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# **WORKING PAPER**

# Human vs. Machine: Disposition Effect among Algorithmic and Human Day Traders

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## Human vs. Machine: Disposition Effect among Algorithmic and Human Day Traders

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#### Abstract

This paper studies whether and why algorithmic traders exhibit one of the most broadlydocumented behavioral puzzles – the disposition effect. We use trade data from the NASDAQ Copenhagen Stock Exchange merged with the weather data. We find that on average, the disposition effect for human traders is substantial and increases significantly on colder days, while for similarly-trading algorithms, it is insignificant and insensitive to the weather. This provides causal evidence of the link between human psychology and the disposition effect and suggests that algorithms can reduce psychology-related human errors. Considering the ongoing AI adoption, this may have broad implications.

**Keywords:** Disposition effect; Algorithmic trading; High-frequency trading; Decision making; Financial markets; Rationality

**JEL Classification:** D8, D91, G11, G12, G23, G41, O3

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#### 1. Introduction

Artificial intelligence (AI) has been rapidly transforming the financial sector in general and algorithmic trading (AT) in particular (Buchanan, 2019; Bholat et al., 2020; Bholat and Susskind, 2021). Arguably, one of the benefits of AT is the ability to reduce psychology-related human errors (Borch and Lange, 2017; Buchanan, 2019; Buckmann et al., 2021), yet, to our knowledge, there is no evidence on the extent to which AT actually achieves that.<sup>1</sup> This paper provides such evidence by examining whether and why algorithmic traders (ATs), including high-frequency traders (HFTs), exhibit one of the most robust and broadly-documented puzzles in behavioral finance – the disposition effect, i.e., the tendency to realize gains faster than losses (Shefrin and Statman, 1985).<sup>2</sup>

This paper provides a bridge between the behavioral finance literature and the AT and HFT literature and makes a twofold contribution. First, psychological biases help explain why investors behave differently than predicted by rational economic models (Barberis and Thaler, 2003), yet evidence of the causal link between psychology and the disposition effect puzzle has started to emerge only recently and primarily from experimental studies (e.g., Frydman et al., 2014; Chang et al., 2016; Frydman and Camerer, 2016; Fischbacher et al., 2017).<sup>3</sup> We provide novel identification of this causal link using field trading data, exogenous weather variation and with algorithms as a control group. More generally, we contribute by suggesting how algorithms can be used as a control group to help identify the effects of human psychology. We also provide suggestive evidence on the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>E.g., algorithms can inherit various biases from developers or training data (e.g., Cowgill and Tucker, 2019).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Barber and Odean (2013) review the literature that provides potential explanations for the disposition effect and documents it for different asset classes and investor types. The asset classes include stocks (Odean, 1998), stock options (Heath et al., 1999), commodity and currency futures (Locke and Mann, 2005), real estate (Genesove and Mayer, 2001), while investors include individual (Odean, 1998) and institutional (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001) investors, mutual funds (Cici, 2012), and professional day-traders of futures (Locke and Mann, 2005). The explanations include the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), the realization utility theory of Barberis and Xiong (2012), regret aversion and self-control issues (Shefrin and Statman, 1985), beliefs in mean-reversion or in private information (Ben-David and Hirshleifer, 2012), portfolio rebalancing and transaction costs (Odean, 1998).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Using field data, Heimer (2016) finds causal peer effects, Frydman and Wang (2020) find causal salience effects and Li et al. (2021) find causal air pollution effects on the disposition effect.

link between psychology and the disposition effect by simply comparing the levels of the disposition effect among algorithms and humans. If the disposition effect is driven primarily by emotions and cognitive biases rather than by rational reasons such as informed trading, portfolio rebalancing or transaction costs, we would expect to observe it for humans but less so for algorithms. Second, despite the prevalence of ATs and HFTs<sup>4</sup>, the literature is silent on the disposition effect among them. We document for the first time the disposition effect for HFTs and examine which trading strategies it is associated with. This contributes to a better understanding of both the disposition effect and HFT strategies.<sup>5</sup>

We use trade-level data from the NASDAQ Copenhagen Stock Exchange for the two years 2016-2017 to measure the disposition effect as a percentage of gains realized (PGR) minus a percentage of losses realized (PLR) for every proprietary trading account of every member at every point in time. For comparability between algorithms and humans, we focus on day-traders and, in line with, e.g., Locke and Mann (2005); Coval and Shumway (2005); Baron et al. (2019), assume zero starting inventories every day. The data has two important features. First, we see members' addresses, which allows matching the data with the hourly weather data in traders' locations, and thus, similarly to Goetzmann et al. (2014), to proxy for traders' mood. Second, we observe the types of trading accounts issued by the exchange and thus can precisely identify humans and algorithms that trade "with no human involvement" (Nasdaq, 2019). Since algorithms are immune to mood shocks, we use them as a control group to account for weather-induced stock market movements (e.g., Saunders, 1993; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003; Goetzmann et al., 2014) that could potentially affect trading decisions for all traders, including algorithms. To further strengthen the identification, we control for interactive fixed effects, i.e., trader-day, stock-day and trader-stock fixed effects.

**Results.** First, we find that by the end of the day, human traders realize 28% of gains (PGR) and only 17% of losses (PLR) on average. The average end-of-day disposition effect, i.e.,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Algorithms generated around half of the trading volume in our dataset from the Copenhagen Stock Exchange in 2016-2017. See SEC (2010) for the prevalence of HFT in the US and ESMA (2014) in Europe. <sup>5</sup>See, e.g., O'Hara (2015) and Menkveld (2016) for the literature reviews on HFT.

PGR-PLR gap, equals 11.5 pp and is statistically different from zero at the 1% significance level. For similarly-trading algorithms,<sup>6</sup> the disposition effect equals 1.5 pp and is not statistically significant (PGR=34% and PLR=33% on average). This suggests that the disposition effect is driven by unintentional causes specific to humans, e.g., emotions and cognitive biases, rather than by intentional profit-maximizing motives that would be relevant for algorithms as well.

Second, we find that warmer weather between 8 am and 9 am CET i.e., when traders travel to work and thus are most likely to be exposed to the weather, reduces the disposition effect in the first trading hour. For human traders, the disposition effect at 10 am CET on average equals 7.5 pp on mornings that are warmer than the monthly median and 9.6 pp, i.e., 28% more, on mornings that are colder than the monthly median. The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Among other robustness checks, we show that the main results are similar when we use different fixed effects and error clustering, measure temperature in degrees instead of the "higher-than-median" dummy, consider either only long or only short positions, and control for other weather variables such as sunshine duration, cloud cover, precipitation, air pressure, humidity, radiation and wind speed. No other weather variable shows such a significant and robust effect. The effect of air temperature remains significant until 11 am but fades out by noon and, in line with evidence in Keller et al. (2005) on the temperature-mood relationship, is most significant when temperatures are moderate, i.e., in spring and autumn. We find no impact of the weather on the disposition effect for algorithms.

Due to a well-documented link between the weather and human psychology (see, e.g., Denissen et al., 2008; Klimstra et al., 2011; Harley, 2018), we interpret these results as evidence of the causal effect of psychology on the disposition effect. Since warmer air is found to improve both mood (Cunningham, 1979; Howarth and Hoffman, 1984; Keller et al., 2005) and cognition (Keller et al., 2005; Yeganeh et al., 2018), our results can be explained by both major preference-based theories on the disposition effect – realization utility (Barberis and Xiong, 2012) and prospect

 $<sup>^{6}\</sup>mathrm{For}$  comparability, we exclude algorithms that trade more frequently than the most frequently trading human.

theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Firstly, according to realization utility, the disposition effect occurs because it is pleasant to realize gains and painful to realize losses. Realizing more gains than losses can thus be seen as a mood-repair technique, which becomes less relevant as the mood is improved by warmer weather.<sup>7</sup> Secondly, if warmer weather improves cognition, this can help reduce cognitive biases that potentially cause the disposition effect, e.g., loss aversion and attachments to reference points which are at the heart of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman, 2011). Alternatively, the weather could impact the disposition effect through beliefs rather than preferences. There is evidence that better mood increases overconfidence (e.g., Au et al., 2003; Nofsinger, 2005; Ifcher and Zarghamee, 2014), and overconfidence is thought to strengthen the disposition effect through stronger belief in private information (Ben-David and Hirshleifer, 2012). Yet, we find the opposite, which suggests that the disposition effect is affected by the weather through preferences more than beliefs.

Third, we find that 11 of the 22 most frequently trading algorithms (those with an average gap between trades of less than 100 seconds) persistently exhibit a strong disposition effect and this can be predicted by their engagement into price-reversal trading strategies. All 11 algorithms that on average exhibit a significant disposition effect engaged in price-reversal trading for more than 50% of the time, while the other 11 algorithms engaged in price-reversal trading for less than 50% of the time. This provides evidence that "beliefs" in mean-reversion or private information create the disposition effect (Ben-David and Hirshleifer, 2012) for HFTs and helps us to better understand directional HFT strategies (Brogaard et al., 2014; Van Kervel and Menkveld, 2019; Korajczyk and Murphy, 2019). Unlike the evidence for humans, we find no evidence that price-reversal trading for HFTs is associated with lower profits, which suggests that HFTs' "beliefs" in these strategies are not irrational.

Overall, our results suggest that apart from HFTs, ATs on average avoid the disposition effect,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Craving for mood-repair has been shown to significantly affect behavior (e.g., Morris and Reilly, 1987; Elliott, 1994). Li et al. (2021) also use mood regulation to explain the link between air pollution and the disposition effect.

while similarly-trading humans do not, and this difference can at least partially be explained by psychology-related human errors that ATs manage to reduce. Given the ongoing ubiquitous adoption of AI, this may have broad implications for economic theory, financial markets, the real economy, and, potentially, the future of human behavior. For economic theory, our results suggest that decisions automated by algorithms are more consistent with rational economic models than on-the-spot decisions made by humans. Hence, as humans are replaced by AI, rational economic models, e.g., those based on Bayesian updating of beliefs, the Expected Utility theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947) or Subjective Expected Utility (Savage, 1954), might become more accurate in explaining the real world. Similarly, as human traders are replaced by algorithmic traders (e.g., Kirilenko and Lo, 2013), financial markets might become easier to explain with rational models. For the real economy, industries that require more "rational" decision-making might replace humans with algorithms faster, affecting unemployment, productivity and economic growth.<sup>8</sup> Finally, people surrounded by automated decision-making (e.g. self-driving cars, virtual assistants, etc.) that is more "rational", may either learn to behave more "rationally" or their "rationality" may atrophy due to their reliance on machines.<sup>9</sup>

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 highlights our contribution to the related literature. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 describes the methodology. Section 5 summarizes and discusses the main results. Section 6 analyzes the disposition effect among HFTs. Section 7 concludes.

#### 2. Literature and contribution

This paper contributes to a few lines of literature, including on (1) AT and HFT, (2) the disposition effect, (3) weather effects on financial markets, (4) the algorithmic bias and (5) the

 $<sup>^{8}</sup>$ See, e.g., Autor (2015); Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018); Berg et al. (2018) for effects of automation on the economy.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>See, e.g., North (1994)'s lecture on how environments shape people's mental models of reality, and, in the long run, through collective learning, affect the behavior of future cultures.

debate on the rationality assumption in economics.

First, the literature on AT so far has focused on studying ATs' speed advantage (Budish et al., 2015; Baron et al., 2019), informational advantage (Biais et al., 2015; Chordia et al., 2018), trading strategies (Hagströmer and Nordén, 2013; Menkveld, 2013; Malinova et al., 2014; Brogaard et al., 2014; O'Hara, 2015; Van Kervel and Menkveld, 2019; Korajczyk and Murphy, 2019), and the impact on market quality, namely, liquidity (Hendershott et al., 2011; Hendershott and Riordan, 2013; Brogaard et al., 2015; Ait-Sahalia and Saglam, 2017; Brogaard et al., 2018), validity (Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013; Kirilenko et al., 2017), and price efficiency (Carrion, 2013; Brogaard et al., 2014; Chabout et al., 2014; Conrad et al., 2015; Weller, 2017; Brogaard et al., 2019). Abis (2022) finds evidence that algorithmic portfolio managers benefit from a higher learning capacity but suffer from a lower flexibility during recessions as compared to human portfolio managers. We contribute with evidence that besides other advantages, e.g., speed, informational, learning and, potentially, accuracy (see Kahneman et al., 2016), AT has the ability to reduce behavioral biases.

