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Working Paper

From media-party linkages to ownership concentration causes of cross-national variation in media outlets' economic positioning

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Online Appendix | MPIfG Discussion Paper 22/8

Erik Neimanns and Nils Blossey **From Media-Party Linkages to Ownership Concentration** Causes of Cross-National Variation in Media Outlets' Economic Positioning

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Table A.1 Variable operationalization

Variable	Operationalization	Source
Media outlet partisan favorability	Item: "How would you characterize the political colour of each of these media outlets in [COUNTRY]? Please select for each media which political party it agrees with most often."; parties are matched with their economic left-right score (<i>lrecon</i>) from CHES.	EMSS 2017 (Popescu et al. 2018) & CHES 2014 (Polk et al. 2017)
Partisan journalists	Item: "The political orientation of the most prominent journalists is well-known to the public". Scale ranging from 0 ("untrue") to 10 ("true").	EMSS 2017 (ebd.)
Party influence	Item: "Medium X coverage is influenced by a political party". Scale ranging from 0 ("not at all") to 10 ("strongly"); we construct expert-level mean values.	EMSS 2017 (ebd.)
Usage rate	Percentage of respondents using a TV, radio, print, or online brand on a weekly basis.	Reuters (2017)
Media ownership concentration: Risk to media market plurality from media ownership concentration	Indicator: Horizontal concentration of media ownership; 0: low risk; 100: high risk; based on 31 questions, the indicator includes information about 1) whether a country has enacted rules to prevent horizontal concentration in the different sectors of the media system (audiovisual media, radio, newspapers, and internet content providers), and 2) whether ownership restrictions are effectively implemented according to: 2a) Whether there is an effective supervisory authority, and 2b) actual levels of ownership concentration in each media sector. Whereas items pertaining to 2b) also include the market shares of public broadcasters, the remaining items focus on concentration dynamics of private market actors.	MPM (2016)
Public ownership	Dummy for public ownership on outlet level.	Kennedy and Prat (2018) ¹
Center of gravity	Mean ideological position of party system weighted with vote shares.	CHES 2014 & ParlGov
GDP	GDP in US dollars, constant prices and PPPs, 2016	OECD (2021)

¹ The data is supplemented with manual online research and, where available, validated with EMSS 2010 data.

Unemployment	Unemployment rate, percentage of civilian labour force.	CPDS (2021)
Income inequality	Gini index of inequality in household market income, 2016	Solt (2020)
Social expenditure	Total public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP, 2016	CPDS (2021)
Welfare state regime	Liberal (reference category), Conservative, Social-democratic, Eastern European, Southern European; see Table A.1 for assignment of countries; Eastern Europe added as an additional category to Ferrera's (1996) classification.	Ferrera (1996)
Inflation	Growth of harmonised consumer price index (CPI).	CPDS (2021)
Government partisanship	gov_right2: Government composition: relative power position of right-wing parties in government based on their seat share in parliament, measured in percentage of the total parliamentary seat share of all governing parties. Weighted by the number of days in office in a given year.	CPDS (2021)
Population size	Total population, in thousands.	CPDS (2021)
Expert bias control	We subtract each expert left-right score from the outlet-level mean, capturing experts' deviation from the average expert assignment. Then, we average the expert deviations from the outlet-level mean for all media outlets coded by the expert, yielding a measure of left-right bias in media coding. The measure therefore controls for factors that cause individual experts to strongly deviate from the opinions of their peers. We assume that experts leaning heavily to the right (left) will overestimate the extent to which outlets endorse the political left (right).	EMSS 2017
New York Times left-right control	We leverage the coding of an internationally renowned media outlet as a more explicit proxy for political bias in media outlet coding. In particular, we use the left-right coding of the New York Times (NYT), relying on the assumption that left-right coding of internationally renowned outlets is to some extent a function of experts' own political attitudes. We use the NYT because it does not reside in any of the countries included in the EMSS. Experts from Wallonia did not code the NYT, leaving us with 24 upper-level units. Importantly, because the NYT measure is not expressed in individual experts'	EMSS 2017

deviations from a country-level expert mean, the NYT measure also captures crossnational differences in left-right coding bias. In other words, the measure captures whether a country's experts collectively assign more right-wing ideological positions, which would also affect the assignment of parties to media outlets. In addition, because the NYT measure is not expressed in terms of deviations from the country-level mean, it remains valid even if the country-level mean expert scores do not capture the "true" leftright position of a media outlet. By controlling for this potential type of bias, this procedure relaxes the assumption that a country's experts are on average unbiased in their ideological assignments.

Lending support to our conjecture that both measures (this one and the previous one above) can proxy meaningful degrees in expert bias, the left-right assessment of the NYT is a statistically significant predictor of experts' mean bias in domestic outlet coding: Experts who score the NYT as markedly left-wing also score domestic media outlets as more left-wing than the average domestic expert score.

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6		
Media outlet partisan favorability (0: economically left-wing; 10: economically right-wing)								
Media ownership concentration	0.018 (0.009)	0.018* (0.008)	0.027** (0.008)	0.029** (0.010)	0.029* (0.010)	0.028* (0.012)		
Public ownership		-1.388*** (0.218)	-1.373*** (0.217)	-1.371^{***} (0.218)	-1.364*** (0.218)	-1.367*** (0.219)		
Center of gravity		0.577* (0.222)	0.698** (0.207)	0.680** (0.220)	0.691** (0.227)	0.653* (0.287)		
GDP (log.)			-0.050 (0.114)	-0.015 (0.149)	0.005 (0.156)	-0.000 (0.164)		
Unemployment			0.064* (0.026)	0.068* (0.029)	0.071* (0.030)	0.066 (0.040)		
Income Inequality				-0.018 (0.047)	-0.015 (0.049)	-0.025 (0.066)		
Social expenditure					-0.018 (0.028)	-0.024 (0.040)		
Eastern Europe						-0.168 (0.737)		
Constant	4.349*** (0.647)	1.676 (1.154)	0.486 (1.886)	0.811 (2.170)	0.741 (2.233)	1.846 (5.419)		
Log Likelihood	-3863.525	-3840.570	-3841.495	-3843.572	-3846.044	-3845.414		
Observations	2177	2176	2176	2176	2176	2176		
Outlets	283	282	282	282	282	282		
Experts	222	222	222	222	222	222		
Upper-level units	20	20	20	20	20	20		
Random intercept variance: Outlets	1.889	1.619	1.618	1.618	1.617	1.619		
Random intercept variance: Experts	0.216	0.214	0.214	0.214	0.214	0.214		
Random intercept variance: Upper-level units	0.283	0.145	0.083	0.099	0.114	0.129		
Residual variance	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.070		

Table A.2 Economic left-right media bias and media ownership concentration; multilevel random intercept regression coefficients with usage weights; weighted REML estimator

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; *Weighted restricted maximum likelihood regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; p-values approximated with the Satterthwaite method; public ownership is outlet-level indicator; center of gravity is vote-weighted left-right mean of country; GDP is logged; inequality is market income inequality*

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6			
Media outlet partisan favorability (0: economically left-wing; 10: economically right-wing)									
Media ownership concentration	0.021* (0.009)	0.018* (0.008)	0.030*** (0.007)	0.028** (0.009)	0.028** (0.009)	0.023* (0.008)			
Public ownership		-1.075^{***} (0.208)	-1.060^{***} (0.208)	-1.059^{***} (0.208)	-1.056^{***} (0.209)	-1.090^{***} (0.209)			
Center of gravity		0.601* (0.223)	0.719*** (0.183)	0.736** (0.188)	0.738** (0.194)	0.518* (0.204)			
GDP (log.)			0.012 (0.083)	-0.024 (0.102)	-0.013 (0.120)	-0.050 (0.111)			
Unemployment			0.095** (0.026)	0.088** (0.029)	0.089* (0.030)	0.057 (0.031)			
Income inequality				0.027 (0.042)	0.027 (0.044)	-0.039 (0.051)			
Social expendi- ture					-0.005 (0.025)	-0.053 (0.032)			
Eastern Europe						-0.994* (0.468)			
Constant	4.326*** (0.649)	1.582 (1.177)	-0.966 (1.759)	-1.654 (2.092)	-1.705 (2.165)	5.264 (3.826)			
Log Likelihood	-4902.053	-4861.645	-4860.401	-4862.446	-4865.225	-4862.961			
Observations	2876	2863	2863	2863	2863	2863			
Outlets	429	424	424	424	424	424			
Experts	255	255	255	255	255	255			
Upper-level units	25	25	25	25	25	25			
Random intercept	1.770	1.655	1.653	1.652	1.652	1.651			
variance: Outlets									
Random intercept variance: Experts	0.137	0.134	0.135	0.135	0.135	0.135			
Random intercept variance: Upper- level units	0.397	0.256	0.121	0.129	0.144	0.098			
Residual variance	0.279	0.278	0.278	0.278	0.278	0.278			

