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TI 2022-016/I Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper

Habitual Communication

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Habitual communication*

Konstantinos Ioannidis 💿 !

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Abstract

Many everyday activities are habitual. Among the most common human activities is communication. If people primarily communicate in a common-interests environment, they may form habits of truth-telling and believing messages. If they primarily communicate in a conflicting-interests environment, they may form habits of lying and mistrusting messages. We provide experimental evidence that habits affect strategic communication in an unfamiliar environment. Additionally, we contrast two mechanisms through which habits operate, preference formation and inattention. By varying the frequency of communicating in the unfamiliar environment, we find an effect only when the unfamiliar environment occurs rarely. Our results favor inattention as preference formation would predict an effect irrespective of the frequency of the new environment. Analysis of individual decisions sheds further light on the mechanisms. Our findings highlight the importance of accounting for habits, especially when studying human behavior in infrequent situations.

Keywords: Habits, Strategic information transmission, Communication, Experiment JEL Codes: D91, C92, D01, D83

1 Introduction

People communicate more honestly than predicted by economic models of self-interested agents maximizing their monetary utility, both in individual (Gibson et al., 2013; Abeler et al., 2014, 2019) and in strategic settings (Gneezy, 2005; Leib, 2021). The propensity to communicate honestly has been shown to vary both between individuals (Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz, 2007; Hurkens and Kartik, 2009; Serota et al., 2010) and between groups such as country (Dieckmann et al., 2016; Cohn et al., 2019), occupation (Cohn et al., 2014, 2015) and religiosity (Arbel et al., 2014). Primarily interacting in common-interest settings may facilitate the formation of habits of truth-telling and believing messages. Primarily interacting in conflicting–interest settings may facilitate the formation of habits of lying and distrusting messages. If communication is affected by habits, then excessive honesty may be derived from familiarity with common-interest settings. This paper provides empirical evidence for this line of reasoning.

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We focus on strategic communication in the form of strategic information transmission between two asymmetrically informed agents where (i) preferences are misaligned and (ii) messages do not directly affect monetary payoffs. Many economically relevant interactions are characterized by such information asymmetry. A suspect knows if he is guilty or not, whereas a judge does not. A seller knows the true quality of his product, whereas a buyer may not. In such situations, the informed agent may send a message to the uninformed one. How informative will this communication be? In a seminar paper, Crawford and Sobel (1982) analyzed such cheap talk games and showed that communication becomes less informative when the preferences of the sender and the receiver diverge.

Modern psychology and neuroscience define habits as cue-response associations acquired through repeated interactions in a stable context (Wood and Rünger, 2016; Mazar and Wood, 2018). Habitual behavior is fast, subconscious, and, even though initially driven by goal pursuit, eventually follows automatically from the cues without goal dependence.¹ In the framework of dual process theory of reasoning (Kahneman, 2011), habits shape the default automatic response (System 1) and are only sometimes overridden by deliberate thinking with sufficient motivation (System 2). Empirical evidence document that a large part of everyday activities are habitual. Diary studies asking subjects to report their activities every hour have found that about 43% of human activities are repeated almost every day, in the same way, at the same time, without conscious deliberation (Wood et al., 2002; Lally et al., 2010). The prevalence of habits implies that, for many activities, the answer to why people act the way they do is simply because they are used to it.

The primary goal of the current paper is to investigate whether and how habitual behavior affects strategic communication. Specifically, we are interested to experimentally test two hypotheses: (i) whether familiarity with common-interest environments leads to more informative communication in unfamiliar environments compared to familiarity with conflicting-interests environments, and (ii) whether familiarity with common-interest environments leads to overcommunication whereas familiarity with conflicting-interest environments leads to undercommunication in unfamiliar environments.

The second goal of the paper is to contrast two behavioral mechanisms that can explain habit reliance. The first mechanism is preference formation mechanism. In our setup, preference formation would imply that agents familiar with a common-interest environment will develop a taste for truth-telling, whereas agents who typically communicate in a conflicting-interests environment will develop a taste for lying. In other words, exposure to a common-interest environment increases lying aversion whereas exposure to a conflicting-interests environment decreases it. Consequently, when interacting in a new environment, more lying averse agents will communicate more informatively than less lying averse agents. The second mechanism is inattention. Agents may insufficiently adapt their strategy either because they failed to notice the change in the environment or because the consequences of sticking to their strategy are moderate. Thus, inattention would predict that the likelihood of changing communication strategy depends on the expected costs and benefits of doing so as well as the salience of the

¹One of the first definition of habits dates all the way back to Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics*, where he defines them as dispositions, acquired through repetition, to perform certain types of action. We refer to Fleetwood (2019) for a comprehensive discussion of the different definitions of habits across economics, psychology and sociology.

change in the environment.

We use a controlled laboratory experiment to address our research questions. Our subjects play multiple rounds of a cheap talk sender-receiver game. In each round, the payoff-relevant state of the world is randomly drawn. The sender observes the true state whereas the receiver does not. The sender sends a message about the state to the receiver who then chooses an action determining the payoffs of both players. Our treatments vary the preference alignment between the two players. We use a 2×2 between-subjects treatment design. Subjects play overall 60 rounds of the sender-receiver game with either (fully) conflicting, partially aligned or (fully) aligned interests. The 60 rounds are divided in two parts of 30 rounds each. Treatments vary in (i) whether sender and receiver start with having conflicting or aligned interests in all 30 rounds of part one and (ii) whether they subsequently move on to having partially aligned interests throughout all the remaining 30 rounds or only occasionally so (randomly in 10 out of 30 rounds). Our primary data are the choices of subjects, i.e. sender messages and receiver actions. Additionally, we record decision times, we measure cognitive ability (via the CRT), and we elicit risk attitudes and trust attitudes.

Part one facilitates the formation of different communication habits. We use 30 rounds as habit formation requires long repetition in a stable environment (Wood and Rünger, 2016). We are interested in the effect of the (potentially) formed habits on the behavior in the unfamiliar environment with partially aligned preferences. We hypothesize that communication will be more informative for subjects who started with the aligned environment than for subjects who started with the conflicting environment. We measure the informativeness of the communication by the correlation between states and actions. Part two varies how often subjects interact in the unfamiliar environment. If the preference formation mechanism dominates, we would expect to see a treatment effect (higher correlations after aligned than after conflicting environment) irrespective of how often the new environment occurs. If inattention dominates, we would expect to see a treatment effect when the new environment occurs rarely, but not when it occurs frequently. By varying the frequency of the environment with partially aligned interests, we experimentally manipulate the salience of the change in preference alignment. This variation allows us to compare the strength of those two mechanisms. Additional measures such as decision times and CRT scores also shed light on the mechanisms.

Our main finding is that (on the aggregate level) communication under partially aligned interests is more informative for subjects who started with common-interests in part one, but only if they face the new environment rarely. This effect persists over time. When the new environment occurs frequently, subjects quickly adapt their behavior and we find no difference in the informativeness of communication. Thus, our evidence is consistent with inattention rather than preference formation. Additionally, the actual correlations between action and state provide a point estimate of the informativeness of communication. We find that, compared to the most informative equilibrium, subjects who started with the common-interest environment overcommunicate in the partial aligned case whereas subjects who started with the conflictinginterest environment undercommunicate.

To better understand behavior at the individual level, we classify subjects as habitual if their choices satisfy two conditions: (i) they use a stable strategy for the majority of decisions in part one, and (ii) they use the same strategy when interacting in the new environment. This classification reveals interesting patterns. First, more subjects are classified as habitual if they started with common-interest environment, which suggests that full alignment of preferences provided a simpler environment than fully conflicting and stronger habits were formed. Second, habitual subjects make decisions faster and have lower CRT scores, further suggesting that inattention increases the likelihood on relying on habit as a heuristic. Third, habitual subjects earn slightly less than non-habitual subjects, suggesting that reliance on habits was moderately costly.²

Our paper speaks to various strands of research. First, it is part of the economic literature on habit formation.³ Most of the studies focus on consumption habits, and, more specifically, on the effect of past consumption on future consumption (see Havranek et al. (2017) for a literature review and meta analysis of relevant studies). Empirical evidence also documents saving habits (De Mel et al., 2013; Schaner, 2018), exercising habits (Charness and Gneezy, 2009; Acland and Levy, 2015; Royer et al., 2015) and voting habits (Gerber et al., 2003; Meredith et al., 2009; Coppock and Green, 2016; Fujiwara et al., 2016).⁴ Closest to our design is Peysakhovich and Rand (2016). Motivated to explain the heterogeneity of prosocial preferences, they also use a two stage experiment. In stage one, they experimentally create norms of cooperation and defection by letting subjects play repeated prisoner dilemma games with either high or low continuation probabilities. In stage two, they elicit choices in a range of prosocial one-shot games like trust game, ultimatum game and dictator game. They find that subjects from the cooperative environment exhibit higher levels of prosociality. Our design is parallel to theirs in the setting of strategic information transmission, but allows for testing long term persistence since in our experiment the new environment occurs more than once. Our contribution to this literature is providing experimental evidence of habit formation in strategic communication.

A closely related research question is explored in Belot and van de Ven (2019). They expose subjects to either low and high incentives to lie in a sender-receiver game and reverse the incentives halfway through the experiment. They find no evidence of persistency of either honest or dishonest communication. Their design is similar to one of our treatments, namely the one where the shift to the new environment is permanent. A notable difference is that in their experiment subjects played 12-14 rounds in total whereas in ours they played 60 rounds. As also mentioned in their discussion, habit formation takes time and their shorter experiment may not have been able to facilitate it. However, we also find no effect of past experience when the change of environment is permanent, despite utilizing a longer experiment where habits could be (and actually are) formed. Hence, their results are strengthened in light of our results.

 $^{^{2}}$ This pattern is consistent with the general principles of rational inattention models. Such models essentially assume a trade-off between the cognitive cost of adjusting strategy and the cost of sticking to the same strategy (Sims, 2003; Caplin, 2016).

³There is also economic theory literature on habit formation, primarily aimed at relaxing the assumption of time-separable preferences. See for example Rozen (2010) and Chetty and Szeidl (2016).

⁴Related are also papers which study history-dependence and behavioral spillovers. Romero (2015) compares coordination in a minimum-effort game and finds higher effort levels when the cost parameter increased to a given value compared to when it decreased to the same value. Buser and Dreber (2016) find that subjects participating in a tournament paying scheme contribute less in a subsequent public good game than subjects paid on a fixed piece rate. Herz and Taubinsky (2018) show that subjects familiar with higher prices judge high prices as more fair compared to subjects familiar with lower prices.

