication of exactly what compromise can be tolerated. He uses the substantive rule of law in guiding the parties to a smooth settlement."<sup>722</sup> Despite the introduction of the "modern" judicial system, many Kambata still prefer the traditional way of settling disputes to the "modern" system, since according to them the latter does not favour the *democratic discourse* in which all conflicting parties have the chance to express their ideas and feelings by themselves, rather than being represented by someone else.

By nominating a *Danna* (chief) the minor lineage, major lineage or clan structures its internal political and legal system. As an example, Singer describes the intra-clan politico-legal system of the Efegenna: "It should be noted that the *Bokki Danna* of the Efegenna do not preside over individual lineages. This variation in the general structure was initiated by the present *Ilami Danna*. As he explained it, he felt that matters kept within the lineage framework strengthens that particular unit of the kinship system, but not necessarily the overall clan. It also creates the likelihood that independent sub-clans and lineages will be created. In order to strengthen clan unity, twelve *Bokki Danna* were appointed on a geographical basis. These *Bokki Danna* hear the original matters. This system tends to add a further level into the structure. If two Efegenna from the same village have a dispute, but their *Bokki Danna* is located in another village, they will refer the matter to the *Hera Danna* whether or not he is Efegenna. If he cannot settle the matter they will then bring it before their own *Bokki Danna* and carry it through the kinship system as if it has originated there. There does not appear to be any resistance to this method of proceeding."<sup>723</sup>

The reason why the Kambata reject the governmental legal court is because the process does not involve the community. It is too abstract for them. As I have mentioned in the above section, if two people have a conflict, the whole community is involved at least indirectly. Therefore, the reconciliation process demands at least some representatives of the community. "The most important functions of the *Olla Songo* [representatives of neighbourhood, village] are: judiciary, religious and administrative. Whenever a quarrel arises a public hearing will be arranged in which all members of the neighbourhood can participate as an audience. The accuser and the defendant will then present their case and the elders who form the core of the Songo will give their view about the existing customs and laws and express their opinion. An elder who is a good speaker will preside but the other elders will be consulted. Thereupon, the sentiment of the majority becomes clear."<sup>724</sup>

An intra-clan conflict violates the unifying *ayyana* of the clan and is advantageous for other clans. Therefore, besides their economic and political dimensions, the following factors are the unifying parameters of kinship corporate units in Kambata:

- *ayyana*,
- other lineages and
- other clans.

In an ethnically heterogeneous society like Kambata, clan solidarity is one of the characteristics for the identity of the clan. In order to be able to show its structural solidity to the other clans, each clan organises itself, helps those who are economically weak, settles

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<sup>722</sup> Ibid. 372.

<sup>723</sup> Singer 1980, 546f.

<sup>724</sup> Stanley Stanislaw 1970, 220.

conflicts, etc. It has to be well prepared to resolve possible disputes with other clans. For example, in case of murder the Kambata have the following conflict settlement ritual which eradicates the temptation to revenge and further bloodshed: The parents and closest relatives of the both parties come together in the darkness. A black sheep (or other animals whose meat is usually eaten) will be slaughtered. The knife with which the throat of the animal is cut and the flesh will be thrown into a river. In this case the flesh will not be eaten. After the throat of the animal has been cut, the mother of the murdered one embraces the murderer as her own child, which means, "this is your new son". Both families and their close relatives become blood relatives, and there will be no marriage between the members of these families. The ritual will be confirmed by an oath. Any kind of transgression of it will have heavy consequences for the respective family. Especially, if this happens between different clans, the matter has to be mediated, settled and reconciled very carefully, since the tendency to revenge is very high. "The most important case requiring clan's action is the case of a death of one of its members caused by the action of a person belonging to another clan. The members of the two clans involved cannot meet each other until compensation is secured and the ritual of purification has taken place. The purification consists of the sprinkling of the blood of a sacrificial animal... on the members of the two clans gathered on the opposite banks of a river."<sup>725</sup>

Through birth and initiation, a family, lineage and clan increase their number. Through initiation the community admits somebody as its member. In Kambata circumcision/excision is the most important ritual of admission into community. It is the task of the community and its joy to admit a young boy or a girl as member. By helping to organise this big feast, doing material contribution and blessing after the circumcision/excision of the novice, the family members, relatives and friends show how much they rejoice over the admission of the neophyte.<sup>726</sup> Music, dance and the feast as a whole express this joy. Through this ritual and admission the number of the community is enlarged. This has a great socio-political significance in relation to other clans: numerical bigness secures the political and economic advantages.

If somebody becomes economically successful, if he has a good political position or, if he wants to marry, one of the frequent questions is "*ma manchuan/manchutan?*" which means, *from which clan is he/she?* "*Manna*" has various meanings in the Kambata language: human being, people and clan. This implicitly points to the fact that the quality of an individual depends on which lineage or clan it belongs to. The political position, economic success etc. such things are not considered as an individual matter. His/her success is the success of the minor lineage (*minu*, *shohut*), of the major lineage (*bokku*) and of the clan (*ilamu*, *zeru*) as a whole.<sup>727</sup> They do not only rejoice over his/her success, but also expect material and political help from him/her. He/she has responsibility towards the relatives more than ever. This point will be discussed in details.

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<sup>725</sup> Ibid. 221.

<sup>726</sup> Cf. Braukämper 1983, 227.

<sup>727</sup> It is usually difficult to determine the scopes of minor lineage, major lineage and clan. However, Braukämper divides them as follows: clan as *zeru*, *ilamu*; major lineage as *bokku*; minor lineage as *minu* [*shohut*]. (Cf. *ibid.*, 187). Furthermore he says, *bokku* consists of 7-9 generations, whereas *minu* (which literally means house) consists of more or less 4 generations. (Cf. *ibid.*, 201)

By presenting their ritual sacrifices and celebrating their yearly feasts together such as *Masala*, by solving their intra-clan conflicts and allying against exterior enemies the Kambata consolidate their kinship ties.<sup>728</sup>

The members of a clan or lineage study the patrilineal pedigree by heart. They are proud and conscious of it. If one wants to marry and chooses a partner, the respective parents and relatives begin to count the members of the patrilineal pedigree up until the seventh ancestor, in order to know if those who want to marry have any kinship connections. The choosing of number 7 might have been taken from the Semitic cultural influence. If someone insults or curses somebody saying "*lamaluck urrunkka!*" which means "*may your clan disappear till the seventh generation*", any member of the insulted clan will vehemently react against this curse and insult.

The Kambata kinship structure is patriarchal, patrilineal and patrilocal. In the lineage structure these parameters play a decisive role. Especially, males are not supposed to leave the land of their ancestors for marriage. There are cases in which the husband leaves the area of his lineage and ancestors if the girl whom he wants to marry has no siblings. Her parents invite her fiancé to live with her on their piece of land so that the daughter, her husband and their children inherit the land and property of the parents. But this event causes considerable social difficulties for the husband in the course of time. The consequences seem to be the same among the Kambata as well as the Hadiya. "This person does not have any right to be elected rather than electing others. Even if the person is intelligent enough, he can never take major decisions concerning that tribe. It is possible to say that he is completely disregarded and forgotten. Many people of the tribe including his own original tribe see him in contempt. This kind of consideration continues and applies in the generations following him. If the son-in-law and another person from that tribe die on the same day, they give priority to the matters of the person from the same tribe. The children of the man will be addressed *land-oso* meaning, children of our daughter."<sup>729</sup>

To be without land or to leave the land of the ancestors means to become a slave. When two people fight for a piece of land, they fight not only because arable land has become scarce, but mainly because possession of land has a religious and supernatural significance. Land is something of the ancestors. It is a sign of continuity and connection through which the ancestors live together with their descendants. It is a place where the deads are buried, where their trees will never be cut. Here, the religious and economic aspects are intermingled. "We have more than one wife because how else could we keep our land? By keeping a wife on each piece of land and thereby keeping the children in each of the lineage lands, you keep the land within the lineage."<sup>730</sup> Through inheritance of land of forefathers their *ayyana* too is inherited. To neglect the land means to neglect the ancestors and their *ayyana*. It is a matter of identity. In this sense even the slaves and potters are respected since they identify themselves with the higher social classes on whose territory they live. They call the leader of the village, who descends from a higher social class, their father. They call upon the *ayyana* of this social class.

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<sup>728</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 187.

<sup>729</sup> Tassew Gebre 1983, 29.

<sup>730</sup> Orent 1969, 138f.



Despite their diligence, the Kambata have heavy economic problems because of a shortage of arable land. Therefore, they leave the region for seasonal work for Wonji, Methara (sugar estate), etc. In such cases kinship solidarity plays a significant role. "The existence of strong extended family relations in Kambata and Hadiya allowed the married male to migrate, leaving his farm work to be carried out by his wife, his brother and other relatives in his absence."<sup>731</sup> The advantages of extended family relations are not only at home. "The presence of the extended family relationship at the sugar Estate which would provide initial financial security to new migrants was also an important factor for migration."<sup>732</sup> At the same time, this migration which is caused by economic difficulties, is contributing to the abandonment of the "father land" and along with it the abandoning of the *ayyana* of the ancestors, neglecting of kinship ties and rejection of traditional cultural values.

### 5.3.3 Significance of "Name"

Now let us consider kinship values from another point of view. I have already tried to describe the significance of esteem in the society of Kambata. "*Mannu ma yano!*" (what would the people say!)? determines the social behaviour of the Kambata. How good or bad one is, is judged by his family, neighbours, community, relatives, etc. There is no individual or personal evaluation of an event or a manner. The society is the judge and measure. Only it can justify or criticise one's behaviour according to its code of ethical values.

In many societies "name" is equivalent to person. Name implies the essence of the person. Name is the being and personality. In many religions the name of a God is equivalent with God himself and with his nature. When the Kambata say "*su'mu bao*" (the name is spoiled) they mean that the nature, personality and being of the respective person is destroyed. Exactly that is what the minor lineage, major lineage or clan wants to avoid. If any member of this corporate unit violates the social norms or if he misbehaves, he is spoiling not only his own 'name', but also that of the lineage or of the clan. He is making this corporate unit look ridiculous, which the other clans rejoice over. The religious aspect of land, which has been treated above, is also based on this social philosophical factor. Possessing no land implies:

- economic poverty: material dimension,
- insignificance of the *ayyana* of the ancestors: religious dimension and
- insignificant "name" = no fame, no freedom, no identity, no ancestral line, no personality and no being: social philosophical dimension.

These factors determine the socio-economic activities of the individual of the Kambata. Social esteem is something, which is strongly striven for. "Heroic activities include taking part in wars, capturing the cattle of another community [in the older days] and killing dangerous wild animals such as lions, elephants and leopards. A person who kills enemies in a war or who kills one of the dangerous wild animals is given a high social esteem or value... This social value has significant importance during the marriage of young boys. Due to this, young boys of Hadiya, especially in older days began hunting quite early in their life in order to get experience for warfare..."<sup>733</sup>

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<sup>731</sup> Bayissa 1987, op. cit., 35.

<sup>732</sup> Ibid. 36.

<sup>733</sup> Tessema 1983, op. cit., 1983, 28.

For the Kambata, "Name" describes not only the nature of a person, but it also depicts the respective situation of the family during the birth of the child. This person and its name are remembrance of that happening. Bubamo Arificio writes a similar situation among the Hadiya concerning this matter: "It is customary for Hadiya parents to express their attitude towards the new born by giving him a name which describes a circumstance in which the parents lived, before and during the birth of the child. Accordingly, within two months from the date of birth, the baby girl is given a name on the basis what the parents experienced during the period of gestation. For example, if both parents or one of them become prosperous or had marked success in their efforts, the child may be named *Lombame* which means 'you brought us dignity'. If, however, the mother became a widow during her pregnancy, the daughter could be named *Annsabe* which, literally translated, means 'she who refused to coexist with her father'. After the girl is given her name, her head is shaved for the first time."<sup>734</sup>

Parents and close relatives are the first ones responsible for an ethically good upbringing of children. They are the ones who will be blamed or praised for the bad or good behaviour of their children. They are the ones who are supposed to teach their children the social, cultural and religious values, norms, prescriptions, sanctions and rewards which are established by the lineage, clan or the society as a whole, so that the "holy name" is not defiled. However, nowadays, traditionally oriented parents and relatives are confronted with a cultural crisis. "As the result of these modern institutions [educational system, government administrative organisations, religious institutions, communication systems and various agricultural and industrial institutions] in Ethiopia, the traditional Hadiya songs, social values, norms and customs have been and are being enormously affected."<sup>735</sup> Moreover, when the children go to school they are separated for hours from their parents; this undermines little by little the control of the parents over them. In former times, parents and elders were highly respected. Everyone expected to be respected when he became old. Nowadays, because of their education, children feel superior to their parents, which causes an inferiority complex in the parents and elders. The latter do not enjoy their old age, which their parents enjoyed greatly because of respect towards elders.

#### 5.3.4 The Ayyana and community psychology

*Ayyana* is the principle of unity of a lineage or a clan, which justifies the deeds of the group as a whole or of an individual in the name of the group. It abides in the elder, the chief of the lineage or of the clan. The *ayyana* demands from the individual in whom he will abide, primogeniture,<sup>736</sup> a good ethical background, a good economic achievement (wealth) [otherwise, *butichchi lallabuha*, *burzami gequha*, (nobody pays attention to the speech of a poor man, nobody is afraid of the glare of a man with cataract)], fame and eloquence. The higher the social position of someone in a traditional society, the more powerful *ayyana* he possesses. "The king was considered to be a person in a direct contact with the supernatural

<sup>734</sup> Haile Bubamo Arificio 1973, 134.

<sup>735</sup> Tessema, op. cit., 32.

<sup>736</sup> If the first born is a girl, she does not have the privilege of primogeniture. If there are one or more girls who are older than the boy, the boy has the right of primogeniture. *Ayyana* is meant here in connection with the privileges of the first-born male.

and, indeed, supernatural himself; for the well-being of the nation, he had to live in a fixed daily routine established by tradition. No one who was deformed wounded or sick could be introduced to him. No one was supposed to stand in his path and look at him because of the possibility of the evil eye; his skin could never touch the ground, and he was never to see a funeral for fear of pollution. He did not participate in any funeral, not even his own mother's."<sup>737</sup>

Those who possess the *ayyana* embody something paradoxical: they care for the welfare of the society, but they can also inflict calamities; they can easily kill or make somebody sick, and they can be easily afflicted by ordinary things; they are strong and weak at the same time.

In the same way, while mourning over someone (directly after death and also several times afterwards), this aspect is striking. The relatives of the deceased express on the one hand, love for him by thinking of him/her good behaviour, good deeds, economic, social and political assistance... On the other hand, there is an implicit fear of the deceased, because he is no more a human being. He has a supernatural power; he will be offended if the wishes of his lifetime on earth are not fulfilled by the relatives. Hence, the deceased becomes a threat for the living. Meeting or seeing him in dreams is considered as a harbinger of death. Especially, at night, people avoid going near the tombs, since it is believed that this is the time they ascend from the tomb. The social, economic and political activities of the Kambata should not oppose the expectations of these beings with a special *ayyana*. By saying "*rehe betu gobamua*" (a deceased person is always beautiful), the Kambata are also expressing the fact that nobody should say something bad about a deceased person. Therefore, to be outstanding (elders, kings) in the community and to absent from the community (deceased) means to be ambivalent.

This is one of the important characteristics of gods and spirits not only in Kambata, but also in many religions and cultures. They are good only as long as the living are good to them. As Orent says the spirits of the ancestors are deified.<sup>738</sup> Fortes says, "ancestralhood is fatherhood made immortal."<sup>739</sup> The father's feast should be honoured and his sacrificial promise kept, since everything belongs to the father and forefathers.<sup>740</sup> "By not appeasing these spirits (...), they are not fulfilling the obligations which are stipulated in their value system. These are the obligations, which relate to the respectful behaviour which sons must exhibit toward their fathers. And respect is not only measured in terms of address and in greeting - it is measured in terms of 'ritualised behaviour'... He [the spirit] is fed with the finest and freshest *tef* of the first harvest, which incidentally comes from land that is mutually cared for by the 'brothers' of a lineage and which is especially set aside for him."<sup>741</sup> As Chiatti says, "there can be no well-being without the performance of rituals, because the ancestors and spirits (*ayyana*), or the supernatural in general, want them."<sup>742</sup> Hence, sacred kingship has not only a religious significance, it has mainly a political and economic value: *religio ancilla*

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<sup>737</sup> Chiatti 1984, 363.

<sup>738</sup> Cf. Orent 1969, 302.

<sup>739</sup> Ibid. 302.

<sup>740</sup> Cf. ibid. 301.

<sup>741</sup> Ibid. 301f.

<sup>742</sup> Chiatti 1984, 345.

*societatis*. "The people were assured that the sacrifices would be made for the rain and the fertility of cattle and women, and that the decisions of the king were best for the nation."<sup>743</sup> Kambata's proverb "*woaha womaha lagennoba'a*" which means, there is neither bad water nor bad king (for the Kambata both are principle of prosperity and fertility), is congruent to this religious, political and social philosophical conception of the Wolayta.

*Ayyana* is the principle of life. Not only human beings possess it, but also other creatures such as animals. If a shepherd says "*ayyanu yoba-ea sa'a*" (this cow does not have *ayyana*), it describes the disobedience and troublesomeness of it. But the intensity of the *ayyana* of a creature depends on its intellectual level and social position. *Ayyana* is the immanence of God who is actually too far away from the daily life of the Kambata. It makes God empirical. It is to the different *ayyana* of the different ancestors that a sacrifice is presented, not to God as such. Chiatti observed a similar religious philosophy among the Wolayta, "God is too high and too far away."<sup>744</sup> Knutsson observed a multifaceted concept of *ayyana* among the Macha Galla which is more or less the same among the Kambata: "*Ayyana* has in part the meaning of a divine being ... it also means a man's quality... it refers to a kind of guardian divinity of the family... is the 'kernel' of the personality and thereby the 'cause' of an individual character... It also means day, a particular festival day."<sup>745</sup>

I would like to discuss this point also from the psychoanalytical point of view. We have already seen the importance of community for the individual of the Kambata. As I have already said the social and existential philosophy of the Kambata does not say "*participio, ergo sum*" instead "*participio, ut sum*". Hence the communitarian participation of the Kambata is a teleological participation. The individual participates in the community not for the sake of the community, but instead for its own sake. What is the role of the *ayyana* in the community? What do the members of a family, a lineage or a clan have in common, in order to be able to be called a community?<sup>746</sup> From where does the community receive such a strong power, which obliges each individual to adapt itself to the norms of the community?<sup>747</sup>

Freud analyses the depiction of "Group Soul" of Le Bon, which will be useful for my illustration of *ayyana* in Kambata. We have already said, *ayyana* is the principle of life, and there is no life for the traditional Kambata without community. The community exists because it possesses a collective soul.<sup>748</sup> The individuals have heterogeneous interests, which can only be realised within the community. According to Le Bon, the group demands that the individual changes and adapts itself to the group. The community prevents the temptation of a member to stand out of the community. The collective soul has the task of creating a homogenous community from heterogeneous individuals. In short, *ayyana* is the collective soul. Without *ayyana* no creature, no individual, no lineage, no clan and no community (group) would exist.

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<sup>743</sup> Ibid. 450.

<sup>744</sup> Cf. *ibid.* 344.

<sup>745</sup> Quotation according to Chiatti 1984, 345.

<sup>746</sup> The word "Masse" in this work of Freud is translated as Group or Mass. But I would like to use it as "Community", since it entails something supernatural.

<sup>747</sup> Cf. Freud, *op. cit.*, 67.

<sup>748</sup> Cf. *ibid.* 68.

According to Le Bon, in the community the individual obtains a great power to do something because the social norms allow it.<sup>749</sup> These norms must not be just in themselves. Only the society justifies them. In case they are not just in themselves, nobody is responsible for it, since the individual is anonymous in the community. The second characteristic of the individual in the community is that it sacrifices its interests for the sake of the community. This is something contagious. However, Le Bon either does not mention or grasp the teleological aspect of belonging to a community. The third feature of an individual in the community is suggestibility: the disposition of being influenced by the community.<sup>750</sup> Le Bon compares the situation of an individual in the community with a hypnotised person, who does not possess consciousness. "The main characteristics of an individual in the group are: disappearance of a conscious personality, dominance of an unconscious personality, orientation of thoughts and feelings in one direction through suggestion and contagiousness, tendency towards an immediate realisation of the suggested ideas. The individual is itself not any more, it rather becomes a will-less automaton."<sup>751</sup> According to this view, community is an intellectual disparagement. Therefore, it tolerates or even furthers domination and oppression.<sup>752</sup> The proverb of the Kambata "*woha womaha lagennoba'a*" underlines this maintenance.

A group or, better, a community in the society is not a crowd, since it organises itself and has common interests. It has "some degree of reciprocal influence between the members" and "mental homogeneity".<sup>753</sup> If a community demands that diversity and plurality should be suppressed, the community life is seen as a dissolution and sublimation of the individual. From heterogeneous individuals there emerges an anonymous individual who is infallible and has a collective soul: *ayyana*. As Freud correctly grasped, it is apparently dangerous to oppose it (the collective soul).<sup>754</sup> Therefore, a prohibiting maxim of the Kambata says: "*mannu ma yano!*" (what would the people say!). *Ayyana* as the principle of the community life has common features with "*woga*" which signifies culture, custom, norm, tradition and law. The one who violates the "*woga*" does not have *ayyana*. Therefore, the *ayyana* safeguards the *woga* and takes care of disposition of the individual for emulation and suggestion, which guarantee the existence of community.

According to Freud, the obligation and urge to belong to a community is something libidinal. In the face of disparagement of the intellect, emotion increases. As a consequence individual demarcations will be blurred,<sup>755</sup> and instead, self-sacrifice and self-dissolution emerge.<sup>756</sup> Since to be in love with somebody means to live *in* somebody and to rescind the excluding ego, the subject is dissolved. In the same way, when members of a community have the same emotions, will, desire and goal, the individual Ego is sublimated.

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<sup>749</sup> Cf. *ibid.* 69.

<sup>750</sup> Cf. *ibid.* 69f.

<sup>751</sup> *Ibid.* 71.

<sup>752</sup> Cf. *Ibid.* 73.

<sup>753</sup> *Ibid.* 79.

<sup>754</sup> Cf. *ibid.* 80.

<sup>755</sup> Cf. *ibid.* 79.

<sup>756</sup> Cf. *ibid.* 85.

Further, Freud analyses the work of Trotter (1916) on gregariousness. In a situation of gregariousness "the individual feels himself incomplete, if he is alone."<sup>757</sup> To contradict the group spirit means separation from it; therefore, this has to be avoided. Nobody should stand out from the group, since it is contagious and disintegrates the communal life. The prohibiting maxim of the Kambata "*mannu ma yano*" (what would the people say) and the proverb "*mannu manna ihanohu manninet*" (human beings become human beings through fellow human beings) underpin the existential dependence on one another. Social justice means to relinquish something so that others may not desire to have or do it. This demand of equality is the fundament of social consciousness and sense of obligation.<sup>758</sup> Hence, the community possesses a common power. But this communality needs an object, which unifies the members:

- hatred against a person, group, lineage, clan, etc. (violence canalisation) and
- an individual (leader) or a group (lineage, clan) who personifies the *ayyana*.

### 5.3.5 Blessing and Curse as Communication

When I examine blessing and curse, I will try to underline the significance of the community for the individual. Through blessing or curse the community executes its authority. It has a power to determine the life of an individual. The community can punish or reward an individual not only with sanctions or rewards respectively, but also with his words. It has a creative as well as a destructive word. The fate of the individual of the traditional Kambata is in the hands of its community. For example, in case of sterility, the woman and her husband and relatives believe that she or somebody in the kinship might be accursed. If such a thing should happen in an agricultural society like Kambata, the consequences are grave and multifaceted. "And since the work of agriculture is tiresome and energy consuming, these parents cannot continue working during their old age. Therefore they want to depend on their children for every activity until they die."<sup>759</sup> Hence, blessing or curse touches all the realms of life: social, economic, political, etc.

In the society of Kambata there are many occasions to bless somebody. Just to mention some of them:

- when a woman gives birth to a child, she, the baby and her husband will be blessed by friends and relatives by putting a piece of fresh butter on their head,
- the one who will be circumcised will be blessed by the elders on the eve of the circumcision ritual,
- the circumcised will be blessed by young friends and women of the village by putting fresh butter on his/her head,
- the newly married will be blessed,
- if there is any feast in a family, the members of the family will be blessed by the guests,
- if a family takes in someone as guest, it will be blessed by the guest,

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<sup>757</sup> Ibid. 110.

<sup>758</sup> Cf. *ibid.* 112.

<sup>759</sup> Gebre 1983, 33.

- parents and grandparents bless offspring.

The central point of each blessing is fertility: "*lei, massa'am*" which means "be fertile" (literally; grow) and blessed. Those who bless always have something to drink in their hands. Before the blessing they do not drink from it. Right after the blessing, the one who is blessed drinks from the drink which those who bless have in their hands, but he should drink from it before they drink. This part that he drinks is called "*luda*" which is freely translated as "the best". This part is usually offered for spirits by pouring it on the ground. Hence, to bless someone means to entrust him to the spirits so that they may give him the *ayyana* in abundance to make him a good and exemplary member of the family and society. While blessing the one who blesses is participating in the creative work of God. Blessing is *creatio continua*. Blessing is "power of life, increasing of life... Blessing is radiation of power and energy. Blessing is fertility, living long, luck of life, succeeding in all deeds, being complete, peaceful, secure, in good fortune and welfare."<sup>760</sup> As Frettlöh says, blessing has a social function: it establishes community, solidarity and esteem.<sup>761</sup> "*Massat*" (blessing) has in Kambata two meanings: to bless and to add. Therefore, blessing is an addition of something. This is the dimension of *creatio continua*. A being of *creatio ex nihilo* needs something more. It is not yet complete. The creation has to be carried on and accomplished by the community. The community brings the creation of the individual to its end: the *pleroma/plerosis* (in Greek: fulfilment).

Through his blessing, the one who blesses is expressing what kind of social member he wishes to have. Therefore, blessing as well as cursing is a communication between the one who blesses and the one who is blessed or between the one who curses and the one who is being cursed.<sup>762</sup> Nordh describes the process of blessing and curse as a show of force and a test of each other's strength.<sup>763</sup> In this act, the subject is substantially determining the history of the object. The fate of the object is at the mercy of the subject. At least in the Jewish and Christian religions God is conceived as God of history. He determines the history of his people. Even if there are considerable theological differences, it is almost the same in the traditional society of the Kambata. The immanent spirits, which make the transcendent God concrete, are determining the history of the individual in Kambata, in co-operation with the community. Therefore, every happening could be a theological object. For the traditional Kambata, rewards or sanctions are deeds of the spirits through the community, since *vox populi est vox dei*.<sup>764</sup>

As Nordh says, the one who curses or blesses must have authority so that the blessing or curse works. But what kind of authority? Authority does not mean here social position as parent, elder, chieftain or king. The one who blesses or curses should have a certain connection with the one who is blessed or cursed. He cannot just bless or curse anybody; otherwise it is not effective. "The content of curses and blessings refers to the self-interests of the sender, the aim of the sender is to sustain his self-interests,... The sender must express

<sup>760</sup> Quotation according to Magdalene L. Frettlöh 1998, 43.

<sup>761</sup> Cf. *ibid.* 44.

<sup>762</sup> Cf. Katarina Nordh 1996, 69.

<sup>763</sup> Cf. *ibid.* 70.