Second, the literature on the disposition effect has documented the effect in different markets, e.g. stocks (Odean, 1998), options (Heath et al., 1999), currency and commodity futures (Locke and Mann, 2005), real estate (Genesove and Mayer, 2001), and for different investors, e.g. individual investors (Odean, 1998), institutional investors (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001), mutual funds (Cici, 2012), and professional futures day-traders (Locke and Mann, 2005). Our first contribution to the literature on the disposition effect is to document the effect for the widespread group of ATs that include HFTs.

Our second contribution is on the identification of causes of the disposition effect. The prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) paired with mental accounting (Thaler, 1985) provide a longstanding preference-based explanation of the disposition effect (e.g., Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Odean, 1998; Weber and Camerer, 1998; Henderson, 2012; Li and Yang, 2013; Henderson et al., 2018; Meng and Weng, 2018): if investors view stocks as separate mental accounts and are riskseeking when facing losses but risk-averse when facing gains, they will prefer to gamble with losing investments and to sell winning investments. Realization utility theory (Barberis and Xiong, 2009, 2012; Ingersoll and Jin, 2013; Frydman et al., 2014) provides another preference-based explanation, whereby investors draw utility, e.g., pleasure and pain, directly from the realization of gains and losses. Recent empirical, mostly experimental, studies find evidence that the disposition effect is caused by specific psychological elements such as cognitive dissonance (Chang et al., 2016), pride and regret (Strahilevitz et al., 2011; Frydman and Camerer, 2016), self-control problems (Fischbacher et al., 2017), the salience of the stock purchase price (Frydman and Rangel, 2014; Frydman and Wang, 2020; Dierick et al., 2019), mental accounting (Frydman et al., 2017), peer pressure (Heimer, 2016), mood regulation (Li et al., 2021) and affect (Loewenstein, 2005). The disposition effect can potentially also be explained by beliefs in mean-reversion or private information (Ben-David and Hirshleifer, 2012), portfolio rebalancing (Odean, 1998; Kaustia, 2010), transaction costs (Odean, 1998), the nature of limit orders (Linnainmaa, 2010), and earnings management (e.g., Beatty and Harris, 1999). We contribute with a novel identification of the causal link between psychology and the disposition effect, using field trading data, exogenous weather variation, and algorithms as a control group. Other related papers on the disposition effect examine its impact on asset prices (Grinblatt and Han, 2005; Frazzini, 2006; An, 2015; Birru, 2015).

Third, this paper relates to the literature studying how the weather affects financial markets. The weather has been shown to affect stock returns (Saunders, 1993; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003; Goetzmann et al., 2014), the behavior of individual (Schmittmann et al., 2014) and institutional (Goetzmann et al., 2014) investors, and the behavior and performance of loan officers (Cortés et al., 2016). We contribute with evidence that the weather has an impact on the disposition effect for human traders. This also adds to the psychology literature studying how the weather affects mood (Cunningham, 1979; Howarth and Hoffman, 1984; Denissen et al., 2008; Klimstra et al., 2011) and cognition (Keller et al., 2005). For example, Keller et al. (2005) find that a higher air temperature improves both mood and cognition but only in spring, when the air temperature is moderate. The link between air temperature and cognition is also studied in the engineering literature (for a review, see Yeganeh et al., 2018).

Fourth, the paper also relates to the literature that studies algorithmic biases (Cowgill and

Tucker, 2019). For instance, algorithms have been shown to make biased and discriminatory decisions in lending (Bartlett et al., 2022), criminal sentencing (Dressel and Farid, 2018) and ad targeting (Datta et al., 2015). We contribute with evidence that algorithms reduce behavioral biases.

Finally, our evidence that automated decisions are more in line with rational economic models than on-the-spot human decisions contributes to the debate on the rationality assumption in economics (Hogarth and Reder, 1987; Hirshleifer, 2001; Thaler, 2016).<sup>10</sup>

#### 3. Data

We use millisecond-stamped transaction-level trade data provided by the NASDAQ OMX Copenhagen Stock Exchange for the period from 1 January, 2016, 9 am, i.e., the stock market's opening time, to 31 December, 2017, 5 pm, i.e., the stock market's closing time. We observe the following details about every trade executed by every member of the stock exchange: (1) the execution date and time with millisecond precision, (2) the name of the traded stock, (3) the indicator of whether shares were bought or sold, (4) the share price of the traded stock, (5) the number of shares traded, (6) the indicator of whether a trade added or removed liquidity, (7) the indicator of whether a trade was executed on a trader's own proprietary account or on behalf of the trader's client (i.e., a trader acted as a broker), (8) the name of a trader's institution, i.e., a member of the stock exchange, (9) the member's address, (10) the indicator of whether a trader's account was used by a human or an algorithm, (11) the user account name (first three letters of a trader's name and surname for humans, and PTRxxx, AUTDxx or LPSxxx for algorithms), and (12) the organization name of a second counterparty. Every trade enters the dataset twice, treating each counterparty as a primary one. The name of a trader's institution combined with the user account name provides a trader's unique id.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>For various definitions, measures and interpretations of rationality see, e.g., Machina (1987); Marschak (1950); Simon (1978); Apesteguia and Ballester (2015).

NASDAQ Copenhagen issues "Algo" accounts to algorithms that "automatically determine individual parameters of orders such as whether to initiate the order, the timing, price or quantity of the order or how to manage the order after its submission" (Nasdaq, 2019). For example, the exchange specifies that a "PTRxxx account may be used for execution algo flow with no human involvement when placing Child Orders in the market" (Nasdaq, 2019), and an "AUTDxx account <...> is used for purely automated trading for algorithms with no human involvement in the investment decision and order execution" (Nasdaq, 2019). The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority report (Danish FSA, 2016), released in February 2016, i.e., at the beginning of our sample period, provides a broad overview of algorithmic trading activity on the NASDAQ Copenhagen Stock Exchange. The report summarizes ATs' strategies, benefits and risks to the market, the trends in trading volume of both algorithms and humans, relevant regulations, etc.

Our dataset contains 102,160,854 (double-counted) transactions in all 159 stocks listed in the exchange throughout our sample period. Since we cannot identify traders that use the exchange members as brokers, we focus only on the proprietary trades of the members. This leaves us with 39,703,660 transactions: 32,243,301 executed by 91 algorithmic trading accounts belonging to 33 members and 7,460,359 executed by 597 human trading accounts belonging to 54 members. Throughout the 503 trading days in our sample, an average algorithm executed 704 trades per day, while an average human – less than 25. For comparability between the two groups, we focus on day traders, i.e., those that buy and sell the same stock multiple times per day and, therefore, by the end of the day tend to realize some gains and/or losses. We keep traders with at least 30 non-zero end-of-day observations of the disposition effect.<sup>11</sup> In this final dataset, there are 93 human trading accounts (6,581,144 transactions) belonging to 26 members located in nine cities (32 accounts in London, 21 in Copenhagen, 11 in Stockholm, 8 in Paris, 5 in Amsterdam, and 16 in other Danish cities) and 52 algorithmic trading accounts (31,512,711 transactions) belonging to 24

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>The measure of the disposition effect is defined in the "Methodology" section as the gap between the proportion of gains realized and the proportion of losses realized.

members located in seven cities (28 accounts in London, 12 in Paris, 5 in Stockholm, 3 in Hamburg, 2 in Copenhagen, 1 in Dublin, and 1 in Zürich). Around 2/3 of traders (60 of 93 humans and 36 of 52 algorithms) trade for large international banks such as BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse, etc. Others trade for local banks, small investment banks or proprietary trading firms. We provide summary statistics of trading patterns for humans and algorithms at the beginning of the "Results" section.

We merge the trading data with the hourly weather simulation data, i.e., stored forecasts, provided by Meteoblue in the 12 cities where traders are located: Copenhagen, London, Stockholm, Paris, Amsterdam, Hamburg, Dublin, Zürich, Randers, Silkeborg, Aabenraa and Aalborg.<sup>12</sup> According to the data provider, its weather simulation data is comparable to the measurement data collected by weather stations and has the advantage of often being more complete, more frequent, more detailed, and, if weather stations are relatively remote, more precise than measurement data (Meteoblue, 2022). Our dataset includes the following weather variables: (1) air temperature (°C) two meters above ground, (2) relative humidity (%) two meters above ground, (3) mean sea level pressure (hPa), (4) precipitation (mm), (5) cloud cover (% of the sky area), (6) sunshine duration (minutes), (7) shortwave radiation  $(W/m^2)$ , and (8) wind speed 10 meters above ground (km/h). The hourly data frequency allows us to observe these variables exactly when traders are most likely to be exposed to the weather – on their way to work before the stock market opens. We thus construct city-day-level weather variables by taking an average of two data points: at 8 am and at 9 am CET. Table 1 provides summary statistics for temperature – the variable that we find to have the most significant and robust impact on the disposition effect – and its correlation with the other weather variables that we use as controls. The median morning temperature across all cities and days in 2016 and 2017 was 9.2 °C. The 1st and 99th percentiles were -3.4 °C and 23.2 °C, respectively. Temperature is most correlated with

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>For a few traders that were located in small Danish towns, we use weather data from the closest of the following five Danish cities: Copenhagen, Randers, Silkeborg, Aabenraa and Aalborg.

radiation (correlation coefficient = 0.680). With other variables, the absolute value of the correlation coefficient does not exceed 0.5.

#### 4. Methodology

#### 4.1. The measure of the disposition effect

To estimate the disposition effect, we assume zero starting inventories every day for every trader, which is in line with e.g., Locke and Mann (2005); Coval and Shumway (2005); Baron et al. (2019), and construct traders' intraday stock positions using observed trades. The assumption ensures that our estimated disposition effect is associated with reverting only those trading decisions that were initiated throughout the same day, which alleviates potential concerns regarding the nonstationarity and the autocorrelation of the daily time series. We estimate outstanding paper gain for every trader i, in every stock position s, at every point of time t as follows:

$$outstanding\_paper\_gain_{s,i,t} = \#\_shares\_outstanding_{s,i,t} \times (stock\_price_{s,t} - WAPP_{s,i,t})$$
 (1)

where  $\#\_shares\_outstanding_{s,i,t}$  is the number of shares outstanding in stock *s* held by trader *i* at time *t*,  $stock\_price_{s,t}$  is the stock price in the latest transaction of stock *s* observed in the market up to time *t*, and  $WAPP_{s,i,t}$  is the volume-weighted average purchase price paid for outstanding shares in stock *s* held by trader *i* at time *t*.  $WAPP_{s,i,t}$  is updated every time when shares are bought and stays the same when shares are sold. For short positions,  $\#\_shares\_outstanding_{s,i,t}$  is negative and  $WAPP_{s,i,t}$  is replaced by the weighted average selling price  $WASP_{s,i,t}$ .

Every time trader i closes stock position s either fully or partially, we observe a realization of a gain (or a loss, if negative). At that time t, the realized gain is calculated as follows:

$$realized\_gain_{s,i,t} = \#\_of\_shares\_sold_{s,i,t} \times (selling\_price_{s,i,t} - WAPP_{s,i,t})$$
(2)

where  $\#\_of\_shares\_sold_{s,i,t}$  is the number of shares sold by trader *i* in stock *s* at time *t* (for short positions - repurchased, hence,  $\#\_of\_shares\_sold_{s,i,t}$  is negative), and  $selling\_price_{s,i,t}$  is the selling price of those shares (for short positions - repurchasing price). For short positions,  $WAPP_{s,i,t}$  is replaced by  $WASP_{s,i,t}$ .

We accumulate all realized gains up to time t for every trader in every stock:

$$cumulative\_realized\_gain_{s,i,t} = \sum_{n=0}^{t} Realized\_gain_{s,i,n}$$
(3)

Total gain consists of outstanding paper gain and cumulative realized gain:

$$total\_gain_{s,i,t} = outstanding\_paper\_gain_{s,i,t} + cumulative\_realized\_gain_{s,i,t}$$
(4)

For every trader *i* at every point of time *t*, we aggregate  $total\_gain_{s,i,t}$  across stock positions considering only those with  $total\_gain_{s,i,t} > 0$ . We also aggregate  $cumulative\_realized\_gain_{s,i,t}$ across stock positions considering only those with  $cumulative\_realized\_gain_{s,i,t} > 0$ . We divide these aggregated positive cumulative realized gains by the aggregated positive total gains to estimate the proportion of gains realized  $PGR_{i,t}$  for trader *i* at time *t*, and winsorize it if it exceeds one<sup>13</sup>.

$$PGR_{i,t} = \frac{\sum_{s=1}^{S} (cumulative\_realized\_gain_{s,i,t} \times j_{s,i,t})}{\sum_{s=1}^{S} (total\_gain_{s,i,t} \times k_{s,i,t})}$$
(5)

where  $j_{s,i,t}$  is equal to one if *cumulative\_realized\_gain*<sub>s,i,t</sub> > 0 and zero otherwise, and  $k_{s,i,t}$  is equal to one if  $total_gain_{s,i,t} > 0$  and zero otherwise.