Second, our results speak to the literature documenting communication differences between individuals (Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz, 2007; Hurkens and Kartik, 2009; Serota et al., 2010) as well as between groups such as countries (Holm and Kawagoe, 2010; Innes and Arnab, 2013; Pascual-Ezama et al., 2015; Hugh-Jones, 2016), occupation (Cohn et al., 2014, 2015) and religiosity (Arbel et al., 2014).⁵ With a randomized controlled experiment, we present evidence for a causal link between past environment and communication in a new environment. Thus, we document that habits can solidify communication differences and can (partially) explain the stickiness of these differences in atypical situations. Our paper, therefore, complements those studies and provides a habit formation interpretation of how such differences may have emerged.

Third, our paper belongs in the line of experimental cheap-talk games. Starting from Dickhaut et al. (1995), a long list of experiments have investigated the comparative statics of Crawford and Sobel (1982). A common finding is overcommunication; subjects typically communicate more information than the most informative equilibrium predicted by theory (Cai and Wang, 2006; Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz, 2007; Wang et al., 2010; De Haan et al., 2015).⁶ Our design allows us to test the conjecture that overcommunication is observed because subjects are used to common-interest environments outside of the lab. Such environments facilitate the formation of habits of honest informative communication. When participating in an experiment, subjects may carry this disposition towards honest communication with them. By varying their past experience, we observe both overcommunication and undercommunication, which is consistent with the conjecture.

A notable exception to the common overcommunication finding is Cabrales et al. (2020), who have also documented undercommunication in a cheap talk experiment. In their experiment, they introduce a market for information and vary whether the traded information is verifiable or not. They find that when information is unverifiable -as is the case in our experiment-, the level of market activity is much lower than equilibrium predictions whereas when information is verifiable, the level of market activity is similar to equilibrium. Our experiments differ substantially. In their experiment, information acquisition is costly and an auction mechanism determines whether information is sold or not. In our experiment, information is freely observable by the sender and they always send a free message to the receiver, thus, eliminating any direct cost of information for both agents.

The results of our study arguably have some broader implications. We find that heterogeneity in communication can be (partially) attributed to familiarity with communicating in common-interest or conflicting-interest environments. Peysakhovich and Rand (2016) show that heterogeneity in cooperation can be attributed to familiarity with interacting in more cooperative or less cooperative environments. We view those findings as evidence that habits affect behavior in a wide range of situations. Thus, we need to take into account how familiar agents are with a given situation when studying human behavior. This is particularly important when the degree of familiarity is low and decisions may be influenced by sufficiently similar everyday activities where habits are formed. To enhance our understanding of habits, it is fruitful to study habit formation both empirically and experimentally in different domains. At the same time,

⁵There is also mixed evidence for gender differences in lying aversion. Rosenbaum et al. (2014) presents a comprehensive literature review of experiments on honesty and discusses heterogeneity across various dimensions.

 $^{^{6}}$ A comprehensive literature review of experimental cheap talk games can be found in Blume et al. (2020).

incorporating habitual behavior in theoretical models will also help us better predict behavior, especially when deriving predictions for relatively rarely occurring situations.⁷

The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed presentation of the sender-receiver game and equilibrium predictions, the experimental design, and the predictions. All results are presented in Section 3. We end the paper with Section 4 which interprets the results, positions the contributions and suggests areas for future research.

2 Design & Predictions

2.1 The sender-receiver game

The experiment considers a discrete cheap talk game with five possible states. In the beginning of each round, the state of the world (s) is uniformly drawn from the set $S = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$. The prior distribution is commonly known. The sender privately observes the draw and has to send a message (m) to the receiver. The possible messages are of the form "*The state is m*", where $m \in M = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$. The receiver is uninformed about the true state of the world. After observing the sender's message, the receiver chooses an action (a) from the set $A = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$. The action determines the payoffs of both players and ends the round.

The payoffs depend only on the state and the action (and not on the message), and are given below.⁸

$$U^{S}(a,s,b) = 110 - 20|s+b-a|^{1.4}$$
 and $U^{R}(a,s) = 110 - 20|s-a|^{1.4}$

From the (induced) utility functions, it is clear that the receiver optimally wants to match the true state (a = s) whereas the sender wants the receiver to choose an action higher than the state (a = s + b). Thus, the parameter b naturally captures the alignment of interests between the sender and the receiver; the larger b, the larger the sender's bias is.

2.2 Perfect Bayesian equilibria of the sender-receiver game

Crawford and Sobel (1982) analyzed such games and showed that all equilibria are partition equilibria. In such an equilibrium, the sender partitions the state space and randomly selects one message from each element of the partition. The larger the bias parameter, the more coarse the partition is. In other words, less information is revealed by the sender and less faith is placed in the message by the receiver when their preferences are less aligned. Typically there exist multiple equilibria for each value of b. Crawford and Sobel (1982) showed that the most informative equilibrium is Pareto superior to all other equilibria.⁹

In our treatments, we use three bias values. The fully aligned environment corresponds to b = 0.2, the partially aligned corresponds to b = 1, and the fully conflicting corresponds to

⁷Theoretical models in this direction are Samuelson (2001) and Jehiel (2005).

⁸The payoff functions are taken from Cai and Wang (2006) and Wang et al. (2010). The value of 1.4 in the exponent is used to enhance the salience of payoff differences across receiver actions. Cai and Wang (2006) used various values as a robustness check with similar results.

⁹While some equilibrium selection criteria are too strict and eliminate all equilibria in Crawford-Sobel like games (Matthews et al., 1991; Farrell, 1993), criteria that do select an equilibrium, typically select the most informative one (Chen et al., 2008; de Groot Ruiz et al., 2015).

b = 2. Table 1 lists all the perfect Bayesian equilibria for the values of b used in our treatments.¹⁰ The equilibria are Pareto ranked with the last equilibrium for each bias value being the most informative as well as the most profitable.

1 0.0	3.6	A	a (a.t.)
b = 0.2	Messages	Actions	$\operatorname{Corr}(S,A)$
1	$\{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$	$\{3\}$	0.00
2	$\{1, 2\}, \{3, 4, 5\}$	$\{1, 2\}, \{4\}$	0.84
3	$\{1, 2, 3\}, \{4, 5\}$	$\{2\}, \{4, 5\}$	0.84
4	$\{1\}, \{2, 3\}, \{4, 5\}$	$\{1\}, \{2, 3\}, \{4, 5\}$	0.90
5	$\{1, 2\}, \{3\}, \{4, 5\}$	$\{1, 2\}, \{3\}, \{4, 5\}$	0.90
6	$\{1, 2\}, \{3, 4\}, \{5\}$	$\{1, 2\}, \{3, 4\}, \{5\}$	0.90
7	$\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3\}, \{4, 5\}$	$\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3\}, \{4, 5\}$	0.95
8	$\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3, 4\}, \{5\}$	$\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3, 4\}, \{5\}$	0.95
9	$\{1\}, \{2, 3\}, \{4\}, \{5\}$	$\{1\}, \{2, 3\}, \{4\}, \{5\}$	0.95
10	$\{1, 2\}, \{3\}, \{4\}, \{5\}$	$\{1, 2\}, \{3\}, \{4\}, \{5\}$	0.95
11	$\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3\}, \{4\}, \{5\}$	$\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3\}, \{4\}, \{5\}$	1.00
b = 1.0	Messages	Actions	$\operatorname{Corr}(S,A)$
1	$\{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$	{3}	0.00
2	$\{1\}, \{2, 3, 4, 5\}$	$\{1\}, \{3, 4\}$	0.65
b = 2.0	Messages	Actions	$\operatorname{Corr}(S,A)$
1	$\{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$	{3}	0.00

Note: Rows describe the equilibria. Corr(S,A) is correlation between state and action.

Table 1: Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria for values of b used in the experiment

Each row of the table represents one equilibrium. The *Messages* column describes the sender's partition of the state space. The *Actions* column describes the receiver's partition of the message space. For example, the second row when b = 1 is to be read as follows. The sender partitions the state space into two elements, $\{1\}$ and $\{2,3,4,5\}$. If the state is 1, the sender sends the message "The state is 1". If the state is either 2,3,4 or 5, the senders randomly sends a message between "The state is 2", "The state is 3", "The state is 4" and "The state is 5". In this equilibrium, the message "The state is 1" is followed by the receiver who chooses action 1. Any other message is interpreted as carrying the information that the true state is equally likely to be anywhere between 2 and 5. In that case, the best response of the receiver is to choose action 3 or action 4 with equal probabilities.

The table is augmented with the correlation between state and action in each equilibrium. We use the correlation as our measure of the informativeness of communication (henceforth just correlation). The correlation ranges from 0 for uninformative communication to 1 for fully informative communication.¹¹

2.3 Treatments

The subjects play 60 rounds of a sender-receiver game. The rounds are split in part one (rounds 1-30) and part two (rounds 31-60). We use a 2×2 between subjects design varying the value

¹⁰In subsection A.1 of the Appendix, we present the full list of equilibria for all positive values of b.

¹¹The choice of correlation between states and actions as a measure of informativeness is motivated by previous experimental literature to facilitate comparisons (Cai and Wang, 2006; Kawagoe and Takizawa, 2009; Wang et al., 2010).

of the bias parameter in the two parts. It is important to emphasize that the subjects are only aware that they will play 60 rounds, but not that there are two parts.

Part one is either Aligned or Conflict. In Aligned, the subjects play 30 rounds with a fixed bias parameter of b = 0.2. In Conflict, the subjects play 30 rounds with a fixed bias parameter of b = 2. Part two is either Rare or Frequent. In Frequent, the subjects play all rounds with a bias parameter of b = 1. In Rare, the subjects play in random order 10 rounds with b = 1 and 20 rounds with the same bias parameter as in part one (b = 0.2 if they started with Aligned and b = 2 if they started with Conflict). The random draws of rounds with b = 1 had been done beforehand and was kept constant across (the Rare) sessions. Overall, our design has four treatments, namely Aligned-Rare, Aligned-Frequent, Conflict-Rare, Conflict-Frequent. They are visualized in Figure 1.



Figure 1: Bias per round for each treatment

As can be seen from the figure, in each round the payoffs were slightly perturbed with a small noise. The noise was chosen to be small so that the overall incentive structure was not affected. This was to avoid experimental demand effect when the underlying bias changed. Without the noise, the bias would change after being the same for 30 rounds. This could alert subjects and they would arguably think they are supposed to make different choices. With the small noise, their utility functions slightly change in every round (and more sharply change when the underlying bias also changes).

2.4 Predictions

We are interested in the behavior of subjects in the unfamiliar new environment where b = 1. More specifically, we want to test whether starting in a common-interest environment results in more informative communication in the new environment compared to starting in a conflictinginterests environment. To test whether interacting in a new environment less frequently results in more habitual behavior, we compare correlations two times: (i) between Aligned-Rare and Conflict-Rare, and (ii) between Aligned-Frequent and Conflict-Frequent. To test for the persistence of the effect, we compare the correlations in the early (first 5) and in late rounds (next 5) of b = 1.

