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Activist Manipulation Dynamics

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Abstract

Two activists with correlated private positions in a firm's stock, trade sequentially before simultaneously exerting effort that determines the firm's value. We document the existence of a novel linear equilibrium in which an activist's trades have positive sensitivity to her block size, but such orders are not zero on average: the leader activist manipulates the price to induce the follower to acquire a larger position and thus add more value. We examine the implications of this equilibrium for market outcomes and discuss its connection with the prominent phenomenon of "wolf-pack" activism—multiple hedge funds engaging in parallel with a target firm. We also explore the possibility of other equilibria where the activists trade against their initial positions.

Key words: activism, insider trading, noisy signaling, price manipulation, hedge funds

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1 Introduction

Blockholder activists—shareholders who influence how firms are run—play a central role in modern corporations. To improve a firm’s performance, activists seek a variety of changes in areas such as payout structure (e.g., releasing value to shareholders), strategy (e.g., cost reductions, selling divisions), and governance (e.g., board composition and tenure), partly to ameliorate the losses that stem from the separation of ownership and control. Importantly, a steady increase of activist campaigns has been witnessed over the last years, with large capitalization firms being key targets both due to their relevance in economies and the elevated costs of acquiring them. In addition, considerations of diversity and of social and environmental consciousness have become a more frequent theme in campaigns. These trends suggest that activism as a phenomenon is only bound to grow over time.

The practical importance of activism is also manifested in a prolific academic literature that has illuminated the mechanisms through which corporate governance is affected, with the ensuing linkages between activism and market outcomes. As it has been pointed out (e.g., [Edmans and Holderness, 2017](#)), much of the theoretical literature has nonetheless focused on models with a single activist in isolation, or on multiple activists with fixed blocks—thus, the fundamental question of how stakes are gradually acquired, anticipating that activism will take place eventually, and with other investors having skin in the game too, is much less understood. This issue is also of great empirical relevance, as interventions by multiple activists have become frequent ([Brav et al., 2021](#)), partly reflecting that an individual blockholder rarely has the power to control management. But the strength of any intervention is inherently linked to block size, which is an endogenous variable.

In this paper, we examine a market-based mechanism through which forward-looking activists attempt to steer other activists to add value to firms. Specifically, two activists decide how much stake to accumulate (or deaccumulate) in a [Kyle \(1985\)](#) type of market structure, where (i) private information is about initial blocks, and (ii) firm value is determined by effort choices, as in the single-player model of [Back et al. \(2018\)](#). To this baseline setting, we add two natural ingredients. First, initial positions exhibit correlation. Second, trading is sequential: in the first period, a *leader* activist acts as the unique informed trader, anticipating that a *follower* activist will play that role in the second period. In the third period, both activists simultaneously exert effort that fully determines firm value. Thus, the leader behaves in a “Stackelberg” manner, anticipating how her actions will influence the firm’s value via the follower’s trading opportunities in the second period.

Sequential stake-building and endogenous fundamentals have important consequences. Indeed, [Proposition 2](#) establishes the existence of an equilibrium in which the leader activist’s

orders are nonzero on average. This is in stark contrast to the ubiquitous equilibrium in Kyle-type models, where trades are based solely on the difference (or “gap”) between the insider’s and the market maker’s belief about the fundamentals—which proxies for the potential gains from arbitrage—and are therefore zero in expectation.¹ In particular, with positive correlation in positions, the leader manipulates the price *downwards* to induce the follower to acquire a larger position and ultimately exert higher effort.

The finding rests on a combination of dynamic incentives and endogenous costs. Concretely, while activists’ actions are perfect substitutes in the firm’s value—capturing the traditional free-riding problem highlighted in the literature—trading and effort choices are strategic complements intertemporally, as any added value is applied to all shares. In particular, if leaders with higher initial blocks expect to have higher terminal positions, these *types* benefit more from inducing effort by the follower. As we demonstrate, in the unique linear equilibrium in which trading strategies attach a positive weight to initial positions, if correlation is positive (negative) the leader lowers (increases) the aforementioned weight relative to a traditional “Kyle” setting. In other words, all types deviate in a direction that makes the market maker more pessimistic about the follower’s position, thereby making the exploitation of arbitrage opportunities more attractive for the follower. Further, leaders with larger blocks effectively deviate more than their lower counterparts in absolute terms.

This type of behavior has signaling implications that take us to the second part of the argument: the endogeneity of costs. Specifically, while it is well understood that higher market maker’s beliefs, by shrinking the extent of mispricing, also reduce the amount of trading, the novelty now is that the “limits to arbitrage” that arise through this channel are connected with information transmission in a non-trivial way. Consider the case of positive correlation: with less information conveyed through the order flow due to the reduced signaling, *price impact falls* for a fixed degree of correlation. All leader types then find it (endogenously) less costly to further scale back their purchases in response to an increase in the prior belief, manifested in the weight attached to the prior belief in the leader’s strategy becoming more negative than in a traditional “Kyle” setting. In equilibrium therefore, all types scale back along both dimensions of information, private and public; but this implies that the symmetry of the coefficients encountered in the literature breaks.

Uncovering this type of asymmetry is important for two reasons. First, it reveals a conceptual novelty from a strategic viewpoint: the leader does not continue behaving in an unpredictable manner—i.e., using gap strategies whose weights coincide in absolute value—albeit in a less/more aggressive fashion depending on the correlation; the manipulation

¹Our use of the word “arbitrage” in this paper is in the sense of exploitation of superior information within a market, as opposed to exploiting price discrepancies in different markets.

motive fundamentally alters the nature of her incentives. Second, at a substantive level, this analysis is key for bringing our model closer to the real world in terms both of its predictions for market outcomes and of its evaluation vis-à-vis the evidence on multiplayer activism—this is our endeavor in Sections 5 and 6, respectively.

We begin Section 5 by exploring the implications of our equilibrium for market outcomes. Consider the case of positive correlation in what follows. In this case, we draw several predictions. First, selling pressure arises in that the leader’s trade is negative on average across leader types. Second, prices can increase in response to total sell orders. Third, stronger price impact (or less market depth) can be consistent with *less* strategic information transmission by the leader. Finally, we also show how the leader’s manipulation motive leads to lower firm value than if trading was not possible; yet, critically, the presence of a leader is beneficial in that the firm’s value is higher than in the single-player case in which the follower acts in isolation (and also higher than if both activists were present but no effort was allowed).

Next, in order to bridge our theoretical results to our main application in Section 6, we explore conditions that would incentivize an activist to act first as a leader. We argue that both a stronger positive correlation in initial positions and an increased number of followers are key in this respect. Indeed, if positions are too negatively correlated, the leader may benefit from having a contemporaneous “competitor,” as trade between both with limited price impact can result from each being in the opposite of the market, effectively turning the competitor into a supplier. Second, as the number of followers increases, competition effects can lead them to trade more aggressively, which adds to the value of the leader’s terminal stake in the firm. From a real-world standpoint, therefore, our mechanism is more likely at play when (i) activists seek arbitrage opportunities, (ii) there are many followers, that act in a non-cooperative fashion; and when (iii) the activists involved are similar in that they are likely to have similar stakes.

Section 6 then takes an “institutional” perspective by relating these insights to the evidence on hedge-fund activism—in particular, the phenomenon referred to as *wolf-pack* activism, whereby multiple hedge funds engage with a target firm subsequently after a leader hedge fund has built a stake in it. Indeed, not only are hedge funds the quintessential example of exploitation of arbitrage opportunities, but this intrinsic similarity is enhanced by the empirically documented fact that they tend to hold small to moderate stakes in target firms. In addition, these hedge funds are likely to act in a non-cooperative fashion due to regulatory and legal costs faced otherwise, and there is important evidence of sequentiality in terms of their stock acquisition, with multiple hedge funds building stakes subsequently after a leader has completed her block. From this perspective, our model constitutes a natural theoretical

representation of this type of activism and it uncovers a novel price mechanism through which such a leader hedge fund may attempt to steer others to engage in activism. Further, this mechanism has sharp predictions for market outcomes, some of them documented in practice—such as multi-activist engagements adding more value than those single-player counterparts (e.g., [Becht et al., 2017](#)), despite potential inefficiencies being at play.

Finally, we conclude the paper by examining the task of characterizing the set of all linear equilibria. Specifically, when the order flow is too volatile and hence the market prone to be liquid, creating mispricing to be exploited by the follower may come at the expense of large trading losses. An equilibrium with more of a “coordination” nature can emerge in which at least one of the activists trades against its initial position: for instance, if the first activist is initially long and the second activist is initially short, the first activist could give up her long position and move to a short one similar to the second activist.

Our main equilibrium can co-exist with this coordination-based one when correlation is positive, but it may cease to exist when the correlation is too negative. In the former case, large trades are costly both because of price impact and of the negative effect they have on the follower’s contribution to the firm’s value; by contrast, with negative correlation, the value of manipulation goes against price impact, introducing convexity in the leader’s problem. Reductions in order flow volatility then play a *dual* role: for any degree of correlation, they increase the leader’s ability to manipulate the continuation game, making the coordination equilibrium less plausible; and for negative correlation, they increase price impact, which restores the concavity of the leader’s problem. Indeed, we show that reducing the volatility of noise trading not only makes our main equilibrium re-emerge, but it also eliminates all other equilibria—in other words, market illiquidity refines the equilibrium under study.

Related literature. The study of activism goes back as early as [Berle and Means \(1932\)](#), who recognized the free-riding problem that arises when improving firms’ governance is a costly activity and ownership is dispersed. Since then, the academic literature has analyzed a variety of mechanisms through which “improved monitoring”—to varying degrees—can arise, largely focusing on two forms of activism in practice: “voice,” where a blockholder take actions that directly affect firm value (e.g., [Shleifer and Vishny, 1986](#), [Kahn and Winton \(1998\)](#) and [Maug, 1998](#)), and “exit,” by which a blockholder can discipline a firm’s management via the ex post threat of selling shares (e.g., [Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009](#) and [Edmans, 2009](#)). In this regard, ours is a model of voice, as our activists exert effort to shape firm value; and disposing of shares can instead happen in equilibrium to induce other activists to govern through voice.

In this line, our key focus is on the *dynamic* interaction between *multiple* blockholders, where a block accumulation or de-accumulation can be used strategically to steer others

to build stakes in a firm. We follow [Back et al. \(2018\)](#) who introduce private information about positions and a one-time terminal effort choice in [Kyle \(1985\)](#) to examine the interplay between activism technologies and market liquidity in a single-player set-up. This approach is also adopted by [Doidge et al. \(2021\)](#), where a group of activists act non-cooperatively in a single round of trading, but subsequently act as a coalition (in the sense of cooperative games) at the effort stage to ameliorate the free-riding problem. Away from this framework, some papers have studied how competition among multiple blockholders can have positive effects on activism: [Edmans and Manso \(2011\)](#) show that exit is a stronger disciplinary threat, while [Brav et al. \(2021\)](#) show that an incentive to appear as skilled can lead small and young hedge funds to exert effort when there is competition for investor funds.

Our paper is also related to models of manipulation in financial markets where the ultimate goal is to influence actions that can have real consequences. In [Goldstein and Guembel \(2008\)](#), short-selling can be a profitable strategy for a speculator when it induces a manager to forgo an investment decision; in [Attari et al. \(2006\)](#), a passive fund may dump shares to insure/protect the value of the remaining block as activism by a relationship investor has positive return only when a firm's fundamentals are low; in [Khanna and Mathews \(2012\)](#) a blockholder may be forced to buy a disproportionately large block to prevent value destruction; and in [Yang and Zhu \(2021\)](#), [Boleslavsky et al. \(2017\)](#) and [Ahnert et al. \(2020\)](#) strategic trading can be used to trigger interventions by governments. Other models of manipulation in financial markets instead focus more on questions regarding their informational efficiency; see for instance [Chakraborty and Yilmaz \(2004\)](#), [Brunnermeier \(2005\)](#) and [Williams and Skrzypacz \(2020\)](#) among others.

Finally, this paper also relates to models of belief manipulation employing Gaussian fundamentals and/or shocks in settings other than financial markets, e.g., [Holmström \(1999\)](#), [Cisternas \(2018\)](#), [Bonatti and Cisternas \(2020\)](#), [Cetemen \(2020\)](#), [Ekmekci et al. \(2020\)](#). With exogenous costs functions of the manipulative action, more precise signals lead to more manipulation due to beliefs being more responsive to information; by contrast, manipulation costs are endogenous in our setup because they are linked to the price impact. This introduces a tension between the sensitivity of beliefs and the extent to which they are manipulated.

2 Model

Setup. A *leader* activist (she) and a *follower* counterpart (he) hold initial positions of X_0^L and X_0^F shares in a firm, respectively. Each activist's *block* is her/his private information, and such *types* are normally distributed with mean μ , variance ϕ , and covariance $\rho \in [-\phi, \phi]$.

Actions unfold in three periods. In period 1, the leader acts as a single informed trader

in a [Kyle \(1985\)](#) market structure. Specifically, she submits an order for $\theta^L \in \mathbb{R}$ units of the firm's stock to a competitive market maker who executes it at a public price P_1 after observing the total order flow of the form

$$\Psi_1 = \theta^L + \sigma Z_1.$$

In this specification, Z_1 is standard normal random variable independent of the initial positions that captures noise traders, and the volatility $\sigma > 0$ is a commonly known scalar.

Having observed the first-period price, in period 2 the follower replaces the leader as the single informed trader in an otherwise identical round of trading: he orders $\theta^F \in \mathbb{R}$ units from the same market maker who in turn executes at a (public) price P_2 after observing the total order flow

$$\Psi_2 = \theta^F + \sigma Z_2,$$

where Z_2 is standard normal and independent of (X_0^L, X_0^F, Z_1) . Let $(\mathcal{F}_t^\Psi)_{t=0,1,2}$ denote the public filtration, i.e., the information generated by the prior and the prices $(P_t)_{t=1,2}$.

Finally, in period 3, the activists simultaneously take actions that determine the firm's fundamentals. Specifically, activist i exerts effort $W^i \in \mathbb{R}$ at a cost $\frac{1}{2}(W^i)^2$, $i \in \{L, F\}$, resulting in each share of the firm having a *true value* of

$$W = W^L + W^F.$$

In other words, the firm's fundamental value in the absence of any activism has been normalized to zero.²

Payoffs. Let us introduce two preliminary pieces of notation. First, to link players with their corresponding trading periods, define $t(L) := 1$, $t(F) := 2$, $i(1) := L$, and $i(2) := F$. Second, we denote the activists' *terminal* positions by

$$X_T^i = X_0^i + \theta^i, \quad i \in \{L, F\}. \quad (1)$$

Equipped with this, activist i 's problem can be stated as

$$\sup_{\theta^i, W^i} \mathbb{E} \left[(W^i + W^{-i}) X_T^i - P_{t(i)} \theta^i - \frac{1}{2} (W^i)^2 \mid X_0^i, \mathcal{F}_{t(i)-1}^\Psi, \theta^i \right]. \quad (2)$$

²Note that our model allows for negative effort, which can be seen as value destruction. [Bliss et al. \(2019\)](#) provide some specific examples on negative activism, where blockholders take costly actions to reduce firm value; these include exerting effort to provide negative information about firm fraud, challenging firm patents or blocking favorable acquisitions by the firm.

Clearly, the first-order condition with respect to effort W^i implies that

$$W^i = X_T^i, \quad i \in \{L, F\}. \quad (3)$$

Hence, activist i 's objective (2) is effectively

$$\sup_{\theta^i} \mathbb{E} \left[(X_T^i + X_T^{-i})X_T^i - P_{t(i)}\theta^i - \frac{1}{2}(X_T^i)^2 | X_0^i, \mathcal{F}_{t(i)-1}^\Psi, \theta^i \right]. \quad (4)$$

Let us highlight a few noteworthy features of the model:

1. *Flexible correlation.* We allow for correlation in initial positions that can be positive (e.g., both activists wish to improve the value of the firm), or negative (e.g., one activist wishes to reduce the value of the firm). In the former category, the case of activists that are aligned to add value has been discussed at length in the empirical literature (see [Bebchuk et al., 2015](#)), and hence will receive special attention in our analysis. But the latter category is relevant in practice too: for instance, the work of [Li et al. \(2022\)](#) indicates that more entry of activists occurs after substantial short selling, which suggests negative correlation in initial blocks.
2. *Free-riding and alternative activism technologies.* The perfect substitutability of effort choices in the determination of the firm's value offers a stark representation of the traditional free-rider problem at play: all shareholders benefit from activism undertaken by any individual blockholder. In this line, while we have chosen a specification of fundamentals that varies continuously with total effort, the model can also represent a linear approximation of engagements with binary outcomes, and where the probability of success is increasing in the same aggregate variable.
3. *Endogenous fundamentals and static incentives to trade.* The firm's value $X_T^i + X_T^{-i}$ encodes the benefit stemming from a marginally higher terminal position. Relative to single-player setup with exogenous fundamentals, the *static* incentives to trade are modified through two channels: a higher fundamental value due to the extra effort exerted (X_T^i term), and a higher or lower fundamental value depending on what the other activist will do (X_T^{-i}), which is linked to how positions are correlated initially. As we will see, these *direct* effects result in steeper/weaker incentives that are priced in the form of stronger/weaker price impact.
4. *Dynamic complementarity between trading and effort.* The value of the holdings for each activist is given by $(X_T^i + X_T^{-i})X_T^i$, $i \in \{L, F\}$; in particular, as argued in the

introduction, the larger an activist's terminal block, the stronger her intervention. Not only that: the interaction term $X_T^{-i}X_T^i$ reflects a *dynamic* complementarity between orders and terminal positions across players. In the case of the leader, for instance, the higher her position, the more she benefits from inducing a higher position for the follower. As we will see, this *strategic* effect is a key driver of our findings.

Linear Strategies and Equilibrium Concept. A trading strategy for a player is *linear* if it conditions on the history of signals observed by that player in a linear way. That is,

$$\theta^L = \alpha_L X_0^L + \delta_L \mu, \quad (5)$$

for the leader, while the follower can also condition on the first-period price:

$$\theta^F = \alpha_F X_0^F + \beta_F P_1 + \delta_F \mu. \quad (6)$$

Similarly, a pricing rule is linear if $P_{t(i)}$ is affine in $\Psi_{t(i)}$, $i = L, F$. As is traditional, we will be looking for linear equilibria: (i) the activists' linear strategies are mutual best-responses when taking as given a linear pricing rule set by the market maker, and (ii) the market maker's linear pricing rule satisfies $P_{t(i)} = \mathbb{E}[W^L + W^F | \mathcal{F}_{t(i)}^\Psi]$.

