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Contexts of Radicalization of Jihadi Foreign Fighters from Europe

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Contexts of Radicalization of Jihadi Foreign Fighters from Europe

by Eylem Kanol

Abstract

The research for this article is based on original biographical and relational data on 1,019 foreign fighters from France, Germany, and the UK who had traveled to a conflict country due to their Jihadi convictions between the years 2000 and 2016. It investigates where and how they had radicalized. The findings suggest that foreign fighters were primarily recruited through interpersonal or religious organizational networks. Salafist mosques, radical religious associations, and more informal groups dedicated to proselytizing were particularly crucial to the radicalization process. In contrast, contexts such as the Internet or prisons were comparably less relevant to the radicalization process of foreign fighters. The important role of interpersonal and organizational ties was further evidenced by social network analysis, which found that the majority of foreign fighters were linked within a single social network prior to their mobilization. Overall, the findings document the continued relevance of religious organizations in the recruitment and mobilization of jihadi foreign fighters.

Keywords: Foreign fighters, ISIS, al-Qaeda, radicalization, jihad, social network analysis

Introduction

Journalists, academics, and policy makers alike often puzzle over the radicalization processes of terrorism offenders and foreign fighters. Apart from the micro- and macro-level determinants of radicalization, such as psychological traits, socioeconomic marginalization, or experiences of discrimination, these debates also focus on the question of where radicalization primarily takes place. Arguably, identifying major contexts of radicalization can be crucial for effective policy interventions and counterterrorism measures. Several contexts of radicalization have been highlighted in terrorism and political violence literature. First and most prominently, terrorism and social movement scholars have documented how friendship and kinship ties can enable and facilitate recruitment and mobilization processes.[1] Second, scholars investigating the terror-crime nexus have focused on prisons as major hubs of jihadi radicalization.[2] Third and more recently, the Internet and social media have come under scrutiny and the importance of online radicalization has been emphasized in literature.[3] Finally, earlier accounts recognized mosques and religious associations as relevant venues of ideological encapsulation and recruitment.[4] However, more recently, they are being largely overlooked in literature. Some scholars have argued that these contexts were gradually being replaced by online forums, chat rooms, and social media.[5] Others have asserted that religious organizations are not at all relevant to Islamist radicalization.[6]

In this study, publicly available information on the biographies of foreign fighters from three European countries is used to investigate the relative prevalence of major contexts of radicalization that have been highlighted in literature. Moreover, the biographical analysis is complemented with social network analysis to further examine the interpersonal and organizational ties of foreign fighters prior to their mobilization. The article's focus is on France, Germany, and the UK because these countries were the top three countries of origin of European foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq.[7] It is estimated that more than 1,000 foreign fighters had left France to fight for (or otherwise support) militant Islamist groups in Syria and Iraq, whereas more than 700 fighters departed from Germany and the UK respectively.[8] These numbers illustrate how these countries were particularly affected by jihadi mobilization in Europe.

For the purpose of this study, "foreign fighters" are defined as individuals who have traveled or attempted to travel to Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan, or any other conflict region motivated by their jihadi ideology. This broad definition includes individuals who were actively involved in armed combat, who have attended mil-

itant training camps, but also a small group of noncombatants, who, for instance, traveled with the aim of marrying a militant abroad (131, 13%). The research for this article identified and collected information on a total number of 565 foreign fighters, who traveled or attempted to travel to a conflict country between the years 2000 and 2016. The author generated profiles and coded detailed biographical and relational information on the foreign fighters using a codebook specifically designed for this research project and created the Jihadi Radicalization in Europe (JRE) database. Another 454 foreign fighters, who fit the sampling criteria, were identified in the Brandeis University's Western Jihadism Project (WJP) database and their profiles were integrated into the JRE database. The resulting database of 1,019 foreign fighters was analyzed to determine the most important contexts of radicalization.

This research article is structured as follows. First, it reviews the theoretical and empirical literature concerning various settings for radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization of jihadi foreign fighters and formulates the author's expectations. This section also includes a brief overview of the use of social network analysis in terrorism studies. Next, it introduces the original data set consisting of profiles of 1,019 foreign fighters and discusses the empirical strategy. Subsequently it presents the main findings from the analyses of the biographies of foreign fighters and the results of the social network analyses. Overall, the findings document the continued relevance of religious organizations in the recruitment and mobilization of foreign fighters from Europe. Thus, the findings challenge previous assertions that posit that religious organizations were being replaced by Internet and social media as the primary contexts of radicalization. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications and limitations of this study.