We use two-sided tests for all our hypotheses. We present our predictions for the direction of the effects.

Prediction 1 (Habitual communication when new environment occurs rarely).

- (a) Correlation in Aligned-Rare will be higher than in Conflict-Rare in early rounds.
- (b) Correlation in Aligned-Rare will be higher than in Conflict-Rare in late rounds.

Prediction 2 (Habitual communication when new environment occurs frequently).

- (a) Correlation in Aligned-Frequent will be higher than in Conflict-Frequent in early rounds.
- (b) Correlation in Aligned-Frequent will be higher than in Conflict-Frequent in late rounds.

A secondary set of predictions is related to the absolute levels of correlation in each treatment. We predict that the correlation after aligned (conflicting) environment will be higher (lower) than in the (most informative) equilibrium (see Table 1).

Prediction 3 (Overcommunication and undercommunication).

- (a) Correlation in Aligned-Rare will be higher than 0.650.
- (b) Correlation in Aligned-Frequent will be higher than 0.650.
- (c) Correlation in Conflict-Rare will be lower than 0.650.
- (d) Correlation in Conflict-Frequent will be lower than 0.650.

2.5 Procedure

The computerized laboratory experiment was conducted online in October and November of 2020. All subjects were recruited from the subject pool of the CREED laboratory of the University of Amsterdam. The experiment was programmed in oTree (Chen et al., 2016) and preregistered.¹² Each treatment arm used 64 subjects, resulting in 256 subjects in total. Subjects were on average 22 years old (mean = 22.37, SD = 4.29, min = 18, max = 60), primarily Economics students (64%), and evenly balanced across genders (52% female, 48% male). Each subject participated only once. They earned on average ≈ 27 (mean = 27.33, SD = 6.12, min = 6.95, max = 35.5) in approximately two hours.

Given that the experiment was run online, connectivity issues could temporarily prevent subjects from accessing the experiment. To avoid delaying the whole session, a maximum of 180 seconds was allowed per decision. The timer was initially hidden from the subjects and only appeared when they had 30 seconds left.¹³ If a subject failed to make a choice within

¹²Preregistration was made in the American Economic Association's registry for randomized controlled trials and can be accessed at https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/6387/history/87646.

¹³This message was shown in 32 out of 15360 decision screens and in 236 out of 15360 feedback screens.

180 seconds, they were flagged as inactive. This automatically resulted in 0 points for them in that round. Their partner received 100 points and was informed that their partner was inactive in that round. To ensure the session proceeded without further delays, the maximum time available was reduced by 30 seconds for every round a subject was inactive. Thus, if a subject was inactive for more than five consecutive rounds, they would be removed from the rest of the experiment.¹⁴

16 subjects participated in each session and were randomized into matching groups of eight.¹⁵ Each matching group was randomly assigned to a treatment. Within a matching group, the subjects were randomly assigned a role (i.e. sender or receiver) and kept it throughout the experiment.¹⁶ They were informed that the main experiment will last 60 rounds and that their cumulative earnings from all rounds will be converted to euros at a rate of 200 points per euro. After reading the rules of the sender-receiver game, they had to correctly answer a series of understanding questions.

In the main experiment, they played 60 rounds of the sender-receiver game. They were randomly rematched within their matching group in every round to avoid reputation effects. Eight independent sequences of true states were drawn before the experiment and used for each matching group respectively. The same sequences were used for all treatments to minimize the difference in the variation of true states across all treatments.¹⁷

The payoffs for both players were shown in a table whenever they made their choices; both when the senders were choosing a message and when the receivers were choosing an action. At the end of each round, both players received complete feedback about the true state, the message sent, the action chosen and the realized payoffs of both players. The feedback screen also included the payoff table, allowing the subjects to reflect on their choices.

The experiment ended with three post-experiment questionnaires measuring risk attitudes, cognitive ability, and trust attitudes, as well as a survey of standard demographics (age, gender, field of study).

The first questionnaire measured risk attitudes using the lottery method of Eckel and Grossman (2002).¹⁸ The subjects had to choose from a series of lotteries whose expected payoff increases with variance. Their choice was incentivized and realized by the computer. Given the informational asymmetry of the interaction, controlling for risk is necessary as, for example, risk averse receivers may choose the ex-ante optimal action (a = 3).

The second questionnaire measured cognitive ability using the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) of Frederick (2005). CRT consists of questions with intuitive, but wrong, answers and measures the tendency to override intuition and deliberately reflect on the correct answer. It has been shown to correlate with the tendency to rely on heuristics (Welsh et al., 2013) and

 $^{^{14}}$ No subject was removed due to technical issues. In total four senders and ten receivers (not paired with each other) were inactive for one round, and two receivers were inactive for two rounds. Thus, we later remove 18 observations from our analysis.

¹⁵Due to attendance issues, two sessions had only 14 subjects and two sessions had 18 subjects. Thus, two matching groups have less subjects (six) and two matching groups have more subjects (ten).

¹⁶To avoid framing, in the experiment players were referred as player A (sender) and player B (receiver).

¹⁷To ensure that Aligned-Rare and Conflict-Rare treatments are as comparable as possible, we fixed the rounds in which b = 1 across all matching groups. The rounds in which b = 1 were 31, 35, 39, 42, 43, 46, 47, 52, 55 and 58.

 $^{^{18}}$ We chose this method for the simplicity of implementation. See Charness et al. (2013) for a discussion of different risk elicitation methods.

can predict rational thinking in a range of tasks (Toplak et al., 2014). To avoid subjects being familiar with the questions from participation in previous experiments, we used a modified set of questions.¹⁹ Measuring cognitive ability is interesting as subjects with lower CRT may overrely on habits, thus adapting their behavior less in the rounds where they play the unfamiliar game (b = 1). The CRT was also incentivized.

The third questionnaire measured general trust attitudes towards strangers. We used two questions adapted from the World Values Survey (Glaeser et al., 2000), namely: (i) "When we communicate with strangers, we tell them the truth.", and (ii) "When we communicate with strangers, they tell me the truth". We used a five-point Likert scale from -2 (strongly disagree) to +2 (strongly agree). Their attitudes were elicited to serve as a proxy for their baseline tendency towards honest communication. All else being equal, subjects who are more trusting towards strangers outside the lab may have a higher chance of sending a truthful message as senders or following a message as receivers.

Finally, decision times were recorded throughout the whole experiment.

3 Results

All reported tests are two-sided. All analyses (unless noted otherwise) are done on a matching group level aggregated over rounds to ensure all comparisons use fully independent observations. Results based on alternative specifications are included in the appendix as robustness checks.

3.1 Manipulation check: Differences in behavior in part one

This subsection documents the successful manipulation in part one of the experiment. Two pieces of evidence are presented to support this claim, namely correlations and decision times. For this subsection, which is based on data from part one only, we merge Aligned-Rare and Aligned-Conflict treatments, and Conflict-Rare with Conflict-Frequent treatments and refer to these as Aligned and Conflict environments.

The choices of subjects, as expected, differ dramatically between environments. This is in line with the different incentive structure of Aligned versus Conflict. Figure 2a shows the correlations between states and actions over the first 30 rounds. The average correlation in the Aligned environment is higher (mean = 0.953, N = 16) than the correlation in the Conflict environment (mean = 0.387, N = 16) and the difference is highly significant (Wilcoxon ranksum test, z = -4.753, p < 0.001, N = 32).²⁰ Thus, subjects communicated more informatively in the Aligned environment compared to the Conflict environment.

Decision times differ between environments and decrease over the rounds. This is evident from Figure 2b. The average decision time in the Aligned environment was 10.73 seconds and in

¹⁹The modified version consists of the following questions: (i) "The ages of Mark and Adam add up to 28 years total. Mark is 20 years older than Adam. How many years old is Adam?", (ii) "If it takes 10 seconds for 10 printers to print out 10 pages of paper, how many seconds will it take 50 printers to print out 50 pages of paper?", and (iii) "On a loaf of bread, there is a patch of mold. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 12 days for the patch to cover the entire loaf of bread, how many days would it take for the patch to cover half of the loaf of bread?" (Shenhav et al., 2012; Peysakhovich and Rand, 2016).

²⁰In subsection A.2, we present tests based also on correlations between states and messages and between messages and actions. The same pattern is observed. We also compare our results with previous experimental results and show that past findings replicate.



(a) Correlations between states and actions

(b) Decision times

Figure 2: Correlations and decision times in part one between Aligned and Conflict

the Conflict environment 22.04 seconds. This difference is highly significant (Wilcoxon ranksum test, z = 4.711, p < 0.001, N = 32). This observation is also confirmed in a regression of decision time on round and on environment, with errors clustered at the matching group level. The slope of the environment is significantly negative (b = -11.3, SE = 1.49, CI = [-14.34, -8.27], t = -7.59, p < 0.001, N = 960), indicating that subjects decided faster in the Aligned environment than in the Conflict environment. Additionally, the slope of round is also significantly negative (b = -0.41, SE = 0.50, CI = [-0.51, -0.31], t = -8.14, p < 0.001, N = 960), indicating that, within each environment, subjects decided faster over time.²¹

The difference in decision times reflects the difference in the complexity of the environment. In Aligned, subjects coordinated on the fully revealing equilibrium very fast and their choices were almost automatic. In Conflict, the decision is more complicated due to the preference misalignment, so subjects took more time to figure out what to do. As a side observation to further exemplify the difference in complexity of the environments, subjects in Conflict spent on average 29.6 seconds looking at the feedback screen whereas subjects in Aligned only spent 21.20 seconds. The difference is significant (Wilcoxon ranksum test, z = 4.108, p = 0.005, N = 32), but not affected by rounds.

3.2 Treatment effects: Comparing communication after aligned vs conflict

We now turn to the main questions of interest: (i) is communication in the new environment with partially aligned interests more informative for subjects who started with Aligned versus Conflict environment in part one?, (ii) is the effect stronger when subjects face the new environment sporadically (in Rare) versus permanently (in Frequent)?, and (iii) do those differences persist over time?

