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Focal points in multiple threshold public goods games: A single-project meta-analysis

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Focal points in multiple threshold public goods games: A single-project meta-analysis

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Abstract

This paper is a single-project meta-analysis of four experiments that first model charitable giving as individual contributions to a multiplicity of competing threshold public goods. Given the centrality of the coordination dilemma as the number of recipients increases, we pool 15,936 observations at the individual level for the purpose of identifying the most effective focal points, their mechanics, and their implications for donors’ wealth. We find that competition between public goods implies massive coordination problems that originate from fewer contributions and result in lower profits. In this setting, the most powerful coordination device turns out to be the existence of a single contribution option that stands out on its merits. We also observe an inverted U-shaped trend in the successful provision of public goods, offering evidence for experience as a focal point peculiar to the multiple-public-good framework. The effective focal points do not leverage greater contributions to solve the coordination dilemma, yet they generate higher earnings. Finally, delegation proves to be a sound device for reducing the risk of miscoordination as long as the delegate is formally obliged to pass along a high enough percentage of the transferred resources. We discuss possible implications of our findings.

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1 Introduction

Charitable giving is a phenomenon fulfilling several purposes in society, which range from the alleviation of wealth and health inequalities to the safeguard of the environment and human rights, not to mention the resulting psychological benefits for the donors.¹ The Giving USA 2021 Annual Report shows that its economic relevance remains untouched by the global pandemic, with individuals, bequests, foundations and corporations giving an estimated \$484.85 billion to U.S. charities that year (Foundation, 2022). In an attempt to mobilize the general public, in the last decades a growing number of organizations have turned to social media fundraising in search of smaller contributors, as well as to popular crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter.com, Indiegogo.com, and Kiva.org (Saxton and Wang, 2014; Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2018). This has gradually led to a change in the nature of charitable giving by which, among other things, nowadays it is increasingly easy to compare the characteristics of fundraising campaigns. As a consequence, online competition turns out to be greater (Walk et al., 2022), this potentially involving better-performing organizations (Barman, 2002; Chetkovich and Frumkin, 2003) and superior donor identification with the nonprofit (Hou et al., 2014). Nevertheless, the other side of the coin is that competing projects are often indistinguishable from one another, which reduces the chances of a project being funded at the threshold (Meer, 2014).

Contributing to a burgeoning line of research on competition for charitable giving, Corazzini et al. (2015) (CCV, henceforth) devise a novel experimental framework to explore the coordination dilemma between donors, in which donations are modeled as individual contributions to a multiplicity of threshold public goods. After observing lower contributions, coordination rate, and profits as the number of charities increases, the authors also find that miscoordination can be prevented in case one of the public goods stands out on its merits, or even arbitrarily. Examining the role of fundraising intermediaries such as the United Way, Corazzini et al. (2020) (CCR, henceforth) extend the framework and allow for delegation, showing that the latter is perceived as a focal point only if a destination rule formally obliges the delegate to direct donations to public goods. Even so, Abraham et al. (2021) (ACFR, henceforth) point out that the positive effects of the destination rule can be nullified in the realistic case of an intermediary incurring sunk costs, arguably out of donors' overhead aversion. Corazzini et al. (2021) (CCLR, henceforth) carry on this strand of literature and focus on environments

¹For an overview of the literature on charitable giving and its determinants, we refer the reader to Andreoni (2006) and Bekkers and Wiepking (2011).

with heterogeneous agents that differ in endowments and preferences, concluding that the wealthiest contributors are capable of imposing their philanthropic agenda on all donors.

Although the four aforementioned manuscripts are part of the same project, they investigate the same phenomenon in isolation and leave room for a meta-study that exploits the increased power to outline the bigger picture. Therefore, we pool 15,936 observations at the subject level for the primary purpose of evaluating the relative performance of the coordination devices separately tested by CCV, CCR, ACFR, and CCLR. The secondary goal of this manuscript is to describe how such focal points work, and their implications for donors in terms of wealth. Drawing inspiration from [McShane and Böckenholt \(2017\)](#), we regard the current paper as a single-project meta-analysis, namely, a good practice that should be adopted more broadly within the experimental community by virtue of its clear benefits for project summary, theory testing, and replicability. Moreover, not only do we rely on individual participant data as widely-recognized “gold standard” meta-analytic approach ([Borenstein et al., 2009](#); [Riley et al., 2010](#)), but end-project data combination also allows us to settle controversies such as learning in multiple threshold public goods games, for which the four included studies offer conflicting evidence.²

