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Working Paper

Do countries default in bad times? The role of alternative detrending techniques

Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Working Paper, No.
HEIDWP06-2022

Provided in Cooperation with:

International Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies

Suggested Citation: Panizza, Ugo (2022) : Do countries default in bad times? The role of alternative detrending techniques, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Working Paper, No. HEIDWP06-2022, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva

This Version is available at:

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**Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
International Economics Department
Working Paper Series**

Working Paper No. HEIDWP06-2022

**Do Countries Default in Bad Times?
The Role of Alternative Detrending Techniques**

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April 2022

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April 10, 2022

Abstract

Quantitative models of sovereign debt predict that countries should default during deep recessions. However, empirical research on sovereign debt has found a surprisingly large share of “good times” defaults (i.e., defaults that happen when GDP is above trend). Existing evidence also indicates that, on average, defaults happen when output is close to potential. This paper reassesses the empirical evidence and shows that the detrending technique proposed by [Hamilton \(2018\)](#) yields results that are closer to the predictions of standard quantitative models of sovereign debt.

JEL Codes: F34; F32; H63

Keywords: Sovereign Debt; Default, Business Cycles

1 Introduction

According to economic theory, sovereign defaults should happen during deep recessions. However, several authors found that nearly 40% of default episodes happen when output is above trend and that, at the beginning of the average default episode, the output gap is nearly five times smaller than what is predicted by standard quantitative models of sovereign debt (for surveys, see [Tomz and Wright, 2013](#), [Aguiar and Amador, 2021](#), [Aguiar and Amador, 2014](#), and [Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe, 2017](#)). This is a major puzzle in the sovereign default literature.

This note aims at reconciling the data with theory by showing that alternative detrending techniques yield results which are closer to the predictions of baseline models of sovereign debt. Using the detrending technique suggested by [Hamilton \(2018\)](#), I find that only 20% of defaults happen in good times and that the output gap at the beginning of the average default episode is close to the output gap predicted by the quantitative model of [Tomz and Wright \(2007\)](#).

This note builds on two strands of literature. The first strand relates to the effects of alternative methods for separating the cyclical component of a time series from its underlying trend. A commonly used detrending technique in macroeconomics is the filter originally proposed by [Hodrick and Prescott \(1997\)](#) (hereafter HP).¹ The HP filter has been the object of several types of criticisms. Two well-known issues are the “end-point bias” (i.e., the fact that the last observation has a large impact on the behavior of the trend at the end of the series) and the fact that the filter artificially predicts the future because it includes future realizations. While these issues can be addressed with appropriate techniques (see, among others, [Bruchez, 2003](#), and [Wolf, Mokinski, and Schüller, 2020](#)), several authors show that the HP filter can misrepresent the underlying data. For instance, [King and Rebelo \(1993\)](#) suggest that the conditions under which the HP filter is an optimal filter are “unlikely to be even approximately true in practice” (p. 230). [Cogley and Nason \(1995\)](#) and [Harvey and Jaeger \(1993\)](#) add that, when applied to persistent series, the HP filter can generate business cycle fluctuations even when such fluctuations do not exist in the underlying data. Furthermore, the patterns revealed by the filtered data are often an artifice of the filter itself. [Phillips and Jin \(2021\)](#) also show that, contrary to what is normally assumed in macroeconomics, the HP filter does not typically make a non-stationary series stationary. The same authors conclude that the HP filter can be a useful instrument but that it needs to be used with care and with priors that incorporate economic assumptions about the underlying process.

[Hamilton \(2018\)](#) organizes and expands these various concerns and proposes an alternative detrending technique which uses the two-year-ahead OLS forecast based on the last 4 observa-

¹While the paper that describes the HP filter was published in 1997, the filter has been commonly used in macroeconomics since 1981 when Hodrick and Prescott first circulated their paper. Earlier versions of the filter were developed by [Bohlmann \(1899\)](#), [Whittaker \(1923\)](#), and [Henderson \(1924\)](#).

tions. He shows that this method is superior to the HP filter and, in an article provocatively entitled “Why You Should Never Use the Hodrick-Prescott Filter,” concludes that the HP filter:

...introduces spurious dynamic relations that are purely an artifact of the filter and have no basis in the true data-generating process, and there exists no plausible data-generating process for which common popular practice would provide an optimal decomposition into trend and cycle. ([Hamilton, 2018](#), p. 839)

The HP filter has its defenders. [Drehmann and Yetman \(2018\)](#) suggest that the filter can be useful for estimating credit gaps, and [Phillips and Shi \(2021\)](#) show that it is possible to use machine-learning to build a “boosted” version of the HP filter that can address Hamilton’s criticisms.