To answer these questions, we compare correlations when b = 1 between Aligned and Conflict environments. As illustrated in Prediction 1 and Prediction 2, the comparison is done separately for early rounds and for late rounds of part two. For the Rare case, subjects faced b = 1 only 10 times. We define as early rounds the first five (31, 35, 39, 42, 43) where they did so and as

²¹Regressions were also performed on individual level. Those regressions included control variables (risk, CRT, trust, age, gender, study). The conclusions remain the same. Regressions can be found in Table A5.

late the last five (46, 47, 52, 55, 58). For the Frequent case, subjects faced b=1 in all 30 rounds of the part two. There we define rounds 31-35 as early and 36-40 as late.²²

All comparisons are visualized in Figure 3. Within each treatment, correlations are presented separately for early and for late rounds. We note here that both in Figure 3 as well as the analysis in this section, we use aggregated observations (both over subjects in a matching group and over rounds) to ensure all comparisons use independent observations. This approach leaves us with eight independent observations per treatment. The upside is that differences which are significant with this conservative approach indicate very high confidence in the treatment effect. The downside is that some comparisons may be underpowered. To address the possible low power issue, in subsection A.3 we estimate ordered logistic regressions of receiver action on state (while clustering errors at the subject level) and verify that the conclusions presented here remain valid.

We first look at the left part of Figure 3a. In the early rounds, the correlation in Aligned-Rare is higher (mean = 0.829) than the correlation in the Conflict-Rare (mean = 0.508) and are significantly different (Wilcoxon ranksum test, z = -2.731, p = 0.0047, N = 16). The effect remains sizable and significant in the late rounds (Aligned-Rare: mean = 0.768, Conflict-Rare: mean = 0.401, Wilcoxon ranksum test, z = -2.310, p = 0.0207, N = 16). The upper graph of Figure 3b shows the correlation over the rounds of Aligned-Rare and Conflict-Rare. We see that the correlation after Aligned-Rare remained higher than after Conflict-Rare, further illustrating the treatment effect when the new environment occurs rarely.

Result 1. Communication in early rounds is more informative in Aligned-Rare than in Conflict-Rare treatment. The effect persists over time.

We now turn to the right part of Figure 3a. In the early rounds, the correlation in Aligned-Frequent (mean = 0.734) and the correlation in the Conflict-Frequent (mean = 0.661) are not significantly different (Wilcoxon ranksum test, z = -0.945, p = 0.3823, N = 16). In the late rounds, the correlation in Aligned-Frequent treatment (mean = 0.564) and the correlation in the Conflict-Frequent treatment (mean = 0.641) are also not significantly different (Wilcoxon ranksum test, z = 0.525, p = 0.6454, N = 16). The null effect is further illustrated in the bottom part of Figure 3b.

Result 2. There is no difference in the informativeness of communication between Aligned-Frequent and Conflict-Frequent treatments, neither in early nor in late rounds.

3.3 Overcommunication and undercommunication

We now turn our attention to the absolute levels of the correlations and test for overcommunication and undercommunication. We compare the observed correlations in all treatments with the equilibrium predicted correlation. As seen in Table 1, when b = 1, the most informative equilibrium has a correlation of 0.650. Prediction 3 suggests that the observed correlations will be higher than 0.650 after Aligned and lower than 0.650 after Conflict. The comparison is also visualized in Figure 3, where the horizontal black lines are at the equilibrium level of 0.650.

 $^{^{22}\}mathrm{The}$ results are qualitatively the same if we define rounds 56-60 as late.



Lines in each bar indicate 95% confidence intervals. Horizontal lines indicate equilibrium correlation (0.650).



(b) Correlations over rounds

Figure 3: Treatment effects

The comparison is performed by a signtest.²³ In early rounds of the Aligned-Rare treatment, the correlation is higher (mean = 0.829, signtest, p = 0.0039, N = 8) whereas for Conflict-Rare the correlation is lower (mean = 0.508, signtest, p = 0.1445, N = 8) than 0.650. The same pattern is observed in later rounds (Aligned-Rare: mean = 0.768, signtest, p = 0.1445, N = 8,

 $^{^{23}}$ Results from the regression method suggested by (Cai and Wang, 2006, footnote 12) are presented in subsection A.4. All conclusions remain valid with this alternative method.

Conflict-Rare: mean = 0.401, signtest, p = 0.0352, N = 8). All tests find no evidence that the correlation differs from 0.650 (p-values are between 0.363 and 0.634) in either early or late of Aligned-Frequent and Conflict-Frequent treatments.

Result 3. Overcommunication is observed in Aligned-Rare treatment and undercommunication in Conflict-Rare. The informativeness of communication in the Aligned-Frequent and Conflict-Frequent treatments does not differ from equilibrium predictions.

3.4 Habit formation and inattention mechanism at the individual level

The results presented so far are based on aggregate data. In this subsection, we look more closely in individual decisions to better understand habitual behavior. We are interested in two sets of comparisons. First, we want to compare the tendency to behave habitually across treatments. More specifically, to answer the questions (i) does starting from the simpler aligned environment result in stronger reliance on habits?, and (ii) do subjects rely more on habits when the new environment occurs rarely compared to frequently? Second, we want to compare individual characteristics between habitual and non-habitual subjects such as (iii) do habitual subjects make decisions faster, (iv) do habitual subjects have lower cognitive ability, (v) is relying on habits financially costly?, and (vi) are there more habitual receivers than senders?

To make those comparisons, we first need a method to classify subjects into habitual and nonhabitual. We apply a two-step procedure to do so. In the first step, we apply the psychology definition of habits. Habits are characterized by high automaticity and reduced dependence on goals (Wood and Rünger, 2016). We operationalize the definition into two requirements. High automaticity requires that subjects converge to a stable strategy in part one. The habit formation process takes time (Lally et al., 2010). To account for this, we ignore the first 10 rounds where subjects could potentially still be using trial and error. Reduced goal dependence requires that subjects relied on the same strategy in part two as they did in part one, despite the change in the preference alignment. A subject is classified as *habitual* if their choices satisfy *both* requirements.

We take a data-driven approach to identify behavioral strategies. The set of possible strategies we consider is not restricted to a particular theoretical model. For example, in similar experiments, individual decision analysis typically focused on level-k type classification of behavioral types (Cai and Wang, 2006; Wang et al., 2010). With our procedure, additional strategies are also included. For example, when b = 2, no level-k prediction would imply that senders should exaggerate the true state by one. L0 senders would tell the truth, L1 senders should exaggerate by two since they believe they are facing credulous receivers, and higher levels would exaggerate even more.²⁴ We apply our classification method on rounds 11-30 of the first part and on the 10 rounds of part two where subjects played in the new environment.

We consider all possible pure strategies that can exist in the game. For senders, for each of

 $^{^{24}}$ Other econometric methods to estimate behavioral strategies are the Structural Frequency Estimation Method of Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) and the spike-logit model of Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006). In those methods, the set of candidate strategies is predefined. Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) consider whether alternative strategies (pseudotypes) provide a better fit than the original strategies as a robustness check for their classifications. Our method has a similar intuition in the sense that we consider every possible strategy and choose the best fitting one.

the five possible states, they can choose among five possible messages, resulting in 3,125 possible strategies. Symmetrically, for receivers, for each of the five possible messages they receive, they can choose among five possible actions, also resulting in 3,125 possible strategies. Next, we compute the percentage of decisions consistent with each of the strategies. Eligible strategies are those that are consistent with at least 60% of subject choices. This threshold is used as a compliance rate in behavioral type analysis of sender-receiver games in (Cai and Wang, 2006; Wang et al., 2010). Among the eligible strategies (if any), we select the one with the highest percentage. The compliance rate of 60% is used for both part one and part two.

We can successfully identify behavioral strategies for 228 subjects (out of 256) for part one and for 236 subjects for part two. In total six subjects remain unclassified in both part one and part two and, consequently, are classified as non-habitual. However, those subjects could have formed the habit of *being unpredictable* by using a mixed strategy. To account for the possibility of habitual mixing, we augment our procedure with a second step which attempts to correct for this limitation. We estimate a regression of choice on cue (for senders this is message on state, for receivers this is action on message) including data from both parts and incorporate an interaction effect to allow for different slopes across parts. Formally, we estimate the following regression

$$Choice_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * Cue_i + \beta_2 * Part_i + \beta_3 * Part_i * Cue_i + \epsilon$$

If β_2 and β_3 are jointly significant, then the subject changed strategy. If not, then the subject used the same strategy and is classified as habitual. Our second step essentially equates habitual behavior with (statistically) similarly informative choices between part one and part two.

Table 2 below shows the number of habitual subjects across treatments.²⁵ We remind the reader that there are 32 senders and 32 receivers in each treatment. In total 112 subjects are classified as habitual.

		Treat	ment						
Role	A-F	A-R	C-F	C-R					
Sender	14	11	10	13					
Receiver	16	25	11	12					
Total	30	36	21	25					
Treatment abbreviations:									
A-F = Aligned-Frequent									
A-R = Alig	A-R = Aligned-Rare								
C-F = Conflict-Frequent									
C-R = Con	flict-Ra	re							

Table 2: Habitual subjects per treatment

First, we look at the effect of the complexity of the initial environment on habit formation. Aggregated, in Aligned-Frequent and Aligned-Rare 66 out of 128 subjects behaved habitually

 $^{^{25}}$ The full lists of strategies (for both habitual and non-habitual subjects, and for both part one and part two) are presented in subsection A.5. In subsection subsection A.6 we also redo our analysis using a threshold of 80%. With the higher threshold, essentially we require an even higher automaticity. All results presented here are qualitatively the same.

compared to 46 out of 128 Conflict-Frequent and Conflict-Rare (proportion test, z = 2.5198, p = 0.0117, N = 256). Thus, more subjects relied on habits if they started with commoninterest environments compared to conflicting-interest environments. This observation suggests that the simplicity of the common interest environment facilitated the formation of stronger habits and is in line with psychology findings on the effect of complexity on habit formation (Wood et al., 2002; Verplanken, 2006). In more complex environments, like Conflict-Frequent and Conflict-Rare in our experiment, reaching a stable strategy is harder.

Second, we are interested to see whether subjects are more likely to rely on habit when they face the new environment rarely compared to frequently. Our data are in the expected direction, but the difference is not significant. Taken together, in Aligned-Rare and Conflict-Rare 61 out of 128 subjects behaved habitually compared to 51 out of 128 in Conflict-Frequent and Conflict-Rare (proportion test, z = 1.2599, p = 0.2077, N = 256).

Third, we would expect habitual subjects to decide faster in the new environment. This is clearly supported by our data. When facing the new environment, habitual subjects on average made decisions in 13.47 seconds whereas non-habitual subjects made decisions in 16.47 seconds (Wilcoxon ranksum test, z = 2.799, p-value= 0.0051, N = 256). To have a benchmark on their decision times from part one, we can look at the difference in decision time between part one and part two. Overall subjects who started in common-interests environment *increased* their decision times by 5.75 seconds whereas subjects who started in conflicting-interests environment *decreased* their decision times by 3.67 seconds.