Our main goal will be to characterize linear equilibria exhibiting $\alpha_L > 0$ and $\alpha_F > 0$, i.e., trading strategies exhibiting *positive block sensitivity* (PBS). Thus, larger leader/follower blockholders acquire relatively more stock than their smaller counterparts, which means that trading only increases the relative strength of engagement across types. The question of other linear equilibria beyond the PBS class is relegated to Section 7.

PBS equilibria also conform with the linear equilibria usually examined in the literature, where informed traders place orders that have positive sensitivity to their private information. From this perspective, it is of special interest whether $\mathbb{E}[\theta^L | \mathcal{F}_1^\Psi] = \mathbb{E}[\theta^F | \mathcal{F}_1^\Psi] = 0$, that is, the activists behave in an unpredictable manner as in Kyle (1985) and its generalizations.

3 Learning and Pricing

We begin by characterizing learning and pricing, fixing conjectured strategies (5)-(6). We frequently use the projection theorem for Gaussian random variables: if x and y are jointly normally distributed, then $\mathbb{E}[y|x] = \mathbb{E}[y] + \frac{\text{Cov}(x,y)}{\text{Var}(x)}(x - \mathbb{E}[x])$ and $\text{Var}(y|x) = \text{Var}(y) - \frac{\text{Cov}^2(x,y)}{\text{Var}(x)}$. Supporting details and expressions are in the Supplementary Appendix.

3.1 Initial beliefs

First-period quoted price. We begin by characterizing the market maker's ex ante expectation of firm value, $P_0 = \mathbb{E}[X_T^L + X_T^F]$, which corresponds to the price quoted to the leader before placing an order, and is needed for calculating execution prices. Using (5)-(6),

$$P_0 = \mathbb{E}[(1 + \alpha_L)X_0^L + \delta_L\mu + (1 + \alpha_F)X_0^F + \beta_F P_1 + \delta_F\mu].$$

Since $\mathbb{E}[P_1] = P_0$, we can solve for P_0 as a function of μ as long as $\beta_F \neq 1$. We show in Remark 1 that this must hold in any linear equilibrium, so we assume it in what follows and verify ex post that our candidate equilibrium satisfies it.

Players' private beliefs. Correlation in privately known initial positions implies that the players have private beliefs about each others' positions. Throughout, we use Y_t^i denote player i 's private (mean) belief about the position of player $-i$ following period t . Therefore,

$$Y_0^i = \mu + \frac{\rho}{\phi}(X_0^i - \mu), \quad \nu_0^i := \text{Var}(X_0^{-i}|X_0^i) = \phi - \frac{\rho^2}{\phi}.$$

3.2 First-period updating

The market maker's belief updating. After observing the first-period total order flow, Ψ_1 , the market maker updates beliefs about both activists' positions. We begin with the corresponding (public) belief about the leader's *initial* position, which reads

$$\mathbb{E}[X_0^L|\mathcal{F}_1^\Psi] = \mu + \frac{\alpha_L\phi}{\alpha_L^2\phi + \sigma^2} \{\Psi_1 - \mu(\alpha_L + \delta_L)\}. \quad (7)$$

Now, letting (M_1^L, M_1^F) denote the posterior belief about the *contemporaneous* positions (X_T^L, X_0^F) , we get $M_1^L = (1 + \alpha_L)\mathbb{E}[X_0^L|\mathcal{F}_1^\Psi] + \delta_L\mu$ after using (5). Similarly,

$$M_1^F := \mathbb{E}[X_0^F|\mathcal{F}_1^\Psi] = \mu + \frac{\alpha_L\rho}{\alpha_L^2\phi + \sigma^2} \{\Psi_1 - \mu(\alpha_L + \delta_L)\} \quad (8)$$

where the only difference is the presence of the covariance term ρ . In particular, using (6), $\mathbb{E}[X_T^F|\mathcal{F}_1^\Psi] = (1 + \alpha_F)M_1^F + \beta_F P_1 + \delta_F\mu$.

Let $\begin{pmatrix} \gamma_1^L & \rho_1 \\ \rho_1 & \gamma_1^F \end{pmatrix}$ denote the posterior covariance matrix of the market maker's beliefs about (X_T^L, X_0^F) after period one (see (B.2)-(B.4)). Intuitively, while at this stage price impact will naturally depend on the extent of initial uncertainty about positions, in the next stage the updated uncertainty about the follower's initial position will determine his informational

advantage relative to the market maker.

First-period pricing. The market maker sets a first-period execution price according to $P_1 = \mathbb{E}[X_T^L | \mathcal{F}_1^\Psi] + \mathbb{E}[X_T^F | \mathcal{F}_1^\Psi]$. By the projection theorem,

$$P_1 = P_0 + \Lambda_1 \{ \Psi_1 - \mu(\alpha_L + \delta_L) \}, \text{ with} \quad (9)$$

$$\Lambda_1 := \frac{\alpha_L \phi}{\alpha_L^2 \phi + \sigma^2} \times \frac{1 + \alpha_L + \rho(1 + \alpha_F)/\phi}{1 - \beta_F}. \quad (10)$$

That is, the price responds to unexpected realizations of the order flow, with the intensity of the response given by Λ_1 , usually referred to as *price impact*.

In the expression for Λ_1 , the first fraction is well-known: it is the price impact that arises when the firm's value is normally distributed with variance ϕ . The second fraction in turn reflects the endogeneity of such fundamentals. Specifically, the numerator, encodes how different types take different actions that influence the firm: the term α_L captures that large unanticipated total orders are now even more indicative of higher fundamentals because, as higher leader types purchase more units, they will also exert more effort in correspondence with their trade; $\rho(1 + \alpha_F)/\phi$ in turn captures that more or less firm value can also originate from the follower's effort depending on how types correlate.

The denominator $1 - \beta_F$ encodes how the first-period price affects the firm's value via the channel of the follower's trade: an increase in the order flow that leads the market maker believe the firm has higher value affects firm's fundamentals by β_F , which further affects the market maker's pricing of the firm, thereby influencing the follower's trade again by β_F , and so forth. As long as the slope β_F is different from 1 (as it must be in equilibrium — see Remark 1), the price is always well defined once accounting for this amplification mechanism.

The follower's posterior belief. To set up the follower's best response problem, we need the follower's updated belief about the leader's terminal position given the first-period price:

$$Y_1^F := (1 + \alpha_L) \left[Y_0^F + \frac{\alpha_L \nu_0^F}{\alpha_L^2 \nu_0^F + \sigma^2} \left\{ \frac{P_1 - P_0}{\Lambda_1} + \alpha_L(\mu - Y_0^F) \right\} \right] + \delta_L \mu. \quad (11)$$

Via Y_0^F , (11) is a function of the follower's state variables (X_0^F, P_1, μ) , as desired.³

³The follower needs to use the order flow Ψ_1 to form his posterior belief in (11). Since $\Lambda_1 \neq 0$ in any linear equilibrium (see Remark 1), he can infer Ψ_1 from P_1 via (9).

3.3 Second-period updating

Second-period pricing. Observing Ψ_2 , the market maker sets a second-period execution price of $P_2 = \mathbb{E}[X_L^T + X_F^T | \mathcal{F}_2^\Psi]$. Using that $M_T^L := \mathbb{E}[X_T^L | \mathcal{F}_2^\Psi]$ and $M_T^F := \mathbb{E}[X_T^F | \mathcal{F}_2^\Psi]$ can be written as linear functions of μ , P_1 , and Ψ_2 , we obtain

$$P_2 = P_1 + \Lambda_2[\Psi_2 - \alpha_F M_1^F - \beta_F P_1 - \delta_F \mu], \text{ with} \quad (12)$$

$$\Lambda_2 = \frac{\alpha_F \gamma_1^F}{\alpha_F^2 \gamma_1^F + \sigma^2} \times [1 + \alpha_F + \rho_1 / \gamma_1^F]. \quad (13)$$

Equations (12)–(13) admit the same interpretation as (9)–(10). Notice that there is no $(1 + \alpha_L)$ term accompanying ρ_1 / γ_1^F in the price impact wedge because ρ_1 carries it implicitly, as ρ_1 denotes the correlation between the leader’s terminal position and the follower’s initial one. There is also no denominator because P_2 does not affect the firm’s value.⁴

Finally, while the leader *could* update about the follower using P_2 (or Ψ_2), this is payoff-irrelevant. This is because (i) she does not trade again, and (ii) each activists’ optimal effort is independent of the other’s.

4 Equilibrium Trading

Using (4), the best-response problem of player $i \in \{L, F\}$ reads

$$\sup_{\theta} -\theta \mathbb{E}_i[P_{t(i)-1} + \Lambda_{t(i)}\{\Psi_{t(i)} - \mathbb{E}[\Psi_{t(i)} | \mathcal{F}_{t(i)-1}^\Psi]\} | \theta] + \frac{(X_0^i + \theta)^2}{2} + (X_0^i + \theta) \mathbb{E}_i[X_T^{-i} | \theta], \quad (14)$$

where $\mathbb{E}_i[\cdot] := \mathbb{E}[\cdot | \mathcal{F}_{t(i)-1}^\Psi, X_0^i]$ is player i ’s conditional expectation operator at the beginning of period $t(i)$.

The only structural difference between the players’ problems lies in each activist’s ability to influence the other’s terminal position, which is captured by the last term, $\mathbb{E}_i[X_T^{-i} | \theta]$. From this perspective, since the leader has already moved when the follower gets to trade, this latter term is exogenous in the follower’s problem, so his first-order condition reads

$$0 = -\mathbb{E}_F[P_1 + \Lambda_2\{\Psi_2 - \mathbb{E}[\Psi_2 | \mathcal{F}_1^\Psi]\} | \theta] - \theta \Lambda_2 + (X_0^F + \theta) + Y_1^F. \quad (15)$$

⁴Note, again, that as Ψ_1 can be inverted from P_1 , M_1^F in (12) is ultimately an affine function of (μ, P_1) . Thus, (X_0^F, P_1, μ) are sufficient for the follower’s best response problem.

On the other hand, the leader's counterpart is

$$0 = -\mathbb{E}_L[P_0 + \Lambda_1\{\Psi_1 - \mathbb{E}[\Psi_1]\}|\theta] - \theta\Lambda_1 + (X_0^L + \theta) + \mathbb{E}_L[X_T^F|\theta] + (X_0^L + \theta)\frac{\partial\mathbb{E}_L[X_T^F|\theta]}{\partial\theta}, \quad (16)$$

where the last term captures the leader's ability to affect the follower's terminal position by influencing follower's trade in the second period.

The second-order conditions (SOCs) for the players also have similar forms:

$$1 - 2\Lambda_1(1 - \beta_F) < 0, \text{ for } i = L \quad (17)$$

$$1 - 2\Lambda_2 < 0, \text{ for } i = F. \quad (18)$$

The scalar 1 in (17)-(18) reflects a convexity in the players' payoffs that arises from the interaction between endogenous terminal effort and earlier trades, which is in contrast to a standard *static* setup with exogenous fundamentals. On the other hand, $(1 - \beta_F)\Lambda_1$ in (17) reflects the leader's effective cost for the last unit traded: the direct impact on the price net of the change in the asset value due to the sensitivity of the follower's effort to the market price. As the expression for Λ_1 in (10) shows, however, these steeper or weaker incentives arising from the latter channel are fully anticipated by the market maker and hence perfectly priced, which results in the effective cost being independent of β_F .

Remark 1. *The second-order conditions (17)-(18) must hold given any linear pricing rules where the sensitivities Λ_1 and Λ_2 are general scalars. Thus, $\beta_F \neq 1$ must hold in a candidate equilibrium for part (i) of the equilibrium concept to be satisfied.*

4.1 The follower's trading

Finding an equilibrium is challenging because first-period variables depend on second-period ones by backward induction, and the latter depend on the former via learning; further, all players' beliefs must be correct. To simplify the exposition, we describe the follower's and leader's behavior separately, beginning with the follower.

Proposition 1. *In a PBS equilibrium: $\alpha_F = \sqrt{\sigma^2/\gamma_1^F}$; $\beta_F < 1$, with $\text{sign}(\beta_F) = -\text{sign}(\rho)$; and $\delta_F < 0$. Further, in belief space, the follower's trade admits the representation*

$$\theta^F = \alpha^F(X_0^F - M_1^F). \quad (19)$$

Hence, in the particular case of $\rho = 0$, both players trade according to (19) with $\gamma_1^F = \phi$ and $M_1^F = \mu$ (and this constitutes the unique linear equilibrium).

It is expected that the weight on the prior, δ_F , is negative — we defer a formal explanation to the next section, where we discuss the leader’s counterpart. To understand why β_F and ρ have different signs, it is useful to consider the representation (19). Consider the case of positive correlation: a high price is indicative of a leader with a high type, which leads the market maker to update positively on the follower’s position. As the informational wedge in (19) falls, the follower buys less; in other words, higher prices lead to lower purchases by the follower, so $\beta_F < 0$. Conversely, with negative correlation, high first-period prices map to low market maker’s beliefs about the follower, and hence to more aggressive buying by the latter agent: β_F must be positive.

There are two noteworthy aspects of (19). First, trades are a function of an information wedge but not explicitly a function of mispricing, i.e., the difference between the firm’s true value and the market maker’s perception of it. The reason is that, with linear trading and effort strategies as well as Gaussian learning, fundamental mispricing, $\mathbb{E}[W^L + W^F | \mathcal{F}_1^F] - \mathbb{E}[W^L + W^F | \mathcal{F}_1^*]$, is proportional to $X_0^F - M_1^F$; thus, the latter proxies for the extent of mispricing.⁵

Second, the intensity of trading, $\alpha^F = \sqrt{\sigma^2/\gamma_1^F}$, is exactly as in a one-shot (Kyle) counterpart with exogenous fundamentals, despite price impact Λ_2 in (13) exhibiting the novel term $1 + \alpha_F + \rho_1/\gamma_1^F \neq 1$. The reason is that this wedge effectively reflects the pricing done by the market maker in response to the change in the follower’s marginal benefit to trade relative to a single-player setting with exogenous fundamentals: follower’s effort complementing his trading, and the leader affecting the firm’s value in a correlated manner (see Section 2). With trading costs that adjust perfectly to the change in benefits, the traditional trading intensity encountered in the literature is recovered.

Finally, regarding the last part of the proposition, if the initial positions are i.i.d. the market maker learns nothing about the follower from the first-period trade, so $M_1^F = \mu$ and $\gamma_1^F = \phi$. But this means that the continuation game is unresponsive to the leader’s behavior, and hence static behavior is optimal for her too. In what follows, we assume $\rho \neq 0$.

4.2 The leader’s trading and PBS equilibrium

We now present a central result of this paper. To this end, let $\alpha^K := \sqrt{\sigma^2/\phi}$ denote the traditional (Kyle) trading intensity when the prior variance is ϕ .

⁵It is easy to see that $\mathbb{E}[W^F | \mathcal{F}_1^F] - \mathbb{E}[W^F | \mathcal{F}_1^*] \propto X_0^F - M_1^F$ and $\mathbb{E}[W^L | \mathcal{F}_1^F] - \mathbb{E}[W^L | \mathcal{F}_1^*] \propto \mathbb{E}[X_0^L | \mathcal{F}_1^F] - \mathbb{E}[X_0^L | \mathcal{F}_1^*]$. With Gaussian learning, however, the follower’s private belief about the leader’s initial position combines his type X_0^F and the first-period order flow, Ψ_1 , *linearly*. Thus, the market maker’s belief is a linear combination of M_0^F and Ψ_1 with the same weights, so $\mathbb{E}[X_0^L | \mathcal{F}_1^F] - \mathbb{E}[X_0^L | \mathcal{F}_1^*] \propto X_0^F - M_1^F$.

Proposition 2. Fix $\sigma > 0$. There exists $\underline{\rho} \in (-\phi, 0)$ such that for all $\rho \in [\underline{\rho}, \phi]$, there is a unique PBS equilibrium. In any such equilibrium, the leader trades according to $\theta^L = \alpha_L X_0^L + \delta_L \mu$, where $\alpha_L > 0$ and $\delta_L < 0$. Moreover, if $\rho > 0$, then

$$\alpha_L < \alpha^K < -\delta_L,$$

and the reverse inequalities hold if $\rho \in (-\underline{\rho}, 0)$. In turn, the follower trades as in (19).

In a PBS equilibrium, the leader's strategy departs from the traditional ones in the microstructure literature in that the weights attached to the type and prior diverge from α^K in opposite directions, with a ranking that depends on the correlation of positions. Let us now explain the economics behind this result, deferring a detailed discussion about the lower bound $\underline{\rho}$ to Section 7.

The result stems from a combination of dynamic incentives and endogenous costs. Regarding the first aspect, recall from the leader's first-order condition (16) that her incentives are distorted by $X_T^L \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}_L[X_T^F | \theta]}{\partial \theta^L}$ relative to the follower's. This term captures the leader's *value of manipulation*, i.e., the component of her continuation value that relates to the follower's behavior. Using that $\theta^F = \alpha_F X_0^F + \beta_F P_1 + \delta_F \mu$, this term reads

$$X_T^L \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}_L[X_T^F | \theta]}{\partial \theta^L} = X_T^L \beta_F \frac{\partial P_1}{\partial \Psi_1} = X_T^L \beta_F \Lambda_1. \quad (20)$$

To illustrate, consider the positive correlation case. There, $\beta_F < 0$, suggesting that the leader would like to engage in a *downward deviation* from a traditional gap strategy. Intuitively, high/low first-period order flows Ψ_1 (and hence first-period prices) are indicative of a high/low type of the follower, so the market maker's belief about the follower M_1^F satisfies $\partial M_1^F / \partial \Psi_1 > 0$. Thus, by (19), manipulating M_1^F downwards implies that a larger arbitrage opportunity is created for the follower, so the latter would build up his position more. But with a bigger block, the follower would exert more effort, resulting in more firm value that the leader can enjoy.

The proposition's ranking of the leader's strategy coefficients precisely encodes this type of deviation. To see why, notice first that in the value of manipulation, leaders with higher terminal positions benefit more from reducing their purchases, as the additional value stemming from the follower's extra effort is applied to more units. With the coefficient α_L on the leader's type being positive, higher types indeed end up holding larger blocks; but since $\alpha_L < \alpha^K$, these types effectively end up scaling back more at the same time.