Contexts of Radicalization

Interpersonal Ties and the "Bunch of Guys" Hypothesis

In his seminal study, Marc Sageman revealed that friendship relationships of Islamist extremists were often formed prior to their involvement with jihad. His study also showed that the majority of them joined jihad in small groups of friends and relatives: "each new group became a 'bunch of guys,' transforming its members into potential mujahedin, actively seeking to join the global jihad." [9] For Sageman, social ties are the key element in the radicalization process. [10] Accordingly, social bonds make it easier for individuals to join the jihad by allowing them to rely on mutual emotional and social support, a shared identity, and encouragement to adopt a new faith. Kinship and friendship ties provide a sense of belonging and support that can be appealing to someone who is feeling alienated or marginalized. Moreover, they can also play a role in reinforcing extremist ideologies. In line with this, Nesser argues that interpersonal networks are important drivers of terrorism activity in European countries: "[a] crucial reason why Britain, France, Belgium, and Germany have experienced so many Islamic State plots is that these countries have had substantial jihadi networks since the 1990s, which produced many foreign fighters for Syria." [11]

Scholars of social movements have long since documented how the process through which movement organizations expand their ranks and mobilize support for their causes is "strongly influenced by structural proximity, availability, and affective interaction with movement members." [12] Movement participation is highly unlikely to occur without prior contact with a movement member. Research into the radicalization processes of foreign fighters is overall in line with these observations. For instance, Reynolds and Hafez used social network analysis to examine the mobilization of German foreign fighters. [13] Nearly 80% of foreign fighters in their sample were mobilized within a single interconnected network, thus showing that, similar to other social movements, foreign fighters in Germany were recruited within dense social networks. However, the study was limited in terms of its small sample size (99 observations). Similarly, Bakker and de Bont also found that the jihadist foreign fighters from Belgium and the Netherlands were closely connected to one another by way of family and/or friendship bonds. [14] These preexisting social bonds appear to have played a crucial role in their recruitment and mobilization. Overall, these findings stress the importance of interpersonal ties in the radicalization and recruitment processes. Therefore, interpersonal ties are expected to be central to the jihadi mobilization in Europe.

Internet, Social Media, and Online Radicalization

Often the radicalization process of the so-called “lone-wolves” is attributed to the consumption of online propaganda videos or interactions with recruiters on social media. For instance, Sageman argues that the Internet can facilitate the radicalization of loners, who are active on online forums, where “they share their plans and are encouraged by chat room participants to carry them out.”[15] According to proponents of the online radicalization thesis, radical organizations make extensive use of the Internet and social media for propaganda and recruitment activities: They create and share videos of individuals converting to Islam or of preachers giving advice on radical interpretations of Islam.[16] Monitoring the activities of terrorist groups on the Internet, Weimann documented how there were merely a dozen terrorist websites in the late 1990s; whereas by 2000 nearly all groups had established an online presence.[17] Religious seekers, who are searching for answers to questions about their faith, are often confronted with these contents. The Internet is easily accessible almost anywhere in Europe and online content is available to anyone who owns a smartphone or a personal computer. For instance, a television documentary reported how uncomplicated it is for young people to access online videos of Salafist preachers.[18] Using regression analyses, Pokalova found that Internet penetration was a statistically significant predictor of the outflow of foreign fighters from majority non-Muslim countries.[19]

While the Internet serves as the source of nonrelational, vertical diffusion of movement ideology, social media constitutes the relational, horizontal dimension of radicalization. Accordingly, social media channels “provide horizontal communication that is user generated, interactive, instantaneous, highly personalized, and easily mobile. As such, they facilitate the spreading of radical content between like-minded individuals and assist in forging a sense of communal belonging that is likely to appeal to some alienated individuals.”[20] Radical organizations and groups use these social media platforms to disseminate images of Muslims suffering in various conflict settings, sparking resentment and reinforcing grievances among their audiences.

The Islamic State has been particularly effective in using social media channels as a venue for recruiting and mobilizing individuals.[21] During the height of the conflict in Syria and Iraq, a very high number of European and Western foreign fighters were actively using social media to document their experiences and inspire others to join the cause.[22] In the United States, Mitts found that “among over a hundred individuals charged with providing material support for ISIS or plotting a violent attack on the organization’s behalf, about 62% used social media when they were radicalizing, and among those, 86% expressed their support for ISIS in publicly viewable posts.”[23] However, it is important to note that this study primarily focused on the online behavior of individuals who had already expressed interest in the Islamic State or were already sympathizers and thus, were at the later stages of their radicalization.