Separately comparing time differences between habitual and non-habitual subjects for each treatment reveals an interesting pattern. In Aligned-Frequent and Aligned-Rare, decision times of non-habitual subjects increased significantly more than decision times of habitual subjects (Wilcoxon ranksum test, Aligned-Frequent: z = 2.153, p-value=0.0313; Aligned-Rare: Wilcoxon ranksum test, z = 3.126, p-value=0.0018). The pattern is not observed for subjects who started with the conflicting environment as there is no significant difference between subjects who did and subjects who did not rely on habit (Conflict-Frequent, Wilcoxon ranksum test, z = -1.108, p-value=0.2678; Conflict-Rare, Wilcoxon ranksum test, z = 0.777, p-value=0.4369). This pattern suggests that noticing a change in the environment, which would imply an increase in decision time, was easier for subjects who started with the simple aligned environment compared to subjects who started with the conflicting environment.

Fourth, we would expect habitual subjects to have lower CRT scores. CRT is a proxy for the tendency to rely on intuitive choices versus deliberate thinking. Given that overriding habits requires conscious effort, subjects with higher CRT are more likely to adapt their strategies. In line with our expectations, we find that habitual subjects have (weakly) lower CRT scores than non-habitual subjects (habitual: mean = 2.06, N = 112, non-habitual: mean = 2.24, N = 144, Wilcoxon ranksum test, z = 1.729, p-value = 0.0838, N = 256).

Firth, we are interested in whether relying on habits financially hurt subjects. When interacting in the new environment, habitual subjects earned (on average per round) 89.51 points whereas non-habitual subjects earned 90.51. The difference is not statistically significant (Wilcoxon ranksum test, z = 0.544, p-value=0.5861, N = 256), but more importantly is not economically large.²⁶ This suggests that habits worked relatively well for subjects who relied on them. Thus their choice to not adapt their decision can be considered rational.

Finally, we find that habits persist more among receivers as there are more habitual receivers (62) than habitual senders (40). The difference is significant (Wilcoxon ranksum test, z = 2.8086, p-value=0.0050, N = 256). The majority of habitual senders are truth-tellers (27) and the majority of habitual receivers are believers (43). It is illustrating to compare earnings between habitual and non-habitual subjects separately for senders and for receivers. For senders, there is significant difference in earnings (habitual: mean = 80.82, N = 48, non-habitual: mean = 88.33, N = 80, Wilcoxon ranksum test, z = 3.239, p-value= 0.0012, N = 128). For receivers there is no difference (habitual: mean = 96.64, N = 64, non-habitual: mean = 93.24, N = 64, Wilcoxon ranksum test, z = 1.303, p-value= 0.1924, N = 128). This suggests that receivers are not harmed by being credulous due to the presence of habitual truth-tellers.

As a side observation, it is illustrating to further break the group of habitual subjects based on whether they noticed the change in the environment (positive time difference) or not (negative time difference). 41 out of 112 habitual subjects did not increase their decision time. 71 out of 112 subjects did increase their decision time but kept using the same strategy. Arguably, failing to even notice a change cannot be rational, even if it did not hurt subjects financially. At the same time, noticing a change and consciously using the same strategy can be rational exactly because it did not hurt subjects financially. Thus, this decomposition suggests that inattention can be both rational and irrational.

Taken together, these observations suggest the following interpretation of the data. Subjects found the common-interests environment simple, quickly stabilized their behavior (into truthtelling and message-following), and had fast decision times. When the underlying environment changed, the change in payoffs was salient to the subjects that did pay attention as the variance in earnings in part one was very small. Hence, those subjects who changed strategy increased their decision times as thinking about how to adapt requires cognitive effort. Subjects found the conflicting-interests environment complex in part one and had overall higher decision times. Given the difficulty converging to a stable strategy together with the large variance of their round per round earnings in part one, noticing the change in the underlying bias was less salient, resulting in overall even faster decision times than part one, despite the change in preference alignment.

3.5 Level-k classifications

In this brief subsection, we take a theory-based approach to analyze individual decisions. We focus on the level-k model of reasoning (Camerer et al., 2004). This bounded rationality model assumes that agents differ in their degree of sophistication and that the differences arise from a specific belief structure. Agents with the lowest sophistication (L_0) start with a naive (often completely random) choice. L_1 subjects assume all other agents are L_0 and best-respond to this belief. L_2 subjects best respond to L_1 agents and we continue recursively.

An open question in the level-k literature is whether cognitive levels are a fixed characteristic

²⁶The same conclusion holds when comparing habitual and non-habitual subjects on the basis of the loss from not playing empirical best response (Wilcoxon ranksum test, z = 0.861, p-value=0.3893, N = 256).

of an agent or whether they differ across situations or over time. Recent research favors the latter explanation (Agranov et al., 2012; Georganas et al., 2015; Alaoui et al., 2020). We contribute to this literature by testing whether level-k classifications differ based on past experience.

To obtain predictions, the behavior of L_0 types needs to be specified. Based on previous cheap talk experiments, it is typically assumed that the most naive behavior is anchored at truth-telling for senders and following messages for receivers (Cai and Wang, 2006; Kawagoe and Takizawa, 2009; Wang et al., 2010). Agents of higher sophistication levels best respond to the belief that all other agents are of level one lower than their own.

To test whether past experience affects the distribution of types, we only focus on the classification of subjects according to their behavior in the new environment with partially aligned preferences. If sophistication is a fixed characteristic of subjects, then the randomization of subjects into treatments would result in a similar distribution of levels. If beliefs about others are influenced by past experience, we would expect more subjects to be classified in lower levels after Aligned than after Conflict. Table 3 presents the classifications.

	Sender	Receiver		Treat	ment	
Level	Strategy	Strategy	A-F	A-R	C-F	C-R
L_0	$\{1,2,3,4,5\}$	$\{1,2,3,4,5\}$	20	30	15	10
L_1	$\{2,3,4,5,5\}$	$\{1,1,2,3,4\}$	10	17	27	17
L_2	$\{3,4,5,5,5\}$	$\{1,1,1,2,4\}$	0	0	2	3
L_3	$\{4,5,5,5,5\}$	$\{1,1,1,1,4\}$	0	0	0	2

Treatment abbreviations:

A-F=Aligned-Frequent, A-R= Aligned-Rare

C-F=Conflict-Frequent, C-R= Conflict-Rare

Table 3: Level-k classifications across treatments

We compare the distribution of types across the two initial environments. To do so, we first aggregate both Aligned-Rare and Aligned-Frequent together, and Conflict-Rare and Conflict-Frequent together. The results show that past experience does affect level-k classifications. A χ^2 test shows highly different distributions ($\chi^2 = 10.789$, p-value=0.001, N = 256). We can also compare the average level between treatments. The test yields the same conclusion (Aligned: average level=0.51, Conflict: average level=0.82, Wilcoxon ranksum test, z = 4.258, p-value< 0.0001, N = 256).

Our results suggest that level-k is strongly dependent on past experience. Thus, we complement previous studies that challenged the persistence of strategic sophistication (in the level-k sense).

4 Concluding remarks

The key takeaways from our paper are: (i) habits affect strategic communication, and (ii) reliance on communication habits in atypical environments is moderated by the salience of the change in the environment. By randomizing subjects into environments that support either more informative or less informative communication, we facilitated the formation of different communication habits. When communicating in a new unfamiliar environment, roughly one

third of our subjects relied on their acquired habit and did not adapt their strategy. We varied the salience of the change in the environment by varying how often subjects communicated in the unfamiliar environment. When the change was salient, we observed a strong treatment effect as subjects familiar with the honest environment communicate more informatively than subjects familiar with the dishonest environment. When the salience was low, we found no significant effect. This pattern suggests that inattention rather than preference formation can explain our data.

Our results provide support for the conjecture that overcommunication (Cai and Wang, 2006; Wang et al., 2010) is partially attributed to the fact that in daily interactions telling the truth and believing what you hear work well most of the time. Hence, familiarity with environments that support informative communication (outside of the lab) may lead to excessively informative communication when subjects communicate in an experiment (in the lab). By creating a counterfactual environment where communicating honestly does not pay off, we observed undercommunication.

Our results suggest that habit formation can explain how differences in honesty can solidify in different groups. To illustrate, different occupations are characterized by different levels of preference alignment. Doctors typically have aligned preferences with their patients whereas judges often have misaligned preferences with suspects. Habit formation suggests that doctors may develop the habit of believing information whereas judges may develop the habit of mistrusting information. When communicating outside of their familiar work environment, they may carry their disposition with them.²⁷

A wealth of evidence shows that people are not much better than chance at accurately judging the truthfulness of information (Bond Jr and DePaulo, 2006). In a recent experiment, (Serra-Garcia and Gneezy, 2021) find that conditional on judging a piece of information as truthful, senders are more likely to share it, and conditional on a piece of information being shared, receivers are more likely to believe it. Having shown that receivers who are mostly exposed to truthful information may form the habit of believing information, our results suggest that their habit can make receivers overly credulous and more susceptible to believing fake news and misinformation. Thus, studying the effect of habits on believing and sharing false information is an interesting avenue for future research.

More broadly, our results suggest that habit formation plays an important role in economic decision making (in our case, strategic information transmission). Thus, it is important to take into account whether a given economic situation we are studying resembles a situation with which agents may be more more familiar. Especially when we study less frequent phenomena, reliance on past habits may be a good predictor of behavior. To illustrate, we discuss two empirical questions that build on the key takeaway from the current paper. A real estate agent who works in a seller's market (where demand exceeds supply) may develop the habit of negotiating hard as they have high bargaining power. Would they adapt their strategy in situations when supply exceeds demand and how does this depend on how salient the increase in supply is? An investor during prosperous times may develop the habit of investing in high-risk

²⁷Anecdotally, the competition for the World's Biggest Liar is annually held in a pub in England. Contestants from across the world try to come up with the most convincing lie. The rules forbid lawyers and politicians from participating because "they are judged to be too skilled at telling porkies" (Source: BBC, accessed 03-06-2021.)

high-return assets. Would they adjust their risk portfolio differently when they rarely receive signals that the economy is slowing down compared to a salient media covered emerging crisis?

Appendix A Additional results and robustness checks

This Appendix consists of five subsections. In subsection A.1 we list all Bayesian equilibria of the game. In subsection A.2 we compare our results from part one to previous literature and show that past findings replicate. In subsection A.3 we present econometric evidence for our main treatment effects via ordered logistic regressions. In subsection A.4 we apply the econometric method of Cai and Wang (2006) as a robustness check for our results on overcommunication and undercommunication. Finally, in subsection A.5 and subsection A.6 we present the full classification of subjects in behavioral strategies from both part one and part two and also repeat our analysis with a different threshold for classifying behavior (80%).