Table A.3 Economic left-right media bias and media ownership concentration; multilevel random intercept regression coefficients with vote share weights; weighted REML estimator

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; *Weighted restricted maximum likelihood regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; p-values approximated with the Satterthwaite method; public ownership is outlet-level indicator; center of gravity is vote-weighted left-right mean of country; GDP is logged; inequality is market income inequality*

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6			
Differenced media outlet partisan favorability: $lrecon_{oic} - cog_c$									
Media ownership concentration	0.013 (0.008)	0.014 (0.008)	0.026** (0.008)	0.024* (0.009)	0.025* (0.009)	0.023* (0.010)			
Public ownership		-1.171^{***} (0.210)	-1.151*** (0.210)	-1.151*** (0.210)	-1.152*** (0.210)	-1.158*** (0.211)			
GDP (log.)			-0.033 (0.086)	-0.052 (0.107)	-0.056 (0.125)	-0.068 (0.129)			
Unemployment			0.087** (0.027)	0.083* (0.030)	0.083* (0.031)	0.076* (0.034)			
Income inequality				0.014 (0.044)	0.014 (0.045)	-0.003 (0.053)			
Social expendi- ture					0.002 (0.026)	-0.013 (0.035)			
Eastern Europe						-0.285 (0.470)			
Constant	-0.320 (0.575)	-0.268 (0.554)	-1.484 (1.495)	-1.782 (1.802)	-1.765 (1.861)	-0.177 (3.237)			
Log Likelihood	_ 4877.553	-4837.567	-4836.730	-4838.904	-4841.665	-4841.325			
Observations	2884	2871	2871	2871	2871	2871			
Outlets	429	424	424	424	424	424			
Experts	255	255	255	255	255	255			
Upper-level units	25	25	25	25	25	25			
Random intercept variance: Outlets	1.835	1.711	1.711	1.711	1.711	1.711			
Random intercept variance: Experts	0.148	0.146	0.146	0.146	0.146	0.146			
Random intercept variance: Upper- level units	0.279	0.257	0.136	0.149	0.164	0.177			
Residual variance	1.141	1.138	1.138	1.138	1.138	1.138			

Table A.4 Economic left-right media bias and media ownership concentration; multilevel random intercept regression coefficients; lrecon-cog-difference

Note: p<0.05; p<0.01; p<0.01; Restricted maximum likelihood regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; p-values approximated with the Satterthwaite method; left-right score is subtracted with center of gravity measure on country-level; public ownership is outlet-level indicator; GDP is logged; inequality is market income inequality. Greece is an outlier with this operationalization of the dependent variable (see the right panel in Figure 1 and the associated discussion in the main text). See Table A.5 for a replication of Table A.4 which excludes Greece.

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6			
Differenced media outlet partisan favorability: $lrecon_{oic} - cog_c$									
Media ownership concentration	0.022** (0.007)	0.023** (0.006)	0.027*** (0.005)	0.027** (0.008)	0.027** (0.008)	0.025* (0.009)			
Public ownership		-1.098*** (0.214)	-1.087^{***} (0.215)	-1.080^{***} (0.214)	-1.077*** (0.214)	-1.087^{***} (0.215)			
GDP (log.)			-0.022 (0.062)	-0.030 (0.098)	-0.025 (0.116)	-0.039 (0.119)			
Unemployment			0.047* (0.023)	0.051 (0.032)	0.051 (0.033)	0.040 (0.036)			
Income inequality				-0.001 (0.041)	-0.001 (0.042)	-0.023 (0.050)			
Social expenditure					-0.003 (0.024)	-0.021 (0.032)			
Eastern Europe						-0.372 (0.435)			
Constant	-1.093* (0.490)	-1.026* (0.469)	-1.388 (1.076)	-1.280 (1.667)	-1.296 (1.729)	0.811 (3.022)			
Log Likelihood	-4512.240	-4474.350	-4478.052	-4479.224	-4482.062	-4481.613			
Observations	2692	2679	2679	2679	2679	2679			
Outlets	409	404	404	404	404	404			
Experts	243	243	243	243	243	243			
Upper-level units	24	24	24	24	24	24			
Random intercept variance: Outlets	1.864	1.758	1.806	1.757	1.757	1.756			
Random intercept variance: Experts	0.137	0.134	0.137	0.134	0.134	0.134			
Random intercept variance: Upper- level units	0.110	0.095	0.000	0.102	0.117	0.125			
Residual variance	1.103	1.099	1.099	1.099	1.099	1.099			

Table A.5 Economic left-right media bias and media ownership concentration; multilevel random intercept regression coefficients; lrecon-cog-difference; Greece excluded.

Note: p<0.05; p<0.01; p<0.01; Restricted maximum likelihood regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; p-values approximated with the Satterthwaite method; left-right score is subtracted with center of gravity measure on country-level; Greece is excluded as an outlier case; public ownership is outlet-level indicator; GDP is logged; inequality is market income inequality.

	M1	M2	M3	M4					
Media outlet partisan favorability (0: economically left-wing; 10: economically right-wing)									
Media ownership concentration	0.021* (0.007)	0.021* (0.008)	0.026** (0.009)	0.019* (0.008)					
Public ownership	-1.190^{***} (0.211)	-1.182^{***} (0.211)	-1.178^{***} (0.211)	-1.197^{***} (0.210)					
Center of gravity	0.483* (0.185)	0.466* (0.206)	0.291 (0.224)	0.424* (0.173)					
GDP (log.)	-0.046 (0.102)	-0.093 (0.111)	-0.312 (0.196)	-0.133 (0.087)					
Unemployment	0.060* (0.028)	0.033 (0.035)	0.045 (0.030)						
Income inequality	-0.052(0.045)	-0.050 (0.051)	-0.088 (0.053)	-0.079 (0.046)					
Social expenditure	-0.037 (0.029)	-0.034 (0.033)	-0.041 (0.031)						
Eastern Europe	-0.916* (0.425)	-0.927 (0.466)	-1.146* (0.484)						
Government partisanship	0.005 (0.003)								
Inflation		-0.142 (0.173)							
Population 0.000 (0.000)									
Welfare Regimes (Ref = Co.	nservative)								
Liberal				0.884* (0.399)					
Social-democratic				0.435 (0.385)					
Southern				0.958** (0.284)					
Eastern				-0.351 (0.332)					
Constant	5.499 (3.537)	6.463 (3.835)	11.533* (5.024)	7.764* (2.798)					
Log Likelihood	-4841.670	-4839.136	-4848.328	-4830.659					
Observations	2871	2871	2871	2871					
Outlets	424	424	424	424					
Experts	255	255	255	255					
Upper-level units	25	25	25	25					
Random intercept	1.713	1.711	1.712	1.709					
Random intercept	0.147	0.147	0.147	0.147					
variance: Experts Random intercept variance: Upper-level units	0.049	0.090	0.077	0.033					
Residual variance	1.138	1.138	1.138	1.138					

Table A.6 Additional consistency checks; multilevel random intercept regression coefficients.

Note: ${}^{*}p<0.05$; ${}^{**}p<0.01$; ${}^{***}p<0.001$; Restricted maximum likelihood regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; p-values approximated with the Satterthwaite method; welfare regimes are defined based on Ferrera (1996) and Neimanns (2021); government partisanship is "gov_right2" from CPDS; public ownership is outlet-level indicator; GDP is logged; inequality is market income inequality; In Model 4, we exclude unemployment, social expenditure, and the Eastern Europe dummy to avoid multicollinearity with the welfare state regime dummies.