This note is also related to the literature on the timing of sovereign default. This literature builds on [Eaton and Gersovitz’s \(1981\)](#) seminal paper and starts from the assumption that sovereign immunity prevents private creditors from legally enforcing sovereign debt contracts.² Given that sovereign debtors cannot be forced to repay, they will repay only if they perceive non-payment as the more costly alternative. Hence, it is the cost of default that makes sovereign debt possible.

In the presence of state-contingent debt (for instance, a GDP-indexed bond that stipulates that the country only makes payments when GDP growth is above a certain threshold), countries would be tempted to default in “good times” (because no payments are required in bad times). Knowing this, risk-neutral lenders will only lend up to the point in which the cost of default is equal to the maximum possible payment; therefore, the borrowing sovereign will always prefer to honor its debts. This situation leads to an equilibrium in which countries never default.

Things are different under the more realistic assumption of non-state contingent debt contracts. In this case, the borrower needs to pay principal and pre-determined interest at the end of each period (most models assume one-period debt), independently of the state of the economy. With concave preferences, the cost of paying (in terms of foregone consumption) will be higher in bad times, leading to a situation in which countries are more likely to default during deep recessions ([Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe, 2017](#)). Using a standard quantitative model with persistent income shocks, [Tomz and Wright \(2007\)](#) find that 86% of defaults should happen when output is below trend and that, in the first year of default, output should be 7.4% below trend, on average.³

²For a critical evaluation of this assumption, see [Gelpern and Panizza \(2022\)](#).

³A quantitative model with transitory shocks finds that 100% of defaults should happen in bad times and that the average output gap in the first year of default should be -42%.

These predictions are consistent with [Levy Yeyati and Panizza’s \(2011\)](#) finding that defaults tend to coincide with the trough of the business cycle. However, they are not in line with several papers that show that about 40% of defaults happen when output is above trend and that, on average, in the first year of default output is only 1-2% below trend ([Aguilar and Amador, 2021](#), [Aguilar and Amador, 2014](#), [Tomz and Wright, 2013](#), and [Mitchener and Trebesch, 2021](#)).⁴ I show that alternative trending techniques yield patterns which are closer to the predictions of quantitative models of sovereign debt.⁵

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 uses the case of Argentina to illustrate the pitfalls of using the HP filter to study whether countries default in bad times. Section 3 moves beyond anecdotal evidence and uses data for all default episodes over the period 1975-2020 to show that alternative detrending techniques can help in reconciling theory with the data. Section 4 concludes.

2 An Example

Over the past 40 years, Argentina had 3 default spells which, overall, lasted for 15 years (1982-93, 2001-05, and 2019-2020).

Figure 1 plots the evolution (in logs) of real local currency GDP (the solid line), trend GDP obtained with the HP filter (I follow [Ravn and Uhlig, 2002](#), and set $\lambda=6.25$; the filter is built using data for the period 1970-2020), and three vertical lines that mark the beginning of Argentina’s three default episodes. The data show that defaults always happened when real GDP growth was negative (-1% in 1982, -5% in 2001, and -2% in 2019) and at least two percentage points below average real growth which, over 1970-2020, was about 1.8%.⁶

The fact that the three Argentinean defaults happened when GDP growth was both negative and below average suggests that they did not happen in good times. However, the output gap computed with the HP filter is positive for both the 2001 (0.2%) and the 2019 (2.6%) defaults. Thus, Figure 1 illustrates that the finding that output gaps which tend to be small (or even positive) at the time of default could be an artefact of the HP filter.

