

Lefoll, Erwin; Günther, Isabel; Veronesi, Marcella

Conference Paper

Low Demand for Fair Trade Chocolate: Lack of Efficiency, Attention, Knowledge or Trust?

Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2022: Big Data in Economics

Provided in Cooperation with:

Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Suggested Citation: Lefoll, Erwin; Günther, Isabel; Veronesi, Marcella (2022) : Low Demand for Fair Trade Chocolate: Lack of Efficiency, Attention, Knowledge or Trust?, Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2022: Big Data in Economics, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, Kiel, Hamburg

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/264065>

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Terms of use:

Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.

1 Introduction

This study investigates the drivers of consumers' demand for fair trade products by conducting an incentivised survey experiment on fair trade chocolate in Switzerland. Primary commodities are the lifeblood of many sub-Saharan African economies (UNDP, 2016) and constitute the primary source of income for a large share of their populations. A major challenge is that producers are engaged in rent-poor activities within the global value chain and can only reap a small fraction of the price of the final product. Cocoa is no exception, where farmers earn only about 6.6% of the final purchasing price (Fountain & Hütz-Adams, 2015). As a result, precarious living conditions are a paramount issue for farmers, and an estimated 2.1 million children still work on cocoa fields in Ivory Coast and Ghana alone (Fountain & Hütz-Adams, 2018). In addition to poor social impacts, the production of cocoa has been linked to widespread deforestation in West Africa (Kroeger et al., 2017).

Agricultural commodity production in low and middle-income countries is increasingly covered by voluntary standards, aiming to make agricultural trade more profitable for producers, more sustainable for the environment, and more transparent for the consumer. Among them, "Fairtrade International" (hereafter Fairtrade) is perhaps the most well-known fair trade label and one of the most prominent certification schemes with 1.7 million farmers linked to Fairtrade certification in 2018 (Fairtrade International, 2019).¹ However, despite a higher price paid to farmers for Fairtrade certified production and an increase in revenues (DeFries et al., 2017; Meemken, 2020; Oya et al., 2018), including for cocoa (e.g., Sellare et al., 2020), certified farmers did not, on average, benefit more than non-certified farmers from higher household net income (DeFries et al., 2017; Oya et al., 2018).

One of the reasons is that, despite increased awareness of consumers about production conditions in the producing countries, worldwide demand for fair trade products remains low. For instance, Switzerland is the country with the highest per capita consumption of certified goods globally and where 92% of all ethically certified products sold are certified Fairtrade. However, consumers only spend 7.83 CHF per person a month on Fairtrade products (Max Havelaar Foundation, 2020a), which amounts to 2.67% of all food consumption (FSO, 2020). Moreover, only 7% of the chocolate consumed is Fairtrade (Max Havelaar Foundation, 2020b). One conse-

¹The terms "ethically certified," "fairly traded," and "fair trade" are used interchangeably throughout the paper. They should not be confused with Fairtrade, which is a particular certification scheme. A good can be produced under fair trade conditions but not necessarily be certified by Fairtrade.

quence of such low demand is that less than half of the global cocoa production under Fairtrade standards can be sold on international Fairtrade markets (Fairtrade International, 2019). This means that farmers can only sell a fraction of their output to certified channels, whereas the cost of certification applies to their entire production process.

The scientific literature on the demand for ethically certified products has mainly focused on measuring the extent to which consumers value such products. The existing literature shows that consumers are willing to pay a sizeable price premium for ethically certified products using both stated and revealed preference methods.² Why, then, is aggregate demand for fair trade products still low? Little research has been directed towards answering this question. We test four hypotheses previously underinvestigated by the literature. First, consumers may opt for the more efficient channel by transferring the premium directly to farmers in producers' countries. Second, consumers may lack the necessary attention to purchase ethically certified products. This lack of attention may, in turn, be linked to the labels' lack of salience compared to other attributes. Third, consumers may lack knowledge on fair trade labels. They may not be familiar with fair trade labels, they may not understand what they stand for, or may not know about the production conditions of cocoa farmers. Fourth, consumers may not trust fair trade labels.

We report new empirical evidence on consumers' demand for fair trade chocolate from an online incentivised survey experiment in Switzerland where participants are randomly allocated to different treatments. We find that a lack of salience and attention during the purchasing process mainly explains low consumer demand despite participants being willing to pay a considerable price premium for fair trade chocolate. A lack of efficiency does not seem to play a role. Participants are significantly less likely to donate to an NGO supporting farmers' incomes in developing countries than pay for fair trade chocolate. A lack of familiarity or understanding about what fair trade labels stand for, a lack of knowledge about the production conditions of farmers, or a lack of trust also do not seem to explain low demand. Our results are consistent with a model of consumer choice by Bordalo et al. (2013), whereby choices are influenced by the most salient attributes, which might differ from context to context and consumers' reference points (Hu et al., 2006). Our results are highly robust to the inclusion of a rich array of

²See, for instance, Andorfer & Liebe (2012); Hainmueller & Hiscox (2015); Hainmueller et al. (2015); Hiscox & Smyth (2011); Hiscox et al. (2011); Hiscox et al. (2011); Loureiro & Lotade (2005); Rousseau (2015); Rousu & Corrigan (2008); Tagbata & Sirieix (2008); Tully & Winer (2014); Vlaeminck & Vranken (2015). Most of the literature has focused on coffee, one of the best-known and most widely available ethically certified products. Although few studies have explored consumers' willingness to pay for ethically certified chocolate, these have also found a positive price premium ranging from €0.08/100g to €2.03/100g (Rousseau, 2015; Rousu & Corrigan, 2008; Tagbata & Sirieix, 2008; Vlaeminck & Vranken, 2015).

socio-demographic covariates and different functional forms.

This study makes five main contributions. First, our paper contributes to the growing literature on the economics of fair trade (Dragusanu et al., 2014). Second, it has implications for the extensive literature on inattention (e.g., Castilla & Haab, 2013; Gabaix, 2019; Handel & Schwartzstein, 2018). Third, to our knowledge, it is one of the few studies that attempts to analyse the root behavioural causes of low demand for ethically certified products. In doing so, our paper helps elucidate the results of previous studies in the literature by highlighting a potential main mechanism, i.e., lack of salience and inattention.³ Fourth, this study is the first one to test predominant hypotheses of low demand for fair trade products in one experiment, with one consistent method across hypotheses. Fifth, from a public policy perspective, this study contributes to the development of more sustainable supply chains by guiding organisations on behavioural factors affecting the demand for fair trade chocolate, in particular in Switzerland, where chocolate is perhaps the most iconic Swiss export and where the global turnover of the chocolate industry amounts to 1.8 billion CHF in sales annually (Chocosuisse, 2020).

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature that has motivated the hypotheses tested in this experiment. Section 3 explains the experimental design and data. Section 4 lays out the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the results, and section 6 concludes.

2 What Drives the Demand for Fair Trade Products? Literature Review and Research Hypotheses

Many studies have shown that consumers are willing to pay a price premium for products and chocolate with an ethical label (see Table A1 in Appendix A for a detailed overview).⁴ Among the few studies with chocolate as a study object, Rousu & Corrigan (2008) conducted an auction in a grocery store in Pennsylvania (US) and found that consumers are, on average, willing to pay a premium of €0.08/100g for ethically certified chocolate. In another study, Tagbata & Sirieix (2008) used an experimental method in the commune of Montpellier (France) and found a premium of €0.59/100g. Two recent papers, which exploited stated choice experiments

³We do not exclude the existence of other channels for ethical purchasing behaviour (e.g., social and self-image concerns). In this study, we focus on those that the literature has underinvestigated.

⁴See, for instance, Andorfer & Liebe (2012); Hainmueller & Hiscox (2015); Hainmueller et al. (2015); Hiscox & Smyth (2011); Hiscox et al. (2011); Hiscox et al. (2011); Loureiro & Lotade (2005); Rousseau (2015); Rousu & Corrigan (2008); Tagbata & Sirieix (2008); Tully & Winer (2014); Vlaeminck & Vranken (2015).

in a natural consumer environment in Belgium, found a price premium of €2.03/100g and €0.84/100g, respectively (Rousseau, 2015; Vlaeminck & Vranken, 2015). Yet, there is limited empirical evidence on why the consumption of ethically certified products—and chocolate in particular—remains low (Vlaeminck et al., 2016).

Recent studies have shown that social and self-image concerns alter the purchase of fair trade products. Participants' willingness to pay a premium for fair trade is higher when their decisions are made public (Friedrichsen & Engelmann, 2018; Teyssier et al., 2015) and participants revise this premium upward when their expectations about the premium of others increase and vice-versa (Teyssier et al., 2015). In this study, we test in a single experiment four different hypotheses previously underexplored by the literature:

Hypothesis 1 (H1): *lack of efficiency*

Consumers may opt for the more efficient channel by directly donating money to farmers, instead of buying products with higher prices paid to the producers.⁵ The premiums paid in stores on fair trade chocolate stem not only from higher prices paid to the producer but also from the certification costs and higher tracking costs compared to conventional products. As a result, fair trade labels and the Fairtrade certification may be a less efficient way to transfer income to farmers (Podhorsky, 2015). Hence, consumers may wish to express their ethical concerns more efficiently by buying conventional products and donating to relevant organisations. To our knowledge, only one study to date has analysed this hypothesis. Koppel & Schulze (2013) conducted a natural field experiment in cafés at German Universities where subjects were offered different choices related to coffee purchases. They find that the demand for fair trade coffee was higher than conventional coffee coupled with a donation.

Hypothesis 2 (H2): *lack of salience and attention*

Consumers' attention may not be drawn to fair trade products because of the labels' lack of salience compared to other attributes. As described by Taylor & Thompson (1982) "*salience refers to the phenomenon that when one's attention is differentially directed to one portion on the environment rather than to others, the information contained in that portion will receive disproportionate weighing in subsequent judgments*" (p. 175). The production conditions of

⁵They might also prefer a direct donation because they could derive a higher utility from donating the premium directly to farmers rather than paying the premium for a certified product.

farmers in low-income countries are only one of the many attributes consumers take into account when choosing to purchase fair trade products, and consumers attach a disproportionately high weight to attributes that particularly stand out in the choice context (Bordalo et al., 2013). Shoppers use heuristics to make a simplified decision without taking into account all of the attributes of products in-store settings, where a plethora of products are displayed on shelves and where packages contain a variety of different information (Grunert, 2011; Verbeke, 2008). In this respect, visual attention is essential in the consumer decision-making process (Solomon et al., 2012; Van Loo et al., 2015) and consumers may be distracted by other visual features of packaging than just the labels (Graham et al., 2012).

Hypothesis 3 (H3): *lack of knowledge*

A lack of knowledge might lead consumers to choose conventional chocolate and ignore the source of the cacao of the chocolate they consume (e.g., McEachern & McClean, 2002). First, lack of knowledge refers to a lack of familiarity. Consumers may not be familiar with fair trade labels, and thus may not be able to recognise them. Second, even if consumers recognise the label, they may not understand what the label stands for. In the presence of perfect information, the preferences for the label characteristics equal the label's intrinsic value (De Boer et al., 2007). In this case, a label implicitly provides all the information such that consumers have a clear definition of the good they are purchasing. A welfare loss occurs when the label does not adequately communicate what it represents to consumers (Rousu & Corrigan, 2008). Third, consumers may simply not know about the low production conditions of cocoa farmers.

Hypothesis 4 (H4): *lack of trust*

Consumers may not trust ethical labels even if they know what they stand for (e.g., Rousseau, 2015). One of the main challenges of socially responsible characteristics in food is that they are credence attributes, i.e., they are neither directly observable by consumers before purchase, nor can they be experienced after purchase (Darby & Karni, 1973). As a result, information asymmetries lead to uncertainty and problems of trust. For example, Andorfer & Liebe (2015); De Pelsmacker & Janssens (2007); Wang & Chen (2019) show, in natural field experiments and consumer surveys, that a consumer's decision to purchase ethically labelled products is related to their trust in those labels.

3 Experimental Design

3.1 Sample Description

In our study, we implemented an online incentivised survey experiment with a representative sample of the Swiss-German (German-speaking) adult population in October 2018. Participants were randomly selected from the panel of the institute for opinion research LINK.⁶ The topic of the study was not disclosed in the invitation to avoid sample selection bias due to participants with interest in chocolate or fair trade products. The final sample includes 1,840 participants (see Figure C1 in Appendix C for respondent repartition by area of residence). The survey experiment was conducted in German, took about 20 minutes on average, and participants received a flat rate of 2 CHF for their participation.

Table B1 in Appendix B compares our sample to the nationally-representative sample of the adult population using the statistics published by the Federal Statistical Office of Switzerland (FSO, 2021). We generate the nationally-representative sample means by computing cantonal arithmetic mean weighted by the proportion of German-speaking permanent residents in each canton, where a canton represents a district in Switzerland. About half of the respondents are female (51%), and the average age is about 50, which is in line with the official statistics. The majority of participants are married (51%) or single (31%) and economically active (65%) as the nationally-representative sample. On the other hand, slightly more respondents in our sample are divorced (+2.9 percentage points), fewer are economically inactive (-2.16 percentage points), and self-reported household income is lower than the national median income. Since the national averages for education are given for individuals 25 and older, we also restricted our sample to this age group when comparing average educational attainment. Slightly more have completed secondary education (+3.47 percentage points) in our sample. However, the percentage of respondents with tertiary education is similar to the national statistics (36%).