Focusing on the coordination dilemma rather than the size of contributions, our paper complements a host of recent studies that inquire whether competing charities are substitute for each other, this thereby involving no increase in overall donations ([Reinstein, 2011](#); [Meer, 2017](#); [Krieg and Samek, 2017](#); [Filiz-Ozbay and Uler, 2019](#); [Schmitz, 2021](#)). Furthermore, we build on the long-standing literature on the threshold public goods game (see [Croson and Marks \(2000\)](#) for a meta-analysis), which is a typical tool to frame fundraising ([Andreoni, 1998](#); [Rondeau and List, 2008](#); [Cason and Zubrickas, 2019](#); [Marini et al., 2020](#)), as well as on a related body of research that studies other real-world settings characterized by multiple public goods ([Blackwell and McKee, 2003](#); [Bernasconi et al., 2009](#); [Buchan et al., 2011](#); [Catola et al., 2020](#)). Last but not least, our findings also contribute to the literature on (i) equilibrium selection in games, with reference to the conflict between payoff and risk dominance ([Harsanyi and Selten, 1988](#); [Schmidt et al., 2003](#); [Broseta et al., 2003](#); [Février and Linnemer, 2006](#); [Gold and Colman, 2020](#)), (ii) delegation, as a mechanism to prevent coordination failure ([Hamman et al., 2011](#); [Kocher et al., 2018](#); [Butera and Houser, 2018](#); [Fernández Domingos et al., 2022](#)), and (iii) donors’ overhead aversion, which usually emerges when a portion of the donations is intended to cover administrative and fundraising costs ([Bowman, 2006](#); [Gneezy et al., 2014](#);

²This point is further developed under Subsection 2.3.7.

Meer, 2014; Portillo and Stinn, 2018).

In more detail, we find that competition between public goods implies massive coordination problems that originate from fewer contributions and result in lower profits. In this setting, the most powerful coordination device turns out to be the existence of a single contribution option that stands out on its merits. We also observe an inverted U-shaped trend in the successful provision of public goods, offering evidence for experience as a focal point peculiar to the multiple-public-good framework. The effective focal points do not leverage greater contributions to solve the coordination dilemma, yet they generate higher profits. Delegation proves to be a sound device for reducing the risk of miscoordination as long as the delegate is formally obliged to pass along a high enough percentage of the transferred resources. Even so, administrative and fundraising costs make intermediation not only less impactful, but also less desirable for non-delegated donors in terms of earnings.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes basic framework and dataset, separately listing outcome variables and independent variables. We present the results in Section 3, where a group-level analysis of coordination is followed by an individual-level analysis of contributions and earnings. Section 4 discusses possible implications of our findings and concludes.

2 Basic framework and dataset

2.1 Basic framework

As shown in Table 1, our investigation pools 15,936 observations at the individual level from four experiments (Corazzini et al., 2015, 2020; Abraham et al., 2021; Corazzini et al., 2021) that are part of the same project and first model charitable giving as individual contributions to N threshold public goods indexed $n \in \{1, \dots, N\}$. This framework aims to reproduce fundraising scenarios where multiple charities indistinguishable from each other compete for limited donor contributions. Therefore, not only do participants have to contribute enough to achieve the threshold, but they also need to choose where to direct their contributions, thereby facing an increased risk of miscoordination.

In each of these studies, J participants are divided into unchanging 4-person groups, whose members are indexed $j \in \{1, \dots, 4\}$ and play the game throughout 12 sequential rounds. In every period, each of the subjects is endowed with $y_j > 0$ tokens and is supposed to independently split the initial endowment between a private account and N collective accounts

Table 1: Description of the included datasets

Study	Treatm.	Obs.	Subj.	Groups
(CCV) Corazzini et al. (2015)	7	4,032	336	84
(CCR) Corazzini et al. (2020)	6	5,184	432	108
(ACFR) Abraham et al. (2021)	6	3,840	320	80
(CCLR) Corazzini et al. (2021)	4	2,880	240	60

For each study the columns report number of treatments, number of observations, number of subjects, and number of groups.