While Figure 1 follows [Ravn and Uhlig \(2002\)](#) and sets $\lambda=6.25$, [Tomz and Wright \(2007\)](#) follow [Cooley and Ohanian \(1991\)](#) and set $\lambda=400$, but also experiment with $\lambda=6.25$ and $\lambda=100$ ([Backus and Kehoe, 1992](#)). If I set $\lambda=400$, I find that in all 3 Argentinean defaults output is below trend, but the output gaps remain small (-1.5% in 1982 and -1% in 2019). With the detrending technique suggested by [Hamilton \(2018\)](#), instead, I find large output gaps that range between -5% and -10%.


⁴There is also evidence that emerging market countries with higher income per capita are relatively more likely to default in good times ([Durdu, Nunes, and Sapriza, 2013](#)).

⁵I abstract from the issue that, in emerging markets, the idea of separating cycle and trend may not make sense to start with ([Aguilar and Gopinath, 2006](#)).

⁶Growth was also negative in the years prior to the defaults: -5% in 1981, -1% in 2000, and -2.5% in 2018.

Figure 1: Actual and Trend Real GDP in Argentina (1975-2020)

This figure shows the behavior of log real local currency GDP (the solid black line) together with the Hodrick Prescott trend (the dashed black line) computed setting $\lambda=6.25$ and using data for the period 1970-2020. The vertical lines mark the beginning of Argentina’s three default spells (1982, 2001, and 2019).



Although the choice of the smoothing parameter matters ([Phillips and Jin, 2021](#) show that this choice should depend on both the frequency of the data *and* sample size), [Tomz and Wright \(2007\)](#) show that their results are robust to alternative smoothing parameters.

3 Evidence from Four Decades of Defaults

Figure 1 is a striking illustration of possible problems related to using the HP filter to determine whether countries default in bad times. However, with 3 default episodes in less than 40 years, Argentina is far from being representative of the sample of defaulters. In this section, I move beyond anecdotal evidence and show that we can find similar patterns when we study all default episodes that took place between 1975 and 2020.

In order to build my sample of defaults, I start with the updated version of the dataset originally assembled by [Asonuma and Trebesch \(2016\)](#). While the dataset includes 196 default episodes, many of these episodes are just the continuation of a previous default event. For

instance, [Asonuma and Trebesch \(2016\)](#) list 6 consecutive default episodes for Brazil over 1982-1994.

Rather than considering consecutive defaults as separate events, I follow [Reinhart and Rogoff \(2009\)](#) and [Reinhart and Trebesch \(2016\)](#) and group the 196 default episodes into 95 default spells. I then focus on the first year of each spell. For 16 of these spells, I do not have enough data to compute trend GDP. Thus, my final sample consists of 79 default episodes and 60 countries (Table 1).⁷ The sample includes 2 countries with 4 default spells (Belize and Ecuador; note that Belize defaulted again in 2021, but this default is not in my sample), one country with 3 default spells (Argentina), 11 countries with 2 default spells, and 46 countries with one default spell. My sample is shorter but includes more recent data than the sample of [Tomz and Wright \(2007\)](#) and [Benjamin and Wright \(2013\)](#) who use data for 169 default spells over 1820-2004.

I use real GDP data for 1970-2020 to compute trend GDP and output gaps with the HP filter (with $\lambda = 6.25$ and $\lambda = 400$), the detrending technique suggested by [Hamilton \(2018\)](#), and a log-linear trend.⁸ I also compare GDP growth in the first year of the default episode with country-specific average GDP growth over 1970-2020. Table 1 reports the output gaps computed with the HP filter and the Hamilton detrending technique for all the episodes included in my sample. Table 2 summarizes the data.

Although my sample is smaller than that used in previous work, when I use the HP filter I can replicate the standard results that a relatively large share of defaults happen in good times and that the average output gap at the time of default tends to be small. Specifically, using 6.25 as smoothing parameter, I find that 35% of default episodes happen during good times and that the average output gap in the first year of a default spell is close to -1% (the median value is -0.07%, column 1 of Table 2). Setting $\lambda = 400$, I find that 44% of defaults happen when output is above trend and that the average output gap at the beginning of the default spell is -1.2% (the median value is -0.9%, column 2 of Table 2).

