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# Income shocks, bride price and child marriage in Turkey\*

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## Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of income shocks and bride price on early marriage in Turkey. The practice of bride-price, still vivid in many regions of the country, may provide incentives for parents to marry their daughter earlier, when faced with a negative income shock. In addition, marriages precipitated by negative income shocks may present specific features (endogamy, age and education difference between spouses). Weather shocks provide an exogenous source of variation of household income through agricultural production. Data on weather shocks are merged with individual and household level data from the Turkish Demographic and Health Surveys 1998 to 2013. To study the role of payments to the bride's parents, we interact our measure of shocks with a province-level indicator of a high prevalence of bride-price. We find that girls living in provinces with a high practice of bride-price and exposed to a negative income shocks when aged 12-14 have a 28% higher probability to be married before the age of 15 than girls not exposed to shocks. This effect is specific to provinces with a high prevalence of bride price. Compared to women who experienced the same shock but lived in a province where bride price is infrequent, such women are also more likely to give birth to their first child before 18 and for those who married religiously first, the civil ceremony is delayed by 2 months on average. Our results suggest that girl marriage still participates to household strategies aimed at mitigating negative income shocks in contemporary Turkey.

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# 1 Introduction

Although many countries have passed laws to contain the highly detrimental practice of child marriage, including a minimum legal age at marriage, lack of enforcement or persistence of unregistered unions contribute to explaining the still high proportion of girl marriage. According to UNICEF, although the prevalence of child marriage is declining in most parts of the world, over the 2013-2019 period still 20% of girls under 18 in the world were married. Such a persistence raises the question of the underlying economic motivations and cultural norms that laws, although imperfectly implemented or publicized, cannot discourage.

Turkey is a striking example of a middle-income country which at some point had moved towards alignment with the European Union, where the practice of child marriage persists in spite of legislative development. In Turkey, after the 2002 reform of the civil code, the minimum legal age at marriage which was previously 15, was raised to 18, with exceptions allowing marriage at age 17 (with parental consent) or even 16 (in exceptional circumstances).<sup>1</sup> However, still today, the prevalence of child marriage is high in Turkey, although the practice is unevenly distributed across the country. According to data from the Demographic Health Surveys, in 2018 15% of girls were married before the age of 18.<sup>2</sup>

Identifying the drivers of such a practice and its persistence is key, given the long-lasting negative consequences of marrying as a child on women and their offspring. Studies find that marrying too young is associated with a lower educational attainment for women (Field and Ambrus, 2008) and their children (Chari et al., 2017; Delprato et al., 2017), greater health risks for mother and child (Santhya et al., 2010; Santhya, 2011; Prakash et al., 2011), in particular during pregnancy and delivery (Raj, 2010a; Paul, 2018), a higher probability for women to be victim of domestic violence (Santhya et al., 2010),

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<sup>1</sup>UNFPA, Child marriage in Turkey (Overview), 2012, <https://eeca.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/unfpa%20turkey%20overview.pdf> (accessed August 2020)

<sup>2</sup>DHS data for 2018 not publicly available to date (January 2021). Cited figures are taken from the website <https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/child-marriage/turkey/> The estimated proportion of girls married before the age of 15 is 2%, according to the same source.

a lower bargaining power within the household (Raj, 2010b) and a greater exposure to poverty (Raj, 2010a). Preventing child marriage is a key factor to promote gender equality.

Previous works in various disciplinary fields have contributed to elucidate the reasons behind early marriage. Economists, in particular, have emphasized the role played by marriage to attenuate negative income shocks. Daughter (distant) marriage can indeed be part of an informal insurance strategy (Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989), but it is also a financial resource when a bride price is paid by the groom to the bride's parents. Corno et al. (2020) have shown that negative income shocks are associated with an increase in the probability of child marriage in sub-Saharan Africa, especially where the practice of bride price is the most prevalent.

In this article, we simultaneously explore the impact of droughts on the probability of child marriage in Turkey, and the role played by the prevalence of norms of marriage payments. We use cross-sectional data from the Demographic Health Surveys (DHS) collected in 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008, and 2013 on around 25,000 women born from 1975 to 1998. Individual data from the DHS were matched with weather and agricultural data at the province level. Turkey is divided in 81 provinces (*iller* in Turkish) that correspond to the European NUTS-3 level. In order to explore the role played by bride price on early marriage, we identify among these 81 provinces those where the practice of bride price is the most widespread, by constructing an historical measure of bride price prevalence based on information on actual bride price payments collected among the older cohorts of married women surveyed in the 1993 and 1998 DHS. To address the issue of unregistered unions that could tend to minimize the real extent of the practice of child marriage in public statistics, we exploit information contained in the DHS about the type of union (civil, religious, or both), and the timing of the different ceremonies. Indeed, since no age limit is set for religious ceremonies, we believe that for women who married religiously first, the time span between the two ceremonies is an indicator of disguised early marriage, in the sense that underage girls would be married religiously

and the union would be regularized by a civil ceremony only after the girl has reached the official age to be married. A longer interval between the two ceremonies may thus be indicative of child marriage. Our interpretation is supported by data provided by the Turkish national statistical institute<sup>3</sup> about the form of solemnization by age groups<sup>4</sup>. In 2016, 97% of married women aged 20 and over were married with both a civil and a religious solemnization. This proportion drops to 81.8% for girls aged 15-19, while they are 17.7% to be in unions with a religious solemnization only.

The characteristics of the agricultural sector in Turkey suggest that adverse weather shocks may have major consequences on household income and consumption: although the agricultural sector represents only 9.2% of GDP, it employs 25% of the workforce. In the 2013 DHS, 33% of surveyed women for which we have information on the occupation of their husband are married to a man working in the primary sector. Family farms are predominant, and the average farm size is small (6.5ha) (Van Leeuwen et al., 2011). In the 2000s, self-production represented about 20% of the food consumption of rural households (Tekgüç, 2012). Drought is a major risk to agricultural production in Turkey (OCDE and des Nations Unies pour l'alimentation et l'agriculture, 2021), but insurance against drought was virtually nonexistent before a government supported insurance scheme (TARSIM) was launched in 2005, and is still underdeveloped.<sup>5</sup> In order to verify that droughts represent an adverse income shock in the Turkish context, we first test the impact of weather shocks on agricultural production at the province level. We find that negative rainfall shocks significantly reduce cereal production and total agricultural production. This result is robust to several definition of negative rainfall shocks and validates the use of droughts as a proxy for negative income shocks.

In our main specification, we find that girls living in provinces with a high practice of bride-price and exposed to a negative income shocks when aged 12 to 14 have a 28% higher probability to be married before the age of 15 compared to girls not exposed to shocks.

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<sup>3</sup><https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/medas/?kn=95&locale=en>

<sup>4</sup>See also Yüksel-Kaptanoğlu and Ergöçmen (2014a).

<sup>5</sup>In 2021, only 21% of farmers had taken out the agricultural public insurance, according to Serpil Günal, general manager of TARSIM, interviewed by the Hürriyet Daily News in April 2022.

This effect is specific to provinces where the prevalence of bride price is higher than the median, and robust to controlling for several confounding factors including rurality, ethnicity, Islamist parties and local welfare provision. We also find that girls affected by drought when aged 12 to 17 are more likely to be married and give birth before the age of 18 when living in provinces with a high prevalence of bride price, compared to girls affected by the same shock but who live in provinces where bride price is infrequent. Moreover, for those who married religiously first, the civil ceremony is delayed by two months, on average. In addition, we find that those unions are characterized by a younger age of the groom. When comparing provinces with a high and low prevalence of bride price, we find that after a shock, girls from the former provinces are more likely to enter an arranged union, and tend to marry a younger groom, with a lower level of education, which results in a smaller education gap between spouses.

Our paper first relates to the growing economics literature that explores the influence of cultural traditions – such as dowry, patrilocality, and polygyny that are widely practiced among populations of more than a billion people – on individual and household behaviors ([Bau and Fernández, 2021](#); [Anderson and Bidner, 2021](#)).<sup>6</sup> Most empirical papers addressing the effects of marital norms on household and individual decisions exploit data from African countries or from India. Several recent papers have extended the geographical scope of the analysis. For instance, [Bazarkulova and Compton \(2021\)](#) analyse the practice of bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan. [Guirkinger et al. \(2021\)](#) study the persisting practice of arranged marriage in many migrant communities in Western Europe and North America. We contribute to this literature by emphasizing the role of bride price on girl marriage in response to weather shocks in the context of a fast growing middle-income country whereas the literature until now has focused on developing countries. We are also able to realize a within country analysis thanks to large differences across Turkish provinces in the prevalence of bride price, which allows us to control for more unobserved factors than would a cross-country analysis. We show that droughts in-

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<sup>6</sup>The fact that the cultural traditions has an important role for decision-making has long been understood by anthropologists ([Goody and Tambiah, 1973](#)).

crease early marriage for girls only where bride price is the most frequent, which provides a within-country validation of the hypothesis and cross-country findings of [Corno et al. \(2020\)](#). In addition, we finely explore the timing of events and find that early marriage occurs 16 to 20 months after a drought shock, in provinces characterized by a widespread practice of bride price. This pattern may suggest that marriage of their daughter is not a first resort strategy for households faced with a negative income shock, at least in this context. However, another explanation for this rather long delay could be related to the time needed to find a groom whose family is able to pay the bride price, especially when the extent of the shock is large enough to also affect potential mates' households.

Second, to circumvent the limitations of marriage statistics, in a context where marriage before the age of 18 becomes illegal from 2002, we use a bundle of measures and methods to capture early marriage. We study age at marriage, the probability to be married under the age of 15 and 18, but also the probability to have a child under the age of 18, in a context where out of wedlock births are highly infrequent. As a further attempt to capture unregistered early unions, we explore the impact of droughts on the probability to be married religiously first, and conditional on this, on the time span separating the religious and civil solemnization. In addition, we explore the impact of shocks and norms on the characteristics of unions, which has not been explored in the literature yet.

