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Working Paper Assessing Inflation Targeting after a Decade of World Experience

Working Paper, No. 51

Provided in Cooperation with:

Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB), Vienna

Suggested Citation: Corbo, Vittorio; Landerretche, Oscar; Schmidt-Hebbel, Klaus (2001) : Assessing Inflation Targeting after a Decade of World Experience, Working Paper, No. 51, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB), Vienna

This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/264643

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WORKING PAPER 51

ASSESSING INFLATION TARGETING AFTER

A DECADE OF WORLD EXPERIENCE

VITTORIO CORBO, OSCAR LANDERRETCHE AND KLAUS SCHMIDT-HEBBEL

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Editorial

On April 19 - 20, 2001 the Oesterreichische Nationalbank sponsored a Workshop organized by Richard Clarida (Columbia University), Helmut Frisch (TU Wien) and Eduard Hochreiter (OeNB) on "Exchange Rate and Monetary Policy Issues". It took place at the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna. A number of papers presented at this workshop is being made available to a broader audience in the Working Paper series of the Bank. This volume contains the fifth of these papers. The first ones were issued as OeNB Working Papers No. 44, 46, 47 and 50. The paper by Vittorio Corbo, Oscar Landerretche and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (p. 1ff.) is followed by a discussion by Zbigniew Polanski (p. 47ff.).

September 8, 2001

Assessing Inflation Targeting after a Decade of World Experience

Vittorio Corbo * Oscar Landerretche ** Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel ***

Revised

June 2001

JEL keywords: E52, E58

Abstract

Ten years of inflation targeting worldwide provide valuable lessons. Inflation targeters (ITers) have been very successful in meeting their inflation targets (ITs). Industrial output sacrifice during inflation stabilization and industrial output volatility has frequently been lowered after IT adoption. ITers have consistently reduced inflation forecast errors after IT adoption. The influence of price and output shocks on the behavior of inflation and output gaps has changed much more strongly among ITers than in non-targeting industrial countries in the course of the 1990s. IT has played a role in strengthening the effect of forward-looking expectations on inflation, hence weakening the weight of past inflation inertia. Central bankers' aversion to inflation is on average not different among ITers in comparison to NITers but has risen in emerging-country ITers. ITers have gradually reaped a credibility gain, allowing them to achieve their targets with smaller changes in interest rates in the late 1990s than the changes that were required in the early 1990s.

We thank Eduard Hochreiter, Zbigniew Polanski, Mark Taylor, Volker Wieland, and other participants at the Vienna Workshop on Exchange Rate and Monetary Policy Issues and seminars at M.I.T. and the Central Bank of Chile for excellent comments and discussions. We are grateful to Verónica Mies for outstanding research assistance. The usual disclaimer applies.

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<u>1. Introduction</u>

Inflation targeting (IT) is the new kid on the block of monetary regimes. Since IT was first adopted by New Zealand and Chile in 1990, a growing number of industrial and developing countries followed, anchoring their monetary policy to explicit targets for inflation.

Does adoption of IT make a difference? The experience with IT is certainly very recent, and while IT countries have reduced their inflation levels, more careful evidence provides a more cautious picture. Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999) show that adoption of IT did not make a difference regarding the cost and speed of price stabilization. Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2000) show evidence that, on average, IT countries exhibit degrees of inflation aversion that are not higher than those of non-targeters.

However a large number of questions on the results of inflation targeting remain open. First, how successful have countries been in reducing inflation? Second, how costly has been disinflation under IT? Third, does IT improve the ability to predict inflation? Fourth, does the behavior of the macroeconomy change under IT? Fifth, does IT change central bank aversion toward inflation? Sixth, does IT change central bank behavior? Seventh, what is the transmission mechanism of IT? This paper addresses the latter questions by conducting a wide empirical search of the features and effects of IT, by comparing the performance of countries with and without inflation targets.

Section 2 introduces the sample of inflation targeters used in this paper and compares their performance to that of other country groups, focusing on their success in meeting inflation targets, sacrifice ratios, and output volatility. Section 3 investigates if IT improves the ability to predict inflation by studying differences in VAR structures between inflation targeters and non-targeters. Section 4 studies if the behavior of the macroeconomy changes under IT. Section 5, drawing on the methodology of Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2000), analyzes if central banks' degree of aversion toward inflation is different for targeters and non-targeters. Section 6 studies if IT changes central bank behavior. Section 7

summarizes the main conclusions.

2. Are inflation targeters different from non-targeters?

Recent books and articles describe the design features and general results of inflation targeting (IT) in the small but quickly growing number of countries that have adopted inflation targeting (IT) since 1990.¹ In this section we complement the preceding work by describing the sample of inflation targeters and comparing their performance to that of other country groups. We focus in particular on their inflation performance and success in meeting their targets, as well as their output sacrifice and output volatility.

2.1 Who targets?

IT is based on the central bank's commitment to attain a publicly announced quantitative inflation target over the relevant policy horizon. Its two crucial prerequisites are absence of fiscal dominance and absence of conflict with other nominal policy objectives. Central bank independence, policy transparency, and central bank accountability to political bodies and society at large strengthen exercise of "constrained discretion" under IT (Bernanke et al. 1999).

While there is broad consensus in the literature about the latter general definition of IT, it is more controversial to apply this definition to come up with an empirically relevant sample of IT experiences. The reason for disagreement on sample selection and IT dating is that IT adoption has been more evolutionary than revolutionary. Most countries have adopted gradually all bells and whistles of this new monetary framework, learning over time and from other countries what defines a "full-fledged" IT framework.

According to Schaechter, Stone, and Zelmer (2000), there have been 13 "full-fledged" IT experiences in the world until February 2000: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile,

¹ See in particular Leiderman and Svensson (1995), Mishkin and Posen (1997), Bernanke et al. (1999), Kuttner and Posen (1999), Haldane (1999), Mishkin (2000), Mishkin and Savatano (2000), Schachter et al. (2000).

Czech Republic, Finland, Israel, New Zealand, Poland, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. Of the latter, Finland and Spain abandoned IT in January 1999 when they joined the European Monetary Union (EMU). We follow Schaechter et al. in their country classification (but not always in dating the start of IT experiences). However we add two recent newcomers (Korea and Thailand) to their 13 countries, hence including 15 "full-fledged" IT country experiences until August 2000.

For our empirical analysis conducted for the 1980-1999 period, we introduce 3 country groups (Table 1). 9 countries that have had IT in place dating back at least to 1995 comprise group 1 (called ITers). This group is divided into two sub-samples: two emerging countries that are inflation-transition ITers (in the sense that they started IT at inflation levels substantially above stationary levels: Chile and Israel), and seven industrial countries that are stationary ITers (in the sense that they started IT at inflation levels close to stationary levels): Australia, Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

Group 2 is comprised by eight emerging economies on their way to IT during the 1990s, i.e. countries that have adopted IT either recently and/or have, as of today, a partial IT framework in place. They are Brazil, Colombia, Korea, Mexico, and South Africa. From the vantagepoint of their transition toward inflation targeting during the 1990s we call them potential inflation targeters (PITers). 2

Group 3 – a set of control countries – is comprised by 10 industrial economies countries that are not ITers: Denmark, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland, and the US. These countries have no explicit inflation target in place or, in the case of EMU members, have adopted the euro after targeting their exchange rates to the deutschmark for most of the 1990s.³ We label this control group as non-inflation targeters (NITers).

² Czech Republic and Poland were not included due to lack of information.

³ Switzerland adopted inflation targeting in December 2000.

Figure 1 depicts adoption dates and inflation rates at adoption of the 14 countries that have had IT experiences – 7 (current) ITers, 2 (former) ITers, and 5 PITers as of August 2000.⁴ The following stylized facts are apparent from inspection. Only 5 industrial countries have IT in place after 1998. After early adoption by Chile and Israel, 6 years passed before additional emerging economies joined the club. However 5 additional members were added since 1998.

One salient feature of the international IT experience is that many emerging countries have adopted IT when they were still at inflation levels well above stationary inflation rates. In Chile and Israel inflation stood at 29% and 19%, respectively, when adopting IT in the early 1990s. In the more recent cases of IT adoption, Colombia and Mexico had initial inflation rates of 10 and 18%, respectively, Korea had initial inflation close to 5%, while in Brazil and South Africa initial inflation toward low stationary levels is prima facie evidence that IT can be successfully adopted to reduce inflation from (low) double-digit levels toward low single-digit rates.

2.2 How successful have countries been in reducing inflation and meeting their targets under IT?

We measure IT success in three simple dimensions: the reduction of inflation shortly before and after adopting IT, the speed at which inflation was brought down from the start of IT through the attainment of stationary inflation, and the average deviation of inflation outcomes from target levels.

⁴ Starting dates are defined by the first month of the first period for which inflation targets have been announced previously. For example, the starting date for Chile is January 1991 (the first month of calendar year 1991, for which the first inflation target was announced in Sep. 1990). The initial inflation level is defined as the year-on-year CPI inflation rate of the last quarter before the first month of inflation targeting.(For instance 1990.4 in the case of Chile).