<sup>764</sup> N. B. This is not in the sense of the democratic conception in Europe around the middle of the 19th century according to which the will of the majority was the ultimate measure of social decisions. This sentence applies for the traditional Kambata in a quite different sense: God and the community are *de facto* identical.

himself in such a way that he catches the receiver's attention...; he aims at the self-interests, the weak points, of the receiver. The sender uses the information as a means by which he is able to control and manipulate the receiver."<sup>765</sup> As Nordh says, the formulae of blessing and cursing are wishes and promises, warnings and threats, blackmailing and psychological warfare.<sup>766</sup> The *Sitz im Leben* of cursing and blessing is community. To curse means to exclude someone from the community. It is a special denial of spiritual community. Someone can live *in* the community, but that does not mean that he is *of* the community. In order to be "of the community", there must be a spiritual relationship. The one who curses, therefore, intends to deny this spiritual relationship to the one who is accursed. Only this denial of a spiritual relationship leads to physical isolation, which is similar to being accursed. The one who is accursed has an existential problem: ostracising, exclusion and isolation encompass all realms (political, economic, social and religious) of the respective person.

### 5.3.6 Corruption in the Kinship Structures

Fame and "name" of a community or of an individual depend on political and economic successes, which demand clan solidarity for their realisation. Communality and solidarity are two of the important features of the kinship structures. We have seen above, how pivotal a role the *ayyana* plays in unifying the kinship members. *Ayyana* is a linking element of generations of a clan. It is the substance of the community, lineage, clan assistance and hospitality, even when the clan members did not know each other before. When they know that they are from the same clan, they support each other in case of, for example, political career, trial, fighting, revenge, etc. "If a man decides to run for a political position, all the members of his clan should support him. If a man dies, all the members have one year in which to offer condolences to the close relatives. Daily life is full of occasions for demonstrating this deep solidarity, which is perceived and lived by the actors as one, with no differences among its ritual, political, economic or judicial expressions."<sup>767</sup> If somebody dies who is not a member of the *Sera*, the kinship members have spiritual responsibility for the success of the ceremony.

As Chiatti depicts the kinship solidarity of the Wolayta, in many traditional societies the success as well as the misfortune of an individual is conceived as that of the whole community, lineage or clan. In any case, the individual should be protected by his kin. "If a fight occurs, participants help people of their clan, without inquiring into the issue. Besides being an economic institution, the market is also a social event where people meet and enjoy drinking, talking and smoking. The wealthy, with a retinue of servants, can make a show of power and wealth. Everyone from the controlling clan is proud of his 'father' who is feared by the clans... Economic, socio-political, and religious factors work together to reinforce clan group identity. The identity provides protection and pride, a sacred focus on a confluence of interests, an aggressive and defensive strategy. Isolation is suicidal in this society, and everyone must be part of a group in order to survive. Broad political structures have changed during the centuries, but clan solidarity has continued to be a constant."<sup>768</sup>

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<sup>765</sup> Nordh, op. cit., 71.

<sup>766</sup> Cf. *ibid.* 97.

<sup>767</sup> Chiatti 1984, 136f.

<sup>768</sup> *Ibid.* 184.



Corruption and problems of despotism in many traditional societies can be understood in this context. The mutual benefit in this relationship is that "the big man" expects that through this socio-economic structure, he is supported by the members of his kinship. The latter expect on their side that their socio-economic and political existence is assured. The members of the kinship almost always support the "big man" who will give them money, a piece of land, political positions, etc.<sup>769</sup> As LeVine says, the fulfilment of obligations to one's kinship (LeVine 1989, 370) is part of the cultural responsibilities of many traditional societies. "I see first my mother, my uncles, my father, my brothers, my countryman and I help them first. I know them, but do I know the government of Ghana, or the court of Ghana? [In Ghanaian colloquial usage, 'brother' refers not only to a blood brother but also to any male member of the extended family except one's father or uncles, and often to any male from one's own village or area. It indicates membership in a primary group. 'Sister' is often used in the same way. The colloquial 'countryman' (or 'countrywoman') may refer to someone from the village or the same area as the speaker, or it may simply refer to someone from the same ethnic group. It usually implies co-ethnicity except when used by Ghanaians abroad, when it may simply refer to another Ghanaian.] The politicians, ministers, MPs, even the civil servants with their regulations spoke in the beginning about working for Ghana's good. We were all proud to bring Ghana to democracy and to do better than the English, who only wanted to exploit us. Nkrumah said so and we believed him. Then everybody started to chop<sup>770</sup> money, chop cars, chop stores, and those who did not chop and said it was unlawful were soon sacked. So I learned the lesson and chopped without worrying, for myself and my brothers."<sup>771</sup> Those who "chop" are convinced that the end justifies the means. The end is that the kin are helped, it does not matter which kind of means they use.

## **5.4 Women and their social status**

I would like to discuss this point using the following perspectives that will help me to depict the subject matter systematically:

- a political and social philosophy perspective
- a cultural structure perspective
- a social structure perspective

### **5.4.1 A political and social philosophy perspective**

Treating the case of women and their social status politico- and socio-philosophically, what is the task of *politeia*, which is the constitutional reality - not necessarily, a written constitution - and which determines relations of classes of a *polis* and their social status? Is this social "order" realised by exclusion or integration of women?

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<sup>769</sup> Cf. *ibid.* 174.

<sup>770</sup> To chop means for them to eat, take, steal.

<sup>771</sup> Victor T. LeVine 1989, 367.

According to Aristotle, through the function of a being we understand the reason and end of its existence. The fact that something exists is, according to Aristotle, the proof of its functioning. Not only the existence, but also the essence of a being depends on its function. Therefore, survival, existence, essence and function are interdependent.<sup>772</sup> According to Aristotle, the function of human beings is to develop their special talent or excellence. However, not all human beings are able to exercise their reason equally.<sup>773</sup> "Not all humans qua humans have reason and share in the ability to be rational. Because of this natural difference among groups of human beings, some classes of human beings are by nature more fit for citizenship and rule than others. That some should rule and others be ruled is, in fact, one of the requirements of the polis: 'those which are incapable of existing without each other must be united as a pair ... of a natural ruler and ruled, for the purpose of preservation.' Not only are animals inferior to human beings because of their lack of reason and consequent eligibility to rule, but some classes of human beings are themselves inferior to others and, therefore, also ineligible to rule."<sup>774</sup>

By attributing the capability or incapability of the individual to rule or to be ruled to the predisposition of the soul, Aristotle essentialises the social differences not only as something biological, but also as substantially qualitative and innately different. As Phillips says, according to Aristotle, the reason for the inferior and subordinate status of some classes of human beings is located in their soul. Aristotle divides the soul into two: rational and irrational. By dividing the soul into rational and irrational, Aristotle *naturalises* not only the empowerment of the rational over the irrational, but also the superiority of the citizens over women, slaves and children. "Specifically, Aristotle argues that it is only among *adult men* that the rational part of the soul rules the irrational, while in the case of women, slaves and children, it is the irrational part of the soul that dominates. This means that men are to rule women, masters are to rule slaves and fathers are to rule children."<sup>775</sup> Phillips quotes the words of Aristotle as follows: "The deliberative faculty in the soul is not present at all in a slave; in a female it is present but ineffective; in a child present but undeveloped."<sup>776</sup>

The social system of Aristotle is based on functional differentiation. The system takes care of the adaptation to and maintenance of the existing social structure. Moreover, it strives for the realisation of the goal (end) of the system. Aristotelian functionalism requires functional differentiation. Aristotle wants to justify this social and political philosophy by saying that there is a mutual profit for the structural elements (social classes). For him it is a kind of division of labour. The interdependent concepts, which we have seen above, survival, function, existence, essence and end point to the individual as well as communitarian qualities. Adaptation to the respective socio-structural system, integration and pattern maintenance are required from the members of the community so that the goal attainment (Parsons) is realised (cf. Reinhold 1997, 656).

The Aristotelian 'structure functionalism' not only naturalises, but also justifies the social stratification of different classes, since it envisages in this system the benefit of both

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<sup>772</sup> Cf. Phillips 1993, op. cit., 124.

<sup>773</sup> Cf. *ibid.* 124.

<sup>774</sup> Quoted according to *ibid.* 124f.

<sup>775</sup> *Ibid.* 125.

<sup>776</sup> *Ibid.* 125.

parties. The quality of each social group is realised in performing its allotted tasks. A social class participates in "goodness" if it functions accordingly. Phillips quotes Aristotle as follows: "let it be assumed as to goodness that it is the best disposition or state or faculty of each class of things that have some use or work."<sup>777</sup> According to Aristotle, in the man-woman-relationship, woman is the beneficiary, and man the benefactor.<sup>778</sup> Aristotle not only stresses that women are to reproduce heirs, provide necessities for the male citizen, and they are not fitted to rule, but he also looks on women as if they were a deformity which occurs in the ordinary course of nature.<sup>779</sup>

The class hierarchy of Aristotle, which guarantees the functioning of the social system, is justified as teleological structuralism. That means that even if the majority of human beings is intended by nature to be instruments for assuring that *citizens* (adult men) will realise their highest good and achieve happiness by properly performing their function with the help of the respective virtue (*areté*) even women, slaves and children are achieving their happiness which is proportional to their social status. Concerning the degree of virtue of the respective social class, Phillips comments on the assertion of Aristotle as follows: "There is always a set of qualities in virtue of which a woman is a good woman, a slave a good slave, and so on. A good woman must have, for example, such qualities as quietness, modesty and a capacity for silence that would be totally undesirable in a man. On the other hand, she must not possess those qualities that are required of a good man, such as strength or cleverness. 'A man would seem a coward if he had only the courage of a woman, a woman a chatterbox if she were only as discreet as a good man.'"<sup>780</sup>

In the society of the Kambata, socio-political philosophy concerning women has a considerable similarity with that of Aristotle. Until the communist regime has ameliorated the social status of women, the traditional social norms have made clear-cut patterns of the behaviour of women in the public. By saying "*mentichchu lallabbe miniha, mentichchu azzajje miniha shar!*" which more or less means "*never a talkative (powerful) woman, never a dominant woman!*", the traditional Kambata reject any kind of dominance by women or her attitude of superiority. When their husbands discuss something, women are not supposed to interfere although the matter might pertain to the whole family. A man whose wife is talkative and interferes in discussions is despised by other men and even by women on the basis that his wife is exceeding her social rights and limitations.

According to Aristotle, the rational soul of women is dominated by the irrational one. Therefore, they cannot exercise their virtue actively. The result of this is that they cannot attain total happiness. Men achieve their happiness not only because women, slaves and children help them to attain this goal by being subservient to them; but also with the help of the dominance of their rational soul over the irrational one, they can actively exercise their virtue that makes them citizens and enables them to live the best life possible. The aim of the state is to enable the best life possible whose citizens are *free adult men*.

For the Kambata, like for Aristotle, social stratification and allotting the lower social classes the respective social status do not necessarily mean social injustice. Hierarchy and

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<sup>777</sup> Ibid. 126.

<sup>778</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 126.

<sup>779</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 126.

<sup>780</sup> *Ibid.*, 127.

functional differentiation are conceived as a necessity for the social and cultural order. Hence, the cause of the social and cultural stratification and the status of the respective classes are the socio-political philosophy of that particular society. However, there is a considerable philosophical change concerning the social value of women because of education, which has helped not only to develop the self-consciousness of women, but also to change the attitude of Kambata men towards them. This is an encouraging process for the extension of human and economic development of all social members.

#### **5.4.2 The cultural structure perspective**

Among the Kambata the value of a woman is measured by her fertility. Bubamo Arificio writes over the cultural significance of fertility of a woman among the Hadiya as follows: "In Hadiya tradition, marriage is meaningful only when the wife bears children. Therefore, the most important thing expected to happen during the first year or two after marriage of the young woman is the conception and bringing forth of a baby. So the young woman, her husband, parents of the husband and the parents of the young woman, all pray for the fertility of the young woman. When she becomes an expectant mother, the respect and love of her husband and that of his parents for her increases a lot."<sup>781</sup> "Once the young woman has acquired the status of motherhood she is respected and liked by everyone in the family and the clan."<sup>782</sup>

Since fertility plays an integral role in the cultural life of the Kambata, the cultural structure exerts an immense psychological pressure on women. That is because, by being infertile she not only lacks the decisive value measure of a woman, but she also endangers the family, lineage and even the clan. That means, a woman perpetuates the life of the family and enlarges the number of the members of the lineage and clan. By being sterile, she is almost putting an end to the life and continuity of the family and kinship. The bride price, which is common among the Kambata, is in this sense a kind of reward and compensation for the enabling of the continuation and perpetuation of the life of the bridegroom's family. The custom of the Kambata depending upon which levirate system - the sometimes compulsory marriage of a widow to a brother of her deceased husband - is applied, shows the significance of the fertility of a woman. The reason why the brother<sup>783</sup> of her deceased husband marries her is not only because he should take care of the children of his deceased brother, - if there are any -, but he should also make use of the fertility of the widow and guarantee the continuation and perpetuation of the life of the family, lineage and clan.

Children are the perpetuation of "name". As we have seen above, "name" is equivalent to person and nature. The innate desire for eternity of the Kambata is manifest through their desire for children. To live means to have children and to have children means to live for

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<sup>781</sup> Haile Bubamo Arificio 1973, 146.

<sup>782</sup> Ibid., 147.

<sup>783</sup> If the deceased did not have brothers, she can marry one of the closest relatives of the deceased. Even if she is principally free to marry or not a brother or a relative of the deceased, her freedom is limited. She can marry only either a brother or a relative of the deceased or she must live as widow. Anyone who does not belong to the kinship cannot continue the "work of fertility" which has been begun by her deceased husband. The children of the one whom she marries are considered as children of the deceased. Moreover, if she marries someone who does not belong to the kinship, it is believed that the property and wealth, which was achieved by the deceased, will be misused by the new husband. But if she marries a close relative of the deceased, because of his kinship responsibility, he will take care of the children and property with a big accountability.

eternity. Since the society of the Kambata is patriarchal, usually the name, nature and person of the patriarchal family, lineage and clan are immortalised. Sundermeier writes, about the Venda, in the southern Africa, if a rich woman wants to better her social status and be held in esteem, she can buy a young woman and arrange that the latter bears her children. The rich woman is considered as "father" of the children. She is addressed as "mother" as well as "father". These children "belong" to her whereas the others belong to the lineage of her husband.<sup>784</sup>

Up until money played the decisive role in exchange of goods in Kambata, the bride price was being paid in kind, especially animals. The transfer of living beings as dowry and bride price had a different and symbolic meaning. The bride is symbolically presented as a personification of life. She is bringing life to the family of her bridegroom. By giving the dowry (*gegeyya*), her family is wishing her future family a fertile and fruitful future. By giving animals as the bride price, the family of the bridegroom is thanking the family of the bride for having given this personified fertility. However, after the introduction of money and concentration of the agricultural economy more and more on land cultivation, and shortage of cattle, the Kambata changed over to using money in order to pay the bride price. This money system ended the original and traditional sense of the bride price, and marriage became a financial transaction. The bride is demoted almost to a "commodity". Many parents of the bride see the bride price as a reimbursement of the investment into her education and as security for their old age.<sup>785</sup>

As Aristotle does not include women in the citizenry, the Kambata exclude women from political and public affairs. Women embody a paradox feature. On the one hand, they are the personified fertility, they are the ones who guarantee life and continuity; on the other hand, they are *mas occasionatus* (Thomas of Aquinas), which means a "failed man", who are not as desired as men are; or at least they do not have the good social position and esteem which men enjoy. When a child is born a trill sound rings out. The number of the trill sound depends on the sex of the child. For a boy it is eight times and for a girl four times. Even if I cannot find out if the numbers 8 and 4 have any symbolic significance, they imply the double value of male to female.<sup>786</sup>

Woman also represents bad luck. When the father and the closest male relatives of a young man who wants to marry go to the family of a young girl, in order to ask her parents if it is possible that the young boy and girl would marry, it is a bad sign if they on the way meet a woman. They believe they are not going to be successful.

A marriage, which takes place through a preparatory participation of the parents, is called *qorsishsha*. It is usually initiated and arranged by the parents of both parties and is not necessarily based on the love of the would-be couple. In the modern conception love is an individual self-realisation. The Kambata do not know an individual love. One is loved in and by the family. Self-realisation and self-fulfilment are possible only through and in the family.

<sup>784</sup> Cf. Sundermeier 1988, op cit., 89f.

<sup>785</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 90f.

<sup>786</sup> Cf. Braukämper 1983, op. cit., 222. Maybe depending on different areas in Kambata, there are different numbers of trill sounds. Which Bubamo Arificio writes about the Hadiya might also apply at least for some Kambata areas. He says that the ululation (trill sound) rings out four times for a baby boy and three times for a baby girl. According to Bubamo Arificio the number 3 signifies the triangular shape of the female sexual organ. (Cf. Bubamo Arificio, op. cit., 133f.) Since number four is a full number, it might imply completeness, which could mean that only male, is a complete creature. According to the Kambata, this implies the superiority of men over women.

It is presupposed that she will love him and he will love her. Their children set the seal on this love.

Since recent decades there is another kind of marriage which is being frequented and which is advantageous for both parties. In the Kambata language it is called *heranchcha*. This kind of marriage is based on the acquaintance and love of the boy and the girl. "Though love is the most important part of *heranchcha*, there are other factors which are responsible for *heranchcha*. To mention some of these factors, if the young man is not in a position to pay the bride price, he tries to deceive a girl and marries her. Besides, if the young man's family or ancestors have low social status in their tribe, the boy tries to take this action. On the other hand, the girl marries in the form of *heranchcha*, if she is not beautiful and satisfactory in house activities. She also marries by *heranchcha*, if her age is beyond the tolerance of the tribe. Moreover, she accepts *heranchcha* if she is an orphan."<sup>787</sup> Since the type of marriage mentioned above (*qorsishsha*) is very formal and is based more on wealth, clan belongingness and social status of the parents than on love and face-to-face discussion of the would-be couple, in the face of the increasing economic difficulties of the society, it is becoming more and more non-affordable. Moreover, according to this type of marriage, girls especially are facing considerable difficulties to marry. If a girl is from a poor family or she belongs to a socially lower class, almost nobody wants to marry her; *Heranchcha* is informal and is based on the agreement of the girl and boy. If he is rich or he has rich parents, he dares to marry a girl who belongs to a socially higher class but who is economically poor. This is unthinkable in the formal type of marriage. If someone from a socially higher class marries somebody from a lower class, it is a serious disgrace and social demotion for the members of the family, lineage and clan of the former.

There is another type of marriage, which never respects the freedom of choice of the girls. It is called *midu*, which means abduction. The girl will be taken by force by the friends and relatives of the boy. Some of the reasons for abduction are:

- ◆ if she does not approve the agreement of her parents to give her to a person of a certain social class,
- ◆ if her parents do not agree to the request of the parents and relatives of the boy to marry her,<sup>788</sup>
- ◆ if he or his parents are richer than the parents of the girl, it shows their economic and economically backed up social power,
- ◆ if he or his parents are richer than the parents of the girl but belong to a lower social class (so as to psychologically improve their social position),
- ◆ if she is interested in the boy, and if her parents do not want to approve the marriage, she suggests her would-be husband to abduct her. Then she will pretend as if she were taken by force.

The first thing, which the abductor does, is to deflower or sleep with her. Defloration and sexual relation before marriage have heavy social consequences for her. Even if the parents and relatives of the girl should succeed to get her back, because of the fact that she is

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<sup>787</sup> Tassew Gebre 1983, op. cit., 21.

<sup>788</sup> There are also cases in which the parents of the girl secretly arrange her abduction if they realise that marriage relationship with the family of the future husband would have some economic and social advantages. Another case of implicit involvement of her parents in abduction is if they do not have enough money to provide various ceremonial feasts and different materials and cattle as dowry. (Cf. *ibid.*, 23-26.)

deflowered<sup>789</sup> or became pregnant, the possibility of having a husband in the future in a formal or informal way is very small. This fact exerts a considerable psychological pressure on the parents and relatives of the girl. Even the girl herself finds herself in a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, she does not want to live with the abductor because he violated her freedom; on the other hand, from now on, she will not have the chance any more to choose a husband and to enjoy social esteem and status.

Even death and burial ceremonies are characterised by man-woman-differentiation. If a man dies, his heroic deeds are danced, sung and narrated. This ceremony is called *geda*. Even if it is also sung and danced for women, there is no *geda* for women. The ones who narrate the heroic deeds of a man go to the market places sitting on horses and carrying spears and lances. They are dressed as warriors. Those who mourn over a woman narrate of her fertility, hospitality and what a good housewife she was.

Another important point concerning the position of women among the Kambata is polygyny. The following are some of the factors, which push some Kambata men to marry two or more women:

- by marrying many women, the man wants to instigate jealousy and competition among his wives and see which one loves him more,
- in order to attract the husband, the wives would be more diligent,
- the desire of the man to have many children,
- in most cases (especially in former times) the inability to choose the first wife freely, that means after the first wife, his parents would no more interfere him by choosing a wife,
- to demonstrate that he has become rich,
- to fulfil the desire of having another beautiful wife, since sexual relationship outside of marriage is culturally condemned,
- in case of lower social classes the desire to marry women from higher social classes (to compensate their marginalised socio-cultural status),
- if the first wife is not good enough in housework,
- in case the first wife loses sexual interest (for example, because of her old age).

But nowadays polygyny does not exist because it is

- politically: forbidden,
- religiously: it is sin (in the Christian sense), and
- economically: it is non-affordable.

In the family the husband-wife-relationship is based not on equality but on hierarchy and the superiority of the husband. "The wife is expected to show deference to her husband in all ways and conditions. She is regarded as a good wife if she knows her place [socio-cultural position and rights] when she talks with her husband as well as with other men. She has to act in every sphere of her life by honouring men. The wife should respect her husband, especially when he is with guests and in public. The wife should walk behind her husband when they go together."<sup>790</sup> "When elders or traditional chiefs come near by or when she comes across them she is expected to hide at least her face."<sup>791</sup> However, she not only hides herself from the

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<sup>789</sup> Virginity has a very high social value because pre-marital sexual intercourse is culturally scorned.

<sup>790</sup> Tassew Gebre, op. cit., 40.

<sup>791</sup> Haile Bubamo Arficio, op. cit., 150.

chiefs and gives them deference and priority; but she hides herself from their spirit, which requires hierarchical differences. In the case of violating these regulations she endangers herself and her family.

Another impact of the Kambata patriarchy on women is practising excision. The attempt to reduce sexual desire by excising the clitoris of women is a cultural attitude. That means, by excising the clitoris they want to prevent possible adultery. Even if nowadays almost nobody is conscious of it, this could be one of the attempts to explain the origin of practising excision. Some researchers on the practice of excision believe that it was introduced in the time of the one of the pharaohs of Egypt. One of the wives of the pharaoh loved her husband very much and had a strong sexual desire. In order to prevent that the other wives could attract or sexually possess the pharaoh, she asked her husband to introduce excision for all women of the country. Another mythological theory, which tries to explain the origin of excision, is the following. Socialisation needs distinguishing identification. Circumcision and excision are the process of distinguishing between male and female. Clitoris is the maleness of the female; the foreskin is the femaleness of the male. Through the socialisation process of excision/circumcision the male become pure male, and the female become pure female. Even if it is very difficult to know the real origin and reason of excision, which is still being practised in the Kambata culture, it plays the dominant role in the socialisation process. Through the circumcision/excision the neophyte becomes a full member of the community whereby the humanisation of human beings take place.

For the Kambata to divorce means to expel the woman. Laziness, childlessness, adultery are some of the reasons for expelling a woman. Unless the elders of both families settle the matter, if the husband thinks he should expel her, he has the right to do so. However, divorce is in Kambata very rare. This is mostly because of some practical reasons. For example, if he expels her and has children, it is almost impossible for him to take care of the children. Therefore, children are mostly one of the reasons, which maintain a marriage in spite of some difficulties. In case of divorce, she has no right to share from the wealth of the family, even if she has contributed to the economic set-up of the family. She can only take with her the gifts that were given to her during the wedding and her clothes. "In any event when women leave their agnatic kin at marriage they take only the clothing on their backs and at no time are they permitted to inherit property. Moreover, their jural rights are always supported indirectly for they may never present a claim or defend themselves before the assembly of elders. An elder is always chosen to present the case of a woman complainant. She cannot become a defendant in dispute because women are classed with children as not being legally responsible for their behaviour."<sup>792</sup>

Another feature of discriminating women in many societies is based on the cultural hierarchy. In the cultural system of many traditional societies there are taboos which differentiate the realms of men and women. Orent did a research on the Kafa (southwest Ethiopia). According to the Kafa culture, every man has a special spirit. In a family, if there are many brothers, after the death of the father, the spirit itself chooses to abide only in only one of the brothers. In this case this spirit is called *ek'k'o*. All the others have a spirit, *baro*. A "bleeding" (menstruating) woman is not allowed to enter the house of a man with a special spirit (*ek'k'o*). If she does it (knowingly or unknowingly) she endangers the life of her

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<sup>792</sup> Hamer 1972, op. cit., 26.



husband. If she "bleeds" in the presence of her husband, she endangers the life of her children. Orent says the following as reasons for this punishment:

1. "She was menstruating in the spirits house.
2. She prepared food while menstruating, which others then ate.
3. She entered through *dadi*, the man's part of the house while menstruating.
4. She ate the head of a cock."<sup>793</sup>

By doing this woman is rescinding social differentiation and hierarchy. She is not allowed to trespass cultural norms and allotted social positions, according to which only men should control the flow of any kind of blood.<sup>794</sup> "This is done in:

1. Ritual slaughters where they spill blood.
2. At the Atero feast (which is a fertility feast conducted by old women who are beyond menstruation), at which time the oldest male collects the blood of the sacrifice...
3. During healing activities where they use horns as suction cups to draw out blood.

Women are never permitted to slaughter any animal whatsoever, i.e. those which are to be eaten. It seems then that these categories of transgression run parallel to the division between the sexes in Kafa.

1. Women must enter through certain parts of the house.
2. Women do not partake in the sacrifice.
3. Women must not be present in the initial construction of a house.

The deviation of any of these rules for daily life is a threat to the male roles because the taboos symbolise the opposite of maleness. And therefore it is only to be expected that the spirits, who are of male character, punish all those who are involved in these transgressions."<sup>795</sup>

The women of the Kambata are almost entirely dependent on their husbands. They cannot take decisions by themselves; they need the ratification of their husbands. The husband can sell some of the properties or cattle of the family if he deems it necessary; he does not necessarily need the ratification of his wife. But the wife would never think of doing that. She could at most secretly sell some kilos of grain. Moreover, she can sell some inset-products or vegetables for family purposes. "Women rarely spend on themselves or their children without the approval of the patron, and even then only for special occasions such as holidays. As of today, most women consider their productive work and income as a means of caring for the entire family, and not as a way of protecting themselves in the marital relationship."<sup>796</sup> Some discriminating functional differentiation and labour divisions are usually backed up by traditional values, beliefs and customs that undermine women's position within the household and in the communities by "naturalising" their incapability to perform some activities and hold some social positions.<sup>797</sup>

Labour division between men and women is another factor that determines the social position of both sexes. Taking care of children, nutrition, water, energy, old and sick family

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<sup>793</sup> Orent 1969, 300.

<sup>794</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 300.

<sup>795</sup> *Ibid.*, 300f.

<sup>796</sup> Hanna Kebede 1990, 64.

<sup>797</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 59.

members are the duties of women.<sup>798</sup> Experts say that in the agricultural societies, women work 16 hours a day. Women perform 80% of care for stocks, 90% of food preparation, 60% of trade and 50% of looking after cattle.<sup>799</sup> All their works have something to do with family and home economics. Werlhof calls this system, therefore, "*Hausfrauisierung*" which literally means *housewifisation*.<sup>800</sup>

The cultural structure is apparently influencing the freedom of women in education and economic independence. Even if in the society of the Kambata these discriminating cultural structures are present, participation of women in agricultural activities is substantially low. Moreover, there is a considerable spirit of co-operation by the men, especially young boys, by fetching water, collecting firewood, preparing food, etc. Sometimes, many researchers misunderstand the reason for labour division between men and women or generalise it for the combined African societies or developing countries. Anyway, in the case of the Kambata, many of the agricultural field tasks are extremely heavy for women. Land clearing, cutting of wood, fencing, terracing, harvesting of grain, etc. are some of the very heavy tasks which women cannot perform. Some critics believe that African men perform this kind of work because it is work of short duration.<sup>801</sup> This assertion is firstly, a false generalisation; and secondly, a result of a superficial understanding of the cultural and economic system of various African societies.

