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This is	s the accep	ted manus	script o	f the f	ollowing	g artic	le: Cursed	by no	coast:	How regional	land	dlockedness	affe	cts income
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*Highlights (for review)

Cursed by no coast.

How regional landlockedness affects income within countries

March 27, 2019

Highlights:

- We employ subnational data to test the effect of landlockedness on income levels
- Our data spans 1,527 regions in 83 countries from 1950-2014
- Being landlocked costs $\sim 10~13\%$ in GDP/capita, on average
- Coastal distance ...atters but not length of coastline
- Effect stren , then s , hen countries trade more and shift to manufacturing
- Infrastr.cure aneviates the effect; political institutions play no role

Cursed by no coast.

How regional landlockedness affects income within countries*

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April 24, 2017

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We analyze whether landlocked regions are systematically poorer, using panel data for 1,527 regions in 83 nations from 1,50-2014 and exploiting *within-country-time* variation. Lacking ocean access decreased regional GDP/capita by \approx 13%. Specifically, coastal *distance* matters but not the renoth of coastline. Exploring moderators, national political institutions appear irrelevent while increasing international trade and manufacturing intensifies the landlockednest or regions in the same country and year. However, transport-related infrastructure may be oble to alleviate these disadvantages.

JEL codes: F² 3, H54 O18, O40, R12

Keyword . land ockedness; geography; GDP/capita; trade openness; infrastructure

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1 Introduction

Country-level studies on the link between landlockedness and i nor a generally suggest negative relationships (see UN-OHRLLS, 2016, for an overview) Howe er, cross-country analyses cannot eliminate the influence of unobservable country-spec. Fic characteristics (e.g., cultural attitudes, historical events, or national policies). Studying *sub-uar onal* data permits researchers to fix such shortcomings: if landlockedness indeed mattered landlocked regions within a country should systematically exhibit lower income levels

While the obstacles landlocked *nations* face (e.g., auministrative procedures related to bordercrossing) should be less relevant for landlocked *maions*, ocean access at the regional level can matter for various reasons. For example, when transport costs and dependance on national infrastructure quality can prevent landlocked regions from realizing gains from trade and specialization (Gallup et al., 1999; Faye et al., 2004). Moreover, cultural differences and subnational institutions within a country may affect the within-country distribution of income. Henderson et al. (2017) document 50% aig! er right-time light intensity in coastal grid-cells and Mitton (2016) studies a cross-sec (on of subnational regions, suggesting a positive effect of ocean access on GDP/capita.

We aim to enrich the existing knowledge in two ways. First, analyzing *panel* data on the subnational level releases the landlockedness-income relationship from country-time-specific unobservables, i.e., anything that is unique for a specific nation *and* time period (e.g., Indonesia in 2010). Thus, notional culture, history, policies, and any other nation-wide shocks are accounted for via country-time-fixed effects. Second, we explore national political institutions, trade, trade, trade, trade, trade, the specific distributions, and infrastructure as potential moderators.

2 Data and Methodology

2.1 Data

Gennaioli et al. (2014) access national statistics to provide data of GDP/capita and other variables at the subnational level for a panel of up to $1,527 r_{.gions}$ in 83 nations. We take five-year averages of all variables, producing 13 time periods from 19′,0-1954 to 2010-2014. Regions on all continents are included (see Figure 1 and Table A.), although Africa remains underrepresented.



Figure 1: Data coverage.

We create three geographical variables: a binary indicator for landlockedness, coastal distance, an' length of coastline. Our analysis controls for a comprehensive list of regional-level covariates that may independently affect GDP/capita: latitude, malaria ecology, population density, average educational attainment, oil and gas production, and a binary indicator for national capitals (see Table A2). Intuition and references for these covariates are explained in the Appendix.