⁵ Inflation attained one quarter before adopting IT.

A general feature of IT is that countries prepare in adopting IT by reducing inflation around the date of IT adoption (noted as year t in Table 2). This feature is generally observed in industrial and emerging, transition and stationary, ITers and PITers. Depending on the selected period, 14 inflation targeters have reduced inflation rates on average by measures that range from 5.4% (between years t-2 and t+1), and 8.7% (between years t-3 and t+1). Our sample of ITers has reduced inflation on average by 5.9% (3.4%) in the period that ranges from 3 (1) years before and 1 year after IT adoption. Similar results are observed in the sample of PITers, where inflation was reduced on average by 13.8% (6.9%).

Now let's consider the speed of convergence to stationary inflation among ITers (Table 3). ITers have reached stationary inflation levels in 10 quarters on average. Among the 9 ITers, Chile and Israel had the longest transition periods (36 and 24 quarters, respectively) – not surprisingly, considering their high initial inflation rates. Australia and Sweden were on the other extreme, as they adopted IT when they had already attained stationary inflation.

ITers have been successful in meeting their targets (Table 4). On average – as measured by their average relative deviation of actual annual inflation from target inflation – ITers have missed only 12 basis points, a figure that rises to 66 basis points when considering the average absolute deviation. Among the 9 ITers, the UK, Chile, and Canada are closest on target while Israel, Sweden, and Finland score the highest deviations. Similar results are obtained when scaling relative and absolute deviations to annual inflation rates – a necessary correction to take care of large country differences in inflation levels during transition to stationary inflation. Using this alternative measurement, Israel and Spain join Canada, Chile, and the UK as the countries that were most on target, while Finland, Australia and now Sweden show the largest deviations.

2.3 How costly has been disinflation under IT?

It is straightforward to compute sacrifice ratios – i.e. percentage output losses per percentage unit of inflation reduction – as measures of the costs of disinflation under IT. For the period that ranges from 3 years before to 1 year after IT adoption – as represented in Table 2 – sacrifice ratios are computed for GDP and industrial production, and for ITers and PITers (Table 5). ⁶ Among the 9 ITers, the sacrifice ratio amounted to an average of 0.60 (using GDP), 6.6 (using industrial output) and 2.6 (using industrial output but excluding Chile and Spain, two large outliers). Among 5 PITers, the sacrifice ratio was on average a (negative) -0.4 when using GDP and -0.2 when using industrial production. Country dispersion is moderate when using GDP and high when using industrial production, ranging from –2.3 to 2.5 and –4.2 to 23.3 respectively.

An alternative way is to compare sacrifice ratios for disinflation periods under IT to sacrifice ratios before adopting IT in the same country group, and to comparable sacrifice ratios among PITers and NITers (Tables 6a and 6b). While there is large country variation, there does not seem to be a clear difference in GDP-based sacrifice ratios before and after IT adoption among the set of 9 ITers. Excluding outliers, average sacrifice ratios before and after after IT adoption are -0.22 and 0.06, respectively. These figures are compared to the average sacrifice ratio of 0.57 recorded by NITers during disinflation periods in the 1990s and are substantially larger to the average figure of -1.84 observed among PITers (Table 6a).

However using industrial production a different result emerges. On average, sacrifice ratios after IT adoption were highly negative (-1.2) among ITers, and hence much lower than those recorded by the same country group before IT adoption (0.5), and also lower to the average sacrifice ratios observed among NITers (0.8) and PITers (-0.8). This result represents preliminary evidence suggesting that IT contributed in lowering output

⁶ Sacrifice ratios are computed as ratios of the sum of deviations of potential from actual output divided by the reduction in CPI inflation. They were based on annual frequency for GDP-based measures and quarterly data for industrial output.based measures. Average sacrifice ratios based on industrial output are calculated with and without two large outliers (Chile and Spain).

costs of inflation stabilization, at least when considering higher-frequency measures of industrial output (Table 6b).

A related result is referred to output volatility. We compare the volatility of industrial output before and after IT adoption in 9 ITers and only 1 PITer (Table 7). Output volatility fell in 8 of the 10 countries and in 6 of them the reduction in the standard deviation of industrial output was significant at least at the 10% level. Output volatility among ITers is similar to that observed among NITers during the 1990s.

3. Does inflation targeting improve the ability to predict inflation?

This section reports country VAR models, shows differences in VAR structures between ITers and non-ITers, and compares how one-step-ahead inflation forecast errors (constructed from the country VARs) have evolved over time in the three country groups.

For the three groups of countries we have put together a database of quarterly 1980-1999 variables for five relevant macroeconomic variables: industrial production (IP), ⁷ money (M), consumer prices (CPI), interest rates (IR), and the nominal exchange rate (NER). To avoid treating cointegration vectors in different countries, we specify all variables (excepting the interest rate) as deviations from a potentially non-stationary trend measured with a Hodrick-Prescott filter with a 1600 penalty parameter on the second derivative of the trend. Each variable is measured as the logarithmic deviation from the trend, allowing us to focus on the relationships between the stationary components of the set of macroeconomic variables. In the case of IP the resulting series is an approximation of the gap between actual and potential output and in the case of inflation the resulting series is a deviation from trend inflation.

We assume that the structure of the economy can be adequately described by a nonstructural vector autoregressive simultaneous equation system. We run a comprehensive model, common to all economies, described by the stationary components of their mayor macroeconomic variables. The unrestricted VAR is based on five endogenous variables, ordered from more to less endogenous: CPI, IP, M, NER, IR. We also include two exogenous variables: international interest rates and oil prices. The ordering of the variables in the VAR assumes that the movements of the short-term interest rate are the most relatively exogenous of all the set of macroeconomic variables.⁸ The VAR uses four lags and is run on a moving window of seven years for most countries. The equation of inflation in the VAR is used to generate a one-period out-of-sample forecast of inflation, which is our proxy of inflation expectations. To be able to make some robust inferences we run two types of exercises: one is for a seven-year moving window, and the other is a recursive estimation of the VAR with additional information used in every recursive estimation.

In countries that have used IT to converge to steady-state levels of inflation, inflation targets carry information on the monetary stance of the central bank. The announcement of the inflation target should be news for the market and inflation expectations should be affected by the target set by the bank. The inflation target signals how aggressive the disinflation will be during the relevant period; it acts as a coordination mechanism and a commitment device. We should expect this coordination mechanism to reduce the forecast error since agents will have a larger degree of certainty about the parameters of the economy in which they are operating.

In countries close to their steady-state levels of inflation, the inflation target carries less information than in the previous case. However the credible commitment of the monetary authority to a numerical target may also contribute to better coordination among agents and markets. For example, announcing inflation targets may reduce the reaction of agents to inflation news or the dependence of specific prices on formal or informal indexation mechanisms, aligning the reaction of the economy to the desired reaction of the central bank.

⁷ We use industrial production to construct a measure of the production gap due to availability of quarterly data for some of our emerging market economies.

The VAR results are used for generating inflation deviation forecasts for each country. Up to this point we are using a rolling (recursive) estimation of an inflation equation to generate inflation. ⁹ We use four lags in the estimation, which come from a rolling and recursive estimation of Akaike, Schwartz and Hannan-Quinn information criteria for each country.¹⁰

To assess the effect of the inflation-targeting regime on the formation of inflation expectations we generate the square of the forecast errors from the aforementioned VARs and average them across ITers and NITers. In order to control for the fact that high inflation forecast errors could be related to high inflation levels we divide by the trend level of inflation hat we have estimated before aggregating by country.

In Figures 2a and 2b we depict average quadratic inflation forecast errors for different samples of ITers and NITers. In panels I, III and V of each figure we define the group of ITers by including each ITer only in the periods in which they had IT in place; in all other periods years they are included among NITers. However in panels II, IV and VI we define the group of ITers by including every country that had IT in place during some period in 1990-1999. Panels I and II are defined for the full country sample except Brazil and Indonesia that were found to be very clear outliers. Panels III and IV are identical to panels I and II but for Mexico and Korea, that were excluded because of high volatility during the sample period. Panels V and VI represent an even smaller sample of only industrial countries, hence excluding Israel and Chile. In all six panels the continuous lines depict ITers and the dotted lines represent NITers.

⁸ In the following sections we assume that short-term interest rates are, over quarterly averages, closely aligned with the policy interest rate of the central bank.

⁹ The dynamic properties and hence the importance of characteristics such as the ordering of the endogenous variables become relevant in the following sections.

¹⁰ The Kullback-Liebler distance is a measure of the distance from the maximum likelihood fit of the model, and is calculated as the sum (the integral) of the deviations of the maximum likelihood function evaluated at the estimated parameters from the true fit. This measure is usually used to evaluate the fit of a time-series model and is usually approximated by the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC). It can be shown that the AIC is inconsistent in the sense that it picks larger than optimal lags. There are many ways of correcting this, usually

The results suggest an effect of inflation targeting on the accuracy of the forecasts. We observe consistently that countries that adopted IT have converged to levels of accuracy similar to that of non-targeters. This convergence has occurred towards 1994 and is on top of the improved accuracy observed in the group of non-targeters. The result of panel VI suggests that this convergence process has been important for non-industrial countries ITers, such as Israel, Chile, and Mexico. The results suggest that the bonus of higher accuracy (and presumably more credibility) has been reaped by countries converging to steady-state inflation levels rather than steady-state inflation targeters. Hence inflation targeters have achieved during the last decade a significant convergence of inflation expectations to their actual inflation rates over the last decade. The similarity of results reported in Figures 2a and Figure 2b supports the robustness of this conclusion.