A.1 All Bayesian equilibria of the game

Table A1 lists the complete set of all perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game for all possible values of b.²⁸ The equilibria are ranked in order of informativeness –as captured by the correlation between state and action– with the last in each parameter range being the most informative.

²⁸Finding all perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game is computationally complex. To facilitate the computations, we made a Python program that finds all equilibria given the state space for all bias values. An illustration of this program can be found on my website here and is available upon request.

Ranking	Mes	ssages	Action	IS	$\operatorname{Corr}(S,A)$
1	$\{1, 2,$	$3, 4, 5\}$	$\{3\}$		0.00
2	$\{1, 2\},\$	$\{3, 4, 5\}$	$\{1, 2\}, \{$	[4]	0.84
-	$\{1, 2, 3\}$	B , $\{4, 5\}$	$\{2\}, \{4,$	$5\}$	0.84
-	$\{1\}, \{2\}$	$\{3, 4, 5\}$	$\{1\}, \{2\}, $	$\{4\}$	0.84
3	$\{1\}, \{2,$	$3\}, \{4, 5\}$	$\{1\}, \{2, 3\},\$	$\{4, 5\}$	0.90
-	$\{1, 2\}, \{$	$\{3\}, \{4, 5\}$	$\{1, 2\}, \{3\}, $	$\{4, 5\}$	0.90
-	$\{1, 2\}, \{$	$\{3, 4\}, \{5\}$	$\{1, 2\}, \{3, 4\}$	$\{1\}, \{5\}$	0.90
4	$\{1\}, \{2\}, \{2\}, \{2\}, \{2\}, \{2\}, \{2\}, \{2\}, \{2$	$\{3\}, \{4, 5\}$	$\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3\}$	$\{4, 5\}$	0.95
-	$\{1\}, \{2\}, \{2\}, \{2\}, \{2\}, \{2\}, \{2\}, \{2\}, \{2$	$\{3, 4\}, \{5\}$	$\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3\}, \{3\}, \{3\}, \{3\}, \{3\}, \{3\}, \{3\}, \{3$	$4\}, \{5\}$	0.95
-	$\{1\}, \{2, 3\}$	3 , $\{4$, $\{5\}$	$\{1\}, \{2, 3\}, \{$	$[4], \{5\}$	0.95
-	$\{1, 2\}, \{3\}$	$3\}, \{4\}, \{5\}$	$\{1, 2\}, \{3\}, \{3\}, \{3\}, \{3\}, \{3\}, \{3\}, \{3\}, \{3$	$[4], \{5\}$	0.95
5	$\{1\}, \{2\}, \{2\}, \{2\}, \{2\}, \{2\}, \{2\}, \{2\}, \{2$	$\{3\}, \{4\}, \{5\}$	$\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3\}, \{3\}, \{3\}, \{3\}, \{3\}, \{3\}, \{3\}, \{3$	$\{4\}, \{5\}$	1.00
		$(a) \ b \in [($) () 22)		
Ranking	Mes	ssages	Action	IS	$\operatorname{Corr}(S,A)$
1	$\{1, 2,$	3, 4, 5	{3}		0.00
2	$\{1\}, \{2\}$	2, 3, 4, 5	$\{1\}, \{3,$	4}	0.65
3	$\{1, 2\},\$	$\{1, 2\}, \{3, 4, 5\}$		[4]	0.84
4	$\{1\}, \{2\}$	$\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3, 4, 5\}$		$\{1\}, \{2\}, \{4\}$	
-	$\{1\}, \{2\}$	$3\}, \{4, 5\}$	$\{1\}, \{2, 3\}, \{4, 5\}$		0.90
-	$\{1\}, \{2\}, \{2\}, \{2\}, \{2\}, \{2\}, \{2\}, \{2\}, \{2$	$\{3\}, \{4, 5\}$	$\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3\}$	$\{4, 5\}$	0.90
5	$\{1\}, \{2\}, \{2\}, \{2\}, \{2\}, \{2\}, \{2\}, \{2\}, \{2$	$\{3\}, \{4\}, \{5\}$	$\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3\}, \{3\}, \{3\}, \{3\}, \{3\}, \{3\}, \{3\}, \{3$	$\{4\}, \{5\}$	1.00
		(b) $b \in [0.$	(22, 0.50)		
	Donking	Maggaggg	Actions	Com (S. A	
-		(1 0 0 4 F)	Actions		<u>()</u>
	1	$\{1, 2, 3, 4, 3\}$	{ð} (1) (9 4)	0.00	
	2 {	$\{1\}, \{2, 3, 4, 5\}$	$\{1\}, \{3, 4\}$	0.65	
-	3 {	$[1, 2], \{3, 4, 5\}$	$\{1, 2\}, \{4\}$	0.84	
		(c) $b \in [0.1]$	50, 0.73)		
	Popling	Moggagog	Actions	Corr(S A	
-		Messages	ACTIONS		<u>()</u>
	1	$\{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$	{3} (1) (2) (2)	0.00	
=	2 {	$\{1\}, \{2, 3, 4, 5\}$	$\{1\}, \{3, 4\}$	0.05	
		(d) $b \in [0.$	73, 1.28)		
	Ranking	Messages	Actions (Corr(S A)	
	1	$\{1 \ 2 \ 3 \ 4 \ 5\}$	{3}	0.00	
		(±, ±, 5, ±, 5)	رق	0.00	:
		(e) $b \in [1]$	$.28,\infty)$		

Table A1: All perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria for all values of \boldsymbol{b}

A.2 Replicating past cheap-talk experimental findings

This subsection serves two goals. First, it illustrates the differences in the behavior of subjects across aligned and conflict treatments in more detail. Second, it provides evidence replicating past findings in experiments testing the comparative statics of Crawford and Sobel (1982).

Crawford and Sobel (1982) predicts that communication will be more informative with more aligned preferences. Table A3 shows the correlations between states and actions, states and messages, and messages and actions in part one. The first pair of columns was presented and discussed in subsection 3.1. The other two pairs of columns exhibit the same patterns and serve as a robustness check for the manipulation check. All correlations differ significantly between Aligned and Conflict environment.

		Correlation(S,A)		Correlation(S,M)		Correlation(M,A)	
Ν	Environment	Observed	Predicted	Observed	Predicted	Observed	Predicted
16	Aligned	0.953	1.000	0.967	1.000	0.982	1.000
16	Conflict	0.387	0.000	0.528	0.000	0.647	0.000

Table A3: Correlations between states, messages and actions in part one

At the same time, we observe overcommunication in the conflict treatment as all correlations are significantly larger than zero. This can be seen by comparing actual with predicted correlations in Table A3. The results are in line with past experimental findings (Cai and Wang, 2006; Wang et al., 2010). Table A4 provides a comparison of results from earlier papers and the current one.²⁹

Bias	Correlation	Current	CW	WSC	Predicted
	$\operatorname{Corr}(S,A)$	0.959	0.876	0.86	1.000
Low	$\operatorname{Corr}(S,M)$	0.972	0.916	0.93	1.000
	$\operatorname{Corr}(M,A)$	0.983	0.965	0.92	1.000
	$\operatorname{Corr}(S,A)$	0.402	0.207	0.32	0.000
High	$\operatorname{Corr}(S,M)$	0.560	0.391	0.34	0.000
	$\operatorname{Corr}(M,A)$	0.650	0.542	0.58	0.000

Notes: CW=Cai and Wang (2006), WSC=Wang et al. (2010)

Table A4: Correlations between states, messages and actions in part one

Table A5 shows regressions of decision times and time spent on feedback screen, both on individual and on matching group level. They provide the evidence for the conclusions from subsection 3.1 that (i) decision times differ between treatments and decrease over rounds, and (ii) the feedback times differ between treatments and do not decrease over rounds.

²⁹Previous papers reported correlations computed based on choices of pairs of subjects (not on matching group level or aggregated over rounds as current paper). To facilitate comparisons, we do the same in Table A4. Comparison data are from Table 3 in Cai and Wang (2006) and from Table 2 in Wang et al. (2010).

	Decisio	on Time	Feedba	ick Time
	Group	Individual	Group	Individual
Aligned	-11.31***	-11.04***	-10.52^{***}	-10.71***
	(1.49)	(1.21)	(1.94)	(1.14)
Round	-0.41***	-0.40***	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Risk		-0.07		0.21
		(0.34)		(0.35)
CRT		-0.37		0.65
		(0.66)		(0.56)
Trust sender		-0.47		-0.04
		(0.73)		(0.82)
Trust receiver		-0.34		-0.33
		(0.91)		(0.92)
Constant	28.40***	30.36***	30.09***	37.28***
	(1.84)	(3.90)	(1.92)	(2.85)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
R^2	0.428	0.109	0.096	0.016
Observations	960	7680	960	7680

Controls: Age Gender Study

Std. Err. adjusted for 256 (32) individual (matching group) clusters * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A5: Decision and feedback times in part one

A.3 Econometric tests for treatment effects

In this subsection, we are interested in testing whether starting from then aligned environment in part one leads to more informative communication when interacting in the new environment in part two compared to starting from the conflict environment. To do so, we estimate ordered logistic regressions of action on state and interact state with part one environment. A significant interaction ($State \times Aligned$) translates to more informative communication after aligned environment compared to after conflicting. We estimate separate regressions for when the new environment occurs rarely or frequently, and separate for early and late rounds that it does so. Each regression is estimated using individual choices with errors clustered at subject level. The regressions control for risk, CRT, trust towards strangers and demographics.

			Action	
	Rare Early	Rare Late	Frequent Early	Frequent Late
State	1.15^{***}	1.16^{***}	1.49^{***}	1.65^{***}
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.10)
State×Aligned	0.34***	0.32***	0.09	-0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Round	0.02	-0.02	-0.05	0.08
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Risk	-0.06	0.08	0.05	0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
CRT	0.08	-0.15	0.12	0.02
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.12)
Trust sender	0.06	-0.08	0.04	0.15
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Trust receiver	0.06	0.18	0.11	0.04
	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.228	0.227	0.248	0.259
Observations	640	640	640	640

Action refers to receiver's part two behavior under partially aligned interests Controls: Age Gender Study

Std. Err. adjusted for 128 subject clusters

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table A6: Ordered logistic regression of action on state

Our results reveal a treatment effect when the new environment occurs rarely (columns 1 and 2) and a null effect when the new environment occurs frequently (columns 3 and 4). Thus the results in main text are robust.

A.4 Econometric tests for overcommunication and undercommunication

This section provides robustness checks for the results on overcommunication and undercommunication presented in subsection 3.3. To do so, we use the regression method utilized by Cai and Wang (2006).