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6		
Media outlet partisan favorability (0: economically left-wing; 10: economically right-wing)								
Ownership concentration	0.019* (0.008)	0.017* (0.007)	0.027** (0.007)	0.026** (0.009)	0.026* (0.009)	0.022* (0.009)		
Expert bias	0.209*** (0.033)	0.211*** (0.033)	0.210*** (0.033)	0.210*** (0.033)	0.211*** (0.033)	0.210*** (0.033)		
Public ownership		-1.152*** (0.213)	-1.133*** (0.212)	-1.132*** (0.212)	_ 1.133*** (0.213)	-1.160*** (0.213)		
Center of gravity		0.547* (0.215)	0.647** (0.186)	0.653** (0.193)	0.653** (0.199)	0.460* (0.215)		
GDP (log.)			-0.037 (0.083)	-0.048 (0.104)	-0.053 (0.122)	-0.086 (0.116)		
Unemployment			0.080** (0.027)	0.078* (0.030)	0.078* (0.031)	0.050 (0.033)		
Income inequality				0.008 (0.043)	0.008 (0.044)	-0.049 (0.053)		
Social expenditure					0.002 (0.025)	-0.039 (0.033)		
Eastern Europe						-0.865 (0.488)		
Constant	4.356*** (0.606)	1.848 (1.133)	0.365 (1.781)	0.160 (2.140)	0.176 (2.218)	6.242 (4.000)		
Log Likelihood	-4502.149	-4464.633	-4464.362	-4466.583	-469.365	-4467.670		
Observations	2685	2674	2674	2674	2674	2674		
Outlets	427	423	423	423	423	423		
Experts	233	233	233	233	233	233		
Upper-level units	25	25	25	25	25	25		
Random intercept variance: Outlets	1.864	1.748	1.748	1.748	1.747	1.748		
Random intercept variance: Experts	0.092	0.088	0.088	0.088	0.088	0.089		
Random intercept variance: Upper-level units	0.330	0.226	0.126	0.140	0.156	0.120		
Residual variance	1.100	1.098	1.098	1.098	1.098	1.098		

Table A.7 Economic left-right media bias and media ownership concentration; multilevel random intercept regression coefficients; Expert bias control

Note: ${}^{*}p<0.05$; ${}^{**}p<0.01$; ${}^{***}p<0.001$; *Restricted maximum likelihood regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; p-values approximated with the Satterthwaite method; expert bias is average expert deviation from average outlet score of all experts.*

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6		
Media outlet partisan favorability (0: economically left-wing; 10: economically right-wing)								
Ownership concen- tration	0.018* (0.008)	0.016* (0.007)	0.025** (0.007)	0.025* (0.009)	0.025* (0.009)	0.019* (0.008)		
NYT Left-right	0.058** (0.022)	0.058** (0.022)	0.054* (0.022)	0.054* (0.022)	0.054* (0.022)	0.057** (0.022)		
Public ownership		-1.110^{***} (0.218)	-1.090^{***} (0.218)	-1.090*** (0.218)	-1.094^{***} (0.219)	-1.132*** (0.219)		
Center of gravity		0.523* (0.206)	0.623** (0.184)	0.620** (0.191)	0.616** (0.196)	0.351 (0.207)		
GDP (log).			-0.039 (0.082)	-0.035 (0.102)	-0.054 (0.120)	-0.099 (0.108)		
Unemployment			0.068* (0.026)	0.069* (0.029)	0.068* (0.030)	0.030 (0.031)		
Income inequality				-0.003 (0.043)	-0.003 (0.044)	-0.079 (0.051)		
Social expenditure					0.008 (0.025)	-0.043 (0.031)		
Eastern Europe						-1.125* (0.473)		
Constant	4.246*** (0.578)	1.821 (1.085)	0.568 (1.751)	0.654 (2.129)	0.750 (2.199)	8.797* (3.927)		
Log Likelihood	-4094.441	-4062.105	-4062.759	-4064.994	-4067.732	-4064.974		
Observations	2429	2419	2419	2419	2419	2419		
Outlets	415	411	411	411	411	411		
Experts	202	202	202	202	202	202		
Upper-level units	24	24	24	24	24	24		
Random intercept variance: Outlets	1.827	1.719	1.720	1.720	1.720	1.719		
Random intercept variance: Experts	0.134	0.132	0.133	0.133	0.133	0.133		
Random intercept variance: Upper- level units	0.268	0.179	0.105	0.119	0.132	0.074		
Residual variance	1.091	1.090	1.089	1.089	1.089	1.089		

Table A.8 Economic left-right media bias and media ownership concentration; multilevel random intercept regression coefficients; NYT left-right control

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; Restricted maximum likelihood regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; p-values approximated with the Satterthwaite method; NYT left-right is the individual expert assessment of the New York Times on the general left-right axis.

Excluded country	Media ownership concentration coefficient and standard error
Austria	0.020* (0.008)
Belgium Dutch	0.022* (0.009)
Belgium French	0.021* (0.008)
Bulgaria	0.027* (0.009)
Croatia	0.021* (0.009)
Cyprus	0.028** (0.008)
Czech Republic	0.023* (0.008)
Denmark	0.021* (0.009)
Estonia	0.024* (0.008)
Finland	0.018 (0.009)
France	0.022* (0.008)
Germany	0.024* (0.009)
Greece	0.024* (0.008)
Hungary	0.020* (0.008)
Ireland	0.024** (0.008)
Italy	0.022* (0.008)
Latvia	0.021* (0.008)
Lithuania	0.022* (0.008)
Netherlands	0.023* (0.008)
Poland	0.022* (0.008)
Portugal	0.024* (0.008)
Slovakia	0.022* (0.008)
Spain	$0.028^{**}(0.008)$
Sweden	0.023* (0.009)
United Kingdom	0.022* (0.008)

Table A.9 Jackknife-Tests; coefficients of media ownership concentration based on baseline Model 6

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6		
Media outlet partisan favorability (0: economically left-wing; 10: economically right-wing)								
Partisan journal- ists (expert-level)	-0.051^{***} (0.014)	-0.049^{***} (0.014)	-0.051^{***} (0.014)	-0.050*** (0.014)	-0.050*** (0.014)	-0.050^{***} (0.014)		
Public ownership		-1.153^{***} (0.210)	-1.132*** (0.210)	-1.134^{***} (0.210)	-1.133^{***} (0.211)	-1.167*** (0.211)		
Center of gravity		0.583* (0.218)	0.630** (0.217)	0.659** (0.214)	0.660** (0.220)	0.378 (0.226)		
GDP (log.)			-0.141 (0.093)	-0.199 (0.101)	-0.192 (0.124)	-0.207 (0.110)		
Unemployment			0.032 (0.027)	0.028 (0.027)	0.028 (0.028)	0.002 (0.027)		
Income inequality				0.056 (0.042)	0.056 (0.043)	-0.038 (0.054)		
Social expendi- ture					-0.003 (0.028)	-0.061 (0.035)		
Eastern Europe						-1.219* (0.496)		
Constant	6.043*** (0.165)	3.166* (1.143)	4.454* (1.795)	2.334 (2.386)	2.303 (2.465)	10.598* (4.012)		
Log Likelihood	-4862.677	-4820.399	-4822.496	-4823.875	-4826.541	-4823.594		
Observations	2873	2860	2860	2860	2860	2860		
Outlets	429	424	424	424	424	424		
Experts	253	253	253	253	253	253		
Upper-level units	25	25	25	25	25	25		
Random intercept variance: Outlets	1.833	1.708	1.710	1.710	1.710	1.710		
Random intercept variance: Experts	0.138	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.137		
Random intercept variance: Upper- level units	0.363	0.249	0.218	0.206	0.225	0.146		
Residual variance	1.146	1.143	1.143	1.143	1.143	1.143		

Table A.10 Partisan journalists; expert-level estimation; multilevel random intercept regression coefficients.

Note: ${}^{*}p < 0.05$; ${}^{**}p < 0.01$; ${}^{***}p < 0.001$; Restricted maximum likelihood regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; p-values approximated with the Satterthwaite method; expert-level classification of country's level of partisan journalism.