Similarly, we estimate the proportion of losses realized  $PLR_{i,t}$ :

$$PLR_{i,t} = \frac{\sum_{s=1}^{S} (cumulative\_realized\_gain_{s,i,t} \times m_{s,i,t})}{\sum_{s=1}^{S} (total\_gain_{s,i,t} \times n_{s,i,t})}$$
(6)

where  $m_{s,i,t}$  is equal to one if *cumulative\_realized\_gain*<sub>s,i,t</sub> < 0 and zero otherwise, and  $n_{s,i,t}$  is equal to one if  $total_gain_{s,i,t} < 0$  and zero otherwise.

 $<sup>{}^{13}</sup>PGR_{i,t} > 1$  is possible if, e.g., a trader had realized all gains but then re-opened the position and experienced some paper losses. The winsorization ensures that  $PGR_{i,t} \in [0, 1]$ .

Following, Odean (1998), the disposition effect is the gap between  $PGR_{i,t}$  and  $PLR_{i,t}$ :

$$DE_{i,t} = PGR_{i,t} - PLR_{i,t} \tag{7}$$

We graphically depict an average intraday development of the disposition effect for humans and algorithms, but in all regression analyses, we use daily observations either at end-of-day, i.e., at 5 pm CET, or, when testing morning weather effects, after the first hour of trading, i.e., at 10 am CET.

#### 4.2. Average disposition effect

Separately for humans and algorithms, we estimate the average end-of-day disposition effect (DE), proportion of gains realized (PGR) and proportion of losses realized (PLR) by regressing these trader-day-level variables on a constant and clustering standard errors at the trader level:

$$PGR_{i,t} = \alpha + \epsilon_{i,t} \tag{8}$$

$$PLR_{i,t} = \alpha + \epsilon_{i,t} \tag{9}$$

$$DE_{i,t} = \alpha + \epsilon_{i,t} \tag{10}$$

For robustness, we also estimate the following regression specification, which exploits all three dimensions of our panel data, and, thus, allows us to control for interactive fixed effects:

$$PR_{s,i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 Gain_{s,i,t} + FE + \epsilon_{s,i,t} \tag{11}$$

where  $PR_{s,i,t}$  is the proportion of either a gain or a loss realized in a stock position s held by trader i at the end of day t, and is calculated as:

$$PR_{s,i,t} = \frac{cumulative\_realized\_gain_{s,i,t}}{total\_gain_{s,i,t}}$$
(12)

and  $Gain_{s,i,t}$  is a dummy equal to one if  $total_gain_{s,i,t} \ge 0$  and zero otherwise.<sup>14</sup> Coefficient  $\beta_1$  represents an average difference in  $PR_{s,i,t}$  when gains are realized as opposed to losses, and thus measures the disposition effect. FE includes bank-stock, bank-time, and stock-day fixed effects.

#### 4.3. The impact of air temperature on the disposition effect

To estimate the impact of weather conditions on the disposition effect, we extend regressions (8)-(11) with the eight city-day-level weather variables defined in "Data" section and Table 1, where every observation is an average of two data points in every city: at 8 am and 9 am CET. Since we find only temperature to have a significant and robust impact on the disposition effect, we denote the temperature variable separately by  $T_{i,t}$  and treat the other seven weather variables as controls denoted by  $C_{i,t}$ . Specifically,  $T_{i,t}$  is equal to an average temperature (°C) between 8 am and 9 am CET of day t in trader *i*'s city. To reduce the effects of yearly seasonality in temperature, in our regressions we primarily use a dummy variable  $T_dummy_{i,t}$  equal to one if  $T_{i,t}$  is above that month's median in that city and zero otherwise, but we show that our results remain robust if we use variable  $T_{i,t}$  instead. The regressions are specified as follows:

$$PGR_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 T\_dummy_{i,t} + C_{i,t} + FE + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

$$\tag{13}$$

$$PLR_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 T \_ dummy_{i,t} + C_{i,t} + FE + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

$$\tag{14}$$

$$DE_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 T\_dummy_{i,t} + C_{i,t} + FE + \epsilon_{i,t}$$
(15)

 $PR_{s,i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 Gain_{s,i,t} + \beta_2 T\_dummy_{i,t} + \beta_3 Gain_{s,i,t} \times T\_dummy_{i,t} + C_{i,t} + FE + \epsilon_{s,i,t}$ (16)

All four trader-day-level dependent variables are observed at 10 am CET. The coefficient of

 $<sup>{}^{14}</sup>PR_{s,i,t}$  is winsorized if it exceeds 1. If  $PR_{s,i,t} < 0$  while  $cumulative\_realized\_gain_{s,i,t} > 0$ , this suggests that a trader was eager to realize gains (while it was gaining) but lost overall. To reflect his eagerness to realize gains but not losses, in such cases, we replace  $PR_{s,i,t}$  with 1 and  $Gain_{s,i,t}$  with 1. Similarly, if  $PR_{s,i,t} < 0$  and  $cumulative\_realized\_gain_{s,i,t} < 0$ , we replace  $PR_{s,i,t}$  with 1 and  $Gain_{s,i,t}$  with 1. Similarly, if  $PR_{s,i,t} < 0$  and  $cumulative\_realized\_gain_{s,i,t} < 0$ , we replace  $PR_{s,i,t}$  with 1 and  $Gain_{s,i,t}$  with 0. Our results remain almost identical if instead we winsorize the variable  $PR_{s,i,t}$  below zero or if we drop observations where  $PR_{s,i,t} < 0$ .

interest in regression specification (16) is  $\beta_3$  on the interaction term. Its statistical significance would show that an average disposition effect measured by  $\beta_1$  in specification (11) depends on temperature. FE represents trader-fixed effects and day-fixed effects in specifications (13) to (15) and trader-day, stock-day and trader-stock fixed effects in specification (16).

#### 4.4. The difference between humans and algorithms

All regressions specified above are run for humans and algorithms separately. In order to test whether the disposition effect and the impact of temperature differ significantly between humans and algorithms, we extend specifications (10), (11), (15) and (16) with a dummy variable  $Human_i$  equal to one if trader *i* is a human and zero if an algorithm and run the regressions for all traders jointly. Effectively, this splits traders into a treatment group (treated by the weather) and a control group:

$$DE_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 Human_i + \epsilon_{i,t} \tag{17}$$

$$DE_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 Human_i + \beta_2 T \_dummy_{i,t} + \beta_3 Human_i \times T \_dummy_{i,t} + C_{i,t} + FE + \epsilon_{i,t}$$
(18)

$$PR_{s,i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 Gain_{s,i,t} + \beta_2 Human_i + \beta_3 Gain_{s,i,t} \times Human_i + FE + \epsilon_{s,i,t}$$
(19)

$$PR_{s,i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 Gain_{s,i,t} \times T\_dummy_{i,t} \times Human_i + V\&I_{s,i,t} + C_{i,t} + FE + \epsilon_{s,i,t}$$
(20)

 $V\&I_{s,i,t}$  denotes the three variables that constitute the triple interaction term in specification (20) and the three possible interactions among them. The dependent variables in specifications without weather variables, i.e., (17) and (19), are observed at 5 pm CET, while in the other two specifications - at 10 am CET. The coefficients of interest in regressions (18) and (19) are  $\beta_3$  on the interaction terms, and, in regression (20),  $\beta_1$  on the triple interaction term.

#### 5. Results

#### 5.1. Comparability between human and algorithmic traders

To ensure that humans and algorithms in our regression analysis are comparable, we first examine trader heterogeneity. Figure 1 plots an average disposition effect on the y-axis for every trader in our sample, i.e., 93 humans and 52 algorithms that have at least 30 non-zero end-of-day observations of variable  $DE_{i,t}$ . Traders are sorted along the x-axis by a major dimension of heterogeneity – an average trading frequency, which is calculated for every trader as an average time gap (in seconds) between trades executed throughout the sample period. The disposition effect is estimated for every trader by regressing the variable  $DE_{i,t}$  (observed daily at 5 pm) on a constant with robust standard errors. Blue and red circles represent humans and algorithms, respectively. If the disposition effect is statistically different from zero at the 99% significance level, the circles are colored.

The figure shows that traders differ significantly in their average trading frequency, e.g., some algorithms trade once every few seconds, while some humans trade once every hour (not necessarily the same stock). For comparability between humans and algorithms, we exclude 14 algorithms that trade more frequently than the most frequently trading human, i.e., every 54 seconds, from our regression analysis and label them "HFTs". Moreover, to ensure enough within-trader variation in the disposition effect measured daily at 10 am for the weather impact analysis, as a baseline we consider "frequent traders", i.e., 44 humans and 30 algorithms with an average gap between trades smaller than 10 minutes. The 10-minute threshold is chosen arbitrarily but we show that our main results remain robust when we include all the remaining traders labeled "infrequent traders".

Figure 1 suggests that humans tend to exhibit a much larger disposition effect than algorithms that trade at similar frequencies, even though the share of traders that exhibit a statistically significant disposition effect equals one third for both groups (disregarding HFTs). Interestingly, among algorithms that trade more frequently than once every 100 seconds, a large share, 11 out of 22, exhibit a significant disposition effect, while seven exhibit a significant inverse disposition effect. In section 6 we examine if this heterogeneity can be explained by trading strategies that HFTs pursue.

To compare humans and algorithms in terms of other trading patterns besides the disposition effect, we construct the following trader-day-level variables: (1)  $N_of_trades_{i,t}$  – the total number of trades executed by trader *i* in day *t*; (2) *Turnover\_EUR<sub>i,t</sub>* – total turnover expressed in euros generated by trader *i* in day *t*; (3) *Portfolio\_size\_EUR<sub>i,t</sub>* – average portfolio size expressed in euros for trader *i* throughout day *t*;<sup>15</sup> (4) *Inventory\_days<sub>i,t</sub>* – trading horizon for trader *i* in day *t*, calculated as a ratio of *Portfolio\_size\_EUR<sub>i,t</sub>* over the total value of shares sold (repurchased, for short positions) by trader *i* in day *t*, valued at purchase prices (sale prices, for short positions); and (5) *Turnover\_top10<sub>i,t</sub>* – the turnover generated in the 10 most traded stocks by trader *i* in day *t*, divided by total turnover generated by trader *i* in day *t*. We regress these five variables on a constant and a dummy *Human<sub>i</sub>* equal to 1 for humans and 0 for algorithms. We cluster errors at the trader level.

Table 2, Panel A shows that among "frequent traders", i.e., our baseline sample, humans and algorithms trade similarly as the dummy  $Human_i$  is not statistically significant for any of the five dependent variables. On average, algorithms execute 604 trades per day, while humans execute 119 fewer trades, both humans and algorithms generate around EUR 4.1m daily turnover, average portfolio size is EUR 0.9m for algorithms and EUR 0.1m more for humans, on average it takes 3.3 days to close all daily positions for algorithms and 1 day more for humans, and on average algorithms generate 87% of their turnover in their 10 most-traded stocks, while humans generate 4% more. The list of 10 most-traded stocks in terms of aggregate turnover is the same for humans and algorithms. Table 2, Panel B reports that when adding "infrequent traders" to the sample, turnover and portfolio size remains similar between algorithms and humans, but humans tend to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>For every trader, we assume zero daily starting inventories and, based on trades, estimate long and short stock positions valued at purchase prices (sale prices, for short positions) at 5-minute intervals throughout a day. We sum up absolute values of long and short positions and calculate an average of this sum across the 5-minute intervals.

trade significantly less frequently, with longer horizon, and with more concentration in favorite stocks than algorithms. To compare algorithms from our baseline sample with HFTs, we redo the analysis with dummy  $HFT_i$  instead of  $Human_i$ .  $HFT_i$  equals 1 for HFTs and 0 for algorithms in the "frequent traders" group. Table 2, Panel C shows that HFTs are significantly different. They trade with more frequency, more turnover, larger portfolios, shorter horizons and less concentration on favorite stocks.