Third, we directly highlight the role played by bride price practices and exposure to adverse income shocks in the province of origin of women to explain the persistence of child marriage. Compared to [Corno et al. \(2020\)](#) who can only identify the location of women at the time of the survey, we exploit information on the province of origin to precisely measure both shocks and historical bride price norms to which girls were exposed during their adolescence. In order to assess the size of the bias resulting from the absence of information on the province of origin, we re-estimate our model by substituting the current location of surveyed women to their province of origin. Interestingly, although some of our initial results remain significant, the interaction between shocks and bride



price is no longer significant to explain the probability of being married before the age of 15 and 18. This finding suggests that internal migration is likely to selectively affect those women who are more likely to be married underage, at least in the Turkish context, and that estimations relying on current location for lack of the precise location of girls before they were married are most probably downward biased.

The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the related literature and the Turkish context. The data are described in Section 3. Section 4 presents our empirical model and discusses potential identification issues. Results are shown in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.

## **2 Literature and context**

### **2.1 Early marriage, marriage characteristics and norms in the literature**

Given the negative consequences for women and their children of early marriage, it is of course crucial to understand its determinants, in order to shape public policies that would decrease the occurrence of the practice. This is relevant provided that factors that can be impacted by public policies are at work. We know that the legal interdiction of child marriage is insufficient to reduce the practice, in many contexts, including the Turkish one. Among factors explaining child marriage, economic difficulties have been shown to be a major determinant. Poverty is associated with a higher rate of child marriage, one explanation being that marrying a daughter relieves her parents of the responsibility to provide for her ([Lee-Rife et al. \(2012\)](#)). The literature exploiting exogenous economic shocks provides mixed evidence. Negative shocks can be associated with lower marriage rate and may delay the entry into marriage, due to low prospects for establishing a self-sufficient household ([Palloni et al. \(1996\)](#)). But idiosyncratic economic shocks can also accelerate marriages ([Kumala Dewi and Dartanto \(2019\)](#), [Villar \(2018\)](#)), notably in

countries where parents have a higher say in the marital decision than their offspring and where marriages can improve their informal insurance network. Our paper builds on [Corno et al. \(2020\)](#), who go one step further, by trying to understand how the impact of negative income shock can be magnified by the custom of bride price exchanges, that increases the incentives for marrying a daughter as a child.

[Corno et al. \(2020\)](#) show that women are more likely to marry early (before age 18) following a negative shock to their parent's income in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), due to the practice of bride price. On the contrary, in India, where dowry are exchanged, the authors show that negative income shocks have no effect on women's age at marriage. According to their work, in SSA, in the event of a negative income shock, parents are encouraged to accelerate their daughter's marriage in order to collect the bride price and thus smooth out the decline in their consumption. This conclusion of the authors is to be contrasted with the one of [Khan \(2021\)](#) for Pakistan: the author finds that adverse shocks during teenage year, in villages where bride price are exchanged, do not have a clear-cut effect on the probability to be married. The absence of impact can be due to the fact that other coping mechanisms exist, according to the author. Others paper tend also to highlight that evidence is mixed: [Hotte and Lambert \(2020\)](#), do not find, in the context of Senegal (where bride price are exchanged), that negative income shocks during adolescence increase the probability to be married.

Our work thus contributes to this literature by addressing the issue in a new context, Turkey, and with a distinct methodology. [Corno et al. \(2020\)](#) use for their analysis a variation between large geographical areas (SSA and India) or countries. They provide a robustness analysis exploiting within country variation in bride payments norms (based on the difference of prevalence in the ethnic group according to information from the Atlas of pre-colonial societies ([Muller et al., 2010](#))<sup>7</sup>), but the results turn out to be insignificant. In this paper, our whole analysis is based on a variation of the frequency of bride price

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<sup>7</sup>The Atlas of Pre-Colonial Societies provides historical information on transfers made at marriage, either bride price or dowry, for a large set of ethnic groups identified in the ethnography literature. It is an extension of Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas (1957), which has been extensively used in the literature, often in combination with the DHS.

exchanged, within-country (allowing to mitigate for unobservable heterogeneity between countries). Contrary to [Corno et al. \(2020\)](#), our measure of the prevalence of the bride price practice is computed from survey data (and not from ethnographic work whose representativeness can be questioned - see [White and Brudner-White \(1988\)](#)). This is possible thanks to very rich modules related to marriage conditions in the Health and Demographic Surveys for Turkey collected in 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008 and 2013. As shown in Figure 3.3, the prevalence of the practice varies across the 81 Turkish provinces. Unlike [Khan \(2021\)](#), we exploit rainfall shocks to capture negative income shocks rather than the self-reported measures of income shocks.

Note that negative income shocks are not the only dimension of the social and economic environment studied in interaction with bride price practice. [Ashraf et al. \(2020\)](#) study the interaction with the expansion of education supply (school construction). They show that in Zambia and Indonesia, where bride price is practiced, girls are more likely to benefit from an expansion of education supply. The logic is that as education increases the bride price, parents have an incentive to take advantage of the new educational opportunities available to their daughters in order to receive a higher bride price when they marry. Ultimately, where more schools are available, girls from ethnic groups practicing the bride price, marry later.

The frequency of the bride price practice can therefore impact girls negatively or positively, depending on the nature of the incentive with which the practice interacts.<sup>8</sup>

If the age at entry into marriage is crucial for woman's (future) marital well-being and has attracted much of the attention of the literature, it is not the sole factor related to marriage impacting women's well-being and autonomy. Other characteristics of marriage

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<sup>8</sup>This ambiguity also characterises the literature investigating the links between the obtention of a bride price (at the individual level) and a woman's well-being. Some papers stress the negative impact of bride price on women's autonomy in Uganda ([Kaye et al., 2005](#)). In the context of Senegal, [Gaspart and Platteau \(2010\)](#) show that a high bride-price increases the groom's incentives to push his wife to ask for divorce, potentially violently, if the bride price has to be repaid in case of divorce. Another strand of the literature finds a positive correlation between the bride price and women's welfare: [Mansoor \(2018\)](#) finds that a higher bride price increases the probability of modern contraceptive use, seen as a signal of a higher bargaining power in Bangladesh. Finally, in the context of Senegal, [Hotte and Lambert \(2020\)](#) do not find any correlation between the bride price and women's well-being, but a positive correlation between the transfer given to the wife herself and her own well-being.

may impact women’s welfare, such as co-residence with in-laws, patrilocality, consanguinity between spouses (referred to in this paper as endogamy), individual consent to an arranged marriage, or rank in the marriage (in polygamous contexts). The literature on these aspects is scarcer, for a part due to a lack of data, since household surveys as well as censuses do not often collect precise marital information. We discuss two of these dimensions, consanguinity (endogamy) and arranged marriage, as we have information on these characteristics in the Turkish DHS.<sup>9</sup>

The practice of endogamy can go hand in hand, for women, with a lower say in expenditure decision, as shown by [Rahman and Rao \(2004\)](#) in the context of South Asia. Other works nevertheless highlight that it can decrease the occurrence of intimate partner violence ([Weimer \(2019\)](#)). It is at least detrimental for children’s health: [Mete et al. \(2020\)](#) show that in rural Pakistan children born into consanguineous unions have lower cognitive scores and a higher likelihood of being severely stunted. [Arkadev et al. \(2021\)](#), using 19th and 20th century US state-level bans against cousin marriage also show that this type of marriage can contribute to impede development: descendants of individuals affected by the bans have higher female participation, level of education and wages. The relationship between arranged marriages and well-being has been less investigated, partly because arranged marriages are difficult to define and cover a wide range of situation, including marriages where preferences of parents and children are aligned and other situation where it is not the case. The practice still raises the question of the individual consent in the choice of the partner, which could have consequences on marital well-being: on this matter, the literature is relatively scarce because the lack of data is even more critical. The literature on the links between arranged or self choice marriage and marital satisfaction provides mixed evidence ([Arif and Fatima, 2015](#); [Xiaohe and Whyte, 1990](#)).

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<sup>9</sup>Concerning the potential negative impact of co-residence with in-laws, [Bau \(2021\)](#) show, using data from Ghana and Indonesia, that parents invest more in the education of the child who is supposed to co-reside with them in the future, than of the child who is supposed to join in-laws in her/his marital life. [Dimri \(2015\)](#) shows in the Indian context that the presence of the father-in-law tends to disempower women, in terms of self-reported decision-making.

A strand of the literature is exploring the factors that determine the occurrence of practices such as endogamous or arranged marriages. The advantage of the practice of arranged marriages partly resides in the informal insurance that it provides to the parents (Rubio, 2014), but it is challenged by industrialization and urbanization according to the upholders of the Modernization theory (Adams, 2010; Goode, 1963). Since the practice has already been shown to be linked with the demand of insurance ex-ante of the parents, it seems relevant to explore whether arranged marriage of daughters could also be a way to deal ex-post with the occurrence of negative shocks. This could be particularly probable in regions where bride prices are exchanged, and where the incentive to marry quickly a daughter are stronger. Indeed, arranged marriages are potentially a way to reduce the time needed to find a suitable partner. We could also observe a mechanical increase if early marriages are more frequent due to the shock and if early marriages are disproportionately arranged by the parents. To our knowledge, whether the interaction between the frequency of the bride price and negative income shocks increases or not the practice of arranged marriage is a question that has never been formally investigated: it is one aim of the paper.

Regarding the practice of endogamy, three major motives have been identified in the literature. Endogamy is a way to improve the property retention within the family (Goody, 1983). It can also facilitate the exchanges of women and therefore the occurrence of marriages within the group, in a system where marriage is used as a repayment for past matrimonial debts (Lévi-Strauss, 1967).<sup>10</sup> Endogamy has also been shown to answer to a parental demand for insurance (Hotte and Marazyan, 2020). But only a very small part of this literature exploits exogenous economic shocks or focuses on the role played by marital payments in union characteristics. To our knowledge, the only paper on the topic is Mobarak et al. (2013), which looks at the impact of a flood in Bangladesh. The authors show that brides from non-flooded households received larger dowry payments

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<sup>10</sup>Edlund (2018) suggests also that the custom of the *mahr*, a marital payment directly given to the bride in the muslim tradition, explains the high rate of endogamous marriages in the Muslim world, since it is a way to compensate the bride from her loss of decision power regarding her choice of partner in favor of her father.

and were less likely to be married with relatives. We investigate the same question, using negative income shock in the Turkish context. Impact of negative income shock could have an ambiguous effect on endogamy: it could increase this kind of marriage (if the family wants to marry quickly their daughter) but it is less probable if the families of the husband are also affected by the shock. It seems relevant to investigate the interaction of the bride price practice and income shocks, as the potential impacts can be ambiguous. Indeed, the impact of the interaction between bride price custom and the occurrence of a negative income shock can be negative on child marriage if bride prices are lower in case of endogamous marriage. But it could also be positive if the amount of bride price does not depend on the nature of the marriage (endogamous or not).<sup>11</sup>

## 2.2 Marriage and bride price payments in the Turkish context

In the Turkish tradition, marriages are commonly arranged although children may provide informal consent (Van Eck, 2002). Early marriage is associated with the norm of women’s virginity before marriage that determines the honor (*namuz*) of their male relatives. A virgin woman will also obtain a higher bride price (Tutku, 2013). Elopement of a bride to avoid an arranged marriage or loss of virginity or alleged loss of virginity before marriage may result in honor crime perpetrated by the bride’s husband, father, brother or uncle.<sup>12</sup>

Poverty, especially in rural areas, has been related to the practice of bride price: parents accept a bride price for their daughters, often pulling them out of school at a very young age to secure that they have a husband and that the parents receive what the girl is worth while she is young and virgin (Tutku, 2013).<sup>13</sup> Bride price used to be associated with either a large age difference between spouses (parents marrying their teenage daugh-

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<sup>11</sup>This is something that we cannot test with the DHS data, unfortunately, since we do not know the amount of the bride price exchanged.