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6		
Media outlet partisan favorability (0: economically left-wing; 10: economically right-wing)								
Party influence (expert-level)	-0.002 (0.017)	-0.000 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.017)	-0.004 (0.017)	-0.004 (0.017)	-0.002 (0.017)		
Public ownership		- 1.226*** (0.213)	-1.210*** (0.213)	-1.211^{***} (0.213)	-1.215*** (0.214)	-1.244*** (0.214)		
Center of gravity		0.617* (0.234)	0.653* (0.236)	0.681** (0.234)	0.679* (0.239)	0.402 (0.250)		
GDP (log.)			-0.153 (0.101)	-0.213 (0.110)	-0.236 (0.134)	-0.250 (0.121)		
Unemployment			0.028 (0.029)	0.023 (0.029)	0.022 (0.030)	-0.004 (0.030)		
Income inequality				0.059 (0.046)	0.059 (0.047)	-0.031 (0.060)		
Social expendi- ture					0.009 (0.030)	-0.046 (0.038)		
Eastern Europe						-1.179* (0.547)		
Constant	5.761*** (0.175)	2.709* (1.227)	4.249* (1.953)	2.022 (2.587)	2.122 (2.665)	10.149* (4.421)		
Log Likelihood	-4388.027	_ 4348.885	-4351.126	-4352.468	-4355.005	-4352.557		
Observations	2596	2585	2585	2585	2585	2585		
Outlets	427	423	423	423	423	423		
Experts	224	224	224	224	224	224		
Upper-level units	25	25	25	25	25	25		
Random intercept variance: Outlets	1.855	1.717	1.720	1.719	1.719	1.719		
Random intercept variance: Experts	0.128	0.125	0.125	0.125	0.125	0.126		
Random intercept variance: Upper- level units	0.417	0.306	0.282	0.269	0.287	0.209		
Residual variance	1.110	1.108	1.107	1.107	1.107	1.107		

Table A.11 Party influence; expert-level estimation; multilevel random intercept regression coefficients.

Note: ${}^{*}p < 0.05$; ${}^{**}p < 0.01$; ${}^{***}p < 0.001$; Restricted maximum likelihood regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; p-values approximated with the Satterthwaite method; expert-level classification of country's level of party influence on media outlets.

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6		
Differenced media outlet partisan favorability: $lrecon_{oic} - cog_c$								
Partisan journal- ism (expert-level)	-0.047^{**} (0.014)	-0.047^{**} (0.014)	-0.049^{**} (0.014)	-0.048^{**} (0.014)	-0.048** (0.014)	-0.048** (0.014)		
Public ownership		-1.154*** (0.210)	-1.132*** (0.210)	-1.134*** (0.210)	-1.133*** (0.211)	-1.144^{***} (0.211)		
GDP (log.)			-0.128 (0.097)	-0.194 (0.105)	-0.183 (0.128)	-0.185 (0.128)		
Unemployment			0.044 (0.027)	0.038 (0.027)	0.039 (0.028)	0.031 (0.029)		
Income inequality				0.063 (0.044)	0.063 (0.045)	0.024 (0.057)		
Social expendi- ture					-0.005 (0.029)	-0.031 (0.038)		
Eastern Europe						-0.540 (0.499)		
Constant	0.847*** (0.158)	0.998*** (0.158)	2.254 (1.301)	0.062 (1.984)	0.025 (2.048)	2.853 (3.318)		
Log Likelihood	-4861.200	-4821.542	-4823.296	-4824.489	-4827.113	-4826.303		
Observations	2873	2860	2860	2860	2860	2860		
Outlets	429	424	424	424	424	424		
Experts	253	253	253	253	253	253		
Upper-level units	25	25	25	25	25	25		
Random intercept variance: Outlets	1.832	1.709	1.710	1.710	1.710	1.710		
Random intercept variance: Experts	0.139	0.137	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.137		
Random intercept variance: Upper- level units	0.311	0.297	0.251	0.234	0.252	0.252		
Residual variance	1.146	1.143	1.143	1.143	1.143	1.143		

Table A.12 Partisan journalists; expert-level estimation; lrecon-cog difference; multilevel random intercept regression coefficients.

Note: ${}^{*}p < 0.05$; ${}^{**}p < 0.01$; ${}^{***}p < 0.001$; Restricted maximum likelihood regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; p-values approximated with the Satterthwaite method; expert-level classification of country's level of partisan journalism.

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6		
Differenced media outlet partisan favorability: $lrecon_{oic} - cog_c$								
Party influence (expert-level)	0.001 (0.017)	0.001 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.017)	-0.002 (0.017)		
Public ownership		-1.227*** (0.213)	-1.209^{***} (0.213)	-1.210*** (0.213)	-1.213*** (0.214)	-1.223^{***} (0.214)		
GDP (log.)			-0.140 (0.104)	-0.208 (0.113)	-0.225 (0.137)	-0.227 (0.138)		
Unemployment			0.039 (0.029)	0.033 (0.029)	0.032 (0.030)	0.024 (0.031)		
Income inequality				0.065 (0.047)	0.065 (0.048)	0.027 (0.061)		
Social expendi- ture					0.007 (0.031)	-0.019 (0.041)		
Eastern Europe						-0.524 (0.536)		
Constant	0.571*** (0.167)	0.722*** (0.167)	2.182 (1.395)	-0.087 (2.128)	-0.024 (2.192)	2.717 (3.560)		
Log Likelihood	_ 4386.296	-4349.648	-4351.661	-4352.850	-4355.384	-4354.611		
Observations	2596	2585	2585	2585	2585	2585		
Outlets	427	423	423	423	423	423		
Experts	224	224	224	224	224	224		
Upper-level units	25	25	25	25	25	25		
Random intercept variance: Outlets	1.853	1.717	1.719	1.719	1.719	1.718		
Random intercept variance: Experts	0.128	0.125	0.125	0.125	0.125	0.125		
Random intercept variance: Upper- level units	0.351	0.344	0.308	0.290	0.309	0.312		
Residual variance	1.110	1.108	1.107	1.107	1.107	1.107		

Table A.13 Party influence; expert-level estimation; lrecon-cog difference; multilevel random intercept regression coefficients.

Note: ${}^{*}p < 0.05$; ${}^{**}p < 0.01$; ${}^{***}p < 0.001$; Restricted maximum likelihood regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; p-values approximated with the Satterthwaite method; expert-level classification of country's level of partisan influence on media outlets.

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Media outle	t partisan fav	vorability (0: ed	conomically lef	t-wing; 10: eco	nomically righ	t-wing)
Partisan journal- ism (expert-level)	-0.053** (0.018)	-0.049^{**} (0.018)	-0.049^{**} (0.018)	-0.047^{**} (0.018)	-0.048^{**} (0.018)	-0.049^{**} (0.018)
Public ownership		-1.339*** (0.217)	-1.326*** (0.218)	-1.334*** (0.218)	-1.329*** (0.218)	-1.359*** (0.219)
Center of gravity		0.604* (0.234)	0.699* (0.255)	0.740* (0.260)	0.753* (0.269)	0.461 (0.306)
GDP (log.)			-0.086 (0.139)	-0.164 (0.163)	-0.146 (0.171)	-0.129 (0.158)
Unemployment			0.024 (0.028)	0.020 (0.028)	0.022 (0.029)	0.004 (0.029)
Income inequality				0.045 (0.048)	0.049 (0.050)	-0.037 (0.071)
Social expendi- ture					-0.019 (0.033)	-0.061 (0.041)
Eastern Europe						-1.083 (0.672)
Constant	5.860*** (0.182)	3.012* (1.220)	3.449 (2.118)	2.089 (2.583)	2.036 (2.662)	9.061 (5.002)
Log Likelihood	_ 3855.215	-3833.454	-3836.577	-3838.261	-3840.603	-3838.870
Observations	2172	2171	2171	2171	2171	2171
Outlets	283	282	282	282	282	282
Experts	220	220	220	220	220	220
Upper-level units	20	20	20	20	20	20
Random intercept variance: Outlets	1.887	1.620	1.620	1.619	1.618	1.624
Random intercept variance: Experts	0.206	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.206
Random intercept variance: Upper- level units	0.287	0.187	0.205	0.208	0.231	0.175
Residual variance	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.070

Table A.14 Partisan journalists; expert-level estimation; usage rate weights; multilevel random intercept regression coefficients.