#### 5.2. Average disposition effect

To estimate an average disposition effect for humans and algorithms, we run the regression specifications (8) to (11) for each group separately. Table 3 presents the results for humans in Panel A and for algorithms in Panel B. Odd columns consider only "frequent traders" and even columns include "infrequent traders". On average, by the end of the day, human "frequent traders" realize 28.2% of their daily gains and only 17.4% of their daily losses. The average disposition effect, i.e., the gap between PGR and PLR, equals 11.5 pp and is statistically different from zero at the 1% significance level. When using the regression specification (11) saturated with trader-day, stock-day and trader-stock fixed effects, the average disposition effect drops to 6.6 pp but remains statistically significant at the 1% level. All these figures become somewhat smaller but remain statistically significant at the 1% level when including "infrequent traders" in the even columns. Algorithmic "frequent traders" realize 34.4% of their daily gains and 32.9% of their daily losses by the end of the day on average. The average disposition effect is only 1.5 pp and is not statistically significant (p-value=0.571). It remains insignificant when using the regression specification (11) saturated with fixed effects and when including "infrequent traders".

Figure 2 shows an average intraday development of PGR and PLR measured at the end of every hour for human and algorithmic "frequent traders". The data points at 5 pm match the estimates from Table 3 described above. The figure shows that on average PGR and PLR gradually and stably increase throughout a day for both humans and algorithms. In the last trading hour, the realization of both gains and losses intensifies in particular, especially for algorithms. The gap between average PGR and PLR remains stable at around 2 pp throughout a day for algorithms, but gradually and slightly increases for humans from 8.1 pp at 10 am to 10.8 pp at 5 pm. The graph suggests that the disposition effect for human "frequent traders" at 10 am is substantial and comparable to the end-of-day measure. We therefore use it in the analysis of the impact of the morning weather. An average disposition effect at 10 am for human "frequent traders" measured using the regression specification (10) equals 8.6 pp (p-value = 0.001).

#### 5.3. The impact of air temperature on the disposition effect

To evaluate the impact of air temperature on the disposition effect, we estimate regression specifications (13) to (16) using the dependent variables  $PGR_{i,t}$ ,  $PLR_{i,t}$ ,  $DE_{i,t}$ , and  $PR_{s,i,t}$  observed daily at 10 am. Table 4 presents the results for humans in Panel A and for algorithms in Panel B. Columns (1) and (2) indicate that human "frequent traders" realize on average 18.7% of gains and 9.8% of losses on mornings that are colder than the median for that city-month. On mornings that are warmer than the median, PGR is on average lower by 0.9 pp (i.e., by 5%) and PLR is on average higher by 0.7 pp (i.e., by 7%). Both differences are statistically significant at the 10% level and point towards a lower overall disposition effect. Column (3) shows that an average disposition effect for human "frequent traders" equals 9.6 pp on mornings that are colder than the median and 2.1 pp less (i.e., 22% less) on mornings that are warmer than the median. The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. The estimated impact of temperature is stronger in column (4) when controlling for the other seven weather variables described in the "Data" section and Table 1 and even stronger in column (5) when trader-fixed effects and day-fixed effects are added. When extending the sample with "infrequent traders" in column (6), the coefficient on T dummy<sub>i,t</sub> equals -2.1 pp again and is statistically significant at the 5% level. When replacing  $T\_dummy_{i,t}$  with  $T_{i,t}$ , the coefficient equals -0.4 pp and is statistically significant at the 5% level, which suggests that a 1 °C higher morning air temperature is associated with a 0.4 pp weaker disposition effect on average. In most specifications, including the latter, coefficients on the other weather variables are insignificant.

The results are similar in columns (8) to (10) with three-dimensional panel data. Column (8) shows that the disposition effect for human "frequent traders" measured by the coefficient on  $Gain_{s,i,t}$  in specification (11) is lower by 1.6 pp on mornings that are warmer than the median. This result is statistically significant at the 1% level. The regression controls for the other weather variables and trader-day, stock-day and trader-stock fixed effects. The result remains statistically significant at 1% level in column (9) which includes "infrequent traders". When replacing  $T_{dummy_{i,t}}$  with  $T_{i,t}$  in column (10), the coefficient equals -0.1 pp and is statistically significant at the 10% level.

Table 4, Panel B shows that there is no statistically significant impact of air temperature on the disposition effect for algorithms. Having algorithms as a control group assures that the estimated impact of the weather on the disposition effect for humans is not driven by weather-induced stock market movements (see, e.g., Saunders, 1993; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003; Goetzmann et al., 2014), that would affect trading decisions for all traders, including algorithms. For example, if traders (including algorithms) pursue a mean-reversion strategy in which they trade stocks when prices cross certain thresholds, then a positive effect of the weather on stock prices could generate more realized gains, and thus lead to a stronger disposition effect for all traders.

For human "frequent traders", the impact of morning air temperature on the disposition effect remains significant by 11 am but fades out by noon. For example, re-estimating column (3) of Table 4 with the variable  $DE_{i,t}$  observed daily at 11 am, returns the coefficient on  $T\_dummy_{i,t}$  equal to -1.1 pp (p-value = 0.057). The coefficient is equal to -1.7 pp (p-value = 0.007) when weather control variables are added (i.e., as in column (4)) and -2.6 pp (p-value = 0.039) when trader-fixed effects and day-fixed effects are also added (i.e., as in column (5)). The coefficient is insignificant if the variable  $DE_{i,t}$  is observed at 12 pm or later.

In line with the evidence in Keller et al. (2005) on the temperature-mood relationship, we find that the impact on the disposition effect is most significant when temperatures are moderate, i.e., in spring and autumn. For example, re-estimating column (3) of Table 4 with observations for March, April and May returns the coefficient on  $T\_dummy_{i,t}$  equal to -2.7 pp (p-value = 0.076), and for September, October and November – -3.6 pp (p- value = 0.030). For June, July and August, the coefficient equals -1.4 pp (p-value = 0.335), and for December, January and February, only -0.7 pp (p-value = 0.534). The latter two insignificant results could be explained by temperatures being uncomfortably high in summer and by a potential avoidance of weather exposure in winter.

#### 5.4. The difference between humans and algorithms

To test if the differences in the results between humans and algorithms in subsections 5.2 and 5.3 are statistically significant, we estimate differential effects using a dummy variable  $Human_i$  in regression specifications (17) to (20). Table 5 presents the coefficients of interest for "frequent traders". Column (1) shows that the disposition effect is on average larger by 9.9 pp for humans than for algorithms and the difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. In column (2), the coefficient on the interaction term between  $T_{dummy_{i,t}}$  and  $Human_i$  is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level, which suggests that a higher morning air temperature reduces the disposition effect for humans significantly more than for algorithms. This differential effect is stronger and statistically significant at the 5% level when weather controls are included in column (3) and somewhat weaker but still statistically significant at the 10% level when trader-fixed effects are also added in column (4).

The results are similar with the three-dimensional panel data. Column (5) reports a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 10% level on the interaction term between  $Gain_{s,i,t}$  and  $Human_i$ , which suggests that the disposition effect measured by  $\beta_1$  coefficient on variable  $Gain_{s,i,t}$ in specification (11) is significantly larger for humans than for algorithms. Columns (6) and (7) show a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 5% level on the triple interaction term between  $Gain_{s,i,t}$ ,  $T_dummy_{i,t}$  and  $Human_i$  without and with all the interactive fixed effects, respectively. This suggests that the impact of air temperature on the disposition effect measured by the negative coefficient  $\beta_3$  on the  $Gain_{s,i,t} \times T_dummy_{i,t}$  interaction term in specification (16) is significantly stronger for humans than for algorithms.

#### 5.5. Discussion

The results indicate that, on average, algorithmic day traders manage to avoid the disposition effect while similarly-trading human day traders do not. This serves as suggestive evidence that the disposition effect is largely driven by unintentional causes specific to human traders, e.g., emotions and cognitive biases, rather than by intentional profit-maximizing motives, e.g., portfolio rebalancing, transaction costs, and private information, that would be relevant for algorithms as well. This notion is further strengthened by our causal evidence that an air temperature, potentially through mood and cognition, significantly affects the disposition effect for humans but not for algorithms. Here we discuss potential explanations of how air temperature can affect the disposition effect for humans and how algorithms can avoid the disposition effect.

How can air temperature affect the disposition effect for humans? The psychology literature documents the link between the weather and human psychology (see, e.g., Denissen et al., 2008; Klimstra et al., 2011; Harley, 2018). In particular, a higher air temperature is found to improve both mood (Cunningham, 1979; Howarth and Hoffman, 1984; Keller et al., 2005) and cognition (Keller et al., 2005; Yeganeh et al., 2018). We therefore argue that our results can be explained by two major preference-based theories on the disposition effect – realization utility (Barberis and Xiong, 2012) and prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). First, according to realization utility, the disposition effect occurs because it is pleasant to realize gains and painful to realize losses. Realizing more gains than losses can thus be seen as a mood-repair technique (see Morris and Reilly (1987) for theory and Elliott (1994) for another example of mood-repair techniques), which becomes less relevant as the mood is improved by warmer weather. Li et al. (2021) use the same mood-regulation argument to explain the link between air pollution and the disposition effect.

Second, according to prospect theory, investors draw utility from gains and losses relative to a reference point, are risk-averse when facing gains but risk-seeking when facing losses, and experience losses more severely than equivalent gains, i.e., are loss-averse (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Hence, if investors view every stock as a separate mental account (Thaler, 1985), they will prefer

to continue gambling with losing investments and to sell winning investments. If a higher air temperature improves cognition, this can help reduce cognitive biases such as loss aversion and attachments to reference points, which would reduce the disposition effect.

The weather may also impact the disposition effect through beliefs rather than preferences. For example, Goetzmann et al. (2014) find that the weather-induced mood affects traders' beliefs and behavior. According to Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012), the disposition effect can be caused by traders' beliefs in their private information about the stock value,<sup>16</sup> and these beliefs can stem either from genuine information or overconfidence.<sup>17</sup> Since there is evidence that a higher temperature enhances mood and that better mood increases overconfidence (see, e.g., Au et al., 2003; Nofsinger, 2005; Ifcher and Zarghamee, 2014), one could expect warmer weather to strengthen the disposition effect. This prediction, however, is the opposite of our findings, which suggests that morning air temperature impacts the disposition effect primarily by affecting preferences rather than beliefs.

The direct effects of the weather can potentially be amplified through social interactions, since mood is found to be contagious (Neumann and Strack, 2000).

How can algorithms avoid the disposition effect? First, while human traders make on-thespot decisions under stress, developers have time to "think slow" (Kahneman, 2011) and deliberately polish decision-making principles in their algorithms. By "thinking slow", i.e., using the slow System 2, developers may avoid behavioral biases, heuristics and other cognitive features of the fast System 1, such as attachments to reference points and loss aversion, which are at the core of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman, 2011) – the long-standing explanation of the disposition effect. However, despite claims (see, e.g., Borch and Lange, 2017), it is not obvious that developers manage to eliminate effects of mood, emotions and cognitive biases from their codes. For example,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>Traders may view price hikes as the incorporation of their information into the price and price drops as temporary setbacks, and thus sell (hold) stock after price hikes (drops). Yet, the opposite may hold too: after price drops (hikes) traders may lose (gain) confidence in their information and sell (buy more) stock (Ben-David and Hirshleifer, 2012).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>Overconfidence is an extensively documented cognitive bias that affects beliefs (Barberis and Thaler, 2003).

algorithms may inherit biases from biased developers or training data (Cowgill and Tucker, 2019). This can help explain why some algorithms in Figure 1 exhibit a significant disposition effect.

Second, while coding, developers are unlikely to experience feelings associated with the on-thespot realization of gains and losses. This arguably makes algorithms less affected by realization utility (Barberis and Xiong, 2012), i.e., pleasure and pain drawn from the realization of gains and losses, respectively, and by other related psychological mechanisms that help explain the disposition effect such as pride and regret (Muermann and Volkman Wise, 2006; Frydman and Camerer, 2016), the salience of the stock purchase price (Frydman and Wang, 2020) and affect (Loewenstein, 2005).

Third, algorithms may serve as a pre-commitment device which can eliminate time-inconsistent behavior stemming from, for example, self-control problems associated with the disposition effect. For example, Fischbacher et al. (2017) find that an option to pre-commit to a realization of losses using an automatic selling device significantly reduces the disposition effect.

Fourth, coding can arguably be viewed as a delegation of trading decisions to an algorithm, which creates distance between the trading decisions and developers and, thus, reduces the cognitive dissonance associated with the realization of losses. Chang et al. (2016) finds that the delegation of trading decisions, e.g., to mutual funds, is associated with a lower – and even reversed – disposition effect. According to the authors, this can be explained by cognitive dissonance: investors dislike admitting past mistakes, but delegation allows them to blame someone else.