To rationalize $\delta_L < -\alpha^K$, i.e., an increased sensitivity to the prior in the leader's strategy, we need to incorporate the endogenous cost aspect of the analysis: price impact. Specifically,

it is easy to show that δ_L satisfies

$$\delta_L = \frac{1}{(1 - \beta_F)\Lambda_1} \times \frac{\partial}{\partial \mu}(\mathbb{E}_L[W_L + W_F] - P_1), \quad (21)$$

i.e., it corresponds to the sensitivity of mispricing to the prior, scaled by the effective marginal cost of trading. The derivative is always negative: in forecasting the firm's value, the market maker relies more on the prior than the leader does, in a reflection of the market maker's (leader's) informational disadvantage (advantage). As μ grows, therefore, *all types* scale back because their arbitrage opportunities shrink. But with a lower signaling coefficient α_L , there is less price impact for each fixed $\rho > 0$ than with α^K , holding everything else fixed (see Λ_1 in (10)). Further scaling back in response to an increase in μ is then less costly, as the trading losses become smaller. Thus, we conclude that all types deviate downwards on both dimensions of information, private and public.⁶

We conclude with two observations. First, the logic is identical with negative correlation: an unexpectedly *high* first-period order flow is now a signal of the follower having a lower initial position, and the market maker's belief falls—all leader types then find it optimal to buy more aggressively, i.e., $\alpha_L > \alpha^K$, and hence $-\alpha^K < \delta_L$ via the price impact channel. These predictions are consistent with the empirical results in Li et al. (2022) who show that the abnormal returns to activists who follow large short positions are substantially higher (see Figure 2 in their paper).

Second, in equilibrium the follower may also buy more because the market becomes more liquid: any informational advantage $X_0^F - M_1^F$ gets amplified by $\sqrt{\sigma^2/\gamma_1^F} > \sqrt{\sigma^2/\phi}$. This, however, is an effect that arises in equilibrium only, as deviations by the leader are hidden.⁷

5 Predictions

We first explore the implications of our equilibrium for market outcomes. We then assess the plausibility of it from the lens of first-mover advantages: when would a leader activist likely act as such, and how do her incentives change when the number of followers increases?

⁶ The analogous expression for the signaling coefficient is $\alpha_L = \frac{1}{(1-\beta_F)\Lambda_1} \frac{\partial}{\partial X_0^L}(\mathbb{E}_L[W_L + W_F] - P_1) + \frac{\beta_F}{1-\beta_F}$, which is an *equation* for α_L (in contrast to (21), where δ is absent in the right-hand side due to canceling out in the difference). The derivative is now positive by the same logic, while the last term stems from the value of manipulation, e.g., $\beta_F < 0$ when $\rho > 0$, and there is downward pressure on α_L ; the denominator in turn captures the amplification effect discussed in Section 3 applied to all inframarginal units.

⁷The form of manipulation presented in this section is reminiscent of *encouragement effects* in team dynamics, e.g., Bolton and Harris (1999) and Cetemen et al. (2019). With positive correlation, a key distinction is that our mechanism operates via inducing pessimism about the underlying fundamentals: lowering the firm's price, corresponding to the market maker's belief about the firm, and also the follower's belief about the leader's contribution.

The answers to these questions pave the way for our main application in Section 6.

5.1 Market Outcomes

Let $\mathbb{E}[\cdot]$ denote the expectation operator with respect to the prior distribution. Note that absent any trading, the firm would take value $\mathbb{E}[\theta_0^L + \theta_0^F] = 2\mu$. Hence, we assume $\mu > 0$.

Proposition 3. *In the equilibrium of Proposition 2:*

- (i) *Order flow:* $\mathbb{E}[\Psi_1] < 0$ if and only if $\rho > 0$, while $\mathbb{E}[\Psi_2] = \mathbb{E}[\Psi_2|\mathcal{F}_1^\Psi] = 0$ for all ρ .
- (ii) *Firm value:* $\mathbb{E}[W^L + W^F] = (2 + \alpha_L + \delta_L)\mu$, which is (ii.1) less than 2μ if and only if $\rho > 0$, and (ii.2) always greater than μ .
- (iii) *Signaling coefficient:* α_L is decreasing in ρ .
- (iv) *Price impact:* $\partial\Lambda_1/\partial\rho > 0$ in a neighborhood of $\rho = 0$, at which point $\Lambda_1(0) = \frac{\alpha_K\phi(1+\alpha_K)}{\alpha_K^2\phi+\sigma^2}$.

Let us again use the case of positive correlation to illustrate. There, the downward deviation manifests in on-path *selling pressure*: leader types sell on average and the expected order flow, $\mathbb{E}[\Psi_1]$, is negative. But this implies that moderately negative first-period orders, via $P_1 = P_0 + \Lambda_1[\Psi_1 - \mathbb{E}[\Psi_1]]$, can lead to a *price increase*, as they are indicative of high leader types; by contrast, since $\mathbb{E}[\Psi_2|\mathcal{F}_1^\Psi] = 0$, P_2 updates in the direction of the order flow. The implication is that *realized* order flows that are identical across periods can lead to higher prices early on, beyond the effect of the market maker responding more aggressively due to being more uninformed about fundamentals.

Turning to firm value (part (ii)), the manipulation motive ends up increasing the firm's value on average when $\rho < 0$ relative to a world in which trading is not possible, and the opposite occurs with positive correlation (part (ii.1)). Of course, the latter is a strong prediction because it averages across all possible activist types, and there could be selection effects influencing activist leadership in practice (expected firm value conditional on the leader's type can be larger than 2μ even when $\rho > 0$ if X_0^L is sufficiently large). But the result does uncover a *real* inefficiency associated with the presence of a financial market.

That said, this finding does not mean that the leader does not add value to the firm when $\rho > 0$. Specifically, by part (ii.2), the presence of a leader who can trade results in higher firm value relative to a world in which the follower acts as a lone activist: this is because ex ante firm value would correspond to $\mathbb{E}[X_0^F + \alpha_K(X_0^F - \mu)] = \mathbb{E}[X_0^F] = \mu$ in this latter case. Intuitively, the leader's manipulation is profitable not only through the channel of shifting

effort contribution to the follower, but also through inducing positive correlation in positions ($X_T^L X_T^F$ term). From this perspective, because the follower does not change her position from an ex ante perspective (see the previous equality), it does not pay off the leader to reverse her position on average; but this happens when $\mathbb{E}[X_0^L + \alpha_L X_0^L + \delta_L \mu] = (1 + \alpha_L + \delta_L)\mu < 0$, which is equivalent to the presence of a leader lowering the firm's value. Importantly, we note that this result is in line with the evidence of [Becht et al. \(2017\)](#) that activism by multiple hedge funds tends to perform “strikingly better” than single-activist engagements.

Finally, part (iii) reflects that the value of manipulation across leader types increases when the underlying correlation, either positive or negative, is stronger: as $|\rho|$ grows, the first-period order flow becomes more informative about the follower for the market maker. On the other hand, part (iv) states that first-period price impact is increasing in ρ around $\rho = 0$; in other words, order flow informativeness (part (iii)) and price impact (part (iv)) move in *opposite* directions. This is intuitive in light of the direct effect that correlation has on firm value: when $\rho > 0$ for instance, a drop in order flow informativeness is in fact indicative of higher ex ante value, and our equilibrium preserves the initial ranking of types at the terminal-position stage. We note that (iv) seems to hold for all values of ρ , as seen [Figure 1](#); away from a neighborhood of $\rho = 0$, the difficulty is purely technical in that α_L satisfies a highly non-linear equation (see [\(23\)](#) in [Section 7](#)).




Figure 1: Price impact and the leader's signaling coefficient as functions of covariance in initial positions. Parameter values: $\mu = \phi = 1$, $\sigma = .2$.

5.2 First-Mover Advantages

A natural question is whether an activist is indeed willing to act as a leader. To answer this, we also examine a simultaneous-move version in which both activists place orders at the same time in only one round of trading before ultimately exerting effort. The next result

characterizes the type of equilibrium that emerges there, and leverages the tractability of the model around $\rho = 0$ for comparisons.

Proposition 4. (i) *With simultaneous moves, there exists $\underline{\rho}^{sim} \in (-\phi, 0)$ such that for all $\rho \in [-\underline{\rho}^{sim}, \phi]$, there exists a unique symmetric PBS equilibrium.⁸ In this equilibrium, the activists trade according to $\theta^i = \sqrt{\frac{\sigma^2}{2\phi}}(X_0^i - \mu)$, $i = L, F$.*

(ii) *In a neighborhood of $\rho = 0$, the leader gets a higher ex ante payoff if she goes first.*

The presence of another activist in any round of trading necessarily raises the issue of *competition*, which is succinctly captured in the coefficient in (i): if types coincide, i.e., $X_0^L = X_0^F$, the total order placed by the activists is proportional to $2\sqrt{\sigma^2/2\phi}$, which is larger $\sqrt{\sigma^2/\phi}$, the coefficient that would arise if acting as an informed monopolist in a single round of trading. It is noteworthy that the coefficient in (i) is independent of ρ ⁹: while higher correlation naturally leads to more price impact, it also means each activist relies more on her own type to predict the other player's position—a stronger marginal benefit to trade emerges via the *private belief* about the other activist's contribution to firm. With cost and benefits that adjust in the same, the explicit dependence on ρ disappears.

Part (ii) in the proposition then sets $\rho = 0$ in the sequential-move game to shut down the leader's manipulation motive, thus enabling us to compare pure competition effects across settings. It is confirmed that an activist indeed wants to become a leader, and that this incentive remains such by continuity in the presence of mild manipulation motives arising due to non-trivial correlation.

One would expect this first-mover advantage only to be reinforced by the ability to influence the continuation game, but this depends on whether being accompanied by another informed trader is good or bad. Indeed, consider large *negative covariance*: in this case, the presence of another trader can be beneficial because the activists are likely to be on opposite sides of the market, which means that trade can take place with little impact on the price. For non-trivial levels of correlation, therefore: if $\rho > 0$, going first implies escaping from competition detrimental to profits *and* enjoying an ability to manipulate the game; for $\rho < 0$, going first implies giving up the benefit of having a counterparty to trade in exchange for an ability to strategically influence firm value.

Figure 2 illustrates these points by comparing ex ante payoffs for the leader in the sequential game with those for an individual activist in the simultaneous-move version. For positive levels of correlation, going first is in fact desirable, and the benefit increases in ρ .

⁸The reason behind the appearance of $\underline{\rho}^{sim}$ is analogous to that of $\underline{\rho}$ in Proposition 2, which we discuss in Section 7.

⁹See, for instance, Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) and Foster and Viswanathan (1996) in this respect.

Intuitively, manipulation becomes more cost-effective in that (i) the market maker is more responsive to the outcome of the first-period and (ii) the downward deviation results in lower expenditures (purchasing less at a lower price); while with simultaneous moves it is more likely that both activists are on the same side of the market. At the other end, however, the figure demonstrates that being able to influence the follower need not compensate for the more favorable terms of trade that would arise when another trader is present: indeed, in the sequential case, while both the leader and the follower end up adding value to the firm, this occurs through large purchases of the leader that also drive the stock price up.




Figure 2: Leader's payoff comparison. Parameter values: $\mu = \phi = 1$, $\sigma = .2$.

We conclude that our mechanism is more likely in engagements involving activists that are perceived to be more similar in terms of their stakes, as captured by a higher ρ . In reality, with a fixed number of shares issued, however, the blocks of such similar activists must also not be too large: otherwise, a hypothetical leader's trade can be expected to be absorbed by the remaining activists, effectively reversing the type of inference done when $\rho > 0$ in the model. From the viewpoint of applications, therefore, our mechanism is more likely to arise in engagements where activists are all *similar* and they have *small to moderate* blocks, as both elements open the way for the type of updating that takes place with positive correlation.

5.3 Number of Followers

We conclude this section by discussing how the incentives for market leadership change as the number of followers varies, a comparative static that is also empirically relevant in light of the aforementioned application discussed in Section 6.

Suppose now that the original initial stake of our follower is diluted among N individuals. That is, there are N followers all with an identical initial position X_0^F , where

the latter random variable is Gaussian with mean μ/N and variance ϕ/N^2 , and such that $\text{Cov}(X_0^F, X_0^L) = \rho/N$. Since the total position of the followers NX_0^F has mean μ , variance ϕ , and covariance ρ with the leader, the underlying information structure is unchanged from the perspective of the market maker and the leader—any change in equilibrium outcomes is then linked to strategic considerations pertaining to the presence of multiple followers. The symmetry in the followers' positions is simply for analytical convenience.

As before, the firm has value $W^L + \sum_{i=1}^N W^{F,i}$, where $W^{F,i}$ is the effort exerted by follower i , which ultimately takes value $X_T^{F,i}$. And we look for equilibria in which the followers play symmetric (linear) strategies in period 2, which means that we only need to keep track of the market maker's belief about a *single* follower's initial position given the observed first-period order flow; we let M_1^F and γ_1^F denote the corresponding mean and variance, respectively, and concentrate on the case of positive correlation for the reasons stated in Section 5.2.

Proposition 5. *Fix any $\rho \in (0, \phi]$. In the unique PBS equilibrium, each follower trades according to $\theta^F = \alpha_F(X_0^F - M_1^F)$, where $\alpha_F = \sqrt{\frac{\sigma^2}{N\gamma_1^F}}$. In addition, α_F is increasing in N ; both α_L and the firm's ex ante value are decreasing in N ; and the leader's ex ante payoff grows in proportion to \sqrt{N} asymptotically.*

The coefficient α_F in the followers' strategy generalizes that of Proposition 4 for the two-player simultaneous-move game to account for N followers and an endogenous uncertainty γ_1^F about each of them. Importantly, this posterior variance decays at rate $1/N^2$, fixing the leader's strategy. Consequently, the competition effect from Section 5.2—i.e., smaller individual trades that in total add up to more than the monopoly counterpart—is now exacerbated in that each follower trades *more* aggressively with N : since each follower's contribution to the firm is a smaller fraction of the total, the price responds less to each individual trade, prompting more aggressive behavior. With followers that are more sensitive to mispricing, the leader's manipulation incentive grows with N , and so α_L decreases in N when $\rho > 0$.¹⁰ In turn, since the followers' orders are zero on average, ex ante firm value is decreasing in N .¹¹

The proposition also states that the leader's ex ante equilibrium payoff,

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\underbrace{(X_0^L + \theta_L)}_{=X_T^L} \underbrace{N(X_0^F + \alpha_F(X_0^F - M_1^F))}_{=\sum_i W^{F,i}=NX_T^F} + \underbrace{\frac{(X_0^L + \theta_L)^2}{2}}_{=W^L X_T^L - (W^L)^2/2} - P_1 \theta_L \right], \quad (22)$$

¹⁰While this decay in α_L raises γ_1^F all else equal, this effect cannot overturn the direct downward effect that larger N has on γ_1^F , as $\gamma_1^F \leq \phi/N^2$ for any linear strategy of the leader.

¹¹Specifically, as in Proposition 3, ex ante firm value is $(2 + \alpha_L + \delta_L)\mu$; but in equilibrium, $\delta_L = -\frac{\sigma^2}{\phi\alpha_L}$ (see Proposition (A.1)), so ex ante firm value is increasing in α_L and thus decreasing in N .

is of the order \sqrt{N} for N large, implying that the benefits of acting as a leader grow with the number of followers. The explanatory term is the first, i.e., $\mathbb{E}[X_T^L N X_T^F]$, which captures the value of the leader's block that is attributed to the followers' effort choices.¹² Indeed, it can be shown (Appendix B.3) that, for some scalar $C(N)$ that is uniformly bounded in N ,

$$\mathbb{E}[(X_0^L + \theta_L)N(X_0^F + \alpha_F(X_0^F - M_1^F))] = C(N) + \alpha_F \rho (1 + \alpha_L) \frac{\sigma^2}{\alpha_L^2 \phi + \sigma^2},$$

and hence payoffs grow in proportion to α_F due to α_L being strictly positive and bounded. At the core of the result is then that, with a noisy order flow, there is always non-trivial correlation between the leader's terminal position and the extent of arbitrage opportunities for the follower. Indeed, it is only when $\sigma = 0$ that the market maker learns the leader's type, implying that the leader and the market maker share the same belief about the follower, which effectively eliminates the possibility of arbitrage opportunities from the perspective of any leader type.

We conclude this analysis on the number of followers with three observations. First, the term $\alpha_F \rho$ in the last expression uncovers a *complementarity* between the number of followers and the correlation among initial positions: when types are more correlated, the leader benefits from having more followers because their increased trading intensity α_F leads to additional firm value that is more in line with the leader's counterpart. Figure 3 confirms this intuition, also illustrating that the leader's ex ante payoff is naturally increasing in N .




Figure 3: Leader's expected payoff as a function of the number of followers, for various levels of covariance. Other parameter values: $\phi = \mu = \sigma = 1$.

¹²It is clear that the second term does not depend on N or α_F . As for the trading costs, it can be shown that, in equilibrium, price impact in (10) simplifies to $\frac{\text{Cov}(\Psi_1, X_T^L + X_T^F)}{\text{Var}(\Psi_1)} = \frac{\alpha_L[(1 + \alpha_L)\phi + \rho]}{\alpha_L^2 \phi + \sigma^2}$, which is independent of N and α_F ; this follows from the first-period order flow not carrying the followers' trades, and from their additional value to the firm being unpredictable from the market maker's perspective. In particular, N is relevant for first-period price impact only insofar as it affects α_L in the leader's strategy.

Second, while the leader also benefits from the extra trading intensity in a simultaneous-move interaction, one would expect this benefit to be lower than if moving first. In Lemma B.1 in the Appendix, we confirm this intuition for the case $\rho = 1$ (which simplifies the updating in the simultaneous-move game): the leader’s ex ante payoff in the sequential version net of the simultaneous-move counterpart also grows in proportion to \sqrt{N} for N large. Third, it is easy to see that all the aforementioned benefits of acting as a leader would be even higher if instead all the followers are *exact replicas* of our original one in the baseline model, as both the variance and covariance of their total position grow with N .

Collecting the findings from Sections 5.1–5.3, we conclude that our model and proposed mechanism are more likely in engagements involving (i) similar activists, (ii) all having small to moderate stakes, and (iii) in situations where multiple follower activists trade in a non-cooperative way subsequently after the leader has built her stake. This is the topic of the next section, where we discuss the evidence on “wolf pack activism:” multiple *hedge funds*—and hence, activists that are inherently of similar nature—engaging with a target firm while each in possession of a relatively small block, and with the distinctive feature that a leader turns out to be followed by a pack of hedge-fund activist counterparts.

6 Application: Wolf-Pack Activism

From an institutional viewpoint, our findings rest on three assumptions: (i) activism is a costly endeavor after building a stake; (ii) activists act in a non-cooperative way; and (iii) follower activists respond to arbitrage opportunities. The studies of Becht et al. (2017) and Brav et al. (2008) in the empirical finance literature, as well as Briggs (2007), Coffee Jr and Palia (2016) and Bebchuk et al. (2015) in the law literature studying corporate governance, are instructive in this regard.