2.2 Methodology

We employ a linear regression approach to predict the bgar in of GDP/capita, as is common in the cross-country literature. Income in region r of country i in five-year time period t is estimated via

$$ln(GDP/cap)_{rit} = \beta \left(Landlocke^{-J} \right)_{ri} + X_{rit}\gamma + \delta_{it} + \epsilon_{rit}, \tag{1}$$

where $(Landlocked)_{ri}$ constitutes a binary indicator for landlocked regions and X_{rit} represents the vector of control variables introduced above. δ_{it} captures country-time-fixed effects, i.e. controls for any country-specific inodegrables that do not change over time (e.g., Indonesian history or cultural traits), contempore v global phenomena (e.g., the Global Financial Crisis), as well as everything unique in a given country and time period (e.g., Indonesian national policies in 2010-2014). ϵ_{rit} constitutes the conventional error term and standard errors are clustered at the regional level through ut our analysis.

3 Empirical Findings

3.1 Mr. in Results

Table Licplays our main results. The univariate regression in column (1) produces a 30% gap between 1. ndlocked and coastal regions. Adding country- and time-fixed effects in column (2) decreases the gap to 19%. Column (3) includes the full set of covariates and country-time-fixed effects, leaving the coefficient associated with landlockedness statistically significant at the 1%

level.¹ This result remains robust when (i) accounting for the number of neighboring states (since international borders may affect economic and political characteristics of a region) and (ii) studying continent- or time-specific subsamples (see Table A) and A4). Further, omitted variables are unlikely to play a fundamental role when exploring selection on unobservables (see Table A6, following Oster, 2016).

Dependent variable: Ln(regional GDP/carita)								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)				
Landlocked	0.30↓ *** (1.∪≦?.)	-0.193*** (0.027)	-0.126*** (0.019)					
Ln(1+coastal distance)				-0.027*** (0.004)				
Length of coastline				0.000 (0.001)				
Country- & time-fir ed e ifec s		yes	yes	yes				
Control variables &			yes	yes				
N	9,472	9,472	7,494	7,494				

Table 1: The effect of regional landlockedness on regional GDP/capita.

The respective magnitude reduces to 12.6% which is somewhat lower than suggested by parts of the cross-country literature that often finds magnitudes around 20%. Since several obstacles and locked *nations* face, such as the dependence on transit neighboring countries, are less relevant for landlocked *regions*, our results may signal a lower-bound estimate of the adverse impacts of national landlockedness.

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the regional level are displayed in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. ^aIncludes is given all initiate, malaria ecology, Ln(oil & gas production), a binary variable indicating whether the nation is capital is in the region, regional years of education, and Ln(regional population density).

¹The sample in specifications (3) and (4) is reduced as not all control variables are available for all regions.

In column (4), we use more refined measures of landlockedness: the log of coastal distance and the log length of the coastline.² The results show that distance with extent of a region's coast. In terms of magnitude, a one of indard deviation increase in coastal distance would be associated with a decrease in GDI /capit. by $\approx 8.7\%$ (-0.027×3.23). This leads us to an exploration of potential moderators of the landlockedness-income link.

3.2 Moderating Factors

Table 2 introduces interaction terms between landlook dness measured as log coastal distance and several national characteristics. We study political institutions, international trade, the sectoral distribution of a nation's economy, and in astructure.

As institutional variables, we employ (i), the *polity*2 variable, measuring democracy, (ii) government size, (iii) government effectiveness, and (iv) a binary indicator for federal nations. All of these characteristic may, in theory, be able to mitigate the detrimental effects of landlockedness. Although the baseline effect of coastal distance remains consistently negative and statistically significant in columns (1)-(4), we find no evidence for moderating effects of political institutions.

As approximately 90[°] of the global trade volume is carried by sea (see IMO, 2017), landlocked economies may find it difficult to realize gains from trade. The results in column (5) show that distance to use sea becomes more detrimental as international trade expands. Distinguishing between explores and imports produces consistent results (see Table A5).

Further, the vectoral distribution of production may matter (see Henderson et al., 2017). For example, in largely agricultural nations, a landlocked region may not be as disadvantaged, whereas it manufacturing gains importance regional development patterns might change, highlighting the importance of ocean access because of transportation. For example, Gallup et al.