Other potential explanations for the difference in the disposition effect between humans and algorithms include belief-based explanations and purely rational explanations such as portfolio rebalancing, career concerns and transaction costs. We test these explanations in the next section as part of the robustness checks for our main results.

#### 5.6. Robustness checks

We re-estimate regression specifications (10) and (15) under five different assumptions, which are listed and explained in detail below. Namely, we consider (1) only long positions, (2) only short positions, (3) only missed opportunities to gain and lose (i.e., mental gains and losses), (4) only full realizations of gains and losses, and (5) we use the FIFO method instead of WAPP to estimate real gains and losses. Table 6 shows the results for human and algorithmic "frequent traders" separately. Besides providing robustness checks for our results, these alterations of the baseline setting test whether transaction costs, career concerns and portfolio rebalancing drive the difference in the average disposition effect between humans and algorithms.

**Transaction costs**. A stock price decline may relatively increase transaction costs for that stock, and, therefore, cause reluctance to sell a losing position. Algorithms may care less about transaction costs since market venues compete for algorithmic traders by offering favorable terms (Danish FSA, 2016). This could explain the difference in the disposition effect between humans and algorithms, but only for long positions. We test this explanation by comparing the disposition effect between long positions, short positions and our baseline setting, which includes both.

Assumption 1: we consider only long positions (see results in Table 6, columns (1) and (2)). Technically, we set negative  $\#\_shares\_outstanding_{s,i,t}$  and  $\#\_of\_shares\_sold_{s,i,t}$  in equations (1) and (2), respectively, to zero.

Assumption 2: we consider only short positions (see results in Table 6, columns (3) and (4)). Technically, we set positive  $\#\_shares\_outstanding_{s,i,t}$  and  $\#\_of\_shares\_sold_{s,i,t}$  in equations (1) and (2), respectively, to zero.

**Career concerns**. Human traders and developers of trading algorithms may have different incentives to report realized gains and losses due to potentially different career concerns or compensation schemes. For instance, banks have been shown to manage, e.g., smooth, their reported earnings by strategically realizing gains and losses from securities (see, e.g., Dong and Zhang, 2018; Beatty and Harris, 1999; Ahmed and Takeda, 1995). However, these concerns should affect only reported gains and losses but not missed opportunities to gain and lose. For example, consider a trader who is long in 100 shares and sells one of them. If the stock price subsequently increases, the trader gains on the 99 shares, but misses the opportunity to gain on the sold share, which can mentally be perceived as a loss. This loss can be realized by repurchasing the share at the higher price.<sup>18</sup> If the average disposition effect for these mental gains and losses is similar to the baseline, this would suggest that our main results are not driven by contract-induced incentives to realize gains and losses.

Assumption 3: we consider positions that are either long from the daily perspective, i.e., when assuming zero starting inventory every day, but short from the long-term perspective, i.e., when assuming zero starting inventory only on the first day, or short from the daily perspective but long from the long-term perspective (see results in Table 6, columns (5) and (6)). Technically, we first select trader-stock-day positions that from the long-term perspective are either long or short throughout the whole day. Then, if a trader-stock-day position from the long-term perspective is long, we set positive  $\#\_shares\_outstanding_{s,i,t}$  and  $\#\_of\_shares\_sold_{s,i,t}$  in equations (1) and (2), respectively, to zero. If the position from the long-term perspective is short, we set negative  $\#\_shares\_outstanding_{s,i,t}$  and  $\#\_of\_shares\_sold_{s,i,t}$  in equations (1) and (2), respectively, to zero.

Another explanation related to career concerns could be that after a stock price decline and an associated loss, human traders (more than algorithmic traders) may be incentivized to take extra risks, and if low-priced stocks are more volatile than high-priced stocks (see, e.g., Ohlson and Penman, 1985; Dubofsky, 1991), traders might prefer to hold on to losing stocks. This explanation, however, again holds only for long positions, and therefore can be tested by comparing the results for long and short positions in columns (1) and (3), respectively.

**Portfolio rebalancing**. Gains (losses) increase (decrease) the weight of certain stocks in a portfolio and to restore a well-diversified balance, investors may close a portion of their winning positions (increase their losing positions). If algorithmic traders care less about portfolio rebalancing, this could explain the difference in the disposition effect between humans and algorithms. According to Odean (1998), "investors who are rebalancing will sell a portion, but not all, of their shares of winning stocks. A sale of the entire holding of a stock is most likely not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>Similarly, Strahilevitz et al. (2011) study how regret affects the repurchase of stocks previously sold.

motivated by the desire to rebalance". To test the portfolio rebalancing explanation, we check if the results remain similar to the baseline when we consider only those positions that were fully closed at least once throughout a day.

Assumption 4: consider the realization of gains and losses only for those trader-stock-day positions that were completely closed at least once throughout a day (see Table 6, columns (7) and (8)). Technically, in the numerator of equations (5) and (6), we set *cumulative\_realized\_gain*<sub>s,i,t</sub> to zero for those trader-stock-day positions that were never fully closed throughout the day.

Finally, we check if our results are affected by the chosen estimation method of real gains and losses - WAPP.

Assumption 5: use the first-in-first-out (FIFO) method, instead of WAPP, to calculate realized gains and losses (see Table 6, columns (9) and (10)).

Table 6 shows that our main results remain robust under each of the five assumptions. The estimated constant in the odd columns indicates that the average disposition effect for humans remains similar and statistically significant at the 1% level, while for algorithms it is never statistically different from zero. This suggests that neither transaction costs, nor career concerns, nor portfolio rebalancing alone can fully explain the difference in the average disposition effect between humans and algorithms. The estimated coefficient on  $T_dummy_{i,t}$  in the even columns show that under every assumption, the impact of air temperature on the disposition effect for humans remains similar and statistically significant at least at the 10% level, while for algorithms it is never statistically significant.

#### 5.7. Belief-based explanations

Traders may purchase a stock because they believe they have superior private information about its potential future price. As a result, they may view price hikes as incorporation of their private information into the price (and thus sell) and price drops as temporary setbacks (and thus hold or buy more), which would create the disposition effect (Ben-David and Hirshleifer, 2012). Similarly, traders may believe in the mean-reversion of the stock price, and thus sell stock after price hikes and buy it after price drops, which would also lead to the disposition effect. Algorithms, having better access to information (Chordia et al., 2018; Biais et al., 2015), more computational power and learning capacity (Abis, 2022), and, possibly, being less subject to overconfidence, may have weaker "belief" in these price-reversal trading strategies than humans, which would explain the lower disposition effect on average.

To test whether humans pursue price-reversal strategies more often than algorithms, we implement the following exercise. First, we estimate the absolute value of the hourly change in the number of shares,  $|\Delta inventory_{s,i,t}|$ , for every trader *i*, stock *s*, day-hour *t*, and find the 90th percentile of this variable for every trader-stock,  $perc90_{s,i}$ , considering only non-zero observations. Second, for every trader *i*, we count the number of stock-day-hour level observations,  $N_i$ , where  $|\Delta inventory_{s,i,t}| > perc90_{s,i}$  and the stock price  $S_{s,t}$  has either increased or decreased for the second consecutive hour, i.e., either ( $\Delta S_{s,t} > 0$  and  $\Delta S_{s,t-1} > 0$ ) or ( $\Delta S_{s,t} < 0$  and  $\Delta S_{s,t-1} < 0$ ). Third, among these observations, we count the number of cases,  $N_reverse_i$ , where the change in inventory,  $\Delta inventory_{s,i,t}$ , occurred in the opposite direction from  $\Delta S_{s,t}$ , i.e., either ( $\Delta inventory_{s,i,t} > 0$  and  $\Delta S_{s,t} < 0$  and  $\Delta S_{s,t-1} < 0$ ) or ( $\Delta inventory_{s,i,t} < 0$  and  $\Delta S_{s,t} > 0$  and  $\Delta S_{s,t-1} > 0$ ). Finally, we estimate a proportion of stock-day-hours spent on price-reversal trading for every trader as:

$$Reversal\_trading\_proportion_i = \frac{N\_reverse_i}{N_i}$$
(21)

We regress this variable on a constant and a dummy  $Human_i$  equal to 1 for human and 0 for algorithmic "frequent traders" and use robust standard errors. The constant equals 0.504 (p-value = 0.000) and indicates that algorithms on average pursue price-reversal and momentum trading equally often, i.e., 50% of the time. The coefficient on the dummy  $Human_i$  equals 0.056 (p-value = 0.023) and suggests that humans pursue price-reversal trading 55.6% of the time, which is significantly more often than algorithms and thus helps explain why humans' disposition effect is stronger.

It is not obvious, however, if humans' price-reversal trading, and the associated disposition effect,

are rational or not (e.g., driven by overconfidence). According to Odean (1998), if the disposition effect helps traders to perform better, it would be justified and rational, but if traders continue to exhibit it despite persistent evidence that doing so hurts their performance, this behavior would be irrational. To measure the performance of human and algorithmic "frequent traders" we estimate every trader's i return at the end of every day t:

$$r_{i,t} = \frac{\sum_{s=1}^{S} total\_gain_{s,i,t}}{Portfolio\_size_{i,t}}$$
(22)

where  $total\_gain_{s,i,t}$  is defined in equation (4),  $\sum_{s=1}^{S} total\_gain_{s,i,t}$  is the sum of end-of-day profits across all stocks held by trader i in day t, and  $Portfolio\_size_{i,t}$  is calculated in the same way as  $Portfolio\_size\_EUR_{i,t}$  defined in "Data" section and Table 2, but not converted to euros. We regress this variable on a constant, separately for human and algorithmic "frequent traders". and cluster standard errors at the trader level. For humans, the constant equals -0.0033 (p-value = 0.260), which translates to an average annualized return of -11.3%.<sup>19</sup> The negative return is driven by traders that tend to pursue price-reversal strategies: for humans with Reversal trading proportion<sub>i</sub> larger than median (i.e., 0.54), the average annualized return equals -31.2% (p-value = 0.011), while for the rest it is 20.1% (p-value = 0.214). Similarly, for humans that on average exhibit a significant disposition effect, as shown in Figure 1, and for those who do not, the average annualized return equals -22.5% (p-value = 0.051) and 0.1% (p-value = Hence, both the price-reversal trading and the disposition effect are 0.994), respectively. associated with significant losses for human traders, which suggests that human traders' beliefs in price-reversal strategies are not always rational.

For algorithms, the average annualized return equals 17.2% (p-value = 0.244). For algorithms with *Reversal\_trading\_proportion<sub>i</sub>* larger than median (i.e., 0.50), the average annualized return equals 45.2%, while for the rest it is 2.2% (both p-values are above 0.1). Similarly, for algorithms

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>Average annualized return is calculated as  $(1+\text{average}_daily_return)^{365} - 1$ .

that on average exhibit a significant disposition effect, as shown in Figure 1, the average annualized return equals 49.2%, while for the rest it is 1.7% (both p-values are above 0.1). Hence, algorithms perform better than humans on average, and particularly when pursuing price-reversal strategies, which suggests that their "beliefs" in price-reversal strategies might be mostly rational.

Finally, to test whether the disposition effect has a causal effect on performance, we implement the following exercise. First, for every trader we observe the portfolio composition daily at 1 pm, i.e., in the middle of a trading day, and create a hypothetical "realization portfolio", which, if acquired, would cancel out all losing positions and thus would realize all unrealized losses. At the end of a trading day, i.e., at 5 pm, we estimate the return on this "realization portfolio". Second, we regress this trader-day level return on a constant separately for four groups of "frequent traders": humans and algorithms that do and do not exhibit a significant average disposition effect, as shown in Figure 1. We cluster errors at the trader level. Assuming zero transaction costs and zero price impact, the estimated constant can be interpreted as an average daily return not earned due to not realizing one's losses in the middle of a trading day. For humans that exhibit a disposition effect, this constant equals 0.000929 (p-value = 0.046), which translates to an average annualized return of 40.3%. Hence, these traders would have benefited significantly from a full realization of losses daily at 1 pm, which suggests that the disposition effect for them was harmful and not driven by rational causes. For the other three groups, the estimated constant is positive but not statistically significant.

#### 6. The disposition effect for high-frequency traders

Figure 1 shows that 18 out of the 22 algorithms that on average trade more frequently than once every 100 seconds, on average exhibit either a significant disposition effect or a significant inverse disposition effect. We explore if this can be explained by these HFTs' trading strategies.