<sup>12</sup>Still today, occurrence of honor crimes in Turkey is not scarce. According to unofficial counts, the number of honor crimes per year varied from 66 to 422 between 2008 and 2021 (<http://anitsayac.com/?year=2019>).

<sup>13</sup>In a more recent context, Yaman (2020), who relies on interviews and focus groups with 120 Syrian women in Istanbul confirms the economic role of child marriage, as a “survival strategy” to avoid extreme poverty, and sometimes perceived by mothers as a better option than child labor.

ter to an older man) or marriage with a first or second cousin. These strategies aimed at ensuring that the little wealth or commodity a family had did not pass into a new bloodline (Tutku, 2013). Although no quantitative data exist on the amount of the bride price<sup>14</sup> and its financial significance for (poor) households, the fact that such strategies were documented suggests that its amount was not anecdotal. Although these strategies may be less frequently at stake, at least consciously<sup>15</sup>, endogamous marriages are still frequent today. Kaplan et al. (2016) measure the prevalence of endogamous marriage and its correlates with socio-demographic and obstetric risk factors among ever-married women aged between 15-75, using cross-sectional national-level survey data collected in 2013 in Turkey. The prevalence of endogamous marriage amounts to 18.5%, and of these 57.8% were first cousin marriages. Endogamous marriage is found to be positively related to living in an extended family, a low education level, a younger age at first marriage, and a poor perceived economic status.<sup>16</sup> In the our sample, a bride price has been exchanged in 25% of marriages with a relative, when it is the case of only 14% of non-endogamous marriages.

Yüksel-Kaptanoğlu and Ergöçmen (2014b) provide a descriptive analysis of trends in early marriage in Turkey from 1978 to 2008, and explore factors associated with early marriage, based on data from the 1978 Turkish Fertility Survey and 2008 Turkey Demographic and Health Survey. They find significant associations with lower levels of education and geographical location.

As for the legal context, since negotiations for Turkey's membership to the European Union started in 2005, violence against women in the country has been under the microscope of not only NGOs and feminist organizations, but also of European Unions officials that pushed Turkey into the process of modernization of the law. Part of this process

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<sup>14</sup>The DHS provide no information of the amount that was actually paid.

<sup>15</sup>In a community-based survey conducted by Çiçeklioğlu et al. (2013) in an urban slum in the province of İzmir, the authors note that bride prices does not play an important role in explaining consanguineous marriages.

<sup>16</sup>However, Kisioglu et al. (2010) shows that attitudes towards and knowledge of risks associated with consanguineous marriage (inherited blood disorder in particular) significantly improved after a formal training program on such marriages for high school students.

is the reform of the Civil Code in 2001.<sup>17</sup> The reform of 2001 goes several steps further in reaching equality between spouses, including for instance equal rights over property acquired during marriage. In 2002, as mentioned above it includes a revision of minimum age of marriage.<sup>18</sup> Note however that the objective of this paper is not to analyze the impact of this reform, which concerns only the youngest women present in our sample.

## 3 Data

### 3.1 Data on marriage in Turkey

The main data source used in this article is the Turkish Demographic and Health Survey. Standard Demographic and Health Surveys are collected every five years. In total, our main sample is made of 30,000 girls and women aged 15 and over, surveyed in 1998, 2003, 2008 and 2013<sup>19</sup>, among which over 17,500 married women. Standard DHS surveys are particularly suited to our study, as they contain detailed characteristics of women marital history. Turkish DHS are particularly rich on this aspect, compared to DHS conducted in other countries, as they contain detailed information not only on current union, but also on women's first union.<sup>20</sup> In particular, we know the month and year women entered their first union, whether the ceremony was civil, religious, or both, and in the latter case, which ceremony took place first and the time span between the two

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<sup>17</sup>Note that at the time of its implementation (1926, under the leadership of Mustapha Kemal), the Code (inspired from the Swiss Code) was considered as very modern: it banned polygyny and women had equality in matters of divorce, child custody, and inheritance (Tutku, 2013)

<sup>18</sup>Other law reforms have been adopted. In 1998, Law 4320 was passed by the Assembly with the ideas of providing protection for women from their abusive and threatening male family members. One limit of Law 4320 (apart from the difficulty to enforce the Law in remote and rural areas of the country) was the fact that under that law abusers were not prosecuted. Abusers prosecutions had to wait the reform of the penal code in 2004. Since 2004, men or boys that carry out honor killings of their female relatives can be sentenced to life in prison. Today, the process of modernization can be considered as stopped with the withdrawal of Turkey from the Convention of Istanbul in 2021. Since the AK Party's accession to power, there are attempts at introducing Islamist legislation. A form of legal pluralism is observed and is investigated by Yilmaz (2021).

<sup>19</sup>The latest data collection has been completed in January 2019, but to date (in September 2021), the data are not available yet.

<sup>20</sup>If women entered several unions, information is provided about the first and last union. We exploit in this paper information on the first union only.



ceremonies. In addition, we have information about the type of the union (whether it was arranged), and some characteristics of the groom (his age and education<sup>21</sup>, whether he was related to the bride, and the type of relation). Last, we know whether a payment was made to the bride’s family. We do not use directly individual data on bride price payments, as it is very likely endogenous. Instead, we take advantage of the availability of this information to construct a province-level measure of the historical prevalence of bride money payments (detailed in the next subsection).

We focus on women born since 1969, for whom we have data on weather shocks during adolescence. Figure 1 represents the prevalence of early marriage for women born from 1969 to 1997 in the DHS. A clear declining trend is observed for very early marriage (graph 1a), especially at the beginning of the period. However, among women born in the early 1990s, around 2% were married before the age of 15. The share of women married under the age of 18 is on a downward slope until 1985, and then stabilizes around 20-25%.<sup>22</sup> Note that the 2002 law, which set to 18 the minimum legal age at marriage, and should have applied to women born after 1984, appears to have had no effect on the prevalence of marriage before 18.<sup>23</sup>

### 3.2 Province-level prevalence of bride money payments

Turkey is divided into 81 provinces corresponding to NUTS-3 statistical regions, and province is the most precise location available in the DHS. The country is characterized by a large divide between modern Western cities and more rural and traditional areas, mostly in the East and in Central Anatolia. In order to study the role of bride price payment on incentives to marry daughters early, we construct a province-level variable measuring the

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
<sup>21</sup>While age of the groom is available for women’s first union, education of the groom is provided for the current union only. However, only 2.2% of women in our sample had more than one union.

<sup>22</sup>Note that standard deviations are higher for younger cohorts since they are surveyed only in 2013. In the empirical analysis we account for the over- or under-representation of different cohorts by re-weighting individual DHS weights (see Section 4.1)

<sup>23</sup>Similar graphs with the year of marriage instead of the year of birth on the x axis actually reveal a small and temporary decrease in the share of early marriage in 2002 and 2003, followed by a rebound as soon as 2004. The 2002 law does not seem to have significantly affected the (slowly declining) trend of early marriage practices.

Figure 1: Share of early marriage by year of birth, 1969-1997

(a) Share of women married before the age of 15      (b) Share of women married before the age of 18



Source: DHS data, 1998, 2003, 2008, and 2013 weighted data.

prevalence of the practice of bride price. We use for this purpose information contained in the first two wave of the DHS, collected in 1993 and 1998: we compute for each province the weighted<sup>24</sup> share of women born in this province who declare that a bride price was paid on the occasion of their first union. To avoid endogeneity issues, since our estimation sample is made of women born after 1969, we compute the province-level share of bride price practice by restricting the sample to women married before 1981, ie before the oldest cohort of women in our estimation sample (born in 1969) is 12 years old.<sup>25</sup> This measure of bride price is assumed to be a proxy for the exposure of subsequent cohorts of women to traditional cultural norms implying the payment of an amount of money to the family of the bride. Map 2 illustrates the variation in cultural norms related to marriage across provinces. In the Western provinces of Izmir and Mugla, the practice of bride money is virtually non-existent. By contrast, in the Eastern province of Van, 88.4% of women married before 1981 and interviewed either in 1993 or in 1998 declare that a bride price was paid to their family at the occasion of their marriage. However, the heterogeneity of the practice of bride price is not limited to a basic opposition between West and East.

<sup>24</sup>Using DHS weights.

<sup>25</sup>We drop from the sample the province of Iğdir, for which we can use 4 observations only to construct our measure for the historical prevalence of bride price. Our results are robust to additionally excluding the 10 other provinces for which less than 20 individual observations were available to compute the value of the bride price share (see Table A3 in the online Appendix). On average, the calculation of the province-level prevalence of bride price is based on 113 individual values.

While the practice of bride price is obviously widespread in the Eastern part of Turkey, the custom is also common in some provinces in the West, such as Afyon, or in the Black Sea region, as in Sinop.

Figure 2: Distribution of bride money payment practice in 1993 and 1998 among women married before 1981 (deciles)




Figure 3: Source : DHS 1993 and 1998. Legend: weighted share of women married before 1981 with an exchange of bride price (deciles)

Our measure being constructed at the province level using data collected among women married before the oldest women in our regression sample were 12, we are quite confident that it is not endogenous. Indeed, weather shocks experienced during adolescence may have an impact on the type of unions formed, and in particular on the payment of a bride price.<sup>26</sup> However, we rely here on a province level variable measured before unions under study actually took place to capture exposure to norms, rather than directly use individual statements on bride price payments.