²Coastal distance is measured as the shortest geodesic distance from a region's border to any coastline.

Table 2: Exploring modernet ors.

Dependent variable: Ln(regional GDP/capita)	(1)	(2)	2)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Ln(1+coastal distance)	-0.033*** (0.012)	-0.044 * (0.012)	-0.031*** (0.005)	-0.030*** (0.006)	-0.010 (0.006)	0.015 (0.015)	-0.038*** (0.007)
$Ln(1+coastal distance) \times Polity IV$	0.000 (0.001)						
$Ln(1+coastal \ distance) \times Government$ size		ົ 001 ທີ.0ບ.)					
$Ln(1+coastal \ distance) \times Government$ effectiveness			0.001 (0.005)				
$Ln(1+coastal distance) \times Federalism$				0.004 (0.007)			
$Ln(1+coastal distance) \times Trade openness$					-0.039*** (0.012)		
$Ln(1+coastal distance) \times \frac{manufacturi}{GDP} \stackrel{j}{=}$						-0.265*** (0.079)	
Ln(1+coastal distance) $\times \frac{agricultu}{GDP} \stackrel{2}{=}$						0.065* (0.035)	
Ln(1+coastal distance) $\times \frac{rail line km}{l_{\mu}}$							0.399** (0.185)
Respective additional variable , country-time-fixed effects x control variables ^b	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	7,252	7,106	3,817	7,400	7,177	5,364	5,335

Notes: Standard et ors clust red at the regional level are displayed in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. ^aIndicates whether the rest ective a⁴ditional variable is included individually. ^bIncludes the same control variables as Table 1.

(1999) emphasize the role of transport costs for intermediate inputs a_1 , $4 r_2$ -exports in the manufacturing sector. Interaction terms between landlockedness and n_2 to n_1 , there is of production in agriculture and manufacturing (with services providing the renew ce point) support that idea: As manufacturing rises, regions further away from the coast end to fall behind.

How could these detrimental effects of landlockedne r_{s} be imagated? In column (7), we explore transport-related infrastructure via rail lines measured in $\frac{km}{km^2}$ (data available from 1980-2014), which may facilitate transport to and from lendlock d regions (e.g., see Limao and Venables, 2001). The respective results imply that ran connections alleviate the disadvantage of coastal distance in the same nation and time peric.⁴ Assuming no rail lines whatsoever, a one standard deviation increase in rail lines (equage.ent to 0.025; see Table A2) would reduce the effects of coastal distance from 3.8% to 2.3% of GDP/capita. Results from exploring the *logistics performance index*, measuring the guality of trade- and transport-related infrastructure (taken from World Bank Group, 2017), also suggest an alleviating role of infrastructure (see Table A5).

Figure 2 visualizes the station cally powerful effects implied by the interaction terms of trade openness, manufacturing, and the two infrastructure measures on income levels. Improving national transport infrastructure by one standard deviation compensates between 70-100% of the effects from a one standard deviation increase in trade openness or the share of manufacturing in production.

4 Conclusion

This par er aims to enrich our understanding of whether and how landlockedness can explain differences in income levels.

First, employing panel data for 1,527 subnational regions in 83 nations from 1950-2014 allows us to control for country-time-fixed effects. Thereby, we account for everything that



Figure 2: Implied effects of interaction. with coastal distance on GDP/capita, assuming a one standard deviation increase of the respective variable.

is unique to a specific nation and time period. It is important to remember that certain unobservable differences between legit ns (e.g., regional culture or regional policies) still remain unaccounted for, although the are able to control for regional measures of geography, malaria ecology, population dons y, average educational attainment levels, oil and gas production, as well as regions featuring the nation's capital. We find landlocked regions to be approximately 13% poorer than control table gins in the same nation and time period. Especially coastal distance matters but not the length of a coastline.

Second, we explore potential moderators. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, national political institutions do not seem to matter. Coastal distance becomes more disadvantageous as a nation trades nor with the rest of the world and expands its manufacturing sector. Finally, transport-related infrastructure seem to moderate the detrimental income effects of landlockedness.

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