Most of the time-series structure of the inflation errors has been removed from the VARs on which the quadratic inflation deviation forecast errors are based. However, we still find that some time-series structure remains in the inflation series for some countries, as indicated by correlograms. Since we are not able to address this problem by including more lags, we resort to filtering the resulting forecast errors by the time-series structure suggested by the correlograms, recalculating the group averages of quadratic inflation deviation forecast errors for targeters and non-targeters. The corresponding results (Figures 3a and 3b) show that the preceding result of panels I to V are maintained while the result of panel VI provides evidence of inflation expectations convergence. While in the previous panel VI (in Figures 2a and 2b) industrial-country ITers exhibited a similar reduction of forecast errors than NITers over the 1990s, now panel VI (in Figures 3a and 3b) shows a clear convergence of ITers to NITers, as the latter had already low forecast errors since the beginning of the 1990s.

4. Does the behavior of the macroeconomy change under IT?

consisting in penalizing the number of lags in the statistic. We present two of these: the Schwartz (SIC) and

In order to assess if IT has changed the structure of the economies and their response to shocks, we report dynamic variance decomposition results for the country VARs that we used in the preceding section. The dynamic simulation is performed by reporting the average share of the orthogonalized innovation of one variable in the variance of another variable using the estimated VAR parameters and the orthogonalized components of each of the endogenous variables.¹¹

The variance decomposition provides information about the relative importance of each random innovation to each variable in the VAR, describing the reduced-form effects and tradeoffs that are present in an economy. If the VAR model is an adequate description of the economy, it will provide the reduced-form response of the macroeconomy that combines the interplay of private and public sector actions, including monetary policy reactions of the central bank.

We simulate dynamic variance decompositions for the rolling country VARs reported in the preceding section. ¹² We report some results as aggregates for samples of IT countries and non-IT countries while others we report separately for each country.

The results for two sample selections are reported for both the complete set of 25 countries¹³ (Figure 4a) and for an alternative smaller set of industrial countries¹⁴ (Figure 4b). The figures show the shares of orthogonalized innovations in inflation and the output gap in the variance of inflation innovations, considering both own and cross innovations. Each figure reports separately the dynamic variance decomposition effects for the four

the Hannan Quinn information criteria (HQIC).

¹¹ A variance decomposition is a dynamic simulation of the estimated system where a shock to an endogenous variable is separated into the orthogonal component shocks to the endogenous variables of the VAR. As usual the orthogonalized errors are constructed decomposing the estimated errors according to a Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix.

¹² Since in section 3.1 we did not find major differences between the results from rolling VARs and recursive VARs, here we perform the exercise on rolling VARs only, in order to maximize the observed changes in economic structure.

¹³ United States of America, United Kingdom, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, Japan, Finland, Portugal, Spain, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Israel, Indonesia, and Korea.

¹⁴ Same countries as in preceding footnote 19, except African, Latin American, and Asian countries.

different lags included in the VARs. The results for rolling VARs are reported for fixed windows of 40 quarters (depending on availability of data per country VAR), starting with 1980.1 - 1989.4 (reported as the first observation in each figure) and ending with 1990.1 - 1999.4 (reported as the last observation).

The results show revealing commonalties and differences across country groups and over time. An innovation in the first inflation lag (reflecting first-order inflation persistence) shows some increase over time but not much difference across country groups of ITers and NITers. However the role of innovations in higher-order lags in inflation on inflation has fallen on average among ITers but increased among non-ITers – for both sample definitions corresponding to Figures 4a and 4b. This is suggestive of the role of IT in partly substituting forward-looking inflation expectations (influenced by the official inflation target) for the backward-looking roots of the inflation process.

We do not find much difference between ITers and non-ITers regarding the crosseffects of inflation shocks on output gap variances. In both country groups the effects are small and tend to fall during the 1990s. Regarding the opposite cross effect – from inflation innovations to output gap variances – more significant differences emerge between both country groups. Among ITers a large reduction in the role of inflation innovations on output variance took place in the 1990s, towards levels closer to those of NITers, who also observed some reduction in the role of inflation innovations. Hence IT may have contributed to anchor inflation expectations, helping in isolating the output gap to inflation innovations.

A third and final difference among country groups is observed regarding lagged output gap innovations on the current output gap variance. On average, output persistence – at every lag – has increased by a sizable amount among ITers throughout the 1990s, toward levels comparable to those of non-ITers, whose output persistence did not change much during the decade.

The effect of innovations in the nominal exchange rate on inflation variance can be interpreted as the reduced-form passthrough from devaluation to inflation. No major differences were observed at the aggregate level of country samples – nor over time – regarding the latter innovations.¹⁵

No major differences between ITers and non-ITers are observed regarding the effects of innovations in or on other variables, with the exception of the effects of innovations on interest rates, that are discussed in section 6.

5. Does IT change central bank aversion towards inflation?

Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2000), henceforth CE, have developed a useful and simple model to derive and measure the aversion of central bankers to inflation variability relative to their aversion to output variability. By maximizing a standard quadratic loss function subject to linear aggregate supply and aggregate demand equations, they derive the following equation that relates the relative aversion to inflation variability (α) to the slope of the aggregate supply curve (γ) and the variance of inflation (σ_{π}^2) and output (σ_{γ}^2):

(5.1)
$$\frac{\boldsymbol{s}_{y}^{2}}{\boldsymbol{s}_{p}^{2}} = \left[\frac{\boldsymbol{a}}{\boldsymbol{g}(1-\boldsymbol{a})}\right]^{2}$$

Using equation (5.1) and country data for inflation and output variances and estimating aggregate supply slopes from impulse response functions that derive the output effects of supply shocks, CE calculate the inflation-aversion coefficient (a). From their

¹⁵ However some interesting results were obtained at the country level. For the two transition ITers that have converged during the 1990s to steady-state inflation: Chile and Israel show a decline in the share of exchange-rate innovations in inflation variance during the 1990s. This result supports the notion that the devaluation-inflation passthrough has declined in both countries during the 1990s, as a result of recent (Chile) or ongoing (Israel) convergence toward a flexible exchange-rate regime and achievement of stationary inflation in both countries

country-by-country results, based on quarterly data for the 1980s and 1990s for 9 ITers and 14 NITers, CE conclude that, on average, the inflation aversion of ITers is not higher than in the control group of NITers. However, by using rolling regressions for shorter sub-samples, they also find that inflation aversion has increased significantly in most ITers shortly before, during, or after adoption of IT.

Next we redo CE's calculation for our samples of ITers and NITers, departing in 4 important ways from their empirical procedures. First our sample differs from theirs in country composition and time coverage. Regarding the latter, our quarterly sample extends from 1980 through 1999, which is longer than theirs. Second, CE define the deviation of inflation (and the corresponding variance) with regard to a constant 2% annual inflation rate, while we define it as the deviation from an estimated HP trend (as discussed in section 3) (for non-ITers) or the deviation from inflation target levels (for ITers). This has important consequences for the time-varying measures of inflation variance, as discussed below. Third, we reestimate output supply slopes from impulse response functions based on the country VARs run in section 3 and add alternative estimates based on simple Phillips-curve estimations. Finally, we reestimate inflation and output variances from our country samples.

Our results of cumulative impulse responses of output to interest rate shocks at quarterly leads, ranging from 1 to 13 quarters, show a wide range of period and country responses, from large positive to large negative supply slopes. The time averages over the 13 lead responses for each country (excepting the 5% tails of the cross-country time-series distribution) vary between -7.2 (France) and 10.7 (Netherlands). We rescale linearly the latter ordering to obtain a ranking of output slope coefficients in the range spanned from 0.1 to 6.0.

As an alternative to the previous results we next estimate supply slope coefficients from the two following variants of the simple Phillips curve:

(5.2)
$$ygap_t = \boldsymbol{d}_0 + \boldsymbol{d}_1(\boldsymbol{p}_t - \boldsymbol{p}_{t-1})$$

or

(5.2')
$$ygap_t = d_0 + d_1(p_t - E_{t-1}p_{t-1})$$

where last period's expectation of current inflation is obtained from out-of-sample inflation projections from the VARs used in section 3.

Two measures for the output gap (ygap) were applied by using the deviations from HP trend levels of GDP and industrial output, as defined in section 3. The different combinations of equations and output measures were estimated by OLS and TSLS (using the interest rate as the instrument for the inflation deviation, to be consistent with the VAR impulse response estimates). The sample period extends from 1980 to 1999, with quarterly data frequencies. The eight slope coefficients for the corresponding combinations of equations, output measures and estimation techniques again vary widely by estimated equation and country. Averages for each country across equations (outliers were defined as the observations of the 5% tails) again were linearly rescaled, obtaining slope coefficients in the 0.10 - 6.0 range.