Costly activism. Activists may seek to accomplish a variety of outcomes in target firms, the planning and execution of which is a costly activity: simpler restructurings such as board changes; intermediate ones such as changes in capital structure (e.g., payout policy) and governance (e.g., organizational structure); and more complex ones such as takeovers, spin-offs or even selling the firm. Gantchev (2013) presents estimates of these costs: on average, making direct demands costs \$2.94M; board representation costs \$1.83M; and a final proxy battle costs \$5.94M, for a total cost of \$10.71M (sum of three stages). Moreover, even analyzing how to vote on a proposed change by an “insurgent” entails costs, reflected in the outsourcing of these duties to “proxy” advisors that lowers overhead costs.¹³ With additional

¹³Coffee Jr and Palia (2016), p. 16.

share value benefiting all shareholders, a well-recognized free-riding problem naturally arises.

Non-cooperative behavior. There are substantial costs associated with being perceived as a “group” from the standpoint of Section 13(d)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act.¹⁴ At the core of these is that any activist must disclose her position within 10 days of exceeding a total 5% ownership level — an organized group of activists is thus treated as a single entity that owns a block equal to the sum of its components, with all the identities revealed in the event of disclosure. From this perspective, there are potential legal fees if the target firm alleges a violation of disclosure requirements; in contrast, if these activists were below the 5% threshold and acted non-cooperatively, then due to their anonymity the firm would not be aware of them. Also, there are costs associated with disclosure: since a group must disclose earlier *ceteris paribus*, it necessarily invites undesired competition that makes it costly to achieve any desired block size; and the target firm may bar the acquisition of more shares by the group members, which may preclude the success of any engagement.

That said, changes in SEC regulations since 1992 imply that activists can communicate in a limited manner without this being characterized as insider trading or trading as a group—unless an explicit agreement is in place, which is argued to be a rare phenomenon (e.g., [Becht et al., 2017](#)). Consequently, activists can be aware of each other’s existence. The rise of hedge fund activism—which we discuss next—is partly attributed to the resulting improved knowledge regarding the economic environment.¹⁵

Sensitivity to arbitrage opportunities. The activist ecosystem is multifaceted, featuring blockholders that are active in expressing their voice and shaking firms (Carl Icahn, Elliott); index funds that are largely passive in that they limit themselves to voting; and in between, blockholders that mainly trade but may make their voice heard ([Edmans and Holderness, 2017](#)). In the last decade, hedge fund activism has had a meteoric rise, demonstrating greater participation from the latter category of blockholders. For instance, [Becht et al. \(2017\)](#) document that in the period 2000-2010, hedge funds were involved in at least 1,740 engagements: of these, more than a quarter involved multiple funds jointly targeting the same firm, and those multiplayer interventions achieved better performance.

Two points are noteworthy here. First, hedge funds hold more concentrated portfolios especially relative to index funds, so their trading is inherently more short term and highly sensitive to arbitrage opportunities—thus, they are natural candidates for our theory.¹⁶ Sec-

¹⁴Ibid 24—26.

¹⁵For more on this topic, see [Briggs \(2007\)](#).

¹⁶“What we do know is that the targets of hedge funds are not randomly distributed, but rather tend to have some common characteristics, including in most (but not all) studies a low Tobin’s Q, below average leverage, a low dividend payout, and a “value,” as opposed to “growth,” orientation.” Ibid, p. 5.

ond, crucially, there is important suggestive evidence of sequentiality in hedge fund activism: multiple hedge funds of small or moderate size that attack a target firm in a parallel, and apparently non-cooperative, manner after a lead hedge fund has built a stake in it—a phenomenon termed *wolf-pack activism* in the law literature examining corporate governance.

The argument supporting this leader-follower type of activism rests on a combination of incentives and empirics. On incentives, hedge funds face important costs above 10% ownership on top of the disclosure costs above the 5% threshold.¹⁷ Further, these entities obviously benefit from less competitive environments when building their stakes. Second, on empirics, it has been documented that when hedge-fund activism occurs, much of the stock appreciation or abnormality occurs in the 10 days before disclosure (e.g., [Brav et al., 2008](#)).

The first part of the argument then implies that a hedge fund is likely to end up acquiring less than 10% stake, which means that less than half of the terminal position is acquired in the ten days before disclosure; and in order to avoid competition, such purchases are likely to be materialized as early as possible. But if a hedge fund leader is likely to accumulate only a moderate extra stake during the 10-day window, and to do it rather quickly, it must be that *other* hedge funds are responsible for the subsequent unprecedented trading volume and price movement that is observed in practice over the 10-day period. The work of [Bebchuk et al. \(2013\)](#) is important in this regard: they find that (i) the median stake of hedge fund activists is of 6.3%; (ii) that hedge fund leader’s trades occur primarily in the day the 5% window is crossed and the day after; and that (iii) a substantial fraction of purchases by other hedge funds occur throughout the window.¹⁸

Applied relevance. The previous facts offer a strong support for our model and findings. First, that these “wolf packs” consist mostly of hedge funds—a particular type of investor within the activist ecosystem—is a clear sign of strong similarity. Second, as argued, their blocks are typically small, to the point that the identity of many is not disclosed due to their stakes remaining below 5%.¹⁹ Third, since limited communication is permitted, a hedge-fund evaluating an engagement may develop a good idea of the potential size of the pack, which may prompt her to act as a leader.

From this perspective, one understudied aspect of multi-agent activism is how an activist induces other blockholders to buy shares in the target firm. Our paper offers a non-cooperative price manipulation mechanism through which followers can be influenced via the

¹⁷For instance, the short swing rule or Section 16(b) of the Securities Act gives the issuer the right to ask a hedge fund holding over 10% to return any profits from reversal trades over a 6 month period.

¹⁸See pp. 23-24 in [Bebchuk et al. \(2013\)](#) and also footnotes 56 and 61 in [Coffee Jr and Palia \(2016\)](#).

¹⁹A prominent recent example is the case of Sotheby’s proxy contest in 2014 (see [Coffee Jr and Palia, 2016](#)). There, the initial activist (Third Point LLC) held 9.62% in the firm, but other hedge funds who came subsequently (the wolf pack), many of them undisclosed, held 23.24% collectively.

channel of exploiting arbitrage opportunities—to a first-order approximation, precisely the element unifying hedge funds’ businesses models. Further, due to their similar stakes, our mechanism predicts that a leader hedge fund would build her position less aggressively than if she acted in isolation. While this points to an inefficiency, our results show that this is still desirable relative to the case in which the leader is not present, in line with the evidence on the performance of multiplayer engagements.

7 Other Linear Equilibria and Refinement

So far we have explored linear equilibria exhibiting a positive weight on initial positions: that is, high types build their positions more (or de-accumulate less) than low types due to their more attractive arbitrage opportunities. In this section, we relax this restriction by exploring if and when one or both activists in fact trade *against* their private information. This can happen because the the activists exhibit coordination motives that are self-fulfilling.

To build intuition, suppose that the activists start “long” on the firm (i.e., $X_0^L, X_0^F > 0$), a likely outcome when types are positively correlated. Further, suppose that the leader expects the follower to acquire a substantial short position on the firm’s value, i.e., $\alpha_F < 0$, potentially indicative of negative effort by the follower. The leader may then find it profitable to acquire a short position so as to build a negative terminal position too, as this would yield a positive surplus due to both players exerting negative effort. By the same logic, the follower would choose $\alpha_F < 0$. Importantly, while this type of coordination can rely on the firm potentially taking a negative value, it should not be disregarded as implausible in practice.²⁰ Indeed, it simply reflects the idea that acquiring a negative position can be profitable if it triggers a mechanism that ends up reducing a firm’s value, such as when it precludes undertaking a value-enhancing action.²¹ For instance, if our leader was able to short-sell—i.e., sell *borrowed* shares—she could profit from a reduced, yet positive, value of the firm, an incentive that would be stronger if she expected others to do the same.

Formally, Proposition A.1 in the Appendix characterizes the set of linear equilibria as solutions to (i) a set of equations for the coefficients in the activists strategies and (ii) a set of inequalities that include conditions for concavity in both activists’ problems. In particular,

²⁰Specifically, if a leader with a positive initial position reverses it, her effort will be negative; and if this position is sufficiently large, her payoff can be positive.

²¹See Goldstein and Guembel (2008) in the context of a speculator and a manager who has can make an investment decision.

it is shown there that leader's and follower's signaling coefficients satisfy

$$\alpha_L = \frac{\sigma^2}{\phi\alpha_L} + \underbrace{\frac{\rho\alpha_F}{\phi(1+\alpha_L) + \rho(1+\alpha_F)}}_{=\frac{\beta_F}{1-\beta_F}} \quad \text{and} \quad \alpha_F^2 = \frac{\sigma^2}{\gamma_1^F}, \quad (23)$$

respectively. That is, the equation for the leader's coefficient α_L carries a “Kyle component” $\sigma^2/\phi\alpha_L$ plus a correction term stemming from the value of manipulation in any linear equilibrium.²² As for the follower, the corresponding coefficient can only take the standard form, $\sqrt{\sigma^2/\gamma_1^F}$, or its negative, $-\sqrt{\sigma^2/\gamma_1^F}$.

We are interested in conditions under which such equilibria exhibiting $\alpha_L < 0$ or $\alpha_F < 0$ can emerge. The next result offers a glimpse into this question.

Proposition 6. (i) *Positive correlation: If $\rho > 0$, then for sufficiently large $\sigma > 0$, there exists a linear equilibrium in which α_L and α_F are strictly negative.*

(ii) *Perfect negative correlation: If $\rho = -\phi$, there is no linear equilibrium with α_L and α_F have the same sign. A linear equilibrium in which $\alpha_L < 0 < \alpha_F$ exists for all $\sigma > 0$.*

According to part (i), if correlation is positive, both activists can trade against their positions provided the volatility of the noise traders is large. That is, the possibility of coordination emerges precisely when the leader's manipulation ability is limited by the reduced responsiveness of the market maker's belief. Part (ii) then exploits the analytical convenience of the case of perfect negative correlation to demonstrate that the weights on initial positions naturally must have opposite signs across activists in that case: in particular, the leader trades against her initial position to go on the same side of the follower. Consequently, fixing the volatility of noise traders $\sigma > 0$, as ρ falls from ϕ to $-\phi$: equilibria with negative weights on positions for both players can co-exist with the PBS one when correlation is positive; as ρ falls into the negative domain, equilibria with different signs on initial positions can emerge; eventually, as ρ approximates $-\phi$, only the latter type of equilibria are possible.

This brings us to the topic of the lower bound $\underline{\rho} < 0$ in Proposition 2, which guarantees the existence of our main equilibrium under study (and that is always unique within the PBS class). Specifically, recall that in a standard one-shot Kyle model, the only force limiting a trader's orders—i.e., putting limits to arbitrage—is price impact. In the current model, however, there is also the possibility of manipulation. With positive correlation, therefore,

²²The equation for α_L is the analog of (21) for δ_L from in Section 4.2. The “Kyle component” terminology originates from the equation for α_L admitting the solution $\sqrt{\sigma^2/\phi}$ absent the manipulation term. Further, from footnote 6, we deduce that this component corresponds to $\frac{1}{(1-\beta_F)\Lambda_1} \frac{\partial}{\partial X_0^L} (\mathbb{E}_L[W_L + W_F] - P_1)$ while the manipulation correction is $\frac{\beta_F}{1-\beta_F}$.

more aggressive trading carries the extra cost of lowering the follower’s contribution to the firm. By contrast, with negative correlation, trading more aggressively is beneficial in that it encourages the follower to exert effort, a force that goes against price impact.

Consequently, aside from the extra convexity stemming from the complementarity between the leader’s terminal position and effort, the leader’s problem is more “concave” than traditional ones when $\rho > 0$, and so a PBS equilibrium always exists. By contrast, the problem gains *convexity* when $\rho < 0$. This latter issue can be severe in that, fixing $\sigma > 0$, there is always a threshold $\underline{\rho} < 0$ depending on σ such that if $\rho < \underline{\rho}$ the leader’s second-order condition is not satisfied by pairs $\alpha_L > 0$ and $\alpha_F > 0$.

The dual role that order flow volatility plays is now apparent. First, for any level of covariance, lowering σ increases the leader’s ability to manipulate the continuation game, making the coordination equilibrium less likely to arise. Second, for negative covariance, lowering σ increases price impact due to the order flow becoming more informative, which introduces concavity in the leader’s problem and thus makes our PBS equilibrium more likely to arise. The next result offers a strong “refining” result in this respect.

Proposition 7. *Suppose that $\rho \in (-\phi, \phi)$. Then for sufficiently small but positive σ , a PBS equilibrium exists and is the unique equilibrium within the linear class.*

Thus, market illiquidity not only refines our PBS equilibrium in regions where it exists, but it also expands its range of existence without other equilibria emerging.

8 Conclusion

We have developed a model of activism where first-mover advantages shape firm values and financial markets through the channel of strategic trading. This is an important question because multiple blockholders influence management in practice, and their blocks—which determine willingness to intervene—are endogenous. Hence, games of influence emerge.

A key advantage of the model is that it is both simple and realistic. The former feature is leveraged to provide clean insights into a natural form of leadership in financial markets, paralleling Stackelberg treatments of oligopolistic markets that have become benchmarks for understanding core incentives in industrial organization. But the model is also realistic in that the form of market leadership discussed has been documented in practice, with several key institutional details and empirical findings matching our assumptions and results. We now discuss some modeling choices, while shedding light on potential future work.

The endogeneity of the firm’s fundamentals is key for our manipulation strategy to arise, a fact that is supported by the extensive literature on Kyle models that feature traditional

equilibrium strategies depending on gaps only. However, with sequential trading over two rounds, endogeneity is not enough, as the market maker would not necessarily learn about the follower’s position from a first-period order flow that only carries leader’s trades. Non-trivial initial correlation among initial positions opens this latter channel: this assumption is economically meaningful—e.g., hedge funds with similar trading strategies and access to funding that results in similar blocks in a statistical sense—and clearly the generic case.

From this perspective, we would expect our mechanism to be at play in a fully dynamic setting with repeated rounds of simultaneous trading among multiple activists, even if positions are initially independent. In fact, from an incentives standpoint, the presence of all activists in every round implies that the market maker will rely on the public history to forecast each activist’s terminal position at all times; but this means that each activist will have an incentive to manipulate the market maker’s belief about the other activists’ positions so as to induce them to acquire larger positions.²³ In the process, positions will naturally acquire correlation as the activists condition their trades on the observed prices.²⁴

Finally, in line with most of the literature, we have not forced the leader to reveal her position; but as argued, activists must disclose their blocks—and further, their intended actions—when ownership exceeds 5%. Our model is still relevant for three reasons. First, in many large firms activists generally do not accumulate 5%, yet still attack: in 2021, for instance, such “under the threshold” campaigns were a majority in the U.S., with an average market capitalization that was substantially higher than those that had to disclose.²⁵ Second, as stated in Section 6, since filing can occur with a delay of as much as 10 days, other activists can (and do) trade in the interim—that our game ends in the “third” period can then be understood as a subsequent disclosure act that reveals activists’ actions, and hence firm value. Third, methods such as total return swaps and over-the-counter derivatives can be used to circumvent filing. That said, we would expect our leader to randomize by “noising up” her trade as in [Huddart et al. \(2001\)](#) if disclosure were mandatory for all ranges as in their model, thus preserving her ability to manipulate the market maker’s belief. We leave this and other questions for future research.

²³A similar analog between fully dynamic and Stackelberg analyses arises in the oligopoly model of [Bonatti et al. \(2017\)](#), where manipulation via overproduction is reminiscent of leader-follower Cournot incentives.

²⁴Activists’ beliefs would also be private in such a dynamic version due to individual trades depending on privately observed positions and the order flow carrying the sum of activists’ trades. The ensuing “beliefs about beliefs” problem can be handled using the techniques in [Foster and Viswanathan \(1996\)](#) nonetheless.

²⁵<https://www.cnbc.com/2022/01/15/activist-hedge-funds-launched-89-campaigns-in-2021-heres-how-they-fared.html>.

A Appendix: Proofs

A.1 Preliminaries

We begin by stating a proposition that characterizes equilibria via a system of equations and inequality conditions derived from the players' first and second order conditions and the pricing equations. The first half of the proposition below provides necessary conditions for equilibrium. The second half of the proposition is a strong converse: it shows that we can focus on the system of equations for the signaling coefficients (α_F, α_L) ; these coefficients determine price impact and therefore pin down the remaining coefficients.

Proposition A.1. *The strategy coefficients $(\alpha_F, \beta_F, \delta_F, \alpha_L, \delta_L)$ together with a pricing rule defined by (10)-(13) characterize an equilibrium only if $\Lambda_1 \neq 0$, $\Lambda_2 \neq 0$, $\beta_F \neq 1$, $\phi(1 + \alpha_L) + \rho \neq 0$, and*

$$\alpha_F^2 = \sigma^2 / \gamma_1^F, \quad (\text{A.1})$$

$$\beta_F = -\frac{\rho}{\phi(1 + \alpha_L) + \rho} \alpha_F, \quad (\text{A.2})$$

$$\delta_F = \frac{(\alpha_L + \delta_L)\rho - \alpha_L\phi - (\phi - \rho)}{\phi(1 + \alpha_L) + \rho} \alpha_F, \quad (\text{A.3})$$

$$\alpha_L = \frac{\sigma^2}{\phi\alpha_L} + \frac{\rho\alpha_F}{\phi(1 + \alpha_L) + \rho(1 + \alpha_F)}, \quad (\text{A.4})$$

$$\delta_L = -\frac{\sigma^2}{\phi\alpha_L} \quad (\text{A.5})$$

$$0 \geq \sigma^2 - \alpha_L^2\phi - 2\alpha_L[\rho(1 + \alpha_F) + \phi], \quad (\text{A.6})$$

$$0 \geq -\alpha_F[\sigma^2(\phi + \rho(1 + \alpha_L)) + \alpha_L^2(\phi^2 - \rho^2)]. \quad (\text{A.7})$$

Conversely, suppose (α_F, α_L) satisfy (A.1), (A.4), (A.6)-(A.7), and $\phi(1 + \alpha_L) + \rho \neq 0$. Then (i) $(\beta_F, \delta_F, \delta_L)$ are well defined via (A.2), (A.3), and (A.5), with $\beta_F \neq 1$; (ii) $\Lambda_1 \neq 0$ and $\Lambda_2 \neq 0$ are well defined via (10) and (13); and (iii) the associated strategies and pricing rule constitute an equilibrium.