#### 5.4.3 The social structure perspective

The aim of the section 5.4 is to show the interconnection between the political and social philosophy, cultural structure and social structure of the society of the Kambata. The philosophical worldview manifests itself in the cultural norms, regulations, customs and institutions. The latter allots an individual and a class its respective social status and determines the grade of freedom, participation in public activities, the making use of the social infrastructures and the space for an individual and a class self-realisation.

"In the last decade and a half, urban women have branched out into employment areas which do not require formal education, to earn their living. Jobs in the construction industry and in factories, as well as in sales and marketing are now filled by women."<sup>802</sup> The low educational level of women is caused by the socio-cultural structures, which do not favour the education of women. Many parents in Kambata tend to send their boys than their girls to school. The consequence of this is a considerably low rate of economically active<sup>803</sup> women. Relying on the research on economic activities by the UN (UN 1986:198-9), Hanna Kebede worked out the growth rate of the economically active and non-active in the global economic system.

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<sup>798</sup> Cf. Ludgera Klemp 1993, 289.

<sup>799</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 290.

<sup>800</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 292.

<sup>801</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 297.

<sup>802</sup> Hanna Kebede, *op. cit.*, 64.

<sup>803</sup> Being *economically active* means according to Hanna Kebede performing skilled labour and being formally employed.

**Table 10: Economically active/inactive males and females**

The growth of economically active males and females			The growth of economically inactive males and females		
Year	Male	Female	Year	Male	Female
1970-1985	2.1%	1.7%	1970-1985	2.8%	2.7%
1985-2000	2.5%	1.6%	1985-2000	3.4%	3.3%

Source: Hanna Kebede, op. cit., 62.

Klemp says that 2/3 of all work hours in the world is performed by women, but they receive only 10% of the world income and they possess less than 1% of the world economy.<sup>804</sup> Women experience discrimination and disadvantages in their political powerlessness, lack of representation in skilled positions, male-oriented marriages and family regulations, different wages for the same qualifications and achievements and violence against women. Furthermore, there are discriminating differences between men and women in the literacy rate and working in formal economic sectors.<sup>805</sup>

According to Klemp, in the colonial value system the work of men was considered as "modern" and that of women "backward". Male labour power was implemented in the economic sectors which enhanced export economy and cash crop production, such as cotton, peanut, coffee, tobacco, rice, tea, etc. Because of taxation men had to work on big farms and in the mines of the colonisers. The consequence was that women had to perform all the work at home including that of the men and take care of the family. In the face of the money-economy, the subsistence economy was considered backward. Hence, a factual polarisation and discrimination was introduced: formal against non-formal qualifications, market production against subsistence production, money income against agricultural produce, industrial mass production against craftsman production.<sup>806</sup>

When the sectors in which women are usually employed begin to be modernised, women are replaced by men since they are not technically qualified and have no formal skill. Klemp mentions an example from Bangladesh concerning this fact. The introduction of the rice mill for the women in Bangladesh means a loss of their only source of employment because the millwork is run by men.<sup>807</sup> Another example is the intensification of agricultural work through the use of tractors and the enlargement of agricultural fields. This trend became a heavy burden for women because the mechanised work is usually run by men while the labour-intensive and non-mechanised is performed by women. By using the machines the men's working hours became shorter and the women's longer, because through the help of the tractors large pieces of land can be cultivated within a short period of time.<sup>808</sup>

Furthermore, the introduction of western drinks such as beer supersedes the local drinks in many African societies. The local beer is usually brewed by women. Since the introduction of western beer and its factories almost nobody is interested in drinking the local beer, which means a substantial loss of income for women.

<sup>804</sup> Cf. Klemp, op. cit., 289.

<sup>805</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 290.

<sup>806</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 292f.

<sup>807</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 293.

<sup>808</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 300.

There are structures in many developing countries, which factually make it impossible for women to become big traders. In India, Klemp says, there are a lot of women who are active as traders of fish in a small setting. But there is no woman who has access to the big trade. Moreover, when formal structures are introduced, the number of women working as big traders substantially decreases.<sup>809</sup>

In the face of sexually specific labour division, subsistence production and market production are functionally interdependent. De facto the labour division is characterised by the integration of men into the market production and women in the subsistence production. Even if the work of women is considered as "backward", they are the ones who, with their subsistence work, subsidise the modern sector.<sup>810</sup> This statement confirms the situation of the Kambata. Because of the arable land scarcity many Kambata men migrate to Methara and Wonji, where there are big government farms of cash-crop production and sugar factories. Women remain at home, take care of their children, fields and cattle and pay governmental and non-governmental taxes. By taking on these responsibilities and producing food-crops, they are indirectly subsidising the market production and industrial sector.

The world economic system allots the industrialised countries the capital-intensive work and final processing of industrial products and the developing countries the labour-intensive work and export oriented partial processing of industrial and agricultural products. As Klemp says, many production sectors in the free trade zones in the developing countries such as in Asia and Latin America are run by young and not yet "used up" women between the age of 14 and 22, since they offer a cheap human labour.<sup>811</sup> Klemp sees the reason of the set-up of many female self-help organisations in this structural injustice. Through the creation at their own co-operative groups and union, they demonstrate their rejection of the current global structural discriminations.<sup>812</sup>

As we have seen above, the growth of economically active women is lower than that of men, and the growth of the economically non-active women higher than that of men. 80% of the people who are displaced because of political persecution, war, violence, environmental destruction, etc. are women and children. Moreover, the structural adjustment programmes are disadvantageous mainly to women, because the reduction of public expenditure is endangering women and the sectors in which they are active. As long as the international and national frameworks do not consider the cases of women and abolish the patriarchal discrimination and oppression, the *feminisation of poverty* (Feminisierung der Armut (Klemp) will never cease to exist.<sup>813</sup>

Last summer (1999) I spoke with the departmental leader of the Qadida-Gamela District schools. He gave me the following data regarding school leavers in the primary, junior secondary and senior secondary schools: In 1997 out of 22,666 students there were 2,069 dropouts; and in 1998 out of 25,183 students there were 3,884 dropouts. He told me that female dropouts are higher than male dropouts are. Some of the reasons are:

- The parents buy clothes for boys rather than for girls.

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<sup>809</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 294.

<sup>810</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 294.

<sup>811</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 298.

<sup>812</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 299.

<sup>813</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 301f.

- Girls cannot express their worries and ideas to their parents. For example, cases that have something to do with sexuality cannot be discussed with the parents. Moreover, during the menstruation time, many girls prefer to stay at home for fear of bleeding in front of the students, since most of them do not have any protectors.
- In the schools, boys ask the girls for money. If they do not give them, they threaten them.
- Early in the morning before going to the school, the girls have to go to fetch water. If they are not punctual, they are not allowed to enter the school compound.
- Since most of the students go to school from distant areas, it is very tiresome and difficult to be at school on time. Especially during the rainy season, the roads are very slippery. It is usually very difficult particularly for female students to be on time despite these climatic and geophysical hardships.

So as not always to face these problems, they would rather prefer to marry at an early age. That is one of the reasons why they are always employed in informal sectors. As a consequence, one of the interesting characteristics is the higher the level of education, the lower the number of women.

#### The Table of Teachers' Educational Qualification in Kambata

**Table 11: Teacher's educational qualification**

School Year	Educational Level	Male Teachers	Female Teachers
1997/98	≤12	207	76
	TTI <sup>814</sup>	1223	242
	Diploma/College	102	5
	BA/University	32	1
1998/99	≤12	201	74
	TTI	1,188	249
	12+1	13	0
	Diploma/College	119	9
	BA/University	27	3
	MA/University	1	0

Source: Department of Education, Durame 1999

A table of teachers and enrolled students in the primary schools, junior and senior secondary schools in Kambata:

<sup>814</sup> Teachers Training Institute

**Table 12: Teachers and enrolled students**

<u>School Year</u>	<u>Students</u>		<u>Teachers</u>	
	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>
1993/94	24,979	15,227	737	97
1994/95	26,270	15,262	1,300	255
1995/96	34,624	21,688	1,437	273
1996/97	36,446	24,356	1,434	286
1997/98	38,969	27,176	1,564	324
1998/99	41,817	29,774	1,549	335

Source: Department of Education, Durame 1999

The following table shows the number of young girls and boys in Kambata between the ages of 5 and 24.<sup>815</sup> Here the aim is to show the number of male and female students in comparison to their absolute number in the region.

**Table 13: Boys and girls between the age of 5-24**

<u>Year</u>	<u>Boys</u>		<u>Girls</u>	
	in number	in per cent	in number	in per cent
1994/95	114,405	49.86%	115,026	50.14%
1995/96	117,145	49.88%	117,683	50.12%
1996/97	119,493	49.79%	120,509	50.21%
1997/98	122,821	49.88%	123,407	50.12%
1998/99	125,770	49.88%	126,376	50.12%

Source: Department of Planning and Economy, Durame 1999

The following table shows the percentage of enrolled girls and boys between 1994/95 and 1998/99:

**Table 14: Percentage of enrolled students**

	<i>Percentage of enrolled students</i>	
<u>Year</u>	<u>Girls</u>	<u>Boys</u>
1994/95	13.28%	23%
1995/96	18.42%	29.56%
1996/97	20.21%	30.5%
1997/98	23.01%	31.72%
1998/99	23.56%	33.24%

Source: Department of Planning and Economy, Durame 1999

Even if the absolute number of girls between the age of 5 and 24 is slightly higher than that of the boys, the enrolled girls in the schools are substantially less than the boys.

<sup>815</sup> The reason why I chose this age between 5 and 24 is because in Kambata many young boys and girls do not finish their senior secondary school before the age of 24.

## 5.5 Kambata and its population

In this section I would like to shortly discuss the population growth of Kambata and its causes from an economic, socio-cultural and religious point of view. The causes of the population growth of Kambata can be divided into two: positive and negative causes. The positive causes favour the growth of population because they bestow favourable economic, ecological, climatic, sociological and socio-political preconditions. These facts can also be negative causes of population growth. For example, the economic, ecological and climatic situation is a positively determining factor because it disposes an auspicious precondition to produce food that is a basic necessity in order to exist. However, unfavourable economic, ecological and climatic conditions can also be a cause of demographic growth. The people in this situation reproduce themselves in order to be able to manage the consequences of these conditions and to guarantee their own and their descendants' future. Sociological and socio-political elements are positive if in a community there is socio-cultural stratification that is propitious for those who are from higher social classes, and who can make use of their political power and social status, and as a consequence favour their reproduction. But those from lower social classes have to reproduce so as to cope with their economic, sociological and socio-political challenges and disadvantages. Let us see the positive ecological, climatic and economic causes of the demographic growth of Kambata.

In the first section of this part of the paper, I have been trying to shortly present the geographic, ecological, and climatic situation of Kambata. Kambata provides propitious living conditions for settlement. Braukämper describes Kambata as one of the most stable ecological systems in the northeast Africa.<sup>816</sup> Even the top of the mountains (higher than 2800 m) in the region are cultivable. The highlands and mountains can be used throughout the whole year as alpine pasture.<sup>817</sup> "Population densities are higher in the highland areas than in the lowlands..."<sup>818</sup>

Besides these favourable agricultural factors, the geo-medicinal conditions are auspicious circumstances, which contribute to the demographic growth in Kambata. Some of the dangerous tropical diseases, such as malaria are hardly to be found in Kambata. Some epidemics which had occurred in the past and which occur now have never been and are rarely a considerable threat for the population of the region.<sup>819</sup> For the neighbouring peoples, the Kambata were and are people with a high life expectancy. And because of its rich agricultural resources, the region as a whole was considered by the neighbouring people as a place of refuge in the times of economic needs. Therefore, Kambata, as an agriculturally self-sufficient and ecologically stable and calculable region, has quite often been an attraction for many immigrants and refugees.<sup>820</sup>

**Table 15: Demographic table of the population of Kambata**

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<sup>816</sup> Cf. Braukämper 1983, 8.

<sup>817</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 8.

<sup>818</sup> Markos Ezra 1990. 160.

<sup>819</sup> Besides the geo-medicinal auspicious preconditions, the medical and hygienic improvements play an important role by furthering population growth. However, whereas the medicinal improvement to some extent hinders mortality and therefore, contributes to a rapid population growth, the economic development stagnates and even deteriorates in Kambata. Without economic growth there is no education, and without extensive education there is no economic growth; therefore, the Kambata think that they can overcome their economic problems only if they have more children, and the modern medicine facilitates this attitude. (Cf. Manfred Wöhlcke 2000, 70.)

Year	Urban Areas		Rural Areas		<b>Total</b>
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
1994/95	14886	14863	192514	192057	<b>414320</b>
1995/96	15511	15487	196855	196388	<b>424241</b>
1996/97	16162	16137	201295	200817	<b>434411</b>
1997/98	16839	16814	205834	205345	<b>444832</b>
1998/99	17546	17518	210475	209976	<b>455515</b>
1999/2000	18283	18254	215222	214711	<b>466470</b>

Source: Kambata, Alaba and Tembaro Planning and Economic Development Department Statistics Bureau of Population Growth, 1998 Durame.

Kambata is an exclusively agricultural society. As it has already been elaborated in the section 4 above, the total area of Kambata is 1,040.39 km<sup>2</sup> and the population density is 449.5 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>.

### 5.5.1 The Economic Reason for the High Population Growth in Kambata

The subsistence agricultural economy of the Kambata is one of the determining factors for the high population growth. In a labour intensive agricultural economy, children are the only available labour source and social security for the parents, relatives and neighbours. A Kambata family cannot fulfil its basic needs if it does not have children. The families of the sons and daughters are the old-age home of the parents. Therefore, the more children the parents have, the better their social security will be. Moreover, the older brothers and sisters not only help their parents in the agricultural or home works, but they also take care of their younger brothers and sisters. Therefore, many Kambata children develop a solid sense of responsibility already at a young age.<sup>821</sup>

In an agricultural society, which depends on the cultivation of land, boys have a higher economic value. In Kambata, males are the ones who almost exclusively work on agricultural fields. If a family has only daughters, the father of the family faces enormous economic difficulties. Therefore, the motto which says, "the desire for boys is the father of many girls", gives expression to the economic preference for male children. Of course, that does not mean that a Kambata family does not wish to have female children. If a family has only male children, the labour burden of the wife is very high. Therefore, the father as well as the mother strongly desire to have at least one daughter, not only so that she can help the mother with housework; but a family is only then complete if it has both boys and girls.

According to Wöhlcke, poverty is one of the key reasons for a high population growth in a country or society. As long as the poverty is not so extreme that the general and child mortality is higher than the biological reproduction level, an economically weak society faces a high population growth. Wöhlcke enumerates the following points as its cause:

- "The significance of having many children as social and old-age security in a marginal socio-economic milieu in which children yield more income than cause expenses;
- lacking education, and dominant role of the woman as mother;

<sup>820</sup> Cf. Braukämper, op. cit., 8.

<sup>821</sup> Cf. Jürg A. Hauser 1991, 184.



- anomalous family relationships;
- widely practised promiscuity, and
- ignorance of the contraceptive methods or a little access to them."<sup>822</sup>

Wöhlcke holds that the present "development" of the Third World is the cause of its present demographic explosion. With this thesis, Wöhlcke wants to disprove another economic development theory, which maintains that economic development causes high population growth. Here, the modern medicine is playing a decisive role by substantially decreasing child mortality and increasing life expectancy. However, the medicinal effects and economic achievement are substantially incongruent. That means that the economic growth is either stagnating or going backward, whereas modern medicine is furthering the life expectancy. Finally, Wöhlcke maintains that the economic development as well as demographic stemming can be realised only if the individual is economically actively integrated.<sup>823</sup>

On the other hand, researchers of demography and demographic sociologists should be cautious when they propound that many traditional societies have many children so that, in the face of the enormous economic problems, at least some of the children might survive.<sup>824</sup> This assertion shows a superficial understanding of the value of the individual in its respective culture and society. If the parents would think like this, then the individual child in the family would be just one of many, without having any special significance for the parents and its siblings. Of course, the parents are always confronted with the danger of losing some of their children; but they, never think and say that at least some of their children might survive for them as social security. They love each child as an individual and in the familial context; and there is not an individual love, which says to an individual "I love you!" Therefore, the rationality of having many children is not based on the wish that the parents would like to have many children so that at least some of the children might survive. Having many children is rational rather because of the motto "unity is strength"; and unity is efficacious and strong only if the group contains as many members as possible. This unity is not only political or economic, but also affectional and religious.

### **5.5.2 The Socio-Cultural Reason for the High Population Growth in Kambata**

The different realms of human life are structurally and functionally interwoven. The socio-cultural components "normalise" and institutionalise the co-existence of the members of a community. Religion is the backbone and supernaturally justifying power of the structures and social and cultural values of this community. The socio-cultural as well as the religious components aim at the economic and political well being of the social unit. Therefore, many social values can be understood in this context of religious and socio-cultural functional interactions.

As I have already mentioned in the section of "kinship structures", the high value of the fertility of a woman is to be understood in its social and instrumental sense. To have many children means to maintain and strengthen the power of the family. A woman who does not

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<sup>822</sup> M. Wöhlcke, op. cit., 71.

<sup>823</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 71.

<sup>824</sup> Cf. Die deutschen Bischöfe 1993, 16f.

have children is endangering the continuity of the family and clan. Moreover, the Kambata believe that a family is more joyful and colourful only if it has many members. If a child in a Kambata family is greedy, the parents say to it, "don't be as if you grew up alone in the family!" This is to teach the child that it should develop a sense of sharing and caring for the others and adapt itself to the social system. In many traditional societies, children are practically the only social value measure of women, since the women's political and economical contribution is considered as insignificant.

The socio-cultural norms institutionalise the framework for socially legitimised sexual relationships and births.<sup>825</sup> According to this setting, the age of marriage, re-marriage, norms on extra-nuptial sexual relationships or sanctions and taboos concerning it, etc., are regulated.<sup>826</sup> The regulations, norms and traditions are, as Hauser says, anchored by the society and/or state and their "religion". Here, it is meant by "religion" something which holds back and restrains a group of human beings with a common interest and which they rely on. Therefore, the instrumental function of religion is to take care of the survival of the human beings; and any socio-cultural norms in any given period of time are introduced only according to the respective environmental and social conditions at the time of the introduction of the norms.<sup>827</sup> The aim of all economic, socio-cultural and religious strategies is to secure the biological continuity as a group, society or nation. As Hauser says, a society invents a *normative* solution, if its members are confronted with common, burdensome and recurrent problems with heavy consequences for the whole group. This is an integral part of a culture. The norms consist of sanctions and rewards. The socio-cultural sanction for an infertile woman in the society of Kambata is lack of respect and a latent social rejection; and the reward for a fertile woman is social esteem and acceptance. Therefore, the rewards are mostly pro-natal.<sup>828</sup>

Even a single cultural group can have different preconditions for different social members. In the society of Kambata there are different cultural social classes. Especially in past times, this fact has played a considerable and interesting role in the motivation of different social classes to have many children. The higher social classes that had a huge amount of land and could own slaves and tenants were not necessarily interested in having many children as labour power. Children had social (esteem) and religious value for their parents, but not necessarily an economic value. But for those who were from lower social classes, children had primarily an economic value as labour power to help the parents when they were working for their owners and lords. Social value was not important for them since they themselves did not have a social value and esteem. Moreover, in past times, it was absolutely forbidden for those who were from lower social classes to marry more than one woman, whereas those from higher social classes could marry more than one woman. Therefore, those who were from higher social classes could become bigger in number, politically influential, economically rich and socially esteemed. Accordingly, many of the Kambata who were migrating from the region to look for a better future in other places were

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<sup>825</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 173.

<sup>826</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 178.

<sup>827</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 179.

<sup>828</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 179.

the ones from lower social classes.<sup>829</sup> That is why to some extent even now, those who migrate from Kambata and search for seasonal work in some parts of Ethiopia are socially - at least latently - despised.

### 5.5.3 The Religious<sup>830</sup> Reason for the High Population Growth in Kambata

Because of its supernatural origin religion restrains the human beings to internalise external values and to rely on them. They are "external" because they are precepts of a supernatural power ("deity") and the community; and their observance is watched over by the "deity" as well as the community. That is why a community contains something supernatural. To be in a community enables an individual to take part in a supernatural existence. The individual as an individual is void of supernaturality. This supernaturality justifies and legitimises that the precepts and norms of a community are recognised as commandments of a deity. Therefore, for the Kambata *vox populi* and *vox dei* are the same, since to some extent, god and community become identical. As Hauser says, big families are the "will of God" and children are the fruit and blessing of his bounty. Therefore, the restrictive contraceptive methods are against the faith, religion, and will of God and community.<sup>831</sup> So that the tradition will be continuously transmitted, the family, lineage, clan, religion, village and the whole territorial and cultural unit expect from and encourage the individual to have many children.

Even if the Kambata do not obviously confess the instrumentality of religion, it has an instrumental function and significance for them. Religion is the fundamental element that protects and guarantees the continuity of human beings by helping them to invent institutions whereby they master economic and environmental difficulties and defend themselves from external enemies. Therefore, religion is the fundamental bond of unity and sign of identity for a society wherein communality plays the existential role. In the name of their religion and deity the members of a community fight together against their external threats.

The religion of the Kambata allots the elders a supernatural power. The eldest members of the society take part in the divine wisdom. They achieve this goal and enjoy this age only when they have children from whom they expect homage. This is the will of the ancestors who blessed the living before they died by saying, "become old (rich in age) and fruitful!" If a family is not fruitful, it is the spirit of the ancestors (*ayyana*) which is invoked because it has the power to make the people fruitful. If the living fulfil their obligations to the ancestors, the latter guarantee an abundant procreation of the living. But the living have to sacrifice to the ancestors and hope and plead for their favour. Any community confesses its religiousness if it hopes for something. By hoping, it is accepting the uncertainty of the future, which is in the hands of someone or of a supernatural power.

The celebration of the birth of a newborn child is practically a religious act. Because of the new born child the relatives, neighbours, friends and even those with whom the parents

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<sup>829</sup> Cf. Karl Martin Bolte 1998, 269.

<sup>830</sup> The religion of the Kambata is now mainly Christianity. However in terms of "religion" in this sub-section I do not mean the Christianity, rather the natural and animistic religion that still plays a decisive role in the social behaviour of the Kambata. After the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, Kambata was one of the focal points of Christian evangelisation. Until this time, the Kambata were neither Ethiopian Orthodox Christians nor Muslims nor Protestants. Italian and French missionaries took advantage of it and evangelised the region and established schools and health centres.

<sup>831</sup> Cf. Hauser, op. cit., 185.

of the newborn child have conflicts will come to the celebration (regardless of the conflict). That means, the newborn child and the celebration are a sign of unity and gift of the deity to the whole community. Procreation is a vital force, which emanates from the living elders, the whole community, the deceased ancestors and the deity.

#### 5.5.4 The Consequences of the High Population Growth

The limits of the eco-system and the unlimited human capacity to reproduce itself are the challenges of the economic development. The following are briefly the ecological problems which are caused by demographic growth: an increasing greenhouse effect, holes in the ozone layer, the emission of dangerous gases, global temperature increase, irregular rainfall, the sea level increase, ecocide (because of the deforestation) and air pollution, soil erosion, desertification, scarcity of water and water pollution, nutrition problem, unemployment, rapid urbanisation, energy problem, conflict, etc. All these problems have detrimental consequences, especially for agricultural societies like Kambata.

Birg contends that the nutrition problems in many developing countries are in principle solvable. According to him, the scarcity of natural resources is not as alarming as many scientists and ecologists prophesy it. The nutrition problem is not to be conceived as the problem of overpopulation. For Birg, the cause of the problem of overpopulation is not the population number, but behavioural problem. That means, only the combination of the ways of production and consumption that are not easy to get on with the eco-system capacity, on the one hand (behavioural problem), and growing population number on the other hand, (population problem) can yield negative effects for humanity.<sup>832</sup> Like the nutrition problem the ecological problem is also solvable provided that the eco-system and bio-diversity are already not irreversibly damaged. Therefore, according to Birg, a practical reformation of the industrial production and consumption system is the turning point in order to solve the global economic problem.<sup>833</sup> Hence, the global behavioural problem demands a global economic ethics.

Furthermore, according to Birg, what he calls the *political population problem* is the cause of the present global problem. That means, the lacking international solidarity on the political basis as well as on the basis of institutions and organisations - but not on the individual level - on the one hand, and the extensive rejection of modern technique and science by some ideological, political and ecclesiastical groups in the industrialised countries on the other hand, are factors which are hindering solving some of the global problems.<sup>834</sup> At the same time, Birg makes the industrialised as well as the developing countries responsible for the present ecological and economic problems. In my opinion, this assertion is too general and superficial. The developing countries are characterised by strong heterogeneity of sectors and structures: on the one hand a highly modern industrial sector with its effects on the eco-system; and on the other hand, a poor agricultural system. The Kambata, as an exclusively agricultural society, cannot be responsible for the global climatic changes, which they are economically suffering from. They know that deforestation has bad consequences for the eco-

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<sup>832</sup> Cf. Herwig Birg 1994, 32, 33.

<sup>833</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 33.

<sup>834</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 35.

system. But because of overpopulation they have to clear arable land that is their only economic alternative.

As a result of overpopulation, soil degradation is causing heavy food shortage in Kambata, a region that was in former times known for its agricultural over-production. "Ethiopia is one of the three countries of the world which has the worst record of soil erosion. India, Columbia and Ethiopia lose 6 billion, 4 billion and 2 billion metric tons of soil annually respectively."<sup>835</sup> Moreover, the burning of topsoil while clearing land and setting on fire of the residues of crops after the harvest period contributes to the loss of soil fertility. As Abbi Mamo says, the causes of deforestation in Ethiopia include: excessive tillage, overgrazing, bush fire, the past resettlement and villagisation schemes, etc.<sup>836</sup> He says further, 70 per cent of Ethiopia's arable land is exposed to soil erosion.

Another major problem for the Kambata as well as for the whole of Ethiopia is fuel-wood. "Farming families face declining fuel-wood supplies due to diminishing tree stocks. They also resort to burning crop residues and dung as fuel, which are basic elements in fixing nutrients in many farmlands. This chemical degradation leads to soil fertility losses. The burning of crop residues and dung also leads to declining livestock feed and animal productivity. ... Fuel-wood has increasingly been replaced by dung and crop residues, which together provide up to 55 per cent of domestic energy and are the dominant fuel source for one-third of the population. Burning dung reduces the nation's potential for crop production. The decline in the humus content of the soil causes a further cumulative fall in crop production estimated at one per cent per annum. There is an increasing use of dung and crop residues for fuel, and it is expected that the use of dung for fuel will rise by 70 per cent in the decade 1985-1995. The burning of crop residues, a valuable source of animal feed, is placing further pressure on the grazing areas. To meet rural fuel-wood needs by the year 2010, and to replace the use of dung as fuel, some 16 million hectare rural fuel-wood plantations will be required, with another 1.2 million hectare of forests to provide timber needs."<sup>837</sup>

However, over-population is not the only cause of the economic problem in the developing countries. Intra-societal systems such as lacking economic and social participation of the poor, poorly organised or unstable legal and economy policy settings for economic activity, neglect of rural areas, privileges of elite, corruption and finally, international socio-economic and political relations are some of the key reasons for underdevelopment.<sup>838</sup> Overpopulation is the efficient but not the first cause of the problem.

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<sup>835</sup> Abbi Mamo 1995, 69.