The first four columns in Table 8 report supply slope coefficients according to four available measures: the original average cross-country CE measure (2.83), the original country CE measure for those countries included by CE or 2.83 for the excluded countries, our first country measure from VAR impulse responses, and our second country measure from Phillips curves. There is much output slope variation across countries. Across our three country groups, the variation is smaller. However it is interesting to note that gammas appear to be on average consistently (i.e., in columns 2 through 4) higher in ITers than in potential PITers and NITers.

Finally we report in columns 5-8 of Table 8 country inflation aversion coefficients, based on the gammas shown in the corresponding columns 1-4 and country output and inflation variances, by applying equation (5) from CE. Our estimates for alpha are much higher on average than CE's figures, reflecting the fact that our inflation variance is much

lower, as discussed above. Across different measures and countries, the average alpha is close to 0.91. There are no difference in alphas between ITers, PITers, and NITers – confirming the earlier CE result.

Next we investigate if the relative aversion to inflation has changed over the 1990s. As CE, we focus on time-varying country estimates of inflation aversion coefficients from rolling 5-year windows. In order to minimize contamination from mismeasurement of output supply coefficient, here we use a common gamma for all countries (2.83 obtained directly from CE). We also focus our discussion on the time pattern of alphas starting about 1990 (hence starting with 5-year windows before 1991) as much noise characterized policies and outcomes until the mid-1980s.

In many countries – across various groups – inflation aversion rose during the 1990s. Among ITers, revealed inflation aversion rose significantly in Finland, Sweden, Chile, and Israel. Also among many NITers inflation aversion increased significantly in the 1990s, as occurred in the U.S., Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland. Among PITers such a trend is not observed – moreover, alphas declined in Brazil and Mexico during the 1990s. Many of these country results differ significantly from those reported by CE.

We report aggregate dynamic alphas for four country groups and our four alternative estimates for output supply coefficient gamma, on 5-year estimation windows and our inflation variances. The country group results in Figure 5 are quite robust across different gamma estimates (i.e., different panels). They show that for the sub-group of industrial-country ITers the average alpha does not exhibit any time trend during the 1990s although there are cyclical swings. However inflation aversion shows an upward trend in the two transition ITers – Chile and Israel – since 1990. While in the mid-1990s there is a temporary decline in alpha – largely reflecting a strong temporary decline in Israel – the average alpha is 4 percentage points higher in the late 1990s than around 1990.

Another country group that exhibits a significant trend rise in inflation aversion

during the 1990s is the NITers, also by a magnitude close to 4 percentage points. The only group that shows a trend decline in their inflation aversion is the PITers, by an average total reduction of some 2 percentage points.

Hence regarding time trends of aversion coefficients, our results are strikingly different from CE's. Only transition ITers (Chile and Israel) show a trend increase in their alphas during the 1990s. In this they behavior they are similar to industrial-country NITers, not to other ITers.

6. Does IT change central bank behavior?

In this section we analyze if ITers differ from non-ITers regarding the behavior of central banks in setting their policy instrument – the interest rate. We approach this question from two different angles. First we report the results of inflation and output innovations on the variance of interest rates, based on dynamic variance decompositions performed on the rolling VARs estimated in section 3 and already applied to other variance decompositions in section 4. Then we report econometric results for simple Taylor policy rules to infer about the weights of inflation and output gaps in the evolution of short-term interest rates.

In Figure 6 we present the dynamic variance decomposition for the gap and inflation pressure on the interest rate. The two top panels are for the whole samples of ITers and NITers and the two bottom panels are for the industrial-country sub-samples of ITers and NITers. The most interesting result is that ITers have been able to lower the reaction of the interest rate to innovations in both inflation and the gap during the 1990s. This result is robust to inclusion or exclusion of non-industrial countries in the groups of ITers and NITers. It suggests that ITers have gradually reaped a credibility gain that allows them to achieve their inflation targets with gradually smaller changes in interest rates. Among NITers, however, the impact of inflation innovations on interest rates has not declined in the 1990s while there is some decline – at the first and second lags – of the effect of output

gap innovations on interest rates among NITers.

Next we estimate a simple Taylor rule consistent with a reduced-form partialadjustment equation for the reaction of the central bank to inflation and output gaps.¹⁶ This equation is consistent with a central bank that determines its policy rate (r) as a weighted average of the one-period lagged rate and the optimal rate, and the latter is a function of both contemporaneous gaps, giving rise to the following reduced-form equation:

(6.1) $r_t = \boldsymbol{d}_0 + \boldsymbol{d}_1 r_{t-1} + \boldsymbol{d}_2 \boldsymbol{p} gap + \boldsymbol{d}_3 y gap$

where π gap (the inflation gap) is the difference between actual and target inflation for ITers and between actual and trend inflation for non-ITers, and ygap (the output gap) is the difference between actual and trend industrial output.

Quarterly data for the 1990-1999 period are used for each country. Country-bycountry OLS results for equation (6.1) are reported in Table 9. The only result that is common across most countries is that the lagged quarterly interest rate coefficient is numerically close to 1 in most countries, reflecting a high degree of monetary policy inertia. Hence there are proportionally large differences between short and long-term effects of the inflation gap and the output gap on interest rates. While most gap coefficients are positive, as expected, they exhibit large cross-country variation in their sizes and not many are significantly different from zero.

In all countries, except Chile, the interest rate is a nominal rate. In all countries with nominal interest rates (less Brazil), the coefficient of the short-term inflation gap is smaller than 1, signaling that central banks raise nominal interest rates by less than a contemporaneous increase in inflation. In the case of Chile, the smaller-than-1 estimated coefficient is consistent with a coefficient of 1 plus the estimate under nominal interest rates. These results are similar to previous findings on Taylor rule estimations for various countries (Corbo, 2000; Restrepo, 1999; Taylor, 2000).

¹⁶ On the robustness of simple Taylor rules see Taylor (2000).

The long-term inflation gap coefficient is positive and significantly different from zero in 3 ITers (UK, Australia, and Israel), 4 NITers (the US, Netherlands, Japan, and Portugal), and 3 PITers (Brazil, Colombia, and Korea). Country output gap coefficients are positive in most countries, and positive and significantly different from zero in 10 countries.

Simple averaging across our 3 country groups allows obtaining the group coefficients identified at the bottom of Table 9. Among the three groups, ITers exhibit the largest inflation gap coefficient relative to the output gap coefficient although both coefficients are not significantly different from zero. NITers show gap coefficients that are small and similar in size, although only their output gap coefficient is significantly different from zero.

Next we perform rolling estimations of country Taylor rules for 10-year windows. The regressions are performed for the same samples of total ITers and NITers for which the variance decompositions for interest rates were reported in Figure 6. The corresponding results in Figures 7a and 7b are very consistent with those reported in Figure 5. Both the inflation and output gap coefficients have declined consistently among ITers – and this is observed both including transition ITers Chile and Israel (in Figure 7a) and excluding them (in Figure 7b). Such reduction is not observed among NITers, where both inflation and output gap coefficients do not exhibit any trend in the 1990s. Hence these results confirm that ITers have gradually established credibility, requiring smaller changes in interest rates in response to inflation or output shocks in the late 1990s than when they started IT in the early 1990s.

7. Conclusions

This paper has conducted a wide empirical search on the rationale and consequences of adopting IT. By comparing policies and outcomes in full-fledged IT countries to two control groups of potential targeters and non-targeters, we have identified in which ways IT makes a difference.

ITers have been very successful in meeting their targets. Output sacrifice ratios measured by industrial production were lower after IT adoption among ITers than among potential targeters and non-targeters during the 1990s. Volatility of industrial output fell in most ITers after IT adoption, to levels similar to those among non-targeters.

ITers have consistently reduced inflation-forecast errors (based on country VAR models) after IT adoption, toward the low levels prevalent in non-targeting industrial countries.

Variance decomposition results from VARs show that the influence of price and output shocks on the behavior of inflation and output gaps has changed much more strongly among ITers than in non-targeting industrial countries in the course of the 1990s. Inflation persistence has declined strongly among ITers during the 1990s. This suggests that IT has played a role in strengthening the effect of forward-looking expectations on inflation, hence weakening the weight of past inflation inertia. The influence of inflation shocks on output has declined while output persistence has increased significantly during the 1990s. The influence of price and output shocks on inflation and output gaps tended to converge among ITers in the late 1990s to the patterns observed among non-targeting industrial countries.

Regarding exchange-rate innovations on inflation – evidence of reduced-form devaluation-inflation passthroughs – no differences where identified between stationary (industrial-country) ITers and non-targeting industrial countries. However both transition ITers (Chile and Israel) show a significant decline in the share of exchange-rate innovations in inflation variance during the 1990s. This suggests that the passthrough has fallen as both countries have actually converged (Chile in 1999) or are converging (Israel) toward a floating exchange regime.