(i.e., public goods), with $c_j \in [0, y_j]$ being the total contributions made by subject j to the collective accounts. The private account pays an individual profit of 2 points per token assigned, whereas each of the collective accounts potentially benefits the whole group and returns no points, if the tokens therein do not reach the threshold τ . Otherwise, each group member earns one point for every token therein (regardless of who contributes) plus a bonus $b_{j,n}$ that captures efficiency and makes all the collective accounts payoff-dominant as compared with the private account.³ Unless noted otherwise, (i) the group endowment is split into equal portions, (ii) the threshold τ is set to 60% of the group endowment, and (iii) the bonus $b_{j,n}$ is the same for every player j and every public good n . These conditions imply that, while each group can fund at most one public good at its threshold, player j is unable to do it unilaterally and unwilling to contribute to a collective account unless she expects others to contribute to the same public good.

Let $C_n = \sum_{j=1}^4 c_{j,n}$ and $c_{j,n} \geq 0$ indicate the group contributions to collective account n and the contributions made by subject j to collective account n , respectively. As a result, the individual benefit $B_{j,n}$ associated with each public good n is as follows:

$$B_{j,n}(C_n) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{when } C_n < \tau \\ C_n + b_{j,n} & \text{when } C_n \geq \tau \end{cases}$$

whereas the payoff u_j earned by player j in each round amounts to:

$$u_j(c_j) = 2(y_j - \sum_{n=1}^N c_{j,n}) + \sum_{n=1}^N B_{j,n}(C_n)$$

³Technically, all the experiments adopt the same group size (4), number of interactions (12), and marginal per capita return to the public good (0.5), as well as partner matching, no-refund condition, and linear rebate rule. For further details about the specific designs, we refer the reader to the four included studies.

2.2 Outcome variables

Consequently, we define the following three outcome variables:

- *Coordination* (i.e., public good provision), a group-level dummy equal to 1 if the threshold is reached on at least one public good.
- *Contributions_e*, the sum of individual contributions to all public goods divided by the initial endowment (i.e., c_j/y_j).
- *Earnings_e*, the individual earnings divided by the initial endowment (i.e., u_j/y_j).

2.3 Independent variables

Given the centrality of the coordination dilemma in the presence of multiple public goods, we code a battery of independent variables that might represent focal points or generally influence coordination, contributions, and earnings.

2.3.1 Number of public goods

Typically, the threshold of a given collective account can be achieved only in case the public good is able to collect donations from multiple players, entailing a coordination problem that has been long examined in the literature on single threshold public goods. Importantly, the coordination problem intensifies as the number of public goods increases, since now the players also have to coordinate contributions on the same collective account. Hence, the higher the number of available contribution options, the higher the risk of contributing to a public good that eventually fails. CCV show that, as compared with the single-public-good scenario, the presence of multiple public goods per se reduces the coordination rate, whenever group members cannot rely on any coordination device to discriminate between identical collective accounts. The authors also point out that the lower fundraising success is caused by lower individual contributions and results in lower earnings, so that we code the continuous variable N_{pg} and hypothesize a negative relationship with the three outcome variables.

2.3.2 Non-binding budget constraint

Some treatments in CCV relax the budget constraint by decreasing the threshold from 60% to 15% of the group endowment, implying that every player can afford to fund one public good by herself. Given that in this condition the coordination problem no longer exists, we view the

dummy *No_constraint* mostly as a control and expect it to be associated with higher provision rate. Conversely, its effect on contributions and earnings is more ambiguous: while the risk of losing contributions out of failed coordination vanishes, the non-binding budget constraint makes the setting similar to a linear public goods game, thereby giving prominence to the free-rider problem. At the same time, public good success no longer necessarily guarantees greater individual profits than does the private account.

2.3.3 Bonus salience

As long as the bonus remains constant across public goods, all collective accounts are payoff-dominant and equally efficient, leaving no room for coordination. Among other things, in separate treatments CCV test the performance of two focal points that consist in making salient one of the collective accounts through bonus manipulation. In the former case, one of the public goods stands out on its merits in that it offers a higher bonus. In the latter case, a lower bonus distinguishes one of the collective accounts. In line with the findings of CCV, our prior beliefs are as follows: (i) the presence of a single more efficient public good (i.e., dummy *1_ME*) boosts contributions, coordination, and profits; (ii) the presence of a single less efficient public good (i.e., dummy *1_LE*) has no impact on the three outcome variables.