Note: ${}^{*}p < 0.05$; ${}^{**}p < 0.01$; ${}^{***}p < 0.001$; Restricted maximum likelihood regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; p-values approximated with the Satterthwaite method; expert-level classification of country's level of partisan journalism; usage rate weights from Reuters (2017).

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6			
Media ou	Media outlet partisan favorability (0: economically left-wing; 10: economically right-wing)								
Party influence (expert-level)	-0.021 (0.021)	-0.018 (0.020)	-0.019 (0.021)	-0.019 (0.021)	-0.019 (0.021)	-0.017 (0.021)			
Public ownership		-1.432*** (0.220)	-1.421*** (0.220)	-1.430*** (0.220)	-1.428^{***} (0.221)	-1.453*** (0.222)			
Center of gravity		0.638* (0.248)	0.744* (0.269)	0.789* (0.271)	0.797* (0.282)	0.530 (0.330)			
GDP (log.)			-0.129 (0.147)	-0.220 (0.169)	-0.213 (0.179)	-0.198 (0.170)			
Unemployment			0.022 (0.030)	0.018 (0.030)	0.018 (0.031)	0.001 (0.032)			
Income inequality				0.053 (0.050)	0.054 (0.052)	-0.023 (0.076)			
Social expendi- ture					-0.007 (0.035)	-0.044 (0.043)			
Eastern Europe						-0.982 (0.725)			
Constant	5.670*** (0.190)	2.662 (1.289)	3.630 (2.236)	2.037 (2.689)	2.005 (2.791)	8.349 (5.369)			
Log Likelihood		-3431.621	-3434.526	-3436.047	-3438.492	-3437.021			
Observations	1953	1953	1953	1953	1953	1953			
Outlets	282	282	282	282	282	282			
Experts	195	195	195	195	195	195			
Upper-level units	20	20	20	20	20	20			
Random intercept variance: Outlets	1.934	1.629	1.630	1.629	1.628	1.633			
Random intercept variance: Experts	0.186	0.182	0.182	0.182	0.182	0.183			
Random intercept variance: Upper- level units	0.314	0.227	0.245	0.241	0.272	0.226			
Residual variance	0.067	0.067	0.067	0.067	0.067	0.067			

Table A.15 Party influence; expert-level estimation; usage rate weights; multilevel random intercept regression coefficients.

Note: ${}^{*}p < 0.05$; ${}^{**}p < 0.01$; ${}^{***}p < 0.001$; Restricted maximum likelihood regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; p-values approximated with the Satterthwaite method; expert-level classification of country's level of party influence on media outlets; usage rate weights from Reuters (2017).

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Media ou	tlet partisan fa	vorability (0: ec	conomically left	-wing; 10: econ	omically right-	wing)
Partisan journal- ism (expert-level)	-0.051^{***} (0.014)	-0.049^{***} (0.014)	-0.050^{***} (0.014)	-0.049^{***} (0.014)	-0.049^{***} (0.014)	-0.050^{***} (0.014)
Public ownership		-1.067*** (0.214)	-1.055*** (0.214)	-1.057*** (0.214)	-1.054^{***} (0.215)	-1.087*** (0.215)
Center of gravity		0.760** (0.243)	0.715** (0.244)	0.731** (0.241)	0.735** (0.249)	0.447 (0.255)
GDP (log.)			-0.142 (0.094)	-0.197 (0.103)	-0.183 (0.126)	-0.198 (0.113)
Unemployment			0.015 (0.035)	0.013 (0.035)	0.013 (0.036)	-0.008 (0.033)
Income inequality				0.053 (0.043)	0.053 (0.044)	-0.036 (0.055)
Social expendi- ture					-0.006 (0.029)	-0.062 (0.035)
Eastern Europe						-1.177* (0.509)
Constant	6.036*** (0.169)	2.198 (1.283)	4.146* (1.858)	2.160 (2.435)	2.095 (2.522)	10.140* (4.149)
Log Likelihood	-4502.649	-4461.490	-4464.070	-4465.532	-4468.162	-4465.474
Observations	2681	2668	2668	2668	2668	2668
Outlets	409	404	404	404	404	404
Experts	241	241	241	241	241	241
Upper-level units	24	24	24	24	24	24
Random intercept variance: Outlets	1.858	1.752	1.753	1.754	1.754	1.753
Random intercept variance: Experts	0.125	0.123	0.123	0.123	0.123	0.123
Random intercept variance: Upper- level units	0.390	0.228	0.225	0.216	0.236	0.162
Residual variance	1.108	1.105	1.104	1.104	1.104	1.104

Table A.16 Partisan journalism; expert-level estimation; multilevel random intercept regression coefficients; Greece excluded

Note: ${}^{*}p < 0.05$; ${}^{**}p < 0.01$; ${}^{***}p < 0.001$; Restricted maximum likelihood regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; p-values approximated with the Satterthwaite method; expert-level classification of country's level of partisan journalism.

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6		
Media outlet partisan favorability (0: economically left-wing; 10: economically right-wing)								
Party influence (expert-level)	-0.008 (0.017)	-0.007 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.008 (0.017)		
Public ownership		-1.142*** (0.217)	-1.132*** (0.217)	-1.134*** (0.217)	-1.136^{***} (0.218)	-1.164^{***} (0.218)		
Center of gravity		0.776** (0.266)	0.728* (0.267)	0.744* (0.264)	0.740* (0.272)	0.460 (0.286)		
GDP (log.)			-0.156 (0.102)	-0.215 (0.112)	-0.229 (0.137)	-0.244 (0.126)		
Unemployment			0.013 (0.039)	0.011 (0.038)	0.011 (0.040)	-0.010 (0.038)		
Income inequality				0.057 (0.047)	0.057 (0.048)	-0.029 (0.061)		
Social expendi- ture					0.006 (0.031)	-0.047 (0.039)		
Eastern Europe						-1.126 (0.566)		
Constant	5.792*** (0.181)	1.872 (1.406)	4.033 (2.027)	1.923 (2.646)	1.987 (2.741)	9.683 (4.602)		
Log Likelihood	-4025.591	-3987.949	-3990.371	-3991.775	-3994.320	-3992.127		
Observations	2404	2393	2393	2393	2393	2393		
Outlets	407	403	403	403	403	403		
Experts	212	212	212	212	212	212		
Upper-level units	24	24	24	24	24	24		
Random intercept variance: Outlets	1.886	1.766	1.769	1.769	1.769	1.769		
Random intercept variance: Experts	0.110	0.107	0.107	0.107	0.107	0.108		
Random intercept variance: Upper- level units	0.448	0.299	0.293	0.282	0.304	0.234		
Residual variance	1.064	1.061	1.061	1.061	1.061	1.061		

Table A.17 Party influence; expert-level estimation; multilevel random intercept regression coefficients; Greece excluded

Note: ${}^{*}p < 0.05$; ${}^{**}p < 0.01$; ${}^{***}p < 0.001$; Restricted maximum likelihood regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; p-values approximated with the Satterthwaite method; expert-level classification of country's level of party influence on media outlets.