Things change dramatically when I compute trend growth with the two-year-ahead OLS forecast suggested by [Hamilton \(2018\)](#). Column 3 of Table 2 shows that the share of good-times defaults drops to 19% and the average output gap in the first year of default is now close to -7% (the median is -5.4%). These values are much closer to the theoretical predictions of a standard quantitative sovereign debt model (14% of good-times default and an average output gap of -7.4%; see last column of Table 2).

⁷I source data on real local currency GDP from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI). Given that WDI data end in 2018, I update the series to 2020 using data from the World Economic Outlook database maintained by the International Monetary Fund. The default spells for which I cannot compute trend GDP are: Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1992; Croatia, 1991; Guinea, 1985; Liberia, 1980; Macedonia 1992; Poland, 1981; Romania, 1981; Russia, 1991; Sudan, 1975; Serbia, 1992; Sao Tome and Principe 1984; Tanzania, 1981; Uganda, 1981; Vietnam 1982; Yemen 1983; and Yugoslavia, 1983.

⁸The panel is unbalanced because not all countries have GDP data going back to 1970. In fact, some countries included in the sample achieved independence after 1970.

Table 1: Default Episodes and Output Gaps

This table lists all the default episodes studied in the paper, together with their relative output gaps computed using the HP filter with $\lambda=6.25$ and $\lambda=400$ and the detrending technique suggested by [Hamilton \(2018\)](#).