In contrast, German security agencies analyzed the profiles of over 370 German foreign fighters and reported that the Internet was not a critical factor for radicalization, neither at the beginning nor at the later stages of the radicalization process.[24] In fact, only 9% of the analyzed individuals had no personal contact with the Salafist milieu and were known to have radicalized solely online. A social network analysis of German foreign fighters similarly maintained that online recruitment was not a primary vector of radicalization. A report on 15 cases of extremism and terrorism in the United Kingdom also found meager support for the online radicalization hypothesis.[25] Although the Internet was found to facilitate radicalization, it did not substitute physical contact during the radicalization process. Based on this discussion and the mixed evidence concerning the role of the Internet and social media, this author expects the Internet to be a relevant facilitator of radicalization but not as important as interpersonal ties. Moreover, online radicalization is expected to be more crucial for the later stages of radicalization rather than during the initial stages.

Prisons

European prisons have been pointed out as crucial recruitment grounds and in some cases as bases of operational planning.[26] Basra and Neumann have suggested that the Islamic State was increasingly recruiting

in European jails and among individuals who were previously engaged in violent and criminal activities. [27] Similarly, in an op-ed published in the Guardian, Pantucci highlighted the problem of the spread of violent Islamist extremist ideas in British prisons. Two prominent cases, Richard Reid the “shoe bomber” and 21 July 2005 plot leader Muktar Said Ibrahim, served as examples of individuals who radicalized while serving prison terms for petty crime. Media reports have dubbed a segregated prison wing in the UK as “Jihad University” to illustrate the increased risk of radicalization of inmates. Belgian and French prisons have also been pointed out as being fertile hunting grounds for Islamist recruiters. Both Chérif Kouachi, who was one of the gunmen in the Charlie Hebdo shooting, and Amedy Coulibaly, who was the hostage-taker in the Hypercacher Kosher Supermarket siege, were radicalized in prison by the al-Qaeda recruiter Djamel Beghal. [28] As Bisserbe reports, convicted terrorists like Beghal, “sit atop the social pecking order in many facilities, using jail time to plot new attacks or groom petty criminals for jihad.” Acquaintances and friendships that are made in prisons can also later be activated for the purposes of terrorist activities. For example, it was in a Belgian prison where the 2015 Paris attackers Abdelhamid Abaaoud and Salah Abdeslam had met. [29]

For Neumann, the prison represents a place of vulnerability where individuals experience social isolation or personal crisis, both of which are important risk factors for radicalization. [30] Describing his experiences in a Belgian prison, a former convict echoes these observations as he recalls how Muslim youths arrive in prisons alone and how the older Muslim inmates particularly attract those “who want to become fuller members of the group.” [31] Silber and Bhatt note that the “prison’s isolated environment, ability to create a ‘captive audience’ atmosphere, its absence of day-to-day distractions, and its large population of disaffected young men, makes it an excellent breeding ground for radicalization.” [32] Similarly, Brandon argues that prison inmates who are disaffected “can easily be persuaded that adopting rigid Islamist beliefs will help them turn away from crime.” [33] Prisons can also bring together terrorism offenders with other types of criminals, “creating the potential for an ‘unholy alliance’ between the two.” [34] Within the prison context, politically motivated offenders and ‘ordinary’ criminals can exchange information and transfer skills on procuring weapons, evading authorities, and engaging in violence. [35] Similarly, Olivier Roy highlights prisons as major places of radicalization. Accordingly, prisons link radicals with other radicalized peers outside of any institutionalized religious circuit and facilitate the “reinterpretation of crime as legitimate political protest.” [36]

Despite the media attention and the academic focus on the crime-terror nexus, no study has so far investigated the relative importance of prisons in the jihadi radicalization process using a large sample. Moreover, the available studies have mostly focused on terrorism offenders rather than foreign fighters, and they are also characterized by some limitations. Although Roy considers radicalization in prison to be a common feature of jihadi terrorists, he does not provide an exact share of his sample of 140 Western radicals who radicalized in prison. In their influential study, Basra and Neumann sampled 79 recent European jihadists with criminal pasts and found that one-third of those who spent time in prison (12 out of 45 cases) had indeed been radicalized there. [37] However, this is probably an overestimation of the role of the prison in radicalization considering that only individuals with a criminal past were sampled. Moreover, the authors also note that in the majority of the cases the radicalization process continued and intensified after the individuals were released from prison. In a report published by the German security agencies, prisons are not mentioned among the most important contexts of radicalization of the sample’s 378 German foreign fighters. [38] Other studies have primarily focused on previous involvement of foreign fighters in criminal activities, but mostly did not investigate the specific role of prisons in radicalization. [39] Given these limitations and the available evidence concerning the role of prisons in the radicalization of German foreign fighters, prisons are not likely to be central to the mobilization of European foreign fighters.