This method has a standard regression as a starting point. Consider a model $Y = \alpha + \beta X + \epsilon$. The estimator for β is given by $b = \frac{SD_Y}{SD_X}Corr(X, Y)$, where SD_Y, SD_X are the sample standard deviations of X and Y and Corr(X, Y) is the correlation between X and Y. To test whether the estimated correlation differs from a theoretical one (denote the theoretical by σ_{XY}), it suffices to estimate the adjusted model $Y - r_{XY}X = \alpha + \beta X + \epsilon$, where $r_{XY} = \frac{SD_Y}{SD_X}\sigma_{XY}$. The t-test on the estimate of β in the adjusted model allows us to precisely test whether $Corr(X, Y) = \sigma_{XY}$. We estimate those regressions separately for each of the four treatments and separately for early and late rounds. For all regressions, we use the correlation of the most informative equilibrium as the theoretical prediction ($\sigma_{XY} = 0.650$).

				Act	ion			
	CR Early	CR Late	AR Early	AR Late	CF Early	CF Late	AF Early	AF Late
State	-0.14*	-0.15**	0.19***	0.17^{***}	0.03	0.09**	0.10	0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)
D: 1	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
Risk	-0.04	0.05	-0.04	-0.02	0.01	-0.02	0.06	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
CRT	0.08	-0.09	-0.00	-0.08	0.08	-0.04	0.01	0.11
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Trust sender	0.06	-0.07	0.01	0.04	0.06	0.11	0.02	0.04
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)
Trust receiver	0.15	-0.01	-0.09	0.11	0.04	0.06	0.08	-0.10
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Constant	1 33*	0.75	1 15***	0 99**	1 40***	1 26**	0.94*	1 10***
Comptant	(0.59)	(0.46)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.24)	(0.37)	(0.44)	(0.30)
Controls	Ves	Ves	Ves	Ves	Ves	Ves	Ves	Ves
$\frac{1}{B^2}$	0.073	0.092	0.140	0.133	0.036	0.060	0.047	0.069
Observations	320	320	320	320	320	320	320	320
Observations	320	320	320	320	320	320	320	320

Action refers to receiver's part two behavior under partially aligned interests

Controls: Age Gender Study, Std. Err. adjusted for 64 subject clusters, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table A7: Regressions of (adjusted) action on state

When the new environment occurs rarely (first four columns), we see significant differences from equilibrium predictions. When subjects started with conflicting preferences (columns 1 and 2), we observe undercommunication as the coefficient on state is negative. When subjects started with aligned preferences (columns 3 and 4), we observe overcommunication as the coefficient on state is positive. We observe no significant differences when the new environment occurs frequently (with the exception of column 6).

A.5 Full classification of behavioral strategies

This subsection presents the behavioral strategies in part one and part two of the experiment. Before presenting the results of the classification, we describe all strategies and (in parentheses) their coding.

		-		
Strategy	Coding		Strategy	Coding
Tell the truth	Truth		Follow message	Believer
Exaggerate state by 1	State+1		Discount message by 1	Message-1
Exaggerate state by 2	State+2		Discount message by 2	Message-2
Exaggerate state by 3	State+3		One more than message	Message+1
Always send message 4	Always 4		Always choose action 3	Always 3
Always send message 5	Always 5		Always choose action 4	Always 4
(a) Sender strateg	jies	-	(b) Receiver strate	egies

Table A8: All strategies used

We present our classification results separately for each treatment, and separately for senders and receivers. We remind the reader that this classification uses 60% as a threshold to classify a subject as using a particular strategy. Habitual subjects are in bold.

_		Truth	State+1	State+2	Mixing
	Truth	12	17	1	-
	State+1	-	1	-	-
	Mixing	-	-	-	1

	Believer	Message-1	Message-2	Unclassified
Believer	16	10	2	3
Unclassified	1	-	-	-

(a) Sender strategies

(b) Receiver strategies

Table A9: Strategies used in Aligned-Frequent

	Truth	State	+1 State+	2 Unclassified
Truth	11	17	1	3
		(a) Sen	der strategies	
	Be	eliever	Message-1	Unclassified
Belie	ver	25	4	3
		(1) D		

(b) Receiver strategies

Table A10: Strategies used in Aligned-Rare

	Truth	State+1	State+2
Truth	6	-	-
State+1	2	4	-
State+2	-	10	-
State+3	-	-	1
Always 4	-	1	-
Always 5	-	-	2
Unclassified	1	4	1

(a) Sender strategies	
-----------------------	--

	Believer	Message-1	Message-2	Always 3	Mixing	Unclassified
Believer	6	3	-	-	-	1
Message-1	2	1	-	-	-	-
Message-2	1	7	1	-	-	-
Always 3	-	-	-	2	-	-
Mixing	-	-	-	-	1	-
Unclassified	4	3	-	-	-	-

(b) Receiver strategies

Table A11: Strategies used in Conflict-Frequent

	Truth	State+1	State+2	State+3	Always 4	Always 5	Mixing	Unclassified
Truth	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
State+1	2	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
State+2	1	8	4	-	-	1	-	-
State+3	2	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
Always 4	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Always 5	1	-	-	1	-	2	-	-
Unclassified	-	1	-	-	1	1	-	-

(a) Sender strategie	\mathbf{s}
----------------------	--------------

	Believer	Message-1	Message-2	Always 3	Unclassified
Believer	6	-	-	-	-
Message-1	-	4	1	-	1
Message-2	3	7	2	-	1
Message+1	1	-	-	-	-
Always 3	-	1	-	-	-
Always 4	-	-	-	-	1
Unclassified	-	1	-	3	-

(b) Receiver strategies

Table A12: Strategies used in Conflict-Rare

A.6 Robustness of habitual classification with respect to threshold

This subsection briefly discusses the results if we increase the threshold to classify a subject into a behavioral strategy from 60% to 80%. Increasing the threshold naturally reduces the number of subjects classified into a a behavioral strategy. With 60% as a threshold, we classify 112 subjects as habitual, whereas with 80% we classify 102. This already suggests that the classification is not very sensitive to the chosen threshold.

Consistent with the observations from main text, we find: i) more habitual subjects after aligned environment compared to conflicting (57 VS 45), more habitual subjects when the new environment is rare compared to frequent (57 VS 45), (iii) habitual subjects making faster decisions compared to non-habitual (16.97 seconds VS 12.43 seconds), (iv) habitual having lower CRT scores (2.06 VS 2.23), (v) habitual subjects having slightly lower earnings (88.3 VS 91.2), and (vi) more habitual receivers than senders (62 VS 40).

Appendix B Instructions and screenshots

This appendix includes screenshots of all decision screens of the experiment.

Welcome!

Thank you for participating in this study.

Please make sure that you are in the Zoom meeting throughout the experiment.

You were admitted to the session from the waiting room, renamed, and sent back to the waiting room. This was to ensure your privacy.

If you have any questions, you can message the experimenter during the experiment. The Zoom session only allows participants to message the experimenter. Any question you ask and the answer from the experimenter will **not** be shown to any other participant.

Please keep your video off and stay muted throughout the experiment.

Next

Figure A1: General welcome to the session

Payment registration

Please enter your IBAN below. This will be used for payment after the experiment. You will **not** be able to change this at a later point. We will delete this number after making the payment.

Submit

Figure A2: Payment registration

Welcome!

Welcome to this experiment. Please read the following instructions carefully. We ask that you do not communicate with other participants during the experiment. The use of mobile phones is not allowed during this experiment. If you have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, at any time, please message the experimenter privately in the zoom session and he/she will assist you. The data collected through this experiment does not include your name or any other information that would allow your identification. All of the data you provide during the experiment cannot be traced back to you.

Your earnings in today's session will be paid to you at the end of the experiment. Your earnings will depend on your own and other participants' decisions. You will play **60** rounds in total. For each round your earnings will be in points. At the end of the experiment, your **accumulated** points will be converted to euros at a rate of 1 euro per 200 points. You will receive your earnings at the end of the experiment at the bank account you provided.

In the next page you will receive the relevant instructions.

Thank you for your participation.

Next

Figure A3: Overview of the experiment

Please read the following instructions carefully.

Matching & roles

In each round, all participants are matched in pairs. One participant within a pair has the role of player A and the other participant has the role of player B. The matching scheme is chosen to guarantee the following:

- In each round you will be randomly matched to another participant.
- You will never learn with whom you are matched.
- You will never be paired to the same participant in subsequent rounds.
- You will always have the same role in all rounds.

Sequence of actions

- 1. In each round of the experiment, the computer will randomly roll a die with numbers between 1 and 5. All numbers are equally likely. This outcome of the die is called the *state*. Player A will observe the state, whereas player B will not.
- 2. Player A moves first and has to choose between one of the following 5 options.
 - Send the message "The state is 1"
 - Send the message "The state is 2"
 - Send the message "The state is 3"
 - Send the message "The state is 4"
 - Send the message "The state is 5"

If player A decides to send a message, it does not have to match the state. This is the only decision of player A.

3. Player B will observe the message and choose an action between 1 and 5. The decision of player B ends the round.

Earnings

In each round you can earn or lose points. The earnings of both players **depend only** on the state and the action of player B. The earnings **do not depend** on the message send by player A. The earnings of both players for all possible combinations of state and action will be provided to you in a table. The table will be shown to both of you in the decision screen.

Next

Figure A4: Rules of the sender-receiver game

Understanding questions

Each cell of the table contains two numbers which correspond to the earnings of the two players.

- For player A, the earnings are the number on the left (shown in blue).
- For player B, the earnings are the number on the right (shown in red).

Remember that earnings depend **only** on the combination of state and action and **not** on the message.

Below there is an example of such a table to make you familiar with the format. All the scenarios described in the questions are purely hypothetical. Answering all questions correctly will make sure you fully understand the rules of the game and how points are earned.

	Action is 1	Action is 2
State is 1	10 , 20	20 , 10
State is 2	30 , 30	40 , 40

Figure A5: Understanding questions (part 1)

• The state is 1.	• The state is 2.
Player A send the message "The state is 1".	Player A send the message "The state is 2".
Player B chose action 2.	Player B chose action 2.
What are the earnings of each player?	What are the earnings of each player?
O Player A gets 10 and player B get 20	O Player A gets 10 and player B get 20
O Player A gets 20 and player B get 10	O Player A gets 20 and player B get 10
\bigcirc Player A gets 30 and player B get 30	O Player A gets 30 and player B get 30
\bigcirc Player A gets 40 and player B get 40	\bigcirc Player A gets 40 and player B get 40
• The state is 1.	• The state is 2.
Player A send the message "The state is 2".	Player A send the message "The state is 1".
Player B chose action 2.	Player B chose action 2.
What are the earnings of each player?	What are the earnings of each player?
O Player A gets 10 and player B get 20	○ Player A gets 10 and player B get 20
\bigcirc Player A gets 20 and player B get 10	O Player A gets 20 and player B get 10
\bigcirc Player A gets 30 and player B get 30	O Player A gets 30 and player B get 30
\bigcirc Player A gets 40 and player B get 40	○ Player A gets 40 and player B get 40
• When player A chooses the message to send Is this statement True or False?	to player B, both players know the state.
O True	
O False	
 Player A can send the message "The state is 2 Is this statement True or False? 	when the state is 1.
O True	
() False	
• Player A send the message "I don't want to se	end a message" when the state is 1.
Player B chose action 2.	
What are the earnings of each player?	
points for playe	er A
points for playe	er B
Click the "Check" button below to check your an	swers. You can only proceed to the next page if all answers are correct.