<sup>836</sup> "Deforestation, land and soil degradation have reached catastrophic levels in Ethiopia. The forest cover is currently about 3.6 per cent of the total area of the country. This is roughly 4.5 million ha. Less than a century ago, about 40 per cent of the country is believed to have been covered by forest. It is estimated that over 200,000 ha of forestland are lost annually. The destruction of trees and shrubs for fuel wood, construction, agricultural implements and other uses sets the pace for accelerated soil erosion and progressive deterioration of the productive capacity for food and energy supply. In most parts of highland Ethiopia, deforestation has been almost complete. According to the Ethiopian Highlands Reclamation Study, the ecological and economic costs of land degradation and soil losses are tremendous. Degradation is estimated to cost Ethiopia over 15 billion Birr in the next 25 years or about 600 million Birr per annum. This is equivalent to 14 per cent of the contribution of agriculture to GDP in 1982/83. In terms of cereal production, the losses would amount to about 120,000 tons annually in the early 1980s. These losses, when viewed against a background of stagnating development and technological inputs, and increased population, are likely to lead to a grave displacement of population. The Highland Reclamation Study estimates that by the year 2010, over 10 million people of highland Ethiopia would have to derive their livelihood from sources other than cropping their own land. They would have to be absorbed elsewhere in the economy." (Markos Ezra, op. cit., 162.)

<sup>837</sup> Abbi Mamo, op. cit., 72.

<sup>838</sup> Cf. Die deutschen Bischöfe, op. cit., 22.

## Chapter 6: The Social Stratification and its Impact on the Participative Development

### 6.1 The General Socio-Cultural Attitude of the Kambata Towards some kinds of Handiwork

In the ethnological chart (section 4.2.1) we have seen the social stratification of the Kambata characterised by belonging to different social classes. Moreover, the determining factors of the social status of the respective group, its social esteem and its political and economic freedom are thoroughly depicted. This social stratification is cemented by the ideal culture, and the ideal culture is materialised as social structure. The social structure of the Kambata allotted different groups of the society different chances and limitations.

The society of the Kambata is divided into kingly clan, noble clans, commoners and castes. One of the scientists who did thorough studies on Kambata is Ulrich Braukämper. According to him, one of the crucial causes of the social stratification of the Kambata was the demographic and spatial expansion since the 18th century. The process of expansion has created a kind of labour division among the Kambata. The kingly and noble clans monopolised the state political positions and military affairs, whereas the commoners were limited to the agricultural economic sector. Even if the latter were in principle free farmers, the economic relationship between the higher social classes and the commoners developed into serfdom. The obligations to pay taxes and to work for the king and the higher social classes as well as the limitations of the spatial and social freedom of movement (for example, prohibition of marriage to foreigners [such as the Hadiya, etc.]) show the clan-based political and serfage economic policy towards the commoners, which was imposed during the reign of King Dilbato.<sup>839</sup> The commoners are called *kontoma*. Etymologically, it connotes scarcity, lack (Cf. Habiso 1983, 387). Therefore, it points to social degradation. The Kambata terminology, *womannut* (the free citizens) differentiates the commoners from the slaves.<sup>840</sup> It has an etymological relationship with *woma*, which means King. The substantive, *womanmat* means the state of a free Kambata.

Not all types of handiwork are despised in the traditional understanding of the Kambata. Making of baskets, plates and tables out of *eleusire jaegeri* is widely practised and appreciated as long as it is not the only economic means to live on. The main reason for the socio-cultural disdain that is based on the economic means is if someone economically relies on a source of income other than land possession. Therefore, the socio-cultural value of an individual depends on the amount of land it possesses. In this chapter I would like to concentrate on the castes, the *Fuga*. However, before turning to the castes, I would like to briefly mention the situation of slaves and artisans in Kambata, especially up until the end of the Ethiopian Empire. Slavery was highly practised among the Kambata until it was abolished under the pressure of the Ethiopian central government (monarchy) by decree in 1919 and

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<sup>839</sup> Cf. Braukämper 1983, op. cit., 173.

<sup>840</sup> Even if the word *Womannut* etymologically connotes a kingly state, the *Kontoma* (*Womannut*) belong to the lower social class. That means, in relation to the *Oyyata* they are *Kontoma* ("scarcity"), but in relation to the slaves they are *Womannut* (free citizens) who even share in the kingly qualities.

1923. However, slavery was unofficially practised for decades after the decree.<sup>841</sup> The Italians tried to abolish slavery in Ethiopia, which was a kind of pretext and moral justification for their colonial attempt.<sup>842</sup> The slaves were either bought or robbed from the neighbouring regions.<sup>843</sup> There are different classifications of slaves: prisoners of war, foreigners bought at the local market, natives bought at the local market, slaves exchanged in private trade, natives declared slaves because of financial debt, slaves who owned some private property, slaves given for a dowry, the wives of slaves, the widows of slaves, the unmarried daughters of slave parents, the unmarried sons of slaves and slaves of slaves.<sup>844</sup> Apparently, most of the slaves had a more Negroid physical appearance. Even the Kontoma and Oyyata with Negroid physical appearance were laughed at by being called "slaves". As Braukämper says, light-skinned slaves were considerably few.

The slaves were in every way dependent on their owners. A slave owner allots a piece of land to his slaves. The settlement of the slaves geographically lies on the lower part of the slave owner's land, especially if the area where the slave owner settles is a landscape with hills. To settle below or above someone (geographically) has a socio-psychological value for the Kambata: to live above someone means to have a better social position and respectable ethnological line, and to live below means to be dependent on or tributary to someone. Therefore, it was usual that only those from the higher social classes could settle on the hills.

The slave owners considered their slaves not only as their possessions whereby they could secure their political and economic interest. Even if they did not interfere in the internal affairs of the slaves' families, they protected them from external enemies and arrogant attacks from the other members of the higher social classes. This patronage enabled the slaves to call the *ayyana* of their owner's clan as their own. They swear on the *ayyana* of their owner, not on that of their own ancestors and clans, especially in the presence of the clan members of their own. However, the absolute loyalty to the owners was the fundamental prerequisite for this patronage. Nevertheless, their social position was amendable. Depending on their loyalty, performance and favour of their master they could be set free from their slavery. They could be buried near their masters. The slaves of the Kings were the executors of punishment, confiscators of properties of the guilty on behalf of the King or his officials.<sup>845</sup>

After the end of the paternalistic economic relationship in the slavery period, the slaves were plunged into severe economic difficulties. They got their personal freedom but they remained without land. By renting land they tried to maintain their economic survival. But this was not easy, because of the overpopulation in Kambata, there was a high scarcity of arable land even at that time. Therefore, many of them decided to migrate as seasonal workers on estate farms such as in Wonji, Methahara, etc. Many of them also began to be active as artisans. Therefore, artisanship *de facto* points to a despised economic sector. After the official abolishment of slavery, the social situation of the slaves was at least alleviated. They could marry even the Kontoma.

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<sup>841</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 98.

<sup>842</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 109.

<sup>843</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 183.

<sup>844</sup> Cf. Chiatti, *op. cit.*, 213. ("The slaves of chiefs and of the king were privileged to own their own slaves to whom they gave the heavy jobs and the care of cattle, possessions, pastures, and lands of their masters." *ibid.*, 214.)

<sup>845</sup> Cf. Braukämper, *op. cit.*, 184.

As Braukämper has correctly observed, the slavery abolishment did not automatically yield an auspicious social and economic framework. As we shall see in chapter 7, land reform and distribution (since 1975) was accompanied by corruption and nepotism. Even after the Ethiopian revolution, only those who were economically strong dominated the political scene. Since most of the slaves were poor and socially despised, they could not be elected as leaders. This fact is cemented by the Kambata social philosophy, which says *butichchi lallabuha burzami gequha* (nobody pays attention to the speech of a poor man, nobody is afraid of the glare of a man with cataract), which I discussed in the section 5.3 above. Even nowadays, the number of former slaves in good political positions is substantially lower than that of the Oyyata and the Kontoma.<sup>846</sup>

The poverty of a Kambata is directly proportional to his land possession. As I have mentioned it in different sections and contexts, land possession touches all spheres of the Kambata that are absolutely dependent on agricultural economy. Orent has observed a similar situation in Kafa. "The ownership of land is such a crucial part of man's life; it enters into all his activities, from the secular (food for his family, status in the community, ability to aid his sons, ability to acquire additional wives, it allows him to accumulate tenants to aid him in his labours);... to the sacred (it is a place for his ancestral feasts, ..., he will be able to give greater sacrifices in some feasts...)"<sup>847</sup> Slavery means to lack all these positive values attached to the owning of land.

The other aspect of slavery is personal and social humiliation. "They [the slaves] emphasise the social aspects and how their lives were full of humiliation. They could not speak in front of their masters and always had to obey them. They talk about how easily the masters changed their minds and beat slaves. The hard work they did was not mentioned. Instead, being despised was the usual complaint; ... The exploitation of their labour was the recognised consequence of their status..."<sup>848</sup> A slave was expected to be faithful, to risk his own life for his master, to be a hard worker, to take care of his lord's properties and family as if they were his own.<sup>849</sup> Chiatti writes the following on the harshness of slavery in Wolayta: "If a slave committed a crime, he was punished in the most severe way, chained to the stocks, beaten, mutilated in one eye, or foot, or hand, according to the crime and the willingness of the master to damage his chattel. The master had full rights of life and death over his slaves, but only for the most repellent crimes - for example, an attempt to kill his master or to rape his master's wife or daughter, or the killing of a free person - was the slave condemned to death. In this case, he was chained in front of his master's house and was the target of the spears of the relatives of the offended person."<sup>850</sup>

Other groups of socially despised classes *were* carpenters and blacksmiths.<sup>851</sup> Ethnologically, they are classified as Fuga in Kambata (cf. the ethnogenetic chart in the section 4.2.1 above). They were active in the secondary production sector in Kambata since

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<sup>846</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 185.

<sup>847</sup> Amnon Orent, *op. cit.*, 292.

<sup>848</sup> Chiatti, *op. cit.*, 217.

<sup>849</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 219.

<sup>850</sup> *Ibid.*, 219

<sup>851</sup> I use here the past form "were" because their social position is considerably bettered. Meanwhile, many of the commoners also are performing this work.



earlier than the 16th century.<sup>852</sup> Blacksmiths had a special social position in Kambata and lived in a separated social formation. Therefore, it is right to call them castes even if the intensity was not as severe as that of the potters and tanners. The fundamental reason for the rest of the Kambata to socially exclude them was the supposedly ritual impurity. That was why there was no connubiality with them. Of course, the connubiality with them was not as absolutely rejected as that with potters and tanners. Braukämper says that they were not obliged to limit themselves to endogamous marriage.<sup>853</sup> But factually no commoner was ready to marry a member from these groups.

Braukämper says that iron-smithy was not practised in Kambata before the beginning of the 20th century. Iron-products must have been introduced in Kambata from Jimma, Wolayta and Gurage. The Kambata came in contact with ironsmiths that came from Gurage around the beginning of the 20th century. Mainly the former slaves and poor commoners learnt from the Gurage iron smithery.<sup>854</sup>

While discussing the situation of slaves, blacksmiths, carpenters, potters and tanners, there are two important elements to take into consideration:

- landlessness and
- working for someone.

The negative attitude of the Kambata towards wage and seasonal labourers is based on these two elements. I have quite often stressed the sociological and economic value of land possession for the Kambata. Therefore, I do not want to repeat it again. To work for someone to earn something from him means to be dependent on him, to possess no land, to be his chattel and to have no identity. That is what a free Kambata hates to have no "name" and no pride on which the social identity is based. Concerning this matter, there is a considerable parallelism between the socio-political philosophy of the Kambata and that of the ancient Greece. To work for someone means not only to be dependent on him, but also to become like an animal that works for his owner. According to the ancient Greece, the corporal work is slavish because it is forced by the corporal and life necessity.<sup>855</sup> This necessity justifies the slavery. "To work means to be slave of necessity, and this slavery is innate in the nature of the human life."<sup>856</sup> Without work this natural necessity cannot be satisfied.

If one works by himself, he is not free since he cannot perform the *cura rei publicae*, but he only busies himself with the *cura privati negotii*.<sup>857</sup> Therefore, he has to try to make the others his slaves so that they take care of his corporal necessity, while he peacefully dedicates his time and intellect to the *cura rei publicae*. However, what primarily justifies the slavery is not the will to dedicate oneself to the *cura rei publicae*, but the corporal necessity. Because of this necessity slavery is naturalised. In this level of necessity, everyone is slave and animal: he is slave of his own necessity and works for it. By enslaving someone, he frees himself from this slavery. To become enslaved means to become slave twice: slave of one's own necessity and slave of his master. Through this slavery, which is an evil destiny, there

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<sup>852</sup> Cf. Braukämper, op. cit., 174.

<sup>853</sup> Cf. ibid., 178.

<sup>854</sup> Cf. ibid., 178.

<sup>855</sup> Cf. Hanna Arendt 1996, 101.

<sup>856</sup> Ibid., 101.

<sup>857</sup> Cf. ibid., 102.

occurs a change in the nature of the enslaved: degradation into mere animality.<sup>858</sup> "If the human being is considered as *animal laborans*, he is nothing but an animal, at best the highest of the animal species which populate the earth."<sup>859</sup>

The decisive matter, which determines the slavery of the animal laborans, is that he dedicates his time to the *cura privati negotii*. He is not dedicated to the *cura rei publicae*. The *cura rei publicae* is parallel to the "father land" of the Kambata. A Kambata who possesses a piece of land does not say "my land"; instead, "the land of my father (fathers)". Therefore, his land and the land of his relatives have a common father or fathers. By saying "the land of my father", he is making this piece of land public which does not necessarily mean he is going to share it with them. It only means that the land has the same origin by having been possessed by the same ancestors. Even if they are dead, these ancestors are still owners of the land. They have entrusted the land to the living. Therefore, the publicness of the land has two dimensions: the horizontal dimension, all living relatives are indirectly responsible of the land of their relatives; vertically, the dead are co-owners of the land; they are only physically absent, but spiritually, they are present among the living.

Those who do not possess land have, hence, neither the vertical nor the horizontal publicness of land. They have to dedicate themselves only to the *cura privati negotii*. That is why the Kambata say: *butichchi lallabuha burzami gequha* (nobody pays attention to the speech of a poor man, nobody is afraid of the glare of a man with cataract). If one is poor, he does not have land. If he is poor and without land, he can dedicate himself only to the *cura privati negotii*, not to the *cura rei publicae*. Therefore, he is handiworker, slave, carpenter, smith, potter and tanner. These groups are slaves of themselves and their society. Especially in former times, because of this social philosophy, any kind of handiwork was rejected by the Oyyata and the commoners. On the contrary, to be a farmer was highly esteemed, because a farmer works for his own needs on the land of his fathers.

The philosophy of the Kambata corresponds to that of Aristotle by denying the slaves the virtues for the *cura rei publicae*. By despising the "*lallabuha*" (which literally means speech) of the poor and slaves, the Kambata are excluding a slave who is factually poor from public affairs. Aristotle says, "About slaves, the first question to be asked is whether in addition to their virtues as tools and servants they have another and more valuable one. Can they possess restraint, courage, justice, and every other condition of that kind, or have they in fact nothing but the serviceable quality of their persons? The question may be answered in either of two ways, but both present a difficulty. If we say that slaves have these virtues, how then will they differ from free men? If we say they have not, the question is anomalous, since they are human beings and share in reason."<sup>860</sup>

According to Aristotle, a slave has fulfilled his duty if he performs his allotted tasks. That is his function, and the reason and the end of his existence. By providing the daily needs of his master's subsistence, the slave is at the same time working for his own benefit.<sup>861</sup> Aristotle expresses the animality and instrumentality of the slave as follows: "So any piece of property can be regarded as a tool enabling a man to live, and his property is an assemblage of

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<sup>858</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 101.

<sup>859</sup> *Ibid.*, 102.

<sup>860</sup> Phillips, *op. cit.*, 125.

<sup>861</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 124ff.

such tools; a slave is a sort of living piece of property, and like any other servant is a tool in charge of other tools."<sup>862</sup> For the Aristotelian as well as for the Kambata socio-political philosophy, "a man's economic position is the decisive external factor qualifying him for citizenship."<sup>863</sup> However, there is a big difference between the Aristotelian socio-political philosophy and that of the Kambata: for the Kambata, to work for one's own need and on his father's land is not slavery, rather the highest dignity. But for Aristotle, the natural necessity of the human being is already slavery. An individual frees itself from this slavery by enslaving someone else in its place so that the slave provides the needs of subsistence for his owner.

As I have already mentioned, the discrimination of slaves, carpenters and smiths has considerably abated in the last decades. Connubalism is being widely practised between them and the Oyyata and the commoners. Economically, there is not much difference, which is based on belonging to a certain clan. Even the Oyyata and the commoners practice carpentry and smithery. Politically, many non-Oyyata are in key positions. In this sense the Kambata traditional culture and social structure have no significance any more. But the tanners and potters are still excluded from connubalism, commensalism and de facto from the political positions. It seems it will take a long time until they are politically and socially integrated and accepted - if ever - as equal social members. The integration and acceptance of these groups would be the key for the extensive economic development of the Kambata. By despising the ethnic groups of the handiworkers, the Kambata undermined their economic development. Only the primary economic sector was culturally and socio-structurally esteemed. Even for the future, the development policy in Kambata should concentrate on the social integration and esteem of these groups and their products.

## **6.2 The Fuga (potters and tanners)**

### **6.2.1 The origin of the Fuga**

Culture is the complete social inheritance, which comprises elements such as the knowledge, the beliefs, the moral norms and customs and the skills that an individual learns from his society in the socialisation process.<sup>864</sup> Therefore, culture penetrates all realms of the social life. In the formation of the respective social and cultural structure myths play a decisive role. On the one hand, the anthropologists try to explain the origin of the Fuga-castes in different Ethiopian societies; on the other hand, the local people have a mythological explanation through which they justify their discriminating approach towards these castes. First let us see the mythological explanation.

One of the mythological explanations of the origin of the Fuga says that the forefather of the Fuga was a contemporary of Jesus Christ. When Jesus died his friends and relatives did not have a place where to bury him. Then the forefather of the Fuga sold a piece of land for an extortionate price. That was why he and his descendants were cursed to never own land and

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<sup>862</sup> Ibid., 126.

<sup>863</sup> Ibid., 128.

<sup>864</sup> Cf. G. Reinhold 1997, 375.

wander their whole life as landless people. Therefore, his descendants became potters and tanners.<sup>865</sup> The same story is narrated slightly different by a Fuga: "After our forefather sold this piece of land, he was cursed by Jesus saying, 'you and your descendants should live on by digging the inside of the soil [as an insinuation about pottery and looking for clay]. Only after the 77th generation, the curse was revoked, and we are allowed just to "taste the soil" which means we can possess just a bit of land and should be happy of what (the piece of land) the people give us." Another story says, "the Fuga wanted to be like God. They made a statue out of clay. Then God cursed them saying, 'let your work be for ever the moulding of clay!'" It is interesting to notice that all the curses of the Fuga are always in connection with deprivation of land. Through this deprivation of land, they are denied social esteem, and even their handiwork is despised.

Another legend says, "after the death and burial of Jesus no one wanted to possess the money for which the grave yard of Jesus was sold, since it was stained by blood. But there was a man who was ready to take it with him. With this money he bought a piece of land. After that he was cursed that his descendants should never own land. Therefore, they must live on pottery."<sup>866</sup> The mythological substantiation of the discrimination of the Fuga is based on food rituals. This is common in many societies. Concerning this, the Wolayta have the following legend: "As the Fuga relate it, in the beginning all of the Wolayta people gathered together for a feast to eat a bull which was raised for three years with the best food provided co-operatively by the clans. After slaughtering the animal, they divided it. The Tigre clan which includes the royal lineage, got the fat of the back, which was considered the best piece; the Hizia clan got the leg and loin for the same reason; the tanners got the head and skin; the blacksmiths got the ribs; the minstrels got the intestines and the tail; and the beggars got the anterior feet."<sup>867</sup>

Chiatti documents another interesting legend about the origin of the Fuga: "The commoners explain discrimination against the Fuga in another way. The ancestor of the outcasts, Irasha, committed a sin or at least made a mistake because in the beginning, God offered two covered cups to this man - one full of grain, the other full of ashes [an insinuation about the burning process of the moulded clay products] - and he chose the second. From that day his clans have been condemned to sit on the ground and to work the clay. Some artisans relate this same version with the change that the mistake was made by a woman."<sup>868</sup> Many Fuga have a strikingly different and more Negroid physical appearance than many of the Kambata. Some Kambata try to explain this difference as follows: because all what they eat and how they behave is so contemptuous that it has repercussions on their physical appearance. Moreover, according to some Kambata, the social discrimination has influenced their physical evolution.

According to the scientific explanation of the origin of the Fuga, as Braukämper has noticed, Kambata is one of the important regions, where the Fuga originated. Since the Fuga, migrating from Kambata settled in the regions of the Hadiya, Alaba and Arusi.<sup>869</sup> That is one

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<sup>865</sup> Cf. Braukämper 1983, 37f.

<sup>866</sup> Ibid., 38.

<sup>867</sup> Chiatti, op. cit., 234f.

<sup>868</sup> Ibid., 235.

<sup>869</sup> Cf. Braukämper, op. cit., 38, 176.

of the reasons why many Hadiya still despise the Kambata "Fuga!" They despise the Kambata language as 'Fuga language'.

Braukämper proposes three possibilities about the origin of the Fuga:

- a) discovering and populating the region, which was already settled by autochthonous who were living as hunters,
- b) migration of the castes from another region, and
- c) a structurally caused social process.<sup>870</sup>

However, according to Braukämper, the combination of the first and second possibilities is the most probable scientific explanation of the origin of the Fuga.<sup>871</sup> And according to the research of Chiatti, "the origin of the Fuga is told in two versions. Some claim to be 'brothers' of the royal clan and to have come with it from an outside region; others say that they have been in Wolayta forever. This second version favours the common anthropological hypothesis that outcasts were conquered people and the most ancient inhabitants of the territory."<sup>872</sup>

Some other ethnological theories try to explain the origin of the Fuga from a mainly economic point of view. The first of these theories is called "remnants theory". According to Ad. E. Jensen (1959), "these smiths and hunters are all related and represent a pre-Nilotics and pre-Cushitics that he [Ad. E. Jensen] calls Nigritic. He believes that they are Negroid peoples."<sup>873</sup> In the same way, Trimmingham says that these casts are "remnants of former aboriginal Negroid peoples who have not been absorbed and live amongst the peoples who subjected them as primitive hunters."<sup>874</sup> However, according to Todd, these differentiating physical appearances are very much the exception that cannot be propounded as a general theory of the origin of casts.<sup>875</sup> "It is difficult to speak of an identifiable physical type. Skin colour varies from extreme light to very dark, and there is a considerable height range. It is therefore impossible to distinguish members of any caste by physical criteria. Nor do members of any caste speak a different language, or claim ever to have done so. We must therefore conclude that this theory makes no sense..."<sup>876</sup> If I take into consideration the case of the Fuga in Kambata, the theories of Jensen and Trimmingham are not "nonsense", unlike the claim by Todd. The non-Fuga Kambata say to an ugly Kambata, "you look like a Fuga". There are prominent face structure and hair type differences between the Fuga and most of the non-Fuga. Many of the former slaves also show some differences in their physical appearance. Moreover, the Fuga have a more distinctive slang than that of the Kambata even if they live within the territory of the Kambata. Their accent is not neutralised by the Kambata language, this maybe because their social contact with the Kambata is not intensive enough, and they live in a socially, economically and politically isolated ghettos. However, this does not mean that all Fuga and former slaves show a Negroid feature. It is possible also to find some Oyyata and commoners who show more Negroid physical appearances than the Fuga and former slaves.

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<sup>870</sup> Ibid., 175.

<sup>871</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 175.

<sup>872</sup> Chiatti, *op. cit.*, 231.

<sup>873</sup> Dave Todd London 1977, 7.

<sup>874</sup> Ibid, 7.

<sup>875</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 7f.

<sup>876</sup> Ibid., 12f.

The second ethnological theory tries to explain the origin of the Fuga from a solely economic point of view. This is the theory of "mutualistic specialisation". Levine contends that "a modality of adaptation is achieved when a small society no longer relies solely on intermittent contact with outside groups to goods and services which it cannot provide for itself, but moves to secure them on a regular basis by finding a place for the suppliers within its own home territory. This is the condition represented by tribes which have incorporated caste groups."<sup>877</sup> But Todd objects this theory because of the following reasons. Todd says, that there are some castes that have no specialisation other than serving their chiefs. Secondly, one can find agricultural as well as handicrafts' facilities in the same ecological area. Thirdly, he says, while performing their religious rituals for the fertility of their women, cattle and fields, the chiefs are dependent on the co-operation of the tanners and hunters.<sup>878</sup> Therefore, Todd believes that "the twin needs of a regular supply of skins and people with enough food to exchange (...) for them, suggests ... a genesis in a society with domestic and hunted animals, as well as an agricultural system sufficiently developed to provide surplus to support non-productive specialists."<sup>879</sup> This contention of Todd might apply to the Dime, but because of the physiological and slight slang differences between the Fuga and the rest of the Kambata, the theory of Levine as well as the objection of Todd do not elucidate the origin of the casts in Kambata.

According to Levine, the third theory is called the theory of "internal social differentiation." "Firstly, that distinct groups of people settled in 'ecological niches', developed 'specialised crafts' and then dispersed into 'host groups' in order to market their products. Secondly, those societies produced relatively stable methods of food production, which did not consume all, or even most, of the members' time while producing more than subsistence level of food. As knowledge of the country improved, resources such as iron ore, animals, honey, clay, and reeds became known, and people realised their usefulness. Techniques to make use of these resources were developed, and the products from them became in demand. Possibilities for specialisation varied greatly between societies in accordance with the spread of resources, as did the interpretation, which was put on various skills. Where resources and skill were sufficient, and there existed sufficient surplus food to support them, some people preferred to live mainly, or even solely on what they could gain in exchange for their specialist products."<sup>880</sup> Todd says, "the most viable way of combating the food problem would therefore be to produce sufficient iron objects for trade to support the family. This level of production would further reduce the direct food output of the smith, so that he became a true specialist. Better (iron) tools led to more efficient agriculture, which in turn enabled the population to support further smiths." This is the interconnection of the primary and secondary economic sector. The economic relation bases itself on common economic interest. But this theory cannot explain why the casts are despised, although they are contributing to the socio-economic welfare of the whole society. All the theories have both convincing aspects as well as nomothetic failings. More anthropological research is needed to better elucidate the origin of these casts.

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<sup>877</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>878</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 13.

<sup>879</sup> Ibid., 13.

<sup>880</sup> Ibid., 7.

### 6.2.2 The activities of the Fuga

It has already been mentioned, how any economic activity, which is not agricultural, is or was socially despised in the culture of the Kambata. In this context, the Kambata have an interrogative proverb which says, "*yo'ihundo rehe'ihu bata'ano?*" which means "is the number of the living or dead greater?" And the answer is, according to the Kambata, "*zazzalanchu bargi, rehe'ihu bata'ano*" which means, "including merchants, the number of the dead is greater." What is the background of this philosophy?

- in former times, a merchant did not possess land,
- he was the one who wandered from one market to the other, and consequently who lived separated from his family for a long period of time,
- he was a liar who did not say the real value and quality of his goods. He had to lie because trade was the only means of his economic life; he had even to cheat by demanding a non-appropriate price for his goods.

Consequently, a merchant lives an uncertain economic life, unlike those who possess land. Therefore, the Kambata consider this way of life as death. The social despicability of such an economic sector is based on this socio-economic philosophy.

Based on the fact that the Fuga live from pottery, they were given a considerably small amount of land in comparison to the other Kambata during the land distribution after 1975. Since the middle of the 1980s the economic situation has become substantially difficult for the Fuga because of the increasing introduction of modern European furniture and utensils.<sup>881</sup> That means, on the one hand, they do not have land for agricultural production; on the other hand, many Kambata are not interested in their products anymore. Barenna, a Fuga, told me that his wife and his children, especially the girls, work the whole week on their pottery, and the sale is not more than 10 Eth. Birr, which is currently equivalent to US \$ 1.2.