Religious Organizations

According to Silke, before 9/11, “mosques played a key role in providing potential jihadis with a route into groups such as al-Qaeda.” [40] Radical preachers like Abu Qatada (alias Omar Mahmoud Othman) or Mustafa Kamel (alias Abu Hamza al-Mazri), both based in London, are known to have actively recruited

potential jihadis. In fact, attendance at one of two London mosques—Brixton Mosque and Finsbury Park Mosque—linked together a considerable share of the UK’s Islamist radicals. Similarly, Sageman highlights that it was primarily in mosques where the intensification of religious sentiment and the reinforcement of ideological commitment took place, transforming potential recruits into dedicated militants.”[41] Mosques also provided settings in which individuals could make new friends and interact. Particularly in the diaspora, young, alienated Muslims would seek out a mosque to get to know fellow Muslims from their community and thereby, could get linked to the jihad through those who were already connected.

In the social movement literature, places of worship have previously been characterized as “mobilizing structures.” Defined as “collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action,”[42] mobilizing structures include all forms of social movement organizations that provide the infrastructure, resources, and staff for sustained collective action.[43] Social movement theory predicts that activism and mobilization are more likely to occur and endure if there is a dense organizational and institutional infrastructure. Citing the role of churches in the civil rights movement in the United States, social movement scholars point to mosques and other types of religious or cultural organizations as an example of formal mobilizing structures within the Islamist movement.[44]

However, some observers argue that recent developments, which involved a combination of state surveillance and public pressure on local religious community leaders, have pushed the mobilization structures of radical Islamists into more informal settings.[45] Reviewing the empirical literature on homegrown terrorism, Hafez and Mullins stress that “[a]s governments in the Muslim world and Europe look askance on promoters of radicalization and take steps to limit their freedom of maneuver in mosques and other recruitment sites, jihadists turn to the Internet, online forums, chat rooms, and a whole range of social media technologies to circumvent the physical and legal limits on reaching new recruits.”[46] Sageman also pointed out that radical mosques have been replaced by the Internet and the new online forums.[47] According to this view, radicalization is now primarily taking place online, and the online forums have the same influence that radical mosques had for the previous generation of terrorists.

There are also scholars who go a step further and outright reject that religious organizations play any role whatsoever in the radicalization process. Most prominently, the French sociologist Olivier Roy asserts that almost all the terrorism offenders from Europe “suddenly renew their religious observance, either individually or in the context of a small group (*never in the framework of a religious organization*).”[48] Roy also makes the claim that most of the jihadists have rarely visited a mosque.[49] In line with this, Uçar points out that there is no available evidence that religious extremists in Germany are influenced by mosques.[50] In contrast, the study by German security agencies on foreign fighters from Germany has highlighted the continued relevance of formal mobilizing structures for the radicalization of potential recruits.[51] Their study shows that the majority of foreign fighters had been active in Salafist or Islamist milieus, where they participated in Koran distribution activities, Islamic seminars, and charity events for Islamic causes.

Although some scholars argue that the relevance of religious organizations or mosques as contexts of radicalization may have declined in recent years, drawing on the social movements literature, one can expect that these contexts continue to play an important role in the radicalization process of European foreign fighters.

Social Network Analysis

Social network analysis has become an increasingly popular tool for studying terrorist groups and understanding their behavior. This method enables researchers to investigate the relationships between individuals within a network as well as the structure of the overall network. It has been widely used to provide valuable insights into how terrorist groups operate and how they might be efficiently countered by security agencies.[52] For example, social network analysis can help identify the key individuals within the network who play important roles in its functioning.[53] It can also be utilized to categorize networks into subgroups and characterize power dynamics within and across different groups. This information can then be used to examine processes of ideological commitment, identity formation, and decision-making within networks as

well as to predict the choice of different tactics by terrorist groups.[54] It is important to highlight the importance of these types of analyses in developing counter-terrorism measures and strategies for disrupting the activities of terrorist networks.

Pioneering the use of social network analyses in the field of terrorism studies, Krebs gathered publicly available information to map the network of the 9/11 hijackers and found that the pilots were embedded in dense preexisting connections established in university, via kinship, or during their training in Afghanistan, making the network very resilient.[55] An influential study by Koschade described processes to detect structural vulnerabilities of terrorist groups by conducting a social network analysis of the Jemaah Islamiyah cell that was responsible for the Bali bombings in 2002.[56] Similarly, Medina demonstrated the strength and flexibility of the global Islamist terrorism network by redrawing their network after removing the most connected individuals.[57] An investigation by Perliger and Pedahzur was another important contribution to the use of social network analysis in the field of terrorism studies.[58] The authors supplemented the predominant organizational approach to suicide terrorism with a social network perspective and demonstrated the grassroots factors responsible for the emergence of Palestinian suicide bomber networks. Their study showed how horizontal networks, based primarily on kinship and friendship ties, gradually replaced hierarchical organizational systems.