	M1	M2	M3	M4
Media outlet parti	isan favorability (0: e	conomically left-win	g; 10: economically	right-wing)
Partisan journalism (expert-level)	-0.050^{***} (0.014)	-0.051^{***} (0.014)	-0.050^{***} (0.014)	-0.048** (0.014)
Public ownership	-1.168^{***} (0.211)	-1.162^{***} (0.211)	-1.163*** (0.211)	-1.163*** (0.210)
Center of gravity	0.432 (0.212)	0.421 (0.227)	0.327 (0.261)	0.499* (0.182)
GDP (log.)	-0.149 (0.106)	-0.203 (0.109)	-0.293 (0.228)	-0.194* (0.092)
Unemployment	0.021 (0.026)	-0.016 (0.030)	-0.002 (0.029)	
Income inequality	-0.032 (0.050)	-0.026 (0.055)	-0.046 (0.059)	-0.042 (0.046)
Social expenditure	-0.057 (0.032)	-0.050 (0.036)	-0.063 (0.035)	
Eastern Europe	-1.189* (0.462)	-1.215* (0.493)	-1.318* (0.558)	
Government partisanship	0.006 (0.003)			
Inflation		-0.222 (0.188)		
Population			0.000 (0.000)	
Welfare Regimes (Ref = Co	onservative)			
Liberal				1.129* (0.421)
Social-democratic				0.851* (0.348)
Southern				0.830* (0.302)
Eastern				-0.148 (0.353)
Constant	8.776* (3.858)	9.726* (4.056)	12.389* (5.848)	7.818* (3.066)
Log Likelihood	-4826.626	-4823.646	-4834.024	-4815.306
Observations	2860	2860	2860	2860
Outlets	424	424	424	424
Experts	253	253	253	253
Upper-level units	25	25	25	25
Random intercept variance: Outlets	1.712	1.710	1.710	1.706
Random intercept variance: Experts	0.137	0.137	0.137	0.137
Random intercept variance: Upper-level units	0.107	0.143	0.161	0.071
Residual variance	1.142	1.143	1.143	1.143

Table A.18 Partisan journalism; expert-level estimation; multilevel random intercept regression coefficients; Additional consistency checks

Note: ${}^{*}p < 0.05$; ${}^{**}p < 0.01$; ${}^{***}p < 0.001$; Restricted maximum likelihood regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; p-values approximated with the Satterthwaite method; expert-level classification of country's level of partisan journalism.

	M1	M2	M3	M4
Media outlet partis	an favorability (0: eco	onomically left-wing;	10: economically rig	ht-wing)
Party influence (expert-level)	-0.004 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.017)	-0.001 (0.017)
Public ownership	-1.243*** (0.214)	-1.239*** (0.214)	-1.241*** (0.214)	-1.239*** (0.213)
Center of gravity	0.455 (0.241)	0.462 (0.252)	0.375 (0.290)	0.552* (0.200)
GDP (log.)	-0.194 (0.120)	-0.245 (0.120)	-0.298 (0.252)	-0.196 (0.101)
Unemployment	0.015 (0.030)	-0.027 (0.034)	-0.006 (0.032)	
Income inequality	-0.025 (0.057)	-0.015 (0.060)	-0.036 (0.065)	-0.033 (0.050)
Social expenditure	-0.043 (0.036)	-0.032 (0.039)	-0.047 (0.039)	
Eastern Europe	-1.143* (0.522)	-1.159* (0.542)	-1.231 (0.616)	
Government partisanship	0.006 (0.003)			
Inflation		-0.283 (0.210)		
Population			0.000 (0.000)	
Welfare Regimes (Ref = Conse	ervative)			
Liberal				0.983* (0.463)
Social-democratic				1.070* (0.383)
Southern				0.806* (0.335)
Eastern				-0.117 (0.390)
Constant	8.343 (4.363)	8.912 (4.476)	11.108 (6.442)	6.839 (3.351)
Log Likelihood	-4355.969	-4352.290	-4362.956	-4343.754
Observations	2585	2585	2585	2585
Outlets	423	423	423	423
Experts	224	224	224	224
Upper-level units	25	25	25	25
Random intercept variance: Outlets	1.719	1.719	1.719	1.715
Random intercept variance: Experts	0.126	0.125	0.126	0.125
Random intercept variance: Upper-level units	0.176	0.202	0.230	0.111
Residual variance	1.107	1.107	1.107	1.108

Table A.19 Party influence; expert-level estimation; multilevel random intercept regression coefficients; Additional consistency checks

Note: ${}^{*}p < 0.05$; ${}^{**}p < 0.01$; ${}^{***}p < 0.001$; Restricted maximum likelihood regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; p-values approximated with the Satterthwaite method; expert-level classification of country's level of party influence on media outlets.

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6		
Media outlet partisan favorability (0: economically left-wing; 10: economically right-wing)								
Partisan journal- ism (expert-level)	-0.032* (0.013)	-0.030* (0.013)	-0.032* (0.013)	-0.031* (0.013)	-0.031* (0.013)	-0.031* (0.013)		
Expert bias	0.197*** (0.034)	0.199*** (0.033)	0.198*** (0.033)	0.199*** (0.033)	0.199*** (0.033)	0.199*** (0.033)		
Public ownership		-1.130*** (0.213)	-1.111^{***} (0.213)	-1.113^{***} (0.213)	-1.112^{***} (0.213)	-1.143^{***} (0.214)		
Center of gravity		0.615* (0.228)	0.665** (0.229)	0.698** (0.224)	0.700** (0.231)	0.426 (0.240)		
GDP (log.)			-0.136 (0.098)	-0.201 (0.105)	-0.195 (0.129)	-0.208 (0.116)		
Unemployment			0.033 (0.028)	0.027 (0.028)	0.028 (0.029)	0.003 (0.028)		
Income inequality				0.065 (0.044)	0.065 (0.045)	-0.025 (0.057)		
Social expendi- ture					-0.003 (0.029)	-0.058 (0.036)		
Eastern Europe						-1.163* (0.524)		
Constant	5.925*** (0.166)	2.876* (1.193)	4.074* (1.891)	1.598 (2.491)	1.564 (2.577)	9.514* (4.260)		
Log Likelihood	-4489.946	-4452.448	-4454.684	-4455.815	-4458.442	-4455.922		
Observations	2674	2663	2663	2663	2663	2663		
Outlets	427	423	423	423	423	423		
Experts	231	231	231	231	231	231		
Upper-level units	25	25	25	25	25	25		
Random intercept variance: Outlets	1.861	1.745	1.747	1.747	1.747	1.747		
Random intercept variance: Experts	0.089	0.086	0.086	0.086	0.086	0.086		
Random intercept variance: Upper- level units	0.400	0.286	0.261	0.240	0.261	0.186		
Residual variance	1.105	1.103	1.103	1.103	1.103	1.102		

Table A.20 Partisan journalism; expert-level estimation; multilevel random intercept regression coefficients; Expert bias control

Note: ${}^{*}p < 0.05$; ${}^{**}p < 0.01$; ${}^{***}p < 0.001$; Restricted maximum likelihood regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; p-values approximated with the Satterthwaite method; expert-level classification of country's level of partisan journalism; Expert bias is average expert deviation from average outlet score of all experts.

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6		
Media out	Media outlet partisan favorability (0: economically left-wing; 10: economically right-wing)							
Party influence (expert-level)	-0.020 (0.015)	-0.019 (0.015)	-0.021 (0.015)	-0.022 (0.015)	-0.022 (0.015)	-0.021 (0.015)		
Expert bias	0.204*** (0.034)	0.205*** (0.034)	0.207*** (0.034)	0.207*** (0.034)	0.207*** (0.034)	0.206*** (0.034)		
Public ownership		-1.218*** (0.215)	-1.200*** (0.215)	-1.202*** (0.215)	-1.205*** (0.215)	-1.234*** (0.216)		
Center of gravity		0.626** (0.235)	0.670** (0.235)	0.702** (0.230)	0.700** (0.235)	0.443 (0.250)		
GDP (log.)			-0.156 (0.100)	-0.221 (0.108)	-0.240 (0.132)	-0.252 (0.121)		
Unemployment			0.032 (0.029)	0.027 (0.029)	0.026 (0.030)	0.002 (0.030)		
Income inequality				0.065 (0.045)	0.065 (0.046)	-0.020 (0.060)		
Social expendi- ture					0.008 (0.030)	-0.045 (0.038)		
Eastern Europe						-1.100 (0.545)		
Constant	5.854*** (0.173)	2.759* (1.232)	4.251* (1.937)	1.792 (2.550)	1.872 (2.629)	9.366* (4.414)		
Log Likelihood	-4215.281	-4175.816	-4177.814	-4178.975	-4181.546	-4179.332		
Observations	2511	2500	2500	2500	2500	2500		
Outlets	427	423	423	423	423	423		
Experts	214	214	214	214	214	214		
Upper-level units	25	25	25	25	25	25		
Random intercept variance: Outlets	1.892	1.755	1.758	1.758	1.758	1.758		
Random intercept variance: Experts	0.072	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068		
Random intercept variance: Upper- level units	0.434	0.317	0.282	0.261	0.280	0.215		
Residual variance	1.089	1.086	1.086	1.086	1.086	1.086		

Table A.21 Party influence; expert-level estimation; multilevel random intercept regression coefficients; Expert bias control

Note: ${}^{*}p < 0.05$; ${}^{**}p < 0.01$; ${}^{***}p < 0.001$; Restricted maximum likelihood regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; p-values approximated with the Satterthwaite method; expert-level classification of country's level of party influence on media outlets; Expert bias is average expert deviation from average outlet score of all experts.