| Country | Year | Ham. | HP ($\lambda=6.25$) | HP ($\lambda=400$) | Country | Year | Ham. | HP ($\lambda=6.25$) | HP ($\lambda=400$) |
|---------|------|-------|--------------------------|-------------------------|---------|------|-------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| ALB | 1991 | -49.5 | -13.1 | -21.4 | KEN | 1992 | -7.3 | -1.1 | 0.8 |
| ARG | 1982 | -10.6 | -3.0 | -1.5 | KNA | 2011 | -4.2 | -1.0 | -3.1 |
| ARG | 2001 | -7.3 | 0.2 | -5.8 | MAR | 1983 | -0.7 | -2.0 | -4.4 |
| ARG | 2019 | -5.1 | 2.6 | -1.0 | MDA | 2002 | 6.0 | 0.5 | -5.4 |
| BGR | 1990 | -22.6 | 1.0 | 8.0 | MDG | 1981 | -9.2 | -2.5 | -2.5 |
| BLZ | 2006 | 1.3 | 0.9 | 3.9 | MEX | 1982 | -1.1 | 2.2 | 9.2 |
| BLZ | 2012 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.6 | MNG | 2017 | -0.4 | -2.0 | 0.9 |
| BLZ | 2016 | -1.2 | -0.7 | 2.3 | MOZ | 1983 | -33.6 | -3.9 | -4.8 |
| BLZ | 2020 | -22.7 | -9.3 | -15.3 | MOZ | 2015 | 2.3 | 1.3 | 5.2 |
| BOL | 1980 | -5.8 | 0.0 | 7.1 | MRT | 1992 | -2.2 | -1.4 | -1.7 |
| BRA | 1982 | -14.4 | -0.7 | -0.8 | MWI | 1982 | -10.2 | -3.1 | -3.0 |
| BRB | 2018 | -0.3 | 1.8 | 2.3 | MWI | 1987 | -6.0 | -0.9 | -2.0 |
| CHL | 1983 | -25.2 | -6.3 | -9.0 | NER | 1983 | -6.9 | 3.1 | 5.1 |
| CIV | 1983 | -9.9 | -2.0 | -2.7 | NGA | 1982 | -27.3 | -0.5 | -2.7 |
| CIV | 2000 | -7.6 | -0.1 | 6.0 | NIC | 1978 | -3.7 | 8.5 | 15.8 |
| CMR | 1985 | 5.7 | 1.8 | 17.1 | PAK | 1998 | -5.4 | -0.6 | -2.2 |
| COD | 1975 | -12.2 | 1.3 | 2.8 | PAN | 1984 | -10.8 | -2.0 | 5.0 |
| COD | 1982 | -1.3 | -1.0 | -4.3 | PER | 1976 | -3.4 | 1.6 | 5.0 |
| COG | 1983 | 9.4 | 5.3 | 19.1 | PER | 1983 | -18.3 | -7.1 | -4.4 |
| CRI | 1981 | -10.3 | 1.3 | 2.9 | PHL | 1983 | -2.0 | 5.6 | 9.2 |
| DMA | 2003 | -1.1 | 0.2 | -3.6 | PRY | 1986 | -0.1 | -1.8 | -5.1 |
| DOM | 1982 | -4.4 | 0.0 | 3.0 | RUS | 1998 | -4.9 | -4.6 | -20.7 |
| DOM | 2004 | -7.4 | -4.8 | -6.5 | SEN | 1981 | -1.2 | -0.5 | -0.9 |
| DZA | 1990 | -2.8 | 1.3 | 1.2 | SEN | 1990 | -3.4 | -0.7 | 0.3 |
| ECU | 1982 | -2.9 | 0.5 | 2.3 | SLE | 1980 | 5.0 | 0.8 | 1.5 |
| ECU | 1999 | -8.0 | -2.1 | -5.0 | SLV | 1992 | 0.9 | -0.1 | -0.6 |
| ECU | 2008 | 3.6 | 1.5 | 1.7 | SYC | 2008 | 2.9 | 1.3 | -1.1 |
| ECU | 2020 | -12.6 | -5.9 | -12.3 | TCD | 2014 | 3.5 | 4.1 | 10.5 |
| ETH | 1990 | -5.4 | 5.4 | 6.6 | TGO | 1987 | -3.5 | -2.3 | -0.9 |
| GAB | 1986 | -12.7 | 4.6 | -2.2 | TTO | 1988 | -8.5 | -2.2 | -11.4 |
| GIN | 1991 | -0.2 | -0.4 | -0.7 | TUR | 1976 | 7.6 | 3.8 | 8.4 |
| GMB | 1984 | 3.8 | 2.6 | 2.7 | TUR | 1981 | -6.4 | -1.5 | -5.2 |
| GRC | 2011 | -10.0 | -1.9 | -3.0 | UKR | 1998 | -3.8 | -1.0 | -25.0 |
| GRD | 2004 | 3.5 | -3.6 | 1.4 | UKR | 2015 | -11.7 | -6.9 | -9.7 |
| GRD | 2013 | -2.1 | -3.5 | -8.6 | URY | 1983 | -25.8 | -6.7 | -10.1 |
| GUY | 1982 | -16.4 | -1.8 | 0.8 | URY | 2003 | -7.3 | -4.7 | -13.8 |
| HND | 1981 | -8.8 | 0.0 | 1.4 | VEN | 1983 | -11.0 | -3.0 | -7.1 |
| IRQ | 1986 | -10.2 | -3.5 | 0.0 | ZAF | 1985 | 0.7 | -0.8 | 0.7 |
| JAM | 1977 | -11.3 | -2.1 | -1.7 | ZMB | 1983 | -11.5 | -0.9 | -1.2 |
| JOR | 1989 | -25.4 | -7.7 | -12.6 | | | | | |

Table 2: Good-Times Defaults Using Alternative Detrending Techniques

This table reports summary statistics for all the default episodes listed in Table 1. The first column computes the output gap using the HP filter with $\lambda=6.25$, the second column uses the HP filter with $\lambda=400$, the third column uses the detrending technique suggested by [Hamilton \(2018\)](#), the fourth column uses a log-linear trend, the fifth column compares GDP growth in the year of the default with average GDP growth over 1970-2020 (all variables in this column should be interpreted as deviations from average growth and not as output gaps), and the last two columns report historical values and permanent shock simulations from Table 1 of [Tomz and Wright \(2007\)](#).