The economic problem of the potters is prevalent in many societies in Ethiopia. Chiatti observed the following case in Wolayta. "An average of 20 to 25 hours from the moment of digging to the transportation to the market is needed for the completion of a few pieces of pottery. 'Today the girls do not want to learn this profession anymore' is a common statement. It is too much work which is poorly rewarded. Potter girls openly say that they prefer aluminium and iron products because they last forever, and people are beginning to buy them, so there is no future for their work."<sup>882</sup>

Braukämper notes that in some cases the potters had to pay taxes to the owners of land from where they dig clay for their pottery. Moreover, because of the over-population and deforestation in Kambata, the Fuga are faced with a shortage of firing material in their pottery process. Braukämper maintains that because of this economic crisis related to pottery, the potters began to work as carpenters. Moreover, they (especially the tanners) are trying to increase their income by producing baskets covered with leather and brewing and selling local beer on the streets and markets.<sup>883</sup> But the beer is non-profitable on the grounds that the non-Fuga Kambata never drink beer if they know it is brewed by Fuga.

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<sup>881</sup> Concerning the types of furniture and utensils, cf. section 5.1.2.

<sup>882</sup> Chiatti, op. cit., 262.

<sup>883</sup> Cf. Braukämper, op. cit., 181f.

There is a clear-cut labour division in the Fuga-families.<sup>884</sup> Pottery is mainly the task of female-Fuga. Males work as hunters, tanners and carpenters.<sup>885</sup> Orent write about these castes in Kafa as follows: "They also perform leather repairs on saddles and they make sheaths for knives. The men sell saddles, grain bags, honey bags and household mats made from cowhide. The women sell coffee pots, butter dishes, water jars and clay hearth griddles".<sup>886</sup> But the horse furniture was mostly imported from Wolayta. The few who are active in processing this furniture must have either migrated from Wolayta or learnt from the Fuga there.<sup>887</sup> As Barenna informed me, the Fuga learnt tannery from the Awado, and the pottery from the Saga. Moreover, the Fuga were musicians, singers of praise songs for the King and higher social classes, entertainers, etc. But the Saga, who were also potters but not castes in the strict sense, served the King by drying his feet.<sup>888</sup> The special castes are also active as butchers, musicians, singers, bards, surgeons, dentists, doctors and veterinary surgeons.<sup>889</sup>

Concerning the activities of the Fuga in Wolayta, Chiatti reports the following: "Since outcasts were called for any funeral, wedding, circumcision, or general social event, there was no end to the reach of their voices and their messages. They carried their instruments - small drums and the large drum, the sitars, the long horns - and the ingenuity and creativity of their compositions were almost limitless. During the songs, there was a soloist who announced the actions, and the chorus, which repeated a verse throughout the song. The singer invented facts and places, exaggerated events, and the more he was paid, the more he praised the guests. All the songs were rhythmic, accompanied either by the clapping of hands or the beating of drums. The dances consisted of continuous jumping with the help of a stick, with spinning and tumbling or the imitation of animals."<sup>890</sup> Among the Wolayta, when a man from a higher social class dies, it is the tanners who slaughter the animals.<sup>891</sup>

As we shall see in the following section in detail, the castes personify a kind of paradox: something despicable and holy at the same time. They have the power to cure the sick and perform some cultural medicinal rituals. "The chinasha [castes] men are also considered expert doctors, able to pull tonsils out with their fingers, and the women act as dentists to extract teeth. This profession is in some sense sacred because any disease is provoked by a bad spirit, generally the devil. The operation requires some skill."<sup>892</sup> This mixture of good and evil makes their special social status.

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<sup>884</sup> Cf. E. Haberland 1979, 18.

<sup>885</sup> Cf. Braukämper, op. cit., 176.

<sup>886</sup> Orent 1969, 284.

<sup>887</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 177.

<sup>888</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 179.

<sup>889</sup> Cf. Eike Haberland 1978, 130f.

<sup>890</sup> Chiatti, op. cit., 252.

<sup>891</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 257.

<sup>892</sup> *Ibid.*, 262.



### 6.2.3 The social status of the Fuga

#### 6.2.3.1 Cohabitation and Seclusion

The situation of the Fuga, which is described above (section 6.2.2), characterises the position of the Fuga, and along with it the attitude of the traditional Kambata towards handwork and landlessness. To possess no land means to own no domestic animals. To live without land and cattle in an agricultural society like Kambata is an absolute material disadvantage and social disgrace. A bad nutritional situation, ragged clothes, small houses constructed with bad wood, dirty and small compounds, lack of domestic animals, etc., are some of the features which characterise the life of the Fuga. They were at the mercy of their owners, on whose land they settled, especially up until the beginning of the communist revolution and land reform.<sup>893</sup> The owner had the right to expel them from his territory when and in whatever way he wanted. This uncertainty of life was one of the reasons why they mostly did not plant *inset-edulis* or have cattle, and why they lived on their handiwork.<sup>894</sup> "Among those people in Ethiopia or Kenya whose social ideal is the free independent farmer and cattle breeder, a certain aversion and disregard against all kind of hired, paid labour may have increased the common dislike of the handicraft. It goes so far that activities like woodcarving or carpentry (which are as a rule exercised by every farmer) are called 'pariah-worker' as soon as they are done as paid work and not for one's own use."<sup>895</sup>

Concerning the socio-structurally caused unstable settlement situation of the castes among the Konso, Hallpike informs us the following: "The Konso often refer to the moon as *haudida*<sup>896</sup> because, unlike the sun, the moon rises and sets at different times each night, and is sometimes visible during the day, generally behaving in an irregular and unsettled way. In the same way the *hauda* [castes] are thought of as having no settled abode, moving from place to place as they feel inclined. This is certainly a correct impression, particularly with regard to blacksmiths... The *edanda* [cultivators], who have always had the ties of land, tend almost invariably to remain in the place of their birth..."<sup>897</sup>

The social elements, which differentiate the Fuga from the rest of the Kambata, are not only material possessions. Even their burial is less ceremonial. Concerning it, Chiatti says the following about the Fuga in Wolayta: "When a Fuga dies, he must be buried the same day and cannot be put in a coffin; after having been tied in a blanket, he is buried in a cemetery which is reserved for his class. Yet the Fuga do not see this as darkly as commoners' views would suggest: they have no horses at the funeral, but they have their music, songs and food - although they admit that the amount of food is smaller because it is supposed to be given by the patron."<sup>898</sup>

Concerning the public order, there are different social prescriptions that oblige the Fuga how to behave in the public. Especially in former times, when a non-Fuga Kambata

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<sup>893</sup> Cf. Eike Haberland 1968, 237.

<sup>894</sup> Cf. Braukämper 1983, 182.

<sup>895</sup> Eike Haberland 1978, 130.

<sup>896</sup> In the Konso language, the word '*haudida*' is derived from *hauda*, *hauwé* which means alone, separate, which signifies separation from the generally applicable system. (Cf. C.R. Hallpike 1968, 259.)

<sup>897</sup> Ibid., 266.

<sup>898</sup> Chiatti, op. cit., 249.

passes by and meets a Fuga, he used to say, "*gota it, golja it!*"<sup>899</sup>, (which literally means 'eat hyena, eat warthog'). And the Fuga used to answer, "*qarichcho obodda*", (which means 'O yes my Lord').<sup>900</sup> Werner J. Lange reports on the Gimira (south-west Ethiopia) and says the following: "Upon meeting a non-castes She, a caste member would bow very lowly saying: 'tostange tabatze' (= 'good day, let me broken for your sake'); the non-caste She either says nothing or merely 'tostange' and passes on."<sup>901</sup> The Fuga used to face a similar situation in Wolayta. "When a man of the royal clan ... dies, the outcasts have to cover their heads with ashes and clay, and the tanners and ironworkers must rub their heads with manure; if they refuse to do this they can be killed."<sup>902</sup> After having observed similar situations in different societies, Eike Haberland says: "Meeting a commoner on the road, they had at least in certain regions, to kneel down and to turn away their faces."<sup>903</sup>

Another important feature, which characterises the social segregation, is the prohibition to enter houses of the non-Fuga or the prescription how to behave when they enter. Usually, they are not given a chair or anything to sit on, although it is a cultural obligation to give a chair if someone enters a house; whereas the Fuga sit on the floor just behind the door.<sup>904</sup> One of the reasons why many societies exclude the Fuga from cohabitation is because of the belief that the latter have a supernatural power and they can make the non-Fuga ill.<sup>905</sup> This exclusion is accepted and justified by the commoners as well as by the Fuga themselves. "According to common opinion they are human beings of an inferior category. Very often they regarded themselves as despised and as pariah in the true sense of the word. They have few if any political rights. The recompense, the blood price for a killed member of these castes, was meaningless compared with that of a commoner. They were forbidden to participate in public meetings; ...They were the objects of much degradation. Officially they were ritually unclean; corporal contact with them, even unintentional, caused a dangerous ritual pollution that had to be purified by a complicated ritual."<sup>906</sup>

Different societies have different reasons for excluding and despising the castes. We have already seen (section 6.2.1) the mythological reasons which the Kambata give for denying the Fuga any social cohabitation. The Konso (south-west Ethiopia) despise and exclude the castes because of the following reason: "...it was 'bad' to treat earth like food, grinding it, mixing water with it, and kneading it, like flour, instead of tilling it and sowing seed in it."<sup>907</sup>

Another "bad" quality, which the Kambata identify with the Fuga, is disorder. When the parents of a Kambata family reprimand their children, they say, "don't behave like the Fuga!" For the Kambata the Fuga have no social norms, no respect of the parents, no "*mannu*

<sup>899</sup> This reminds us the belief of the Kambata that the Fuga possess an evil spirit that can "eat" (harm) the people. Therefore, the hyena and warthog are the representatives/escape goats of the potential victims of the Fuga.

<sup>900</sup> Cf. Braukämper, op. cit., 179.

<sup>901</sup> Werner J. Lange 1975, 225.

<sup>902</sup> Chiatti, op. cit., 257.

<sup>903</sup> Eike Haberland, op. cit., 131.

<sup>904</sup> Cf. Braukämper, op. cit., 179.

<sup>905</sup> Cf. Lange, op. cit., 225, 229.

<sup>906</sup> Haberland, op. cit., 131.

<sup>907</sup> C.R. Hallpike, op. cit., 265.

*ma yano*" (what would the people say), etc. They are de facto exempt from the social prescriptions that apply to the "normal" Kambata, since there is no *communio* between both parties. Hallpike witnesses the following on the attitude of the *edanda* (cultivators) towards the *hauda*: "When I was asking some *edanda* whether a particular town [area, village] would be a nice place for me to live in they said, 'Oh no, don't go there. It is full of *hauda* [castes, Fuga], and all they do is quarrel and shout at each other all day long.' Here again, the *hauda* are seen as people not properly integrated in society, pursuing their legitimate self-interest to the point of social disintegration."<sup>908</sup>

I would like to summarise the exclusion of the Fuga from the social cohabitation in Kambata and other traditional societies in Ethiopia as follows: They are what they are because they are excluded from the social structure; but also they are excluded from common social norms and rules of life, because they are what they are. That means in other words, the cause is the effect, and vice versa. But the respective societies do not conceive it in this way. "It is not because they dig the ground or hammer iron. They eat what we do not eat; things we think are rubbish and throw away. Their wives cut umbilical cords, which is dirty, so we think they are dirty. We throw away bad meat, and they pick it up and eat it."<sup>909</sup> Concerning this fact, Hallpike made a conclusion worthwhile to quote: "Two conclusions of a more general nature are suggested by the status of the craftsmen. The first is that social stereotypes are simply yet another mode of classification by which order is imposed on the complexity of human relations. The second is that where these stereotypes are based upon the values of a dominant group, they serve not only to reinforce that group's sense of its own identity, but also its sense of superior rectitude."<sup>910</sup> Interestingly, materially, religiously and culturally, the Fuga are very important for the Kambata. In this sense there is a considerable cohabitation and mutual dependence. But on the other hand, they are bad and evil personified. We shall see this ambivalence later. As Herbert Lewis asserts, the Ethiopian castes have the following characteristics in common with Indian castes: endogamy, restriction on commensalism, status hierarchy, concepts of pollution, caste membership ascribed by birth and association with traditional occupation.<sup>911</sup>

### 6.2.3.2 The problematic of Commensalism

As I have already mentioned, on the one hand, the Fuga are excluded from the community of their village or neighbourhood because they eat what is despised by the commoners and higher classes; on the other hand, they eat this despised food because they are excluded from the community, social norms, values and cohabitation. Bareenna (a Fuga informant) told me bitterly: "we are already despised. We are hyenas, we are dogs. It does not make any difference if we eat carcass or not; nobody respects us; we cannot marry a commoner. That is why we eat whatever we find." "When a domestic animal is accidentally killed or dies of disease, the tanners are called to pick up and eat the carcass, which is otherwise left to the hyenas. The impurity of the dead and of the scavengers is equated with

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<sup>908</sup> Ibid., 266.

<sup>909</sup> Todd, op. cit., 10f.

<sup>910</sup> Hallpike, op. cit., 268.

<sup>911</sup> Cf. Gebru Wolde 1973, 8

that of the outcasts."<sup>912</sup> Even some parts of the animals, which are slaughtered properly and according to the cultural ritual, are eaten only by the Fuga. Chiatti observed a custom in Wolayta, which is similar to that of the Kambata. "For each killing, the tanner gets the head, feet, lungs and intestines as reward for his work because these parts are considered to be polluted or bad by commoners."<sup>913</sup> The Geymi whom Haberland describes as "special" castes used to live on the feasts meals and ritual flesh of the commoners.<sup>914</sup>

Especially in former times, the Fuga were without land and cattle, therefore, they had to get hold of their food through different ways. As musicians and singers in front of the Kings during the *masala*-feast and burial ceremonies they used to earn their living. As Todd has discovered, the castes are not only beggars, but they also have a cultural and mythological right to be fed and paid by the non-caste groups who fear them because of their "supernatural" power. "At the funeral of his chief patron a smith becomes an important person. He dances around the clearing in front of the house containing the body, and chants praises concerning the chief's generosity and the well-being he brought to his territory. In between these dances he demands a large quantity of the best cuts of meat and beer, and usually receives them. At other times, as elsewhere in Ethiopia, the smith's portions of meat are those considered very poor by other Dime, particularly the top section of the head and the intestines. At one funeral I witnessed, a smith threatened that unless his demands were met he would touch the corpse, which would have debarred it from burial in the traditional place."<sup>915</sup>

Moreover, any kind of festivity was and is an important source of livelihood for the Fuga. Usually, they are given the leftovers from the table of the commoners' meal. Fuga are the ones who take home the meat of animals that are sacrificed to the spirits and ancestors. Contrary to the rest of the Kambata, the Fuga used to eat wild animals such as antelopes, wild boar and guinea fowl.<sup>916</sup>

Because of the Christian evangelisation, many of the cultural and religious ceremonies and rituals are rapidly disappearing from the Kambata culture. In the face of this and the drastic decrease of the appreciation of their products, the Fuga are facing a great problem to earn their livelihood.<sup>917</sup>

The fact the Fuga eat whatever they get and are considered as voracious and unscrupulous.<sup>918</sup> These are the factors, which are the stumbling block for the commensalism between the Fuga and the rest of the Kambata. During feasts, the Fuga had to bring with them their own crockery. If not, they used to be given old crockery that will be thrown away or broken after having been used by the Fuga. The other possibility is an *inset*-leaf used instead of dishes.<sup>919</sup> "At the market place, they can drink and smoke with other people, but they have to bring their own cups and pipes."<sup>920</sup> Through the denial of commensalism, such societies not

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<sup>912</sup> Chiatti, op. cit., 249.

<sup>913</sup> Ibid., 257.

<sup>914</sup> Cf. Haberland 1993, 237.

<sup>915</sup> Todd, op. cit., 11.

<sup>916</sup> Even the Fuga did not eat all animals. They also avoid such as predators, apes, donkeys, horses, etc. This means, they also have their own prescriptions of food avoidance Cf. Braukämper, op. cit., 180.

<sup>917</sup> Cf. ibid., 181.

<sup>918</sup> Cf. Hamer John 1976, 334.

<sup>919</sup> Cf. Braukämper, op. cit., 179. Cf. also Haberland 1968, op. cit., 237.

<sup>920</sup> Chiatti, op. cit., 248.

only want to show the superiority of the non-Fuga over the Fuga, but the former are also afraid of the latter since they are conceived as a personified pollution. "If a Fuga touches a glass or the drink of another person, everything is thrown away and the Fuga is insulted and hit. If he touches something belonging to a chief, he must pay with a goat whose blood serves to purify the lord's possession."<sup>921</sup> The Fuga are never invited to any feast since they have no right to participate in social events. That is why they are still separated by seating from the rest of the people.<sup>922</sup> Lange witnessed a happening among the Gimira, where a member of a higher social class would not drink a tea prepared by Lange himself, if the water for the tea is brought by a hunter.<sup>923</sup> In Kambata, even after having worked together in a voluntary self-help association such as Dawa (cf. the section 5.2 above), the Fuga are not allowed to eat together with the members of the Dawa.

### 6.2.3.3 The ambivalent nature of the Fuga

As it has already been mentioned, impurity is the striking negative quality or nature of the Fuga. As far as possible, any contact with them has to be avoided. They are not considered as human beings; but dirty creatures and hyenas, which eat carcass. But at the same time they possess a supernatural power, which can make others ill, which can kill, cure, etc. They embody something contradictory. But, are these qualities really contradictory? "One has to pay attention to a great number of functions which are apparently, to our regard, not compatible with their status as 'pariah'. Like the Latin word 'sacer' which means 'the Holy' and 'the Execrated', the social position of the members of the special castes is ambiguous. On the one hand, they are the 'dishonoured'; on the other hand, they are indeed not 'holy' but they are in certain sphere highly esteemed, regarded as being gifted with special spiritual and magic positive powers. With the normal religious life they have very little in common. Prayers, regular offerings, ancestors or rain service do not belong to their sphere. They will become active, if extraordinary events touching the existence of man such as birth, circumcision, initiation, marriage, death and burial, or when bad death, incest, diseases, murder and enchantment are disturbing the individual. Therefore, they are highly respected accoucheurs and accoucheuses (the women share the capacity of their husbands), circumcisers... coroners, embalmers, and gravediggers, helpers against black magic and malediction, bringers of fertility for men and animals. These are functions which are difficult to combine according to European ideas with the before mentioned contempt and disregard."<sup>924</sup>

Haberland observed how the castes among the Dizi had a special relationship to the sacred king. They were messengers, lackeys, tax collectors of the kings; they were also executioners.<sup>925</sup> Haberland informs that the Dizi used to grant the castes (Geymi) a special position in ritual life. Moreover, they even used to taste the foods and drinks of the chieftains before the latter began to eat or drink. They blessed and slaughtered an animal, which was to be sacrificed. Interestingly, from the same victim, they could only have the head, intestine, stomach, etc., parts, which are not eaten by the common people. If they took the heart and

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<sup>921</sup> Ibid, 248f.

<sup>922</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 257.

<sup>923</sup> Cf. Lange, *op. cit.*, 229.

<sup>924</sup> Haberland 1978, 131.

<sup>925</sup> Cf. Haberland 1968, 237.

liver, they used to be severely punished. In spite of this weakness - being easily punished by the ordinary people - their curse could make the men, cattle and field infertile.<sup>926</sup> Not only their words are believed to make things infertile, but also their presence and touch embodied infertility, pollution and contact with a bad spirit. There were cases where when they came in contact such as with farmland, granary, etc., a cow had to be sacrificed and its blood sprinkled on the field and the granary so that they could be used by the non-castes.<sup>927</sup>

In cases of impotence some men of the higher social classes used to have sexual intercourse with the Fuga-women believing that they would be cured from their impotence. In many societies, Fuga were and are the ones who perform circumcision.<sup>928</sup> In some traditional societies, relations between the Fuga and the chiefs on the religious and ritual level are quite striking.<sup>929</sup> Where there is a feast, there are Fuga. They are polluted, but they are the ones who make also clean. "The tanners are called on for any feast - anniversary, wedding, or funerals - because they are expected to slaughter the animals; they are the only people allowed to kill and skin the beasts which otherwise would be impure. While they themselves are considered polluted and dirty because of their contact with the skin and intestines of the slain animals, after their work the meat is considered clean."<sup>930</sup>

Because of their ambivalent nature, sometimes they contribute something very important to the society. Even if they are not in the centre of a conflict, they can draw the attention of the conflicting parties, who would kill or severely beat at least one of them, since they do not have any rights as the rest of the members of the society. Chiatti observed an interesting situation in Wolayta. "When the conflict between the king and his aristocracy broke out, the Fuga became the scapegoat of the struggle between King Gobe and his councillors. At this point, no pollution and no discrimination saved the outcasts from mass persecution. The king, who based his power, or at least some of it, on them, did nothing to save them."<sup>931</sup>

They are mixtures of humans, scavengers and supernatural beings. Therefore, they are considered as monstrous. "They were accused of terrible and sacrilegious things: scavenging tombs and eating the corpses. The evil-eye (gormothia) was especially attributed to them; it makes people fall sick and die, and it was claimed that after the burial the Fuga would open the tomb and carry the corpse on their shoulders, in the form of a hyena, and eat it later in their houses. If someone surprised them at this horrible banquet, all the Fuga who were present would become transformed into rats."<sup>932</sup>

Besides their "pollution", "evil-eye", "bad quality", "dirtiness", "voraciousness", the Fuga are considered as parasites of their society. Societies like of the Dime exclude them from holy rituals on the grounds that they are "polluted". According to the Dime cosmology, nature is something supernatural. For its fertility and abundance the human beings should offer sacrifices to the spirits of the ancestors. But these "holy" spirits do not want the

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<sup>926</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 237ff.

<sup>927</sup> Cf. Todd, *op. cit.*, 11.

<sup>928</sup> Cf. Braukämper, *op. cit.*, 179.

<sup>929</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 180.

<sup>930</sup> Chiatti, *op. cit.*, 256.

<sup>931</sup> *Ibid.*, 278f.

<sup>932</sup> *Ibid.*, 248.

participation of the "polluted" castes. In this sense, the castes are not contributing to the welfare of their society. Therefore, they are parasites, using God-given resources whilst playing no direct part in their renewal.<sup>933</sup>

Concerning the mixture of contempt, despicability, abhorrence and respect, it is worthwhile to quote the observation of Chiatti in Wolayta regarding the complaint and attitude of the non-Fuga about the Fuga: "We do not hate the outcasts, but they are ashamed, they are taboo because they are non-humans, animals, kana (dog) is their proper name. We are not afraid of them. They are inferior: they seat always near the animals if they are allowed to enter the master's house. Even if some of them are educated and rich, we cannot be with them and share our meals with them. We want to be friends with them, but they run away. They are Fuga, period! They are fearful people like women. They always build their houses apart from other people, either because they are shy or individualistic, or because they are always ready to quarrel. They do not have a social life; they do not know the rules of conversation, they are impolite, they are not gentlemen, and they lie all the time. They cannot keep secrets and do not keep their word. They have no weapons, cannot be warriors, and they are always subservient to a master. They cannot control their instincts and need to eat even before a funeral is ended. They are not able to enjoy the company of other people: they come for songs and dances, and afterwards grab their food and drink and run away to eat alone. They are like sponges; they are insatiable eaters. They eat everything: dead animals, fish, birds. They are voracious... What we give to the dogs we give to the outcasts because there is no rotten food which can displease a Fuga. The tanners even eat the animal's brain! And they cannot have cattle because they devour them immediately. They smell, smell! They eat sick animals, which other people do not want to care for. They eat every part of the beast, including what is really dirty and impure: the stomach, the intestines, the lungs, and the spinal marrow. They are the most skilled poisoners. There is no black magic or diabolic divination without them. We are afraid because they have the worst spirits, which always bring about disease, accidents and bad luck. They are cannibals like the devil. And they are very vindictive people. They are stupid and lazy; in fact, they do not want to know how to farm and raise cattle and they have no crops and no storage. They are jesters because it is easier than work in the field. They are only beggars..."<sup>934</sup>

Anthropologically, it is interesting to discover why these bad qualities are attributed to the Fuga. The Kambata as well as the other societies, which are disposed to the Fuga in such a way, essentialise and naturalise these attributed qualities of the Fuga. They do not want to grasp the mutual interaction of the cause and the effect. Cultural anthropologically, it can be nomothetically confirmed that exclusion from a community creates an ambivalent quality, as we have seen above. In my opinion, it is the exclusion of the Fuga, which attributes "pollution", "evil-eye", "bad quality", "dirtiness", "voraciousness", etc. to them. Since these qualities are attributed to them, they are consequently excluded from the community. As long as one is a full member of a community, he cannot be a threat to it. But when its membership becomes too large or too small, he can be a protector as well as a threat or a scapegoat of the community, when a conflict breaks out.

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<sup>933</sup> Cf. Todd, *op. cit.*, 12.

<sup>934</sup> Chiatti, *op. cit.*, 272f.

Not belonging to a community is a weakness. This weakness is a characteristic, which differentiates the victim from the members of the community. Therefore, the victim is ready to be sacrificed physically as well as socially. Physically, there were cases in which the Fuga were sacrificed when a conflict broke out among the commoners, as we have seen in some cases in Wolayta. Socially, the Fuga are always excluded from the community as permanent victims. They are the scapegoat and bad and evil personified. Moreover, the non-Fuga are dependent on the technical products and religious and ritual activities of the Fuga. Hence, the Fuga are "sacer", a mixture of "holy" and "execrated". It is the same with the spirits of the dead. After the death, the dead obtains a power, which they did not have while they were alive. They obtain a power to kill, to make sick, to cure, to revenge. They are feared and respected at the same. Even here, the reason of this ambivalence lies in the fact that they are no more in the community. Therefore, both the Fuga and the dead do not totally belong to the community. This is the root of their ambivalent nature. To be outside of the community is *per se* danger and threat.<sup>935</sup>

As I have elaborated in the course of this paper, Kambata is a society, which almost absolutely depends on agricultural products. Possession of land has a determining economic, social, religious and political value. Especially in past times, the primary economic sector was conceived as the only respectable economic sector. Any economic activity apart from it was despicable. The economic activities of the Fuga and smiths as handiworkers (secondary economic sector) were considered socially, economically and religiously inferior. This is one of the key reasons for social discrimination and economic under-development. The interconnection of both sectors and the acceptance of the despised social classes would have considerably contributed to the development of the Kambata. Hence, the interdependence of cultural structure, social structure and economic development becomes conspicuous; however, without a genotypical conception of culture.

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<sup>935</sup> Cf. René Girard 1994, 9ff.



## Chapter 7: The Economic Situation of the Kambata since 1975

### 7.1 The Main Governmental Economic Activities

1974 was the end of the Ethiopian Monarchy and its Salomonic Dynasty, which was overthrown by the Ethiopian Communist Revolution. This coup d'état brought a radically new political, social and economic system in the history of Ethiopia. Besides other infrastructure set-up activities land reform, resettlement and villagization are the conspicuous achievements of the communist regime. The goals and strategies of the communist regime were to abolish class differences in the society and to establish social, economic and political equality.

It is a tenet of development policy that economic justice and social justice are functionally interdependent. Economic justice and reform aim at social justice, and the latter is the basis of economic development and the mobilisation of human potential. In other words, *participation* is the pillar of the economic development of a society. As Tommasoli says, popular participation is "a process by which people take an active and influential hand in shaping decisions that affect their lives".<sup>936</sup> By quoting Bhatnagar and Williams, Tommasoli defines participation as "a process by which people, especially disadvantaged people, influence decisions that affect them. The term 'popular' refers not only to the absolute poor but also to a broader range of people who are disadvantaged in terms of wealth, education, ethnic group, or gender. 'Participation' means influence on development decisions, not simply involvement in the implementation or benefits of a developmental activity, although those types of involvement are important and are often encouraged by opportunities for influence."<sup>937</sup>

Participation helps the people to understand that development lies in their own hands; it helps to develop social and individual consciousness; it bridges the social gulf between the central political and economic decision-makers on the one hand, and the people on the other hand. In many governmental and non-governmental developmental activities the ordinary people are very often considered as *tabula rasa*. The endeavour of the governmental and non-governmental development workers is to develop *them*. This subject-object-relationship does not bring the hoped-for rewards; it is even counterproductive. In development attempts the decision-makers should rather take into account the already existing wishes of the people to organise themselves in groups, to create association with the aim of economic and social advantages and to defend their political interests.