2.3.4 Random signal

CCV also examine whether a reliable coordination device can be represented by a non-merit-based signal which is unrelated to efficiency considerations. In this case, the computer randomly recommends one of the otherwise identical public goods by means of a group-level message that is displayed on the players' screens prior to the contribution stage. Whenever salience is obtained in this fashion, our dummy *R_signal* takes the value 1. Prior findings suggest that this variable is a weak focal point.

2.3.5 Delegation

CCR and ACFR study delegation as a coordination device by adding an initial stage to the basic framework of the game. Essentially, in each round one of the group members is randomly appointed as the intermediary to whom the other players can individually decide to transfer any number of tokens between 0 and y_j . In the second stage, all four group members allocate funds to private and collective accounts just as they do in the game without delegation, except that now their endowments are updated on the basis of the first-stage transfers. In

particular, by means of a destination rule the two aforementioned studies manipulate the percentage of the transfers that the delegated player is obliged to pass along to the collective accounts. Accordingly, the four treatment-level dummies *Del0*, *Del20*, *Del80*, and *Del100* take value 1 in our dataset if the delegate is required to contribute 0%, 20%, 80%, or the 100% of the transferred resources to the public goods, respectively, with the reference category being the game without delegation.⁴ In line with previous evidence, we expect delegation to be an effective focal point provided that the level of the destination rule is high enough to protect non-delegated players from expropriation by the intermediary. Nevertheless, ACFR also find that the positive effects of a high destination rule on coordination, contributions, and profits are wiped out in case it is common knowledge that only the intermediary is to incur unavoidable sunk costs tied to her function. Therefore, we control for the presence of sunk costs through the treatment-level dummy *Overheads*.⁵

2.3.6 Donor heterogeneity

CCLR incorporate donor heterogeneity into the basic framework by means of two separate treatments that manipulate endowments and preferences, respectively. In the former case, the design imposes four different wealth levels within group, each level being randomly assigned to one of the subjects at the beginning of the experiment. Importantly, the same initial endowment characterizes player j throughout the 12 rounds, and allows her to fund at least an equal share of a public good. In the latter case, the group members exhibit different favorite public goods, with the favorite collective account featuring a higher bonus for the duration of the game. As pointed out in CCLR, both types of heterogeneity potentially hinder coordination, contributions, and earnings, since they increase complexity of the donation environment without introducing any obvious focal point. We label these dummy variables *Het_endow* and *Het_pref*.

⁴Alternatively, we code a continuous variable *Dest_rule* for the size of the destination rule, along with two individual-level dummies *Delegate* and *Non-delegate* denoting the type of player (*Standard* is the omitted type that characterizes players in the game without delegation).

⁵Only in the treatments introducing sunk costs, the delegates can potentially make a loss since such costs are subtracted at the end of each round. Nevertheless, (i) considering the big picture, this is just a rare occurrence in practice (35 out of 15,936 observations); (ii) all the included studies are monetarily incentivized in such a way that all rounds are paid; (iii) in the end no player scores negative total payoffs.

2.3.7 Experience

Albeit under-studied to date, the learning process plays a crucial role as the number of public goods increases, in that players need learn to use treatment-specific focal points or simply their past contributions as coordination devices. Even though it might be tempting to predict a positive relationship between provision rate and experience, the four included studies offer mixed evidence that ranges from a positive link (CCV and CCLR) to a negative link (CCR) to null findings (ACFR). Given the sensitivity of this variable even to minor design variations, our meta-analysis can contribute substantially to the solution of the puzzle and draw general conclusions. Among these, we expect to observe the same decline in contributions over time that is peculiar not only to the four examined experiments, but also to the more general single-public-good literature. We study the role of experience through a linear time *Trend* that starts from 0.

2.3.8 Reshuffling


At times the contribution options feature multiple levels of the bonus without any of the collective accounts being salient. For instance, ACFR consider both efficient and inefficient public goods (i.e., two bonus levels), where either category in turn consists of several collective accounts. In this context the authors randomly select the efficient public goods in rounds 1, 5, and 9, thus deliberately hampering experience-based coordination through a *Reshuffling* of the most profitable options. In case this takes place, we use a binary variable equal to 1 in rounds 5 and 9 only.