Cecchetti and Ehrmann (CE) found that the aversion of central bankers towards inflation did not differ, on average between ITers and NITers. However they found that

inflation aversion increased significantly in most ITers when they adopted ITs (i.e., during the 1990s), as opposed to non-targeters. We extended CE's estimates and inflation-aversion measures in various ways and confirmed their first result: inflation aversion is on average not different among ITers in comparison to NITers. However, in opposition to CE's second result, we do not find evidence that industrial-country (stationary) ITers showed increasing inflation aversion through the 1990s. In contrast, inflation aversion increased in the emerging-country (and transition) ITers: Israel and Chile. Also in opposition to CE, we find a trend increase in inflation aversion among industrial-country NITers. Among potential ITers (PITers), inflation aversion fell during the 1990s.

Does IT change central bankers' behavior in setting interest rates? First we performed variance decomposition exercises from country VARs to test for changes in the response of interest rates to inflation and output innovations. In fact, the reaction of interest rates to both inflation and output shocks has declined significantly among ITers throughout the 1990s. Among industrial-country NITers, however, these reductions were either nil or much weaker in the 1990s. Next we estimated Phillips curves that confirmed the latter result: the coefficients of inflation and output gaps have monotonically declined in both emerging and industrial ITers during the 1990s – as opposed to unchanged parameters among NITers. This result suggests that ITers have gradually reaped a credibility gain, allowing them to achieve their ITs with smaller changes in interest rates in the late 1990s than the changes that were necessary to adopt in the early 1990s.

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Data Appendix

Inflation Targeting periods

Consider countries as inflation targeters in the following periods: United Kingdom from the fourth quarter of 1992 onwards, Sweden from the first quarter of 1993 onwards, Canada from the first quarter of 1991 onwards, Finland from the first quarter of 1993 to present, Spain form the third quarter of 1996 to the fourth quarter of 1998, Australia from the fourth quarter of 1994 onwards, New Zealand from the second quarter of 1990 onwards, Chile from the fourth quarter of 1990 onwards and Israel from the first quarter of 1991 onwards.

Industrial Production

For all countries, except for the following, the Seasonally Adjusted Industrial Production Index, code 66.. czf of the IFS catalogue, for Switzerland, the Seasonally Adjusted Industrial Production Index (90=100), code 66.. izf of the IFS catalogue, for Turkey, the Industrial Production Index, code 66.. zf of the IFS catalogue, for New Zealand, the Seasonally Adjusted Manufacturing Production Index, code 66ey.czf of the IFS catalogue, for Chile, Colombia and Mexico, the Manufacturing Production Index, code 66ey.czf of the IFS catalogue.

Money

For all countries, except for the following, Money, code 34..zf of the IFS catalogue + Quasi-Money, code 35..zf of the IFS catalogue, Germany, Italy, Finland and Spain, Currency in Circulation + Demand Deposits, code 34a.nzf + 34b.nzf of the IFS catalogue.

Inflation

For all counties, Consumer Prices, code 60..zf of the IFS catalogue.

Interest Rate

1 For Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Spain, the Call Money rate, code 60 b..zf of the IFS catalogue, for Switzerland, Italy, Korea and Japan, the Money Market rate, code 60 b..zf and 60 p..zf of the IFS catalogue, for the USA, the Federal Funds rate, code 60 b..zf of the IFS catalogue, for the United Kingdom, the Overnight Interbank rate, code 60 b..zf of the IFS catalogue, for Canada, the Overnight Money Market rate, code 60 b..zf of the IFS catalogue, for the United Kingdom, the Overnight Interbank rate, code 60 b..zf of the IFS catalogue, for Canada, the Overnight Money Market rate, code 60 b..zf of the IFS catalogue, for Turkey, the Interbank Money Market rate, code 60 b..zf of the IFS catalogue, for Austria, the New Issue rate -3 Months T-Bills, code 60 c..zf of the IFS catalogue, for New Zealand, Comm. Bill Rate (90 Day Max), code 60 b..zf of the IFS catalogue, for Chile, the Monthly Average rate of 90-D Deposit Certificates, source BRC, for Mexico, the Treasury Bill rate, code 60 b..zf of the IFS catalogue, for Israel, the Overall Cost of Unindexed Credit, code 60 p..zf of the IFS catalogue, for Colombia, the Lending rate, code 60 b..zf of the IFS catalogue.

Nominal Exchange Rate

For all countries, except for the following, the Market rate, code ..rf..zf of the IFS catalogue, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Finland, the Official rate, code ..rf..zf of the IFS catalogue, Chile and Mexico, the Principal rate, code ..rf..zf of the IIFS catalogue.

For any variable x, we construct log(x)-log(hpx). In this measure of deviations from trend we compare each moments observation with the trend, ignoring the position of the variable with respect to the trend in the previous period. With this variable we are measuring the position of the variable with respect to the trend and not the change of the variable from period to period.

	1
Table	
Lanc	1

Country Sample of Inflation Targeters (ITers), Potential Inflation Targeters (PITers), and Non-Inflation Targeters (NITers) during the 1990s

ITers		Potential ITers	Non-ITers
Transition ITers	Stationary ITers		
Chile	Australia	Brazil	Denmark
Israel	Canada	Colombia	France
	Finland	Mexico	Germany
	New Zealand	Korea	Indonesia
	Spain	South Africa	Italy
	Sweden		Japan
	United Kingdom		Netherlands
			Norway
			Portugal
			Switzerland
			United States

	(t-1 ; t +1)	(t-2 ; t +1)	(t-3 ; t +1)	
Australia	0.9	-1.3	-5.4	
Brazil	-3.2	-6.9	-15.8	
Canada	-3.3	-3.5	-2.5	
Colombia	-17.5	-16.0	-17.3	
Chile	-10.6	-1.6	0.8	
Finland	-1.5	-3.0	-5.0	
Israel	-8.1	-6.2	-9.3	
Korea	-3.6	-4.1	-3.7	
Mexico	-8.7	-13.4	-27.2	
New Zealand	-5.8	-4.7	-14.1	
Spain	-1.2	-1.0	-2.4	
Sweden	-0.1	-7.1	-8.3	
South Africa	-1.4	-3.1	-4.8	
United Kingdom	-1.3	-3.9	-7.0	
Average	-4.4	-5.4	-8.7	

Alternative Measures of Initial Disinflation in Inflation Targeting
Countries

Note: Projected inflation was used for South Africa, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico. Source: Authors' calculations based on data from IFS and JP Morgan.

Table 3	5	
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Convergence to Stationary Inflation under Inflation Targeting in 14 Countries: 1989-2000(1)

	Initial Inflation	(Date)	Final Inflation	(Date)	Quarters of Convergence	Inflation Change	Average Inflation per Quarter
ITers							
Australia	1.2	(1993.1)	1.2	(1993.1)	0	0.0	-
Canada	4.9	(1990.4)	1.6	(1992.1)	5	-3.3	-0.7
Chile	29.0	(1990.4)	2.5	(1999.4)	36	-26.5	-0.7
Finland	2.5	(1992.4)	2.0	(1993.3)	3	-0.5	-0.2
Israel	18.5	(1991.4)	1.9	(1999.4)	24	-16.7	-0.7
New Zealand	4.4	(1989.2)	2.8	(1991.2)	8	-1.6	-0.2
Spain	4.7	(1994.3)	1.6	(1997.2)	11	-3.1	-0.3
Sweden	1.8	(1992.4)	1.8	(1992.4)	0	0.0	-
United Kingdom	3.6	(1992.3)	1.8	(1993.1)	2	-1.8	-0.9
Average	7.8		1.9		9.9	-5.9	-0.5
Potential ITers							
Brazil(2)	8.3	(1999.4)	7.9	(2000.1)	1	-0.4	-0.4
Colombia	10.0	(1999.2)	10.6	(2000.2)	4	0.6	0.2
Korea	5.1	(1997.4)	0.7	(1999.1)	5	-2.4	-0.5
Mexico	17.6	(1998.4)	10.6	(2000.1)	5	-7.0	-1.4
South Africa	2.0	(1999.4)	2.0	(1999.4)	0	0.0	-
Average	8.6		6.4		3.0	-1.8	-0.5
Overall Average	8.1		3.5		7.4	-4.4	-0.5

⁽¹⁾Convergence refers to most recent available observation. Stationary inflation for countries that do not explicitly annouce a long - term inflation target is calculated as inflation attained by industrial countries (2-

3%). ⁽²⁾ Initial Inflation is calculated 2 quarters ahead, in order to adjust for the extraordinarily low inflation in 1999:1.

Source: Authors' calculations based on data from IFS, country sources, and Schaechter, et al.