SEC (2010) describes four broad categories of HFT strategies, namely, (1) passive market making, (2) arbitrage, e.g., exploiting price inefficiencies across products or markets, (3) structural, e.g., exploiting co-location arrangements to increase the speed of data delivery, and (4) directional, e.g., price-reversal or price momentum strategies. As described in subsection 5.7, price-reversal strategies can generate the disposition effect, hence, trading in the opposite direction, i.e., pursuing price momentum strategies, can create its inverse. Since HFTs have been shown to pursue directional trading in both directions (see, e.g., Brogaard et al., 2014; Van Kervel and Menkveld, 2019; Korajczyk and Murphy, 2019), we suspect that being persistently biased towards either one of the two directions may explain the observed patterns of the disposition effect for HFTs.

Figure 3 shows an example of a price-reversal trading pattern for one HFT that, according to Figure 1, on average exhibits a significant disposition effect, and a momentum trading pattern for another HFT that on average does not exhibit the disposition effect. The figure plots, for the first ten days of our sample, hourly (end-of-hour) observations of the stock price of Pandora, one of the most traded stocks in the Copenhagen stock exchange, and the inventory of Pandora stock held by the two different HFTs. We assume zero starting inventory on the first day. The price and inventory appear to correlate negatively for the HFT that exhibits the disposition effect and positively for the HFT that does not.

To check how well the engagement in price-reversal strategies can predict the disposition effect among HFTs, we estimate a trader-level variable *Reversal\_trading\_proportion<sub>i</sub>*, defined in subsection "5.7. Belief-based explanations", equation (21). The variable measures a proportion of stockday-hours spent on price-reversal trading, i.e., either significantly increasing stock inventory as the price has decreased for the second consecutive hour, or significantly decreasing stock inventory as the price has increased for the second consecutive hour. Figure 4 plots a distribution of this variable across the 22 algorithms that, according to Figure 1, on average trade more frequently than once every 100 seconds. The red columns represent algorithms that, according to Figure 1, on average exhibit a statistically significant disposition effect, and the white columns represent HFTs that do not. The histogram shows that all the algorithms with *Reversal\_trading\_proportion<sub>i</sub>* > 0.5 on average exhibit the disposition effect, while all the rest do not. This suggests that the engagement in price-reversal strategies can very well predict whether an HFT would exhibit the disposition effect. In order to check whether the disposition effect among HFTs is associated with a lower performance and, thus, with irrational explanations, we estimate every trader's daily return  $r_{i,t}$ defined in equation (22) and regress it on a constant separately for HFTs that on average exhibit the disposition effect and for HFTs that do not. We cluster standard errors at the trader level. The constant equals 0.00073 (p-value = 0.007) and 0.00087 (p-value = 0.028) for the two groups, respectively. These average daily returns translate to average annualized returns of 30.5% and 37.3%, respectively. The difference between them is not statistically significant as measured by a dummy variable splitting the data into the two groups. This suggests that for HFTs, the disposition effect is not associated with a significantly lower performance and, thus, with irrational beliefs. In our dataset, we observe cases where two HFT accounts that belong to the same institution follow opposite directional trading strategies and where one account exhibits a significant disposition effect while the other one exhibits a significant inverse disposition effect. This suggests that multiple algorithms are deliberately designed to pursue opposite directional trading strategies, possibly for diversification purposes.

#### 7. Conclusion

This paper studies whether and why algorithmic traders exhibit the disposition effect. First, by using exogenous weather variation and algorithms as a control group, we provide a novel identification of the impact of human psychology on the disposition effect. We find that warmer weather reduces the disposition effect for human traders but has no impact on algorithmic traders. This suggests that the disposition effect for humans is at least partially caused by psychological biases and that algorithms can at least partially avoid these biases.

According to the psychology literature, higher air temperature improves both mood and cognition. Our results can therefore be explained by the two major preference-based explanations of the disposition effect: realization utility (when traders' mood is worse, they may try to regulate it more by seeking pleasure and avoiding pain from the realization of gains and losses, respectively) and prospect theory (better cognition may help avoid cognitive biases such as loss aversion and the

attachment to reference points). The belief-based explanation predicts the opposite: better mood may boost overconfidence, beliefs in private information and the disposition effect. This suggests that the weather impacts the disposition effect primarily though preferences rather than beliefs.

Second, we find that on average human traders exhibit a significant disposition effect while similarly-trading algorithms do not and that the difference between the two groups is statistically significant. Our robustness tests show that this cannot be explained only by potentially different transaction costs, career concerns or portfolio rebalancing practices between the two groups. This could be explained, however, by different beliefs in mean-reversion and private information as humans on average tend to rely on price-reversal strategies more than similarly-trading algorithms. We find that for humans, both price-reversal trading and the disposition effect are associated with significant trading losses, which suggests that such human beliefs are irrational. These results support the results of the weather impact analysis by providing suggestive evidence that the disposition effect for humans is driven by psychological biases and that algorithms can at least partially avoid these biases.

Our main results are robust to including maximum fixed effects, using different error clustering, including the least frequently trading human and algorithmic day-traders, defining the temperature variable both as a higher-than-median dummy and as an actual temperature, controlling for other weather variables, and using specifications that exploit the three dimensions of our panel data, which allows adding trader-time, stock-time and trader-stock fixed effects. Moreover, the results remain similar when using only long positions, only short positions, only mental gains and losses (i.e., missed opportunities to gain and lose), only full (not partial) realizations of gains and losses, and the FIFO method instead of WAPP to estimate realized gains and losses.

Third, we find a high heterogeneity of the average disposition effect among the most frequently trading algorithms, HFTs, and that it can be very well predicted by their tendency to engage in price-reversal strategies. Unlike the evidence for human traders, we do not find evidence for HFTs that their price-reversal trading and, thus, the disposition effect is associated with lower trading profits. This suggests that for HFTs, the disposition effect is not associated with irrational beliefs.

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| TABLE 1  |                            |                  |             |                  |                  |               |  |  |  |
|--|----------------------------|------------------|-------------|------------------|------------------|---------------|--|--|--|
| Summary statistics of morning air temperature    |                            |                  |             |                  |                  |               |  |  |  |
| Number of  | 1 <sup>st</sup> percentile | 25 <sup>th</sup> | median      | 75 <sup>th</sup> | 99 <sup>th</sup> | mean          |  |  |  |
| observations                                     |                            | percentile       |             | percentile       | percentile       |               |  |  |  |
| 8,772  | -3.4 °C                    | 4.4 °C           | 9.2 °C      | 15.0 °C          | 23.2 °C          | 9.5 °C        |  |  |  |
|  |                            |                  |             |                  |                  |               |  |  |  |
| Correlation coefficient between temperature and: |                            |                  |             |                  |                  |               |  |  |  |
| Relative humidity                                | Mean sea                   | Precipitation    | Cloud cover | sunshine         | Shortwave        | Wind speed 10 |  |  |  |

| Relative numberly    | Mean sea             | Precipitation     | Cloud cover         | sunsnine          | Snortwave       | wind speed 10      |
|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| 2 meters above       | level pressure       | (mm)              | (% of the sky       | duration          | radiation       | meters above       |
| ground (%)           | (hPa)                |                   | area)               | (minutes)         | (W/m2)          | ground (km/h)      |
| -0.493               | -0.072               | 0.017             | -0.160              | 0.286             | 0.680           | -0.217             |
| Table 1 provides sum | mary statistics of t | he temperature va | ariable and correla | tion coefficients | between the tem | perature and other |

Table 1 provides summary statistics of the temperature variable and correlation coefficients between the temperature and other weather variables. All weather variables are constructed at the city-day level by taking an average of two data points: at 8 am and 9 am CET in every city. The data includes every daily observation in the years 2016 and 2017 from the following 12 cities: Copenhagen, London, Stockholm, Paris, Amsterdam, Hamburg, Dublin, Zürich, Randers, Silkeborg, Aabenraa and Aalborg.

|                     |                     | TABL                        | E 2                               |                        |                               |
|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Com                 | •                   | <b>U</b> 1                  | tween algorithms an               |                        |                               |
|                     |                     | -                           | 44 humans and 30 algo             |                        |                               |
|                     | (1)                 | (2)                         | (3)                               | (4)                    | (5)                           |
| Dependent variable: | $N_of_trades_{i,t}$ | Turnover_EUR <sub>i,t</sub> | Portfolio_size_EUR <sub>i,t</sub> | Inventory $days_{i,t}$ | Turnover_top10 <sub>i</sub>   |
| Human <sub>i</sub>  | -119                | -86,352                     | 97,037                            | 0.983                  | 0.041                         |
| Tuman <sub>i</sub>  | (100)               | (966,293)                   | (196,820)                         | (1.004)                | (0.025)                       |
| Constant            | 604***              | 4,165,230***                | 895,525***                        | 3.308***               | 0.874***                      |
| Constant            | (61)                | (558,959)                   | (134,983)                         | (0.739)                | (0.023)                       |
| Observations        | 20,315              | 20,315                      | 20,315                            | 16,516                 | 20,313                        |
| Panel B: "          | frequent trade      | rs'' + ''infrequent         | traders'' - 93 humans             | and 38 algorith        | ns                            |
|                     | (1)                 | (2)                         | (3)                               | (4)                    | (5)                           |
| Dependent variable: |                     |                             | Portfolio_size_EUR <sub>i,t</sub> | × ,                    | . ,                           |
|                     |                     |                             |                                   |                        |                               |
| Human <sub>i</sub>  | -199**              | -948,756                    | -155,442                          | 1.803**                | 0.046**                       |
|                     | (81)                | (664,781)                   | (144,859)                         | (0.899)                | (0.02)                        |
| Constant            | 459***              | 3,232,470***                | 706,042***                        | 3.899***               | 0.902***                      |
|                     | (67)                | (512,296)                   | (117,588)                         | (0.658)                | (0.019)                       |
| Observations        | 37,355              | 37,355                      | 37,355                            | 25,640                 | 37,344                        |
| Panel               | C: 14 HFT al        | gorithms and 30 a           | algorithms from ''freq            | uent traders''         |                               |
|                     | (1)                 | (2)                         | (3)                               | (4)                    | (5)                           |
| Dependent variable: | $N_of_trades_{i,t}$ | $Turnover\_EUR_{i,t}$       | $Portfolio\_size\_EUR_{i,t}$      | Inventory $days_{i,t}$ | Turnover_top10 <sub>i</sub> , |
| HFT <sub>i</sub>    | 4,800***            | 29,621,417***               | 2,442,565***                      | -2.462***              | -0.087***                     |
| ···· •1             | (1647)              | (9,880,467)                 | (623,033)                         | (0.79)                 | (0.028)                       |
| Constant            | 604***              | 4,165,230***                | 895,525***                        | 3.308***               | 0.874***                      |
| Constant            | (61)                | (558,959)                   | (134,983)                         | (0.739)                | (0.023)                       |
| Observations        | 13,560              | 13,560                      | 13,560                            | 12,563                 | 13,560                        |

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Panels A and B show the results of regressing five different trader-day-level variables on a constant and a dummy  $Human_i$ , which is equal to 1 for humans and 0 for algorithms. The five dependent variables are: (1)  $N_of_trades_{i,t}$  – total number of trades executed by trader *i* in day *t*; (2) *Turnover\_EUR*<sub>i,t</sub> – total turnover expressed in euros generated by trader *i* in day *t*; (3) *Portfolio\_size\_EUR*<sub>i,t</sub> – average portfolio size expressed in euros for trader *i* throughout day *t* (see the "Data" section for the detailed variable definition); (4) *Inventory\_days*<sub>i,t</sub> – trading horizon for trader *i* in day *t*, calculated as a ratio of *Portfolio\_size\_EUR*<sub>i,t</sub> over the total value of shares sold (repurchased, for short positions) by trader *i* in day *t*, valued at purchase prices (sale prices, for short positions); and (5) *Turnover\_top10*<sub>i,t</sub> – the turnover generated in the 10 most traded stocks by trader *i* in day *t*, divided by total turnover generated by trader *i* in day *t*. Panel A considers "frequent traders", i.e., 44 humans and 30 algorithms with an average gap between trades ranging from 54 seconds (the most frequently trading human) to 10 minutes. Panel B includes "infrequent traders" and, thus constitutes 93 humans and 38 algorithms with an average gap between trades smaller than 54 seconds. Panel C compares two types of algorithms and thus replaces the *Human<sub>i</sub>* dummy with a dummy *HFT*<sub>i</sub>, equal to 1 for algorithms with an average gap between trades smaller than 54 seconds and 0 for algorithms assigned to the "frequent traders" group. Standard errors are clustered at the trader level and reported in parentheses.