Another more recent line of literature has conducted social network analyses of online activities and propaganda campaigns of extremist groups on social media platforms to identify influential figures and map communication structures.[59] Specifically, they investigated YouTube channels and Twitter accounts to show how information about ongoing operations or conflicts is disseminated online. Moreover, they documented the most popular and influential disseminators and their potential role in recruitment and radicalization processes.

For the present study, social network analysis is used to complement the biographical investigation of the contexts of radicalization of foreign fighters. Specifically, it analyzes the interpersonal and organizational ties of foreign fighters prior to their departure to investigate whether individuals were embedded in interconnected networks before their mobilization or whether they mobilized alone in isolation. Moreover, it explores foreign fighters' preexisting ties to religious mobilizing structures to test Olivier Roy's assertion that European jihadists do not radicalize or mobilize in the framework of a religious organization.

Data and Methods

For this study, data on foreign fighters and noncombatant members of militant groups from France, Germany, and the UK were used to investigate the research questions. The data are drawn from the JRE and the WJP databases. Detailed information on the two databases as well as the data collection procedures and data resources used to compile them can be found in the online appendix.[60]

The sample for this study consists of 327 foreign fighters from France, 322 from Germany, and 370 from the UK (Table 1).


Table 1: Number of Foreign Fighters in the WJP- and JRE-Databases across Countries

	France	Germany	UK	Total
WJP sample	158	99	197	454
JRE sample	169	223	173	565
Total sample	327	322	370	1019

Unless specified otherwise, the term “foreign fighters” will also be used to refer to noncombatants and those who have attempted to travel to a conflict country. 84% of the sample succeeded in reaching their destination and becoming foreign fighters, whereas 16% failed to reach their destination. The majority of those who failed were prevented from departing by security agencies. There were also some individuals who traveled or attempted to travel to multiple conflict countries. Given the public attention received by the most recent wave of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq and the centrality of this conflict to the academic literature, if there were individuals who participated in multiple conflicts, here their most recent travel attempt was analyzed.

Figure 1 illustrates the number of departures between the years 2000 and 2016. There are three identifiable waves of mobilization. The first peak in year 2001 was connected to the events surrounding the September 11 attacks. Some of the perpetrators had visited al-Qaeda affiliated camps in Waziristan - the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan - whereas others had traveled to Waziristan just before or shortly after 9/11. The most frequent destination for foreign fighters from the second wave in 2009 was also Waziristan. The third wave took place between the years 2012 and 2016. It concerned the civil war in Syria and was much larger than the previous ones.

Figure 1: Year of Departure.



The main destination for foreign fighters in the sample was Syria or Iraq (Levant). There were a total number of 714 foreign fighters (70% of the sample) who traveled to the Levant region, followed by 216 foreign fighters (21%) who traveled to Afghanistan or Pakistan.[61] The insurgency in Somalia also attracted a small number of foreign fighters (43). The other conflict countries included, among others, Mali, Libya, and Palestine. The demographic characteristics (e.g., age, gender, country of origin etc.) of the sample are described in detail and compared with previous studies in the online Appendix.

Two different variables were used to document the radicalization process. The *introduction to radicalization* variable documents where the individual first came into contact with radical Islamist ideology. Some individuals were socialized in an Islamist/Salafist family. Others were introduced to the radical milieu by their friends. Still others encountered radical content online. Most of the time, this information was available in the sources. In some cases, they were derived from the biographies of the individuals. For example, if the father was a prominent Islamist figure, it is highly likely that the son had his first contact with the radical ideology through his father. Since the aim was to identify and isolate the initial step into radicalization, this variable could only have one single value. The *progression of radicalization* variable documents radicalization enabling contexts and venues where the radicalization further progressed. For instance, after being

introduced to a radical milieu by friends, an individual could still have been further radicalized online. In fact, the radicalization process of many individuals took place in multiple settings, as they gradually became more involved in the cause. Therefore, this variable can have multiple values.