3.2 Research Design

Figure 1 shows the research design. In a first step, all participants were asked general socio-demographic questions (e.g., age, annual income, geographical area of residence). In a second step, we conducted a between-subject incentivised experiment in which participants were ran-

⁶The LINK Internet panel is the largest and highest quality online panel in Switzerland. Panel members are representative of the Swiss population between 18 and 79 years of age that uses the internet at least once a week for private purposes (LINK Institut, 2020).

domly assigned to two control groups and eight treatment groups (about 185 participants per group) for which they received 2–4 CHF (in addition to the usual 2 CHF flat-rate for participation given by LINK to participants) that they could either spend on chocolate or (partly) keep as described in more detail below. In a third step, participants were asked questions about their chocolate consumption as well as their knowledge and behaviour related to fairly traded products in general and Fairtrade Max Havelaar products specifically, which is by far the largest fair trade label in Switzerland.




Figure 1: Structure of the survey experiment

Table 1 provides an overview of the treatments and the hypothesis tested in each treatment. Control group 1 (C1) corresponds to the control group of treatments 1, 2, and 3 (T1, T2, and T3), while control group 2 (C2) corresponds to the control group of treatments 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 (T4, T5, T6, T7, and T8). For each treatment, respondents were asked to choose between two options: option A always contained 100g of conventional milk chocolate, whereas

option B always contained 100g of fair trade milk chocolate, except in treatment 1, where option B included 100g of conventional milk chocolate paired with a donation to poor farmers. If participants chose option A, they could retain up to 3 CHF depending on the treatment, whereas they could not retain any money if they chose option B. Before making their choice, respondents were informed that at the end of the survey, they would have received an electronic voucher with a bar code (see Figure C2 in Appendix C) from LINK via email for the chocolate they chose. Participants could trade in the voucher for a chocolate bar at any store of the Swiss food retail chain Coop between October and November 2018.⁷ For more information about all treatments, Appendix C contains the original description and choice tasks given to respondents in each treatment (translated from German to English).⁸

In control group 1 (C1), respondents are asked—in text format—to either spend 1 CHF on conventional chocolate and keep 1 CHF or spend 2 CHF on fair trade chocolate. In treatment 1 (T1), respondents are asked to either spend 1 CHF on conventional chocolate and keep 1 CHF or spend 1 CHF on conventional chocolate and donate the remaining 1 CHF to a Swiss NGO dedicated to improving the living conditions of poor farmers. The comparison between control group 1 and treatment 1 allows testing the first hypothesis of lack of efficiency (H1).

In treatment 2 (T2), participants face the same choice as control group 1; however, they are shown a picture of a conventional chocolate bar and a Fairtrade certified chocolate bar. The goal is to mimic the choice of control group 1 in picture format instead of text format. Comparing control group 1 and treatment 2 allows testing the second hypothesis (H2) of lack of salience and attention. In treatment 3 (T3), participants are shown a picture of a popular branded chocolate bar (Lindt), and an identically priced Fairtrade certified chocolate bar and asked to choose between them. This treatment also tests the second hypothesis by measuring whether consumers pay attention to various attributes. Note that in these treatments, we are able to keep social and self-image concerns constant since neither the setting of the chocolate choice nor the expectations about the premium of others are altered.

Nevertheless, a change in demand for fair trade chocolate in both treatments could also be driven by a lack of knowledge or trust in fair trade chocolate. We test for this by investigating heterogeneous treatment effects of consumers who (i) state they are very familiar with the Fairtrade Max Havelaar label and (ii) who state they trust fair trade chocolate. As we discussed

⁷Coop offers the densest network of sales outlets in Switzerland (Coop, 2021b).

⁸The original survey in German is available from the authors upon request.

in Section 2, knowledge can refer to familiarity with the label or knowledge on how the label works or about the production conditions of farmers. Here, since chocolate choices are given visually in treatments 2 and 3, knowledge refers to visual familiarity with the Fairtrade label. Later in the paper, we will also focus on the other meanings of knowledge. If the second hypothesis about a lack of salience and attention is supported, we expect respondents' consumption to significantly decrease when the choice is presented in picture format (treatments 2 and 3) compared to text (control group 1). Note again that in control group 1, we only refer to fair trade chocolate (and not to a specific label as in treatments 2 or 3). On the contrary, if results are driven by a lack of knowledge (hypothesis 3) or trust (hypothesis 4), we would expect the coefficients of familiarity or trust to be positive and significant when the choice is given in text while the interaction terms with treatments 2 and 3 (visual choice) to be small and insignificant.

In control group 2 (C2), respondents faced the same choice as in control group 1 (C1), but the price of fair trade chocolate was three times higher than the price for conventional chocolate to test respondents' price sensitivity. Participants in the remaining treatments 4-8 faced the same choice as control group 2, but they also randomly received one of the following five pieces of information:

- Treatment 4 (T4) - Child labor information: description of poor working conditions of children working on West African cocoa plantations.
- Treatment 5 (T5) - Environmental information: description of negative effects of detected pesticide residues in cocoa beans on the health of cocoa farmers and on the environment in West Africa.
- Treatment 6 (T6) - Poverty information: smallholders working on the cocoa fields in West Africa live under widespread extreme poverty.
- Treatment 7 (T7) - Fairtrade information: Fairtrade certification's minimum price, premium, and standards.
- Treatment 8 (T8) - Negative information: the living conditions of farmers who produce Fairtrade certified cocoa are hardly better than the living conditions of other smallholder farmers.

Table 1: Treatments and choice tasks

Treatment number	N	Option	Choice task	Money to keep (CHF)	Hypotheses tested
C1	188	A	1 conventional chocolate (1 CHF) and keep 1 CHF	1	
		B	1 fair trade chocolate (2 CHF)	0	
T1	184	A	1 conventional chocolate (1 CHF) and keep 1 CHF	1	H1
		B	1 conventional chocolate (1 CHF) and donate 1 CHF to Swiss NGO improving living conditions of poor farmers	0	
This chocolate (1 CHF) and keep 1 CHF:					
T2	187	A		1	H2-H4
		This chocolate (2 CHF):			
		B		0	
		This chocolate (2 CHF):			
T3	185	A		0	H2-H4
		This chocolate (2 CHF):			
		B		0	
C2	No information	180			
T4	Child labour	182	A	1 conventional chocolate (0.60 CHF) and keep 3 CHF	H3
T5	Environment	183			H3
T6	Poverty	183			H3
T7	Fairtrade information	183	B	1 fair trade chocolate (1.80 CHF)	H3
T8	Negative information	185			H3
		1,840			

Notes: C1 corresponds to the control group of treatments 1, 2 and 3 (T1, T2, and T3), while C2 corresponds to the control group of treatments 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 (T4, T5, T6, T7, and T8). Option B always represents the ethical option (fair trade chocolate), except in T1, where option B represents conventional chocolate plus a donation. The fair trade chocolate is not related to a specific label except in T2 and T3, where it corresponds to a Fairtrade labelled chocolate. H1, H2, H3 and H4 represent hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 4 described in section 2. N represents the number of observations.

Comparing control group 2 with the information treatments on child labour (T4), the environment (T5), and poverty (T6) allows us to determine whether respondents are sensitive to information about problems related to cocoa production. In the same vein, comparing control group 2 and treatments 7 and 8 allows us to determine whether participants are sensitive to information about Fairtrade. We expect respondents to be more likely to choose fair trade chocolate when provided with information in treatments 4 to 7 and less likely to choose fair trade chocolate in treatment 8. Then, we investigate whether the effects of treatments 4 to 7 are larger for less knowledgeable participants about how fair trade labels work or the problems related to cocoa production to rule out that other channels linked to a lack of knowledge (hypothesis 3) might be driving the results. If results are driven by a lack of knowledge (hypothesis 3), we would expect the coefficient on lack of knowledge to be negative and significant when provided with no information while the interaction terms with treatments 4 to 7 (i.e., with information) to be positive and significant.

3.3 Randomization Checks

The randomization of participants into different treatment groups was done electronically. To verify whether the randomization successfully orthogonalized the treatments with respect to confounding factors, we verify if key covariates are balanced across treatments. Table 2 displays the covariates for all socio-demographic characteristics gathered in the survey for all treatments (the geographical area of residence is not shown because of space constraints). We report the mean values for all covariates for each treatment and p-values from an F-test for equality of means across treatments. We obtain a high balance across covariates. The only statistically significant difference between treatments arises for religiosity and the percentage of economically inactive respondents (at the 10% level). A Tukey posthoc test (Tukey, 1949) to determine which treatments differ from each other—via a pairwise comparison—reveals no significant differences between any one pair of treatment groups in terms of economic inactivity and religiosity.

Table 2: Randomization checks

Treatment number	C1	T1	T2	T3	C2	T4	T5	T6	T7	T8	F-test p-value
Female (%)	48.40	50.54	50.80	54.05	52.78	56.04	49.73	53.55	50.82	45.41	0.723
Age	50.36	50.18	49.82	48.37	48.89	50.75	52.49	50.38	49.45	51.56	0.446
Household income in CHF (%)											
$\geq 200,000$	3.20	4.89	5.34	4.32	5.00	5.50	6.02	5.46	4.92	5.94	0.983
150,000 to 199,999	10.11	3.80	10.16	8.65	11.11	6.04	6.01	5.46	9.29	5.95	0.106
100,000 to 149,999	21.28	22.83	24.6	24.32	20.56	23.08	20.77	18.03	18.58	15.68	0.500
50,000 to 99,999	37.77	33.15	35.83	30.27	33.89	34.62	37.16	44.26	38.80	41.62	0.203
$< 50,000$	12.24	21.74	13.91	17.84	17.22	18.68	18.03	15.85	15.3	15.13	0.460
No answer	15.43	13.59	10.16	14.59	12.22	12.09	12.02	10.93	13.11	15.68	0.832
Highest level of education (%)											
University PhD	2.13	2.17	1.60	4.32	2.22	1.65	1.09	2.19	2.19	2.70	0.777
University Master	5.32	8.15	9.63	7.03	6.67	7.69	8.74	8.74	6.01	9.19	0.854
University of Applied Science/ Education Master	10.10	10.33	13.37	11.89	15.00	9.89	11.48	10.39	7.65	9.19	0.587
University Bachelor	5.32	2.72	1.07	3.24	3.89	2.20	3.28	2.73	3.28	2.16	0.590
University of Applied Science/ Education Bachelor	10.11	13.04	10.16	10.27	15.56	8.24	12.02	9.83	8.20	6.48	0.211
Apprenticeship	48.94	43.48	48.66	42.16	38.33	51.65	42.62	44.26	48.63	52.97	0.105
Maturität (high school)	5.85	5.98	8.02	7.57	7.22	6.59	5.46	6.01	8.20	3.24	0.744
Completed compulsory schooling/No diploma	3.72	5.98	2.67	4.86	4.45	3.85	5.47	4.37	3.28	3.78	0.906
Other	8.51	8.15	3.74	8.65	6.11	7.69	9.29	11.48	12.57	9.73	0.150
Marital status (%)											
Married	55.32	50.00	50.80	47.03	46.67	50.00	48.09	59.02	50.82	52.43	0.389
Divorced	9.57	11.41	12.83	16.76	15.00	10.99	16.94	8.74	14.21	13.51	0.232
Widowed	4.79	4.35	2.14	3.78	3.89	3.85	4.37	2.73	3.83	4.86	0.951
Single, in a partnership	15.96	13.04	16.04	16.76	17.78	15.93	15.30	14.21	18.58	15.14	0.956
Single, no partnership	13.83	20.65	18.18	15.68	15.00	18.13	15.3	14.21	12.57	14.05	0.567
Employment status (%)											
Full-time employee	37.23	30.98	37.97	35.68	41.67	30.22	31.69	37.16	33.33	34.05	0.404
Part-time employee	19.68	23.37	21.93	23.24	20.00	28.57	20.77	22.95	29.51	23.24	0.342
Independent	6.38	5.43	6.42	7.03	8.33	3.85	7.65	5.46	6.56	7.57	0.866
Economically inactive [†]	30.32	33.70	25.67	25.41	22.78	32.97	34.97	28.96	23.50	31.89	0.074*
Student/ Apprentice	5.85	5.44	6.95	7.57	4.44	3.85	4.92	4.37	6.01	3.24	0.721
Have children under the age of 18 (%)	22.87	15.22	20.32	20.00	22.22	20.88	16.39	20.22	22.40	20.54	0.700
Number of people in household	2.53	2.32	2.39	2.46	2.43	2.39	2.43	2.37	2.63	2.39	0.441
Born in Switzerland (%)	87.77	91.85	89.30	90.81	89.44	90.66	92.90	93.99	92.35	89.73	0.615
Trust people	7.61	7.41	7.67	7.52	7.47	7.74	7.65	7.62	7.57	7.71	0.666
Political orientation	4.82	5.13	4.96	5.18	5.07	5.03	5.11	5.16	5.10	5.41	0.482
Religious (%)	54.79	41.31	47.06	48.11	49.44	58.25	48.64	48.09	53.55	56.21	0.046*
N	188	184	187	185	180	182	183	183	183	185	1840

Notes: Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$. C1–C2 correspond to control groups 1 and 2, respectively. T1–T8 correspond to treatments 1–8. Trust and political orientation are measured on a Likert scale from 0 to 10: 0= do not trust people at all or very left-wing whereas 10= completely trust people or very right-wing, respectively.

[†] Economically inactive refers to the following categories: unemployed, inactive and house wife/ husband.