The first and decisive step in the development attempt is, hence, an active integration of the subjects in the developmental activities. That means, those who are in charge of the developmental activities should take into account the decisions, which are made at the grassroots levels. There are many formal and spontaneous associations, which characterise the inter- and intra-association relationships. By enabling an active integration of the members as individuals and communities to foster the inter-relationships among grassroots communities, identification of key needs, making of appropriate decisions, contribution to a comprehensive

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<sup>936</sup> Massimo Tommasoli 1996, 563.

<sup>937</sup> Ibid., 563.

and sustainable development process and verification of formal, informal or spontaneous associations or institutions are possible.<sup>938</sup> The developmental strategies of the Ethiopian Communist regime were aimed at the participative dimension of development. Therefore, the land reform, resettlement and villagization policy were political and economic measures to manage participative development.

While treating the points concerning land reform, resettlement and villagization, I would like briefly to depict the policies of the communist regime concerning these developmental measures for the whole country, since the same policies applied for the whole Ethiopia. Only in the section, which deals with infrastructures, will I concentrate on the situation of the Kambata.

### **7.1.1 The land reform**

The land reform, which this section deals with, is the land reform since 1975 that was introduced by the communist regime. There were two main reasons, which caused the Ethiopian government to implement the land reform: in the international context and national context.

- Internationally: international labour division and economic injustice based on it.
- Nationally: socio-economic injustice and structural heterogeneity within Ethiopia. That means, on the one hand, the landlords and feudals, and on the other hand, the tenants.

In the economic difficulties of Ethiopia there are factors which are not typical of it. "Ethiopia shows all the characteristics of an underdeveloped country. It relies heavily on foreign exchange and imported technology, modernisation and economic progress are hampered by a poor infrastructure, a small industrial base, a shortage of skilled manpower, low agricultural productivity and heavy dependence on one export commodity."<sup>939</sup> Moreover, there are some features that characterise the situation of many developing countries: the vulnerability to climatic and topographic constraints, high population growth and rapid ecological degradation.<sup>940</sup> In an agricultural society, like Ethiopia, the agricultural products play the pivotal role for foreign exchange as well as for domestic needs. Therefore, the development of the society substantially depends on the agricultural products. "From a development perspective agriculture has to fulfil four main functions. It must (1) feed a steadily growing rural and urban population, (2) finance its own growth and structural change, (3) provide capital and raw materials for the country's long-term industrial development, and (4) provide cash crops for export."<sup>941</sup> Therefore, the patriotic politics of the communist regime had the objective to create a powerful nation of Ethiopia, which is proud of its being the only never colonised African nation. The harsh economic reforms, political measures and military consolidation of the regime were to establish Ethiopia as an African super power.

In order to realise these ideals, Ethiopia as an agricultural society, had to introduce land reform, since economic development is the basis of political and military power.

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<sup>938</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 581.

<sup>939</sup> Stefan Brüne 1990, 17, 19.

<sup>940</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 19.

<sup>941</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

Feudalism and absentee landlordism not only disadvantaged the individuals of the country, but it also debilitated the economy of the whole nation. One of the decisive reasons for the resurgence of Ethiopian Communist Revolution was, therefore, the question of land tenure and, along with it, the socio-economic injustice and the lack of political will on the part of the imperial government to create justice in the country.<sup>942</sup> The land reform proclamation of 1975 transferred the rural lands from private ownership prior to Ethiopian Revolution to public ownership. "All private ownership of land by individuals and organisations was outlawed; the transfer of land by sale, lease or mortgage was declared illegal and anyone willing to farm was to be given land. Tenancy was abolished and peasants were freed from all obligations to landlords. The maximum plot allocated to each household by the newly founded peasant associations was to be 10 ha, this being the maximum an average peasant family could till with standard farming equipment and oxen... Average holdings vary greatly in different areas, but on a national level are estimated to be slightly above or even below 1 ha."<sup>943</sup>

Many development researchers, economists and political scientists say that the land reform - although it had political, economic and social objectives - was overridden by political ambitions. "It would appear that the leadership was primarily concerned with creating social justice without giving due consideration to the complex and long-term economic implication of the reform. Considerations such as farm size and the choice of technology were not thoroughly analysed... Rectifying obvious injustices in both land ownership and the allocation of resources, the government - under the pressure of political events - had no long-term strategy to improve agricultural productivity and raise the social and economic status of peasant families."<sup>944</sup> That means, it was a re-distributive and levelling reform (Desalegn Rahmato 1984, 62/63). Moreover, as Rahmato says, the land distribution was implemented in a haphazard and hasty manner. The land reform policy and distribution was first executed by the University students who did not have an idea of the rural agricultural life, since most of the students were coming from the cities where rich people lived and could afford to send their children to school and enabled them to attend University. Since this first and defective land distribution attempt of 1975 and 1976, the Peasant Associations were redistributing the land every year by correcting the imbalances in the previous land distribution and by taking into consideration the new members of Peasant Associations who have become eligible<sup>945</sup> to a share of land in the years since the organisations were formed.<sup>946</sup>

Owing to the fact that more than 90% of the Ethiopians are farmers and live in rural areas, the Ethiopian communist regime was trying to concentrate its developmental activities most especially on the rural areas. The land reform was the fundamental step. By proclaiming the rural land under public ownership and by its exclusion of it as a private property, the government hoped that the reform will serve the goals of economic development in general

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<sup>942</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 20.

<sup>943</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>944</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>945</sup> "A resident of Peasant Association community becomes eligible to membership of the Peasant Association, and therefore to a share of land, at the age of 18. Since new, unused land is either scarce or unavailable, new members will acquire land only if land redistribution is carried out and some of those with larger plots are made to give up portions of them to others... Since land cannot be transferred by sale, lease, inheritance (except to minors and widows), or other means, there is no other way of acquiring it except through the Peasant Association (PA). In addition, to bring virgin land into cultivation requires capital and effort beyond the ability of the average peasant or PA." (Desalegn Rahmato 1984, 42.)

<sup>946</sup> Cf., *ibid.*, 41f.

and rural development in particular.<sup>947</sup> Through this policy, the government believed that the independent small-holder would become the major force in rural production, and inequalities of wealth and possession - which characterised the preceding imperial political system of feudalism and landlordism - would be eliminated.<sup>948</sup> In order to implement effectively its policy, the central government became a surrogate of the people, it possessed the ultimate authority, had final jurisdiction over the disposition of rural land, and granted the people only the usufructuary land possession rights.<sup>949</sup>

The land reform was not only an economic but also a social reform. Rahmato quotes UN *Progress in Land Reform, Fourth Report* and backs up the social dimension of land reform: "In its narrower and most popular sense, 'land reform' means the redistribution of land. This is the type of reform which arouses the deepest political passions, for in a predominantly agrarian society a redistribution of land means a redistribution of wealth, of income, of status and political power, in short, a revolutionary change in the social structure."<sup>950</sup> The central government wanted to abolish social and economic dependence of the tenants on the landlords. Since the social position of an individual depends on its economic success, the government policy limited the maximum amount of land to be possessed (see above) - in order to eliminate socio-economic inequalities -; it prohibited the use of hired labour to cultivate one's holding; it abolished the onerous practice of tenancy and freed the peasants from all obligations to the landlord.<sup>951</sup>

At least in the society of the Kambata, the land reform and land redistribution brought a significant cultural change. As I have often mentioned in the previous sections, land has not only a material-economic significance, but also a religious-cultural value for the Kambata. Land is a materialised unity between the living and the dead ancestors. It had to be inherited. Selling and leasing means a breach of the ancestral religious bond. Through the land reform and redistribution

- land is materialised,
- its spiritual significance is rescinded,
- the supernatural bond with the living and the dead is weakened,
- the consciousness of moral justice is weakened (social justice was not important),<sup>952</sup>
- positive social differences are eliminated and
- corruption is disseminated.

By losing their power over the land, those who had possessed land lost their social responsibility. The Kambata, who had to take care of moral and social justice – however, social justice did not necessarily mean social equality - of their social members were stripped of their socio-cultural moral consciousness. As I have said above, for the traditional Kambata, social justice did not necessarily mean social equality. A political and social system was just, as far as it respected the individual according to its social status. The justice system of the Kambata did not strive to politically, socially or economically equalise the status of the

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<sup>947</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 37.

<sup>948</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 37.

<sup>949</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 37.

<sup>950</sup> *Ibid.*, 40.

<sup>951</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 38.

<sup>952</sup> Cf. section 5.3

members of the society. Therefore, according to the cultural sociology and anthropology of the Kambata, social justice is based on social differentiation, not on social equalisation.

When the leading organs of the PA took over the executive power to implement the plans of the central government, the consciousness of the traditional and cultural justice system and responsibility began to wane. The supernaturalised social differences, on which the people believed that the social order was based, abated. Moreover, a blatant effect of land redistribution in the Kambata was corruption. The leading organs became dictators. They could considerably determine the economic situation of a household that virtually depends on land and agricultural products. The period of land distribution was almost to compare with a season of a pre-programmed corruption.

On the other hand, Kambata as a highly populated region was causing difficult problems for the leading organs. They had to take into consideration the size of the family before allotting it a plot of land. They had also to take into account the quality of the plot of land. While redistributing they were almost always confronted with complaints and dissatisfaction from the members of the PA (Peasant Association). "The distribution did not aim to bring about the complete equalisation of the holdings of everyone, for this was impossible due to factors such as family size, previous status and size of holdings, the quality of the land, the farming ability of the individual, (i.e. whether he was a capable farmer and had the means requisite for cultivation), and so on. As far as the distributing agents were concerned, the main purpose was to accommodate everyone as much as possible, and to eliminate what all peasants consider to be the greatest misfortune, namely landlessness."<sup>953</sup>

Furthermore, the other challenge for the leaders and for land redistribution as a whole was the consequences of subsistence economy and cultural kinship ties in Ethiopia. "Peasants are reluctant or unwilling to move out of their own communities, and therefore 'colonisation' of unclaimed land is not very popular. Moreover, unclaimed land is often land that a peasant with the know-how and technique available to him cannot profitably operate. The peasant who is about to set out on his own is very often absolutely destitute. He does not own the implements, oxen, seeds, and other basic items necessary for farming. He therefore depends on relatives and friends for the first two or three harvests. In an alien environment, far from his sources of assistance and support, he will be exposed to the threats of starvation."<sup>954</sup>

As has already been mentioned, an absentee ownership of land was forbidden. With this law the central government wanted to show not only its anti-landlordship ownership system, but it also intended to hinder rural-urban migration. Those who were away for a long period of time forfeited their right to the land. In the face of this law, many decided to remain with their plot of land and relatives in the rural areas rather than migrating to the urban areas and losing the kinship ties and their plot of land.

Besides the supernatural and religious significance of land possession that I have mentioned above, as Dejene Aredo and Teferri Regassa say, land is a stock of capital, a fixed asset or investment, and a measure of wealth for the Kambata and any other agricultural society.<sup>955</sup> Since the Kambata see their land as a livelihood security, as financial security, as a

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<sup>953</sup> Rahmato op. cit., 44.

<sup>954</sup> Ibid., 42.

<sup>955</sup> Cf. Dejene Aredo and Teferri Regassa 1995, 314.

transferable wealth across the generations and as a source of consumption purposes,<sup>956</sup> land reform and distribution is an existential component of the economic life of the Kambata. Therefore, land reform and distribution deal with some burning economic questions that determine the objectives of land reform. "Pressure for land reform arises due to the growing disparity between highly unequal land ownership and the rapid economic and demographic changes taking place in society. These changes include population growth, increased mobility, development of the market, income growth, and the changing forms of economic exchange or social interaction. Eventually, the disparity between rigid land ownership and accelerating social changes became so wide, leading to some kind of land reform. Thus, land reform always has a mixture of political, social and economic objectives... The political and social (...) have been variously listed as improving distributive justice, reducing concentration of economic and political power, increasing political participation, enhancing social stability and redesigning social power structures."<sup>957</sup>

In order to make concrete the participative dimension of its development policy, the central government established different associations at the grass roots level. The Peasant Association (PA) was the most important association.<sup>958</sup> Initially, the idea of the establishment of the PA was to awaken the self-consciousness of the peasants, so that they understood that they had the potential (human capital) in order to utilise the natural resources and amend their economic situation. It was intended to break through the traditional religious belief drummed into the poor peasants, that they cannot develop themselves. They religiously substantiated their poverty believing that the rich and the landlords were chosen by God to become rich. This was a political and economic fatalism. This religious viewpoint became the springboard for the anti-religious communist politics. Therefore, the political consciousness was one of the crucial communist revolutionary policies. The PA was the breeding ground for this political consciousness.

However, the economic dimension was playing conspicuous role. The set-up of the PAs concentrated mainly, but not exclusively, on the agricultural sector which is still the only economic sector in Kambata. "Each PA was to be organised on an 800-hectare area, and membership was to be made up of tenants, landless labourers, owners with less than ten hectares, and, after the completion of land distribution, former landlords who were willing to personally cultivate their holdings. PAs were given a wide range of functions and responsibilities, chief among which were the following: to administer public property; to establish service co-operatives; to build schools and clinics, and to undertake villagisation programmes. Initially, however, their major function was to implement the land reform. PAs were also empowered to establish *judicial tribunals* [emphasis by the author]. These were initially concerned with cases involving land disputes among PA members, but later their powers were widened considerably."<sup>959</sup>

Basically, the responsibilities that the PAs had to fulfil were not something new for the society of the Kambata. The only difference in the pre-communist era was that the fulfilling of social responsibilities, conflict management, justice system, etc. were based on kinship

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<sup>956</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 314.

<sup>957</sup> *Ibid.*, 318.

<sup>958</sup> There were also Youth Association and Women Association.

<sup>959</sup> Dessalegn Rahmato 1984, 38.

structures. After the introduction of the communist administrative policy, the kinship structures lost their significance and different clan and lineage members were crowded together in a PA-territory. This system brought social irresponsibility as well as corruption. The Kambata began to think that the fate of their society and community is in the hands of the central government and leading organs of the PAs. This was the opposite of the central government's original idea. The government had intended to awaken the public consciousness by believing that through participative developmental activities the PAs would amend their economic, political and social life by themselves. The people began to expect everything from above. Through this impersonalisation of the social responsibility an abysmal social gulf, which divided the society into two, was created: the central government and the leading organ on the one hand, and the members of the PAs on the other hand. This was contrary to the original intention of the Ethiopian Revolution.

In any case, the task and structure of the PAs were as follows: "The PA is a mass organisation composed of all peasants in the community over 18 years of age. Its *general assembly* [emphasis by the author] is the highest decision-making authority, and elects the leadership of all subsidiary bodies as well as its own executive council. More importantly, PAs have assumed many of the functions of the old local administrative apparatus of the previous regime. It is the PA, which is responsible for collecting taxes, resolving community conflicts, providing services and maintaining law and order. The agrarian reform has thus drastically restructured rural society, and promises the peasant the opportunity to administer his own affairs. In 1977, the government decided that PAs must be established at the provincial and national levels, the provincial PAs to co-ordinate the activities of all lower level PAs in the provinces, and the national organisation - the All-Ethiopian Peasant Association (AEPA) - to be responsible for the work of the country's PAs. Members to AEPA are elected by the general assemblies of their respective provincial PAs, and members to the latter by assemblies of their *awraja*<sup>960</sup> organisations, and so on down to the *woreda*<sup>961</sup> and local or *kebele*<sup>962</sup> level. The kebele Peasant Association is the basic organisation unit of the rural community, the grass roots organisation which is charged with administering the land in its area, and responsible for the basic needs of the peasant community."<sup>963</sup>

We have seen above the task of the members of the PAs, the administering and (re) structuring task of the general assembly and the leading organs. There is also another important task of the general assembly and leading organs: the economic aspect. The key role of the central government here is to become a supporting apparatus for collective endeavour. The motto of the government was: *unity is strength*. This was to remind the peasants that their political weakness and economic backwardness were a result of a lack of unity among the tenants and landless during the feudal landlordism and its political system. Hence, participation and collective endeavour were conceived as the first and fundamental steps towards improving of the welfare of the peasants. In order to achieve this, the following were the main tasks of the PAs:

<sup>960</sup> "For administrative purposes the country is divided into 14 provinces. Each province is further divided into *awrajas*, and each *awraja* into *woredas*" (Ibid., 8.).

<sup>961</sup> "The *woreda* is the lowest administrative unit, and the one closest to the rural community." (Ibid., 8.)

<sup>962</sup> *Kebele* is "the lowest level or unit of urban and rural organisations. The *kebele* Peasant Association is the primary organisation of the peasantry." (Ibid., 8.)

<sup>963</sup> Ibid., 39.

- ◆ land distribution and land administration,
- ◆ responsibilities associated with rural development (irrigation works, terracing, road-building, land reclamation and colonisation, etc.),
- ◆ increasing production,
- ◆ making improvements in farm methods and technique,
- ◆ encouraging the members to move towards socialist form of agriculture,
- ◆ following government policy and co-operating with concerned agencies in matters related to land use, conservation and infrastructural projects, and
- ◆ establishing health, education and marketing services.<sup>964</sup>

Even if the peasants showed at the beginning a good deal of active concern for the association and its ideals, the fact that it did not bring any significant economic advances contributed to the wane of the peasants' initial enthusiasm. Some of the reasons for the disinterest of the Kambata in the PAs were:

- the corruption of the leaders,
- timely overlapping of the general assembly meetings with the private works of the peasants on their own fields,
- fruitless general assembly meetings wherein most of the times only the chairman and the leaders spoke for hours,
- vague objectives for the meetings,
- vying for power,
- attempts by the leaders to give privilege to their relatives,
- the ill-treatment of the individuals by the officials,
- teaching the complicated marxist-leninist political ideologies to uneducated farmers.

However, there are some other reasons, which pushed the peasants to participate actively in the PAs and general assemblies:

- only those who participated actively in the matters of the PAs had fewer problems in receiving artificial fertiliser during its distribution,
- they had less problems with the leaders during land distribution, and
- those who did not take part in the activities of the PAs were being fined, detained or punished by compulsory labour on the land of Producers Co-operatives or of soldiers who were fighting for the central state.

The Ethiopian government intended, as has already been mentioned, to make the nation wealthy and powerful within a short period of time. In order to implement this, small-scale agriculture seemed to be a stumbling block for the government policy; since it envisaged a long-term industrial development and the creation of more mechanised farms.<sup>965</sup> In the face of this, the government preferred a socialist collective ownership to the smallholder strategy. Hence, collectivisation and the creation of Producers Co-operatives became part of the land and economic reform and the PAs' agricultural policy. The following was the plan of the government for the farming sectors:

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<sup>964</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 74f.

<sup>965</sup> Cf. Brüne, *op. cit.*, 21.



**Table 16: Nationalisation programmes**

Farming Sectors	1983/84	1985/86	3.Yr. Plan 1988/89	10-Yr.Plan 1993/94
State Farms	3%	3%	4%	6%
Producer Co-op.	1%	2%	6%	52%
Individual Farms	95%	94%	90%	40%

Source: *ibid.*, 23.

In order to implement its policy of grassroots developmental participation and to foster the economic, political and social consciousness, the government stressed the importance of the Producers Co-operatives and Service Co-operatives. The Producers Co-operatives and Service Co-operatives are two quasi-different sectors of the members of 4 to 6 *kebeles* who made a producers unit. Whereas the first one concentrates on common agricultural production, the latter's task is to sell some industrial products to the members of the co-operatives for fair prices. That means, it protects the peasants from exploitation by small-scale merchants who had been fixing the prices of their commodities as they liked. The two Co-operatives were summarised as Agricultural Service Co-operatives. The products from the Producers Co-operatives were sold in order to purchase some basic goods from the distribution centres. These goods were handed over to the co-operative sales-man from which the peasants were buying them for fair prices.

Alemayehu Lirensa says, "the Agricultural Service Co-operatives had had the following objectives, powers and duties:

- a) to procure crop expansion service,
- b) to market the produce of members at fair prices,
- c) to give loans at fair interest rates,
- d) to give storage and savings services,
- e) to supply consumer goods to members according to their needs,
- f) to give education in socialist philosophy and co-operative work in order to enhance the political consciousness of the peasantry,
- g) to supply improved agricultural implements and provide tractor services,
- h) to collect contributions,
- i) to give flour mills services,
- j) to organise craftsmen in order to promote cottage industry,
- k) to provide political education with a view to establish agricultural producers' co-operative societies by forming, promoting and consolidating mutual aid teams,
- l) to sue and be sued,
- m) to draw up its internal regulations."<sup>966</sup>

<sup>966</sup> Alemayehu Lirensa 1984, 196.

### 7.1.2 Resettlement

The land reform, which we have seen above, had set an important course for the implementation of resettlement as well as villagization. The government, which had expropriated the landlords of their possession, became on the one hand the deputy of the peasants; but on the other hand, the legal owner of land. Nationalisation of land and the absolute power of the central government concerning land possession paved the way for the implementation of the resettlement. By taking advantage of this right, the government could choose areas where the resettlement had to take place. The significance of resettlement for the development of Ethiopia was multifaceted. "Resettlement was seen as a means of addressing a range of issues. From an ecological perspective it was seen as a way to redress population imbalances and reduce population pressure in the highlands; from an economic standpoint it was believed that resettlement could help to increase productivity and make use of supposedly under-utilised fertile lands; and from a social point of view resettlement was seen as a way of providing land to those without it, to settle pastorals, and remove unwanted urban unemployed."<sup>967</sup>

Besides the economic, social and ecological visions, patriotic national motivations played a significant role while implementing the resettlement policy. As I have mentioned above, the Ethiopian Revolutionary Government was trying to set up a powerful Ethiopia, which was to be militarily strong and economically self-sufficient and wealthy. It believed that if it systematises the settlement sites in order to set up a favourable infrastructure for its citizens and to exploit the natural resources, the military and the economic dreams would be realised. The government believed that it had enough human capital and natural resources to achieve this goal. "Settlement was a way to resolve the riddle of how it is that while we have we lack and when we could be lending we are beggars."<sup>968</sup>

By expropriating the landlords of their land and by nationalising the land and making it public property, the main aim of the government was national unity. The central government understood itself as a personified unity. This vision of unity entailed the unity between the ruling and the ruled. That was to show its different political standpoint, which was contrary to that of the landlordism and feudalism wherein, the peasants on the one hand, and the landlords and feudals on the other hand, were divided by economic, social and political gulf. Besides its being a symbol for unity and equality, resettlement had to set a course for the facilities of infrastructures and political ideological teachings. "The fresh start which settlement required was perceived as an opportunity to introduce social and economic change in three major respects. Firstly, an essential component of the plans was to establish settlement villages linked in complexes. Resettlement was thus in some senses the precursor to the massive villagization, which altered the physical appearance of most of the Ethiopian countryside between 1986 and 1989. Secondly, settlement was seen as offering a chance to introduce settlers to improve forms of technology and thus liberate peasants from 'backward' agricultural practices. Thirdly, and despite the experience of former settlements, more than half the settlements were planned as producers' co-operatives, with minimal private holdings of 0.1 ha."<sup>969</sup>

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<sup>967</sup> Alula Pankhurst 1990, 121.

<sup>968</sup> Ibid., 122.

<sup>969</sup> Ibid., 123f.

While trying to implement the resettlement, the central government had acted in a manner, which was contrary to its original ideology and attitude. As we have seen above, the participative dimension of development was the springboard of the revolutionary movement and political and economic mobilisation. By hastily organising the resettlement procedures, by choosing the resettlement sites without consultation with the people and thorough scientific researches and by recruiting the resettlers without enough psychological preparations, the government policy not only failed to achieve its goal, but it also expended a considerable amount of money in vain and made the resettlers even poorer than before. Those who were resettled had had health problems because of the new environmental and climatic conditions. Those who had escaped the resettlement and come back had no more assets to live on. Alula Pankhurst says the following about the results and objectives of the resettlement: "The numbers resettled were too insignificant to affect population redistribution, the economic results were poor in terms of production, yields, and cost. On the eve of the famine, settlement had not become self-sufficient and still required food. Moreover, the use of mechanisation proved unsustainable. Socially, the results were disastrous. The settlement schemes paid no regard to the local population; the attempt to settle urban unemployed and pastorals on agricultural schemes, often against their will, led to massive desertions, and the policy of settling men without their families proved unpopular and was abandoned by the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission."<sup>970</sup>

The resettlement plan had two main systems: conventional and integrated. The first one was characterised, for example, by the provision of services of the agricultural mechanisation. The integrated resettlement system had been implemented by integrating the re-settlers in the under-populated areas of the western Ethiopia.<sup>971</sup> The re-settlers were using the already existing social services and infrastructures, whereas in the conventional resettlement areas new infrastructures were set up. Moreover, the integrated settlers were being integrated into the already organised peasant associations and service and producers co-operatives.

Concerning the trend of the resettlement process, A. Pankhurst writes the following: "A number of changes occurred in the implementation of the plan. Firstly, the size of the operation was scaled down. Some 200,000 households were resettled instead of the planned 500,000. Moreover, the household size, instead of the estimated five members, consisted of an average of three, so that some 600,000 people representing 1.6 per cent of the country's rural population were resettled instead of the anticipated 1.5 million. Secondly, the plan concentrated on Wollo, Tigray and Gonder. Target figures for Shewa were not provided and certainly no plans existed to settle people from southern Shewa."<sup>972</sup> In fact after Wollo, Shewa became the largest source area for re-settlers. Thirdly, the settlement was halted earlier than planned in January 1986, probably not, as some commentators have assumed, because of external pressure, but for internal reasons. With the onset of the rains in the second half of

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<sup>970</sup> Ibid., 122.

<sup>971</sup> The destinations of the settlers were Kafa, Ilubabor, Wollegga and Gojam. All these administrative regions are in the western and southwestern Ethiopia.

<sup>972</sup> Kambata belongs to the southern Shewa province. Unfortunately, I could not find the exact number of the resettled Kambata. Many of them came back from their temporary camps before being deported. These camps were set up in order to gather together all the would-be resettlers. Those who were already deported escaped and came back to Kambata because of the climatic and economic challenges in the resettlement areas; and also those who were still in the temporary camps came back mostly because the government gave up the resettlement policy.

1985, willingness to resettle decreased among peasants who regained hopes of being able to subsist on their land. As the crisis subsided, the government also became less preoccupied with famine, and the strains on the economy caused by the disproportionate expenditures on resettlement became hard to justify. Resettlement was resumed when a new crisis seemed likely in late 1987. However, as the drought proved less severe than anticipated, and few peasants were willing to leave, the plans were scaled down."<sup>973</sup>

Besides the speed, lack of thorough organisation and co-ordination between the sending areas and receiving areas, superficial information on the advantages and disadvantages of resettlement, weak participation of the re-settlers in the preparation process (which could have fostered a sense of responsibility for their future in a new situation, area, climate and culture), eventual coercion during the recruitment, etc. are some of the points which some critics find fault with the resettlement preparation and process. However, there were "push" as well as "pull" factors, which played a decisive role in taking decisions concerning the resettlement. The over-population and over-utilised land in Kambata and their consequences were the push factors. It was obvious that only poor people were being recruited. Most of these poor people belonged to the lower social classes. That means, they were poor because they belonged to the lower social classes. Even after the land reform policy and land redistribution, they remained poor. Of course, there were some that also belonged to the higher social classes, who were economically poor and who had been recruited for settlement, although their number was substantially lower. As far as I know, there was not a single family, which was economically, well off and which wanted or was obliged to be resettled.<sup>974</sup>

Moreover, those who were organising the recruitment and deportation were authorities that mostly belonged to the higher social classes and were consequently rich. If there was an inclination from the side of some members of the authority to recruit some relatives of the other members of the authority, the latter hindered their relatives from being recruited. That means, after the initial resettlement euphoria had abated, it was difficult to find voluntary settlers. Especially, after they had stayed for a longed time in the temporary camps, the settlers began to be sceptical of the resettlement. Even from the very beginning, to go for resettlement meant de facto to belong to a socially and (or) economically lower class.