Results

Contexts of Radicalization

In the first step of the analysis, investigating where individuals initially came into contact with the radical ideology, i.e., *introduction to radicalization*, it was possible to identify the mode of introduction to the radical ideology for 442 cases (43%). In a second step, the present study explored where individuals radicalized further, i.e., *progression of radicalization*. There was comparably more information available on the different contexts of radicalization that followed the onset of radicalization. It was possible to identify at least one context of radicalization for 701 (69%) cases.

Figure 2 displays the share of contexts of the introduction to, and the progression of, the radicalization process. In general, the relative importance of each context of radicalization was similar across the three countries. The majority of the cases, for which information on their conditions of introduction to the radical ideology was available, were introduced through their interpersonal ties (44%). These included family members, close friends, work or school colleagues, or other acquaintances. Within each country, interpersonal ties were the most crucial context for both the onset and the progression of radicalization.

Figure 2: Context of Introduction to, and Progression of Radicalization of Foreign Fighters.




Mosques and religious associations were the second most crucial context of radicalization. A quarter of the individuals made their first encounter with the radical ideology in a mosque, in a religious association, or a religious seminar. Examples of this type of association include the Iqra bookshop in Leeds, the Abu-Bakr Mosque in Vénissieux, or the Al-Nur Mosque in Berlin. They played a comparably bigger role in the

German sample's progression of radicalization. Nevertheless, almost half of the British and French samples also further radicalized by attending radical mosques or during their activities in these radical associations. Together these two networks - interpersonal and organizational - contributed to the onset of radicalization for more than two-thirds of the sample in each country.

The Internet or prisons were comparably less crucial to the radicalization process of foreign fighters. Internet was a relevant catalyst of radicalization particularly in the UK, as it led to the radicalization of almost 20% of the British sample. The Internet was also more important for the progression of radicalization. One-third of the sample within each country further radicalized online, after being introduced to the radical ideology through other contexts.

Internet and social media are nowadays much more widespread than they were at the beginning of the 2000s and have become more central to our lives in the more recent years. Given the timeframe of the sample - which ranges from 2000 to 2016—it is possible that the findings based on such as sample can be slightly biased, as foreign fighters who mobilized in the early 2000s were less likely to have radicalized online. To take this into account, the sample was split into two groups, with one group consisting of foreign fighters who traveled abroad between 2000 and 2010 and a second group consisting of foreign fighters who traveled abroad after 2010 (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Context of Introduction to, and Progression of Radicalization of the Entire Sample of Foreign Fighters Depending on the Date of Departure



The findings suggest that the relevance of Internet as a context of introduction to radicalization did, in fact, increase significantly from 5% (2000-2010) to 20%, making it the second most important context of initial radicalization among the 2010-2016 sample. The most notable change was among the British foreign fighters, where the Internet as the primary venue of initial radicalization jumped from 6% to 25% (see also on-line Appendix Figures S7 and S8 for the results across the different countries). However, even after splitting the sample, interpersonal contacts remain the most crucial context of introduction to radicalization across both timeframes. Similarly, the importance of Internet as a context of progression of radicalization almost doubled from 18% (2000-2010) to 35% (2010-2016) among the pooled sample. However, the interpersonal contacts (65%) and organizational ties (44%) remain the first and second most important contexts of the progression of radicalization for the 2010-2016 timeframe.

One context of radicalization that has not received much attention in the literature but appeared to be relevant was radicalization abroad. Interestingly, more than 10% of the sample had initially radicalized abroad, whereas 20% further radicalized outside of their country of residence. For example, some individuals were radicalized abroad in language schools (e.g., the Easy Language School in Egypt) or while visiting their relatives in their countries of origin. In comparison to foreign fighters from Germany, foreign fighters from

France and the UK were more likely to have radicalized abroad. The share of those who began radicalizing abroad was the highest among the British sample. This is because an estimated number of 22 British foreign fighters had previously attended the private University of Medical Sciences and Technology in Khartoum (Sudan) before traveling to Syria.[62] Overall, prisons played only a marginal role in each country. They were most relevant for the French sample, as 8% initially radicalized in prison.

Social Network Analysis

In the next step of the analysis, the interpersonal and organizational networks of foreign fighters before they traveled to a conflict country were investigated. Figure 4, Figure 5, and Figure 6 are social network graphs representing the foreign fighters and their network ties to each other, to other radical individuals, and to mobilizing structures.

Figure 4: Social Network Graph of French Foreign Fighters Prior to Mobilization.





Figure 5: Social Network Graph of German Foreign Fighters Prior to Mobilization.

The depicted network ties include all types of ties, including friendships, kinship, and affiliation and are treated as being uni-directed.[63] Nodes on the network graph are coded by shape and color. Circle nodes represent individuals, whereas square nodes represent the radical religious mobilizing structures. Gray circle nodes represent the sample, i.e., the foreign fighters from each country. Transparent circle nodes represent other radical individuals, including preachers, recruiters, and other terrorism offenders.