3 Analysis and results

Distinguishing between two levels of analysis, Table 2 summarizes the three outcome variables and highlights that the average *Coordination* ($M = 0.564$), *Contributions_e* ($M = 0.532$), and *Earnings_e* ($M = 2.839$) in the single-public-good scenario are higher than those in the presence of multiple collective accounts ($M = 0.488$, $M = 0.475$, and $M = 2.572$, respectively).

LOWESS smoothers in Figure 1 indicate that, interestingly, while donations follow a similar declining trend in both settings, differences emerge when it comes to successful provision and ensuing profits. On the one hand, decreasing contributions are associated with lower coordination rates and earnings when only one collective account is available, reflecting common findings from the single-public-good literature. On the other hand, within framework (ii) we

Figure 1: Time trends of coordination, contributions, and earnings



observe an inverted U-shaped trend in coordination rates and individual profits that suggests experience as a potential coordination device.

As to the other variables categorized as focal points in Table 2, one preliminary remark is that 1_ME ($M = 0.806$) and R_signal ($M = 0.753$) on average perform better than 1_LE ($M = 0.375$) and $Delegation$ ($M = 0.422$). Figure 2 provides a few additional insights. First, the horizontal bar chart reveals that the presence of a single less efficient public good is arguably not even perceived as a coordination device, since the threshold is never achieved in round 1 and repeated interactions are necessary to develop coordination in this condition. Second, the performance of the random signal is worse than it seems, once we control for the case where every player can afford to fund one collective account by herself (i.e., $No_constraint$). Third, scatterplots (c) and (d) show that delegation is increasingly effective as the intermediaries face more restrictions on the destination of the transferred resources, but performs poorly in

Table 2: Summary statistics


	Group level		Individual level		
	Obs. (%)	Coord.	Obs. (%)	Contr_e	Earn_e
<i>Overall</i>	3,984 (100)	0.503	15,936 (100)	0.487	2.625
<i>Framework</i>					
Multiple_PG	3,192 (80.1)	0.488	12,768 (80.1)	0.475	2.572
Single_PG	792 (19.9)	0.564	3,168 (19.9)	0.532	2.839
<i>Focal points</i>					
1_ME	144 (3.6)	0.806	576 (3.6)	0.657	3.412
1_LE	144 (3.6)	0.375	576 (3.6)	0.494	2.368
R_signal	288 (7.2)	0.753	1,152 (7.2)	0.501	2.870
Delegation	1,824 (45.8)	0.422	7,296 (45.8)	0.417	2.487
Other	1,584 (39.8)	0.535	6,336 (39.8)	0.548	2.690
<i>Controls</i>					
Delegate	-	-	1,824 (11.5)	1.283	2.716
Non-delegate	-	-	5,472 (34.3)	0.128	2.411
Standard	-	-	8,640 (54.2)	0.545	2.741
Overheads	468 (11.7)	0.259	1,872 (11.7)	0.338	2.013
No_overheads	3,516 (88.3)	0.536	14,064 (88.3)	0.506	2.706
No_constraint	288 (7.2)	0.823	1,152 (7.2)	0.445	2.746
Constraint	3,696 (92.8)	0.478	14,784 (92.8)	0.490	2.615
Het_endow	360 (9.0)	0.553	1,440 (9.0)	0.596	2.894
Hom_endow	3,624 (91.0)	0.498	14,496 (91.0)	0.476	2.598
Het_pref	360 (9.0)	0.456	1,440 (9.0)	0.571	2.519
Hom_pref	3,624 (91.0)	0.508	14,496 (91.0)	0.478	2.635
Reshuffling	268 (6.7)	0.321	1,072 (6.7)	0.351	2.238
No_reshuffling	3,716 (93.3)	0.516	14,864 (93.3)	0.496	2.653

The group-level columns report absolute (relative) frequencies and means for *Coordination*, whereas the individual-level columns report absolute (relative) frequencies, means for *Contributions_e* and *Earnings_e*. *Multiple_PG* is a dummy that equals 1 if more than one collective account is available. *Delegation* is a dummy that takes value 1 if the game features the delegation phase. *Delegate*, *Non-delegate*, and *Standard* are individual-level dummies for the player type.

case the delegates are to bear sunk costs.