In the following analysis, we define a binary indicator equal to one for provinces with a high prevalence of bride price, ie provinces where our indicator of bride price is over the national median (equal to 42.5%). Descriptive statistics of the main demographic indicators used in this article depending on the province-level historical prevalence of bride price norms are shown in [Table 5](#) and [Table 6](#) in Appendix.

### 3.3 Weather data and agricultural production

We merge DHS data with gridded weather data converted at the province level, to construct measures of weather shocks. Rainfall data come from the CHIRPS project, and are available from 1981 onwards.<sup>27</sup> In addition, we use agricultural data on crop production at the province level, obtained from the Turkish Statistical Institute.<sup>28</sup>

In order to validate our use of rainfall shocks as relevant proxies for income shocks, we first investigate the impact of rainfall shocks on agricultural production. We estimate

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<sup>26</sup>Descriptive statistics however indirectly suggest that this is not the case in the Turkish context: we find that provinces with a high and low prevalence of bride price have been exposed to the same number of past weather shocks (See [Table 9](#)).

<sup>27</sup>The Climate Hazards Group InfraRed Precipitation with Station (CHIRPS) data archive is a quasi-global (50S-50N), gridded 0.05 degree resolution, 1981 to near-real time precipitation time series. The terrestrial precipitation estimates, are available in daily to annual time intervals. CHIRPS was created in collaboration with scientists at the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Earth Resources Observation and Science (EROS) Center to deliver reliable, up-to-date, and more complete datasets for a number of early warning objectives (such as trend analysis and seasonal drought monitoring) using satellite data and precipitation grids produced from station data. They can be downloaded at this address: <http://chg.geog.ucsb.edu/data/chirps/> ([Funk et al., 2014](#)).

<sup>28</sup><https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/medas/?kn=95&locale=en>

the following equation:

$$Y_{p,t} = \alpha + \beta DNegativeShock_{p,t} + D_p + \epsilon_p \quad (1)$$

where  $Y_{p,t}$  represents the production quantity for different categories of crops and other agricultural productions in year  $t$ , measured at the province level ( $p$ ). The  $DNegativeShock_{p,t}$  variable is a dummy equal to one if the rainfall z-score measured over the 9 months of the growing season (January to September) in year  $t$ <sup>29</sup> and province  $p$  is below  $-1.64$ . Such a measure captures unusual variations in precipitations by comparing observed rainfall to average rainfall for the same province and period of the year, once the “normal” variability of rainfall is accounted for. The literature on shocks usually considers a z-score lower than  $-2$  as a severe drought, however, with this definition, no province has been shocked over the period of interest. With a threshold set at  $-1.64$ , i.e. defining negative shocks as observed rainfall over the first 9 months of the year under 1.64 standard errors below the province average, 4.78% of our province-year observations were shocked over the period.<sup>30</sup> Figure 4 (in Appendix), illustrates the distribution of shocks over the period under study. We observe variation in our indicator over time, in spite of a major drought in 1989, which affected almost all provinces. The potential issues raised by this large shocks are further discussed in Section 4.2 and addressed in Section 5.3.

Estimation results for equation 1 are shown in Table 7 in Appendix. We find that negative rainfall shocks have a large and significant effect on agricultural output. Column 1 shows for example that when a negative rainfall shock is observed, the production of cereals decreases by 333 thousand tonnes, when the average production of cereals over the period is 1100 thousand tonnes, which represents a 30% drop in cereal production.

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<sup>29</sup>The z-score is computed as the difference between observed precipitations in province  $p$  and average precipitations in  $p$  for the same 9 months over the 1981-2018 period divided by the long-term standard deviation of precipitations in province  $p$ .

<sup>30</sup>We test the robustness of our results to the choice of an alternative threshold,  $-1.5$ , according to which 6.35% of province-year observations were shocked. First-stage and main results (available upon request) are comparable to those obtain with a threshold set at a  $-1.64$  standard deviation.

In total, column (5) shows that a negative rainfall shock causes a 25% decrease (420 thousand tonnes) in our aggregate measure of agricultural production constructed as the total of cereals, fruit and vegetables productions. Data on yields are not available for all agricultural productions, however, we test in column (6) the impact of shocks on wheat yields. We find that a drought decreases wheat yields by 1099 kg per hectare, while the average yield for the period is 4857 kg per hectare.<sup>31</sup>

## 4 Empirical model

### 4.1 Impact of weather shocks on marital and educational outcomes

In order to assess the impact of income shocks and bride money practice on early marriage we estimate the following generic equation:

$$Y_{i,p,y} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 D_{NegativeShock}_{\tau_{i,p,y}} + \beta_2 D_{NegativeShock}_{\tau_{i,p,y}} \times BridePrice_p + D_p + D_y + D_w + \epsilon_{i,p,y} \quad (2)$$

where  $Y_{i,p,y}$  are different variables describing the timing and type of union of woman  $i$ , born in province  $p$  and year  $y$ . Equation 2 is estimated on the sample of married women, for whom we have detailed information about their first union.  $Y_{i,p,y}$  includes several proxies for early marriage: binary variables for being married before the age of 15 and 18<sup>32</sup>, age at marriage, age at first birth, and the time span between religious and civil ceremonies.

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<sup>31</sup>Note that we also investigated, symmetrically, the impact of positive shocks, and found that after such a shock the probability to be married before 15 is significantly reduced in regions where bride price is frequent, compared to regions where bride price is less frequent. We choose however not to develop this aspect since positive shocks have a lower predictive power in terms of production, than the negative rainfall shocks.

<sup>32</sup>We followed the literature in setting the age cut-offs at 15 and 18. Note however that we find consistent results with an age cut-off at 16.

$DNegativeShock_{-\tau_{i,p,y}}$  is a dummy equal to one if a negative rainfall shock is observed in province  $p$  when woman  $i$  was in age range  $\tau$ . The considered age range is 12 to 17 for all outcomes except marriage before the age of 15 and education, for which the relevant age range is 12 to 14.<sup>33</sup> Consistent with above, a negative rainfall shocks is defined as a z-score for precipitations from January to September below  $-1.64$ .<sup>34</sup>

The rainfall shock variable is interacted with the binary variable<sup>35</sup>  $BridePrice_p$  equal to one if woman  $i$  lived during her childhood in a province where the average prevalence of the practice of bride money is above the national median. The average prevalence of bride money is computed using individual answers to the bride money question asked to ever married women in the DHS questionnaire in 1993 and 1998, weighted and averaged at the level of the province of origin.

$D_p$ ,  $D_y$ , and  $D_w$  are province, year-of-birth, and survey wave fixed-effects respectively; standard errors are clustered at the province of origin  $p$  level.<sup>36</sup> All individual observations are weighted using DHS weights.<sup>37</sup>

In a second analysis, in order to investigate the impact of shocks and bride price norms on education, we use the whole sample of women included in the DHS, either married or not (results shown and discussed in Section 5.3).

Finally, we estimate Equation 2 on the sample of married women and change the list

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<sup>33</sup>The lower bound, 12, corresponds to a commonly admitted age for puberty, and higher bounds were chosen with respect to the 15 and 18 age cut-offs to define child marriage and early marriage that are used in the literature.

<sup>34</sup>As noted in the previous section, results are similar in size when using an alternative threshold set at  $-1.5$  standard deviation.

<sup>35</sup>We also test another specification in which we interact the shock variable with binary variables for the different quartiles of the distribution of bride price prevalence. Results (available upon request) are consistent and suggest a linear effect of exposure to bride price norms.

<sup>36</sup>In an alternative specification, we include in addition an interaction term between year-of-birth dummies and our binary bride price variable. Such a specification allows us to control for any unobservable trend specific to provinces with a high prevalence of bride price that are likely to affect the relationship between shocks, norms, and marital behavior. However such a specification is highly demanding, given the relatively small size of our sample. The estimated coefficient on the interaction between shocks and norms remains significant for marriage before 15, but we lose precision for other measures of early marriage. Results are available upon request.

<sup>37</sup>We use individual weights in our main regressions on the subsample of married women, and household weights in regressions estimated on the total sample of women, whatever their marital status. We follow [Crespin-Boucaud \(2020\)](#) and adjust individual and household weights to avoid over-representing cohorts that are surveyed in multiple waves.



of dependent variables to examine the effects of shocks on the characteristics of unions. Our list of dependent variables includes dummy variables for endogamous union (defined here as a union between relatives<sup>38</sup>), for arranged union, age and education of the groom, and age and education difference between spouses.

## 4.2 Threats to identification

A first potential threat to our identification strategy is related to the geographical distribution of rainfall shocks and its possible correlation with marital payment practices. Indeed, long-term rainfall patterns, and in particular a more frequent occurrence of shocks, could explain the persistence of bride price, as a form of insurance against negative income shocks. However, the distribution of shocks across provinces over the 1981-2013 period shown in Figure 5 in Appendix, to be compared with the geographic distribution of the prevalence of bride price shown in Figure 2, does not provide evidence of a particular concentration of shocks in provinces with the most widespread practice of bride price. The first line of Table 9, in Appendix, confirms this: provinces with a high and low practice of bride price were affected by the same number of shocks (rainfall z-score  $< -1.64$ ) over the period of interest. To explore further this issue, we use the geo-referenced rainfall datasets provided by the University of Delaware<sup>39</sup>, which are less precise than the CHIRPS products but cover a wider time range. The second row of Table 9 shows that there is no significant difference in the number of rainfall shocks over the 1900-1981 period between provinces with a high prevalence of bride price and the rest of the country.

Another related potential threat comes from the fact that provinces where the practice of bride price is the most widespread are also likely to differ on a number of characteristics from provinces where the practice is nearly extinct. Our specifications include province fixed-effects that capture time-invariant differences across provinces. However, there is

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<sup>38</sup>More specifically, the DHS provides information on whether the bride was related to her husband and the type of relationship. We define a union as endogamous provided that women declare that they were related to their husband

<sup>39</sup>Available here: [https://psl.noaa.gov/data/gridded/data.UDel\\_AirT\\_Precip.html](https://psl.noaa.gov/data/gridded/data.UDel_AirT_Precip.html)

no ambiguity about the fact that the practice of bride price is correlated with traditional norms and practices, which could challenge the interpretation of our results. We address this issue and discuss the role of potential confounding factors in Section 5.2.