4 Empirical Strategy

We formally estimate the following regression model:

$$\text{Ethical}_i = \alpha_0 + \sum_{j=1}^3 \alpha_j T_{i,j} + \mathbf{X}_i' \boldsymbol{\theta} + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where $\text{Ethical}_i = 1$ if respondent i chooses fair trade chocolate or conventional chocolate plus donation (option B in Table 1) and 0 if the respondent chooses conventional chocolate. $T_{i,j}$ represent treatments 1–3 where T_1 denotes treatment 1 (conventional chocolate versus conventional chocolate plus donation), T_2 treatment 2 (conventional chocolate versus Fairtrade chocolate with a picture of both chocolates) and T_3 treatment 3 (conventional chocolate with brand versus Fairtrade chocolate with a picture of both chocolates). In this model, control group 1 (conventional chocolate versus fair trade chocolate) is left as the base category. Vector \mathbf{X} contains a rich set of socio-demographic control variables: respondents' age, gender, household income, educational, geographical area of residence (canton), marital status, employment status, children below 18 years old, number of people in the household, born in Switzerland. The vector also contains measures of trust, political orientation, and religiosity.

We also estimate the second following equation:

$$\text{FT}_i = \beta_0 + \sum_{j=4}^8 \beta_j T_{i,j} + \mathbf{X}_i' \boldsymbol{\gamma} + \epsilon_i \quad (2)$$

where $\text{FT} = 1$ if the respondent chooses fair trade chocolate (option B in Table 1) and 0 if the respondent chooses conventional chocolate. $T_{i,j}$ represent the information treatments 4–8 where T_4 denotes treatment 4 (child labour), T_5 treatment 5 (environment), T_6 treatment 6 (poverty), T_7 treatment 7 (Fairtrade information) and T_8 treatment 8 (negative information). In this setting, control group 2 (no information) is left as the base category. Equation 2 contains the same vector \mathbf{X} of control variables as equation 1.

In both equations, we estimate a linear probability model (LPM) to easily interpret the results. However, we also estimate logit models as a robustness check, and our results do not change (Appendix B, Table B4).

5 Results

5.1 Descriptive Results

Our survey shows that Swiss-Germans are fond of chocolate:⁹ About 67% of respondents indicate that they buy chocolate at least once a month (top of Figure B1, Appendix B) and about 34% indicate that they eat a minimum of 400 grammes of chocolate a month (middle of Figure B1, Appendix B).¹⁰ However, only about 16% indicate that they buy Fairtrade chocolate at least once a month (bottom of Figure B1, Appendix B). When respondents are asked to report all the Fairtrade products they have bought over the last month (Figure B2, Appendix B), chocolate is the second most-consumed Fairtrade product (22% of respondents). Except for bananas, which are bought by 62% of respondents,¹¹ other Fairtrade products are rarely purchased (all purchased by less than 20% of respondents in the previous month). These observations suggest that the demand for fair trade products in general and chocolate specifically are low in our sample, similar to the official Swiss statistics on Fairtrade consumption, which indicate that consumers only spend 7.83 CHF per person a month on Fairtrade products (Max Havelaar Foundation, 2020a).

Figure 2 displays the results of the choices made in control groups 1 and 2, which both offered—in text format—a choice between conventional chocolate and money to keep, and more expensive fair trade chocolate (and no money to keep). If consumers chose conventional chocolate, they could keep 1 CHF in control group 1 and 3 CHF in control group 2. In control group 1, about 65% of respondents chose fair trade chocolate, even though the price was twice as high as conventional chocolate. In control group 2, 48% of respondents chose fair trade chocolate, despite the price being three times higher than conventional chocolate. The proportion of respondents choosing fair trade chocolate in control group 2 is significantly lower than in control group 1 (at the 5% statistical level). This indicates that consumers are price-sensitive, which supports the relevance of the findings of such an incentivised online experiment. Figure 2 further shows that people are willing to pay a sizeable price premium for ethically produced consumption products. This result is in line with the literature, which finds that a higher price does not significantly reduce consumers' demand for fairly traded products worldwide and, more

⁹Note that all questions on chocolate and fair trade consumption were asked after the experiment to avoid priming participants (see Figure 1).

¹⁰The official numbers report that Switzerland consumes on average 870 grammes per capita a month, but this figure includes tourists (Chocosuisse, 2020).

¹¹Only Fairtrade labelled bananas (and not unlabelled ones) can be found at Coop (Coop, 2021a).

specifically, in Switzerland (e.g., Mahé, 2010; Tanner & Wölfling Kast, 2003).




Figure 2: Consumption of fair trade chocolate

Notes: Control group 1 (C1) corresponds to conventional chocolate (value 1 CHF) and keeping 1 CHF versus fair trade chocolate (value 2 CHF) while control group 2 (C2) corresponds to conventional chocolate (value 0.6 CHF) and keeping 3 CHF versus fair trade chocolate (value 1.8 CHF)

5.2 Experimental Results

Table 3 displays the results of treatments 1–3 by estimating equation 1. Treatment 1 tests whether a possible explanation of the low demand for fair trade chocolate is a lack of efficiency (hypothesis 1), i.e., whether people prefer to donate to an NGO rather than to pay a premium for fair trade products. Our experiment rejects this hypothesis. Column 1 shows that respondents are 16.5 percentage points less likely to donate to an NGO to support poor farmers than to pay a premium on ethically certified chocolate for the same cause and at the same financial cost. This result is highly robust to the inclusion of socio-demographic control variables (column 2). This suggests that respondents prefer fair trade products compared to direct donations, despite the loss in efficiency. This result is in line with the findings by Koppel & Schulze (2013).

Table 3: Ethical choice and lack of efficiency, salience and attention, knowledge or trust

	Dependent variable: ethical choice (1/0)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Reference group: control group 1 (C1)						
Donation (T1)	-0.165*** (0.051)	-0.154*** (0.051)	-0.230*** (0.078)	-0.214*** (0.082)	0.049 (0.092)	0.038 (0.087)
Picture without brand (T2)	-0.200*** (0.050)	-0.212*** (0.053)	-0.084 (0.086)	-0.089 (0.089)	0.114 (0.087)	0.119 (0.087)
Picture with brand (T3)	-0.319*** (0.049)	-0.302*** (0.050)	-0.315*** (0.075)	-0.311*** (0.079)	-0.109 (0.078)	-0.092 (0.077)
Very familiar Fairtrade			0.134* (0.072)	0.111 (0.073)		
Donation (T1) \times Very familiar Fairtrade			0.132 (0.102)	0.114 (0.103)		
Picture without brand (T2) \times Very familiar Fairtrade			-0.186* (0.106)	-0.193* (0.108)		
Picture with brand (T3) \times Very familiar Fairtrade			0.005 (0.099)	0.025 (0.103)		
Trust fair trade					0.463*** (0.070)	0.439*** (0.068)
Donation (T1) \times Trust fair trade					-0.332*** (0.108)	-0.316*** (0.104)
Picture without brand (T2) \times Trust fair trade					-0.469*** (0.104)	-0.496*** (0.104)
Picture with brand (T3) \times Trust fair trade					-0.296*** (0.098)	-0.311*** (0.097)
Control variables	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	744	742	744	742	744	742
R^2	0.052	0.172	0.080	0.192	0.110	0.218

Notes: OLS regressions. The treatment base category is control group 1 (C1), i.e., conventional chocolate versus fair trade chocolate. T1–T3 refer to treatments 1–3. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if respondents choose fair trade chocolate (T2 and T3) or conventional chocolate plus donation (T1) over conventional chocolate. *Very familiar Fairtrade* is a dummy equal to 1 if respondents state that they are "very familiar" when asked "How familiar are you with what the Fairtrade label represents?" *Trust fair trade* is a dummy that equals 1 if respondents assign a score of at least 6 on a Likert scale from 0 (no confidence at all) to 10 (total confidence) when presented with the statement "I consider myself to be a person who trusts fair trade chocolate." The control variables include the respondents' age, gender, household income, education, geographical area of residence (canton), marital status, employment status, children below 18 years old, number of people in the household, born in Switzerland, measures of trust, political orientation and religiosity. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, *** $p < 0.01$.

As a next step, we analyse whether a lack of salience and attention might lead to low demand for fair trade products (hypothesis 2). As Table 3, column 1 shows, the share of respondents choosing fair trade chocolate significantly decreases by 20 percentage points when a picture of conventional and fair trade chocolate is shown (treatment 2) compared to when the same choice is presented in text format (control group 1), even if the premium is the same. The share of respondents drops even further, by about 32 percentage points, when a picture of branded conventional chocolate (Lindt) and no branded fair trade chocolate is shown (treatment 3), although both chocolates cost the same. These results are robust to the inclusion of control variables (column 2). This suggests that the visual of packaging distracts people from the ethical attribute of chocolate, as fair trade labels are not salient enough and can be easily overshadowed by other packaging attributes.

Alternative reasons for the difference in consumption of fair trade chocolate might be a lack

of knowledge (hypothesis 3) or a lack of trust in fair trade labels (hypothesis 4). We explore these hypotheses by analysing heterogeneous treatment effects. As discussed in the previous section, we measure knowledge first as familiarity with the label, and then as the understanding of the label. Now, we focus on familiarity. In columns 3 and 4 of Table 3, we interact our treatments 1, 2, and 3 with a dummy variable equal to 1 if respondents state that they are "*very familiar*" with what the Fairtrade label represents visually, and equal to 0 if respondents state that they are "*not familiar at all*," "*somewhat familiar*," "*I am not sure*," or "*not very familiar*." In our sample, about 60% of respondents are very familiar with what the Fairtrade label represents (Appendix B, Figure B5). In columns 5 and 6, we interact treatments 1, 2, and 3 with trust in fair trade chocolate, i.e., a dummy variable that equals 1 if respondents assign a score of at least 6 on a Likert scale from 0 (totally disagree) to 10 (totally agree) when presented with the statement "*I consider myself to be a person who trusts fair trade chocolate*." In our sample, about 66% of respondents have a level of trust in fair trade chocolate of at least 6 (Appendix B, Figure B6). Results are highly robust to different cut-offs (e.g., 7 and 8) and to whether *trust* is defined as a continuous rather than a binary variable.¹²

We find that consumers who report that they are very familiar with the Fairtrade label or trust fair trade chocolate are more likely to choose it when it is presented as text (Table 3, columns 3–6). However, these effects are cancelled out when the choices are given in picture format. In particular, column 3 shows that the demand for fair trade chocolate decreases by 18.6 percentage points for respondents who are very familiar with the Fairtrade label when a picture of conventional and fair trade chocolate is shown (treatment 2) compared to control group 1 with a text description of the same choice task. Similarly, the demand for fair trade chocolate decreases by about 47 percentage points for consumers who trust Fairtrade labels when a picture of conventional and Fairtrade chocolate is shown instead of a written description (column 5). In both specifications, the effect of the unbranded picture treatment (treatment 2) becomes weak and insignificant for consumers who are not very familiar with the Fairtrade label and consumers who mistrust fair trade chocolate. Therefore, the negative treatment effect of visuals is predominantly driven by respondents who are very familiar with the Fairtrade label and/or trust fair trade chocolate. These results imply that a lack of knowledge and a lack of trust do not explain low demand in settings where chocolate choices are made visually (e.g., in a shop). In contrast, they partially explain low demand in settings where choices are made only

¹²Results are available upon request from the authors.

in a written format without pictures. These results are highly robust to the inclusion of control variables (columns 4 and 6) and support the hypothesis that low attention impedes to higher fair trade consumption.

Table 4 shows the results of treatments 4–8 (equation 2). Any information—in text format—about cocoa production or Fairtrade significantly increases the demand for fair trade chocolate compared to the control group (control group 2). Information about child labour (treatment 4), pesticide residues in the environment (treatment 5), and poverty (treatment 6) increase the demand by 30.8, 24.9, and 29.3 percentage points, respectively (column 1). Information about the Fairtrade standards (treatment 7), and information about the limited effect of Fairtrade labelling (treatment 8) increase the demand by 19.4 and 11.1 percentage points, respectively (column 1).

Interestingly, information about the limitations of Fairtrade (treatment 8) also significantly increases the demand for fair trade chocolate. One possible explanation is that negative publicity can increase the probability of purchase by increasing product awareness (e.g., Berger et al., 2010). Moreover, information about the problems of conventionally produced chocolate (treatments 4–6) increases the demand for fair trade by 5 to 10 percentage points more than information about the Fairtrade programme (treatment 7)—although the difference is insignificant at conventional levels. A possible explanation is that a development problem is easier to understand for consumers and leads to a "warm-glow" effect when consumers feel they are addressing it, whereas existing solutions such as a Fairtrade programme tend to be more complex and facts-driven (e.g., see Karlan & Wood, 2017; Metzger & Günther, 2019).