|                              |                     |                     | TABLE 3             | 3                   |                     |                     |                     |                     |  |
|------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--|
|                              |                     | Average             | e dispositi         | on effect           |                     |                     |                     |                     |  |
|                              |                     |                     |                     |                     | : humans            |                     |                     |                     |  |
|                              | (1)                 | (2)                 | (3)                 | (4)                 | (5)                 | (6)                 | (7)                 | (8)                 |  |
| Dependent variable:          | PG                  | R <sub>i,t</sub>    | PL                  | R <sub>i,t</sub>    | D                   | E <sub>i,t</sub>    | PR <sub>s,i,t</sub> |                     |  |
| Regression specification:    |                     | 8)                  | (                   | 9)                  | (1                  | 0)                  | (1                  | 1)                  |  |
| Gain <sub>s,i,t</sub>        |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     | 0.066***            | 0.052***            |  |
| Constant                     | 0.282***<br>(0.000) | 0.223***<br>(0.000) | 0.174***<br>(0.000) | 0.150***<br>(0.000) | 0.115***<br>(0.000) | 0.079***<br>(0.000) | 0.257*** (0.000)    | 0.227***<br>(0.000) |  |
| Fixed effects                |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     | Yes                 | Yes                 |  |
| Include "infrequent traders" |                     | Yes                 |                     | Yes                 |                     | Yes                 |                     | Yes                 |  |
| Observations                 | 10,504              | 21,452              | 10,478              | 21,368              | 9,847               | 18,826              | 182,043             | 266,476             |  |
| Adjusted R-squared           | 0                   | 0                   | 0                   | 0                   | 0                   | 0                   | 0.224               | 0.238               |  |
| Number of traders            | 44                  | 93                  | 44                  | 93                  | 44                  | 93                  | 44                  | 93                  |  |
|                              |                     |                     |                     | Panel B: a          | algorithms          |                     |                     |                     |  |
|                              | (1)                 | (2)                 | (3)                 | (4)                 | (5)                 | (6)                 | (7)                 | (8)                 |  |
| Dependent variable:          | PG                  | R <sub>i,t</sub>    | PLR <sub>i,t</sub>  |                     | D                   | E <sub>i,t</sub>    | PR <sub>s,i,t</sub> |                     |  |
| Regression specification:    | (8                  | 8)                  | (                   | 9)                  | (1                  | 0)                  | (11)                |                     |  |
| Gain <sub>s,i,t</sub>        |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     | 0.018               | 0.019               |  |
|                              |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     | (0.307)             | (0.261)             |  |
| Constant                     | 0.344***            | 0.321***            | 0.329***            | 0.304***            | 0.015               | 0.019               | 0.416***            | 0.398***            |  |
|                              | (0.000)             | (0.000)             | (0.000)             | (0.000)             | (0.571)             | (0.385)             | (0.000)             | (0.000)             |  |
| Fixed effects                |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     | Yes                 | Yes                 |  |
| Include "infrequent traders" |                     | Yes                 |                     | Yes                 |                     | Yes                 |                     | Yes                 |  |
| Observations                 | 8,468               | 11,042              | 8,454               | 11,008              | 8,159               | 10,286              | 167,524             | 183,980             |  |
| Adjusted R-squared           | 0                   | 0                   | 0                   | 0                   | 0                   | 0                   | 0.291               | 0.297               |  |
| Number of traders            | 30                  | 38                  | 30                  | 38                  | 30                  | 38                  | 30                  | 38                  |  |

Standard errors are clustered at trader level; p-values are reported in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 3 presents estimates of the average proportion of gains realized ( $PGR_{i,t}$ ), proportion of losses realized ( $PLR_{i,t}$ ), and disposition effect ( $DE_{i,t}$ ) for humans (Panel A) and algorithms (Panel B) obtained with regression specifications (8) to (11):

| $PGR_{i,t} = \alpha + \epsilon_{i,t}$                                | (8)  |
|--|------|
| $PLR_{i,t} = \alpha + \epsilon_{i,t}$                                | (9)  |
| $DE_{i,t} = \alpha + \epsilon_{i,t}$                                 | (10) |
| $PR_{s,i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 Gain_{s,i,t} + FE + \epsilon_{s,i,t}$ | (11) |

Variables are observed daily at 5 pm CET. Subscripts *s*, *i* and *t* represent *stock*, *trader* and *day*, respectively. In specification (11), which uses three-dimensional panel data, a proportion of either a gain or a loss realized  $PR_{s,i,t}$  is regressed on a dummy variable  $Gain_{s,i,t}$  equal to 1 for non-losing positions and 0 for losing positions. Coefficient  $\beta_1$  estimates the disposition effect. Detailed descriptions of all variables are provided in section 4 "Methodology". FE represents stock-day, trader-day and stock-trader fixed effects. Odd columns consider only "frequent traders" and even columns include "infrequent traders".

|   |                           |                           | 1         | ADLE 4     | •                        |          |          |          |                            |          |
|---|---------------------------|---------------------------|-----------|------------|--------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------------------------|----------|
|   | The i                     | mpact of                  | air tempe | erature of | n the dis                | positior | n effect |          |                            |          |
|   |                           |                           |           |            | Panel A:                 |          |          |          |                            |          |
|   | (1)                       | (2)                       | (3)       | (4)        | (5)                      | (6)      | (7)      | (8)      | (9)                        | (10)     |
| Dependent variable:                         | PGR <sub>i,t</sub>        | PLR <sub>i,t</sub>        |           |            | DE <sub>i,t</sub>        |          |          |          | PR <sub>s,i,t</sub>        |          |
| Regression specification:                   | (13)                      | (14)                      |           |            | (15)                     |          |          |          | (16)                       |          |
| T_dummy <sub>i,t</sub>                      | -0.009*                   | 0.007*                    | -0.021*** | -0.028***  | -0.038***                | -0.021** |          |          |                            |          |
|   | (0.051)                   | (0.075)                   | (0.001)   | (0.000)    | (0.001)                  | (0.014)  |          |          |                            |          |
| T <sub>i,t</sub>                            |                           |                           |           |            |                          |          | -0.004** |          |                            |          |
|   |                           |                           |           |            |                          |          | (0.027)  |          |                            |          |
| $Gain_{s,i,t} \times T_dummy_{i,t}$         |                           |                           |           |            |                          |          |          |          | -0.011***                  | :        |
|   |                           |                           |           |            |                          |          |          | (0.002)  | (0.004)                    |          |
| $\text{Gain}_{s,i,t} \times \text{T}_{i,t}$ |                           |                           |           |            |                          |          |          |          |                            | -0.001*  |
| _   |                           |                           |           |            |                          |          |          |          |                            | (0.095)  |
| Constant                                    | 0.187***                  | 0.098***                  | 0.096***  | 0.423      | 0.808                    | 0.123    | 0.199    | 0.140*** | 0.115***                   |          |
|   | (0.000)                   | (0.000)                   | (0.000)   | (0.413)    | (0.384)                  | (0.823)  | (0.733)  | (0.000)  | (0.000)                    | (0.000)  |
| Weather controls                            |                           |                           |           | Yes        | Yes                      | Yes      | Yes      | Yes      | Yes                        | Yes      |
| Fixed effects                               |                           |                           |           |            | Yes                      | Yes      | Yes      | Yes      | Yes                        | Yes      |
| Include infrequent traders                  |                           |                           |           |            |                          | Yes      | Yes      |          | Yes                        | Yes      |
| Observations                                | 7,843                     | 7,707                     | 7,101     | 7,101      | 7,101                    | 11,325   | 11,594   | 71,778   | 99,145                     | 101,745  |
| Adjusted R-squared                          | 0.000                     | 0.000                     | 0.001     | 0.008      | 0.114                    | 0.101    | 0.102    | 0.168    | 0.166                      | 0.166    |
| Number of traders                           | 44                        | 44                        | 44        | 44         | 44                       | 93       | 93       | 44       | 93                         | 93       |
|   |                           |                           |           |            | anel B: al               | 0        |          |          |                            |          |
| Dependent variable:                         | (1)<br>PGR <sub>i,t</sub> | (2)<br>PLR <sub>i,t</sub> | (3)       | (4)        | (5)<br>DE <sub>i,t</sub> | (6)      | (7)      | (8)      | (9)<br>PR <sub>s,i,t</sub> | (10)     |
| Regression specification:                   | (13)                      | (14)                      |           |            | (15)                     |          |          |          | (16)                       |          |
| T_dummy <sub>i,t</sub>                      | -0.004                    | 0.001                     | -0.004    | -0.006     | 0.006                    | 0.013    |          |          |                            |          |
|   | (0.469)                   | (0.846)                   | (0.578)   | (0.392)    | (0.674)                  | (0.350)  |          |          |                            |          |
| T <sub>i,t</sub>                            |                           |                           |           |            |                          |          | 0.003    |          |                            |          |
|   |                           |                           |           |            |                          |          | (0.180)  |          |                            |          |
| $Gain_{s,i,t} \times T\_dummy_{i,t}$        |                           |                           |           |            |                          |          |          | -0.002   | -0.001                     |          |
|   |                           |                           |           |            |                          |          |          | (0.656)  | (0.850)                    |          |
| $Gain_{s,i,t} \times T_{i,t}$               |                           |                           |           |            |                          |          |          |          |                            | -0.001   |
|   |                           |                           |           |            |                          |          |          |          |                            | (0.542)  |
| Constant                                    | 0.185***                  | 0.167***                  | 0.021     | 0.294      | 0.384                    | 0.875    | 0.688    | 0.217*** | 0.211***                   | 0.211*** |
|   | (0.000)                   | (0.000)                   | (0.244)   | (0.554)    | (0.644)                  | (0.223)  | (0.322)  | (0.000)  | (0.000)                    | (0.000)  |
| Weather controls                            |                           |                           |           | Yes        | Yes                      | Yes      | Yes      | Yes      | Yes                        | Yes      |
| Fixed effects                               |                           |                           |           |            | Yes                      | Yes      | Yes      | Yes      | Yes                        | Yes      |
| Include infrequent traders                  |                           |                           |           |            |                          | Yes      | Yes      |          | Yes                        | Yes      |
| Observations                                | 7,359                     | 7,284                     | 6,847     | 6,847      | 6,846                    | 7,837    | 7,988    | 95,596   | 101,100                    | 103,186  |
| Adjusted R-squared                          | -0.000                    | -0.000                    | -0.000    | 0.000      | 0.067                    | 0.055    | 0.057    | 0.270    | 0.273                      | 0.273    |
| Number of traders                           | 30                        | 30                        | 30        | 30         | 30                       | 38       | 38       | 30       | 38                         | 38       |

TABLE 4

Standard errors are clustered at trader level; p-values are reported in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 4 shows an estimated impact of air temperature on the proportions of gains ( $PGR_{i,t}$ ) and losses ( $PLR_{i,t}$ ) realized and the disposition effect ( $DE_{i,t}$ ) for humans (Panel A) and algorithms (Panel B). We report coefficients of interest for specifications: (13)

$$PGR_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 T_dummy_{i,t} + C_{i,t} + FE + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

$$PLR_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 T_dummy_{i,t} + C_{i,t} + FE + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

$$\mathcal{L}R_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 T_{-} dummy_{i,t} + C_{i,t} + FE + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

$$\mathcal{D}E_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 T_{-} dummy_{i,t} + C_{i,t} + FE + \epsilon_{i,t}$$
(14)
(14)
(15)

$$DE_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 T_dummy_{i,t} + C_{i,t} + FE + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

 $PR_{s,i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 Gain_{s,i,t} + \beta_2 T_dummy_{i,t} + \beta_3 Gain_{s,i,t} \times T_dummy_{i,t} + C_{i,t} + FE + \epsilon_{s,i,t}$ (16)

Dependent variables are observed daily at 10 am CET. Temperature  $T_{i,t}$  and other weather variables  $C_{i,t}$  used as controls are observed daily between 8 am and 9 am.  $T_dummy_{i,t}$  equals 1 if  $T_{i,t}$  was higher than the median for that city-month. Subscripts s, i and t represent stock, trader and day, respectively. In specifications (13)-(15), FE stands for trader-fixed and day-fixed effects. In specification (16), PR<sub>s,i,t</sub> is a proportion of either a gain or a loss realized, Gain<sub>s,i,t</sub> is a dummy equal to 1 for non-losing positions and 0 for losing positions, and FE stands for stock-day, trader-day and stock-trader fixed effects.