Proof. We first establish necessity, starting with the follower's conditions. Expanding the follower's first order condition (15) at the candidate strategy (6) yields an expression that is linear in (X_0^F, P_1, μ) , which must be identically zero over $(X_0^F, P_1, \mu) \in \mathbb{R}^3$. Hence, the coefficients on each variable (X_0^F, P_1, μ) must be zero, delivering three equations:

$$0 = \frac{\tilde{\Lambda}_2}{\gamma_1^F} (\sigma^2 - \alpha_F^2 \gamma_1^F), \quad (\text{A.8})$$

$$0 = -\frac{\tilde{\Lambda}_2}{\gamma_1^F} \left[\frac{\rho\sigma^2(1-\beta_F)}{\phi(1+\alpha_L) + \rho(1+\alpha_F)} + \beta_F\alpha_F\gamma_1^F \right], \quad (\text{A.9})$$

$$0 = \frac{\tilde{\Lambda}_2}{\gamma_1^F} \left[-\sigma^2 + \frac{(2+\alpha_F+\alpha_L+\delta_F+\delta_L)\rho\sigma^2}{\phi(1+\alpha_L) + \rho(1+\alpha_F)} - \alpha_F\delta_F\gamma_1^F \right], \quad (\text{A.10})$$

where $\tilde{\Lambda}_2 := \frac{\gamma_1^F}{\alpha_F^2\gamma_1^F + \sigma^2} \times [1 + \alpha_F + \rho_1/\gamma_1^F]$. We argue that in any linear equilibrium, the right hand sides are well defined and $\tilde{\Lambda}_2 \neq 0$. First, $\gamma_1^F > 0$ for any (finite) α_F . Second, (18) implies $\Lambda_2 \neq 0$, so $\tilde{\Lambda}_2$ is well defined and nonzero. Third, $\Lambda_1 \neq 0$ implies $\phi(1+\alpha_L) + \rho(1+\alpha_F) \neq 0$ in the denominators in (A.9) and (A.10).

We can now derive (A.1)-(A.3) and (A.7). Since $\tilde{\Lambda}_2 \neq 0$ is necessary for equilibrium, (A.8) reduces to (A.1). (Note that this implies $\alpha_F \neq 0$.) Using this fact to write $\alpha_F\gamma_1^F = \sigma^2/\alpha_F$, (A.9) reduces to

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &= -\frac{\tilde{\Lambda}_2}{\gamma_1^F} \left[\frac{\rho\sigma^2(1-\beta_F)}{\phi(1+\alpha_L) + \rho(1+\alpha_F)} + \beta_F\frac{\sigma^2}{\alpha_F} \right] \\ &= -\frac{\tilde{\Lambda}_2\sigma^2}{\gamma_1^F\alpha_F[\phi(1+\alpha_L) + \rho(1+\alpha_F)]} [\rho\alpha_F + \beta_F[\phi(1+\alpha_L) + \rho]]. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.11})$$

We claim that $\phi(1+\alpha_L) + \rho \neq 0$ in equilibrium. By way of contradiction, if $\phi(1+\alpha_L) + \rho = 0$, then (A.11) implies $\alpha_F = 0$ or $\rho = 0$. Equation (A.1) rules out $\alpha_F = 0$. And if $\rho = 0$, we have $\alpha_L = -1$, and thus $\Lambda_1 = 0$, violating the leader's SOC. Hence, $\phi(1+\alpha_L) + \rho \neq 0$, and (A.11) reduces to (A.2). Analogous arguments yield (A.3) from (A.10). Lastly, using (A.1) to eliminate α_F^2 terms, the follower's SOC (18) reduces to (A.7).

Next, we derive the leader's conditions (A.4)-(A.5) and (A.6). For the leader, the FOC (16) must hold for all $(X_0^L, \mu) \in \mathbb{R}^2$. Setting the coefficients on these variables to 0 and using (A.1) and (A.2), it is straightforward to show that the leader's FOC reduces to (A.4)-(A.5) where $\alpha_L \neq 0$ in equilibrium since the leader's SOC implies $\Lambda_2 \neq 0$. The leader's SOC is equivalent to (A.6).

For the sufficiency half of the proposition, take (α_F, α_L) as in the statement. Note that (A.6) can be rewritten as $\sigma^2 + \alpha_L^2\phi - 2\alpha_L[\rho(1+\alpha_F) + \phi(1+\alpha_L)] \leq 0$, which implies $\alpha_L \neq 0$ and $\phi(1+\alpha_L) + \rho(1+\alpha_F) \neq 0$. Hence, the right hand side of (A.4) is well defined. Given that $\phi(1+\alpha_L) + \rho \neq 0$ by supposition, (β_F, δ_F) are well defined by (A.2)-(A.3). Further, $\phi(1+\alpha_L) + \rho(1+\alpha_F) \neq 0$ implies that $1 \neq -\frac{\rho\alpha_F}{\phi(1+\alpha_L) + \rho} = \beta_F$. This establishes (i). It follows that Λ_1 and Λ_2 are well defined by (10) and (13), respectively. Moreover, by construction, (A.6)-(A.7) imply (17)-(18), so $\Lambda_1 \neq 0$ and $\Lambda_2 \neq 0$, establishing (ii).

For part (iii) of the sufficiency claim, observe that since the players' best responses problems are quadratic, it suffices to check first and second order conditions. Given that

the inequalities $\Lambda_1 \neq 0$, $\Lambda_2 \neq 0$, $\beta_F \neq 1$, $\phi(1 + \alpha_L) + \rho \neq 0$ are satisfied, the equations (A.1)-(A.5) imply the FOCs (15) and (16) by construction, and as noted for part (ii), the SOC (17) and (18) are satisfied. \square

A.2 Proof of Proposition 1

By Proposition A.1, α_F must satisfy (A.1), so either $\alpha_F = \alpha_{F,1} := \sqrt{\frac{\sigma^2}{\gamma_1^F}}$ or $\alpha_F = \alpha_{F,2} := -\sqrt{\frac{\sigma^2}{\gamma_1^F}}$. Since $\alpha_F > 0$ in any PBS equilibrium (by definition), $\alpha_F = \alpha_{F,1}$. Consequently, β_F and δ_F are characterized by (A.2)-(A.3). To sign β_F , recall that $\alpha_F, \alpha_L > 0$ and $|\rho| \leq \phi$, so $\text{sign}(\beta_F) = -\text{sign}(\rho)$ via (A.2). Similarly, from (A.3), $\text{sign}(\delta_F) = \text{sign}((\alpha_L + \delta_L)\rho - \alpha_L\phi - (\phi - \rho))$. This is unambiguously negative, since $(\alpha_L + \delta_L)\rho \leq 0$ by Proposition 2, and since $\alpha_L\phi > 0$ and $\phi - \rho \geq 0$ by assumption.

We now establish that $\beta_F < 1$. For $\rho > 0$, this is immediate since $\beta_F < 0$. For $\rho < 0$, as we show in the proof of Proposition 2 (which does not rely on the current result), in a PBS equilibrium, $\alpha_L > \alpha^F$ when $\rho < 0$. Hence, when $\rho < 0$, we have $\alpha_L > \frac{(\alpha^F)^2}{\alpha_L} = \frac{\sigma^2}{\phi\alpha_L}$. In light of equation (A.4) for α_L derived from the leader's first order condition, this implies $\frac{\beta_F}{1-\beta_F} > 0$. This, in turn, implies $\beta_F \in (0, 1)$. For the case $\rho = 0$, we show below that $\beta_F = 0$ in the unique equilibrium, also satisfying the inequality $\beta_F < 1$.

Next, we verify that in any linear equilibrium (PBS or otherwise), the follower's strategy has the form (19) for $\alpha_F = \alpha_{F,1}$ or $\alpha_F = \alpha_{F,2}$. First, express M_1^F in terms of P_1 and μ by using (9) to replace the surprise term $\Psi_1 - \mu(\alpha_L + \delta_L)$ in (8):

$$M_1^F = \mu + \frac{\alpha_L \rho}{\alpha_L^2 \phi + \sigma^2} \frac{P_1 - P_0}{\Lambda_1}, \quad (\text{A.12})$$

where P_0 is linear in μ (see (B.1)). Substituting (A.12) into (19) then yields an expression for the follower's strategy in which the coefficient on X_0^F is $\alpha_{F,i}$, and the coefficients on (P_1, μ) equal $(\beta_{F,i}, \delta_{F,i})$ when (A.2)-(A.3) hold.

Finally, when $\rho = 0$, note that (A.7) becomes $-\alpha_F[\sigma^2\phi + \alpha_L^2] \leq 0$, which is satisfied by $\alpha_F = \alpha_{F,1}$ and not $\alpha_F = \alpha_{F,2}$. Equation (A.4) yields $\alpha_L = \pm\alpha^K$. Of these, only $\alpha_L = \alpha^K$ satisfies (A.6). Given $(\alpha_F, \alpha_L) = (\alpha^K, \alpha^K)$, $(\beta_F, \delta_F, \delta_L) = (0, -\alpha^K, -\alpha^K)$ is the unique solution to (A.2), (A.3), and (A.5).

A.3 Proof of Proposition 2

In light of Proposition A.1, we begin by rearranging (A.4) to a convenient form. By multiplying through (A.4) by the denominators on the right hand side and rearranging terms, we

obtain

$$\alpha_F \rho [\sigma^2 - \alpha_L(1 + \alpha_L)\phi] = (\rho + \phi + \phi\alpha_L)(\alpha_L^2\phi - \sigma^2). \quad (\text{A.13})$$

Note that we can also recover (A.4) from (A.13) provided our solution satisfies (A.6): from the proof of Proposition A.1, (A.6) implies $\alpha_L \neq 0$ and $\phi(1 + \alpha_L) + \rho(1 + \alpha_F) \neq 0$ in the denominators in (A.4). Hence, Proposition A.1 remains true if we replace (A.4) with (A.13).

We now derive a single equation for α_L by solving (A.13) for α_F and substituting $\alpha_F = \alpha_{F,1}$. To that end, we claim that $\sigma^2 - \alpha_L(1 + \alpha_L)\phi \neq 0$ in any solution to (A.13) for which $\alpha_L > 0$. Indeed, $\alpha_L > 0$ implies $\phi(1 + \alpha_L) + \rho > 0$. Thus, if $\sigma^2 - \alpha_L(1 + \alpha_L)\phi = 0$, then (A.13) implies $\sigma^2 - \alpha_L^2\phi = 0$, which is impossible. Hence, we can solve for α_F in (A.13). Since $\alpha_F = \alpha_{F,1}$ in any PBS equilibrium by Proposition 1, (A.13) is equivalent to

$$\sqrt{\frac{\sigma^4 + \alpha_L^2\sigma^2\phi}{\sigma^2\phi + \alpha_L^2(\phi^2 - \rho^2)}} = \frac{(\rho + \phi + \phi\alpha_L)(\alpha_L^2\phi - \sigma^2)}{\rho[\sigma^2 - \alpha_L(1 + \alpha_L)\phi]}. \quad (\text{A.14})$$

Define $\hat{\alpha} := \frac{-\phi + \sqrt{\phi^2 + 4\sigma^2\phi}}{2\phi} > 0$ to be the positive root of the denominator on the right side of (A.14). Note that $\alpha^K > \hat{\alpha}$.

We now prove the proposition for $\rho \in (0, \phi]$; we address negative ρ via Proposition A.2 below, which is proved in the Supplementary Appendix.

Let $L(\alpha_L)$ and $R(\alpha_L)$ denote the left and right sides of (A.14). L is positive and strictly increasing in α_L for $\alpha_L \geq 0$. Meanwhile, R is continuous on $[0, \hat{\alpha}) \cup (\hat{\alpha}, +\infty)$ and satisfies $R(\hat{\alpha}-) = -\infty$, $R(\hat{\alpha}+) = +\infty$, and $R(\alpha^K) = 0$. Further,

$$R'(\alpha_L) = -\phi \frac{(\alpha_L^2\phi - \sigma^2)^2 + (\rho + \phi)(\alpha_L^2 + \sigma^2) + 2\alpha_L^3\phi^2}{\rho[\sigma^2 - \alpha_L(1 + \alpha_L)\phi]^2}, \quad (\text{A.15})$$

which is unambiguously strictly negative when $\rho > 0$ and $\alpha_L \in [0, \hat{\alpha}) \cup (\hat{\alpha}, +\infty)$. Thus, R is strictly decreasing on $(\hat{\alpha}, +\infty)$, so there exists a solution to (A.14) on $(\hat{\alpha}, \alpha^K)$ and this is the only solution on $(\hat{\alpha}, +\infty)$. Since $L(0) > 0$, while $R(0) = -(\rho + \phi)/\rho < 0 < L(0)$ (given $\rho > 0$), there is no solution on $[0, \hat{\alpha})$, so this solution is the unique among $\alpha_L \geq 0$. And by (A.5), $\alpha_L < \alpha^K$ implies $\alpha^K < -\delta_L$ (and $\delta_L < 0$).

It remains only to verify SOC's. For the leader, note that since $\alpha_L, \alpha_F > 0$, (A.6) is bounded above by $\sigma^2 - \alpha_L^2\phi - \alpha_L\phi$, which is negative since $\alpha_L > \hat{\alpha}$. For the follower, (A.7) holds by inspection for $\rho > 0$ since $\alpha_L > 0$ and $\alpha_F > 0$.

Proposition A.2 below establishes the part of the proposition for negative ρ . (Note that it establishes uniqueness within the broader class of linear equilibria, and it also applies to

small positive ρ .)

Proposition A.2. *If $|\rho| > 0$ is sufficiently small, there exists a unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium, $\alpha_L > 0$ and $\alpha_F > 0$. Moreover, if $\rho > 0$, $\alpha_L < \frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{\phi}} < -\delta_L$, and if $\rho < 0$, $\alpha_L > \frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{\phi}} > -\delta_L$.*

Proof. Assume throughout that $\rho \neq 0$. We begin by characterizing candidate equilibrium values of α_L ; later in the proof, we will prove uniqueness by checking SOC's.

We claim that if $|\rho|$ is sufficiently small, then for any solution to (A.13), $\sigma^2 - \alpha_L(1 + \alpha_L)\phi \neq 0$, allowing us to divide through by $\rho[\sigma^2 - \alpha_L(1 + \alpha_L)]$ to solve for α_F in (A.13). Indeed, if $\sigma^2 - \alpha_L(1 + \alpha_L)\phi = 0$, then (A.13) implies either (i) $\alpha_L = \frac{\rho + \phi}{\phi}$ or (ii) $\alpha_L^2 = \sigma^2/\phi$. In case (i), we have $\sigma^2 - \alpha_L(1 + \alpha_L)\phi = \sigma^2 - \frac{\rho(\rho + \phi)}{\phi}$ which is strictly positive for $|\rho|$ sufficiently small, a contradiction. And case (ii) is clearly impossible if $\sigma^2 - \alpha_L(1 + \alpha_L)\phi = 0$. Thus, we can isolate α_F : for any pair (α_L, α_F) solving (A.1) and (A.13), either (i) $\alpha_F = \alpha_{F,1}$ and α_L satisfies (A.14), or (ii) $\alpha_F = \alpha_{F,2}$ and

$$-\sqrt{\frac{\sigma^4 + \alpha_L^2 \sigma^2 \phi}{\sigma^2 \phi + \alpha_L^2 (-(\rho)^2 + (\phi)^2)}} = \frac{(\rho + \phi + \phi \alpha_L)(\alpha_L^2 \phi - \sigma^2)}{\rho[\sigma^2 - \alpha_L(1 + \alpha_L)\phi]}. \quad (\text{A.16})$$

We call any such a pair (α_L, α_F) a *candidate signaling pair*.

The rest of the analysis proceeds as follows. We construct two candidate signaling pairs (α_L^*, α_F^*) and (α_L^b, α_F^b) . We then show that for small $|\rho|$, these are the only candidate signaling pairs satisfying the leader's second order condition, and among them, only (α_L^*, α_F^*) satisfies the follower's second order condition. We then invoke the second part of Proposition A.1 to establish existence of a unique equilibrium based on (α_L^*, α_F^*) .

We claim that if $\rho < 0$, there exists $\alpha_L^* \in (\alpha^K, \infty)$ solving (A.14) and $\alpha_L^b \in (\hat{\alpha}, \alpha^K)$ solving (A.16). Analogous arguments for the case $\rho > 0$ establish the existence of $\alpha_L^* \in (\hat{\alpha}, \alpha^K)$ and $\alpha_L^b \in (\alpha^K, \infty)$; we omit this case for brevity. In either case, we will ultimately show that α_L^* is the unique equilibrium value of α_L for small $|\rho|$. Let $R(\alpha_L)$ denote the right hand side common to (A.14) and (A.16). Note that R is continuous on $(\hat{\alpha}, \infty)$, and has the properties $\lim_{\alpha_L \rightarrow +\infty} R(\alpha_L) = +\infty$, $\lim_{\alpha_L \downarrow \hat{\alpha}} R(\alpha_L) = -\infty$, and $R(\alpha^K) = 0$. The left hand side of (A.14) is strictly positive for all α_L , so by the intermediate value theorem, there exists a solution $\alpha_L^* \in (\alpha^K, \infty)$ to (A.14). Similarly, the left hand side of (A.16) is strictly negative for all α_L , so by the intermediate value theorem, there exists a solution $\alpha_L^b \in (\hat{\alpha}, \alpha^K)$ to (A.16).

Define $\alpha_F^* := \alpha_{F,1}(\alpha_L^*)$ and define $\alpha_F^b = \alpha_{F,2}(\alpha_L^b)$. By definition, both (α_L^*, α_F^*) and (α_L^b, α_F^b) are candidate signaling pairs.