Table 4: Fair trade choice and information treatments

	Dependent variable: fair trade chocolate choice (1/0)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Reference group: control group 2 (C2)						
Child labour (T4)	0.308*** (0.048)	0.291*** (0.047)	0.472** (0.196)	0.468*** (0.179)	0.186** (0.074)	0.202*** (0.073)
Environment (T5)	0.249*** (0.050)	0.230*** (0.048)	0.293 (0.190)	0.230 (0.184)	0.140* (0.077)	0.164** (0.078)
Poverty (T6)	0.293*** (0.049)	0.295*** (0.047)	0.256 (0.180)	0.266 (0.171)	0.197*** (0.070)	0.246*** (0.070)
Fairtrade information (T7)	0.194*** (0.051)	0.186*** (0.049)	0.325 (0.198)	0.331* (0.193)	0.127 (0.084)	0.147* (0.085)
Negative information (T8)	0.111** (0.052)	0.126** (0.051)	0.046 (0.195)	0.102 (0.186)	-0.100 (0.088)	-0.030 (0.091)
Score unknowledgeable fair trade			0.040 (0.040)	0.032 (0.038)		
Child labour (T4) \times Score unknowledgeable fair trade			-0.048 (0.056)	-0.052 (0.052)		
Environment (T5) \times Score unknowledgeable fair trade			-0.012 (0.053)	0.001 (0.052)		
Poverty (T6) \times Score unknowledgeable fair trade			0.011 (0.050)	0.009 (0.048)		
Fairtrade information (T7) \times Score unknowledgeable fair trade			-0.038 (0.056)	-0.042 (0.055)		
Negative information (T8) \times Score unknowledgeable fair trade			0.023 (0.056)	0.010 (0.053)		
Price producers incorrect					-0.200*** (0.075)	-0.139* (0.073)
Child labour (T4) \times Price producers incorrect					0.200** (0.097)	0.147 (0.095)
Environment (T5) \times Price producers incorrect					0.177* (0.101)	0.105 (0.100)
Poverty (T6) \times Price producers incorrect					0.126 (0.101)	0.038 (0.097)
Fairtrade information (T7) \times Price producers incorrect					0.121 (0.105)	0.073 (0.104)
Negative information (T8) \times Price producers incorrect					0.330*** (0.109)	0.242** (0.110)
Control variables	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1096	1093	1096	1093	1096	1093
R^2	0.053	0.188	0.059	0.191	0.064	0.195

Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if respondents choose fair trade chocolate over conventional chocolate. The treatment base category is conventional chocolate versus fair trade chocolate (control group 2 (C2)). T4–T8 refer to treatments 4–8. *Score unknowledgeable fair trade* corresponds to the sum of incorrect answers (from 0 to 5) on consumers' knowledge about fair trade. *Price producers incorrect* is a dummy equal to 1 if respondents give a number above 9 when asked "What proportion of the retail price of chocolate does the cocoa farmer receive when you buy conventional chocolate?" The control variables include the respondents' age, gender, household income, educational, geographical area of residence (canton), marital status, employment status, children below 18 years old, number of people in the household, born in Switzerland, measures of trust, political orientation and religiosity. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

We now test the third hypothesis of lack of knowledge as an explanation of low demand when knowledge refers to the understanding of the fair trade label and farmers' production conditions. In particular, we investigate whether respondents with a lower general understanding of how fair trade labels work or about the problems related to cocoa production are more likely to choose fair trade chocolate when provided with information compared to respondents who have a better understanding. Note that respondents were asked general questions about fair trade and cocoa production and not questions related to the information treatments. First, we interact our treatments 4–8 with a constructed score on consumers' lack of knowledge. The score is the sum of incorrect answers (from 0 to 5) using three questions on consumers' knowledge about fair trade

such that higher scores correspond to less knowledgeable consumers.¹³ Second, we interact our treatments with lack of knowledge about the production conditions of farmers, i.e., a dummy variable equal to 1 if respondents give a number above 9 when asked: "*What proportion of the retail price of chocolate does the cocoa farmer receive when you buy conventional chocolate?*" (Appendix B, Figure B8). If the information treatments mainly affect demand through improving knowledge, we expect the information treatments to be stronger for participants who are less knowledgeable about (i) fair trade and/or (ii) farmers' production conditions.

Table 4 (columns 5 and 6) shows that participants less knowledgeable about farmers' production conditions are less likely to purchase fair trade chocolate than more knowledgeable respondents. However, consumers who are less knowledgeable about fair trade labels (column 3 and 4) or farmers' production conditions (columns 5 and 6) are not more likely to choose fair trade chocolate when provided information. One notable exception is the positive effect of negative information (treatment 8) on consumers who are not knowledgeable about farmers' production conditions. We show that these results are robust to alternative measures of knowledgeable consumers in the robustness checks sub-section.

Table B2 and Table B3 in Appendix B are identical to Table 3 and Table 4, respectively, but report the coefficients on all the included control variables. We find that women are more likely to choose the ethical option than men, and politically left-wing consumers are more likely to consume ethically than right-wing consumers. Income is weakly associated with ethical consumption, confirming that consumers' purchasing decisions for fair trade products are weakly associated with price differences. Age, education, marital and employment status, and having children under 18 are also weakly associated with ethical consumption.

5.3 Supportive Survey Results

Our survey results support our experimental findings: a lack of attention seems to be a major driver of low demand rather than a lack of knowledge or a lack of trust. First, when respondents are asked why they rarely or never buy Fairtrade chocolate (select a maximum of three criteria),

¹³The first question asks "*What do you think best describes the price of fair trade chocolate?*" (Appendix B, Figure B7). We create a dummy equal to 1 if respondents fail to choose the correct answer "*Farmers receive a minimum price*". The second question asks, "*What proportion of the retail price of chocolate does the cocoa farmer receive when you buy fair trade chocolate?*" (Appendix B, Figure B8). We generate a dummy equal to 1 if respondents gave any number above 9. The third question asks, "*In your opinion, which three characteristics best describe fair trade chocolate? (Please select exactly three characteristics)*" (Appendix B, Figure B9). We generate a categorical variable that takes the value 0, 1, 2, or 3, where each integer corresponds to the number of incorrect characteristics chosen. The final score corresponds to the sum of the three variables.

39% say they buy chocolate spontaneously and do not pay attention (Appendix B, Figure B3). Moreover, when respondents are asked what they pay attention to when they buy chocolate (select the three most important features), 63% say the taste, 48% habits and good experiences, and 45% quality. In contrast, fair trade labelling only comes fifth with 24% (Appendix B, Figure B4). Thus, consumers appear to value other attributes more (Lusk & Briggeman, 2009). Consumers are confronted with a plethora of information on the package and are likely to use heuristics to make a simplified decision without taking into account all attributes (Grunert, 2011; Verbeke, 2008). Besides colour, packages usually include brand names, ingredients lists, and various marketing claims that all compete for consumers' attention, and they might attach disproportionately high weight to more salient attributes (Bordalo et al., 2013) than the small Fairtrade label in the right corner of a packaged chocolate (see Table 1).

Although respondents indicate that they are familiar with the Fairtrade label (60% are very familiar and 30% are somewhat familiar, Appendix B, Figure B5) and trust fair trade chocolate (about 66% gave a score of 6 or above while about 16% gave a neutral score of 5, Appendix B, Figure B6), there is a significant mismatch between what a fair trade label stands for and what people believe it is. When respondents are asked how to best describe the price of fair trade chocolate, only about 24% choose the correct answer (i.e., farmers receive a minimum price, Appendix B, Figure B7). While the share of the retail price that goes to cocoa farmers is unchanged for fair trade chocolate, almost all respondents believe that farmers receive a higher share of the final price for fair trade chocolate, and that they get, on average, one-quarter of the final retail price (Appendix B, Figure B8). In reality, it is usually not above 10%. However, more consumers seem to be aware that farmers receive a low share of the retail price for conventional chocolate (about 41% answered less than 10% and about 19% answered 10% of the final price). More generally, when respondents are asked which characteristics (exactly three characteristics) best describe fair trade chocolate, 58% of the total characteristics are wrong (Appendix B, Figure B9). Among the most common misconceptions are that farmers receive a minimum wage, that a higher share of the sale price goes to producers, and that less profit goes to the middlemen.

These findings confirm previous research, which shows that certain labels are misinterpreted by consumers and even induce a cognitive bias called the "halo effect" (Messer et al., 2017), whereby an initial good impression promotes subsequent favourable evaluations on other unrelated dimensions. For instance, Schuldt et al. (2012) found that chocolate labelled as ethical made some consumers believe it had fewer calories because it was made ethically.

5.4 Robustness Checks

Since the dependent variable captures a dichotomous outcome, our linear model applied in Tables 3 and 4 may suffer from out-of-bound predictions. Thus, we also estimate logit regressions as robustness checks and display odd ratios for ease of interpretation in Table B4 in Appendix B. Table B4 shows that the treatment effects of equations 1 and 2 are robust: the magnitude of the point estimates and their precision are largely unchanged.

We also explore whether the findings in Table 4 are robust to alternative measures of knowledgeable consumers about fair trade (Appendix B, Table B5). In column 3, we interact our treatments with a constructed knowledge index based on principal component analysis (PCA) with the same three questions as our score in Table 4. We create it such that the higher the index, the less knowledgeable the consumer. Results are also robust to when consumers' knowledge is defined as a binary rather than a continuous variable and to different cut-offs.¹⁴ In column 4, we interact our treatments with lack of familiarity, i.e., a dummy variable equal to 1 if respondents state that they are not "*very familiar*" when asked "*How familiar are you with what the Fairtrade label represents?*" (Appendix B, Figure B5). The overall treatment and interaction effects as shown in Table 4 remain largely unaffected.

6 Conclusion

Voluntary standards such as fair trade are increasingly characterising agricultural commodity production with the objective to make agricultural trade more profitable for producers, in particular in low and middle-income countries, and more transparent for the consumers. In the literature, it is an open question why the consumption of fair trade products remains low despite consumers' willingness to pay a premium for them. This study aims to answer this question by implementing a between-subject incentivised survey experiment in Switzerland about fair trade chocolate. First, we show that respondents are willing to pay a considerable price premium for fair trade chocolate, although the real-world demand remains low. Then, we investigate several hypotheses regarding consumers' low demand: lack of efficiency, lack of salience and attention, lack of knowledge, and lack of trust. We find that a lack of salience and attention is the leading hypothesis supported by our experiment to explain low consumption. A lack of perceived efficiency of labels in transferring money to poor farmers and a lack of knowledge on the label

¹⁴Results are available upon request from the authors.

and farmers' production conditions or a lack of trust in the label are neither supported by our experimental nor our survey results. Although we highlight a lack of salience and inattention as significant drivers of low demand, we do not rule out the existence of other channels for ethical purchasing behaviour. The question of how a lack of salience and inattention weight compared to other channels is beyond the scope of this study and is left for future research.

We suggest a few possible courses of action that may foster the future consumption of fair trade products. First, since research has shown that the packaging plays a vital role in attracting consumers' attention (Bialkova et al., 2013; Clement et al., 2013; Takahashi et al., 2018, among others) and consumers attach a disproportionately high weight to salient attributes (Bordalo et al., 2013), production standards could be made more salient on consumption goods. For example, Bialkova et al. (2013) suggest that information density undermines consumers' attention to food labels and that the optimal label, from an attention-getting perspective, may not be one label but a combination of labels. This means that a package with a low information density and a Fairtrade label coupled with a random interchangeable fairly traded characteristic, i.e., no child labour, could be an option. Second, the consumer decision could be simplified if retailers only offered products with high production standards. In addition, fairly traded products could be grouped on highly visible shelves. Last but not least, national governmental regulations that enforce ecological and socially sustainable sourcing for domestically consumption products could be implemented such as the European Commission legislation that compels companies to show that products they sell in the European Union do not drive global deforestation or violate human rights.

References

- Andorfer, V. A. & Liebe, U. (2012). Research on fair trade consumption—A review. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 106(4), 415–435.
- Andorfer, V. A. & Liebe, U. (2015). Do information, price, or morals influence ethical consumption? A natural field experiment and customer survey on the purchase of fair trade coffee. *Social Science Research*, 52, 330–350.
- Berger, J., Sorensen, A. T., & Rasmussen, S. J. (2010). Positive effects of negative publicity: When negative reviews increase sales. *Marketing Science*, 29(5), 815–827.

- Bialkova, S., Grunert, K. G., & van Trijp, H. (2013). Standing out in the crowd: The effect of information clutter on consumer attention for front-of-pack nutrition labels. *Food Policy*, 41, 65–74.
- Bordalo, P., Gennaioli, N., & Shleifer, A. (2013). Salience and consumer choice. *Journal of Political Economy*, 121(5), 803–843.
- Castilla, C. & Haab, T. (2013). Limited attention to search costs in the gasoline retail market: evidence from a choice experiment on consumer willingness to search. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 95(1), 181–199.
- Chocosuisse (2020). The swiss chocolate industry 2019. Press release.
- Clement, J., Kristensen, T., & Grønhaug, K. (2013). Understanding consumers’ in-store visual perception: The influence of package design features on visual attention. *Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services*, 20(2), 234–239.
- Coop (2021a). Tat nr. 162 unsere bananen können sie mit gutem gewissen geniessen. <https://www.taten-statt-worte.ch/content/taten-statt-worte/de/unsere-taten/tat-nr-162.html>.
- Coop (2021b). Who we are. <http://https://www.coop.ch/en/company/about-us/who-we-are/retail.html>.
- Darby, M. R. & Karni, E. (1973). Free competition and the optimal amount of fraud. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 16(1), 67–88.
- De Boer, J., Hoogland, C. T., & Boersema, J. J. (2007). Towards more sustainable food choices: Value priorities and motivational orientations. *Food Quality and Preference*, 18(7), 985–996.
- De Pelsmacker, P. & Janssens, W. (2007). A model for fair trade buying behaviour: The role of perceived quantity and quality of information and of product-specific attitudes. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 75(4), 361–380.
- DeFries, R. S., Fanzo, J., Mondal, P., Remans, R., & Wood, S. A. (2017). Is voluntary certification of tropical agricultural commodities achieving sustainability goals for small-scale producers? A review of the evidence. *Environmental Research Letters*, 12(3), 033001.