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6			
Media outle	Media outlet partisan favorability (0: economically left-wing; 10: economically right-wing)								
Partisan journal- ism (expert-level)	-0.043** (0.015)	-0.040^{**} (0.015)	-0.042** (0.015)	-0.042** (0.015)	-0.041** (0.015)	-0.041^{**} (0.015)			
NYT Left-right	0.055* (0.022)	0.056* (0.021)	0.053* (0.022)	0.053* (0.022)	0.052* (0.022)	0.056* (0.022)			
Public ownership		-1.089*** (0.218)	-1.070^{***} (0.218)	-1.072*** (0.218)	-1.075^{***} (0.219)	-1.115*** (0.219)			
Center of gravity		0.566* (0.218)	0.609* (0.222)	0.636* (0.221)	0.634* (0.228)	0.283 (0.227)			
GDP (log.)			-0.130 (0.094)	-0.180 (0.103)	-0.189 (0.125)	-0.205 (0.106)			
Unemployment			0.027 (0.027)	0.022 (0.027)	0.022 (0.028)	-0.010 (0.026)			
Income inequality				0.050 (0.043)	0.050 (0.045)	-0.063 (0.055)			
Social expendi- ture					0.003 (0.029)	-0.061 (0.033)			
Eastern Europe						-1.420* (0.491)			
Constant	5.790*** (0.193)	2.969* (1.152)	4.197* (1.832)	2.290 (2.460)	2.342 (2.544)	12.212** (4.061)			
Log Likelihood	-4092.464	-4060.367	-4062.916	-4064.483	-4067.115	-4063.313			
Observations	2429	2419	2419	2419	2419	2419			
Outlets	415	411	411	411	411	411			
Experts	202	202	202	202	202	202			
Upper-level units	24	24	24	24	24	24			
Random intercept variance: Outlets	1.824	1.716	1.719	1.718	1.718	1.716			
Random intercept variance: Experts	0.125	0.125	0.124	0.124	0.124	0.125			
Random intercept variance: Upper- level units	0.322	0.232	0.216	0.209	0.228	0.119			
Residual variance	1.092	1.090	1.090	1.090	1.090	1.090			

Table A.22 Partisan journalism; expert-level estimation; multilevel random intercept regression coefficients; NYT Left-right control

Note: ${}^{*}p < 0.05$; ${}^{**}p < 0.01$; ${}^{***}p < 0.001$; Restricted maximum likelihood regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; p-values approximated with the Satterthwaite method; expert-level classification of country's level of partisan journalism; Expert bias is average expert deviation from average outlet score of all experts.

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Media outlet partisan favorability (0: economically left-wing; 10: economically right-wing)						
Party influence (expert-level)	-0.002 (0.018)	-0.001 (0.018)	-0.004 (0.018)	-0.004 (0.018)	-0.003 (0.018)	-0.002 (0.018)
NYT Left-right	0.051* (0.022)	0.051* (0.022)	0.048* (0.022)	0.048* (0.022)	0.048* (0.022)	0.051* (0.022)
Public ownership		-1.170^{***} (0.220)	-1.154^{***} (0.221)	-1.155*** (0.221)	-1.163*** (0.221)	-1.201*** (0.221)
Center of gravity		0.599* (0.226)	0.631* (0.231)	0.656* (0.231)	0.645* (0.234)	0.302 (0.238)
GDP (log.)			-0.143 (0.098)	-0.192 (0.107)	-0.235 (0.129)	-0.251* (0.111)
Unemployment			0.022 (0.028)	0.019 (0.028)	0.015 (0.029)	-0.016 (0.027)
Income inequality				0.048 (0.045)	0.048 (0.046)	-0.062 (0.057)
Social expenditure					0.018 (0.030)	-0.045 (0.035)
Eastern Europe						-1.385* (0.515)
Constant	5.589*** (0.200)	2.613* (1.191)	4.107* (1.900)	2.287 (2.555)	2.507 (2.613)	12.117* (4.246)
Log Likelihood	-3841.214	-3807.391	-3809.933	-3811.555	-3813.963	-3810.529
Observations	2278	2268	2268	2268	2268	2268
Outlets	415	411	411	411	411	411
Experts	186	186	186	186	186	186
Upper-level units	24	24	24	24	24	24
Random intercept variance: Outlets	1.862	1.736	1.740	1.739	1.739	1.738
Random intercept variance: Experts	0.112	0.111	0.110	0.110	0.110	0.111
Random intercept variance: Upper- level units	0.358	0.262	0.245	0.240	0.251	0.148
Residual variance	1.075	1.073	1.072	1.073	1.073	1.072

Table A.23 Party influence; expert-level estimation; multilevel random intercept regression coefficients; NYT Left-right control

Note: ${}^{*}p < 0.05$; ${}^{**}p < 0.01$; ${}^{***}p < 0.001$; Restricted maximum likelihood regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; p-values approximated with the Satterthwaite method; expert-level classification of country's level of party influence on media outlets; Expert bias is average expert deviation from average outlet score of all experts.

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Media outlet partisan favorability (0: economically left-wing; 10: economically right-wing)					
Partisan journalists	-0.281*	-0.433**			
(country-level)	(0.109)	(0.131)			
Party influence			-0.078	-0.224	
(country-level)			(0.121)	(0.170)	
Party influence					-0.235
(country-level, weighted)					(0.129)
Public ownership	-1.176***	-1.389***	-1.173***	-1.387***	-1.384***
	(0.211)	(0.220)	(0.211)	(0.220)	(0.220)
Center of gravity	0.285	-0.041	0.402	0.417	0.311
	(0.214)	(0.281)	(0.242)	(0.303)	(0.300)
	0.1.51	`	0.015	0.100	0.10
GDP (log.)	-0.151	0.087	-0.217	-0.128	-0.136
	(0.104)	(0.149)	(0.116)	(0.164)	(0.150)
Unemployment	0.041	0.060*	0.010	0.042	0.050
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.040)
Income inequality	-0.040	-0.098	-0.016	0.005	-0.008
1 5	(0.050)	(0.057)	(0.061)	(0.079)	(0.069)
Social expenditure	-0.074*	-0.077*	-0.063	-0.056	-0.046
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.037)
	(****=)	((0.000)	(0.007)	(0.0007)
Eastern Europe	-0.943	-1.076	-1.147*	-0.801	-0.768
	(0.472)	(0.524)	(0.539)	(0.751)	(0.689)
Constant	11.635**	13.725**	9.552*	7.418	8.362
	(3.754)	(4.007)	(4.228)	(5.206)	(4.720)
Log Likelihood	-4836.297	-4354.977	-4839.007	-4358.253	-4357.801
Observations	2871	2609	2871	2609	2609
Outlets	424	341	424	341	341
Experts	255	224	255	224	224
Upper-level units	25	20	25	20	20
Random intercept variance: Outlets	1.708	1.655	1.712	1.657	1.657
Random intercept variance: Experts	0.146	0.147	0.146	0.147	0.147
Random intercept variance: Upper- level units	0.100	0.064	0.177	0.188	0.158
Residual variance	1.138	1.129	1.138	1.129	1.129

Table A.24 Economic left-right media bias and political parallelism; country-level estimation based on Table 2, M2 and M4; multilevel random intercept regression coefficients

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; Restricted maximum likelihood regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; p-values approximated with the Satterthwaite method country-level political parallelism scores are averages of all mean expert scores of each media outlet; to avoid an excessive influence of small outlets for "party influence", which is measured on expert-outlet level ("partisan journalists" is measured on the expert level exclusivel), we apply media usage rates from Reuters (2017). For "partisan journalists" and "party influence", the second column respectively uses the smaller sample with the identical variable to ascertain whether the changing estimate of weighted party influence is driven by the sample reduction or the weight itself. Figure A.4 illustrates the estimated effect. Upper-level units include 23 countries, plus the two Belgian regions of Flanders and Wallonia.