To examine statistical significance of these initial insights, in Table 3 we perform multilevel

Figure 2: Relative performance of focal points



regression models with group-level clustering (model (1)) as well as clustering at both the group and individual level (models (2), (3), and (4)). In all cases, we follow best practices (Borenstein et al., 2009) and stratify the analyses by study, including dummy covariates that preserve the identity of each experiment.⁶

Column (1) implements a multilevel probit model to evaluate the relative performance of focal points while controlling for confounders. First and foremost, the average marginal effects of N_{pg} and its square are significant at the 1% level ($p = 0.003$ and $p = 0.004$, respectively), revealing that the negative effect of multiplicity on coordination is non-linear. Importantly, statistical significance of $Trend$ and its square ($p < 0.001$ in both cases) provides evidence for the inverted U-shaped relationship between coordination and experience, the

⁶The study dummies also capture the effect of variables (e.g., cross-cultural differences, online vs lab experiments) which are not coded due to insufficient variation and multicollinearity issues.

latter facilitating convergence of donations to the same collective account. For the purpose of designing an effective fundraising campaign, of particular interest is the number of interactions at which the probability of reaching the threshold is maximized. By using the delta method (Moffatt, 2015) we estimate the optimal number of interactions to be 6.799, with confidence interval (6.461, 7.137). However, the most powerful coordination device turns out to be the presence of a single more efficient public good, which increases the probability of successful provision by 27.5% ($p = 0.003$). Delegation significantly promotes the chances of coordination (+23.9% and +16.2%) only if a destination rule formally requires the intermediary to pass 80% or the totality of the transfers along to the collective accounts ($p = 0.009$ and $p = 0.013$, respectively), whereas *1_LE* and *R_signal* do not accomplish the goal. All these outcomes emerge after controlling for noticeable confounders such as sunk costs ($p = 0.002$), reshuffling of public goods ($p < 0.001$), and non-binding budget constraint ($p < 0.001$).

Result 1. *Effective focal points in a multiple-public-good environment are (i) experience, (ii) the presence of a single contribution option that is more profitable than the alternatives, and (iii) delegation associated with a destination rule whose level is at least 80%, since they all significantly increase the chances of successful public good provision.*

Given that 35.2% of the individual contributions equal 0, column (2) analyzes donations through a multilevel one-limit tobit model.⁷ We find that, in addition to exacerbating miscoordination, the increasing number of collective accounts also discourage players from giving ($p = 0.002$). Another meaningful message from this specification is that the effective focal points do not leverage greater contributions to solve the coordination dilemma. Rather, such focal points work despite the negative donation trend ($p < 0.001$), and delegation can even decrease contributions if the destination rule is absent ($p < 0.001$) or its level is too low ($p = 0.046$). To study the mechanics of delegation in more detail, in column (3) we include only observations from non-delegates and treatments implementing delegation, and we estimate a multilevel two-limit tobit model with *Transfers_e* as dependent variable, namely, the individual amount of tokens transferred to the delegate divided by the initial endowment. The positive significant coefficient of the covariate *N_pg* ($p = 0.025$) points out that delegation becomes a more and more popular fundraising channel as the risk of miscoordination increases, yet its use follows the same declining trend as direct contributions ($p < 0.001$). Moreover, in the presence of the

⁷Table A1 and Table A2 in Appendix A report distributions of the outcome variables.

two most restrictive destination rules (i.e., 80% and 100%) non-delegates anticipate a minor risk of expropriation by the intermediary, thus raising transfers by 35.6% and 42.0% of their initial endowment, respectively ($p < 0.001$ in both cases). On the contrary, overheads appear to have the opposite effect ($p = 0.001$).

Result 2. *The effective focal points do not leverage greater contributions to solve the coordination dilemma. Rather, they work despite the fact that donors reduce their contributions over time.*