- Dragusanu, R., Giovannucci, D., & Nunn, N. (2014). The economics of fair trade. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 28(3), 217–36.
- Fairtrade International (2019). Monitoring the scope and benefits of Fairtrade: Cocoa. https://files.fairtrade.net/publications/2019_Monitoring_Cocoa_10thEd.pdf.
- Fountain, A. & Hütz-Adams, F. (2015). Cocoa barometer 2015. <https://www.voicenetwork.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Cocoa-Barometer-2015.pdf>.
- Fountain, A. & Hütz-Adams, F. (2018). Cocoa barometer 2018. <https://www.voicenetwork.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/2018-Cocoa-Barometer.pdf>.
- Friedrichsen, J. & Engelmann, D. (2018). Who cares about social image? *European Economic Review*, 110, 61–77.
- FSO (2020). Swiss household budget survey 2018. <https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/news/whats-new.gnpdetail.2019-0623.html>.
- FSO (2021). Look for statistics. <https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics.html>.
- Gabaix, X. (2019). Behavioral inattention. In *Handbook of Behavioral Economics: Applications and Foundations 1*, volume 2 (pp. 261–343). Elsevier.
- Graham, D. J., Orquin, J. L., & Visschers, V. H. (2012). Eye tracking and nutrition label use: A review of the literature and recommendations for label enhancement. *Food Policy*, 37(4), 378–382.
- Grunert, K. G. (2011). Sustainability in the food sector: A consumer behaviour perspective. *International Journal on Food System Dynamics*, 2(3), 207–218.
- Hainmueller, J. & Hiscox, M. J. (2015). The socially conscious consumer? Field experimental tests of consumer support for fair labor standards. MIT Political Science Department Research Paper 15.
- Hainmueller, J., Hiscox, M. J., & Sequeira, S. (2015). Consumer demand for fair trade: Evidence from a multistore field experiment. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 97(2), 242–256.
- Handel, B. & Schwartzstein, J. (2018). Frictions or mental gaps: What’s behind the information we (don’t) use and when do we care? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 32(1), 155–78.

- Hiscox, M. J., Broukhim, M., & Litwin, C. (2011). Consumer demand for fair trade: New evidence from a field experiment using ebay auctions of fresh roasted coffee. Working paper.
- Hiscox, M. J., Broukhim, M., Litwin, C., & Woloski, A. (2011). Consumer demand for fair labor standards: Evidence from a field experiment on ebay. Working paper.
- Hiscox, M. J. & Smyth, N. (2011). Is there consumer demand for fair labor standards? Evidence from a field experiment. Working paper.
- Hu, W., Adamowicz, W. L., & Veeman, M. M. (2006). Labeling context and reference point effects in models of food attribute demand. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 88(4), 1034–1049.
- Karlan, D. & Wood, D. H. (2017). The effect of effectiveness: Donor response to aid effectiveness in a direct mail fundraising experiment. *Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics*, 66, 1–8.
- Koppel, H. & Schulze, G. G. (2013). The importance of the indirect transfer mechanism for consumer willingness to pay for fair trade products—Evidence from a natural field experiment. *Journal of Consumer Policy*, 36(4), 369–387.
- Kroeger, A., Bakhtary, H., Haupt, F., & Streck, C. (2017). Eliminating deforestation from the cocoa supply chain. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/26549/114812-5-5-2017-12-49-5-Cocoafinal.pdf?sequence=8&isAllowed=y>. World Bank.
- LINK Institut (2020). Link internet-panel online-forschung im grössten und repräsentativsten. https://www.link.ch/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/LINK_FactSheet_Internet_Panel_D.pdf.
- Loureiro, M. L. & Lotade, J. (2005). Do fair trade and eco-labels in coffee wake up the consumer conscience? *Ecological Economics*, 53(1), 129–138.
- Lusk, J. L. & Briggeman, B. C. (2009). Food values. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 91(1), 184–196.
- Mahé, T. (2010). Are stated preferences confirmed by purchasing behaviours? The case of fair trade-certified bananas in switzerland. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 92(2), 301–315.

- Max Havelaar Foundation (2020a). Annual report 2019 - Max Havelaar Foundation (Switzerland). https://issuu.com/maxhavelaarswitzerland/docs/mhch_annualreport2018_960ad268283b88.
- Max Havelaar Foundation (2020b). Le cacao Fairtrade - Fondation Max Havelaar (Suisse). https://www.maxhavelaar.ch/fileadmin/CH/Mediathek/Factsheets/MH_Kakao_Leaflet_F_Web.pdf.
- McEachern, M. G. & McClean, P. (2002). Organic purchasing motivations and attitudes: Are they ethical? *International Journal of Consumer Studies*, 26(2), 85–92.
- Meemken, E.-M. (2020). Do smallholder farmers benefit from sustainability standards? A systematic review and meta-analysis. *Global Food Security*, 26, 100373.
- Messer, K. D., Costanigro, M., & Kaiser, H. M. (2017). Labeling food processes: The good, the bad and the ugly. *Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy*, 39(3), 407–427.
- Metzger, L. & Günther, I. (2019). Making an impact? The relevance of information on aid effectiveness for charitable giving. A laboratory experiment. *Journal of Development Economics*, 136, 18–33.
- Oya, C., Schaefer, F., & Skolidou, D. (2018). The effectiveness of agricultural certification in developing countries: A systematic review. *World Development*, 112, 282–312.
- Podhorsky, A. (2015). A positive analysis of fairtrade certification. *Journal of Development Economics*, 116, 169–185.
- Rousseau, S. (2015). The role of organic and fair trade labels when choosing chocolate. *Food Quality and Preference*, 44, 92–100.
- Rousu, M. C. & Corrigan, J. R. (2008). Estimating the welfare loss to consumers when food labels do not adequately inform: An application to fair trade certification. *Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization*, 6(1), 1–26.
- Schuldt, J. P., Muller, D., & Schwarz, N. (2012). The “fair trade” effect: Health halos from social ethics claims. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 3(5), 581–589.

- Sellare, J., Meemken, E.-M., Kouamé, C., & Qaim, M. (2020). Do sustainability standards benefit smallholder farmers also when accounting for cooperative effects? Evidence from Côte d'Ivoire. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 102(2), 681–695.
- Solomon, M., Russell-Bennett, R., & Previte, J. (2012). *Consumer Behaviour*. Pearson Higher Education AU.
- Tagbata, D. & Sirieix, L. (2008). Measuring consumer's willingness to pay for organic and fair trade products. *International Journal of Consumer Studies*, 32(5), 479–490.
- Takahashi, R., Todo, Y., & Funaki, Y. (2018). How can we motivate consumers to purchase certified forest coffee? Evidence from a laboratory randomized experiment using eye-trackers. *Ecological Economics*, 150, 107–121.
- Tanner, C. & Wölfling Kast, S. (2003). Promoting sustainable consumption: Determinants of green purchases by swiss consumers. *Psychology & Marketing*, 20(10), 883–902.
- Taylor, S. E. & Thompson, S. C. (1982). Stalking the elusive "vividness" effect. *Psychological Review*, 89(2), 155.
- Teyssier, S., Etilé, F., & Combris, P. (2015). Social-and self-image concerns in fair-trade consumption. *European Review of Agricultural Economics*, 42(4), 579–606.
- Tukey, J. W. (1949). Comparing individual means in the analysis of variance. *Biometrics*, 99–114.
- Tully, S. M. & Winer, R. S. (2014). The role of the beneficiary in willingness to pay for socially responsible products: A meta-analysis. *Journal of Retailing*, 90(2), 255–274.
- UNDP (2016). Primary commodity booms and busts emerging lessons from sub-saharan africa. https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/PDF_-_Primary_Commodity_Booms_and_Busts_October_27.pdf.
- Van Loo, E. J., Caputo, V., Nayga Jr., R. M., Seo, H.-S., Zhang, B., & Verbeke, W. (2015). Sustainability labels on coffee: Consumer preferences, willingness-to-pay and visual attention to attributes. *Ecological Economics*, 118, 215–225.
- Verbeke, W. (2008). Impact of communication on consumers' food choices: Plenary lecture. *Proceedings of the Nutrition Society*, 67(3), 281–288.

- Vlaeminck, P., Vandoren, J., & Vranken, L. (2016). Consumers' willingness to pay for fair trade chocolate. In M. P. Squicciarini & J. Swinnen (Eds.), *The Economics of Chocolate* (pp. 180–195). Oxford University Press.
- Vlaeminck, P. & Vranken, L. (2015). Do labels capture consumers' actual willingness to pay for fair trade characteristics? Bioeconomics Working Paper Series 5.
- Wang, E. S.-T. & Chen, Y.-C. (2019). Effects of perceived justice of fair trade organizations on consumers' purchase intention toward fair trade products. *Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services*, 50, 66–72.

Appendix A – Overview of Studies on the Willingness-to-Pay for Fair Trade Products

Table A1: Overview of studies on the willingness-to-pay for fair trade products

Authors	Research question	Product	Country	Method	Sample	Results
Audorfer & Liebe (2012)	Overview of research on individual consumption of fair trade products on the basis of 51 journal publications	Many	World (mostly US and UK)	Experimental, qualitative and conventional survey methods	Mostly convenience or purposive samples	Positive willingness-to-pay
Hainmueller & Hiscox (2015)	Experimental tests of consumer support for fair labour standards	Cloths	US	Large-scale field experiment conducted with Gap Inc. in 111 Banana Republic factory stores	In-store shoppers	Labels with information about fair labour standards had a substantial positive effect on sales. The labels increased sales of a more expensive women's item by 14%. The sales of the two most popular coffees rose by almost 10% when they carried a fair trade label as compared to a generic placebo label. Demand for the higher-priced coffee remained steady when its price was raised by 8%, but demand for the lower-priced decreased by 30% when its price was raised by 9%.
Hainmueller et al. (2015)	Impact of ethical labels on consumers' willingness-to-pay	Coffee	US	Field experiment conducted in 26 stores of a major U.S. and retail grocery store chain	In-store shoppers	Sales of labelled brands rose by around 10% when the labels were applied and by 16-33% when the label was combined with price markups of 10-20%. The market shares of the brands rose by 20-41% when they were labelled and offered at a price premium.
Hiscox & Smyth (2011)	Evidence on consumer demand for fair labour standards	Candles and towels	US	Field experiment in a major retail store in New York City	In-store shoppers	Fair trade label has a substantial positive effect on bidding for coffee: shoppers paid, on average, a 23% premium for fair trade labelled coffee.
Hiscox et al. (2011)	Evidence of consumer demand for fairly traded products	Coffee	World	Online experiment conducted on eBay	Online shoppers	On average, shoppers paid a 45% premium for ethically labelled versus unlabelled shirts.
Hiscox et al. (2011)	Evidence on consumer demand for fair labour standards	Shirts	World	Online experiment conducted on eBay	Online shoppers	Results show that consumers are willing to pay higher premiums for coffee labelled as fair trade or shade grown coffee than for organic coffee.
Loureiro & Lotade (2005)	Reveal consumer preferences for ethical and environmentally sound labeling programs	Coffee	US	Face-to-face survey in supermarkets where participants are randomly selected	In-store shoppers	willingness-to-pay of €2.03/100g for chocolate with a fair trade label
Rousseau (2015)	The role of organic and fair trade labels when choosing chocolate	Chocolate	Belgium	Stated choice experiment	Online participants	
Ronsu & Corrigan (2008)	Consumers when food labels do not adequately inform: an application to fair trade certification	Chocolate and banana	US	Auction experiment in a grocery store	In-store shoppers	€0.08/100g for chocolate with a fair trade label
Taghata & Sirieix (2008)	Measuring consumer's willingness-to-pay for organic and fair trade products	Chocolate	France	Experimental method	Telephone and in-store shoppers	€0.59/100g for chocolate with a fair trade label
Tully & Winer (2014)	Willingness-to-pay for socially responsible products: a meta-analysis covering 80 published and unpublished research papers	Many	World	Experimental, qualitative and conventional survey methods	Many	The mean percentage premium for a socially responsible product is 16% and, on average, 60% of respondents are willing to pay a positive premium.
Vlaeminck & Vranken (2015)	Do labels capture consumers' actual willingness-to-pay for fair trade characteristics?	Chocolate	Belgium	Randomized within-subjects stated choice experiment in a natural consumer environment	In store-shoppers	€0.84/100g for chocolate with a fair trade label

Appendix B – Descriptive and Experimental Results

Figures




Figure B1: Chocolate consumption

Notes: The questions for the middle graph were only asked to respondents who indicated to buy chocolate at least rarely.




Figure B2: Percentage of Fairtrade products purchased by respondents




Figure B3: Percentage of reasons why respondents do not purchased Fairtrade chocolate

Notes: The question was only asked to respondents who indicated to buy chocolate at least once a month (bottom graph Figure B.1).




Figure B4: Percentage of attributes consumers pay attention to when purchasing chocolate

Notes: The question was only asked to respondents who rated their chocolate consumption to more than almost never eat chocolate (middle graph Figure B.1).




Figure B5: Familiarity with Fairtrade label




Figure B6: Trust in fair trade chocolate

Notes: The question asked to what extent the respondent agrees with the following statement: "I consider myself to be a person who trusts fair trade chocolate," where 0 means "totally disagree" and 10 means "totally agree".




Figure B7: Perceptions about fair trade chocolate price




Figure B8: Perceptions about the share of final price to producers




Figure B9: Perceptions about what fair trade chocolate does

Tables

Table B1: Comparison between our sample and the nationally-representative sample

	Sample	Representative Swiss-German sample (FSO)	t-test p-value
Female (+18)	51.20	50.54	0.571
Age (+18)	50.23	49.70	0.168
Highest level of education (+25, %)			
Tertiary education	35.95	34.36	0.165
Secondary education	51.60	48.13	0.004***
Without post-compulsory education	12.10	17.50	0.000***
Marital status (18+, %)			
Married	51.03	52.14	0.340
Divorced	12.99	10.09	0.000***
Widowed	3.86	5.75	0.001***
Single	31.44	32.01	0.600
Employment status (15+,%)			
Active	64.79	63.23	0.165
Inactive	29.02	31.18	0.046**
Student/Apprentice	5.27	5.58	0.562
Number of people in household	2.43	2.22	0.000***
Household income (%)			
< 100,000 CHF	53.31		
100,000 CHF to 149,999 CHF	20.98	120,66 CHF	
≥ 150,000 CHF	12.72		

Notes: The representative Swiss-German sample is computed using cantonal averages published by the Federal Statistical Office of Switzerland (FSO, 2021). We generate the nationally representative sample means by computing a cantonal arithmetic mean weighted by the proportion of German-speaking permanent residents in each canton of our sample.