To assess other candidate signaling pairs, we derive a polynomial equation such that (α_L, α_F) is a candidate signaling pair only if α_L is a root of this equation. By squaring either

(A.14) or (A.16), we obtain a necessary condition

$$\frac{\sigma^4 + \alpha_L^2 \sigma^2 \phi}{\sigma^2 \phi + \alpha_L^2 (-(\rho)^2 + (\phi)^2)} = \left(\frac{(\rho + \phi + \phi \alpha_L)(\alpha_L^2 \phi - \sigma^2)}{\rho[\sigma^2 - \alpha_L(1 + \alpha_L)\phi]} \right)^2, \quad (\text{A.17})$$

and by cross multiplying, an eighth-degree polynomial equation

$$0 = Q(\alpha_L; \rho) = \sum_{i=0}^8 A_i \alpha_L^i, \quad \text{where} \quad (\text{A.18})$$

$$\begin{aligned} A_8 &= -\phi^4(\phi^2 - \rho^2), \\ A_7 &= -2(\phi - \rho)\phi^3(\rho + \phi)^2, \\ A_6 &= \phi^2(\rho^2 - \phi^2)[\rho^2 + 2\rho\phi + \phi(-\sigma^2 + \phi)], \\ A_5 &= 2\sigma^2\phi^2[-2\rho^3 - \rho^2\phi + \rho\phi^2 + \phi^3], \\ A_4 &= \sigma^2\phi[-2\rho^4 - 4\rho^3\phi + 2\rho\phi^3 + \phi^3(\sigma^2 + \phi)], \\ A_3 &= 2\sigma^4\phi[\rho^3 + \rho^2\phi + \rho\phi^2 + \phi^3], \\ A_2 &= \sigma^4[\rho^4 + 2\rho^3\phi + 2\rho\phi^3 + \phi^3(-\sigma^2 + \phi) + \rho^2\phi(-\sigma^2 + 3\phi)], \\ A_1 &= -2\sigma^6\phi[\rho^2 + \phi\rho + \phi^2], \\ A_0 &= \sigma^6[\rho^2(\sigma^2 - \phi) - 2\rho\phi^2 - \phi^3]. \end{aligned}$$

Being an eighth-degree polynomial, $Q(\cdot; \rho)$ has exactly eight complex roots, counting multiplicity; two of these are α_L^* and α_L^\dagger .

We now show that of all candidate signaling pairs, when $|\rho|$ is sufficiently small, only (α_L^*, α_F^*) satisfies both activists' SOC's. To that end, it is useful to approximate all of the roots of (A.18) for small $|\rho|$. We will make use of a standard result on the continuous dependence of the (complex) roots of a polynomial on its coefficients:

Lemma A.1 (Uherka and Sergott (1977)). *Let $p(x) = x^n + \sum_{k=1}^n a_k x^{n-k}$ and $p^*(x) = x^n + \sum_{k=1}^n a_k^* x^{n-k}$ be two n th degree polynomials. Suppose λ^* is a root of p^* with multiplicity m and $\epsilon > 0$. Then for $|a_i - a_i^*|$ sufficiently small ($i = 1, \dots, n$), p has at least m roots within ϵ of λ^* .*

For a proof, see Uherka and Sergott (1977) or the references therein.

We apply this lemma to the polynomial Q indexed by ρ . (While Lemma A.1 assumes a leading coefficient of 1, we can divide through our polynomial $Q(\cdot; \rho)$ in (A.18) by A_8 , which is bounded away from 0 provided $|\rho| < |\phi|$, allowing us to apply the lemma.) In the limit,

$$Q(\alpha_L; 0) = -(1 + \alpha_L)^2 \phi^3 (\sigma^2 - \alpha_L^2 \phi)^2 (\sigma^2 + \alpha_L^2 \phi). \quad (\text{A.19})$$

By inspection, $Q(\cdot; 0)$ is nonnegative and has a double roots at -1 and $\pm\alpha^K$, and it has complex roots at $\pm\alpha^K i$.

Lemma A.1 then has two important implications about the roots of $Q(\cdot; \rho)$. First, since α_L^* and α_L^b are always positive, these must converge to α^K . Second, for any $\epsilon > 0$, there exists $\bar{\rho} > 0$ such that for all ρ with $0 < |\rho| < \bar{\rho}$ all of the other six roots of $Q(\cdot; \rho)$ lie within ϵ of -1 , $-\alpha^K$, or $\pm\alpha^K i$.

We can now check SOC: for the leader in Lemma A.2 and for the follower in Lemma A.3.

Lemma A.2. *For $|\rho| > 0$ sufficiently small, the candidate signaling pairs (α_L^*, α_F^*) and (α_L^b, α_F^b) satisfy (A.6) and are the only candidate signaling pairs that do.*

Proof. First, we show that (α_L^*, α_F^*) satisfy (A.6) for sufficiently small $|\rho| > 0$. As $\rho \rightarrow 0$, the left hand side of (A.6) tends to

$$\sigma^2 - (\alpha^K)^2 \phi - 2\alpha^K \phi = -2\sigma\sqrt{\phi} < 0, \quad (\text{A.20})$$

where we have used that $\alpha_L^* \rightarrow \alpha^K$ as argued earlier. A nearly identical calculation shows (α_L^b, α_F^b) also satisfy (A.6) for sufficiently small $|\rho| > 0$.

The remaining candidates for equilibria are associated with the real roots of (A.18) other than α_L^*, α_L^b . By Lemma A.1, as $\rho \rightarrow 0$, these roots must converge to the other roots of $Q(\cdot; 0)$, namely -1 , $-\frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{\phi}}$, or $\pm\frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{\phi}}i$. Any root of $Q(\cdot; \rho)$ that converges to $\pm\frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{\phi}}i$ is eventually complex, and is therefore not an equilibrium candidate. Therefore, we need only consider candidates which converge to -1 or $-\frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{\phi}}$. In the first case, for any $\alpha_F \in \{\alpha_{F,1}, \alpha_{F,2}\}$, the left hand side of (A.6) converges to

$$\sigma^2 - (-1)^2 \phi - 2(-1)\phi = \sigma^2 + \phi > 0. \quad (\text{A.21})$$

In the second case, for any $\alpha_F \in \{\alpha_{F,1}, \alpha_{F,2}\}$, the left hand side of (A.6) converges to

$$\sigma^2 - \left(-\frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{\phi}}\right)^2 \phi - 2\left(-\frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{\phi}}\right)\phi = 2\sigma\sqrt{\phi} > 0. \quad (\text{A.22})$$

Thus, for $|\rho| > 0$ sufficiently small, all roots of $Q(\cdot; \rho)$ other than α_L^* and α_L^b violate the leader's second order condition. \square

Lemma A.3. *For $|\rho| > 0$ sufficiently small, the candidate signaling pair (α_L^*, α_F^*) satisfies (A.7), while the pair (α_L^b, α_F^b) does not.*

Proof. For the pair (α_L^*, α_F^*) , the left hand side of (A.7) tends to $-[(\alpha^K)^2\phi^2 + \sigma^2\phi] < 0$ as $\rho \rightarrow 0$. For the pair (α_L^b, α_F^b) , the same expression tends to $(\alpha^K)^2\phi^2 + \sigma^2\phi > 0$, violating the second order condition. \square

From Lemmas A.2 and A.3, we conclude that for $|\rho| > 0$ sufficiently small, (α_L^*, α_F^*) is the unique candidate signaling pair satisfying both (A.6) and (A.7). Hence, in any linear equilibrium, (α_L, α_F) must equal (α_L^*, α_F^*) .

To conclude, observe that as $\rho \rightarrow 0$, $\phi(1 + \alpha_L^*) + \rho \rightarrow \phi(1 + \alpha^K) > 0$, allowing us to apply the “converse” part of Proposition A.1 when $|\rho|$ is sufficiently small, giving us existence. Since we have already shown that $0 < \alpha_L^* < \alpha^K$ if $\rho > 0$, (A.5) implies $-\delta_L > -\alpha^K$ in this case, and likewise when $\rho < 0$, we have $\alpha_L^* > \alpha^K$ which implies $0 < -\delta_L < \alpha^K$. \square

A.4 Proof of Proposition 3

For part (i), the expected first-period order flow is

$$\mathbb{E}[\Psi_1] = \mu(\alpha_L + \delta_L),$$

which by Proposition 2 is negative if and only if $\rho > 0$. For the second period, note that by (19), $\mathbb{E}[\Psi_2|\mathcal{F}_1^\Psi] = \mathbb{E}[\alpha_F(X_0^F - M_1^F) + Z_2|\mathcal{F}_1^\Psi] = \alpha_F\mathbb{E}[M_1^F - M_1^F|\mathcal{F}_1^\Psi] = 0$. And by the law of iterated expectations, $\mathbb{E}[\Psi_2] = \mathbb{E}[\mathbb{E}[\Psi_2|\mathcal{F}_1^\Psi]] = 0$.

For part (ii)(a), ex ante expected firm value is

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}[W^L + W^F] &= \mathbb{E}[X_0^L + \theta^L + X_0^F + \theta^F] \\ &= \mathbb{E}[X_0^L + \theta^L + X_0^F] \\ &= \mu + (\alpha_L + \delta_L)\mu + \mu,\end{aligned}$$

where the first equality uses that each activist’s terminal effort is its terminal position, the second equality uses that $\mathbb{E}[\theta^F] = 0$ by Proposition 1, and the last equality uses (5). The last statement of the proposition then follows from the fact that $\alpha_L + \delta_L < 0$ is negative if and only if $\rho > 0$, as used above.

For part (ii)(b), we show that $\alpha_L + \delta_L > -2$. Using (A.5), we have $\alpha_L + \delta_L = \alpha_L - \frac{\sigma^2}{\phi\alpha_L} =: h(\alpha_L)$. Now h is increasing in α_L for $\alpha_L > 0$, and from the proof of Proposition 2, $\alpha_L > \hat{\alpha}$ (and, moreover, $\alpha_L > \alpha^K$ when $\rho < 0$). Hence it is enough to show that $h(\hat{\alpha}) > 0$. By direct calculation, $h(\hat{\alpha}) = -1 > -2$, so we are done.

For part (iii), first consider the case $\rho > 0$. The right hand side of (A.14) crosses the left hand side from above at α_L . Moreover, when $\rho > 0$, the right hand side is (positive and)

decreasing in ρ at α_L while the left hand side is increasing in ρ . Hence, unambiguously, α_L is decreasing in ρ .

When $\rho < 0$, the right hand side of (A.14) crosses the left hand side from below; the left hand side is decreasing in ρ ; and the right hand side is increasing in ρ at α_L . Hence, again, α_L is unambiguously decreasing in ρ .

It is easy to show that α_L is continuous in ρ when this PBS equilibrium exists (in particular at $\rho = 0$), so this establishes the result.

For part (iv), choose ρ sufficiently small that there exists a unique linear equilibrium by Proposition A.2. By substituting the characterization of β_F via (A.2) into (10), we obtain

$$\Lambda_1 = \frac{\alpha_L[\rho + \phi(1 + \alpha_L)]}{\sigma^2 + \alpha_L^2 \phi},$$

which is a C^1 function of ρ by the implicit function theorem. The expression for $\Lambda_1(0)$ is then immediate by using that $\alpha_L = \alpha^K$ when $\rho = 0$. To establish that $\frac{d\Lambda_1}{d\rho} > 0$ for ρ in a neighborhood of zero, it suffices to establish this inequality at $\rho = 0$. Differentiating wrt ρ and evaluating at $\rho = 0$ (where $\alpha_L = \alpha^K$) yields

$$\frac{d\Lambda_1}{d\rho}\bigg|_{\rho=0} = \frac{1 + \phi\alpha'_L(0)}{2\sigma\sqrt{\phi}}. \quad (\text{A.23})$$

Now α_L is characterized by (A.4) for $\alpha_F = \alpha_{F,1}$. After differentiating this equation with respect to ρ and evaluating at 0, one can solve for $\alpha'_L(0) = -\frac{\sigma}{2\phi(\sigma + \sqrt{\phi})}$. Finally, plugging this into (A.23) yields $\frac{d\Lambda_1}{d\rho}\big|_{\rho=0} = \frac{2 - \frac{\sigma}{\sigma + \sqrt{\phi}}}{4\sigma\sqrt{\phi}}$, which is strictly positive for all $\sigma > 0, \phi > 0$ by inspection.

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B Supplementary Appendix

B.1 Supporting details for learning and pricing

Using the fact that $P_0 = \mathbb{E}[P_1]$, the quoted price P_0 satisfies

$$P_0 = \mathbb{E}[(1 + \alpha_L)X_0^L + \delta_L\mu + (1 + \alpha_F)X_0^F + \beta_F P_0 + \delta_F\mu].$$

Solving for P_0 yields ²⁶

$$P_0 = \frac{\mu(2 + \alpha_L + \alpha_F + \delta_L + \delta_F)}{1 - \beta_F}. \quad (\text{B.1})$$

²⁶The leader’s SOC requires $\beta_F \neq 1$, and thus in any equilibrium, the denominator in (B.1) is nonzero.

After period 1, the posterior covariance matrix of the market maker's beliefs about (X_T^L, X_0^F) is $\Gamma_1 = \begin{pmatrix} \gamma_1^L & \rho_1 \\ \rho_1 & \gamma_1^F \end{pmatrix}$, where

$$\gamma_1^L = \frac{\phi\sigma^2(1 + \alpha_L)^2}{\alpha_L^2\phi + \sigma^2}, \quad (\text{B.2})$$

$$\gamma_1^F = \frac{\alpha_L^2[\phi^2 - \rho^2] + \phi\sigma^2}{\alpha_L^2\phi + \sigma^2}, \quad (\text{B.3})$$

$$\rho_1 = \frac{\rho\sigma^2(1 + \alpha_L)}{\alpha_L^2\phi + \sigma^2}. \quad (\text{B.4})$$

The expressions for γ_1^L , γ_1^F , and ρ_1 can be obtained using the law of total variance and law of total covariance.²⁷

The market maker's updated beliefs about (X_T^L, X_T^F) after the second-period order flow is observed are given by

$$\begin{aligned} M_T^F &:= \mathbb{E}[X_T^F | \mathcal{F}_2^\Psi] \\ &= (1 + \alpha_F)M_1^F + \beta_F P_1 + \delta_F \mu + \frac{\alpha_F \gamma_1^F (1 + \alpha_F)}{\alpha_F^2 \gamma_1^F + \sigma^2} [\Psi_2 - \alpha_F M_1^F - \beta_F P_1 - \delta_F \mu] \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.5})$$

$$M_T^L := \mathbb{E}[X_T^L | \mathcal{F}_2^\Psi] = M_1^L + \frac{\alpha_F \rho_1}{\alpha_F^2 \gamma_1^F + \sigma^2} [\Psi_2 - \alpha_F M_1^F - \beta_F P_1 - \delta_F \mu]. \quad (\text{B.6})$$

B.2 Proof of Proposition 4

For part (i), we consider symmetric linear strategies of the form

$$\theta^i = \alpha X_0^i + \beta \mu. \quad (\text{B.7})$$

We begin by characterizing belief-updating and pricing, and then we use these to set up best-response problem of either trader.

After observing the total order flow, the market maker updates her beliefs about the activists' positions. Given the form of strategies it is sufficient for the market maker to only estimate the sum of initial positions. By standard Gaussian filtering,

$$\mathbb{E}[X_0^i + X_0^j | \mathcal{F}_1^\Psi] = 2\mu + \frac{\text{Cov}(X^i + X^j, \Psi_1)}{\text{Var}(\Psi_1)} \left\{ \Psi_1 - \underbrace{[2\alpha\mu + 2\beta\mu]}_{=\mathbb{E}[\theta^i + \theta^j]} \right\}$$

²⁷For instance, $(1 + \alpha_L)\rho = \text{Cov}(X_T^L, X_0^F) = \mathbb{E}[\text{Cov}(X_T^L, X_0^F | \Psi_1)] + \text{Cov}(M_1^L, M_1^F) = \rho_1 + \frac{\alpha_L^2(1 + \alpha_L)\phi\rho}{(\alpha_L^2\phi + \sigma^2)^2}(\alpha_L^2\phi + \sigma^2) = \rho_1 + \frac{\alpha_L^2(1 + \alpha_L)\phi\rho}{\alpha_L^2\phi + \sigma^2}$, so $\rho_1 = (1 + \alpha_L)\rho - \frac{\alpha_L^2(1 + \alpha_L)\phi\rho}{\alpha_L^2\phi + \sigma^2}$.

$$= 2\mu + \frac{2\alpha(\phi + \rho)}{2\alpha^2(\phi + \rho) + \sigma^2} \{\Psi_1 - 2\mu(\alpha + \beta)\}.$$

Hence, P_1 is equal to

$$P_1 = \mathbb{E}[W|\mathcal{F}_1^\Psi] = \mathbb{E}[X_T^i + X_T^j|\Psi_1] = (1 + \alpha)\mathbb{E}[X_0^i + X_0^j|\mathcal{F}_1^\Psi] + 2\mu\beta \quad (\text{B.8})$$

$$= P_0^S + \Lambda_1^S \{\Psi_1 - 2\mu(\alpha + \beta)\}, \quad (\text{B.9})$$

where $P_0^S := 2\mu(1 + \alpha + \beta)$ is the ex ante expected firm value and $\Lambda_1^S := (1 + \alpha)\frac{2\alpha(\phi + \rho)}{2\alpha^2(\phi + \rho) + \sigma^2}$ is Kyle's lambda.

Each activist then maximizes

$$\sup_{\theta^i} \mathbb{E} \left[\frac{(X_0^i + \theta^i)^2 + 2X_T^{-i}(X_0^i + \theta^i)}{2} - P_1\theta^i | X_0^i, \theta^i \right]. \quad (\text{B.10})$$

The FOC is

$$\frac{2(X_0^i + \theta^i) + 2\mathbb{E}[X_T^{-i}|X_0^i]}{2} - \theta^i \frac{\partial P_1}{\partial \theta^i} - P_1 = 0. \quad (\text{B.11})$$

Plugging in the expression for Λ_1^S , evaluating at the conjectured strategy (B.7), and setting the coefficient on X_0^i to 0 yields an equation for α , with the following three roots:

$$\alpha = \frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{2\phi}}, \quad -\frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{2\phi}}, \quad -1. \quad (\text{B.12})$$

Similarly, setting the coefficient on μ to 0, we can pin down β from α via

$$\beta = \frac{\sigma^2}{2\sigma^2 - 4\alpha(1 + \alpha)\phi}. \quad (\text{B.13})$$

Since the second and third roots are negative, we have a unique candidate for a symmetric PBS equilibrium.

For existence, we must check the SOC

$$1 - 2\Lambda_1^S \leq 0. \quad (\text{B.14})$$

Plugging in (B.13) and then setting $\alpha = \frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{2\phi}}$, this condition becomes

$$\sigma^2 - 2\alpha(2 + \alpha)(\rho + \phi) = -\frac{\rho\sigma + 2\sqrt{2\phi}(\rho + \phi)}{\sigma(\rho + 2\phi)} \leq 0.$$

By inspection, the inequality is satisfied whenever $\rho \geq 0$ or $|\rho|$ is sufficiently small,

completing the proof of part (i).

For part (ii), choose $|\rho|$ sufficiently small that by part (i) and by Proposition 4, there is a unique PBS equilibrium of the both the simultaneous-move and sequential-move games. The leader's expected payoff in either case is continuous in ρ and in α_L (which is in turn continuous in ρ by the implicit function theorem).²⁸ Hence, it suffices to prove the result for $\rho = 0$.