Column (4) investigates the implications for the individual profits by means of a multilevel mixed-effects model. In 19.3% of cases the variable *Earnings-e* equals 2, which is the value associated with subjects contributing zero. Since the collective accounts are payoff-dominant, in general it is unsurprising that greater chances to successfully fund a public good correspond to higher individual earnings. Interestingly, while the multiple-public-good scenario entails decreased profitability ($p = 0.007$), making salient one of the contribution options through a higher bonus more than compensates for such a loss ($p = 0.009$). Also, individual profits tend to increase as time goes by, albeit less so at the margin ($p < 0.001$ for both trend variables), in such a way that we estimate them to be maximized after 7.779 interactions. To evaluate the profitability of delegation, it is necessary to consider its joint impact with administrative and fundraising costs that intermediaries in the real world inevitably have to incur to run the business. Given the overwhelming evidence of a positive link between size of the destination rule and earnings ($p < 0.001$), we aim to work out the level of the destination rule at which a standard subject can serve as a delegate without making a loss. Suppose that economic agents interact for the first time in an environment with four public goods and no other focal points available:

$$\widehat{Earnings_e}_{STD} = 3.233 - 0.394 * 4 + 0.030 * 16 = 2.137$$

$$\widehat{Earnings_e}_{DEL} = 3.233 - 0.394 * 4 + 0.030 * 16 + 0.692 * x_{DEST_RULE} - 0.024 - 0.595$$

Equating the earnings of a standard donor to the earnings of a delegate bearing sunk costs, we find that the aforementioned destination rule amounts to 89.5%.⁸ Nevertheless, the benefits

⁸This percentage is close to the 86% of donations that the U.S. United Way branch actually directs to the

Table 3: Multilevel regression models

Variable	<i>Coordination</i>		<i>Contributions_e</i>		<i>Transfers_e</i>		<i>Earnings_e</i>	
	(1) MP		(2) M1LT		(3) M2LT		(4) MME	
	M. Eff	(St. E.)	Coeff.	(St. E.)	Coeff.	(St. E.)	Coeff.	(St. E.)
<i>Framework</i>								
N_pg	-0.179***	(0.060)	-0.023***	(0.007)	0.014**	(0.006)	-0.394***	(0.145)
N_pg ²	0.014***	(0.005)					0.030***	(0.011)
<i>Focal points</i>								
Trend	0.056***	(0.006)	-0.027***	(0.007)	-0.042***	(0.005)	0.241***	(0.010)
Trend ²	-0.005***	(0.001)	-0.001	(0.001)	0.001***	(4.5e ⁻⁴)	-0.018***	(0.001)
1_ME	0.275***	(0.092)	0.172	(0.143)			0.702***	(0.267)
1_LE	-0.099	(0.108)	-0.132	(0.143)			-0.342	(0.267)
R_signal	0.132	(0.084)	0.018	(0.111)			0.189	(0.202)
Del0	-0.124*	(0.069)	-0.448***	(0.099)				
Del20	0.017	(0.108)	-0.304**	(0.153)	0.151*	(0.081)		
Del80	0.239***	(0.091)	-0.116	(0.151)	0.355***	(0.079)		
Del100	0.162**	(0.066)	-0.004	(0.098)	0.420***	(0.068)		
Dest_rule							0.692***	(0.134)
<i>Controls</i>								
Delegate							-0.024	(0.160)
Non-delegate							-0.328**	(0.158)
Overheads	-0.190***	(0.062)	-0.131	(0.094)	-0.211***	(0.065)	-0.595***	(0.157)
No_constraint	0.297***	(0.071)	-0.099	(0.111)			-0.058	(0.202)
Het_endow	0.126*	(0.072)	0.073	(0.107)			0.564***	(0.181)
Het_pref	-0.055	(0.073)	-0.035	(0.107)			-0.187	(0.181)
Reshuffling	-0.146***	(0.025)	-0.108***	(0.028)	0.021	(0.015)	-0.413***	(0.040)
Study dummies		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
<i>Constant</i>			0.699***	(0.082)	0.131**	(0.064)	3.233***	(0.316)
Wald χ^2	200.690***		483.240***		530.890***		913.430***	
No. of obs.	3,984		15,936		5,472		15,936	
No. of groups	332		332		152		332	

(1): marginal effects from multilevel probit (MP) model, with standard errors clustered at the group level in parentheses. (2): coefficient estimates from multilevel one-limit tobit (M1LT) model, with lower limit 0 and standard errors clustered at the group level as well as the individual level in parentheses. (3): coefficient estimates from multilevel two-limit tobit (M2LT) model, with lower limit 0, upper limit 1, and standard errors clustered at the group level as well as the individual level in parentheses. This model includes only observations from non-delegates and treatments implementing delegation. (4) coefficient estimates from multilevel mixed-effects (MME) model, with standard errors clustered at the group level as well as the individual level in parentheses. While the first regression exploits group-level data, models (2), (3), and (4) rely on individual-level data.