| | HP ($\lambda=6.25$) | HP ($\lambda=400$) | Ham. Trend | Log-lin. Trend | $g_t > \mu$ | Tomz & Wright | |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|---------------|-------------------|-------------|---------------|-------|
| | | | | | | Hist. | Model |
| “good times” defaults | 35% | 44% | 19% | 54% | 20% | 38.5% | 14.1% |
| Average output gap (%) | -0.9% | -1.2% | -6.9% | 0.2% | -4.5% | -1.6% | -7.4% |
| Median output gap (%) | -0.07% | -0.9% | -5.4% | 1.3% | -2.7% | | |
| St. dev. output gap | 3.5% | 7.7% | 9.7% | 14.3% | 6.7% | | |
| 25th pctile of output gap | -2.2% | -4.8% | -10.6% | -6.2% | -6.2% | | |
| 75th pctile of output gap | 1.3% | 2.7% | -0.7% | 7.7% | -0.9% | | |
| Skewness | -0.47 | -0.36 | -1.56 | -0.68 | -1.78 | | |
| Number of episodes | 79 | 79 | 79 | 79 | 79 | 169 | |

Column 4 shows that a log-liner trend would imply that good-times defaults are more frequent than bad-times defaults, and that the average output gap in the first year of default is small but positive.


Finally, column 5 compares GDP growth in the first year of a default spell with average country-specific GDP growth. The results are similar to those obtained with the Hamilton trend. Only 20% of defaults happen when GDP growth is above average, and, in the first year of the default spell, GDP growth is 4.5 percentage points lower than country-specific average GDP growth.

Figure 2 plots the non-parametric distribution of the output gaps in the first year of default calculated with [Hamilton’s \(2018\)](#) detrending technique (the solid black line) and with the HP filter with $\lambda=6.25$ (the solid gray line) and $\lambda=400$ (the dashed gray line). The distributions of output gaps computed with the HP filter tend to be approximately symmetric (this is in line with the penultimate row of Table 2 which shows negative but bigger than -0.5 skewness) and with a mode which is close to zero (-0.5% in both cases). The distribution of the output gap computed with the Hamilton trend is highly negatively skewed (-1.56), with a long left tail, and a mode which corresponds to an output gap of about -5%.

An inspection of the few good-times defaults signaled by the Hamilton output gap shows that a number of these events happened under special circumstances. For instance, South Africa defaulted in 1985 while under apartheid sanctions. Slovenia defaulted in 1992 immediately after becoming independent from Yugoslavia. Chad’s 2014 default was associated with a large loan extended by Glencore to the state oil firm and that the company was unable to repay when oil prices collapsed at the end of 2014 ([Coulibaly, Gandhi, and Senbet,](#)

Figure 2: Distribution of Output Gaps Using Alternative Detrending Techniques

This figure plots the non-parametric distributions of the output gap in the first year of default. The solid black line plots the distribution of the output gap obtained with the Hamilton detrending technique and the gray lines plot the distribution of the output gap obtained with the HP filter with 6.25 (solid line) and 400 (dashed line) smoothing parameters.



2019). Mozambique’s 2015 default, instead, was linked with the Tuna Bonds corruption case (Connelly, 2021).

A particularly interesting case is the Ecuadorian default of 2008. This is a rare case of debt restructuring in the absence of any type of financial stress as, at the time of default—output was nearly 4% above trend and GDP growth was well above 6%. It is well documented that this default was purely a political decision based on President Rafael Correa’s electoral promise to refuse to pay the country’s external debt if elected (Feibelman, 2017).

4 Conclusions

While economic theory predicts that countries should default during bad times, the empirical sovereign debt literature has identified a surprisingly large number of defaults that happen in good times (i.e., when output is above trend). This paper reassesses this empirical literature and shows that alternative methods to separate business cycle fluctuations from trend growth

yield different results. Specifically, the detrending methodology suggested by [Hamilton \(2018\)](#) can reconcile the empirical evidence with the predictions of standard quantitative models of sovereign debt.

A quick look at the good-times defaults identified by the Hamilton trend shows that about one-third of these defaults happened under exceptional circumstances. It is thus possible that a careful analysis of non-economic drivers of default (see, for instance, [Esteves, Kelly, and Lennard, 2021](#)) could further reduce the gap between theory and data.

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