A final challenge for interpretation is linked to the impact of the 1989 global shock. In 1989, Turkey was affected by a generalized drought episode, that hit a large majority of provinces. We cannot exclude that part of the effect that we intend to measure is driven by this large and unfrequent shock. This issue is further explored in Section 5.3.

## 5 Results

### 5.1 Rainfall shocks, bride money prevalence, and marriage

Table 1 shows the results of the regression of different marriage variables on shocks and their interaction with the province-level historical measure of bride price on the subsample of ever married women, for which we have the most complete information set on the timing and characteristics of their (first) union. As discussed above, since declared age at marriage, at least for part of our sample, could be biased by the legal framework, which restricted in 2002 the possibility of civil marriage before the age of 18, we use a bundle of measures to proxy for early marriage. In particular, the second part of the table shows the effect of rainfall shocks on the type and timing of wedding ceremonies. Indeed, in Turkey, most married women are married both religiously and civilly. A larger time interval between religious and civil ceremonies for brides who first married religiously could be an indicator of early marriage, where civil registration is performed once the young wife is no longer underage.

We find that exposure to an adverse weather shock during adolescence significantly increases the probability to be married under 15 only for girls born in provinces with a high prevalence of the practice of bride price (column 2). We find in total a 3.1 percentage point increase, which represents a 28% increase in the probability to be married before 15 for girls living in provinces with a high prevalence of bride price and exposed to a

shock during early adolescence, compared to girls who experienced no shock. Additional results reveal differences in provinces depending on the prevalence of bride price. When exposed to the same shock, women from provinces with a high prevalence of bride price have a 28% higher probability (corresponding to a 3.2 percentage point increase) to be married under 18 (column 4) and a 20% higher probability to give birth to a child before 18 (column 8) than women in provinces where bride price is uncommon. Exposure to a shock when aged 12 to 17 significantly reduces age at marriage in provinces with a high historical prevalence of bride price (column 6), however, the opposite is observed for girls living in provinces with a low prevalence of bride price. Finally, while shocks tend to reduce the time interval between religious and civil ceremonies in provinces with a low practice of bride price, the effect of shocks is reversed in provinces where the prevalence of bride price is above the median. These results suggest that in the absence of a financial transfer directed to the bride's parents, there are no financial incentives for the parents to marry their daughter early when faced with an adverse income shock. In this situation, parents may choose to delay the marriage of a daughter because they are unable to support the cost of the ceremony, traditionally borne by the bride's family. This cost is most probably more than compensated by the bride price in regions where marital payments are exchanged. In regions where bride price is infrequent, it is also possible that parents, when faced with an adverse income shock, focus their attention on other ways to cope with the shock (bank loan, help from relatives), making the marriage of a child less a priority at this time. However testing these hypotheses would require information on households' coping strategies that is not available in the DHS.

Table 1: Rainfall shocks and early marriage - sample of ever married women born post 1969, dropping Igdir

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Married under 15		Married under 18		Age at marriage	
Rainfall z-score 12-14 < -1.64	0.015 (0.012)	0.004 (0.012)				
Rainfall z-score 12-14 < -1.64 X bride price		0.027** (0.012)				
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64			0.009 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.020)	0.056 (0.116)	0.211* (0.114)
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64 X bride price				0.032* (0.019)		-0.368*** (0.134)
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of birth fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sum coeff.		0.031		0.028		-0.157
P-value		0.046		0.233		0.338
Mean Dep. Var.	0.11	0.11	0.43	0.43	19.59	19.59
Mean rainfall z-score 12-14 < -1.64	0.22	0.22				
Mean rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64			0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43
N	17647	17647	17647	17647	17647	17647
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Childbirth before 18		Religious first		Time between 2 ceremonies if religious first	
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64	0.001 (0.015)	-0.011 (0.015)	0.020 (0.018)	0.026 (0.021)	-1.417 (1.002)	-4.585*** (1.270)
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64 X bride price		0.028* (0.016)		-0.015 (0.021)		6.635*** (1.398)
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of birth fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sum coeff.		0.017		0.011		2.050
P-value		0.380		0.607		0.178
Mean Dep. Var.	0.24	0.24	0.57	0.57	15.55	15.55
Mean rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.42	0.42
N	17506	17506	15958	15958	9007	9007

Standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Controls not shown: survey year dummies

Sum coeff. reports the sum of the coefficients on the shock variable and its interaction with the bride price indicator.

P-value reports the p-value of the test of Sum coeff. against zero.

Data source: Turkey DHS 1998 to 2013

## Sample selection issues and educational outcomes

Our main results are estimated over the sample of married women, for whom we have the most complete set of information. However, this sample is selected over our outcome of interest (marriage), which may be a source of concern. Yet, partial information is available in the DHS for women who are not yet married and thus not included in the main survey module. We use such information to first corroborate our main results, and second, to provide additional results on education. We thus re-estimate equation 2 on an enlarged sample of over 30,000 observations including all women aged 15 and over, whatever their marital status, for whom we have information on both marital status and educational

attainment. Results are shown in Table 2. Consistent with the results reported in Table 1, we find that girls who were exposed to a drought when aged 12 to 14 and were living in a province with a high practice of bride price are more likely to be married before the age of 15, while the effect of shocks goes in the opposite direction for girls living in provinces where the prevalence of bride money is below the national median. As noted above, this finding is consistent with the bride price providing a financial incentive for parents to marry their daughter early when faced with a shock, whereas in the absence of bride price, marriage represents a net cost that households cannot afford in bad times. Results reported in column (4) for being married before the age of 18 are not significant.

Consistent with the extensive literature linking early marriage to school dropout and with our findings on early marriage, results reported in column (6) show that shocks have a negative effect on educational attainment for girls living in provinces with a high historical practice of bride price. These results confirm that negative income shocks are particularly detrimental to girls in regions where the practice of bride price is common, and point to the role played by marital norms and institutions.

Table 2: Rainfall shocks and early marriage - all women born post 1969

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Married under 15		Married under 18		Nb years of education	
Rainfall z-score 12-14 < -1.64	-0.001 (0.009)	-0.015* (0.009)			0.112 (0.155)	0.274 (0.183)
Rainfall z-score 12-14 < -1.64 X bride price		0.034*** (0.009)				-0.407* (0.214)
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64			-0.006 (0.017)	-0.012 (0.018)		
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64 X bride price				0.013 (0.017)		
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of birth fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sum coeff.		0.020		0.002		-0.133
P-value		0.110		0.941		0.507
Mean Dep. Var.	0.07	0.07	0.30	0.30	7.05	7.05
Mean rainfall z-score 12-14 < -1.64	0.17	0.17	0.20	0.20	0.17	0.17
Mean rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64			0.21	0.21		
N	30146	30146	23726	23726	30855	30855

Standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Controls not shown: survey year dummies

Sum coeff. reports the sum of the coefficients on the shock variable and its interaction with the bride price indicator.

P-value reports the p-value of the test of Sum coeff. against zero.

Data source: Turkey DHS 1998 to 2013

## 5.2 Bride price norms and confounding factors

As discussed in Section 4.2, our interpretation based upon the role of the prevalence of bride price norms may be challenged by the fact that our historical measure of bride price may also capture other traditional norms or customs.

Descriptive statistics shown in [Table 9](#), in Appendix, provide a first picture of potential differences between provinces with high and low prevalence of bride price. We combine in this table variables computed from the DHS (early marriage variables) to indicators from the 1985 census<sup>40</sup> (sex-ratio in the population aged 15+, and rural dummy<sup>41</sup>). The sex-ratio, which is likely to influence marital norms, is not significantly different in the two types of provinces. By contrast, and as expected, provinces with a high practice of bride price are also more likely to be rural. They are also characterized by an ex-ante greater prevalence of child marriage, based on a historical measure constructed using individual answers of married women born before 1969 to the bride price question.

### Tradition and rurality

In order to try to separate the effect of bride price to that of other traditional norms prevailing in provinces with a widespread practice of bride price, we test additional specifications in which we include an interaction between our shock variable and the province level prevalence of marriage before the age of 15 for women born before 1969. We use this measure as a proxy for all other norms that could be correlated with bride price and result from the historical exposure to shocks. Results are reported in [Table 10](#) in Appendix. Although some of the coefficients on the interaction term between the shock and bride price dummies are no longer significant, the coefficient on the interaction between shocks and the bride price dummy remains positive and significant for marriage under 15

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<sup>40</sup>10% extraction available at <https://international.ipums.org/international/>

<sup>41</sup>We use information on the sector of activity of household heads from the 1985 census and define a province as being agricultural if more than 52% - the national median - of active household heads work in the agricultural sector.

(column 2) and time between religious and civil ceremonies (column 12).<sup>42</sup> These findings suggest that although part of our results can be due to past exposure to shocks and attributed to the co-existence of other traditional norms, bride price remains a significant driver of (very) early marriage.<sup>43</sup>

Second, as shown in Table 9, in Appendix, provinces with a historical prevalence of bride price above the median are significantly more rural than other provinces. The coefficients on the interaction between shocks and the bride price dummy may thus in part capture the effect of a greater vulnerability to weather shocks in more rural and/or agricultural areas. In Table 11, we test whether our results are driven by rural areas: we re-estimate equation 2, controlling for the interaction between the shock variable and the dummy for agricultural provinces. Compared with our main results reported in Table 1, the coefficient on the interaction between shocks and the bride price dummy remains positive and significant for marriage under 15 (column 2) and time between religious and civil ceremonies (column 12).<sup>44</sup> Table 11 suggests that although part of our results can be due to a greater vulnerability to shocks in rural provinces, this is not the only driver of our results. The same is observed on the enlarged sample of all women whatever their marital status (results available upon request).

### **The Kurdish ethnic minority**

One may wonder whether our results are driven by the Kurdish minority which is the largest ethnic minority in Turkey.<sup>45</sup> Indeed, Kurds are predominant in the South-Eastern part of the country, which is also characterized by a high prevalence of bride price. In order to test this assumption, we estimate our model on separate samples - Kurdish and non-

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<sup>42</sup>Note however that the sum of the coefficient on the shock variable and its interaction with the bride price indicator is not significant at conventional levels, which may be explained by the correlation between the bride price dummy and the historical prevalence of child marriage.