*** p -value < 0.01.

** p -value < 0.05.

* p -value < 0.10.

of intermediation in terms of increased public good provision come at the expense of non-delegated subjects ($p = 0.037$), who witness a decline in their profits as compared with the no-delegation scenario:

$$Earnings_{\hat{e}_{NON-DEL}} = 3.233 - 0.394 * 4 + 0.030 * 16 + 0.692 * 0.895 - 0.328 - 0.595 = 1.833$$

Broadly speaking, there is no level of the destination rule below 1 that allows non-delegates to avoid this loss.

Result 3. *Except for delegation, which reduces non-delegates' earnings, the effective focal points generate higher individual profits.*

4 Discussion and conclusions

This paper is a meta-analysis of four experiments that are part of the same project and first model charitable giving as individual contributions to a multiplicity of competing threshold public goods. Given the centrality of the coordination dilemma in the presence of multiple charities indistinguishable from each other, the goal of our work is to nail down the most effective focal points, their mechanics, and their implications for donors' wealth.

Meta-analyzing data at the individual level, we find that competition between public goods implies massive coordination problems that originate from fewer contributions and result in lower profits. A possible explanation is that players are fully rational and anticipate the increased risk of miscoordination, thereby reducing their donations. Also, their behavior might be triggered by the paradox of choice (Schwartz, 2004), given the plethora of available recipients. In this setting, the most effective coordination device turns out to be the existence of a single contribution option that is more profitable than the alternatives. This outcome tallies with the theory of equilibrium selection in games by Harsanyi and Selten (1988), according to which groups tend to focus on the payoff-dominant option even when the latter does not correspond to the risk-dominance prediction. Consequently, competing charities should seek to stand out on their merits by improving features that might be valued by donors, such as

end beneficiary. The latter statistic is publicly available at <https://www.unitedway.org/contact-us/faqs> under the section "Where does the money go?".

transparency and alignment between donors' expectations and charities' actions. Moreover, we observe an inverted U-shaped trend in the successful provision of public goods, offering evidence for experience as a focal point peculiar to the multiple-public-good framework. Relatedly, the fact that contributions significantly decrease over time is a signal that donors make more and more efficient use of their initial endowments so that, by implication, in similar real-world settings it could be worthwhile to refrain from designing one-shot fundraising campaigns. We also come to the conclusion that the effective focal points do not leverage greater contributions to solve the coordination dilemma, nevertheless they generate higher profits. Finally, delegation proves to be a sound device for reducing the risk of miscoordination as long as the delegate is formally obliged to pass along a high enough percentage of the transferred resources. Even so, we emphasize that the realistic presence of overheads tied to the function of intermediation makes the latter not only less impactful, but also less desirable for non-delegated donors in terms of earnings. Subjects are less willing to transfer funds when the delegate is to incur administrative and fundraising costs, which is in line with an extensive body of research documenting overhead aversion ([Bowman, 2006](#); [Gneezy et al., 2014](#); [Meer, 2014](#); [Portillo and Stinn, 2018](#)). As a result, for the purpose of fully exploiting the advantages of delegation, it would be advisable for intermediaries to use initial donations from major contributors for covering overhead costs, in such a way as to subsequently offer prospective donors an overhead-free donation opportunity ([Gneezy et al., 2014](#)).

In light of these findings, we believe that further research should clarify the reasons behind overhead aversion, at the same time testing sustainable solutions. Besides, academic efforts could be directed to the temporal dimension so as to study whether sequential giving can act as a focal point, as well as to investigate how donors use past contributions to develop coordination in the following interactions. We also support broader use of single-project meta-analyses, given their clear benefits for project summary, theory testing, and replicability. Concerning the limitations of this paper, it was not possible to examine individual-level demographic characteristics due to the between-study heterogeneity of variables collected and partial data loss. Future pieces of research might shed light on this facet. Last but not least, we encourage scholars to delve into cross-national differences in charitable giving, considering the insufficient variation in our dataset (only two countries involved) and the well-established role played by cultural factors and economic development in this respect ([Kemmelmeier et al., 2006](#); [Einolf, 2017](#); [Cai et al., 2022](#)).

Appendix A. Supplementary material

Figure A1: Distribution of contributions and earnings





Figure A2: Distribution of transfers and their relationship with time trend, destination rule, and overheads



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