|  |            | TABL      | E 5              |           |          |                     |          |
|--|------------|-----------|------------------|-----------|----------|---------------------|----------|
| The  | difference | between h | umans and        | algorithn | ns       |                     |          |
|  | (1)        | (2)       | (3)              | (4)       | (5)      | (6)                 | (7)      |
| Dependent variable:                                    |            | DI        | E <sub>i,t</sub> |           |          | PR <sub>s,i,t</sub> |          |
| Regression specification:                              | (17)       |           | (18)             |           | (19)     |                     | 20)      |
| Human <sub>i</sub>                                     | 0.099**    | 0.075**   | 0.129            |           |          | -0.990*             |          |
|  | (0.011)    | (0.017)   | (0.855)          |           |          | (0.063)             |          |
| $Temp\_dummy_{i,t} \times Human_i$                     |            | -0.017*   | -0.022**         | -0.015*   |          | 0.008               |          |
|  |            | (0.071)   | (0.027)          | (0.089)   |          | (0.174)             |          |
| $Gain_{s,i,t} 	imes Human_i$                           |            |           |                  |           | 0.046*   | -0.317              | -0.484   |
|  |            |           |                  |           | (0.062)  | (0.426)             | (0.191)  |
| $Gain_{s.i.t} \times Temp\_dummy_{i.t} \times Human_i$ |            |           |                  |           |          | -0.014**            | -0.013** |
|  |            |           |                  |           |          | (0.023)             | (0.019)  |
| Constant   | 0.015      | 0.021     | 0.294            | 0.591     | 0.331*** | 0.985**             | 0.180*** |
|  | (0.565)    | (0.234)   | (0.547)          | (0.276)   | (0.000)  | (0.012)             | (0.000)  |
| Weather controls                                       |            |           | Yes              | Yes       |          | Yes                 | Yes      |
| Fixed effects  |            |           |                  | Yes       | Yes      |                     | Yes      |
| Observations   | 18,006     | 13,948    | 13,948           | 13,948    | 359,630  | 182,275             | 174,603  |
| Adjusted R-squared                                     | 0.020      | 0.011     | 0.015            | 0.100     | 0.279    | 0.014               | 0.243    |
| Number of traders                                      | 74         | 74        | 74               | 74        | 74       | 74                  | 74       |

Standard errors are clustered at trader level; p-values are reported in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 5 shows an estimated difference in the disposition effect and an estimated difference in the impact of air temperature on the disposition effect between human and algorithmic "frequent traders". We report coefficients of interest for specifications:

 $\begin{array}{l} DE_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 Human_i + \epsilon_{i,t} \\ DE_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 Human_i + \beta_2 T_d ummy_{i,t} + \beta_3 Human_i \times T_d ummy_{i,t} + C_{i,t} + FE + \epsilon_{i,t} \\ PR_{s,i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 Gain_{s,i,t} + \beta_2 Human_i + \beta_3 Gain_{s,i,t} \times Human_i + FE + \epsilon_{s,i,t} \end{array}$ (17)(18)(19)(20)

$$PR_{sit} = \alpha + \beta_1 Gain_{sit} \times T_dummy_{it} \times Human_i + V\&I_{sit} + C_{it} + FE + \epsilon_{sit}$$

Subscripts s, i and t represent stock, trader and day, respectively. Human<sub>i</sub> is a dummy variable equal to 1 for humans and 0 for algorithms.  $DE_{i,t}$  is the disposition effect measured as the difference between a proportion of gains realized and a proportion of losses realized by trader i in day t. In specification (18), FE represents trader-fixed effects and day-fixed effects. In specifications (19) and (20),  $PR_{s,t}$  is a proportion of either a gain or a loss realized,  $Gain_{s,t}$  is a dummy variable equal to 1 for non-losing positions and 0 for losing positions, and FE represents stock-day, trader-day and stock-trader fixed effects. Dependent variables in specifications without weather variables, i.e., (17) and (19), are observed at 5 pm CET, while at 10 am in the other two specifications. Temperature  $T_{i,t}$  and other weather variables  $C_{i,t}$  used as controls are observed daily between 8 am and 9 am.  $T_dummy_{i,t}$  equals 1 if  $T_{i,t}$  was higher than the median for that city-month.  $V\&I_{s,i,t}$  denotes the three variables that constitute the triple interaction term in specification (20) and the three possible interactions among them.

|                                       |           |           |            | TABLE     | 6          |            |             |             |          |           |
|---------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|----------|-----------|
|                                       |           |           | Rob        | oustness  | checks     |            |             |             |          |           |
|                                       |           |           |            |           | Panel A    | : humans   |             |             |          |           |
| Dependent variable: $DE_{i,t}$        | (1)       | (2)       | (3)        | (4)       | (5)        | (6)        | (7)         | (8)         | (9)      | (10)      |
| Robustness check:                     | Only long | positions | Only short | positions | Mental ga  | uns/losses | Only full r | ealizations | FIFO 1   | method    |
| Regression specification:             | (10)      | (15)      | (10)       | (15)      | (10)       | (15)       | (10)        | (15)        | (10)     | (15)      |
| T_dummy <sub>i.t</sub>                |           | -0.032**  |            | -0.030*   |            | -0.040***  |             | -0.025**    |          | -0.037*** |
|                                       |           | (0.030)   |            | (0.097)   |            | (0.010)    |             | (0.020)     |          | (0.001)   |
| Constant                              | 0.126***  | 0.772     | 0.112***   | 0.652     | 0.123***   | 1.529      | 0.079***    | 0.748       | 0.094*** | 0.846     |
|                                       | (0.000)   | (0.500)   | (0.000)    | (0.696)   | (0.000)    | (0.293)    | (0.001)     | (0.408)     | (0.000)  | (0.445)   |
| Weather controls                      |           | Yes       |            | Yes       |            | Yes        |             | Yes         |          | Yes       |
| Fixed effects                         |           | Yes       |            | Yes       |            | Yes        |             | Yes         |          | Yes       |
| Observations                          | 8,602     | 5,315     | 8,228      | 5,501     | 8,345      | 5,421      | 9,847       | 7,101       | 9,955    | 7,105     |
| Adjusted R-squared                    | 0         | 0.119     | 0          | 0.089     | 0          | 0.069      | 0           | 0.101       | 0        | 0.069     |
| Number of traders                     | 44        | 44        | 44         | 44        | 44         | 44         | 44          | 44          | 44       | 44        |
|                                       |           |           |            |           | Panel B: a | algorithms |             |             |          |           |
| Dependent variable: DE <sub>i,t</sub> | (1)       | (2)       | (3)        | (4)       | (5)        | (6)        | (7)         | (8)         | (9)      | (10)      |
| Robustness check:                     | Only long | positions | Only short | positions | Mental ga  | ins/losses | Only full r | ealizations | FIFO 1   | method    |
| Regression specification:             | (10)      | (15)      | (10)       | (15)      | (10)       | (15)       | (10)        | (15)        | (10)     | (15)      |
| T_dummy <sub>i,t</sub>                |           | 0.001     |            | -0.001    |            | -0.031     |             | -0.005      |          | 0.005     |
| _ •                                   |           | (0.967)   |            | (0.949)   |            | (0.284)    |             | (0.679)     |          | (0.747)   |
| Constant                              | 0.015     | 1.360     | 0.031      | 1.548     | 0.023      | 1.039      | 0.010       | 0.801       | 0.022    | 0.388     |
|                                       | (0.569)   | (0.379)   | (0.258)    | (0.266)   | (0.381)    | (0.416)    | (0.673)     | (0.229)     | (0.321)  | (0.683)   |
| Weather controls                      |           | Yes       |            | Yes       |            | Yes        |             | Yes         |          | Yes       |
| Fixed effects                         |           | Yes       |            | Yes       |            | Yes        |             | Yes         |          | Yes       |
| Observations                          | 7,209     | 5,585     | 7,249      | 5,523     | 7,267      | 5,485      | 8,159       | 6,846       | 8,268    | 6,849     |
| Adjusted R-squared                    | 0         | 0.115     | 0          | 0.108     | 0          | 0.051      | 0           | 0.068       | 0        | 0.041     |
| Number of traders                     | 44        | 44        | 44         | 44        | 44         | 44         | 44          | 44          | 44       | 44        |

Standard errors are clustered at trader level; p-values are reported in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 6 presents an average disposition effect  $(DE_{i,t})$  in odd columns (estimated by the constant) and an impact of temperature on the disposition effect  $(DE_{i,t})$  in even columns (estimated by coefficient  $\beta_1$  on variable  $T_dummy_{i,t}$ ) for human (Panel A) and algorithmic (Panel B) "frequent traders" obtained using regression specifications (10) and (15):

$$DE_{i,t} = \alpha + \epsilon_{i,t}$$
(10)  
$$DE_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_{i,t} T dummy + C_{i,t} + EE + \epsilon_{i,t}$$
(15)

 $DE_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 T_dummy_{i,t} + C_{i,t} + FE + \epsilon_{i,t}$  (15) Variable  $DE_{i,t}$  is observed daily at 5 pm CET for specification (10) and at 10 am for specification (15). Temperature  $T_{i,t}$  and other weather variables  $C_{i,t}$  used as controls are observed daily between 8 am and 9 am.  $T_dummy_{i,t}$  equals 1 if  $T_{i,t}$  was higher than the median for that city-month. Subscripts *i* and *t* represent *trader* and *day*, respectively. FE represents trader-fixed effects and day-fixed effects. We estimate the results under five different assumptions specified in row "Robustness check":

1) Columns (1) and (2) consider only long positions, i.e., assume that gains and losses in short positions were zero.

2) Columns (3) and (4) consider only short positions, i.e., assume that gains and losses in long positions were zero.

- 3) Columns (5) and (6) consider positions that are either long from the daily perspective (assuming every day starts with zero inventory) but short from the long-term perspective (assuming only the first day starts with zero inventory) or short from the daily perspective but long from the long-term perspective.
- 4) Columns (7) and (8) consider the realization of gains and losses only for those trader-stock-day positions that were completely closed at least once throughout a day.
- 5) Columns (9) and (10) use first-in-first-out (FIFO) method, instead of WAPP, to calculate realized gains and losses.




Figure 1 plots on the y-axis an average disposition effect estimated separately for every trader in our sample, i.e., 93 humans and 52 algorithms that have at least 30 non-zero end-of-day observations of disposition effect variable  $DE_{i,t}$ . Variable  $DE_{i,t}$  is defined as the gap between the proportion of gains realized (PGR) and the proportion of losses realized (PLR) by trader *i* at time *t* (for more details, see "Methodology" subsection 4.1 "The measure of the disposition effect"). The average disposition effect is estimated for every trader by regressing the variable  $DE_{i,t}$  (observed daily at 5 pm) on a constant and using robust standard errors. Traders are sorted along the x-axis by an average trading frequency, which is calculated for every trader as an average time gap (in seconds) between trades executed throughout the sample period. Blue and red circles represent humans and algorithms, respectively. Colored circles represent estimates of the disposition effect that are statistically different from zero at the 99% significance level. Algorithms that trade more frequently than the most frequently trading human, i.e., every 54 seconds on average, are labeled "HFTs". Traders that trade less frequently than every 600 seconds on average are labeled "infrequent traders". The remaining traders in between are labeled "frequent traders".




Figure 2 plots an average intraday development of variables  $PGR_{i,t}$  and  $PLR_{i,t}$  observed at the end of every trading hour for human and algorithmic "frequent traders". Every data point is an average across traders (*i*) and days (*t*). Variables  $PGR_{i,t}$  and  $PLR_{i,t}$  are described in detail in section 4 "Methodology". The PGR-PLR gap provides an estimate of the disposition effect.





Figure 3 plots, for the first 10 days of our sample, hourly (end-of-hour) observations of the stock price (solid line, rhs) of Pandora, one of the most traded stocks in terms of average daily turnover, and inventory (dotted line, lhs) of Pandora stock held by two different HFTs: one that, according to Figure 1, exhibits a significant disposition effect on average (Panel A) and one that does not (Panel B). We assume zero starting inventory on the first day. In Panel A, the price and inventory appear to be correlated negatively, which hints towards a price-reversal trading strategy, while in Panel B, the correlation appears to be positive, which suggests a momentum trading strategy.



Reversal\_trading\_proportion<sub>i</sub>

Figure 4 plots the distribution of a trader-level variable *Reversal\_trading\_proportion*<sub>i</sub>, defined in sub-section "5.7. Beliefbased explanations", equation (21), across HFTs. The variable measures a proportion of stock-day-hours spent on pricereversal trading, i.e., either significantly increasing stock inventory as the price has decreased for the second consecutive period, or significantly decreasing stock inventory as the price has increased for the second consecutive period. The red columns represent HFTs that, according to Figure 1, on average exhibit a statistically significant disposition effect, and the white columns represent HFTs that do not. We consider 22 algorithms that on average trade more frequently than once every 100 seconds (see Figure 1).