<sup>43</sup>Results on the enlarged sample shown in Table 2 for marriage before the age of 15 are also robust to controlling for the interaction between shocks and the same variable for the historical prevalence of early marriage (results available upon request)

<sup>44</sup>The sum of the coefficient on the shock variable and its interaction with the bride price indicator is significant at 6% for marriage before 15, and non-significant for time between ceremonies.

<sup>45</sup>In 2013, 20% of DHS respondents declare that their mother tongue is Kurdish.

Kurdish. Ethnic status is defined based on the mother tongue that is declared by surveyed women in the DHS. Estimation results are shown in Tables A1 (for Kurdish women) and A2 (for women of other ethnicity, mostly Turks) in the online Appendix. Coefficients are consistent with our main results but are not significant for Kurdish women, which may be in part due to the relatively small sample size. On the sample of non-Kurdish women, our results on marriage before 15 and on the interval between the religious and civil ceremonies hold the same size and significance as our main results, which confirms that our results are not reflecting different customs and norms that would be specific to the Kurdish group.

### **Electoral results and local welfare provision**

The fact that provinces with a high prevalence of bride price are likely to be more traditional is also expected to be reflected by electoral results. In the period analyzed in this article, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the 2002 general election, and consolidated its victory in the 2004 local elections. The AKP defended traditional and family values, and deployed pro-natalist and pro-marriage welfare provision at the local level ([Aksoy and Billari, 2018](#)). Note that the influence of AKP may be ambiguous since previous works showed that Islamic political representation in Turkey was associated with women empowerment, through higher female secular high-school education ([Meyersson, 2014](#)), or access to employment in the public sector ([Corekcioglu, 2021](#)). However, one may fear that our bride price measure capture local welfare provision likely to affect marital patterns. In order to address this issue, we collected province-level data on the share of seats obtained by the AKP at the council elections of 2004. We define a binary variable equal to one if AKP won the majority of seats, which was the case in 37 provinces, and, reassuringly, we find an almost zero correlation (-0.04) between this variable and our binary indicator for a high prevalence of bride price. We further explore this issue by including as additional controls in our regressions the interaction between shocks and the above defined binary variable for AKP victory in 2004 local elections. Note that



the latter variable is only a proxy for AKP control over local politics: our analysis is performed at the province level, while the relevant level for local politics is the district level. Results are shown in [Table 12](#). We find that the prevalence of marriage before 18 after a shock tends to be reduced in provinces won by AKP suggesting that local welfare provision may have helped households to cope with adverse shock and avoid early marriage. However, results on marriage before 15, age at marriage, and time between religious and civil ceremonies remain unchallenged: after a shock, girls living in provinces where bride price norms are the most prevalent are more exposed to child marriage.<sup>46</sup>

### 5.3 Heterogeneity across cohorts: the 1989 global drought

As mentioned in Section 4.2, a significant proportion of shocked observations are caused by the (quasi) global drought that affected Turkey in 1989. Our results could be driven by the fact that we compare different cohorts, born before and after 1978, the former one being more likely to be affected by a shock, while the latter are less exposed. Nonetheless, [Figure 4](#) (in Appendix), already discussed in Section 3.3, shows that there is some variation in our shock dummy both before and after 1989. To test the potential differences in estimated effects for the oldest and youngest cohorts, we interact both the shock dummy and its interaction with the bride price dummy with an indicator variable equal to one for women born after 1978. Results are shown in [Table 13](#) in Appendix. The coefficient on the triple interaction term is not significant, except for the lapse of time between the religious and civil ceremonies. These findings suggest that, overall, the effect of shocks interacted with the bride price dummy is not significantly different for women born before and after 1978.

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<sup>46</sup>The sum of the coefficient on the shock variable and its interaction with the bride price indicator is significant at 10% for marriage before 15, marriage before 18, and time between ceremonies, and at 12% for age at marriage.

## 5.4 Timing of marriage

In this section, we estimate a discrete duration model to investigate the timing of marriage after a negative income shock. We modify the structure of our data and construct a panel where the individuals (women) are observed from age 11, age at which only a negligible number of girls are already married, until they get married, or until the age of 18 if they were not yet married at 18.<sup>47</sup> The dependent variable is a binary variable equal to one for period  $t$  if a woman gets married in period  $t$ , and zero otherwise. In order to provide a precise analysis of the timing of the different events, we choose to focus on infra-annual periods. We divide each civil year into 3 periods of 4 months each. Note that, according to this divide, shocks all occur in period 1 (January to April), since droughts that take place during this period of 4 months are predictive of lower agricultural production (for cereals and total production) and yields (wheat) for the current year (see Table 8 in Appendix). Each woman contributes to the sample the number of periods of 4 months until she gets married, if married before the age of 18. The estimated equation is the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 M_{i,p,t} = & \beta_0 + \left( \sum_{k=t-8}^{t-1} DNegativeShock_{i,p,k} \right) \beta_1 + \left( \sum_{k=t-8}^{t-1} DNegativeShock_{i,p,k} \times BridePrice_p \right) \beta_2 \\
 & + D_p + D_{yob} \times BridePrice_p + D_w \times BridePrice_p + \epsilon_{i,p,t}
 \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

Where  $M_{i,p,t}$  is a binary variable equal to one if woman  $i$  from province  $p$  gets married at period  $t$ , and zero otherwise.  $\sum_{k=t-9}^t DNegativeShock_{i,p,k}$  is a vector of drought shocks occurring in four-month periods  $t - 8$  to  $t - 1$ , i.e. over the past three years. Consistent with our main specification, shocks are binary variables equal to one if observed rainfall over period  $k$  are below -1.64 long-term standard deviation for the same province and period of the year. Remember that according to our definition of periods, shocks can occur only during the first four-month period of each year (from January to April), which is

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<sup>47</sup>Since we focus on early marriage, women who are not yet married at the age of 18 are thus right-censored.

crucial for most crops in Turkey. As before,  $BridePrice_p$  is a binary variable equal to one if our measure of the prevalence of bride price in province  $p$  is above the national median. We include province dummies, to control for time invariant characteristics of provinces explaining marital patterns. In addition, we control for year-of-birth ( $D_{yob}$ ) and survey waves  $D_w$  dummies.<sup>48</sup>

Results are reported in [Table 3](#). We find that the probability of being married, for teenage girls, increases 5 time periods after a shock. This effect is driven by girls living in provinces with a high prevalence of bride price (column (2)). Said differently, a shock occurring during the first four months of a given year leads to a higher probability for a girl to be married at the end of the following year. This lapse of time (from 16 to 20 months) between the shock and the union may seem rather long, and may suggest for example that forming a union requires an incompressible amount of time, or that girl marriage is for households a last resort strategy to face an adverse income shocks. These results may also suggest that when faced with a shock households may have to arbitrate between marrying a daughter immediately and receiving a probably lower bride price in a depressed context, or wait and hope that they can obtain a higher bride price once the shock is over. The latter strategy is more likely for households having enough savings or assets, which might be related with the 16 to 20 months delay that we find for a shock to translate into early marriage. We are however unable to discriminate between these two explanations, and possibly other relevant ones, for lack of data on households' coping strategies and assets.

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<sup>48</sup>Such a set of fixed-effects is consistent with our main specification. However, we also test the robustness of our results to the inclusion of interaction terms between year-of-birth dummies and our bride price binary variable, to control for time trends in unobserved factors correlated with the prevalence of child marriage, possibly different in provinces with a high prevalence of bride price. Results (available upon request) are virtually unchanged.

Table 3: Rainfall shocks and early marriage - all women born post 1969 - four-month periods regressions

	(1)	(2)
	Married (before 18)	
Rainfall z-score < -1.64 $t - 1$	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)
Rainfall z-score < -1.64 $t - 2$	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)
Rainfall z-score < -1.64 $t - 3$	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Rainfall z-score < -1.64 $t - 4$	0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Rainfall z-score < -1.64 $t - 5$	0.004** (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
Rainfall z-score < -1.64 $t - 6$	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)
Rainfall z-score < -1.64 $t - 7$	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Rainfall z-score < -1.64 $t - 8$	0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Rainfall z-score < -1.64 $t - 1$ X bride price		0.001 (0.003)
Rainfall z-score < -1.64 $t - 2$ X bride price		0.004 (0.003)
Rainfall z-score < -1.64 $t - 3$ X bride price		-0.001 (0.002)
Rainfall z-score < -1.64 $t - 4$ X bride price		0.001 (0.002)
Rainfall z-score < -1.64 $t - 5$ X bride price		0.010** (0.004)
Rainfall z-score < -1.64 $t - 6$ X bride price		0.001 (0.002)
Rainfall z-score < -1.64 $t - 7$ X bride price		-0.001 (0.002)
Rainfall z-score < -1.64 $t - 8$ X bride price		0.006 (0.004)
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Year of birth fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	520007	520007

Standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .  
Controls not shown: survey year dummies  
Data source: Turkey DHS 1998 to 2013

## 5.5 Marriage characteristics

Negative income shocks combined with exposure to specific norms regarding marriage are found to impact the timing of marriage. In addition, they are also likely to impact the type of union that are formed. We thus exploit the richness of information contained in the DHS Turkey to document the effect of shocks on characteristics of unions, depending on the prevalence of bride price norms in girls' childhood province. Results are shown in [Table 4](#). Shocks are not found to affect endogamy (columns (1) to (6)), neither in provinces with a low bride price practice, nor in those where the historical prevalence of

bride price is low. However, while shocks are found to significantly reduce the probability that the marriage is arranged in provinces with a low prevalence of bride price, this is not the case in provinces with a high prevalence of bride price (column (8)).<sup>49</sup> Last, we find that shocks in provinces with a widespread practice of bride price are associated with a younger age at marriage and a lower educational attainment for the groom. This finding is associated with a reduced age and education gap (though significant only for education) between spouses.<sup>50</sup>

Table 4: Rainfall shocks and marriage characteristics - sample of ever married women born post 1969

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Endogamous		Endogamous maternal		Endogamous paternal		Arranged	
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64	0.012	0.010	-0.004	-0.001	-0.007	-0.011	-0.054***	-0.074***
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.021)
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64 X bride price		0.003		-0.006		0.009		0.047**
		(0.017)		(0.010)		(0.011)		(0.019)
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of birth fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sum coeff.		0.013		-0.008		-0.002		-0.027
P-value		0.543		0.502		0.818		0.163
Mean Dep. Var.	0.25	0.25	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.50	0.50
Mean rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43
N	17647	17647	17647	17647	17647	17647	17647	17647
	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
	Groom age		Age gap		Groom education		Education gap	
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64	-0.093	0.119	-0.154	-0.092	0.037	0.102*	0.028	0.047
	(0.151)	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.144)	(0.046)	(0.053)	(0.026)	(0.032)
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64 X bride price		-0.505**		-0.147		-0.153***		-0.045*
		(0.195)		(0.188)		(0.036)		(0.027)
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of birth fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sum coeff.		-0.386		-0.239		-0.051		0.002
P-value		0.084		0.248		0.342		0.952
Mean Dep. Var.	24.32	24.32	4.71	4.71	3.00	3.00	1.34	1.34
Mean rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43
N	17484	17484	17484	17484	17582	17582	17582	17582

Standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Controls not shown: survey year dummies

Sum coeff. reports the sum of the coefficients on the shock variable and its interaction with the bride price indicator.