(various subperiods) ⁽¹⁾						
	(Percentage points)		(As a ratio to cu	rrent inflation)		
	Relative	Absolute	Relative	Absolute		
ITers						
Australia	-0.18	1.13	1.25	1.44		
Canada	-0.15	0.20	-0.60	0.67		
Chile	-0.12	0.40	-0.08	0.12		
Finland	-0.69	0.69	-2.12	2.12		
Israel	0.46	1.62	0.02	0.14		
New Zealand	0.06	0.40	-0.08	0.25		
Spain	0.15	0.45	-0.01	0.21		
Sweden	-0.71	0.71	1.05	1.05		
United Kingdom	0.09	0.31	0.00	0.12		
Average	-0.12	0.66	-0.06	0.68		
Potential ITers						
Brazil	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.		
Colombia	-5.23	5.23	-0.54	0.54		
Korea	-2.30	2.30	-0.71	0.71		
Mexico	-0.68	0.68	-0.06	0.06		
South Africa	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.		
Average	-2.74	2.74	-0.44	0.44		
Overall Average	-0.78	1.18	-0.16	0.62		

⁽¹⁾ Relative (absolute) deviation: sum of relative deviations divided by number of periods. Relative (absolute) deviation as a ratio to current inflation: sum of relative (absolute) deviations as ratios to inflation divided by number of periods. Depending on the IT framework. inflation target is defined as a range or as a point. Source: Authors calculations based on data from IFS. country sources. and Schaechter. et al.

Table	4
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Annual Average Deviation of Actual from Target Inflation under Inflation Targeting in 12 Countries: 1989-2000 (various subperiods)⁽¹⁾

Table	5
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Sacrifice Ratios during Inflation Stabilization with Inflation Targeting in 14 Countries: 1980-2000

(based on annual GDP, and quarterly industrial production data, various subperiods)⁽¹⁾

ITers	GDP	Ind. Output	PITers	GDP	Ind. Output
Australia	1.1	3.3	Brazil	-0.2	-0.2
Canada	-2.3	-4.2	Colombia	0.2	1.8
Chile	-0.4	23.3	Korea	0.4	1.7
Finland	2.4	6.2	Mexico	-0.0	-2.7
Israel	0.6	4.6	South Africa	-2.3	-1.5
New Zealand	0.2	-2.1			
Spain	2.5	18.2			
Sweden	0.6	6.6			
United Kingdom	0.9	3.8			
Average	0.6	6.6		-0.4	-0.2

⁽¹⁾ Sacrifice ratios calculated as cumulative GDP variation (to a trend calculated by a Hodrick-Prescott filter) divided by inflation change between 3 years before and 1 year after IT adoption year. Source: Authors 'calculations based on data from IFS and country sources.

Sacrifice Ratios during Inflation Stabilization in 14 IT Countries and 11 Non-IT Countries: 1980(1990)-2000 (based on annual GDP data, various subperiods)⁽¹⁾

ITers		PITers		Non-ITers		
	Before	After	During 19	990s		During 1990s
Australia	-1.41	0.01	Brazil	-0.58	Denmark	0.90
Canada	-6.84	0.64	Colombia	0.00	France	-0.45
Chile	0.37	-0.7	Korea	0.15	Germany	-0.12
Finland	0.03	-4.74	Mexico	-3.06	Indonesia	2.36
Israel	0.17	-0.14	South Africa	-5.69	Italy	0.25
New Zealand	-0.67	0.22			Japan	1.46
Spain	-0.85	0.82			Netherlands	1.47
Sweden	0.08	0.22			Norway	-0.87
United Kingdom	0.75	0.02			Portugal	-0.39
					Switzerland	0.87
					United States	0.78
Average	- 0.22 ⁽²⁾	0.06 ⁽²⁾		-1.84		0.57

⁽¹⁾ Sacrifice ratios calculated as the cumulative GDP variation (to a trend calculated by a Hodrick-Prescott filter) divided by inflation change in any disinflation period. ITers' sacrifice ratios are calculated before (since 1980) and after adopting IT framework. Outlier observations are excluded. ⁽²⁾ Excluding Canada and Finland.

Source: Authors 'calculations based on data from IFS and country sources.

Table (6b
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Sacrifice Ratios during Inflation Stabilization in 14 IT Countries and 11 Non-IT Countries: 1986(1990)-2000 (based on quarterly industrial production data. Various subperiods)⁽¹⁾

ITers			PITers		Non-ITers	
	Before	After		During 1990s		During 1990s
Australia	-1.3	0.1	Brazil	0.0	Denmark	-0.8
Canada	-1.2	1.4	Colombia	-0.1	France	-1.2
Chile	-0.5	-0.6	Korea	-0.4	Germany	3.0
Finland	3.2	-4.5	Mexico	-0.6	Indonesia	-3.3
Israel	3.5	0.0	South Africa	-2.9	Italy	3.7
New Zealand	-0.2	-0.2			Japan	2.8
Spain	1.8	-4.9			Netherlands	3.7
Sweden	0.0	-2.2			Norway	-0.7
United Kingdom	-0.8	0.3			Portugal	-0.1
					Switzerland	2.0
					United States	-0.7
Average	0.5	-1.2		-0.8		0.8

⁽¹⁾ Sacrifice ratios calculated as the cumulative Industrial Production variation (to a trend calculated by a Hodrick-Prescott filter) divided by inflation change in any disinflation period. ITers' sacrifice ratios are calculated before (since 1986) and after adopting IT framework. Outlier observations are excluded. Source: Authors' calculations based on data from IFS and country sources.

Output Volatility in 14 IT Countries and 11 Non – IT Countries: 1980-2000

(based on quarterly industrial production data, various subperiods)⁽¹⁾

ITers			Potential ITe	ers		Non ITers	
	Before	After		Before	After		During 1990s
Australia	2.8	1.2	Brazil	4.8	-	Denmark	2.8
Canada	4.4	2.2	Colombia	4.5	-	France	1.6
Chile	6.2	3.1	Korea	3.6	9.4	Germany	2.4
Finland	3.1	2.5	Mexico	4.0	-	Italy	2.3
Israel	2.9	1.7	South Africa	3.2	-	Japan	3.3
New Zealand	3.4	3.1				Indonesia	1.4
Spain	2.4	1.7				Netherlands	2.2
Sweden	3.1	3.4				Norway	2.8
United Kingdom	2.4	1.3				Portugal	10.8
						Switzerland	2.8
						United States	2.3
Average	3.4	2.2		4.2	9.4		3.2

⁽¹⁾ Volatility calculated as standard deviation of industrial production variation (to a trend calculated by a Hodrick-Prescott filter).

Source: Authors' calculations based on data from IFS and country sources.

Table 8: Estimates of Central Bank Inflation Aversion: Robustness Exercise

		Gammas				Alphas			
	Average of	Cecchetti and	Ranking of	Ranking of	Average of	Cecchetti and	Ranking of	Ranking of	
	Cecchetti and	Ehrmann or	Aggregate	Impulse	Cecchetti and	Ehrmann or	Aggregate	Impulse	
	Ehrmann	Average	Supplies	Responses	Ehrmann	Average	Supplies	Responses	
Inflation Targeters	2.83	3.39	3.83	2.63	0.92	0.89	0.94	0.89	
Australia	2.83	4.65	3.71	2.80	0.88	0.92	0.90	0.88	
Canada	2.83	1.80	2.71	2.72	0.93	0.90	0.93	0.93	
Chile	2.83	0.84	6.00	2.73	0.95	0.85	0.98	0.95	
Finland	2.83	3.76	3.14	1.68	0.94	0.95	0.94	0.90	
Israel	2.83	1.42	4.07	3.23	0.88	0.79	0.92	0.90	
New Zealand	2.83	0.67	3.25	0.60	0.92	0.74	0.93	0.72	
Spain	2.83	1.22	4.59	5.65	0.96	0.90	0.97	0.98	
Sweden	2.83	2.35	3.33	1.91	0.94	0.93	0.95	0.92	
United Kingdom	2.83	13.76	3.70	2.34	0.89	0.97	0.91	0.87	
Potential Targeters	2.83	2.83	2.36	2.36	0.92*	0.92*	0.91*	0.90*	
Brazil	2.83	2.83	0.10	2.46	0.93	0.93	0.35	0.92	
Czech Republic**	2.83	2.83	3.00	3.00	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84	
Colombia	2.83	2.83	3.43	1.19	0.97	0.97	0.98	0.94	
Korea	2.83	2.83	3.40	1.75	0.92	0.92	0.93	0.87	
Mexico	2.83	2.83	1.90	2.70	0.91	0.91	0.88	0.91	
South Africa	2.83	2.83	2.34	3.07	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.98	
Non Targeters	2.83	3.20	2.52	2.54	0.93	0.91	0.92	0.88	
Denmark	2.83	0.70	3.29	2.32	0.94	0.80	0.95	0.93	
Francia	2.83	6.15	2.59	0.10	0.94	0.97	0.93	0.41	
Germany	2.83	5.72	2.57	1.61	0.91	0.95	0.90	0.85	
Indonesia	2.83	2.83	1.04	2.61	0.94	0.94	0.86	0.94	
Italy	2.83	4.89	2.25	2.90	0.94	0.97	0.93	0.95	
Japan	2.83	1.09	3.16	2.38	0.94	0.87	0.95	0.93	
Netherland	2.83	2.03	2.96	6.00	0.91	0.88	0.91	0.95	
Norway	2.83	2.83	3.10	2.73	0.93	0.93	0.94	0.93	
Portugal	2.83	2.83	2.19	2.89	0.95	0.95	0.94	0.95	
Switzerland	2.83	5.08	1.42	2.52	0.92	0.95	0.86	0.91	
United States of America	2.83	1.10	3.12	1.90	0.92	0.83	0.93	0.89	