The social network graphs of foreign fighters resemble each other across the three countries. Most of the foreign fighters were embedded in densely interconnected networks. Many had multiple connections to both other foreign fighters and to other radical individuals. The number of individuals with memberships in, or affiliations with, mobilizing structures is of particular relevance to this study. First, the interpersonal networks to identify the number of isolated individuals were analyzed.[64] In addition to interpersonal ties, organizational ties in the social network analysis were also included. As Reynolds and Hafez argue, it would be unrealistic to assume that all members of a group knew each other. However, sharing group membership does “establish that these fighters were part of a common network before their mobilization.”[65]

Figure 6: Social Network Graph of British Foreign Fighters Prior to Mobilization




Table 2 below summarizes the findings from the social network analysis. The column “network clusters, excluding MSs” indicates the total number of network components that are identified in the social network graph excluding the mobilizing structures. A component or cluster “is a group of nodes that are connected to each other, but not to the rest of the nodes.”[66] Coincidentally, there were 119 clusters in both France and in the UK. In Germany, there were comparably fewer clusters that were not interconnected (84). Even without including the mobilizing structures, a total number of 218 individuals from Germany, which make up almost 70% of the German sample, were connected to one single large network cluster. In France and the UK, the share of foreign fighters within one network cluster was smaller. Nevertheless, half of the sample in each country was still connected to a single network cluster. In France, there were 59 isolated nodes, i.e., 59 foreign fighters from France did not have any connections to other foreign fighters or radical individuals, which constitutes 18% of the French sample. A comparably similar share of foreign fighters was isolated prior to their mobilization in Germany (17%) and in the UK (17%). The remaining foreign fighters were interconnected within smaller separate network clusters (see column “connected nodes in other clusters excluding MSs”).

Table 2: Results from the Social Network Analysis of Foreign Fighters' Interpersonal and Organizational Networks Prior to Mobilization.

Country	Network clusters excluding MSs	Nodes within a single cluster excluding MSs	Interconnected nodes in other clusters excluding MSs	Isolated nodes excluding MSs
France	119	174 (53%)	94 (29%)	59 (18%)
Germany	84	218 (68%)	53 (16%)	51 (17%)
UK	119	172 (46%)	134 (36%)	64 (17%)
Country	Network clusters including MSs	Nodes within a single cluster including MSs	Interconnected nodes in other clusters including MSs	Isolated nodes including MSs
France	77	215 (66%)	64 (20%)	48 (15%)
Germany	57	242 (75%)	52 (16%)	28 (8%)
UK	105	207 (56%)	109 (29%)	54 (15%)

Note: MS = Mobilizing Structure

Once the mobilizing structures are introduced into the network, the number of distinct network clusters reduces within each network (see column “network clusters including MSs”). Although individuals may not be directly connected to each other through friendship, kinship, or other types of ties, they become connected through their affiliation with, or membership in, radical groups and organizations. Therefore, the number of detached network clusters also becomes fewer. The difference is most significant in France, where the number of network clusters drops from 119 to 77. Including the mobilizing structures in the network analysis also increases the share of connected individuals within one single network cluster to 66% in France. In Germany, the share of foreign fighters within a single cluster got as high as 75%. Once mobilizing structures are taken into account, both in France and in the UK only 15% of the sample remained isolated (see column “isolated nodes including MSs”). In Germany, the share of isolated foreign fighters was halved to a marginal minority of 9%. These findings provide strong supporting evidence that religious associations and organizations are still very relevant to the jihadist mobilization in Europe.

In France, two associations stand out which have mobilized a significant number of foreign fighters. 18 foreign fighters were affiliated with the Sanabil association, whereas 13 were tied to the Forsane Alizza group.[67] Two mosques also feature prominently among the social networks of foreign fighters. 11 individuals were active in the Al-Bakara mosque in Lunel, whereas 9 individuals were active in the El-Islah Mosque in Villiers-sur-Marne.[68]

In Germany, the *Lies!* campaign, or the campaign's initiator *Die Wahre Religion* organization, was the major mobilizing structure of foreign fighters. A total number of 34 individuals took part in the campaign or were active in the *Die Wahre Religion* organization.[69] The second most important mobilizing structure among the German sample was the *Millatu Ibrahim* group, with 22 affiliations.[70] Another frequently mentioned mosque among the sample was the Al-Quds Mosque (later renamed the Taiba mosque) in Hamburg.