Despite this fact, there were some "pull factors" which had attracted and promised the would-be re-settlers a better future. The government had proclaimed in its resettlement propaganda "a glorified vision of fertile plentiful lands awaiting potential migrants. Settlers were told that the land would be cultivated for them by tractors, that the houses would be built, and that they would be provided with food, clothing and equipment, etc. Many that

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<sup>973</sup> Ibid., 126.

<sup>974</sup> In any case, "the criteria for the selection of the *Woredas* [emphasis of the author] and the peasant associations which would be included in resettlement were as follows:

1. a topography of rugged hills and slopes exceeding 35 per cent;
2. severe deforestation and /or severe erosion;
3. few natural resources and poor soils;
4. affliction by recurrent famine in the past 25 years;
5. population density to the point where average land size is too small to sustain a family." (Alemneh Dejene 1990b, 177

could have relied on relatives chose not to in order to remain independent, stating: 'we won't beg from their hands.'<sup>975</sup>

Resettlement had consequences in the family life, kinship responsibilities and social status. In the family, it was not always a unanimous decision, especially when the husbands decided to be resettled. Many women with their children were not ready to take these drastic decisions and leave the environment, friends, neighbours, relatives, dead ancestors and their tombs, etc. who were their social security and with whom they lived and shared their joys and sorrows, and go to unknown places, to a land of oblivion and exile. Even for the kinship itself, it was a big disgrace and pain. This was so, not only because the remaining lost some of their departing relatives as social members; but it also was a social set-back, because through their departure they came to intensely feel the economic and social disparagement of their relatives with whom they identify themselves and for whom they are socially, economically and politically responsible. Therefore, the would-be settlers were very often despised by their neighbours or other social members for leaving the land of their ancestors.

The social dimension plays the major and decisive role, which, therefore, shows a considerable effect of cultural and social structures on the economic activities of a society. Even if the settlers were privileged in many perspectives, as A. Pankhurst says, they were considered as second class in the society. "Paradoxically, settlers have been a favoured section of Ethiopian society, while at the same time they have been treated as second-class citizens. State intervention has had two aspects, care and control... Settlements have received a greater concentration of assistance than any other group. Settlers have been over-privileged in a number of ways. Large amounts of the country's resources, in terms of land, labour and capital, were put at the disposal of settlements. The number of agricultural and health extension workers in resettlement areas is far in excess of any other sector. Settlers have received free tractor services and medical facilities. They have also been exempt from taxes."<sup>976</sup>

From the very beginning the policy of the central government was to have strong control over its citizens, to unify their economic, political and social aims and to monopolise the economic activity. In order to implement this policy, resettlement provides a favourable atmosphere. Through the collectivisation and obligatory setting-up of producers' co-operatives, the controlling hand of the central government began to deeply penetrate the life of the settlers. There were, for example, indirect prohibitions to sell the private agricultural products, sometimes by defining market days as workdays so as to prevent the selling of their products.<sup>977</sup> But if they nevertheless had to sell, they were doing it secretly and for half of the normal price. Moreover, their religious freedom was restricted, for example, by convoking the general assembly on the days of the religious meetings.<sup>978</sup>

After the initial resettlement euphoria has waned, the resentment of the people towards it increased significantly. This was especially the case during the chaotic situation of the resettlement of 1984 because of the high number of people pouring into relief centres, and the

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<sup>975</sup> Alula Pankhurst, *op.cit.*, 127.

<sup>976</sup> *Ibid.*, 128.

<sup>977</sup> Most of the market days in many Ethiopian societies are periodical markets. Some people come to the big periodical markets from a radius of about 15-km on foot. That means they can practically do nothing else on that day than walking to the market and back.

<sup>978</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 129.

separation of families and their sending to different destinations remained a painful experience in the people's memories. "Reasons for their return included serious health problems, the death of a family member, poor working conditions and harvest on huge farms, poor health, a desire to reunite with family members, hostility among natives, and homesickness."<sup>979</sup> As Alemneh Dejene says, the attitude of the peasants towards resettlement has dramatically shifted from ambivalence in 1984 to defiance in 1987 because they would rather die in a place where their umbilical cord is buried.<sup>980</sup>

### 7.1.3 The villagization policy

"Closely related to resettlement is the villagization programme, whose central aim is to move people into villages in order to provide them with essential services, including social and economic facilities of infrastructures. During this first phase, which lasted from December 1985 to March 1986, 4.6 million people or 12 per cent of Ethiopia's rural population were re-housed in 4,500 villages. By July 1987 more than 180,000 dwelling units had been constructed and more than 8 million people villagised. Plans to villagise an additional three million people were announced in October 1987."<sup>981</sup>

Like the resettlement, villagization shows the strong will of the government to develop Ethiopia, especially the rural population within a short time span. By taking into consideration various development policy theories, the government's emphasis on rural development and agricultural sector was a welcome idea and strategy. Making an agricultural society self-sufficient in production of food is the first and basic development strategy. Moreover, the plan of the government to set up favourable infrastructures for the realisation of food self-sufficiency by mechanising the cultivation system and efficiently utilising the natural resources, was a correct step. In order to attain this goal, villagization was seen as a means to remedy the shortcomings of traditional farming and dispersed settlements, and to provide better services to the rural Ethiopia.<sup>982</sup> The objections of the critics of villagisation are like those of resettlement: hasty implementation of the schemes, little knowledge of local conditions, a lack of professional planning, and disregard for peasants attitudes.<sup>983</sup>

Moreover,

- "The peasants will need to rebuild their houses in the new villages. This is likely to contribute to production shortfalls at a time when the country is already suffering from food deficits and regional famines.
- When peasants have to travel further from the villages to their fields, this may well impair agricultural production.
- Smaller plots may not allow peasant households to grow garden crops, raise small animals and perform sideline activities, which augment their income and satisfy consumption needs.

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<sup>979</sup> Alemneh Dejene 1990b, 176.

<sup>980</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 177. (Cf. also Alemneh Dejene 1990a, 97ff.)

<sup>981</sup> S. Brüne, *op. cit.*, 26.

<sup>982</sup> Cf. Alemayehu Lirenso 1990, 135.

<sup>983</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 135.

- Without adequate planning and land use plans, the concentration of many people in a small area may increase the danger of epidemics and other health risks.
- The increased use of wood for house construction may accelerate deforestation, unless massive reforestation programmes compensate for the losses.
- Villagization will increase state control over the peasantry and at the same time pave the way for collectivisation of agriculture and monopolisation of rural trade."<sup>984</sup>

Unlike resettlement, the historic development of villagization was caused by political reasons and not by economic. The Ethio-Somali war was the main reason for having implemented villagization in the administrative region of Bale. It was thought to guarantee the safety of the inhabitants of Bale who were living dispersed during the invasion of the Somalis (1977-78). As Alemayehu Lirenso says, the villagization programme in Hararge (1984) also had security reasons (because of the Somalis). This programme was extended in 1985 from its political aspect to economic and development strategy, which had to apply to all administrative regions. "Interestingly this process was initiated by means of an internal memorandum and not as one would have expected through a public decree. By 1986, 15 per cent of the country's total rural population, about 5.5 million people, had been villagized. In the following years villagization proceeded at rapid speed, and another 7 million people were moved between 1986 and 1988. Thus 12 million Ethiopians were living in newly built villages by mid-1988, about one third of the rural population. The highest number of newly established villages was built in Shewa and Hararge administrative regions, the lowest in Tigre, Gamo Gofa and Wollo."<sup>985</sup>

By implementing villagization social, political, ecological and economic advantages were envisaged. "Major objectives were to provide social services for the rural communities; to promote co-operative work; to raise the level of consciousness of the people; to improve village security and defence; to plan a more rational land use; to develop natural resources and increase agricultural productivity by introducing modern techniques."<sup>986</sup> Did these objectives achieve their goal in Kambata? What was the reaction of the people of Kambata concerning this villagization policy? Which were social, economic and ecological advantages and disadvantages of villagization for the Kambata?

Socio-culturally, most of the Kambata were against the villagisation policy. Even if the villagization of the Kambata was within the territory of Kambata itself, they had to leave houses wherein their fathers and even forefathers lived. They had not only to leave their houses, but also to destroy them, and construct new ones on a plot of land where the spirits of "strangers" abode. By going away from the plot of land of their ancestors, they felt they had distanced themselves from the *ayyana* of their ancestors, which means to leave them alone. Moreover, this settlement system spawned conflicts among the neighbours. The Kambata traditionally have a dispersed settlement system; but the villagization brought the people too close to one another. Because the allotted plot of land<sup>987</sup> was too small and grazing land was for common use various conflicts emerged. When the social members were not too near to

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<sup>984</sup> Ibid., 135f.

<sup>985</sup> Ibid., 136.

<sup>986</sup> Ibid., 139.

<sup>987</sup> The size of compounds, which was allotted for private use, was between 1,000 and 2000 m<sup>2</sup>.

each other, they lived peacefully. Villagization, however, rescinded the significance of proximity and distance for social order. Moreover, villagization means for many Kambata cancellation of social order, which is based on a certain hierarchy and social differentiation.

Of course, there have been considerable socio-structural advantages caused by villagization: "travel time to various service centres had been reduced, because the new villages are closer to roads, local markets, service co-operative shops, grain mills, schools, churches, and water sources. The programme has also facilitated reforestation efforts and extension services to peasant households."<sup>988</sup>

Even ecologically, villagization was not always advantageous. Most parts of Kambata are mountains and hills. The villagization policy was to re-house the people in the flat areas. Traditionally, many Kambata preferred to settle on the hills and slopes of mountains. There they used to build their houses and cultivate perennial crops and *inset* and plant different trees. To abandon these hills and mountain slopes means to expose these areas to erosion. That means, after having left them the farmers will be cultivating them for annual crops, since they cannot leave them fallow because of the shortage of arable land. Therefore, according to the Kambata farmers, it is preferable to settle on the slopes of mountains and hills and plant perennial crops and *inset* so as to protect the land from soil erosion. Additional ecological disadvantages of villagization are overgrazing in the settlement areas and deforestation around the settlement sites.

Technically and architecturally, the people were confronted with big problems. At least in Kambata, the areas which produce only or mainly annual crops were given the priority to be villagized, while areas which grow perennial crops, especially *inset*, had to be villagized at a later date.<sup>989</sup> Those who are from the areas where perennial crops grow had to help (by constructing villages) those from the areas where only or mainly annual crops are cultivated. Since the former had been helping the latter only because they were obliged by the villagization policy and its leading organs, the houses were flimsy. Moreover, children and women, who have no experience and know-how helped during the construction. In some parts of Ethiopia additional labour had to be brought in from towns,<sup>990</sup> who were even worse than the children and women of the countryside concerning house construction and agricultural work. Those who were obliged to help were not interested in the quality of the construction.

Moreover, there was not enough material to build the houses. Usually, when the Kambata build a house, they begin to prepare the necessary material for years, and they rely on the relatives and neighbours for the contribution and collection of the construction material. But since the houses had to be constructed at the same time for all the neighbours and relatives, it created a big construction material shortage. In the face of this, many forest trees were cut down which led to deforestation. They even used materials from their old houses. "Additional problems occurred in the choice of sites for new villages. Houses were built on marshy land, water-logged plains or near the habitat of wild animals. Inexperienced authorities failed to allocate sufficient land for schools, shops and health centres. Some local committees even raised funds from the peasants without the knowledge or consent of the central government. Regardless of such mistakes and shortcomings a number of party

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<sup>988</sup> Ibid., 142.

<sup>989</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 139.

<sup>990</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 138.



secretaries, cadres and *awraja* and *woreda* administrators received rewards from the government for their demonstrated enthusiasm for the programme."<sup>991</sup>

Economically, villagization created considerable disadvantages for the *inset*-cultivating Kambata. The size of the allotted compound for private use was too small to cultivate *inset* and other perennial crops which play a decisive role for the economy of the Kambata. Since the *inset* plants need continuous care, it is difficult to grow them far away from the settlements. This was one of the important factors why the Kambata were against villagization. Since the aim of villagization and along with it the implementation of the "Producers' Co-operative" was not in favour of private property, and as far as I know, the Kambata would never cultivate the *inset* as public property, villagization was from the very beginning *de facto* condemned to fail. "Every second household interviewed had lost a significant part of their crops and roots, being effectively unable to protect their fields from wild animals, pests and thieves from such a distance. It had also become difficult to carry manure to the farms and use it as fertiliser. Many peasants had to leave straw to decay, which would have been used to feed cattle in the dry season or to plaster walls, had their threshing grounds not been so far away. Increased distance to grazing land had reduced grazing time by 20 per cent, and livestock mortality increased significantly."<sup>992</sup>

Besides the lack of space to grow vegetables, raise small animals and poultry, or attempt other sideline activities to earn an additional income, the peasants' discontent could not be ignored because the sizes of the houses were standardised for each family irrespective of its size. In some areas, the houses, which were divided into three rooms (living room, bedroom and store), were vehemently rejected. Firstly, because the byre was built separately, whereas the people preferred to have their cattle in their houses. Secondly, because dividing the house into three rooms consumes more kerosene since the family needs a kerosene lamp in each room, which for many peasants is financially non-affordable.<sup>993</sup> Moreover, the villagized people were disappointed because of the empty promises of immediate electrical supplies, which are until now not fulfilled.

Let me conclude this sub-section: like many of the governmental projects, the failure of villagization was because there was no participation and consultation of the people. That means, they were not convinced of the utility of villagization. It was introduced by the central government by force. The government should have sociologically assessed the project in advance, if the people were really ready to take such drastic economic and social measures. In many traditional societies to begin something, which is radically new, has always been rejected by the people. If the people are not ready and prepared, there is no participation. Without the participation and conviction of the people, no project would be successful. Moreover, villagization in those years caused a considerable decrease of agricultural production. "As the building of new houses absorbed much of the peasants' time, they were prevented from harvesting and threshing the *meher* (main season) crops in time. Many peasants were also unable to grow *belg* (short season) crops due to lack of time."<sup>994</sup>

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<sup>991</sup> Ibid., 138.

<sup>992</sup> Ibid., 140.

<sup>993</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 140.

<sup>994</sup> Ibid., 142.

### 7.1.4 Infrastructures

In this sub-section I would like to briefly show the present situation of infrastructures in Kambata.

#### Electricity supply

Firewood shortage is one of the crucial problems in Kambata. The region has not only lost its botanical bio-diversity, but it is also exposed to devastating soil erosion. This problem is increased by lack of enough electric power supply. Only some inhabitants in the cities have access to electric power supply. Even if it is very difficult to have an exact statistics on this matter, the following chart gives a bit of information on the electric power supply in the region:

**Table 17: Electricity supply**

<i>Year</i>	<i>Inhabitants in the region</i>	<i>Urban inhabitants</i>	<i>Bene-ficiaries in number</i>	<i>Beneficiaries in relation to the urban population</i>	<i>Beneficiaries in relation to the whole population</i>
1999/2000	466,470	36,537	12,606	34.5%	2.7%

Source: The electric power authority, Durame 1999/2000

#### Roads

Concerning infrastructures, Kambata is one of the neglected areas in Ethiopia. One of the main reasons for this fact is that the region does not have any significant economic resources to provide for the central state. Even if the region is very fertile, the production of its farmers does not considerably exceed the consumption by its population. The low number of good roads decelerates the economic contact with the neighbouring peoples.

**Table 18: Structure of roads**

	<b>Roads in km before 1992/93</b>			<b>Roads in km in 1998/99</b>		
	<b>Roads to be used in</b>			<b>Roads to be used in</b>		
District	dry season only	dry & rainy season	<b>Total</b>	dry season only	dry & rainy season	<b>Total</b>
<i>Qacha-Bira</i>	25,7	53,0	<b>78,7</b>	32,7	53,0	<b>85,7</b>
<i>Qadida-Gamela</i>	37	20	<b>57</b>	0	57	<b>57</b>
<i>Hangach-cha</i>	30	41,5	<b>71,5</b>	17	54,5	<b>71,5</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>92,7</b>	<b>114,5</b>	<b>207,2</b>	<b>49,7</b>	<b>164,5</b>	<b>214,2</b>

Source: Kambata, Alaba and Tembaro Planning and Economic Development Department, Durame 1999

#### Potable water 1997/98

One of the crucial problems of the Kambata is the low availability of potable water. The Kambata are absolutely dependent on rainfall for their agricultural activity. The climatic

fluctuation of nowadays exposes the Kambata to economic difficulties. The problem of drinking water is acute, especially in the dry season. In this period, the human beings as well as the cattle face severe problems if the rain does not come on time. As the following table shows, the number of beneficiaries of potable water is conspicuously low.

**Table 19: Potable water supply**

<b>Districts</b>	<b>Population</b>	<b>Beneficiaries (in No.)</b>	<b>Beneficiaries (in %)</b>
<i>Hangachcha</i>	165,997	28,336	17.1
<i>Qadida-Gamela</i>	151,315	62,971	41.5
<i>Qacha-Bira</i>	127,520	29,883	23.4
<b>Total/average</b>	<b>444,832</b>	<b>121,190</b>	<b>27.33</b>

Source: Kambata, Alaba and Tembaro Planning and Economic Development Department, Durame 1999

### **Health Service**

The health service and its facilitation are one of the most important focal points of governmental and non-governmental developmental activities. In former times, most of the Kambata were dependent on their traditional natural medicine. In the face of the fact that, most of the medicinal herbs are no more available - because of the drastic deforestation - most of the Kambata are taking advantage of the modern medicinal facilities, provided that they have the necessary money to pay for treatment. Despite the increasing trend of investment in the health service, the number of qualified workers is substantially low. The beneficiaries of clinics, health posts and health centres are 10,000, 5,000 and 25,000 people respectively.

**Table 20: Medical facilities**

<b>Districts</b>	<b>Doctors</b>	<b>Nurses</b>	<b>Health Ass.</b>	<b>Clinics</b>	<b>Health Posts</b>	<b>Health Centre</b>
Hangachcha	2	9	10	3	3	1
Qadida-Gamela	2	5	17	3	4	2
Qacha-Bira	2	7	17	4	5	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>4</b>

Source: Kambata, Alaba and Tembaro, Ministry of Health, Durame 1999

### **Distribution of Improved Seeds**

Besides reforestation, terracing and the distribution of artificial fertiliser, distribution of improved seeds is another measure, which the ministry of agriculture is taking to increase the agricultural production of the Kambata farmers. Even if it is not yet extensively practised, the trend in the following table shows that the farmers are profiting from its distribution. As I have been informed by the ministry of agriculture in Durame, different varieties of the improved seeds are being distributed. However, in the following table only the totals of each year are shown.

**Table 21: Improved seeds**

Year	Amount in Quintals
1997	362.20
1998	1195.25
1999	1774.25

Source: Kambata, Alaba and Tembaro, Ministry of Agriculture, Durame 1999

### Soil Conservation

The geo-physical situation of Kambata highly favours the soil erosion. In the face of the rapidly growing population and deforestation, the fertility of the soil has drastically decreased. Despite the artificial fertiliser, their annual agricultural production is considerably decreasing as many farmers in Kambata complain. In order to reduce the consequences of this problem, the ministry of agriculture has begun to implement two measures: terracing and reforestation. Concerning this problem, the communist regime had been implementing even more intensive measures. However, in the following table I want to show the trend between 1994 and 1999.

**Table 22: Soil conservation**

Year	Terraces in km	Afforestation (No. of the planted trees)
1994/95	280	2,850,140
1995/96	233	4,086,973
1996/97	344	3,108,124
1997/98	291	2,940,931
1998/99	310	

Source: Kambata, Alaba and Tembaro, Ministry of Agriculture, Durame 1999

### Artificial Fertiliser Distribution

The distribution of artificial fertiliser is another important measure to increase agricultural production. But many Kambata farmers are not at all happy that it has been introduced. They say that after it was introduced, the fertility of the soil drastically decreased; before its introduction they used to collect a better harvest. But now without it, the harvest is very poor. Therefore, in order to raise agricultural production, the ministry of agriculture regularly distributes the artificial fertiliser.

**Table 23: Artificial fertilisers**

	Districts:					
	Hangachcha		Qadida-Gamela		Qacha-Bira	
	<i>Type of fertiliser in qtl.</i>		<i>Type of fertiliser in qtl.</i>		<i>Type of Fertiliser in qtl.</i>	
Year	Dap (18%)	Urea (46%)	Dap (18%)	Urea (46%)	Dap (18%)	Urea (46%)
1996	13,896	176	4,884.5	14	10,884.5	80.5

	<b>Districts:</b>					
	<b>Hangachcha</b>		<b>Qadida-Gamela</b>		<b>Qacha-Bira</b>	
	<i>Type of fertiliser in qtl.</i>		<i>Type of fertiliser in qtl.</i>		<i>Type of Fertiliser in qtl.</i>	
1997	15,915.5	475	19,877	789	10,713	328.25
1998	15,915.5	1,040	10,631	1,199.5	10,597.5	1,440
1999	8,399	6,218	7,184.5	2,996	7,333	4,984.45

Source: Kambata, Alaba and Tembaro, Ministry of Agriculture, Durame 1999

### **Schools**

Education is one of the fundamental preconditions for the human and economic development. Concerning this fact, the former communist regime as well as the present government stress the importance of the construction of new schools. Even if qualitatively the situation of the schools has not significantly changed, the quantity of the schools is increasing considerably.

**Table 24: Numerical growth of schools**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Number of Schools</b>
1993/94	90
1994/95	101
1995/96	115
1996/97	120
1997/98	122
1998/99	123

Source: Kambata, Alaba and Tembaro, Ministry of Education, Durame 1999

Three of the schools are up to 12th grade and one of them up to 10th grade. The rest are either up to 6th or 8th grade. In the region there are no universities, colleges or Teachers Training Institutes.

### **Investment in Different Sectors**

The following table shows the investment trend in different sectors that we have seen in the above tables.

**Table 25: Investment by sectors**

	<b>Investment Sectors (currency = Eth. Birr)</b>				
<b>Year</b>	<b>Health</b>	<b>Education</b>	<b>Agriculture</b>	<b>Water/Irrigation</b>	<b>Road Constr.</b>
1993/94	1,603,057	478,035	586,420	21,233	0
1994/95	382,427	192,429	319,099	0	0
1995/96	2,157,900	993,790	864,631	1,981,155	370,507
1996/97	494,583	1,621,351	755,036	1,306,723	1,161,106
1997/98	616,738	1,989,374	307,354	249,4800	0
1998/99	2,161,806	2,240,005	536,329	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,416,511</b>	<b>7,514,984</b>	<b>3,368,869</b>	<b>5,803,911</b>	<b>1,531,613</b>

Source: Kambata, Alaba and Tembaro Planning and Economic Development Department, Durame 1999

## 7.2 The main non-governmental developmental activities

The non-governmental organisations play an important role in the developmental activities in Kambata. The first schools and health centres in the region were established by these organisations. Especially, the missionary churches such as the Catholics and some Protestant denominations owes Kambata these health and educational facilities. Since recent times, some non-ecclesiastical organisations are also active, some of which are mentioned below.

**Table 26: Some of the NGOs**

Organisation	The Main Investment Sectors
Catholic Church	health service, education, water, road, bridge
Mekkane-Yesus	health service, education, agriculture, road, bridge
Qale-Hiywot	health service, water, agriculture, handicrafts
World-Vision	health service, water, education, agriculture
Adventist Development Rehabilitation Agency	agriculture
Kambati Menti Gezimma	health service, education, agriculture
Gogota Care	health service, education, water, road, electricity

Since all these organisations are active in many macro- and micro-projects, I will avoid going into details of their developmental activities. However, I would like to briefly depict the developmental activities of Kambati Menti Gezimma and Gogota Care which are organisations created by initiatives of the Kambata themselves, whereas the rest are organisations which are founded or financed by non-Kambata.

As one of the working personnel of the Gogota Care told me, their organisation was founded by some Kambata intellectuals in 1993. The visions of the Gogota Care are to overcome the problems in the health service, education, potable water, road construction, unemployment, etc. Electricity facilitation is one of its pivotal projects in towns such as Durame, Shinshichcho, Haddaro, Doyyoganna, Hangachcha, Damboyya, etc. Moreover, it tries to take care of the (escaped) returnees from the resettlement. Their number is about 35,000. The organisation pays a special account to widows. It has a so-called revolving fund, which can be lent to those who are in need. The organisation has 72,145 members who freely join the organisation. Depending on their economic situation, the members pay their monthly contribution between 0.5 and 3.00 ETH Birr.<sup>995</sup>

Another focus of the organisation is the promotion of women. The sub-ordinate social position of women in Kambata, as in many societies, needs a special attention of developmental activity attention. The concentration of the organisation on water projects is indirectly to alleviate the burden of women in fetching water. Moreover, abduction, excision, birth control, abolishing of polygamy and HIV are some of the very crucial issues wherein the

<sup>995</sup> Currently, 1 US\$ is equivalent to 8 ETH Birr.

organisation is active. In order to mobilise women many branches of women promotion centres are being opened. The organisation is expanding to Methara and Wonji where there are many Kambata as seasonal as well as perennial workers.

The organisation does not seem to be welcomed by the government authorities. This maybe because of different political and development policy viewpoints. The organisation is ready to welcome even non-Kambata as its members. Furthermore, it tries to help students who are talented by financially enabling them to join good schools. Thereby it envisages to economically competing with other regions, which have better infrastructures. It plans to open more new schools and technical centres and give them over to the administration of the government, so that it takes care of them and assigns well-qualified personnel to them.

*Kambati Menti Gezimma* (KMG) is another grassroots organisation, which focuses on basic development strategies. A literal translation of the name of the organisation is "Kambata women pooling their labour together". The KMG is a women-focused integrated community development centre, which will help women and the community to secure a livelihood, better health, and restore the depleted environment through education. Therefore, the organisation believes and works in the spirit of the following verse:

"If you think a year ahead, sow seeds.

If you think ten years ahead, plant a tree.

If you think hundred years ahead, educate people." (Origin unknown).

KMG is an indigenous NGO formed by Ethiopians pooling their talents and labour to create a unique women's centre. KMG believes that if the talent and intelligence of women are nurtured, and women are seen as leaders, creators and producers, the quality of everyone's life in the community will improve.

In Ethiopian rural areas there are far fewer schools than in cities. Ethiopian education policy attempts to treat boys and girls equally, however with water carrying, fuel wood collection, taking care of family, and similar duties falling to girls, they have little time for school. Lack of opportunities for girls' further education has far reaching consequences. Rural girls, some of the brightest students from their villages, must leave their home regions often in a futile search for further education or employment. Many are forced into prostitution and become victims and agents of the increasing rapid spread of AIDS. The HIV infection rate among girls in Ethiopia, ages 15-19, is seven to ten times that of boys of the same age.

Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) is another focal point of the organisation. Virtually every Kambata girl endures this life-threatening ordeal at puberty, and lives with the consequences. Scarred genitals that reopen are easily infected. In the age of AIDS, FGM is emerging as a major contributor to the virulent spread of HIV, therefore it must be understood as being dangerous to the entire society. Without such understanding, even if FGM is legally prohibited, it will only be driven underground. KMG is dedicated to fostering the understanding necessary to abolish FGM from within among those who practice it.