*Without Brazil in average

**We assume Czech Republic's gamma to be average in all four rankings, alphas based on data from 1993 onwards

Lagged Initation Interest Rules Cap (J) Cap (J) Cap (J) United States of America 0.78** 0.21** 0.03 0.77** United Kingdom 0.87*** 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.77** United Kingdom 0.87*** 0.04 0.07** 0.04 0.07** Denmark 0.97*** 0.01 0.02 0.07*** 0.97** France 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.77** 0.02 0.01 0.97** 0.03 0.01 0.97** 0.03 0.01 0.97** 0.03 0.01 0.97** 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.77* 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.77* 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.77* 0.03 0.01 0.05* 0.05 0.7* 0.03 0.01 0.05* 0.7* 0.04 0.10* 0.14* 0.7* 0.14 0.7* 0.14 0.7* 0.14 0.7* 0.14 0.7* 0.14* 0.14* 0.14* 0.14* 0	Targeters and	l Non-Targete	ers (1990.1		
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
Table 9: Estimation Results of Simple Taylor Rules for Inflation Targeters and Non-Targeters (1990.1 - 1999.4)

(1) As deviations from an HP1600 trend

(1) As deviations from an In 1000 trend
 (2) Anualized deviations from inflation target or an HP1600 trend
 Note: standard errors are noted in parenthesis. Coefficient with one (two) asteriscs denote significance level 10% (5%).







⁽¹⁾ Inflation attained one quarter before adopting IT. Source: Authors calculations based on data from IFS, country sources, and Schaechter et al.

Figure 2a

Average Quadratic Errors of Inflation Deviation Forecasts for Inflation Targeting and Non-Targeting Countries (obtained from out of sample forecasts of a rolling VAR and divided by the level of trend inflation): 1980-1999, quarterly data




Figure 2b

Average Quadratic Errors of Inflation Deviation Forecasts for Inflation Targeting and Non Targeting Countries (obtained from out of sample forecasts of a recursive VAR and divided by the level of trend inflation): 1980-1999, quarterly data




Figure 3a Average Quadratic Errors of Inflation Deviation Forecasts for Inflation Targeting and Non Targeting Countries (obtained from out of sample forecasts of a Rolling VAR with errors filtered for remaining structure and divided by the level of trend inflation): 1980-1999, quarterly data




Figure 3b Average Quadratic Errors of Inflation Deviation Forecasts for Inflation Targeting and Non Targeting Countries (obtained from out of sample forecasts of a Recursive VAR with errors filtered for remaining structure and divided by the level of trend inflation): 1980-1999, quarterly data




Figure 4a Dynamic Variance Decomposition for Inflation and Output Gaps, Full Country Sample (obtained from out-of-sample forecasts of a Rolling VAR): 1990-1998, quarterly data




Figure 4b

Dynamic Variance Decomposition for Inflation and Output Gaps, Industrial-Country Sample (obtained from out-of-sample forecasts of a Rolling VAR): 1990-1998, quarterly data






Figure 5 Dynamic Inflation Aversion, Coefficients of OECD Inflation Targeters (ITERS_OECD), Israel and Chile (ITERS_ISCH), Potential Targeters (PITERS) and Non-Targeters (NTERS)








Figure 7a Rolling Taylor Rule Coefficients for Industrial ITers plus Chile and Israel and Industrial NITers (Taylor Rule Estimated with Contemporary Inflation and Activity as Independent Variables)





Figure 7b Rolling Taylor Rule Coefficients for Industrial ITers and Industrial NITers (Taylor Rule Estimated with Contemporary Inflation and Activity as Independent Variables)





Discussion

Zbigniew Polanski

Warsaw School of Economics (Chair of Monetary Policy) and National Bank of Poland (Research Department).¹

Inflation targeting (IT) is one of the most fashionable subjects in the area of monetary theory and monetary practice of the moment. V. Corbo, O. Landerretche Moreno and K. Schmidt-Hebbel in the paper "Assessing Inflation Targeting After a Decade of World Experience" attempt to evaluate the impact of IT strategies in the 1990s. Although I share the view that IT policies are advisable, let me have some reservation to the analysis performed and to the generalizations presented in the paper.

The first of my objections stems from the fact that the authors do not provide an IT definition. The paper only mentions "public announcement of inflation targets" as a feature of IT strategies. This, however, cannot be the only attribute defining IT: central banks may announce inflation targets without pursuing IT strategies (as it was the case of the National Bank of Poland in the 1990-97 period). A well known IT definition suggests that what is relevant, is the announcement of a **medium-term** numerical inflation $target^2$ (from this perspective, thus, it is evident that the NBP did not follow an IT strategy in the aforementioned period). IT definitions usually also add other conditions which should be fulfilled, so that it can be said that monetary authorities operate under an IT framework, e.g. an institutional commitment to price stability, an information strategy in which many variables are used for deciding the setting of policy instruments, and increased transparency and accountability.³ On the instrument side it is also

The opinions expressed are not necessarily those of the NBP.

 ² See Mishkin (1999, p. 591).
 ³ Mishkin (1999, p. 591).

stressed that "IT necessarily requires nominal exchange rate flexibility."⁴ Therefore, IT is a monetary policy framework that, at least at the conceptual level, is clearly and precisely defined.⁵

Having said that, and having in mind the approach to IT followed by the authors of the paper under discussion, two questions can be raised: (1) are (or were) central banks not operating under an IT framework really not targeting inflation?, and (2) were all central banks officially following IT only targeting inflation?

As concerns the first question, one can once again recall the example of the NBP. From 1990 until 1997 it focused explicitly on inflation reduction, while officially implemented monetary targeting. A much more prominent example of a central bank classified by the authors as a non-IT institution is the Bundesbank, whose activity, according to other researchers was "better characterized as an inflation targeter than as a money targeter,"⁶ although it did not publish explicit inflation targets. Therefore, taking into account only these two cases, one can conclude that the announcement of inflation targets cannot be considered as the only defining feature of the IT framework.

As concerns the second question, two issues must be raised. The first has to deal with the exchange rate regime, which was in place when some central banks were supposedly implementing IT. Obviously, if we take seriously the above quoted statement, that only a flexible exchange rate is compatible with the IT framework, then one must conclude that neither Israel before June 1997 nor Chile before September 1999 were really IT countries.⁷

The absence of a precise IT definition, and the particular circumstances under which IT was implemented (among them the length of the time period involved) also cast doubts about classifying Finland and Spain as "stationary ITers" during the whole 1990s. All these remarks, although obviously not exhaustive, point out to an important conclusion: The deficiencies of the IT definition led to a mechanical classification of countries as IT countries, potential IT countries and non-IT countries. A more careful approach to countries' experience with their monetary policy strategies could have led to a different selection of countries, their different splitting and, probably, to different conclusions.

⁴ Mishkin (2000, p. 6).

⁵ A thorough discussion on IT concept can be found in Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen (1999, in particular in part 1 and chp. 11).

 $^{^{6}}$ Bernanke and Mihov (1996, p. 32).

⁷ On these (and other) countries' IT experience see Schaechter, Stone and Zelmer (2000).

This, however, has been merely a technical objection. My second critical remark deals with the general approach applied. Namely, the authors tend to forget that monetary policy is just one component of economic policy and IT should be seen in such a wider context. As a result, in their econometric studies V. Corbo et al. put too much emphasis on central bank strategies as explanatory variables. Poland's recent experience in implementing the IT is a case in point here.

Broadly speaking, monetary policy followed in Poland since the beginning of the 1990s can be divided into two basic periods. The first encompasses the years 1990-97; the second has started in 1998 and lasts until now.

As already mentioned, during the 1990-97 period NBP officially implemented monetary targeting. In practice, however, it followed an "eclectic" approach since the implementation of monetary policy took place in an environment of a fixed exchange rate (although evolving from a "truly fixed" exchange rate to a pre-announced crawling band system). What is more, the NBP announced quantitative inflation targets, which might have suggested that some elements of IT framework were involved.⁸ (These targets were set in the state budget by the Ministry of Finance.) The NBP faced, thus, a dual target system (inflation, money supply) while operating in the environment of non-floating exchange rates. Besides the Bank financed central budget deficits.

⁸ Additionally, in 1995 the NBP presented its first *Inflation Report*, which was initially published on semi-annual basis.

		Inflation ^a			Money supply	
Year	Target (%)	Actual (%)	Difference (p.p.)	Target (bn PLN)	Actual (bn PLN)	Difference (%)
1990	95.0	249.3	+154.3	4.1	10.3	+151.2
1991	32.0	60.4	+28.4	8.5	9.0	+5.9
1992	36.9	44.3	+7.4	12.7	15.0	+18.1
1993	32.2	37.6	+5.4	15.0	14.8	-1.3
1994	23.0	29.5	+6.5	15.5-16.9	21.4	+26.6
1995	17.0	21.6	+4.6	17.1	26.9	+57.3
1996	17.0	18.5	+1.5	23.0	30.5	+32.6
1997	13.0	13.2	+0.2	27.4-28.6	39.8	+39.2

Table 1. Inflation and money supply targets in Poland, 1990-97

^a Consumer Price Index. December to December.