Table B2: Ethical choice and lack of efficiency, salience and attention, knowledge or trust

	Dependent variable: ethical					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Reference group: control group 1 (C1)						
Donation (T1)	-0.165*** (0.051)	-0.154*** (0.051)	-0.230*** (0.078)	-0.214*** (0.082)	0.049 (0.092)	0.038 (0.087)
Picture without brand (T2)	-0.200*** (0.050)	-0.212*** (0.053)	-0.084 (0.086)	-0.089 (0.089)	0.114 (0.087)	0.119 (0.087)
Picture with brand (T3)	-0.319*** (0.049)	-0.302*** (0.050)	-0.315*** (0.075)	-0.311*** (0.079)	-0.109 (0.078)	-0.092 (0.077)
Very familiar Fairtrade			0.134* (0.072)	0.111 (0.073)		
Donation (T1) × Very familiar Fairtrade			0.132 (0.102)	0.114 (0.103)		
Picture without brand (T2) × Very familiar Fairtrade			-0.186* (0.106)	-0.193* (0.108)		
Picture with brand (T3) × Very familiar Fairtrade			0.005 (0.099)	0.025 (0.103)		
Trust fair trade					0.463*** (0.070)	0.439*** (0.068)
Donation (T1) × Trust fair trade					-0.332*** (0.108)	-0.316*** (0.104)
Picture without brand (T2) × Trust fair trade					-0.469*** (0.104)	-0.496*** (0.104)
Picture with brand (T3) × Trust fair trade					-0.296*** (0.098)	-0.311*** (0.097)
Female		0.072* (0.041)		0.074* (0.041)		0.072* (0.041)
Age		0.003* (0.002)		0.003* (0.002)		0.003* (0.002)
Reference group: < 30,000 CHF ≥ 500,000 CHF		0.698*** (0.249)		0.631** (0.264)		0.755*** (0.267)
250,000 CHF to 499,999 CHF		0.126 (0.223)		0.153 (0.217)		0.036 (0.231)
200,000 CHF to 249,999 CHF		0.054 (0.148)		0.051 (0.146)		0.070 (0.140)
150,000 CHF to 199,999 CHF		0.060 (0.104)		0.058 (0.103)		0.003 (0.099)
100,000 CHF to 149,999 CHF		0.061 (0.089)		0.073 (0.088)		0.047 (0.086)
50,000 CHF to 99,999 CHF		0.144* (0.084)		0.147* (0.084)		0.104 (0.082)
30,000 CHF to 49,999 CHF		0.080 (0.098)		0.083 (0.099)		0.045 (0.097)
Reference group: completed compulsory schooling/ No diploma						
University PhD		-0.074 (0.147)		-0.076 (0.151)		-0.112 (0.145)
University Master		0.068 (0.114)		0.049 (0.113)		0.029 (0.114)
University Bachelor		0.020 (0.139)		0.021 (0.139)		0.053 (0.135)
University of Applied Science/ Education Master		0.031 (0.113)		0.024 (0.113)		0.016 (0.113)
University of Applied Science/ Education Bachelor		-0.057 (0.109)		-0.057 (0.109)		-0.075 (0.109)
Apprenticeship		-0.054 (0.098)		-0.074 (0.098)		-0.069 (0.099)
Maturität (high school)		-0.091 (0.110)		-0.108 (0.112)		-0.108 (0.113)
Other		-0.019 (0.113)		-0.040 (0.113)		-0.045 (0.111)
Reference group: single, no partnership						
Married		-0.002 (0.069)		-0.008 (0.068)		-0.011 (0.066)
Divorced		0.020 (0.086)		0.022 (0.085)		0.012 (0.085)
Widowed		0.002 (0.117)		0.011 (0.116)		0.025 (0.113)
Single, in a partnership		0.032 (0.065)		0.011 (0.065)		0.019 (0.064)
Reference group: economically inactive						
Full-time employee		0.076 (0.060)		0.076 (0.059)		0.068 (0.058)
Part-time employee		0.198*** (0.058)		0.201*** (0.058)		0.194*** (0.056)
Independent		-0.045 (0.083)		-0.036 (0.081)		-0.040 (0.082)
Student/ Apprentice		0.261** (0.106)		0.268** (0.105)		0.210** (0.106)
Have children under the age of 18		-0.043 (0.060)		-0.046 (0.059)		-0.051 (0.057)
Number of people in household		-0.002 (0.022)		0.003 (0.022)		-0.002 (0.021)
Born in Switzerland		0.070 (0.062)		0.069 (0.062)		0.051 (0.060)
Trust people		0.003 (0.011)		0.001 (0.011)		-0.002 (0.011)
Political orientation		-0.044*** (0.009)		-0.041*** (0.009)		-0.040*** (0.009)
Religious		0.005 (0.038)		-0.002 (0.038)		0.004 (0.037)
Observations	744	742	744	742	744	742
R ²	0.052	0.172	0.080	0.192	0.110	0.218

Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if respondents choose fair trade chocolate or conventional chocolate plus donation over conventional chocolate. Base category for the treatments: conventional chocolate versus fair trade chocolate (control group 1 (C1)). T1–T3 refer to treatments 1–3. *Very familiar Fairtrade* is a dummy equal to 1 if respondents state that they are "very familiar" when asked "How familiar are you with what the Fairtrade label represents?" *Trust fair trade* is a dummy that equals 1 if respondents assign a score of at least 6 on a Likert scale from 0 (no confidence at all) to 10 (total confidence) when presented with the statement "I consider myself to be a person who trusts fair trade chocolate." Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B3: Fair trade and information treatments

	Dependent variable: fair trade					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Reference group: control group 2 (C2)						
Child labour (T4)	0.308*** (0.048)	0.291*** (0.047)	0.472** (0.196)	0.468*** (0.179)	0.186** (0.074)	0.202*** (0.073)
Environment (T5)	0.249*** (0.050)	0.230*** (0.048)	0.293 (0.190)	0.230 (0.184)	0.140* (0.077)	0.164** (0.078)
Poverty (T6)	0.293*** (0.049)	0.295*** (0.047)	0.256 (0.180)	0.266 (0.171)	0.197*** (0.070)	0.246*** (0.070)
Fairtrade information (T7)	0.194*** (0.051)	0.186*** (0.049)	0.325 (0.198)	0.331* (0.193)	0.127 (0.084)	0.147* (0.085)
Negative information (T8)	0.111** (0.052)	0.126** (0.051)	0.046 (0.195)	0.102 (0.186)	-0.100 (0.088)	-0.030 (0.091)
Score unknowledgeable fair trade			0.040 (0.040)	0.032 (0.038)		
Child labour (T4) × Score unknowledgeable fair trade			-0.048 (0.056)	-0.052 (0.052)		
Environment (T5) × Score unknowledgeable fair trade			-0.012 (0.053)	0.001 (0.052)		
Poverty (T6) × Score unknowledgeable fair trade			0.011 (0.050)	0.009 (0.048)		
Fairtrade information (T7) × Score unknowledgeable fair trade			-0.038 (0.056)	-0.042 (0.055)		
Negative information (T8) × Score unknowledgeable fair trade			0.023 (0.056)	0.010 (0.053)		
Price producers incorrect					-0.200*** (0.075)	-0.139* (0.073)
Child labour (T4) × Price producers incorrect					0.200** (0.097)	0.147 (0.095)
Environment (T5) × Price producers incorrect					0.177* (0.101)	0.105 (0.100)
Poverty (T6) × Price producers incorrect					0.126 (0.101)	0.038 (0.097)
Fairtrade information (T7) × Price producers incorrect					0.121 (0.105)	0.073 (0.104)
Negative information (T8) × Price producers incorrect					0.330*** (0.109)	0.242** (0.110)
Female		0.111*** (0.031)		0.111*** (0.031)		0.116*** (0.031)
Age		0.001 (0.001)		0.001 (0.001)		0.001 (0.002)
Reference group: < 30,000 CHF						
≥ 500,000 CHF		-0.198 (0.210)		-0.190 (0.210)		-0.177 (0.215)
250,000 CHF to 499,999 CHF		0.039 (0.114)		0.043 (0.114)		0.030 (0.115)
200,000 CHF to 249,999 CHF		0.071 (0.099)		0.064 (0.099)		0.071 (0.098)
150,000 CHF to 199,999 CHF		0.146* (0.080)		0.141* (0.080)		0.136* (0.080)
100,000 CHF to 149,999 CHF		0.098 (0.069)		0.092 (0.069)		0.102 (0.068)
50,000 CHF to 99,999 CHF		0.037 (0.063)		0.034 (0.064)		0.042 (0.063)
30,000 CHF to 49,999 CHF		0.000 (0.071)		-0.002 (0.071)		0.007 (0.070)
Reference group: completed compulsory schooling/ No diploma						
University PhD		0.096 (0.109)		0.080 (0.110)		0.082 (0.110)
University Master		0.012 (0.086)		0.008 (0.086)		0.005 (0.085)
University Bachelor		-0.106 (0.112)		-0.111 (0.112)		-0.109 (0.111)
University of Applied Science/ Education		-0.019 (0.080)		-0.022 (0.080)		-0.023 (0.079)
Master		0.103 (0.079)		0.100 (0.079)		0.094 (0.078)
University of Applied Science/ Education		0.009 (0.070)		0.003 (0.070)		0.002 (0.069)
Bachelor		-0.012 (0.085)		-0.020 (0.085)		-0.015 (0.084)
Apprenticeship		0.091 (0.080)		0.088 (0.080)		0.087 (0.080)
Other						
Reference group: single, no partnership						
Married		0.054 (0.052)		0.052 (0.052)		0.050 (0.053)
Divorced		0.108* (0.062)		0.110* (0.062)		0.105* (0.062)
Widowed		0.025 (0.084)		0.020 (0.084)		0.025 (0.084)
Single, in a partnership		-0.006 (0.053)		-0.005 (0.053)		-0.012 (0.053)
Reference group: economically inactive						
Full-time employee		-0.083* (0.045)		-0.078* (0.045)		-0.079* (0.045)
Part-time employee		-0.108** (0.042)		-0.101** (0.043)		-0.106** (0.043)
Independent		0.031 (0.057)		0.028 (0.056)		0.028 (0.057)
Student/ Apprentice		-0.120 (0.099)		-0.113 (0.100)		-0.106 (0.099)
Have children under the age of 18		-0.051 (0.044)		-0.049 (0.044)		-0.047 (0.043)
Number of people in household		0.004 (0.015)		0.002 (0.015)		0.005 (0.015)
Born in Switzerland		0.122** (0.051)		0.121** (0.050)		0.116** (0.051)
Trust people		0.002 (0.008)		0.003 (0.009)		0.003 (0.009)
Political orientation		-0.041*** (0.007)		-0.041*** (0.007)		-0.040*** (0.007)
Religious		0.061** (0.029)		0.061** (0.029)		0.063** (0.029)
Observations	1096	1093	1096	1093	1096	1093
R ²	0.053	0.188	0.059	0.191	0.064	0.195

Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if respondents choose fair trade chocolate over conventional chocolate. Base category for the treatments: conventional chocolate versus fair trade chocolate (control group 2 (C2)). T4-T8 refer to treatments 4-8. *Score unknowledgeable fair trade* corresponds to the sum of incorrect answers (from 0 to 5) on consumers' knowledge about fair trade. *Price producers incorrect* is a dummy equal to 1 if respondents give a number above 9 when asked "What proportion of the retail price of chocolate does the cocoa farmer receive when you buy conventional chocolate?" Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B4: Robustness checks: alternative functional forms

	Dependent variable: ethical						Dependent variable: fair trade					
	(1) OLS	(2) Logit OR	(3) OLS	(4) Logit OR	(5) OLS	(6) Logit OR	(7) OLS	(8) Logit OR	(9) OLS	(10) Logit OR	(11) OLS	(12) Logit OR
Reference group: control group 1 (C1)												
Donation (T1)	-0.154*** (0.051)	0.476*** (0.111)	-0.214*** (0.082)	0.377*** (0.141)	0.038 (0.087)	1.232 (0.505)						
Picture without brand (T2)	-0.212*** (0.053)	0.363*** (0.087)	-0.089 (0.089)	0.667 (0.259)	0.119 (0.087)	1.779 (0.701)						
Picture with brand (T3)	-0.302*** (0.050)	0.232*** (0.057)	-0.311*** (0.079)	0.211*** (0.082)	-0.092 (0.077)	0.571 (0.240)						
Very familiar Fairtrade			0.111 (0.073)	1.833* (0.625)								
Donation (T1) × Very familiar Fairtrade			0.114 (0.103)	1.534 (0.735)								
Picture without brand (T2) × Very familiar Fairtrade			-0.193* (0.108)	0.370** (0.180)								
Picture with brand (T3) × Very familiar Fairtrade			0.025 (0.103)	1.159 (0.581)								
Trust fair trade					0.439*** (0.068)	9.720*** (3.641)						
Donation (T1) × Trust fair trade					-0.316*** (0.104)	0.175*** (0.090)						
Picture without brand (T2) × Trust fair trade					-0.496*** (0.104)	0.077*** (0.039)						
Picture with brand (T3) × Trust fair trade					-0.311*** (0.097)	0.212*** (0.114)						
Reference group: control group 2 (C2)												
Child labour (T4)							0.291*** (0.047)	4.869*** (1.270)	0.468*** (0.179)	13.292** (14.195)	0.202*** (0.073)	1.180*** (0.393)
Environment (T5)							0.230*** (0.048)	3.160*** (0.783)	0.230 (0.184)	2.677 (2.454)	0.164** (0.078)	0.905** (0.395)
Poverty (T6)							0.295*** (0.047)	4.825*** (1.239)	0.266 (0.171)	3.344 (2.984)	0.246*** (0.070)	1.449*** (0.377)
Fairtrade information (T7)							0.186*** (0.049)	2.552*** (0.621)	0.331* (0.193)	5.165* (4.937)	0.147* (0.085)	0.800* (0.437)
Negative information (T8)							0.126** (0.051)	1.890*** (0.462)	0.102 (0.186)	1.597 (1.451)	-0.030 (0.091)	-0.062 (0.420)
Score unknowledgeable fair trade									0.032 (0.038)	1.157 (0.211)		
Child labour (T4) × Score unknowledgeable fair trade									-0.052 (0.052)	0.744 (0.231)		
Environment (T5) × Score unknowledgeable fair trade									0.001 (0.052)	1.056 (0.276)		
Poverty (T6) × Score unknowledgeable fair trade									0.009 (0.048)	1.123 (0.289)		
Fairtrade information (T7) × Score unknowledgeable fair trade									-0.042 (0.055)	0.815 (0.220)		
Negative information (T8) × Score unknowledgeable fair trade									0.010 (0.053)	1.069 (0.283)		
Price producers incorrect											-0.139* (0.073)	-0.597* (0.347)
Child labour (T4) × Price producers incorrect											0.147 (0.095)	0.687 (0.523)
Environment (T5) × Price producers incorrect											0.105 (0.100)	0.405 (0.511)
Poverty (T6) × Price producers incorrect											0.038 (0.097)	-0.030 (0.522)
Fairtrade information (T7) × Price producers incorrect											0.073 (0.104)	0.290 (0.529)
Negative information (T8) × Price producers incorrect											0.242** (0.110)	1.112** (0.515)
Observations	742	737	742	737	742	737	1093	1092	1093	1092	1093	1092
R ²	0.172	0.132	0.192	0.150	0.218	0.175	0.188	0.161	0.191	0.165	0.195	0.167