In the UK, the al-Muhajiroun organization (or its derivatives such as the Islam4UK or the Need4Khalifah) played a major role in the mobilization of British foreign fighters. 24 foreign fighters in the sample were members of, or were affiliated with, this organization.[71] Two mosques from London were central to the British foreign fighter networks: 16 foreign fighters had attended the Finsbury Park Mosque and 13 had attended the al-Manaar Mosque.[72]

Conclusions

Overall, the present research finds that jihadi foreign fighters from Europe radicalized in the period 2000-2016 primarily through interpersonal and organizational ties. These networks were the main channel for both the onset of radicalization and the further progression of radicalization of foreign fighters within each country. Thus, these findings are generally in-line with previous studies that emphasize the crucial role of preexisting interpersonal ties and more or less organized social networks.[73] In addition, it finds that mosques and religious associations, mostly adhering to a Salafist interpretation of Islam, remained influential contexts of indoctrination. Particularly following the initial onset of radicalization, which is predominantly triggered by interpersonal ties, these mobilizing structures provide a context where the ideological indoctrination can take place. As Schuurman et al. correctly noted, attackers “hastily labeled as ‘lone wolves’ [in the media] often turn out to have interpersonal, political, or operational ties to larger networks.”[74] The authors also stress that some terrorism offenders may indeed act alone but their radicalization process is generally characterized by preexisting social ties to larger radical milieus, groups, or movements.[74] As evidenced by the social network analysis, the majority of the foreign fighters were indeed interconnected within a single interpersonal and organizational network. Although time trends in the radicalization patterns indicate an increased relevance of online radicalization, it has not, so far, replaced face-to-face encounters.

Most importantly, these findings highlight the continued relevance of mosques and religious associations in the radicalization processes of European jihadists and challenge the assertions of some scholars who have argued that mosques have been replaced by the Internet or social media as primary venues of recruitment.[76] The results also refute Oliver Roy’s prominent claim that Islamist radicalization does not take place in the framework of a religious organization.[77] In contrast, more than half of the sample was further indoctrinated in the framework of religious mobilizing structures. Based on these findings, programs and strategies that aim to prevent and counter violent extremism could benefit from paying particular attention to existing mobilizing structures and diverting their efforts towards dismantling them.

Another context of radicalization that has recently received ample attention from the media and terrorism scholars alike, namely prisons, also appear to be peripheral to the recruitment and mobilization of European foreign fighters. Previous scholarship has primarily focused on the role of prisons in the radicalization process of terrorism offenders – who mainly operate in their country of residence – but comparably less attention has been paid to foreign fighters. Arguably, the crime-terror nexus may be more relevant for those who plan or perform local attacks, since they may be reliant on criminal networks for gaining access to weapons and other resources. In contrast, those who plan to join conflicts abroad may require other types of logistics, such as funding or safe passage across borders, which can also be provided through interpersonal and organizational networks.

The findings presented in this study point to a limited role played by the Internet and social media in the radicalization process of European foreign fighters. Given its limited effect, why do then extremist groups such as the Islamic State or al-Qaeda produce so much online propaganda? One possible explanation is the theater aspect of terrorism. Online propaganda does not only serve recruitment and mobilization purposes. As Brian Jenkins has argued “[t]errorist attacks are often carefully choreographed to attract the attention of the electronic media and the international press.”[78] Through outrageous acts of staged violence that spread fear and alarm, terrorists aim to persuade or intimidate the public and the governments to achieve their political goals. Arguably, the Internet and social media channels gave terrorist groups the opportunity to produce and disseminate their propaganda materials without the censorship, commentary, or gatekeeping involved in traditional mass media. Therefore, it is not so surprising that we have been confronted with so much online propaganda in recent years.

There are, however, some important limitations to this study that are worth highlighting. First, it is possible that the online activities of jihadi foreign fighters may be underreported in the data. For some journalists, interpersonal contacts and organizational ties may be easier to reveal and document than online activities. Similarly, it is conceivable that when describing their radicalization process, individuals might emphasize

the influence others have had on them over their own wrongdoings. Ideally, future research should draw on declassified court and police records to complement publicly available data in order to provide more in-depth information on these processes. This would also improve the quality of the data and reduce the number of cases with missing information. Second, the study was limited in terms of the number and characteristics of countries of residence of foreign fighters. Arguably, France, Germany, and the UK are the countries with the largest, oldest, and most active jihadi networks.[79] It is possible that foreign fighters from other European countries with smaller preexisting networks may have different radicalization trajectories. A comparative research design including other European countries with less significant histories of jihadi mobilization could address these limitations.

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