Source: National Bank of Poland and Central Statistical Office.

Table 2. Inflation targets and	money supply developments	in Poland, 1998-2001

		Inflation ^a			Money supply ^b	
Year	Target	Actual	Difference	Reference value	Actual	Difference
	(%)	(%)	(p.p.)	(bn PLN)	(bn PLN)	(%)
1998	9.5	8.6	-0.9	28.2-35.3	44.1	+24.9
1999	6.6-7.8 ^c	9.8	+2.0	34.0-41.0	42.7	+4.1
2000	5.4-6.8	8.5	+1.7	38.8-47.9	31.0	-20.1
2001	6.0-8.0			40.0-46.0		

^a Consumer Price Index. December to December.

^b Since 1999 r. money supply increases are considered as reference values.

^c Initially set at 8.0-8.5%.

Source: As in Table 1.

Table 1 confirms that under such constraints the efficiency of monetary policy (as measured by targets' performance) had to be limited. However, let us note that actual inflation dropped uninterruptedly and that deviations of actual inflation from targeted inflation were consistently reduced. This was actually not the case with the money supply targets as they were usually largely overshot and the deviations did not follow any regular pattern. Such money supply developments essentially resulted from two factors. In the first half of the 1990s mainly from substantial fiscal deficits (in 1992 their size was of over 5% of GDP), which were mostly financed by the Central Bank. During 1995-97 period money supply expansion was mostly driven by large capital inflows.⁹ However, since inflation was declining in a consistent way, by 1997 the NBP had much more anti-inflation credibility than it had had at the beginning of the decade.

In 1997 and in 1998 important institutional developments concerning Polish monetary policy took place. A new Constitution of the Republic of Poland followed by a new Act on the NBP was passed in 1997, and became effective in 1998. The Bank has been given high degree of independence and a clear anti-inflationary mandate (among others the Constitution has forbidden the government to finance its deficits by any credit obligations to the NBP). A new decision-making body was created, the Monetary Policy Council (MPC), which decided by mid-1998 that the NBP should embrace an inflation targeting framework. In September of that year the MPC announced The Medium-Term Strategy of Monetary Policy (1999-2003), which outlined the strategy to be followed, setting the medium-term inflation target at below 4% for the year 2003. Under the new legal framework the Bank sets inflation numerical targets; the annual targets are presented to the Parliament, the Government and the general public in the yearly monetary policy guidelines. The Strategy assigned money supply changes the role of a reference value and made it clear that Poland is to introduce gradually a free floating exchange rate regime. The latter has become officially effective since 12 April 2000, although the last NBP direct interventions on the forex market took place in July 1998, i.e. just before the Russian crisis. Thus, in short, since 1999 (1998 can be treated as an interim year) NBP has basically conducted a full-fledged IT strategy, a major exception being that of not publishing quantitative inflation forecasts in the course of the year (as it is the case, for instance, with the Bank of England).

Table 2 shows that Poland's 1999-2000 experience with IT is a bit problematic. Not only inflation targets were missed by larger amounts than in the previous three years, but -

⁹ A more exhaustive description of Polish monetary policy in the 1990-97 period can be found in Polanski (1998a, 1998b, 2000).

what is more important - inflation began to accelerate again, reaching 11.6% (year-over-year CPI) in July 2000. What happened?

There were several factors behind this inflation resurgence, one of them being the familiar, at that time, external shocks problem (fuel price increases in the international markets). However, what is crucial in the revival of Polish inflation is the role played by domestic factors. On the one hand, in 1999 the Government (in order to limit the negative effects of the Russian crisis on Poland's farming sector) introduced protective measures, which resulted in food prices increases. On the other hand, the same year, the government started four important public sector reforms (in particular, pension system and health care sector reforms). They proved to be more expensive than initially envisaged, leading to considerable fiscal tensions. These tensions were translated into higher inflation in two ways. First, they resulted in indirect and excise tax increases. Second, fiscal imbalances unexpectedly increased: while in 1998 the fiscal deficit relative to GDP was of 2.6%, in 1999 and in 2000 they were of 3.2%. These deficits also contributed to aggravate the balance of payments current account problem: in the first quarter of 2000 Poland's current account gap exceeded 8% of GDP. Furthermore, against this background, it must be added that restructuring of some other sectors of the economy slowed down in the second half of the 1990s. This has been particularly true with respect to the energy sector and the labor market. As a result, the former, due to its monopolistic structure, was able to influence negatively price developments. The latter, due to its rigidities (resulting from strong employment protection, wage indexation and the structure of the minimum wage) stimulated additional demand in the economy.

How did the NBP react to the inflation revival (and the current account problem)? In several moves dating from the fall of 1999 to the summer of 2000 it increased Central Bank interest rates by 6 percentage points. Consequently, in the last quarter of 2000 and in the first months of 2001 real retail interest rates exceeded 10% while the Zloty showed a strong tendency for appreciation. The Monetary Condition Index reached its highest level since it has been computed by the NBP (1993).

These Central Bank decisions have led to expected results: inflation declined (in March 2001 it was 6.2%) and the current account deficit dropped (to less than 6% of GDP in the first quarter of 2001). The negative side effect of this policy was a substantial slowdown in economic activity (from a 6% real GDP expansion during the first half of 2000 to less than 2.5% in the last quarter of 2000 and in the first quarter of 2001). It was followed by a considerable increase in the unemployment rate (by mid-2000 it was 13.6%, in March 2001 it

reached 15.9%). These developments seem to suggest that structural factors, such as the rigid labor market and underdeveloped market mechanisms, create a situation in which monetary authorities are forced to adopt extremely tough measures to lower inflation at the expense of considerable social cost.

Without the IT framework (and the underlying high Central Bank's independence) such far-reaching tightening of monetary policy would not have been possible. Obviously, the NBP inflation aversion increased considerably as a result of IT adoption, confirming V. Corbo and his co-authors' insight in this matter. Polish experience, however, also points out to an important limitation of their research.

NBP's 1999-2000 experience clearly shows that a central bank cannot be, at least in the short and medium run, the only responsible for inflation control. In order to lower inflation successfully other components of economic policy, in particular fiscal policy, must be properly coordinated with the anti-inflationary stance of monetary policy. In the case of emerging and transition countries macroeconomic actions must be supplemented by marketoriented structural policies, leading to an increase in the responsiveness of economic agents to changes in macroeconomic policy. Poland's experience strongly suggests that when fiscal restraint and adequate structural policies do not support monetary policy actions, achieving inflation targets becomes difficult and very costly. In other words: For a success of an IT strategy other components of the public policy must be focusing on economic stability as well.

In the concluding section of the paper V. Corbo, O. Landerretche Moreno and K. Schmidt-Hebbel state that "Ters have been very successful in meeting their targets" and that macroeconomic behavior of IT countries converged "to the patterns observed among non-targeting industrial countries." Let us notice, however, that Chile, Israel and New Zealand passed through deep, structural, market-oriented reforms in the 1990s and their fiscal deficits were substantially reduced. To some extent similar developments took place in the European Union countries which implemented IT (Finland, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom). These countries were subject to the Maastricht Treaty (1991) provisions, which exerted crucial influence on their economic policies in the second half of the 1990s. Thus, monetary policies were part of wider stability-oriented policies aiming also at some structural changes. Of course, the most important was the support given to monetary policies by tightened fiscal policies. However, our point is a more general one: the success of IT policies, among them the increase in the responsiveness of the economy to monetary policy actions, should not be only

analyzed through the conventional "policy mix" lens, but must also consider structural changes taking place.¹⁰

Summing up: Further research on IT performance should be broadened to encompass factors influencing its efficiency. This should allow for a deeper interpretation of the relative merits of different components of economic policies and for an assessment of the true impact of IT on the economy.

¹⁰ Slightly different, although eventually similar, developments have probably taken place in Australia and Canada. In these two countries IT policies were elements of general policies aiming at locking inflation at low levels. In this case IT, together with central bank independence, created an additional constraint on inflation revival. Let us also pay attention to the countries labeled by the authors as "Potential ITers" (Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Korea, South Africa) which were not as successful in IT implementation as the IT countries. This can be, at least partly, explained by the fact that their fiscal and structural policies have not been as consequent as in the successful IT countries.

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1) vergriffen (out of print)

²⁾ In abgeänderter Form erschienen in Berichte und Studien Nr. 4/1990, S 74 ff

³⁾ In abgeänderter Form erschienen in Berichte und Studien Nr. 4/1991, S 44 ff

⁴⁾ In abgeänderter Form erschienen in Berichte und Studien Nr. 3/1991, S 39 ff

⁵⁾ In abgeänderter Form erschienen in Berichte und Studien Nr. 1/1992, S 54 ff

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