P-value reports the p-value of the test of Sum coeff. against zero.

Data source: Turkey DHS 1998 to 2013

<sup>49</sup>The negative effect of rainfall shocks on the probability to celebrate an arranged marriage may suggest that, in the context of Turkey, love marriages may provide more ex-post insurance than arranged marriages. This result does not necessarily challenge the hypothesis of Rubio (2014) according to whom arranged marriages are demanded by households to improve ex-ante their informal insurance network.

<sup>50</sup>The sum of the coefficient on the shock variable and its interaction with the bride price indicator is significant (at 8%) only for groom age.

## 5.6 Internal mobility and estimation biases

The Turkish DHS exploited in this article provide accurate information on women’s place of residence during their childhood. This is a valuable and uncommon feature of DHS surveys, as it allows us to precisely measure exposure to weather shocks when girls are adolescent and at risk of being married. [Corno et al. \(2020\)](#) who use DHS type surveys from 32 countries only have information on women’s location at the time of the survey. They thus use current location as a proxy for place of residence before marriage and provide an in-depth discussion of the potential implications on their estimation results. As we know for each woman both her province of origin and her place of residence at the time of the survey, we are able to precisely assess, in the case of Turkey, the bias implied by the use of current location instead of location during childhood. We thus re-estimate our main equation after replacing the province of origin by the province where women were surveyed. Results are shown in [Table 14](#) in Appendix. The coefficient on the interaction between the shock and bride price binary variables remains significant for most outcomes (age at marriage, childbirth before 18 and time gap between religious and civil ceremonies), but is no longer significant for marriage before 15. These findings suggest that in the Turkish context internal mobility, either related to marriage or occurring after marriage, is not affecting similarly all women. Replacing province of origin by current place of residence tends to hide part of the effect of shocks and norms on (very) early marriage. Although results obtained on Turkey may not be generalized to any context, we find that internal mobility is selective, and implies that using current residence as a proxy for childhood residence tends to conceal part of the effect of shocks and norms on child marriage, especially for those who got married at a very young age.

## 6 Conclusion

While the relationship between negative income shocks and child marriage has been extensively investigated for low income countries, where the pervasiveness of credit and

insurance market imperfections may lead parents to marry their daughters at a young age as a mean to cope with the negative effect of economic shocks, the extent to which such a strategy may still persist in fast integrating/growing economies remained to be investigated. We study in this paper the effect of negative agricultural income shocks on early marriage and union characteristics in Turkey exploiting retrospective information on marriage for a sample of women born between the end of the 1960s up to the mid-1990s.

We find that negative agricultural income shock increase the probability for girls exposed during their adolescence to be married before the age of 15 by 28% but the effect is fully driven by parents marrying their daughters in provinces where the historical prevalence of bride money payment is high. Shocks appear to be managed differently in other provinces. This differentiated impact does not seem to fade away for younger cohorts. Our results suggest that despite the development of insurance and credit markets, reliance on child marriage may be persisting in some specific areas as norms may adapt at a lower pace. We ensure this difference in response to a shock is robust to accounting for rural/urban differences between provinces and initial prevalence of early marriage norms. Moreover, our results are not driven by the Kurdish minority, nor affected by local welfare provision by the AKP. In addition, we precisely document the timing of early marriages induced by shocks in provinces with a high prevalence of bride price and show that those unions are contracted between 16 and 20 months after a negative income shock. Finally, we explore the characteristics of those early marriages driven by negative shocks and find no impact on the probability for the union to be endogamous in provinces where bride price norms are widespread. However, in those unions, the groom is found to be younger and less educated.

Turkey is a middle-income country, and there are obviously possibilities of at least partial insurance against some risks<sup>51</sup>, that are more developed than in many Sub-Saharan African countries for example. However, our results suggest that all the strategies of households aimed at diversifying their income and limiting their exposure to risk seem

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<sup>51</sup>And in particular against agricultural risks through the public funded insurance program TARSIM.

insufficient since we find that negative shocks increase the probability of child marriage in provinces with a high prevalence of bride price norms. This increase in child marriages after a negative shock in areas where brides prices are frequent suggests that improved access to insurance markets, saving tools, technologies that alleviate vulnerability to rainfall shocks, and public social safety nets could reduce the practice of child marriage by lowering the economic significance of bride price. Since droughts are expected to become more frequent and severe in Turkey (Sen et al., 2012), designing adapted policies helping households to cope with adverse agricultural shocks is key in this context. Prohibiting bride prices or limiting their amount has been shown to be very ineffective in different countries (Boye et al., 1991; Vlěi-Yoroba, 1997; Ordioni, 2005) due for a part to difficulties in the implementation of the measure: it would also not resolve the original issue of unpredictability of incomes and prices.

Our findings point out the need to complement investigation by exploring potential persisting effects on children born from those unions of younger partners following an adverse income shock faced by the bride's household. Another avenue of research is related to the evaluation of the medium-term impact of the 2002 reform of the civil code. First investigations based on a preliminary release of the 2018 DHS however reveal that the econometric evaluation of the reform is hindered by small sample issues, due to the limited number of drought shocks observed in the 2000s.



# Appendix

## Appendix A: Descriptive statistics

Table 5: Characteristics of married women depending on historical practice of bride price in the province of origin (weighted)

	Bride price below median	Bride price above median	Diff.
	mean	mean	
Married before 15	0.07	0.15	0.08*** (0.00)
Married before 18	0.35	0.50	0.15*** (0.00)
Age at marriage	20.22	19.01	-1.21*** (0.00)
Childbirth before 18	0.18	0.30	0.11*** (0.00)
Religious marriage is first	0.44	0.65	0.21*** (0.00)
Time between two ceremonies	3.85	13.62	9.77*** (0.00)
Number of individuals	9,120	8,547	17,647

Source: DHS 1998, 2003, 2008, and 2013. The computation of the historical measure of bride price additionally uses information contained in the DHS 1993 wave.

Individuals observations are weighted using survey weights.

The number of observations computed in the last row corresponds to the maximum number of observations in each group. P-values in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table 6: Characteristics of married women’s first union depending on historical practice of bride price in the province of origin (weighted)

	Bride price below median	Bride price above median	Diff.
	mean	mean	
Endogamous	0.16	0.33	0.17*** (0.00)
Endogamous (groom is a mother’s relative)	0.04	0.08	0.05*** (0.00)
Endogamous (groom is a father’s relative)	0.04	0.11	0.07*** (0.00)
Arranged	0.39	0.59	0.20*** (0.00)
Groom age at marriage	24.83	23.76	-1.08*** (0.00)
Age gap at first marriage	4.61	4.72	0.12 (0.12)
Groom education	3.22	2.77	-0.46*** (0.00)
Education gap	1.21	1.42	0.20*** (0.00)
Number of individuals	9,109	8,538	17,647

Source: DHS 1998, 2003, 2008, and 2013. The computation of the historical measure of bride price additionally uses information contained in the DHS 1993 wave.

Individuals observations are weighted using survey weights.

The number of observations computed in the last row corresponds to the maximum number of observations in each group. P-values in parentheses.

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

## Appendix B: Rainfall shocks and agricultural production


Table 7: Rainfall shocks (from January  $t$  to Sept  $t$  ; z-score < -1.64), production (thousand tonnes) and yields (kg per hectare)

	(1) Cereal	(2) Wheat	(3) Fruit	(4) Vegetable	(5) Total production	(6) Wheat yields
Rainfall z-score < -1.64	-333.142** (151.880)	-62.942*** (15.665)	-49.259* (28.437)	-38.567 (52.371)	-420.968** (179.806)	-1099.719*** (327.999)
Constant	1105.748*** (11.948)	68.960*** (1.411)	225.494*** (2.237)	333.247*** (4.120)	1664.490*** (14.145)	4867.449*** (30.105)
N	1215	811	1215	1215	1215	781

Standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Data source: CHIRPS and Turkish Statistical Institute.

Figure 4: Distribution of shocks by year, 1981-2013



Source: CHIRPS data. Each dot represents a province-year observation. The horizontal red line materializes the  $-1.64$  threshold used to construct the shock dummy included in our main specification.

Table 8: Rainfall shocks (from January  $t$  to April  $t$  and  $z$ -score  $< -1.64$ ), production (thousand tonnes) and yields (kg per hectare)

	(1) Cereal	(2) Wheat	(3) Fruit	(4) Vegetable	(5) Total production	(6) Wheat yields
Rainfall $z$ -score $< -1.64$	-270.777** (114.772)	-64.121*** (13.031)	-30.729 (21.505)	-13.087 (39.596)	-314.592** (135.928)	-1021.968*** (273.809)
Constant	1106.675*** (11.976)	69.207*** (1.406)	225.524*** (2.244)	333.144*** (4.132)	1665.343*** (14.183)	4870.678*** (30.110)
N	1215	811	1215	1215	1215	781

Standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .  
Data source: CHIRPS and Turkish Statistical Institute.

Figure 5: Distribution of shocks (rainfall z-score  $-1.64$ ), 1981-2013




Figure 6: Source : CHIRPS data. Legend: Number of shocks (rainfall z-score  $-1.64$ ).