Recall that when $\rho = 0$, the equilibrium is characterized in Proposition 1, and $\alpha_L = \alpha_F = \sqrt{\frac{\sigma^2}{\phi}}$. The coefficient in the simultaneous-move game is $\alpha_S := \sqrt{\frac{\sigma^2}{2\phi}}$ (see (B.12)). By inspection we have $\alpha_L = \alpha_F > \alpha_S$.

To calculate the leader's expected payoff in the sequential case, plug the equilibrium strategies into (4) to obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E} \left[\frac{1}{2} \left(X_0^L \left(1 + \sqrt{\frac{\sigma^2}{\phi}} \right) - \sqrt{\frac{\sigma^2}{\phi}} \mu \right)^2 + \left(X_0^F + \sqrt{\frac{\sigma^2}{\phi}} (X_0^F - \mu) \right) \left(X_0^L + \sqrt{\frac{\sigma^2}{\phi}} (X_0^L - \mu) \right) \right. \\ \left. - \left(P_0 + \Lambda_1 \left(\sqrt{\frac{\sigma^2}{\phi}} (X_0^L - \mu) + \sigma Z_1 \right) \right) \sqrt{\frac{\sigma^2}{\phi}} (X_0^L - \mu) \right]. \end{aligned}$$

Opening up the expectation and simplifying we can write the first line as

$$\frac{1}{2} \left(\mu^2 + (\sigma + \sqrt{\phi})^2 \right) + \mu^2,$$

and second line simplifies to

$$-\frac{\sigma(\sigma + \sqrt{\phi})}{2}.$$

Hence, the leader's total expected payoff is

$$\frac{1}{2} \left[3\mu^2 + \phi + \sigma\sqrt{\phi} \right]. \quad (\text{B.15})$$

Following similar steps for the simultaneous case, we can write the equilibrium payoff of player i ($i = 1, 2$) as

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E} \left[\frac{1}{2} \left(X_0^i \left(1 + \sqrt{\frac{\sigma^2}{2\phi}} \right) - \sqrt{\frac{\sigma^2}{2\phi}} \mu \right)^2 + 2 \left(X_0^j + \sqrt{\frac{\sigma^2}{2\phi}} (X_0^j - \mu) \right) \left(X_0^i + \sqrt{\frac{\sigma^2}{2\phi}} (X_0^i - \mu) \right) \right. \\ \left. - \left(P_0^S + \Lambda_1^S \left(\sqrt{\frac{\sigma^2}{2\phi}} (X_0^i - \mu) + \epsilon_i \right) \right) \sqrt{\frac{\sigma^2}{2\phi}} (X_0^i - \mu) \right]. \end{aligned}$$

²⁸Full expressions for general ρ are available from the authors upon request.

Opening up the expectation, the first line simplifies to

$$\frac{1}{2} \left(\mu^2 + \frac{(\sigma + \sqrt{2\phi})^2}{2} \right) + \mu^2,$$

while the second line simplifies to

$$-\frac{\sigma(\sigma + \sqrt{2\phi})}{4},$$

for a total expected payoff of

$$\frac{1}{2} \left[3\mu^2 + \phi + \frac{\sigma\sqrt{2\phi}}{2} \right]. \quad (\text{B.16})$$

Subtracting (B.16) from (B.15) yields $\frac{1}{2} \left(1 - \frac{\sqrt{2}}{2} \right) \sigma\sqrt{\phi}$, which is always positive. Therefore, the leader unambiguously prefers the sequential-move game when $\rho = 0$.

B.3 Proofs for Section 5.3

Proof of Proposition 5. Fix μ, σ, ϕ, ρ . Let μs_μ denote the prior mean for each follower, ϕs_ϕ the variance, and ρs_ρ the covariance between the leader and each follower, where s_μ, s_ϕ, s_ρ will vary with N . The setup described in Section 5.3 is captured by $s_\mu = 1/N$, $s_\phi = 1/N^2$, and $s_\rho = 1/N$.

Define $\gamma_1^{\text{sum}} = N^2 \gamma_1^F$, the market maker's posterior variance of the sum of all followers' positions. In any PBS equilibrium, the followers play gap strategies and their first order condition yields $\alpha_F = \sqrt{\frac{N\sigma^2}{\gamma_1^{\text{sum}}}} = \sqrt{\frac{\sigma^2}{N\gamma_1^F}}$. By adapting the proof of Proposition 2, the leader's FOC yields the following equation for α_L :

$$\frac{(N\rho s_\rho + \phi + \alpha_L \phi)(\sigma^2 - \alpha_L^2 \phi)}{N\rho s_\rho[\alpha_L(1 + \alpha_L)\phi - \sigma^2]} = \sqrt{\frac{\sigma^4 + \sigma^2 \alpha_L^2 \phi}{N[\phi s_\phi \sigma^2 + \alpha_L^2(\phi^2 s_\phi - (\rho s_\rho)^2)]}}. \quad (\text{B.17})$$

Familiar arguments show that for $\rho > 0$, (B.17) has a solution α_L in $(\hat{\alpha}, \alpha^K)$, there is no other solution for $\alpha_L \geq 0$, and SOC's are satisfied. The FOC also implies that the coefficient on μ is $\delta_L = -\frac{\sigma^2}{\phi \alpha_L}$.

We now turn to comparative statics wrt N . After plugging in our values for (s_μ, s_ϕ, s_ρ) , (B.17) reduces to

$$\frac{(\rho + \phi + \alpha_L \phi)(\sigma^2 - \alpha_L^2 \phi)}{\rho[\alpha_L(1 + \alpha_L)\phi - \sigma^2]} = \sqrt{\frac{N(\sigma^4 + \sigma^2 \alpha_L^2 \phi)}{\phi \sigma^2 + \alpha_L^2(\phi^2 - \rho^2)}}. \quad (\text{B.18})$$

When these intersect at $\alpha_L \in (\hat{\alpha}, \alpha^K)$, the left hand side crosses the right hand side from

above. Then since the right hand side is increasing in N , the equilibrium value of α_L is decreasing in N . It is also straightforward to show that the left side of (B.18) is decreasing in α_L on $(\hat{\alpha}, \infty)$, so each side of (B.18) is increasing in N . Since the right hand side is precisely α_F , this establishes that α_F is increasing in N .

Since the followers play gap strategies, ex ante firm value is still $(2 + \alpha_L + \delta_L)\mu = (2 + \alpha_L - \sigma^2/(\phi\alpha_L))\mu$ for all N . Since α_L is decreasing in N , ex ante firm value is decreasing in N .

For later use, we show that $\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \alpha_L = \hat{\alpha} > 0$, where $\hat{\alpha}$ was defined earlier as the positive root of $\alpha_L(1 + \alpha_L)\phi - \sigma^2$. As $N \rightarrow \infty$, the right hand side of (B.18) explodes as the rest of the expression in the square root is bounded. Thus, the left hand side must also explode, which requires its denominator to vanish. Given that $\alpha_L > 0$, this implies that α_L converges to $\hat{\alpha}$.

We now turn to the asymptotic result. The leader's expected payoff is

$$\mathbb{E} \left[-P_1\theta_L + \frac{(X_0^L + \theta_L)^2}{2} + (X_0^L + \theta_L)N(X_0^F + \alpha_F(X_0^F - M_1^F)) \right]. \quad (\text{B.19})$$

We simplify (B.19) one term at a time. The first term equals

$$\begin{aligned} & -\mathbb{E}[(P_0 + \Lambda_1[\theta - (\alpha_L + \delta_L)\mu])\theta_L] \\ &= -\mathbb{E}[P_0(\alpha_L X_0^L + \delta_L \mu) + \Lambda_1 \alpha_L (X_0^L - \mu)(\alpha_L X_0^L + \delta_L \mu)] \\ &= -\mathbb{E}[(2 + \alpha_L + \delta_L)\mu(\alpha_L X_0^L + \delta_L \mu) + \Lambda_1 \alpha_L (X_0^L - \mu)(\alpha_L X_0^L + \delta_L \mu)] \\ &= -\mathbb{E}[(2 + \alpha_L + \delta_L)\mu(\alpha_L X_0^L + \delta_L \mu) + \Lambda_1 \alpha_L (X_0^L - \mu)\alpha_L X_0^L] \\ &= -[(2 + \alpha_L + \delta_L)(\alpha_L + \delta_L)\mu^2 + \Lambda_1 \alpha_L^2 \phi] \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.20})$$

$$=: S_1 \quad (\text{B.21})$$

Since α_L and δ_L have finite limits as $N \rightarrow \infty$, and $\Lambda_1 = \frac{\alpha_L(\rho + \phi(1 + \alpha_L))}{\sigma^2 + \alpha_L^2 \phi}$ also has a finite limit, this term overall is therefore uniformly bounded in N .

The second term equals

$$S_2 := \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E} [(X_0^L(1 + \alpha_L) + \delta_L \mu)^2] = \frac{1}{2} [(1 + \alpha_L + \delta_L)^2 \mu^2 + \phi(1 + \alpha_L)^2], \quad (\text{B.22})$$

which is also uniformly bounded in N .

The third term, using that $\mathbb{E}[X_0^F - M_1^F] = 0$ by the law of iterated expectations, equals

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{E}[(X_0^L(1 + \alpha_L) + \delta_L \mu)N(X_0^F + \alpha_F(X_0^F - M_1^F))] \\ &= (1 + \alpha_L)(1 + \alpha_F)N\mathbb{E}[X_0^L X_0^F] + \delta_L N\mu^2 s_\mu - \mathbb{E}[X_0^L(1 + \alpha_L)N\alpha_F M_1^F] \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= (1 + \alpha_L)(1 + \alpha_F)N\mathbb{E}[X_0^L X_0^F] + \delta_L N \mu^2 s_\mu - \mathbb{E}[X_0^L(1 + \alpha_L)N\alpha_F M_1^F] \\
&= (1 + \alpha_L)(1 + \alpha_F)N(\mu^2 s_\mu + \rho s_\rho) + \delta_L N \mu^2 s_\mu - \mathbb{E}[X_0^L(1 + \alpha_L)N\alpha_F M_1^F] \\
&= (1 + \alpha_L)(1 + \alpha_F)N(\mu^2 s_\mu + \rho s_\rho) + \delta_L N \mu^2 s_\mu \\
&\quad - \mathbb{E}[X_0^L(1 + \alpha_L)N\alpha_F \left\{ \mu s_\mu + \frac{\alpha_L \rho s_\rho}{\alpha_L^2 \phi + \sigma^2} [\alpha_L X_0^L + \delta_L \mu - (\alpha_L + \delta_L) \mu] \right\}].
\end{aligned}$$

We now simplify the last term of the last line above:

$$\begin{aligned}
&\mathbb{E} \left[X_0^L(1 + \alpha_L)N\alpha_F \left\{ \mu s_\mu + \frac{\alpha_L \rho s_\rho}{\alpha_L^2 \phi + \sigma^2} [\alpha_L X_0^L + \delta_L \mu - (\alpha_L + \delta_L) \mu] \right\} \right] \\
&= \mathbb{E} \left[X_0^L(1 + \alpha_L)N\alpha_F \left\{ \mu s_\mu + \frac{\alpha_L \rho s_\rho}{\alpha_L^2 \phi + \sigma^2} \alpha_L (X_0^L - \mu) \right\} \right] \\
&= (1 + \alpha_L)N\alpha_F \mu^2 s_\mu + (1 + \alpha_L)N\alpha_F \frac{\alpha_L \rho s_\rho}{\alpha_L^2 \phi + \sigma^2} \alpha_L \mathbb{E}[X_0^L (X_0^L - \mu)] \\
&= (1 + \alpha_L)N\alpha_F \mu^2 s_\mu + (1 + \alpha_L)N\alpha_F \frac{\alpha_L \rho s_\rho}{\alpha_L^2 \phi + \sigma^2} \alpha_L \text{Var}(X_0^L) \\
&= (1 + \alpha_L)\alpha_F \mu^2 + (1 + \alpha_L)\alpha_F \frac{\alpha_L \rho}{\alpha_L^2 \phi + \sigma^2} \alpha_L \phi
\end{aligned}$$

Thus, the third term of (B.19) equals

$$S_3 := (1 + \alpha_L)(1 + \alpha_F)(\mu^2 + \rho) + \delta_L \mu^2 - \left[(1 + \alpha_L)\alpha_F \mu^2 + (1 + \alpha_L)\alpha_F \frac{\alpha_L \rho}{\alpha_L^2 \phi + \sigma^2} \alpha_L \phi \right] \quad (\text{B.23})$$

$$= (1 + \alpha_L)(\mu^2 + \rho) + \delta_L \mu^2 + \alpha_F \rho (1 + \alpha_L) \frac{\sigma^2}{\alpha_L^2 \phi + \sigma^2}, \quad (\text{B.24})$$

where we have used that N cancels with $1/N$ in s_μ and s_ρ . Again, $(1 + \alpha_L)(\mu^2 + \rho) + \delta_L \mu^2$ is uniformly bounded in N , so S_3 has the form $C(N) + \alpha_F \rho (1 + \alpha_L) \frac{\sigma^2}{\alpha_L^2 \phi + \sigma^2}$ as noted in Section 5.3.

The leader's payoff is the sum of (B.20), (B.22), and (B.23):

$$\Pi_L = S_1 + S_2 + S_3. \quad (\text{B.25})$$

To show that the rate of growth is \sqrt{N} , we calculate

$$\begin{aligned}
\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\Pi_L}{\sqrt{N}} &= \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{S_1}{\sqrt{N}} + \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{S_2}{\sqrt{N}} + \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{S_3}{\sqrt{N}} \\
&= 0 + 0 + \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{S_3}{\sqrt{N}}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\alpha_F}{\sqrt{N}} (1 + \alpha_L) \rho \frac{\sigma^2}{\alpha_L^2 \phi + \sigma^2} \\
&= \left(\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\alpha_F}{\sqrt{N}} \right) \left(\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} (1 + \alpha_L) \rho \frac{\sigma^2}{\alpha_L^2 \phi + \sigma^2} \right). \tag{B.26}
\end{aligned}$$

To take limits in the last line, we use the fact that for $\rho \in (0, \phi]$, $\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \alpha_L = \hat{\alpha} > 0$, as shown at the end of the proof of Proposition 5. We have

$$\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\alpha_F}{\sqrt{N}} = \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \sqrt{\frac{(\sigma^4 + \sigma^2 \alpha_L^2 \phi)}{\phi \sigma^2 + \alpha_L^2 (\phi^2 - \rho^2)}} = \sqrt{\frac{(\sigma^4 + \sigma^2 \hat{\alpha}^2 \phi)}{\phi \sigma^2 + \hat{\alpha}^2 (\phi^2 - \rho^2)}} \tag{B.27}$$

$$\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} (1 + \alpha_L) \rho \frac{\sigma^2}{\alpha_L^2 \phi + \sigma^2} = (1 + \hat{\alpha}) \rho \frac{\sigma^2}{\hat{\alpha}^2 \phi + \sigma^2}. \tag{B.28}$$

Since these limits are positive and finite, so is their product, and we conclude that Π_L grows asymptotically at rate \sqrt{N} . \square

The following result was referred to in Section 5.3.

Lemma B.1. *Assume $\rho = \phi$, and let Π_L^{seq} and Π_L^{sim} denote the leader's payoff in the sequential- and simultaneous-move games, respectively. When N is sufficiently large, the leader's payoff advantage from going first is increasing in N . Specifically, Π_L^{seq} and Π_L^{sim} grow at rate \sqrt{N} asymptotically, and $\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\Pi_L^{seq} - \Pi_L^{sim}}{\sqrt{N}} > 0$.*

Proof. Proposition 5 characterizes the asymptotics of Π_L^{seq} , so consider the simultaneous-move game. The FOCs lead to the following system of equations:

$$\alpha_L = \frac{1 - \frac{\rho}{\phi} \Lambda \alpha_F + \frac{\rho}{\phi} (1 + \alpha_F)}{2\Lambda - 1} \tag{B.29}$$

$$\alpha_F = \frac{N(1 - \frac{\rho}{\phi} \Lambda \alpha_L + \frac{\rho}{\phi} (1 + \alpha_L))}{(N + 1)\Lambda - N}, \tag{B.30}$$

where $\Lambda = \frac{(1 + \alpha_L)(\phi \alpha_L + \rho \alpha_F) + (1 + \alpha_F)(\phi \alpha_F + \rho \alpha_L)}{\phi(\alpha_L^2 + \alpha_F^2) + 2\alpha_L \alpha_F \rho + \sigma^2}$.

For the case $\rho = \phi$, we obtain $(\alpha_L, \alpha_F) = \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{(N+1)\phi}}, \frac{N\sigma}{\sqrt{(N+1)\phi}} \right)$. The leader's payoff is again of the order \sqrt{N} , with coefficient $\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} N \frac{\alpha_F}{\sqrt{N}} (1 + \alpha_L) \text{Cov}(X_0^L, X_0^F) = \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\alpha_F}{\sqrt{N}} (1 + \alpha_L) \phi = \sigma \sqrt{\phi}$. To complete the proof, we show that this is strictly less than the corresponding coefficient in the sequential-move game, namely $\sqrt{\frac{(\sigma^4 + \sigma^2 \hat{\alpha}^2 \phi)}{\phi \sigma^2}} (1 + \hat{\alpha}) \phi \frac{\sigma^2}{\hat{\alpha}^2 \phi + \sigma^2}$. By routine

simplifications,

$$\begin{aligned}
\sigma\sqrt{\phi} &\leq \sqrt{\frac{(\sigma^4 + \sigma^2\hat{\alpha}^2\phi)}{\phi\sigma^2}}(1 + \hat{\alpha})\phi\frac{\sigma^2}{\hat{\alpha}^2\phi + \sigma^2} \\
\iff 1 &\leq \sqrt{\sigma^2 + \hat{\alpha}^2\phi}(1 + \hat{\alpha})\frac{\sigma}{\hat{\alpha}^2\phi + \sigma^2} \\
\iff \sqrt{\sigma^2 + \hat{\alpha}^2\phi} &\leq (1 + \hat{\alpha})\sigma \\
\iff \sigma^2 + \hat{\alpha}^2\phi &\leq (1 + \hat{\alpha})^2\sigma^2 \quad (\text{since both sides are positive}) \\
\iff 0 &\leq \hat{\alpha}[\hat{\alpha}(\sigma^2 - \phi) + 2\sigma^2].
\end{aligned}$$

Since $\hat{\alpha}$ solves $\sigma^2 - \hat{\alpha}(1 + \hat{\alpha})\phi = 0$, the right hand side is

$$\hat{\alpha}[\hat{\alpha}(\sigma^2 - \phi) + 2\sigma^2] = \hat{\alpha}[\hat{\alpha}\sigma^2 + \hat{\alpha}^2\phi - \sigma^2 + 2\sigma^2] = \hat{\alpha}[\hat{\alpha}\sigma^2 + \hat{\alpha}^2\phi + \sigma^2] \geq 0,$$

establishing the inequality. \square

B.4 Proof of Proposition 6

Recall from the proof of Proposition 2 that for $\alpha_F = \alpha_{F,2}$, assuming that $\sigma^2 - \phi\alpha_L(1 + \alpha_L) \neq 0$, (A.4) is equivalent to (A.13) and in turn (A.16). We prove that for sufficiently large σ , there is a solution to (A.16) satisfying $\sigma^2 - \phi\alpha_L(1 + \alpha_L) \neq 0$. We then check the conditions (A.6), (A.7), and $\phi(1 + \alpha_L) \neq 0$ and apply the “converse” part of Proposition A.1.