Check

Figure A6: Understanding questions (part 2)

Round 1 of 60

Below you see the table containing the earnings for both players for every combination of state and action.

- For player A, the earnings are the number on the left (shown in blue).
- For player B, the earnings are the number on the right (shown in red).

	Action is 1	Action is 2	Action is 3	Action is 4	Action is 5
State is 1	<mark>55</mark> , 108	<mark>88</mark> , 88	108 , 55	88 , 14	55 , -31
State is 2	14 , 88	55 , 108	<mark>88</mark> , 88	108 , 55	88 , 14
State is 3	-31 , 55	14 , 88	55 , 108	<mark>88</mark> , 88	108 , 55
State is 4	-82 , 14	-31 , 55	14 , <mark>88</mark>	55 , 108	<mark>88</mark> , <mark>88</mark>
State is 5	-137 , -31	-82 , 14	-31 , 55	14 , 88	55 , 108

You are **player A**. The randomly drawn state is



Please choose a message to send to Player B by clicking the corresponding button below.



Figure A7: Sender decision screen

Round 1 of 60

Below you see the table containing the earnings for both players for every combination of state and action.

- For player A, the earnings are the number on the left (shown in blue).
- For player B, the earnings are the number on the right (shown in red).

	Action is 1	Action is 2	Action is 3	Action is 4	Action is 5
State is 1	55 , 108	<mark>88</mark> , <mark>88</mark>	108 , 55	88 , 14	55 , -31
State is 2	14 , <mark>88</mark>	<mark>55</mark> , 108	<mark>88</mark> , <mark>88</mark>	108 , 55	88 , 14
State is 3	-31 , 55	14 , 88	55 , 108	<mark>88</mark> , 88	108 , 55
State is 4	-82 , 14	-31 , 55	14 , <mark>88</mark>	<mark>55</mark> , 108	<mark>88</mark> , <mark>88</mark>
State is 5	-137 , -31	-82 , 14	-31 , 55	14 , 88	55 , 108

You are player B.

Player A sent you the message "The state is 5".

Please choose your action by clicking the corresponding button below.

I choose action 1	I choose action 2	I choose action 3	I choose action 4	I choose action 5

Figure A8: Receiver decision screen (after active sender)

Round 1 of 10

Below you see the table containing the earnings for both players for every combination of state and action.

- For player A, the earnings are the number on the left (shown in blue).
- For player B, the earnings are the number on the right (shown in red).

	Action is 1	Action is 2	Action is 3	Action is 4	Action is 5
State is 1	61 , 114	94 , 94	114 , 61	94 , 20	61 , -25
State is 2	20 , 94	61 , 114	94 , 94	114 , 61	<mark>94</mark> , 20
State is 3	-25 , 61	20 , 94	61 , 114	94 , 94	114 , 61
State is 4	-76 , 20	-25 , 61	20 , 94	61 , 114	94 , <mark>94</mark>
State is 5	-131 , -25	-76 , 20	-25 , 61	20 , 94	61 , 114

You are player B.

Player A was inactive in this round due to technical/connectivity issues. Hence, click Next to proceed. Next

Figure A9: Receiver decision screen (after inactive sender)

Results from round 1 of 60

Below you see the table containing the earnings for both players for every combination of state and action.

- For player A, the earnings are the number on the left (shown in blue).
- For player B, the earnings are the number on the right (shown in red).

	Action is 1	Action is 2	Action is 3	Action is 4	Action is 5
State is 1	55 , 108	88 , 88	108 , 55	88 , 14	55 , -31
State is 2	14 , 88	55 , 108	<mark>88</mark> , 88	108 , 55	88 , 14
State is 3	-31 , 55	14 , 88	55 , 108	<mark>88</mark> , 88	108 , 55
State is 4	-82 , 14	-31 , 55	14 , 88	<mark>55</mark> , 108	<mark>88</mark> , 88
State is 5	-137 , -31	-82 , 14	-31 , 55	14 , 88	55 , 108

• The state was 2.

• Player A sent the message "The state is 5".

• Player B chose action 3.

You were player A. Therefore, in this round you earned 88 points.

Proceed to next round

Figure A10: Sender feedback screen (active player, active partner)

Results from round 1 of 60

Below you see the table containing the earnings for both players for every combination of state and action.

- For player A, the earnings are the number on the left (shown in blue).
- For player B, the earnings are the number on the right (shown in red).

	Action is 1	Action is 2	Action is 3	Action is 4	Action is 5
State is 1	55 , 108	<mark>88</mark> , 88	108 , 55	88 , 14	55 , -31
State is 2	14 , 88	55 , 108	<mark>88</mark> , 88	108 , 55	88 , 14
State is 3	-31 , 55	14 , 88	55 , 108	<mark>88</mark> , 88	108 , 55
State is 4	-82 , 14	-31 , 55	14 , 88	<mark>55</mark> , 108	<mark>88</mark> , 88
State is 5	-137 , -31	-82 , 14	-31 , 55	14 , 88	<mark>55</mark> , 108

• The state was 2.

• Player A sent the message "The state is 5".

• Player B chose action 3.

You were player B. Therefore, in this round you earned 88 points.

Proceed to next round

Figure A11: Receiver feedback screen (active player, active partner)

Results from round 1 of 10

Below you see the table containing the earnings for both players for every combination of state and action.

- For player A, the earnings are the number on the left (shown in blue).
- For player B, the earnings are the number on the right (shown in red).

	Action is 1	Action is 2	Action is 3	Action is 4	Action is 5
State is 1	61 , 114	94 , <mark>94</mark>	114 , 61	94 , 20	61 , -25
State is 2	20 , 94	61 , 114	94 , 94	114 , 61	94 , 20
State is 3	-25 , 61	20 , 94	61 , 114	94 , 94	114 , 61
State is 4	-76 , 20	-25 , 61	20 , 94	61 , 114	94 , <mark>94</mark>
State is 5	-131 , -25	-76 , 20	-25 , <mark>6</mark> 1	20 , 94	61 , 114

Your partner was inactive in this round so you automatically earned 100 points.

Proceed to next round

Figure A12: Feedback screen (active player, inactive partner)

Results from round 1 of 60

Below you see the table containing the earnings for both players for every combination of state and action.

- For player A, the earnings are the number on the left (shown in blue).
- For player B, the earnings are the number on the right (shown in red).

	Action is 1	Action is 2	Action is 3	Action is 4	Action is 5
State is 1	55 , 108	<mark>88</mark> , 88	108 , 55	88 , 14	55 , -31
State is 2	14 , <mark>88</mark>	<mark>55</mark> , 108	<mark>88</mark> , 88	108 , 55	88 , 14
State is 3	-31 , 55	14 , 88	55 , 108	88 , 88	108 , 55
State is 4	-82 , 14	-31 , 55	14 , 88	55 , 108	<mark>88</mark> , 88
State is 5	-137 , -31	-82 , 14	-31 , 55	14 , 88	55 , 108

You were inactive in this round and automatically earned 0 points.

Proceed to next round

Figure A13: Feedback screen (inactive player, inactive partner)

Lottery Task

In the following task, **5 different lotteries** will be presented on your screen. In each of these lotteries, **both rewards** A and B are **equally likely**, i.e. have a probability of exactly 50%. The rewards are denoted in points.

You are asked to **choose exactly one** of the lotteries, which subsequently will be implemented. A random generator will determine whether you win reward A or reward B, respectively. At the end of the experiment, your reward will be added to you earnings.

Choose Lottery

Figure A14: Risk elicitation (instructions)

	Reward A	Reward B	
No.	50% Probability	50% Probability	Your Choice:
1	140 points	140 points	0
2	120 points	180 points	0
3	100 points	220 points	0
4	80 points	260 points	0
5	60 points	300 points	0
6	10 points	350 points	0



Figure A15: Risk elicitation (choice)

Results

You chose the following lottery:						
	Out	come A	Out	come B		
No.	Prob.	Reward	Prob.	Reward	Your Choice	
5	50.0%	60 points	50.0%	300 points	۲	
A random draw determined that reward A has been realized. Thus, your earnings from this task amount to 60 points.						



Figure A16: Risk elicitation (results)

Please answer the following questions.

Each correct answer is worth 50 points.

The ages of Mark and Adam add up to 28 years total. Mark is 20 years older than Adam. How many years old is Adam?

If it takes 10 seconds for 10 printers to print out 10 pages of paper, how many seconds will it take 50 printers to print out 50 pages of paper?

On a loaf of bread, there is a patch of mold. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 12 days for the patch to cover the entire loaf of bread, how many days would it take for the patch to cover half of the loaf of bread?

N	e	X

Figure A17: CRT elicitation (questions)

Results

Your answered 0 questions correctly and each of them is worth 50 points. Your payoff from this questionnaire is 0 points.

Proceed

Figure A18: CRT elicitation (results)

Please answer the following questions.

When I communicate with strangers, I tell them the truth.
Strongly disagree O Disagree O Neither agree nor disagree O Agree O Strongly agree
When I communicate with strangers, they tell me the truth.
Strongly disagree O Disagree O Neither agree nor disagree O Agree O Strongly agree

Figure A19: Trust attitudes elicitation

Please enter the following information.

Please indicate your age.



Please indicate your field of study.

- \bigcirc Economics
- Social Sciences (Non-economics)
- Natural Sciences
- \bigcirc Humanities
- O Applied Sciences
- Other

Please indicate your gender.

- $^{\circ}$ Male
- Female
- Prefer not to answer

Next

Figure A20: Demographics

Thank you!

The experiment is completed. Thank you for your participation.

From the main game, you earned in total 94 points. From the other tasks you additionally earned 60 points. Hence, your total points are 154 points.

The exchange rate is 1 € for 200 points, so you earned 0.77 €.

You will receive your payment to your bank account using in the IBAN you provided in the beginning of the experiment. You can now leave the Zoom session and close your browser.

Figure A21: Payment information and debriefing

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