Notes: OLS regressions in columns 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11. Odds ratios (OR) from logit models are displayed in columns 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12. Columns 1 to 6: the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if respondents choose fair trade chocolate or conventional chocolate plus donation over conventional chocolate. Base category for the treatments: conventional chocolate versus fair trade chocolate (control group 1 (C1)). T1-T3 refer to treatments 1-3. *Very familiar Fairtrade* is a dummy equal to 1 if respondents state that they are "very familiar" when asked "How familiar are you with what the Fairtrade label represents?". *Trust fair trade* is a dummy that equals 1 if respondents assign a score of at least 6 on a Likert scale from 0 (no confidence at all) to 10 (total confidence) when presented with the statement "I consider myself to be a person who trusts fair trade chocolate." Columns 7 to 12: the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if respondents choose fair trade chocolate over conventional chocolate. Base category for the treatments: conventional chocolate versus fair trade chocolate (control group 2 (C2)). T4-T8 refer to treatments 4-8. *Score unknowledgeable fair trade* corresponds to the sum of incorrect answers (from 0 to 5) on consumers' knowledge about fair trade. *Price producers incorrect* is a dummy equal to 1 if respondents give a number above 9 when asked "What proportion of the retail price of chocolate does the cocoa farmer receive when you buy conventional chocolate?". The control variables are included in all regressions and comprise the respondents' age, gender, household income, educational, geographical area of residence (canton), marital status, employment status, children below 18 years old, number of people in the household, born in Switzerland, measures of trust, political orientation and religiosity. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B5: Fair trade, information treatments and alternative measures of knowledgeable consumers

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Reference group: C2				
Child labour (T4)	0.291*** (0.047)	0.468*** (0.179)	0.290*** (0.047)	0.252*** (0.060)
Environment (T5)	0.230*** (0.048)	0.230 (0.184)	0.231*** (0.048)	0.166*** (0.061)
Poverty (T6)	0.295*** (0.047)	0.266 (0.171)	0.299*** (0.047)	0.231*** (0.061)
Fairtrade information (T7)	0.186*** (0.049)	0.331* (0.193)	0.187*** (0.049)	0.155** (0.063)
Negative information (T8)	0.126** (0.051)	0.102 (0.186)	0.145*** (0.050)	0.061 (0.065)
Score unknowledgeable fair trade		0.032 (0.038)		
Child labour (T4) \times Score unknowledgeable fair trade		-0.052 (0.052)		
Environment (T5) \times Score unknowledgeable fair trade		0.001 (0.052)		
Poverty (T6) \times Score unknowledgeable fair trade		0.009 (0.048)		
Fairtrade information (T7) \times Score unknowledgeable fair trade		-0.042 (0.055)		
Negative information (T8) \times Score unknowledgeable fair trade		0.010 (0.053)		
Index unknowledgeable fair trade			-0.003 (0.036)	
Child labour (T4) \times Index unknowledgeable fair trade			-0.017 (0.046)	
Environment (T5) \times Index unknowledgeable fair trade			0.041 (0.048)	
Poverty (T6) \times Index unknowledgeable fair trade			0.035 (0.045)	
Fairtrade information (T7) \times Index unknowledgeable fair trade			-0.016 (0.051)	
Negative information (T8) \times Index unknowledgeable fair trade			0.082* (0.048)	
Not very familiar Fairtrade				-0.196*** (0.069)
Child labour (T4) \times Not very familiar Fairtrade				0.085 (0.094)
Environment (T5) \times Not very familiar Fairtrade				0.129 (0.099)
Poverty (T6) \times Not very familiar Fairtrade				0.134 (0.094)
Fairtrade information (T7) \times Not very familiar Fairtrade				0.048 (0.099)
Negative information (T8) \times Not very familiar Fairtrade				0.127 (0.102)
Observations	1093	1093	1093	1093
R^2	0.188	0.191	0.196	0.202

Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if respondents choose fair trade chocolate over conventional chocolate. Base category for the treatments: conventional chocolate versus fair trade chocolate (control group 2 (C2)). T4–T8 refer to treatments 4–8. *Score unknowledgeable fair trade* corresponds to the sum of incorrect answers (from 0 to 5) on consumers' knowledge about fair trade. *Index unknowledgeable fair trade* is an index on consumers' lack of knowledge about fair trade constructed by principal component analysis (PCA). *Not very familiar Fairtrade* is a dummy equal to 1 if respondents state that they are not "very familiar" when asked "How familiar are you with what the Fairtrade label represents?" The control variables are included in all regressions and contain the respondents' age, gender, household income, educational, geographical area of residence (canton), marital status, employment status, children below 18 years old, number of people in the household, born in Switzerland, measures of trust, political orientation and religiosity. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Appendix C




Figure C1: Respondent repartition by cantons



Herzlichen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme an der FAIRTRADE Studie

Mit diesem Gutschein können Sie in
einer der COOP Filialen bis zum
9. November 2018 eine **Fairtrade
Tafelschokolade Milch extra** einlösen.



2 061000 366693 >

Einlösbar ausschliesslich in grösseren Coop Supermärkten.
Gültig bis zum 9.11.2018.
Bon an der Kasse abgeben.
Bon nur einmal einlösbar und nicht kumulierbar mit anderen Bons.





Herzlichen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme an der FAIRTRADE Studie

Mit diesem Gutschein können Sie in
einer der COOP Filialen bis zum
9. November 2018 eine **Prix Garantie
Tafelschokolade Milch** einlösen.



2 061000 366709 >

Einlösbar ausschliesslich in grösseren Coop Supermärkten.
Gültig bis zum 9.11.2018.
Bon an der Kasse abgeben.
Bon nur einmal einlösbar und nicht kumulierbar mit anderen Bons.




Figure C2: Chocolate vouchers

Survey Experiment Questionnaire (translated in English)

Welcome!

This scientific study is being conducted by the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Zurich in collaboration with LINK.

Data protection

All data we collect is treated confidentially. We place a high value on respecting private data protection. Your answers will not be associated with your name and/or email address. By participating in this study, you agree that the data collected may be analysed and published in aggregate form by ETH Zurich. Information that would allow you to be identified will not be published or used in any presentation under any circumstances.

Contact information

If you have any questions or comments about this study, please contact: panel@link.ch.

If possible, please fill out the questionnaire on a computer, as this ensures optimal presentation of the questions.

I have read the above information and would like to participate in this study.

Yes

☐

No

☐

You will need about **20 minutes** to complete this questionnaire. The questionnaire consists of different thematic parts.

Regardless of your answers and decisions, you will receive **200 premium points**. These 200 points correspond to:

- 2 CHF Cash payout
- 200 Coop Superpoints
- 200 Migros Cumulus Points

In this survey, you can collect **up to 400 additional premium points**. These depend on **your decisions**. 1 bonus point corresponds to:

- 1 Centime
- 1 Coop Superpoint
- 1 Migros Cumulus Point

Control Group 1: Conventional Versus Fair Trade Chocolate

In addition to the 200 premium points for participating in this survey, you earn **200 additional premium points**, which you can spend on the following options.

The choice is yours: How would you like to spend your **200 additional premium points**?

For your information: A voucher for the chocolate will be sent to you by LINK.

100g milk chocolate (value: 100 premium
points) and 100 premium points to my LINK
premium account

☐

100g fair trade milk chocolate (value: 200
premium points)

☐

Treatment 1: Conventional Chocolate Versus Conventional Chocolate Plus Donation

In addition to the 200 premium points for participating in this survey, you earn **200 additional premium points**, which you can spend on the following options.

The choice is yours: How would you like to spend your **200 additional premium points**?

For your information: A voucher for the chocolate will be sent to you by LINK.

100g milk chocolate (value: 100 premium
points) and 100 premium points to my LINK
premium account

☐

100g milk chocolate (value: 100 premium
points) and a donation of 100 premium points
to a Swiss aid organisation that supports poor
farmers in developing countries

☐

Treatment 2: Conventional Chocolate With Picture (Without Brand) Versus Fairtrade Chocolate

In addition to the 200 premium points for participating in this survey, you earn **200 additional premium points**, which you can spend on the following options.

The choice is yours: How would you like to spend your **200 additional premium points**?

For your information: A voucher for the chocolate will be sent to you by LINK.

This chocolate (value: 100 premium points)
and 100 premium points to my LINK premium
account



This chocolate (value: 200 premium points)



Treatment 3: Conventional Chocolate With Picture and Brand Versus Fair-trade Chocolate

In addition to the 200 premium points for participating in this survey, you earn **200 additional premium points**, which you can spend on the following options.

The choice is yours: How would you like to spend your **200 additional premium points**?

For your information: A voucher for the chocolate will be sent to you by LINK.

This chocolate (value: 200 premium points)



This chocolate (value: 200 premium points)



Control Group 2: No Information

In addition to the 200 premium points for participating in this survey, you will receive **additional premium points and chocolate**. You will receive a voucher from LINK for the chocolate, and the premium points will be credited to your LINK premium account.

The choice is yours: Which alternative do you choose?

300 premium points and 100g milk chocolate
(value: 60 premium points)

☐

100g fair trade milk chocolate (value: 180
premium points)

☐

Treatment 4: Information on Child Labour

Please read the following text carefully:

One million children work on West African cocoa plantations. These children carry heavy buckets and work seven days a week in the rainforest so that we can get cheap chocolate. These children usually do not go to school and are constantly injuring themselves on the sharp machetes for the cocoa harvest.

In addition to the 200 premium points for participating in this survey, you will receive **additional premium points and chocolate**. You will receive a voucher from LINK for the chocolate, and the premium points will be credited to your LINK premium account.

The choice is yours: Which alternative do you choose?

300 premium points and 100g milk chocolate
(value: 60 premium points)

☐

100g fair trade milk chocolate (value: 180
premium points)

☐

Treatment 5: Information on the Environment

Please read the following text carefully:

More than half of the cocoa beans available worldwide are produced in West Africa. Cocoa production continues to use pesticides that have long been banned in the EU because of their danger to humans and the environment. The detected pesticide residues in cocoa beans have negative effects on the health of cocoa farmers and on the environment.

In addition to the 200 premium points for participating in this survey, you will receive **additional premium points and chocolate**. You will receive a voucher from LINK for the chocolate, and the premium points will be credited to your LINK premium account.

The choice is yours: Which alternative do you choose?

300 premium points and 100g milk chocolate
(value: 60 premium points)

☐

100g fair trade milk chocolate (value: 180
premium points)

☐

Treatment 6: Information on Poverty

Please read the following text carefully:

A large part of the cocoa we consume is grown by small farmers in West Africa. These farmers receive only 5% of the price we pay for chocolate in the supermarket. Poverty is widespread in the cocoa fields of West Africa: most smallholders earn less than 1 CHF a day.

In addition to the 200 premium points for participating in this survey, you will receive **additional premium points and chocolate**. You will receive a voucher from LINK for the chocolate, and the premium points will be credited to your LINK premium account.

The choice is yours: Which alternative do you choose?

300 premium points and 100g milk chocolate
(value: 60 premium points)

☐

100g fair trade milk chocolate (value: 180
premium points)

☐

Treatment 7: Information on Fairtrade

Please read the following text carefully:

An estimated 200,000 farmers worldwide produce and sell cocoa under a FAIRTRADE seal.

*The **FAIRTRADE minimum price** for cocoa received by farmers is to be understood as a safety net and is intended to cover the average production costs for sustainable production. If the respective world market price is higher, the trader must pay the higher market price.*

*In addition to a minimum price, farmers receive a **FAIRTRADE premium**. In cooperatives, the farmer families decide together in which social, ecological or economic projects the premium will be invested locally.*

*The **FAIRTRADE Standards** also contain criteria on democratic organisational structures (cooperatives), the promotion of organic farming, regulated working conditions and a ban on exploitative child labour.*

All actors involved along the supply chain are regularly controlled by an independent certification body.