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Media outlet partisan favorability (0: economically left-wing; 10: economically right-wing)						
Ownership con- centration	0.018* (0.008)	0.016* (0.007)	0.025** (0.007)	0.026** (0.008)	0.026** (0.008)	0.022* (0.008)
Partisan Journal-	-0.050***	-0.047**	-0.050***	-0.050***	-0.050***	-0.050***
ists (expert-level)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Public ownership		-1.173*** (0.210)	-1.151^{***} (0.209)	-1.151*** (0.209)	-1.149*** (0.210)	-1.183*** (0.211)
Center of gravity		0.487* (0.205)	0.584* (0.169)	0.580** (0.176)	0.581* (0.181)	0.381 (0.192)
GDP (log.)			-0.052 (0.076)	-0.045 (0.095)	-0.041 (0.112)	-0.077 (0.105)
Unemployment			0.079** (0.024)	0.081** (0.027)	0.081* (0.028)	0.052 (0.029)
Income inequality				-0.006 (0.039)	-0.006 (0.041)	-0.065 (0.047)
Social expendi- ture					-0.002 (0.023)	-0.045 (0.030)
Eastern Europe						-0.906 (0.442)
Constant	4.760*** (0.591)	2.532 (1.091)	1.311 (1.635)	1.464 (1.965)	1.447 (2.033)	7.781* (3.615)
Log Likelihood	-4864.217	-4822.087	-4821.111	-4823.426	-4826.294	-4824.215
Observations	2873	2860	2860	2860	2860	2860
Outlets	429	424	424	424	424	424
Experts	253	253	252	252	253	253
Upper-level units	25	25	25	25	2	25
Random intercept variance: Outlets	1.833	1.709	1.709	1.709	1.709	1.709
Random intercept variance: Experts	0.138	0.137	0.137	0.137	0.137	0.137
Random intercept variance: Upper- level units	0.285	0.190	0.079	0.091	0.104	0.068
Residual variance	1.146	1.143	1.143	1.143	1.143	1.143

Table A.25 Economic left-right media bias, media ownership concentration, and political parallelism (partisan journalists); multilevel random intercept regression coefficients

Note: ${}^{*}p < 0.05$; ${}^{**}p < 0.01$; ${}^{***}p < 0.001$; Restricted maximum likelihood regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; p-values approximated with the Satterthwaite method; expert-level classification of country's level of partisan journalists.

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Media outlet partisan favorability (0: economically left-wing; 10: economically right-wing)						
Ownership con- centration	0.020* (0.008)	0.018* (0.007)	0.028** (0.007)	0.028** (0.009)	0.029** (0.009)	0.024* (0.009)
Party influence	-0.000	0.002	-0.003	-0.003	-0.002	-0.001
(expert-level)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Public ownership		-1.247*** (0.213)	-1.228*** (0.212)	-1.228*** (0.213)	-1.234*** (0.213)	-1.263*** (0.214)
Center of gravity		0.505* (0.215)	0.597** (0.183)	0.593** (0.190)	0.589** (0.194)	0.400 (0.210)
GDP (log.)		· · ·	-0.058 (0.083)	-0.046 (0.103)	-0.073 (0.120)	-0.107 (0.114)
Unemployment			0.079** (0.026)	0.082* (0.029)	0.080* (0.030)	0.053 (0.032)
Income inequality				-0.009 (0.043)	-0.009 (0.043)	-0.064 (0.051)
Social expendi- ture					0.011 (0.025)	-0.028 (0.032)
Eastern Europe						-0.842 (0.479)
Constant	4.311*** (0.610)	1.990 (1.145)	0.879 (1.770)	1.096 (2.116)	1.216 (2.169)	7.102 (3.907)
Log Likelihood	-4289.119	-4350.107	-4349.601	-4351.830	-4354.512	-4352.860
Observations	2596	2585	2585	2585	2585	585
Outlets	427	424	424	424	424	424
Experts	224	224	224	224	224	224
Upper-level units	25	25	25	25	2	25
Random intercept variance: Outlets	1.856	1.718	1.719	1.719	1.719	1.719
Random intercept variance: Experts	0.128	0.125	0.125	0.125	0.125	0.126
Random intercept variance: Upper- level units	0.311	0.222	0.115	0.129	0.138	0.103
Residual variance	1.110	1.108	1.107	1.107	1.107	1.107

Table A.26 Economic left-right media bias, media ownership concentration, and political parallelism (party influence); multilevel random intercept regression coefficients

Note: ${}^{*}p < 0.05$; ${}^{**}p < 0.01$; ${}^{***}p < 0.001$; Restricted maximum likelihood regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; p-values approximated with the Satterthwaite method; expert-level classification of country's level of party influence on media outlets.

Excluded country	Partisan journalists	Party influence
Austria	$-0.050^{***}(0.015)$	-0.001 (0.017)
Belgium Dutch	-0.052*** (0.015)	-0.004 (0.017)
Belgium French	$-0.050^{***}(0.014)$	-0.002 (0.017)
Bulgaria	-0.049^{***} (0.015)	-0.002 (0.017)
Croatia	$-0.054^{***}(0.015)$	-0.002 (0.017)
Cyprus	$-0.050^{***}(0.015)$	-0.003 (0.017)
Czech Republic	-0.048^{**} (0.015)	0.003 (0.017)
Denmark	$-0.056^{***}(0.015)$	-0.006 (0.017)
Estonia	-0.048** (0.015)	-0.000 (0.017)
Finland	-0.047 ** (0.014)	-0.008 (0.017)
France	$-0.051^{***}(0.015)$	-0.002 (0.017)
Germany	-0.050** (0.015)	-0.004 (0.018)
Greece	$-0.050^{***}(0.014)$	-0.008 (0.017)
Hungary	$-0.058^{***}(0.016)$	-0.001 (0.018)
Ireland	-0.053*** (0.015)	-0.003 (0.017)
Italy	-0.054^{***} (0.015)	-0.003 (0.018)
Latvia	$-0.051^{***}(0.051)$	-0.002 (0.017)
Lithuania	$-0.049^{***}(0.014)$	-0.004 (0.017)
Netherlands	-0.048^{***} (0.014)	0.006 (0.016)
Poland	$-0.050^{***}(0.015)$	-0.002 (0.017)
Portugal	-0.043** (0.015)	-0.011 (0.016)
Slovakia	$-0.051^{***}(0.015)$	-0.001 (0.017)
Spain	$-0.050^{***}(0.015)$	-0.002 (0.018)
Sweden	-0.045** (0.015)	0.011 (0.017)
United Kingdom	-0.049** (0.015)	-0.006 (0.017)

Table A.27 Jackknife-Tests; coefficients of political parallelism (expert-level) based on baseline Model 2 & 4 in Table 2

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001



Figure A.1 Expert assignments of parties to media outlets; Germany

Note: The vertical axis displays the economic left-right score from CHES; the bars represent mean +/- one standard deviation; the dots may include assignment for a given party by multiple experts; Greens and Social Democrats overlap because their economic left-right position is identical (3.5).

Figure A.2 Predicted values of differenced economic left-right position from M6 of Tables A.4 and A.5.



Note: Horizontal dashed line indicates perfect alignment with partisan center of gravity. Darker blue lines represent confidence bands adjusted with Satterthwaite correction; 95% confidence interval.

Figure A.3 Predicted economic left-right position and political parallelism



Note: Effect of political parallelism (expert-level) on economic left-right position of media outlets in 23 European countries. Predictions and 95% confidence bands based on Models 2 and 4 in Table 2.

Figure A.4 Predicted economic left-right position and political parallelism (country-level)



Note: Effect of political parallelism (country-level) on economic left-right position of media outlets. 'Weights' refers to usage-weighted average of country-level parallelism score. Weights are derived from Reuters (2017). Predictions based on Table A.25 with 95% confidence bands adjusted with Satterthwaite approximation.

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