The ultimate goal of KMG is to empower women to redress the cruelties of inequity and discrimination that girls and women suffer. In order to achieve this goal, KMG has established programmes in three interrelated areas:

1. Health: There is currently no reproductive health education in the region. KMG will offer reproductive health education and extensive community outreach programmes emphasising the need to eliminate FGM. KMG's mobile health clinic with its community based health workers will include FGM education as part of its effort to improve reproductive

health, reduce maternal and infant mortality, and slow the spread of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases in the region.

2. Livelihood: In rural Ethiopia girls and women do tedious, back-breaking, spirit crushing work, in their attempt to meet the needs of their families. KMG's vocational and entrepreneurial programmes will expand women's economic alternatives, and introduce new income generating skills and environmentally sound technologies.

3. Environmental restoration: Much of the region is deforested, with water sources diminishing. This increases the burdens of water carrying and fuel collection. The KMG centre will be designed as a working model of a self-supporting community, using solar and wind power, to educate and give technical assistance to surrounding communities. Introducing the use of non-polluting technologies will reduce dependence on fuel wood, and aid in watershed reforestation.

KMG centre buildings ultimately include administrative offices, workshops, classrooms, dormitories, a library and community resource centre, and home base for the mobile health clinic. The first structure is *Menti Hasawwi mini* (women's dialogue house), where women can meet, come to know about themselves, understand the struggles they share with other women, and experience their collective power to make positive change. In all its programmes KMG attempts to merge the best of traditional wisdom and expertise with the best of modern science and technology, in preparing women, young people and whole community for the future.<sup>996</sup>

These two development organisations are good examples for the so-called development from below. Since they are organisations created by the beneficiary people themselves, they know how to merge the best of traditional wisdom and expertise with the best of modern science and technology. Besides the economic challenges while executing their plans, sometimes they face political hindrances from the government if they do not comply with its political ideology. Another big challenge for these organisations is the cultural background. Those who want to give seminars on contraceptive methods, circumcision, HIV, etc., face considerable difficulties because in Kambata discussions relating to sex are taboo, especially if the addressees are not educated.

As I have observed during my field research, the organisations like Gogota care and Kambati Menti Gezimma are financially and ideologically supported by different organisations. More local people and beneficiaries welcome them than different governmental and non-governmental organisations. This witnesses the appreciation of participative development by the beneficiaries themselves.

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<sup>996</sup> Concerning KMG visit the website <http://filebox.vt.edu/users/lersado/aboutkmg.html>



## Conclusion

In the face of the present global discussion of economic development, the interaction of culture, social structure and economic development has begun to include various disciplines of studies. In the course of time it has become obvious that the economic or natural sciences alone are not able to explain the issue of economic success or failure of various societies. More than ever, the human sciences are playing an important role in the studies of development research. This interdisciplinary approach to discuss the issue of economic development contributes a lot to the holistic understanding of the human being and its intellectual and material achievements. Therefore, natural and human sciences are basically not contradictory to each other. They deal with the same issue, the human being and the rest of the material world, although from different perspectives.

On the other hand, however, the inclusion of human sciences in the discussion of the issue of economic development has created another problem. Before the inclusion of the human sciences in this discussion, the economic failure was being traced back to the alleged inconvenient environmental conditions and exogenous factors such as slavery, colonialism and neo-colonialism. Since the inclusion of the human sciences in the economic development issue, the endogenous factors and preconditions of economic development are being thoroughly analysed. This has contributed to a better and holistic understanding of a society and an individual. At the same time, in the face of the economic failure in many developing countries, it has contributed to the assertion that the problem of economic underdevelopment is based on the mentalities and worldviews of the peoples and cultures in the developing countries. This has led not only to explain the issue of economic success or failure, but it also has contributed to an exaggerated psychological overvaluation of industrialisation and technology and the culture of the economically successful societies. Consequently, the socio-psychological and cultural disparagement and inferiority complex have increased in the developing countries accordingly.

In the face of this and the fact that the human beings are comparing and emulating beings whereon their happiness is based, the inclusion of human sciences in the issue of development studies has created other problems. The first problem is that some scientists come to the conclusion that the cultures and worldviews of the most of the non-western societies are not propitious for economic development; this is a general cultural disparagement. The second problem is that many people in the developing countries have internalised this conclusion and have developed a cultural inferiority complex; this is a self-disdain and dissatisfaction.

Consequently, as industrialisation and economic prosperity have become the ultimate goal of the present world, the “successful” western culture and its economic and political history have become a metaphysical entity. They are believed to be applicable always and everywhere. The modern “*universalisable* civil religion” - democracy and human rights – has become the central instrument of political conditionality in the north south relations. The problem of this socio-cultural metaphysics is not only the global monoculturalisation, but also the failure of the desired economic success. It is an elixir of development studies that a successful economic development develops primarily from inside. Therefore, by understanding the right to development as a fundamental human right, the role of the

exogenous global and national actors is to eradicate the direct as well as structural violence and set a course for own and endogenous developmental initiatives. The beneficiaries know how to develop themselves according to their own methods, expectations, understanding and assessment of development.

The co-operative and self-help associations of the Kambata such as *geja*, *gezimma*, *dawa*, *sera* and *wijjo* are the results of their own methods, expectations, understanding and assessment of the issue of development. The economic dimension is the primary impetus to establish associations. The individual Kambata recognises that it cannot solve its economic problems alone. It realises that it needs its human environment. This knowledge leads to the formation of a group, an association in order to overcome the environmental and economic challenges.

By admitting someone into the group, the members acknowledge that his participation is legitimate. For example, if a group of the Kambata clear a piece of land for an individual, two aspects can be observed: a) its membership in the group is culturally legitimate and legal; b) his right to ownership is justified. However, this membership does not mean social equality. Through the membership the socio-culturally accepted inequality<sup>997</sup> cannot be automatically rescinded. What counts is the economic goal of the members of the group, not the social status of the individual; that means, the economic co-operation is one thing, and the question of social status another.

This economic cause fosters not only the sense of commitment in the group work, but also the individual develops the sense of responsibility, i.e. it is expected from each individual not only to respect, but also to protect the property of the others. The aim of the different sanctions by these associations is to guarantee the individual property and to hinder any violations against the private property and to secure the right to ownership. The association *sera* is very effective in this sense. The decision of *sera* is considered as almost infallible by the Kambata. It can exclude someone from the use of public resources. Therefore, *sera* has a democratic power monopoly, and it functions as a cultural rule of law which obliges the individual Kambata to develop a responsible political self-control and a political culture of constructive conflict management in a welfare society.<sup>998</sup> This shows an important political significance of the socio-cultural structure of the Kambata for the regulation of their social, political and economic life.

From the political perspective, the conflict resolution system of the Kambata could contribute to the social order better than the modern political system, which is being introduced into the region. According to the traditional understanding of the Kambata, peace is not only the absence of war; it is the re-establishment of the original harmony. After a peace negotiation the conflicting parties should kiss and embrace each other; they should kiss the elders who organise and preside the reconciliation ceremony, since they represent the whole community. According to the Kambata, a conflict is never an individual matter. Through a conflict between two individuals, the families, the lineages, the clans and the whole relatives of the conflicting parties are included in the conflict. The conflict between these two individuals can potentially become a macro-sociological conflict. Therefore, for the effectiveness of the peace negotiation it is indispensable that the atmosphere of love is

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<sup>997</sup> See the cases of the slaves and Fuga (chapter 6).

<sup>998</sup> Cf. the civilisation hexagon of Dieter Senghaas (section 2.1 above).

established. Peace without love is void and static. Through *ittansu* (creating peace through love) it becomes dynamic. *Ittansu* is a constructive conflict management. The modern conflict resolution method is not effective in Kambata because it does not know *ittansu*.

If the political systems of the central Ethiopian governments had taken these cultural political and judicial elements into consideration, their political goals could have been relatively fruitful. A good example could be the formation of the Peasant Association. The Kambata have various political, social and economic associations. The failure of the Peasant Association during the communist political system was based on its negligence of cultural elements and its ideological coerciveness. Moreover, the Kambata prefer participative democracy to representative democracy. Most of the governmental developmental activities failed because they were based on an authoritarian and coercive representation, whereas the Kambata accept only a democratic participation.

The sociological aspect of the associations, which is relevant for the development of the Kambata, is the substantiation of the co-operative spirit based on the cultural norms and values. The culture of the Kambata can contribute to the economic development by culturally substantiating some social values that guarantee the social order and regulate the individual action and behaviour within the social framework. There are various cultural laws and commands, which have a socio-political significance: *manni garen higgot; annakkanne woga ba'issot*. The first one means, "don't violate the rights of others!" *Garit* means right, justice and truth. These three concepts are analogously interdependent.<sup>999</sup> The second one means, "don't violate the culture, custom, law and tradition of our forefathers!" Anyone who violates these precepts is creating social disorder and acting against the social framework. By internalising the moralised social obligations, the individual develops the sense of social responsibility and communality. In the communitarian structures the individual experiences its indispensability for its social members and the indispensability of the others for its socio-political and economic self-fulfilment. The solidity of the individual can be realised only in solidarity with the others.

Even if the traditional social behaviour of the Kambata is not always conscious of the instrumentality of group building (for the sake of the individual), it rejects the atomistic individualism. By saying *mahichchi mannu abbano* which means the fellow human beings are above everything (in allusion to the material richness), or *mannu manna ihanohu manninet* which means the human being becomes human being through fellow human beings, the Kambata emphasise that the human being is not a mere homo oeconomicus. The holistic development is the top priority. The spiritual richness and happiness, which can be attained only in the community, cannot be fulfilled and replaced by material richness. These three dimensions (economic, political and sociological) of the culture of the Kambata can be a good starting point for a contextual development.

As experience shows, any developmental activity, which has not respected the cultural context and has not taken this contextual adjustment into consideration has failed to achieve its goals. A developmental activity should pass through two phases: passive and active phases. In the passive phase the *positive* values have to be picked up and integrated into the programme of the development policy. We can term this rationalisation process as adjustment phase. The active phase is the formation phase. In this phase the developmental activity

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<sup>999</sup> See section 5.2.1.

begins to relativise the attitudinal conception of infallibility of the given cultural norms. The culture becomes *ens modificandum*; it undergoes criticism.

Hierarchy, aristocracy and discrimination on the micro- as well as macro-sociological level are some of the central elements of the cultural structure of the Kambata. The micro-sociological hierarchy, aristocracy and discrimination begin in the family. The family fathers and the eldest sons sway the internal and external policy of the family. The role of women is usually minimal, irrespective of how intelligent they are; moreover, they cannot develop their spiritual faculties because their freedom to express themselves is limited.

The political, economic and social superiority of men over women has not contributed to the development of the Kambata; on the contrary, it has hindered the human and material development of the society. The individual is not merely a part of the whole; it is also a being with its own identity striving for its own self-fulfilment. The imbalance between the aristocratic representation and the position of the individual in the family is one of the characteristics of the sociocultural structures of the Kambata. Through the *Hausfrauisierung* (Housewifisation – Claudia von Werlhof) attitude a lot of women are deprived of developing their faculties, and are limited to the act of procreation.

Besides the micro-sociological challenges, there is also another very important aspect that deserves the attention of any developmental activity in Kambata. It is the macro-sociological stratification (macro-sociological aristocracy, hierarchy and discrimination). Among the members of the same lineage and clan the elder and the richer social members have more political power than the younger and poorer ones; i.e. the influential political power needs not only a socially justifying and legitimising power (the *ayyana* of the forefathers), but also an economic success. This shows that even the lineage and clan structure is not harmonic and structurally homogeneous. This leads to intra-lineage and intra-clan corruption. Therefore, the intra-clan identity and co-operation is mostly in view of other clans and potential inter-clan conflicts.<sup>1000</sup>

As it has been shown in the second part of this paper, the existence of the hundreds of clans challenges the political and economic activity in Kambata. Clan based rivalries and conflicts are not rare. One can observe unjust clan based co-operations against the other clans. Economically and politically weak clans are damned to lose their rights and even their lives if inter-clan conflicts arise. Moreover, one can easily observe that the political positions in Kambata are corrupt because they work in a clan-based system. The one who is in a political/influential position tries to have his relatives around him because he is culturally obliged to this kind of action.

One of the problems of the traditional cultural system of the Kambata is the high social esteem of land ownership. To be means to possess land. Especially in former times, this cultural structure has systemically *excluded* some social groups from land ownership, it has *limited* the right of some social groups to land ownership and it has endowed some with *unlimited* privileges. Those without land are called Fuga. Because of this land deprivation they are specialised in the sector of handiwork: carpentry, tannery and pottery. They are despised as inferior human beings, and believed to have been cursed and ostracised by God himself.<sup>1001</sup> They are excluded from macro-sociological contacts. The non-Fuga substantiate

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<sup>1000</sup> Cf. the S. Freud's principle of the narcissism of minor differences.

<sup>1001</sup> See chapter 6.

their discriminating attitude on the grounds that the Fuga look different (strongly Negroid physical appearance) and their way of eating and behaving that they consider contemptible; this makes them similar to the wild animals. But many Kambata forget that whilst the contemptible way of eating and behaving of the Fuga causes their macro-sociological exclusion, it is this exclusion that causes them to behave in such a way.

As it is shown in the chapter 6, the Fuga are specialised in the technical sector. They have contributed and are still contributing to the rest of the Kambata by producing different house items. The non-Fuga are dependent on their products. In my opinion, if the Fuga were not socially and culturally despised and excluded, and if their products were really appreciated by the Kambata, there would be a big motivation to develop their talents and to produce even better items. But the modern utensils coming from the industrialised areas are superseding the products of the Fuga. Not only the economic development is being hindered or decelerated, but also there is a tendency to lose the cultural heritage. In light of this fact, the task of a rational development policy would be to consolidate the productive efforts of the Fuga if it follows the method of development from below. For example, establishing a technical training centre for pottery, tannery and carpentry could be one of the measures to materialise the method of development from below. Measures to boost, modernise and subsidise the products of the Fuga are not enough for the technical development of the Kambata. It is up to the Kambata themselves to integrate the Fuga by overcoming the cultural barriers that separate them socially and that hinder their holistic human and economic development. The Kambata school system needs measures of consciousness building to integrate the Fuga, by teaching the Kambata children in the schools to break down their prejudices against the Fuga. This integration process can help to give the Fuga their right not only in theory, but also the right in practice such as to be elected in the macro-sociological community. The various religious confessions active in Kambata could contribute considerably to the break down of prejudices and discrimination of the Fuga. In their sermons and pastoral and developmental activities, the religious authorities could make the equality of human beings one of their central points. Finally, the political authorities have a binding responsibility and obligation to integrate the Fuga in the political activity of the Kambata.

Another important socio-cultural aspect, which has to be taken into consideration, is the balance between individualism and communality. The individual should be free from unnecessary cultural bondage that hinders individual and social innovation. At the same time the communitarian element has to play an important role in the social life of the Kambata. The theory of D. Senghaas, which stresses the importance of social structure, is remarkable. Without a significant structural reform of the economic and political system an extensive development cannot take place. The Ethiopian communist government has made considerable progress in this perspective. Managing a participative development and abolishing heterogeneous social stratification were some of the central aspects of its social and economic policy, although it had usually contradictory policies: for example, on the one hand, the establishment of PA, Women Association, Youth Association; on the other hand, neglecting the ideas and suggestions of the beneficiaries during the villagisation process.

Development needs two freedoms: first, freedom from oneself. An ego-centred individualism hinders not only the self-fulfilment of the individual, but also of the community. Second, freedom from the community: if a community structure does not favour or even blocks peculiar individual faculties, it is counterproductive for individual as well as

collective development. Therefore, development not only requires freedom *from* and *for* oneself and the community, but also it is this freedom itself.

The will to development is the demand for social justice. Therefore, development is part of social rights. To maintain that there are societies who do not want to develop themselves is to maintain that they reject their rights. The wish to work, to communicate and to live is the will to development. Moreover, the rights to social services, shelter, education are rights and will to development. These social rights of the individual imply to the demand of each human being from its community. This community possesses two interdependent resources: material and immaterial resources.

The community has the power not only to distribute the common material resources (an active distributive justice); it also has the obligation to let all its members take part in the life of the community (a passive distributive justice). Each individual has the right to demand for active as well as passive distributive justice as long as the demand is justifiable. Every member of a community has the right to legal and moral rights. The first one is to legally defend one's rights, whereas the second one is to attain and maintain the self-esteem. "Rights are justified demands of persons against others who violate their interests."<sup>1002</sup> Every person has a moral right to equal respect. Hence, nobody should expect something from others what he does not want that others expect from him (Kantian principle of reciprocal justification), and the handling individual may handle only in view of the interests of the others; that means, the demands of the individual should be acceptable as long as no justifiable reasons are given to reject them (the principle of universality).<sup>1003</sup>

The principle *sumus ut sum* explains the socio-economic rationality of the social contract of the Kambata. The building of a group is an intrasocietal social contract. In an ideal case this social contract needs reciprocity and universality. As it has been shown, the *sumus ut sum* principle of the Kambata lacks the two pillars of a just social contract: reciprocity and universality. The clan differences and privileges based on class stratification enact laws that permit different levels of demands depending on the social status of the individual. The material and the immaterial demands of the higher social classes vary substantially from that of the tanners, potters and slaves.

A social contract without the fulfilment of political and social human rights is an unjust socio-cultural structure. The potters, slaves and tanners are excluded from the social contract because they do not have the political rights and the right to distributive justice. They only have the right to the fulfilment of their basic necessities. They cannot lead their life according to their own opinions, desires and goals; and they cannot test and revise them. Consequently, they cannot create new ways and options. Their only right is to a minimum piece of land that is allotted them by their owners. Even during and after the social equalisation process of the communist government the political and social human rights of the lower social classes (clans) and of women did not change substantially. Slavery and ownership of human beings was forbidden. Laws of negative rights (abolition of slavery and maltreatment of women) were enacted, but no significant positive rights (positive discrimination through privileging the disadvantaged) were materialised. The social equalisation process remained on the formal level. Because of lack of education and material

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<sup>1002</sup> Stefan Gosepath 1998, 149.

<sup>1003</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 151f.

resources they could not materialise their formal freedom. Therefore, their freedom is without any value, for they were not given chances to compensate their previous oppressed life. They are set free *from* something (negative rights) without *for* something (distributive justice and positive discrimination).

The individual autonomy of the potters, slaves and tanners is not anymore threatened by external hindrances as before; but there are no favourable socio-economic conditions to compensate the previous oppression. Distributive justice and positive discrimination are basic for political rights (negative rights). Someone who struggles for his subsistence does not know which political rights he has, and therefore, he cannot make use of them.

The proverb of the Kambata *butichi lallabuha burzami gequha* (nobody pays attention to the speech of a poor man; nobody is afraid of the glare of a man with cataract) expresses this philosophy of human rights aptly. That means, the lack of distributive justice has two effects: 1) the potters, slaves and tanners of the Kambata are concerned exclusively with the acquisition of their basic necessities; consequently, 2) they have not yet developed intellectual capabilities for public affairs and for awareness of their political rights. Therefore, they cannot make any demand for universal and reciprocal moral rights.

This shows that a concept of development policy based on fulfilling the basic necessities and on subsistence economy does not fulfil the requirements of basic human rights. The discrimination of potters, slaves and tanners in Kambata is not only a matter of economic disadvantagedness of these social classes, but also violation of human rights. Therefore, in the face of this fact, the challenging task for the future development policy will be to expand the formal freedom to material freedom through distributive justice towards women and the mentioned social classes. Through a fair distribution all material and immaterial resources should be accessible to all in spite of and against the social stratification. Only this fair distribution enables the establishment of reciprocal and universal social contract. What does this mean?

It is an anthropological demand that every person deserves equal concern and respect. As far as no justifiable reason is given for an unequal division of the available resources, fair distribution of them is the golden rule. Fair distribution means every individual has the *right* to share the positive resources and the *obligation* to share the burdens of the community. Otherwise, the members excluded from the common resources do not have the obligation to defend the community and its resources, since the social contract of the community is not reciprocal and universal.

A reciprocal and universal social contract demands that unequal distribution of resources should not be based on natural and social provisions. An unequal distribution of resources can be justified in the following cases:

1. previously oppressed social groups (women, potters, tanners and slaves) deserve more,
2. unable deserve more distributive attention and
3. those who work more deserve more

Therefore, unequal distribution is either a compensation (1 and 2) or reward (3).

Moral rights are the consequences of the demand for distributive justice. Through an unjustified unequal distribution of immaterial and material resources the disadvantaged individual is discriminated not only materially, but also its nature as human being is denied. Therefore, distributive justice is not only an economic, but also an anthropological concern.

Consequently, human rights are moral demands of justice for something that cannot be withheld from the claimant, since he belongs to the human community through his membership as human being.

The economic strategy of developmental activity goes hand in hand with the anthropological value of the individual. As it has been shown throughout the paper, possession of land plays a very important role in the economic and social life of the Kambata. Even though, because of the very high overpopulation and the extremely high shortage of arable land in the region, a plea for distributive justice in view of land distribution could seem an anachronistic developmental strategy, a just land distribution would boost the production of the lower and discriminated social classes and better their socio-cultural esteem. The following thoughts are some of the aspects of political participation and distributive justice that could be the focal point of developmental activity in Kambata:

- an intensive campaign against the female genital mutilation and the intervention of parents in choosing a marriage partner, especially for girls,
- an extensive positive discrimination of women in educational institutions,
- establishing some institutions of handicraft and similar education centres for women,
- strong legal actions against violation of women rights such as maltreatment, abduction and rape,
- an extensive teaching on birth control and infectious diseases,
- obligation to send children to school and financial help for those who cannot afford to send their children to school,
- enabling an extensive political participation of all lower social classes and women,
- a just distribution of land irrespective of social classes,
- integrating the agricultural economy of the higher social classes and commoners with the products of the despised social groups,
- creating structures (subsidy) which enable the children of the potters to go to school,
- legal actions against those who discriminate the lower social classes at schools and work places,
- modernising the handiwork of the lower social classes through subsidy,
- establishing technical studies centre,
- reforestation and protection of biodiversity,
- legal actions against clan-based monopoly, corruption and leadership,
- solving the problem of the scarcity of firewood,
- taking the agricultural problems of the Kambata farmers seriously, since most of them are unable to pay their annual taxes and fertiliser debt,
- improving potable water supply and clinical facilities,
- improving infrastructures such as electricity and transportation systems so as to boost production and facilitate exchange of products,
- scientific research on *inset* plant,
- integrating the traditional political system and the method of conflict resolution into the modern political system which is being introduced and which creates cultural heterogenisation and conflict of generations,



- enhancing the traditional methods, understanding and assessment of economic development, and
- putting an end to the political monopolisation of the respective governing party in Ethiopia through a real and effective federalism.

It is one of the central ideas of my paper that the political values that are believed to be western values are human values although they are reformed by the respective cultural structures and social institutions. That is why I have analysed the theory of Senghaas, in order to show if there are intercultural political and sociological similarities. If there were no similarities at all, a realisation of intercultural dialogue is damned to fail from the very beginning. There are intercultural similarities more than we usually believe and know. The problematic of globalisation and metaphysics of westernisation define human values as western values. Cultural conflicts are caused by this kind of misinterpretation of human values. The political strategy in the developing countries should be able to reorganise the already existing human values; there is no need and nothing to copy from the west. This isolated cultural west does not exist.

Concerning the civilisation hexagon of Senghaas, the power monopoly of the Kambata is contained in the cultural tradition. This culture conceives that the people themselves have the political power. Their understanding of justice could be a good example. The unwritten law *manni garita baissot* or *manni garen higgot* (do not violate the right of the others!), the “*mannu ma yano*” (what would the people say!) principle point to the fact that the people supervise the ethical behaviour of the individual by putting clear limitation on the social behaviour. The traditional Kambata monopolise the political power by enabling themselves to enact a conventional cultural unwritten law, by executing it and by judging the individuals according to their social political behaviour. The cultural law is the common law that forbids the individual to act haphazardly and to endanger the social order and the individual self-fulfilment.

The political ideas of the Kambata are expressed in their proverbs. Therefore, if one wants to study the political culture of the Kambata, the knowledge of the language is indispensable; since written materials about this society are scarce. For example, the word *garit* expresses three different political and social spheres. It means right (human right), justice and truth. During the socialisation process the individual comes to learn what is socially right and how to respect the rights of the social members. It acts justly if it does not violate the rights of the others; and this behaviour is a social truth. The rule of law is manifest through the social prescriptions that regulate the amount of freedom that each individual may enjoy. Even if the culture of the Kambata, objectively speaking, does not contain just political and social structures (see chapter 6!), it tries to guarantee the right of the individual according to his social and political position.

I have defined culture as the social principle of order and the social principle of action based on different collective values, norms, customs and institutions. The political self-control is one of the constituent elements of this social behaviour. An unjustified attack by the members of the higher social classes on the poor and minority clans is forbidden according to the common law. This violation can bring bad luck - it is believed - to the attacking individual, its family or even its clan. The spirits of the unjustly attacked individual, family and clan can revenge. In such unjust cases the spirits of the unjust attackers can desert them, and the spirit of the attacked group become mighty and vengeful. Therefore, the act of

executing justice is a supernatural act. Any judicial action taken by the dispute settling committee of the elders is legitimised by the supernatural power. Therefore, one should refrain from unjustified attack against the others for his own sake and for the sake of the social order. This is called political self-control.

The traditional understanding of democracy of the Kambata differs from that of the western democracy. There is not a macro-sociological political representation because any macro-sociological representation lacks supernatural legitimacy, since the members are from different clans without a common ancestral spirit. However, it is necessary that all members take part in the meetings of the community or associations to utter their ideas. But there are micro-sociological aristocratic representations on the basis of the family, lineage or clan wherein the family fathers take over the representative role. In the institutions that people belong to - irrespective of their clan status - those from the higher social and economic classes are preferred for the representative positions. Only those who have an economic power can also have a political power. Those from the lower social classes can express their ideas in the meetings and they can give their votes, but they cannot be elected (especially in former times). This shows that the democracy of the Kambata does not necessarily mean the equality of the social members. This a very important task in the future social and political reorganisation process in Kambata and Ethiopia as a whole, which the West would call it democratisation process.

The westernised human values and the economic achievement of the industrialised societies have become the standard of material and immaterial cultures of the developing countries. In the face of this fact, the developmental challenge nowadays is how to reorganise the intrasocietal socio-cultural structures and political institutions and abolish the tendency of westernisation of human values, which is leading to cultural imperialism, cultural inferiority complex in the developing societies and inciting global conflict of cultures.

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<sup>1004</sup> Eth. means here Ethiopian.

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### **QUALIFICATION:**

<b>1984 - 1988</b> 1988, July <b>1988-1991</b>  <b>1991-1993</b> <b>1993 - today</b> - '93/94 - '94 (Jul.-Aug.) - '95 (Aug.-Sept.) - '98  since '98   2000, July – August  2001, July	<b>Senior Secondary School, Angacha/ Ethiopia</b> school leaving examination <b>Philosophical studies</b> Capuchin Franciscan Institute of Philosophy and Theology Addis Abeba/Ethiopia <b>Youth work, Awasa/Ethiopia</b> <b>Universities of Innsbruck/Austria &amp; Hamburg/Germany</b> German language for foreigners (University of Innsbruck) French Intensive Course, Alliance Francaise, Paris Latin Intensive Course, Goethe Institute, Frankfurt am Main <b>Master of Theology, University of Innsbruck</b> M.A.-Thesis: <i>The Profiteers of Poverty: The problematic of North-South-Relations under special consideration of Ethiopia (the original is in German: Das Geschäft mit der Armut. Die Frage der Nord-Süd-Beziehung unter spezieller Berücksichtigung Äthiopiens).</i> <b>Doctoral Research (Political Science)</b> (University of Hamburg/Germany) Title : « <i>The Impacts of the Socio-Cultural Structures of the Kambata (Ethiopia) on their Economic Development</i> » <b>International Summer School (Political Science), Strobl</b> University of Vienna (Certificate) Scholarship from the Austrian Academic Exchange Service <b>Ph.D. graduation (Political Science )</b> (University of Hamburg/Germany)
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