After a change of variables $x = \alpha_L/\sigma$ in (A.16), we obtain

$$-\sqrt{\frac{1 + x^2\phi}{\phi + x^2(\phi^2 - \rho^2)}} = \frac{(\frac{\rho + \phi}{\sigma} + \phi x)(x^2\phi - 1)}{\rho[1 - x\phi/\sigma - x^2\phi]}. \quad (\text{B.31})$$

When $x = -1/\sqrt{\phi}$, the right hand side vanishes, while the left hand side is strictly negative. Now choose σ sufficiently large that $(\frac{\rho + \phi}{\sigma} + \phi x) < 0$ for all $x \leq -1/\sqrt{\phi}$. Define α^\dagger to be the negative root of $\alpha_L(1 + \alpha_L)\phi - \sigma^2$, and define $x^\dagger = \alpha^\dagger/\sigma < -1/\sqrt{\phi}$ to be the unique negative root of the denominator of (B.31), where $x^\dagger \uparrow -1/\sqrt{\phi}$ as $\sigma \uparrow \infty$. The right hand side of (B.31) is well-defined and continuous on $(x^\dagger, -1/\sqrt{\phi}]$ and moreover, it has limit $-\infty$ as $x \downarrow x^\dagger$. Thus, by the intermediate value theorem, there is a solution x_L to (B.31) in $(x^\dagger, -1/\sqrt{\phi}]$, and by the squeeze theorem, $\lim_{\sigma \uparrow \infty} x_L = -1/\sqrt{\phi}$. (By reversing the change of variables, one can recover α_L solving the leader’s FOC.) Note that as $\sigma \uparrow \infty$, $x_F := \alpha_F/\sigma = -\sqrt{\frac{1 + x^2\phi}{\phi + x^2(\phi^2 - \rho^2)}} \rightarrow -\sqrt{\frac{2}{2\phi - \rho^2/\phi}} =: x_F^\infty$

To verify (A.6), note that this is equivalent to the condition $1 - x_L^2\phi - 2x_L(\frac{\rho + \phi}{\sigma} + \rho x_F) \leq$

0. As $\sigma \uparrow +\infty$, the left hand side has limit $1 - 1 - 2(-1/\sqrt{\phi})\rho x_F^\infty = 2\rho x_F^\infty/\sqrt{\phi} < 0$, so (A.6) is satisfied for sufficiently large σ .

As for (A.7), using that $\alpha_{F,2} < 0$, it suffices to show that

$$\sigma^2[x_L^2(\phi^2 - \rho^2) + x_L\sigma\rho + (\phi + \rho)] \leq 0.$$

Recall that x has finite limit as $\sigma \rightarrow +\infty$, so the dominating term is $\sigma^3 x_L \rho < 0$. We conclude that (A.7) is satisfied for sufficiently large σ .

Finally, observe that since the left side of (B.31) is nonzero, at our solution the right side is also nonzero, and thus $\frac{\rho+\phi}{\sigma} + \phi x = \frac{1}{\sigma}[\phi(1 + \alpha_L) + \rho] \neq 0$. Hence Proposition A.1 applies, giving us existence for large σ .

For part (ii), we begin with the observation that for $\rho = -\phi$, (A.7) becomes

$$\sigma^2 \phi \alpha_F \alpha_L \leq 0. \tag{B.32}$$

Hence, there is no equilibrium in which α_F and α_L have the same sign, and (A.7) is satisfied if α_F and α_L have opposite signs.

We now establish the existence of an equilibrium with $\alpha_L < 0 < \alpha_F$. Note that for $\rho = -\phi$, as long as $\alpha_L \neq 0$ (which must hold in any equilibrium), the condition $\phi(1 + \alpha_L) + \rho \neq 0$ is satisfied, so by similar arguments to those in the proof of Proposition 2, (A.13) is equivalent to (A.14) when $\alpha_F = \alpha_{F,1}$. Thus, we work with (A.14) instead of (A.13).

When $\rho = -\phi$ and $\alpha_F > 0$, (A.1) is equivalent to $\alpha_F = \alpha_{F,1} = \sqrt{\sigma^2/\phi + \alpha_L^2}$. Now (A.14) simplifies to

$$\sqrt{\sigma^2/\phi + \alpha_L^2} = \alpha_L \frac{\alpha_L^2 \phi - \sigma^2}{\alpha_L(1 + \alpha_L)\phi - \sigma^2}. \tag{B.33}$$

In particular, an equilibrium with $\alpha_F = \alpha_{F,1}$ exists if and only if there exists α_L satisfying (B.33) such that both SOC's are satisfied. Now the left hand side of (B.33) is positive, while the right hand side vanishes at $\alpha_L = -\sigma/\sqrt{\phi}$, has limit $+\infty$ as $\alpha_L \downarrow \alpha^\dagger$, and is continuous on $(\alpha^\dagger, -\sigma/\sqrt{\phi})$, where α^\dagger was previously defined as the negative root of $\alpha_L(1 + \alpha_L)\phi - \sigma^2$, and recall that $\hat{\alpha}$ is the positive root. Thus, (B.33) has a solution in this interval. We finally check (A.6), which is now $\sigma^2 - \alpha_L^2 \phi + 2\alpha_L \phi \alpha_F \leq 0$. This is satisfied since $\alpha_L < -\sigma/\sqrt{\phi}$ implies $\sigma^2 - \alpha_L^2 \phi < 0$, and clearly $2\alpha_L \phi \alpha_F < 0$. (Recall that (A.7) is satisfied since α_F and α_L have opposite signs.) Hence, existence follows from Proposition A.1.

B.5 Proof of Proposition 7

Since Proposition 1 establishes existence and uniqueness for all $\sigma > 0$ when $\rho = 0$, assume $\rho \neq 0$. We will show that for sufficiently small $\sigma > 0$, there is a unique pair (α_L, α_F) satisfying (A.1), (A.13), (A.6), and (A.7). Further, we will show that $\phi(1 + \alpha_L) + \rho \neq 0$, so existence follows from Proposition A.1.

In any equilibrium, (α_L, α_F) must solve (A.13). By squaring both sides of this equation, using (A.1), and multiplying through by the nonzero denominator, we get (A.18). Now as $\sigma \rightarrow 0$, the coefficients of the polynomial Q converge to those of

$$Q^{\sigma=0}(\alpha_L) := -\alpha_L^6 \phi^2 [\rho + \phi + \alpha_L \phi]^2 (\phi^2 - \rho^2), \quad (\text{B.34})$$

which has a root of multiplicity 6 at 0 and of multiplicity 2 at $-\frac{\rho+\phi}{\phi}$.

By Lemma A.1, for any $\epsilon > 0$, there exists $\delta > 0$ such that if $\sigma \in (0, \delta)$, Q has 6 complex roots within distance ϵ of 0 and 2 complex roots within ϵ of $-\frac{\rho+\phi}{\phi}$. For ϵ sufficiently small that these neighborhoods do not intersect, and δ chosen accordingly, let $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_6$ denote the 6 roots near 0, and let α_7 and α_8 denote the roots near $-\frac{\rho+\phi}{\phi}$. We maintain these assumptions on ϵ and δ throughout the proof.

The following lemma rules out α_7 and α_8 from being part of an equilibrium.

Lemma B.2. *For sufficiently small $\sigma > 0$, each of α_7 and α_8 is either complex or otherwise fails (A.6).*

Proof. The left side of (A.6) is continuous in (σ, α_L) at $(0, -\frac{\rho+\phi}{\phi})$, where it evaluates to $(\phi + \rho)^2/\phi > 0$. Hence, choosing $\epsilon > 0$ sufficiently small, and $\delta > 0$ sufficiently small as described before the lemma, if either α_7 or α_8 is real, it fails (A.6). \square

Remark 2. *Having ruled out α_7 and α_8 , note that if σ is sufficiently small, then for any real $\alpha_L \in \{\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_6\}$, $\rho + \phi + \alpha_L \phi \neq 0$. This fact is useful two fold: (i) this criterion appears in the sufficiency part of Proposition A.1, and (ii) due to (A.13), using that $\rho \neq 0$ and $\alpha_{F,1} \neq 0$ and $\alpha_{F,2} \neq 0$ for α_L real, we have $\sigma^2 - \alpha_L(1 + \alpha_L) \neq 0$ for sufficiently small σ for α_L real. Thus, any real solution to (A.18) solves (A.17).*

We can now rule out equilibria in which $\alpha_F = \alpha_{F,2}$, as these fail the follower's second order condition when σ is sufficiently small. To do so, we use asymptotic properties of the roots of (A.18) as $\sigma \rightarrow 0$.

It is useful to define a change of variables $z = \alpha_L/\sigma$ in (A.18) and divide through the resulting equation by σ^6 , obtaining an equivalent equation

$$0 = \tilde{Q}(z, \sigma) := \sigma H(z) + F(z), \quad (\text{B.35})$$

where $H(z)$ is a polynomial of degree 8 and where $F(z)$ is a polynomial independent of σ that has the form $c_6 z^6 + c_4 z^4 + c_2 z^2 + c_0$.²⁹ (For each $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, 6\}$, define $z_i = \alpha_i/6$.)

Lemma B.3. *F has 6 distinct roots, denoted $\hat{z}_1, \dots, \hat{z}_6$, of which exactly two are positive, two are negative, and two are complex. As $\sigma \rightarrow 0$, z_1, \dots, z_6 converge to $\hat{z}_1, \dots, \hat{z}_6$.*

Proof. We first characterize the roots of F . Consider the cubic polynomial $G(y) = c_6 y^3 + c_4 y^2 + c_2 y + c_0$, where $F(y) = G(y^2)$. We have $G(0) < 0$ and $\lim_{y \rightarrow -\infty} G(y) = +\infty$, so G has a negative root. Also, we have $\lim_{y \rightarrow +\infty} G(y) = -\infty$ and $G(1/\phi) = 2\rho^2\phi > 0$, so G has two distinct positive roots: one in $(0, 1/\phi)$ and one in $(1/\phi, +\infty)$. Since G is cubic, there are no other roots (real or complex). Now the negative root of G corresponds to two distinct complex roots of F , and the positive roots of G each correspond to both one positive and one negative root of F , all distinct.

We now turn to the convergence claim in the lemma. Next, set $K = 1 + \max_{i \in \{1, \dots, 6\}} |\hat{z}_i|$, and define a compact set $\mathcal{K} = \{z \in \mathbb{C} : |z| \leq K\}$. By definition, all roots of F lie in \mathcal{K} . Further, note that on \mathcal{K} , for any sequence $(\sigma_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ with $\sigma_n \downarrow 0$, the sequence $(\tilde{Q}(\cdot, \sigma_n))_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ of functions defined on \mathcal{K} is equicontinuous and converge pointwise to F since $\sigma H(z)$ vanishes; thus, by the Arzela-Ascoli theorem, the sequence converges uniformly to F on \mathcal{K} .

Choose $\bar{\eta} > 0$ less than 1 and less than the minimum distance between any \hat{z}_i and \hat{z}_j , where $i, j \in \{1, \dots, 6\}$ and $i \neq j$. Then for all $\eta \in (0, \bar{\eta})$, for each $i \in \{1, \dots, 6\}$, 0 is the unique value of $t \in (1 - \eta, 1 + \eta)$ such that $0 = F(t\hat{z}_i)$. Further, $F(t\hat{z}_i)$ takes opposite signs at $t = 1 + \eta$ and $t = 1 - \eta$. By uniform convergence, for each such η , it holds that for all sufficiently small $\sigma > 0$, and for all $i \in \{1, \dots, 6\}$, $\tilde{Q}((1 + \eta)\hat{z}_i, \sigma)$ and $\tilde{Q}((1 - \eta)\hat{z}_i, \sigma)$ have the same signs as $F((1 + \eta)\hat{z}_i)$ and $F((1 - \eta)\hat{z}_i)$, respectively; thus, for all sufficiently small $\sigma > 0$, there exists $t_i(\sigma)$ in $(1 - \eta, 1 + \eta)$ such that $\tilde{Q}(t_i(\sigma)\hat{z}_i, \sigma) = 0$, and therefore, $\{z_1, \dots, z_6\} = \{t_1(\sigma), \dots, t_6(\sigma)\}$. Relabelling so that $z_i = t_i(\sigma)$, we have $z_i \rightarrow \hat{z}_i$ for each $i \in \{1, \dots, 6\}$. \square

We now analyze the follower's SOC.

Lemma B.4. *If $\sigma > 0$ is sufficiently small, then (i) there is no equilibrium in which $\alpha_F = \alpha_{F,2}$, and (ii) for $\alpha_F = \alpha_{F,1}$, (A.7) is satisfied for all real roots of Q among a_1, \dots, a_6 .*

Proof. Having ruled out equilibria in which $\alpha_L \in \{\alpha_7, \alpha_8\}$ (when $\sigma > 0$ is small), we show that for $\alpha_F = \alpha_{F,2}$ and for sufficiently small $\sigma > 0$, (A.7) fails for all real roots among $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_6$. By Lemma B.3, each α_i/σ , $i \in \{1, \dots, 6\}$, converges to a finite nonzero limit \hat{z}_i .

²⁹In particular, $F(z) = -z^6(\phi - \rho)\phi^2(\phi + \rho)^3 + z^4\phi[-2\rho^4 - 4\rho^3\phi + 2\rho\phi^3 + \phi^4] + z^2(\rho^2 + \rho\phi + \phi^2)^2 - \phi(\rho + \phi)^2$.

Hence, for sufficiently small $\sigma > 0$, if $\alpha_L = \alpha_i$, for some $i \in \{1, \dots, 6\}$ is real, the factor in square brackets in (A.7) is bounded below by

$$\begin{aligned}\alpha_i^2(\phi^2 - \rho^2) + \sigma^2(\phi + \rho) - |\alpha_i \rho| \sigma^2 &\geq \alpha_i^2(\phi^2 - \rho^2) + \sigma^2(\phi + \rho) - |\rho z_i| \sigma^3 \\ &= \sigma^2(z_i^2(\phi^2 - \rho^2) + \phi + \rho - |\rho z_i| \sigma),\end{aligned}$$

where $z_i^2(\phi^2 - \rho^2) + \phi + \rho - |\rho z_i| \sigma \rightarrow \hat{z}_i(\rho^2 - \rho^2) + \phi + \rho > 0$. Since $-\alpha_{F,2} > 0$, this implies that (A.7) fails.

For $\alpha_F = \alpha_{F,1}$, the same bound above holds, but since $-\alpha_{F,1} < 0$, (A.7) is satisfied. \square

We now turn to the leader's SOC.

Lemma B.5. *If $\sigma > 0$ is sufficiently small, then (i) there is no equilibrium in which $\alpha_L \leq 0$, and (ii) if $\alpha_L > 0$ is a real root of (A.18) and $\alpha_F = \alpha_{F,1}$, then (A.6) is satisfied.*

Proof. For part (i), we only need to consider the roots $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_6$, since for sufficiently small σ α_7 and α_8 cannot be part of an equilibrium by Lemma B.2. By Lemma B.4, we further only need to consider $\alpha_F = \alpha_{F,1}$, for which (A.6) becomes

$$\sigma^2 - \alpha_L^2 \phi - 2\alpha_L \left(\rho + \phi + \rho \sigma \sqrt{\frac{\sigma^2 + (\alpha_L/\sigma)^2 \sigma^2 \phi}{\phi + (\alpha_L/\sigma)^2 (-(\rho)^2 + (\phi)^2)}} \right) \leq 0. \quad (\text{B.36})$$

Clearly, this is violated if $\alpha_L = 0$. And since $\alpha_L \rightarrow 0$ in proportion to σ by Lemma B.3, for small σ , the dominating term is $-2\alpha_L(\rho + \phi)$, which is positive (violating (B.36)) if $\alpha_L < 0$.

For part (ii), we again only need to consider the roots $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_6$, since for sufficiently small σ , α_7 and α_8 are not positive real numbers as they converge to $-\frac{\rho+\phi}{\phi}$. Following the same calculation above, for sufficiently small σ , the left hand side of (A.6) has the same sign as $-2\alpha_L(\rho + \phi)$, which is negative for $\alpha_L > 0$, satisfying (A.6). \square

In light of Lemma B.5, we use Lemma B.3 to show that for sufficiently small $\sigma > 0$, there is exactly one positive solution to (A.14), and thus one equilibrium candidate. We establish this in the following lemma:

Lemma B.6. *For sufficiently small $\sigma > 0$, equation (A.18) has exactly two positive roots, one solving (A.14) and the other solving (A.16).*

Proof. Any (positive) solution to (A.14) or (A.16) must be a (positive) root of (A.18). From the proof of Proposition A.2, (A.18) has *at least* two positive roots, one for each equation (A.14) and (A.16), so it suffices to show that these are the only two positive roots of (A.18). Using the change of variables $z = \alpha_L/\sigma$, $\tilde{Q}(\cdot, \sigma)$ has at least two positive real roots for all

sufficiently small σ . But $\tilde{Q}(\cdot, \sigma)$ cannot have more than two positive roots for all sufficiently small σ . To see this, recall that for small σ , α_7 and α_8 are complex or negative, so any positive roots must be among $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_6$. And if there were more than two such positive roots, then by Lemma B.3, F would have more than two nonnegative roots, a contradiction. Mapping back to $\alpha_L = z\sigma$, this implies that (A.18) has exactly two roots for sufficiently small σ , (A.14) and (A.16) each have exactly one. \square

From Lemmas B.4, B.5, and B.6, for sufficiently small $\sigma > 0$, there is exactly one pair (α_L, α_F) solving (A.1), (A.4), (A.7), and (A.6), and thus at most one equilibrium. By Remark 2, we can invoke the “converse” part of Proposition A.1, establishing existence.