In addition to the 200 premium points for participating in this survey, you will receive **additional premium points and chocolate**. You will receive a voucher from LINK for the chocolate, and the premium points will be credited to your LINK premium account.

The choice is yours: Which alternative do you choose?

300 premium points and 100g milk chocolate
(value: 60 premium points)

☐

100g fair trade milk chocolate (value: 180
premium points)

☐

Treatment 8: Negative Information on Fairtrade

Please read the following text carefully:

According to a new scientific study, the living conditions of farmers who produce FAIRTRADE chocolate are hardly better than the living conditions of other small farmers. To be certified, producers must grow all their cocoa under FAIRTRADE conditions, which entails costs. Many can only sell a third of their harvest under the FAIRTRADE label. In addition, cocoa farmers with the FAIRTRADE label can benefit from a fixed minimum price but, in the case of cocoa, this price has been below the global market price for years.

In addition to the 200 premium points for participating in this survey, you will receive **additional premium points and chocolate**. You will receive a voucher from LINK for the chocolate, and the premium points will be credited to your LINK premium account.

The choice is yours: Which alternative do you choose?

300 premium points and 100g milk chocolate
(value: 60 premium points)

☐

100g fair trade milk chocolate (value: 180
premium points)

☐

Survey Experiment Questionnaire (original)

Herzlich willkommen!

Diese wissenschaftliche Studie wird von der Eidgenössischen Technischen Hochschule (ETH) Zürich in Zusammenarbeit mit LINK durchgeführt.

Datenschutz

Alle Daten, die wir sammeln, werden vertraulich behandelt. Wir legen hohen Wert auf die Achtung des privaten Datenschutzes. Ihre Antworten werden nicht mit Ihrem Namen und/oder Ihrer Email Adresse in Verbindung gebracht. Durch Ihre Teilnahme an dieser Studie erklären Sie sich damit einverstanden, dass die gesammelten Daten von der ETH Zürich analysiert und in aggregierter Form publiziert werden. Informationen, die es ermöglichen würden, Sie zu identifizieren, werden unter keinen Umständen publiziert oder in einer Präsentation verwendet.

Kontaktinformation

Sofern Sie Fragen oder Kommentare zu dieser Studie haben, melden Sie sich bitte bei: panel@link.ch

Wenn möglich, füllen Sie den Fragebogen bitte an einem Computer aus, da hier eine optimale Darstellung der Fragen gewährleistet werden kann.

Ich habe die oben angegebenen Informationen gelesen und möchte an dieser Studie teilnehmen.

Ja

☐

Nein

☐

Sie benötigen circa **20 Minuten**, um diesen Fragebogen auszufüllen. Der Fragebogen besteht aus verschiedenen thematischen Teilen.

Unabhängig von Ihren Antworten und Ihren Entscheidungen werden Sie 200 Prämien-Punkte erhalten. Diese 200 Punkte entsprechen:

- 2 CHF Geldauszahlung
- 200 Coop Superpunkte
- 200 Migros Cumulus Punkte

In dieser Umfrage können Sie **zusätzlich bis zu 400 Prämien-Punkte sammeln**. Diese sind von Ihren Entscheidungen abhängig. 1 zusätzlicher Prämien-Punkt entspricht jeweils:

- 1 Rappen
- 1 Coop Superpunkt
- 1 Migros Cumulus Punkt

Control Group 1: Conventional Versus Fair Trade Chocolate

Zu den 200 Prämien-Punkten für die Teilnahme an dieser Umfrage, verdienen Sie nochmals **200 zusätzliche Prämien-Punkte**, welche Sie auf den folgenden Seiten ausgeben können.

Sie haben die Wahl: Wie möchten Sie Ihre **200 zusätzlichen Prämien-Punkte** ausgeben?

Zu Ihrer Information: Für die Schokolade wird Ihnen einen Gutschein von LINK zugeschickt.

100g Milkschokolade (Wert: 100
Prämien-Punkte) und 100 Prämien-Punkte auf
mein LINK-Prämienkonto

☐

100g fair gehandelte Milkschokolade (Wert:
200 Prämien-Punkte)

☐

Treatment 1: Conventional Chocolate Versus Conventional Chocolate Plus Donation

Zu den 200 Prämien-Punkten für die Teilnahme an dieser Umfrage, verdienen Sie nochmals **200 zusätzliche Prämien-Punkte**, welche Sie auf den folgenden Seiten ausgeben können.

Sie haben die Wahl: Wie möchten Sie Ihre 200 zusätzlichen Prämien-Punkte ausgeben?

Zu Ihrer Information: Für die Schokolade wird Ihnen einen Gutschein von LINK zugeschickt.

100g Milkschokolade (Wert: 100
Prämien-Punkte) und 100 Prämien-Punkte auf
mein LINK-Prämienkonto

☐

100g Milkschokolade (Wert: 100 und 100
Prämien-Punkte Spende an ein Schweizer
Hilfswerk, welches sich für arme Bauern in
Entwicklungsländer einsetzt

☐

Treatment 2: Conventional Chocolate With Picture (Without Brand) Versus Fairtrade Chocolate

Zu den 200 Prämien-Punkten für die Teilnahme an dieser Umfrage, verdienen Sie nochmals **200 zusätzliche Prämien-Punkte**, welche Sie auf den folgenden Seiten ausgeben können.

Sie haben die Wahl: Wie möchten Sie Ihre 200 zusätzlichen Prämien-Punkte ausgeben?

Zu Ihrer Information: Für die Schokolade wird Ihnen einen Gutschein von LINK zugeschickt.

Diese Schokolade (Wert: 200 Prämien-Punkte)

und 100 Prämien-Punkte auf mein

LINK-Prämienkonto



Diese Schokolade (Wert: 200 Prämien-Punkte)



Treatment 3: Conventional Chocolate With Picture and Brand Versus Fair-trade Chocolate

Zu den 200 Prämien-Punkten für die Teilnahme an dieser Umfrage, verdienen Sie nochmals **200 zusätzliche Prämien-Punkte**, welche Sie auf den folgenden Seiten ausgeben können.

Sie haben die Wahl: Wie möchten Sie Ihre 200 zusätzlichen Prämien-Punkte ausgeben?

Zu Ihrer Information: Für die Schokolade wird Ihnen einen Gutschein von LINK zugeschickt.

Diese Schokolade (Wert: 200 Prämien-Punkte)

Diese Schokolade (Wert: 200 Prämien-Punkte)



Control Group 2: No Information

Zusätzlich zu den 200 Prämien-Punkten für die Teilnahme an dieser Umfrage, erhalten Sie weitere **Prämien-Punkte und Schokolade**. Für die Schokolade wird Ihnen einen Gutschein von LINK zugeschickt, die Prämienpunkte werden ihrem LINK-Prämienkonto gutgeschrieben.

Sie haben die Wahl: Für welche Alternative entscheiden Sie sich?

300 Prämien-Punkte und 100g Milkschokolade
(Wert: 60 Prämien-Punkte)

☐

100g fair gehandelte Milkschokolade (Wert:
180 Prämien-Punkte)

☐

Treatment 4: Information on Child Labour

Bitte lesen Sie aufmerksam folgenden Text:

Eine Million Kinder schuften auf Westafrikanischen Kakaoplantagen. Kinder, die Zentner schwere Kübel tragen und Kinder, die an sieben Tagen in der Woche im Regenwald arbeiten, damit wir billige Schokolade bekommen. Diese Kinder gehen meist nicht zur Schule und sie verletzen sich ständig an den scharfen Macheten für die Kakaoernte.

Zusätzlich zu den 200 Prämien-Punkten für die Teilnahme an dieser Umfrage, erhalten Sie weitere **Prämien-Punkte und Schokolade**. Für die Schokolade wird Ihnen einen Gutschein von LINK zugeschickt, die Prämienpunkte werden ihrem LINK-Prämienkonto gutgeschrieben.

Sie haben die Wahl: Für welche Alternative entscheiden Sie sich?

300 Prämien-Punkte und 100g Milkschokolade
(Wert: 60 Prämien-Punkte)

☐

100g fair gehandelte Milkschokolade (Wert:
180 Prämien-Punkte)

☐

Treatment 5: Information on the Environment

Bitte lesen Sie aufmerksam folgenden Text:

Mehr als die Hälfte der weltweit verfügbaren Kakaobohnen werden in Westafrika produziert. In der Kakao-Produktion werden nach wie vor Pestizide eingesetzt, die in der EU aufgrund ihrer Gefährlichkeit für Mensch und Umwelt längst verboten sind. Die nachgewiesenen Pestizid-Rückstände in den Kakaobohnen haben negative Auswirkungen auf die Gesundheit der Kakaobauern und auf die Umwelt.

Zusätzlich zu den 200 Prämien-Punkten für die Teilnahme an dieser Umfrage, erhalten Sie weitere **Prämien-Punkte und Schokolade**. Für die Schokolade wird Ihnen einen Gutschein von LINK zugeschickt, die Prämienpunkte werden ihrem LINK-Prämienkonto gutgeschrieben.

Sie haben die Wahl: Für welche Alternative entscheiden Sie sich?

300 Prämien-Punkte und 100g Milkschokolade
(Wert: 60 Prämien-Punkte)

☐

100g fair gehandelte Milkschokolade (Wert:
180 Prämien-Punkte)

☐

Treatment 6: Information on Poverty

Bitte lesen Sie aufmerksam folgenden Text:

Ein Grossteil des Kakaos, den wir konsumieren, wird von Kleinbauern in Westafrika angebaut. Diese Kakaobauern erhalten lediglich 5% des Preises, den wir für die Schokolade im Supermarkt bezahlen. Auf den Kakaofeldern Westafrikas ist Armut weitverbreitet: die meisten Kleinbauern verdienen weniger als 1 CHF am Tag.

Zusätzlich zu den 200 Prämien-Punkten für die Teilnahme an dieser Umfrage, erhalten Sie weitere **Prämien-Punkte und Schokolade**. Für die Schokolade wird Ihnen einen Gutschein von LINK zugeschickt, die Prämienpunkte werden ihrem LINK-Prämienkonto gutgeschrieben.

Sie haben die Wahl: Für welche Alternative entscheiden Sie sich?

300 Prämien-Punkte und 100g Milkschokolade

(Wert: 60 Prämien-Punkte)



100g fair gehandelte Milkschokolade (Wert:

180 Prämien-Punkte)



Treatment 7: Information on Fairtrade

Bitte lesen Sie aufmerksam folgenden Text:

Schätzungsweise 200.000 Bauern produzieren und verkaufen weltweit unter einem FAIRTRADE Siegel Kakao.

*Der **FAIRTRADE-Mindestpreis** für Kakao den Bauern erhalten ist als Sicherheitsnetz zu verstehen und soll die durchschnittlichen Produktionskosten für eine nachhaltige Produktion decken. Liegt der jeweilige Welt-Marktpreis darüber, muss vom Händler der höhere Marktpreis bezahlt werden.*

*Zusätzlich zum Mindestpreis erhalten die Bauern die **FAIRTRADE-Prämie**. In Kooperativen entscheiden die Bauernfamilien gemeinsam, in welche sozialen, ökologischen oder ökonomischen Projekte vor Ort die Prämie investiert wird.*

*Die **FAIRTRADE-Standards** enthalten darüber hinaus Kriterien zu demokratischen Organisationsstrukturen (Kooperativen), Förderung des Bio-Anbaus, geregelten Arbeitsbedingungen und Verbot von ausbeuterischer Kinderarbeit.*

Entsprechend werden alle beteiligten Akteure entlang der Lieferkette regelmässig von einer unabhängigen Zertifizierungsstelle kontrolliert.

Zusätzlich zu den 200 Prämien-Punkten für die Teilnahme an dieser Umfrage, erhalten Sie weitere **Prämien-Punkte und Schokolade**. Für die Schokolade wird Ihnen einen Gutschein von LINK zugeschickt, die Prämienpunkte werden ihrem LINK-Prämienkonto gutgeschrieben.

Sie haben die Wahl: Für welche Alternative entscheiden Sie sich?

300 Prämien-Punkte und 100g Milkschokolade
(Wert: 60 Prämien-Punkte)



100g fair gehandelte Milkschokolade (Wert:
180 Prämien-Punkte)



Treatment 8: Negative Information on Fairtrade

Please read the following text carefully:

Laut einer neuen wissenschaftlichen Studie sind die Lebensbedingungen von Bauern, die FAIRTRADE Schokolade produzieren, kaum besser als die Lebensbedingungen von anderen Kleinbauern. Um zertifiziert zu werden, müssen Produzenten ihren ganzen Kakao unter FAIRTRADE-Bedingungen anbauen, was Kosten mit sich bringt. Unter dem FAIRTRADE-Label verkaufen können viele aber nur einen Drittel ihrer Ernte. Zusätzlich profitieren Kakaobauern mit FAIRTRADE-Label zwar von einem fixen Mindestpreis, bei Kakao liegt dieser allerdings schon seit Jahren unter dem globalen Marktpreis.

Zusätzlich zu den 200 Prämien-Punkten für die Teilnahme an dieser Umfrage, erhalten Sie weitere **Prämien-Punkte und Schokolade**. Für die Schokolade wird Ihnen einen Gutschein von LINK zugeschickt, die Prämienpunkte werden ihrem LINK-Prämienkonto gutgeschrieben.

Sie haben die Wahl: Für welche Alternative entscheiden Sie sich?

300 Prämien-Punkte und 100g Milkschokolade
(Wert: 60 Prämien-Punkte)



100g fair gehandelte Milkschokolade (Wert:
180 Prämien-Punkte)