## Appendix C: Threats to identification and robustness checks

Table 9: Province characteristics

	Bride price below median	Bride price above median	Diff.
	mean	mean	
Number of shocks (1981-2013)	1.54 (0.10)	1.63 (0.13)	0.10 (0.16)
Number of historical shocks (1900-1981)	2.88 (0.23)	2.97 (0.27)	0.10 (0.35)
Sex Ratio in 1985 (Nfemale/Nmale)	0.97 (0.01)	0.94 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Rural (share of hh head in 1985 > median)	0.39 (0.08)	0.77 (0.07)	-0.38*** (0.10)
Share married before 15 (women born before 1969)	0.18 (0.02)	0.29 (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.03)
Share married before 18 (women born before 1969)	0.54 (0.02)	0.65 (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.03)
Average age at marriage (women born before 1969)	18.73 (0.20)	17.79 (0.16)	0.94*** (0.26)
Observations	39	41	80

Note: The table compares characteristics of provinces with a high and low value of bride price (see Section 3.2). Standard errors are in parentheses and significance levels are denoted as follows: \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . The significance levels for coefficients in columns diff.(1) and diff.(2) are reported for t-tests. The significance levels for coefficients in column diff. (1) - (2) are reported for the test of equality between diff.(1) and diff.(2).

Table 10: Rainfall shocks and early marriage - sample of ever married women born post 1969

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Married under 15		Married under 18		Age at marriage	
Rainfall z-score 12-14 < -1.64	0.015 (0.012)	0.001 (0.014)				
Rainfall z-score 12-14 < -1.64 X bride price		0.023* (0.013)				
Rainfall z-score 12-14 < -1.64 X initial prev. of marr b.15		0.029 (0.059)				
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64			0.009 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.024)	0.056 (0.116)	0.343** (0.153)
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64 X bride price				0.017 (0.025)		-0.234 (0.170)
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64 X initial prev. of marr. b.15				0.108 (0.092)		-0.993 (0.602)
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of birth fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sum coeff.		0.024		-0.003		0.109
P-value		0.229		0.942		0.679
Mean Dep. Var.	0.11	0.11	0.43	0.43	19.59	19.63
Mean rainfall z-score 12-14 < -1.64	0.22	0.22				
Mean rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64			0.43	0.42	0.43	0.42
N	17647	17422	17647	17422	17647	17422
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Childbirth before 18		Religious first		Time between 2 ceremonies if religious first	
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64	0.001 (0.015)	-0.021 (0.019)	0.020 (0.018)	0.023 (0.029)	-1.417 (1.002)	-6.856*** (1.548)
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64 X bride price		0.017 (0.023)		-0.019 (0.024)		3.860*** (1.191)
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64 X initial prev. of marr. b.15		0.091 (0.098)		0.029 (0.112)		18.225*** (5.394)
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of birth fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sum coeff.		-0.004		0.004		-2.996
P-value		0.909		0.917		0.094
Mean Dep. Var.	0.24	0.24	0.57	0.56	15.55	15.20
Mean rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.42	0.41
N	17506	17287	15958	15775	9007	8857

Standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Controls not shown: survey year dummies

Data source: Turkey DHS 1998 to 2013

Sum coeff. reports the sum of the coefficients on the shock variable and its interaction with the bride price indicator.

P-value reports the p-value of the test of Sum coeff. against zero.

Table 11: Rainfall shocks and early marriage - sample of ever married women born post 1969, dropping Igdir

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Married under 15		Married under 18		Age at marriage	
Rainfall z-score 12-14 < -1.64	0.015 (0.012)	0.007 (0.012)				
Rainfall z-score 12-14 < -1.64 X bride price		0.033** (0.016)				
Rainfall z-score 12-14 < -1.64 X agri. prov.		-0.010 (0.016)				
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64			0.009 (0.019)	-0.012 (0.020)	0.056 (0.116)	0.231* (0.123)
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64 X bride price				0.013 (0.026)		-0.313* (0.183)
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64 X agri. prov.				0.031 (0.025)		-0.089 (0.176)
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of birth fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sum coeff.		0.039		0.002		-0.082
P-value		0.053		0.958		0.732
Mean Dep. Var.	0.11	0.11	0.43	0.43	19.59	19.59
Mean rainfall z-score 12-14 < -1.64	0.22	0.22				
Mean rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64			0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43
N	17647	17647	17647	17647	17647	17647
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Childbirth before 18		Religious first		Time between 2 ceremonies if religious first	
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64	0.001 (0.015)	-0.017 (0.014)	0.020 (0.018)	0.021 (0.021)	-1.417 (1.002)	-5.133*** (1.308)
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64 X bride price		0.013 (0.026)		-0.027 (0.024)		4.721*** (1.368)
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64 X agri. prov.		0.025 (0.025)		0.020 (0.024)		2.824** (1.308)
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of birth fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sum coeff.		-0.004		-0.005		-0.412
P-value		0.895		0.838		0.807
Mean Dep. Var.	0.24	0.24	0.57	0.57	15.55	15.55
Mean rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.42	0.42
N	17506	17506	15958	15958	9007	9007

Standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Controls not shown: survey year dummies

Sum coeff. reports the sum of the coefficients on the shock variable and its interaction with the bride price indicator.

P-value reports the p-value of the test of Sum coeff. against zero.

Data source: Turkey DHS 1998 to 2013

Table 12: Rainfall shocks and early marriage - sample of ever married women born post 1969, dropping Igdır - including interactions with a dummy for provinces where AKP won the majority of seats at 2004 elections

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Married under 15		Married under 18		Age at marriage	
Rainfall z-score 12-14 < -1.64	0.015 (0.012)	0.002 (0.017)				
Rainfall z-score 12-14 < -1.64 X bride price		0.027** (0.012)				
Rainfall z-score 12-14 < -1.64 X AKP won		0.004 (0.013)				
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64			0.009 (0.019)	0.017 (0.024)	0.056 (0.116)	0.075 (0.144)
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64 X bride price				0.027 (0.018)		-0.333** (0.131)
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64 X AKP won				-0.034* (0.018)		0.218 (0.133)
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of birth fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sum coeff.		0.029		0.044		-0.258
P-value		0.092		0.071		0.127
Mean Dep. Var.	0.11	0.11	0.43	0.43	19.59	19.59
Mean rainfall z-score 12-14 < -1.64	0.22	0.22				
Mean rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64			0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43
N	17647	17647	17647	17647	17647	17647
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Childbirth before 18		Religious first		Time between 2 ceremonies if religious first	
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64	0.001 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.018)	0.020 (0.018)	0.018 (0.022)	-1.417 (1.002)	-2.782* (1.476)
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64 X bride price		0.025 (0.016)		-0.013 (0.020)		5.992*** (1.216)
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64 X AKP won		-0.017 (0.016)		0.011 (0.021)		-2.719** (1.312)
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of birth fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sum coeff.		0.025		0.005		3.209
P-value		0.244		0.833		0.067
Mean Dep. Var.	0.24	0.24	0.57	0.57	15.55	15.55
Mean rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.42	0.42
N	17506	17506	15958	15958	9007	9007

Standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Controls not shown: survey year dummies

Sum coeff. reports the sum of the coefficients on the shock variable and its interaction with the bride price indicator.

P-value reports the p-value of the test of Sum coeff. against zero.

Data source: Turkey DHS 1998 to 2013



Table 13: Rainfall shocks and early marriage - sample of ever married women born post 1969, interaction with born post78

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Married under 15		Married under 18		Age at marriage	
Rainfall z-score 12-14 < -1.64	0.022	0.007				
shock 12-14Xpost78	(0.024)	(0.023)				
Rainfall z-score 12-14 < -1.64 X bride price		0.032**				
shock 12-14XBPXpost78		(0.013)				
		-0.025				
		(0.029)				
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64			0.030	0.010	-0.107	0.079
shock 12-17Xpost78			(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.120)	(0.133)
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64 X bride price			-0.027	0.001	0.217	0.061
shock 12-17XBPXpost78			(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.185)	(0.228)
				0.043**		-0.427***
				(0.018)		(0.135)
				-0.066*		0.366
				(0.038)		(0.279)
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of birth fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	0.11	0.11	0.43	0.43	19.59	19.59
Mean rainfall z-score 12-14 < -1.64	0.22	0.22				
Mean rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64			0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43
N	17647	17647	17647	17647	17647	17647

	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Childbirth before 18		Religious first		Time between 2 ceremonies if religious first	
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64	0.018	0.004	0.013	0.012	-0.305	-3.893***
shock 12-17Xpost78	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.770)	(1.446)
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64 X bride price		0.032**		-0.003		7.969***
shock 12-17XBPXpost78		(0.016)		(0.020)		(1.538)
		-0.024		-0.075**		-8.805***
		(0.035)		(0.035)		(2.424)
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of birth fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	0.24	0.24	0.57	0.57	15.55	15.55
Mean rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.42	0.42
N	17506	17506	15958	15958	9007	9007

Standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Controls not shown: survey year dummies

Data source: Turkey DHS 1998 to 2013

## Appendix C: Province of current residence instead of origin

Table 14: Rainfall shocks and early marriage - sample of ever married women born post 1969, province = province of residence

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Married under 15	Married under 15	Married under 18	Married under 18	Age at marriage	Age at marriage
Rainfall z-score 12-14 < -1.64	0.009 (0.012)	0.006 (0.012)				
Rainfall z-score 12-14 < -1.64 X bride price		0.016 (0.011)				
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64			0.006 (0.023)	-0.001 (0.025)	0.170 (0.132)	0.271* (0.142)
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64 X bride price				0.028* (0.016)		-0.382*** (0.113)
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of birth fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sum coeff.		0.022		0.027		-0.112
P-value		0.114		0.230		0.474
Mean Dep. Var.	0.11	0.11	0.43	0.43	19.60	19.60
Mean rainfall z-score 12-14 < -1.64	0.22	0.22				
Mean rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64			0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42
N	17564	17485	17564	17485	17564	17485
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Childbirth before 18	Childbirth before 18	Religious first	Religious first	Time between 2 ceremonies if religious first	Time between 2 ceremonies if religious first
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64	-0.026* (0.014)	-0.034** (0.015)	-0.004 (0.021)	-0.006 (0.021)	-1.540 (0.952)	-3.711*** (1.286)
Rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64 X bride price		0.030** (0.013)		0.010 (0.021)		7.755*** (1.378)
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of birth fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sum coeff.		-0.004		0.004		4.044
P-value		0.812		0.890		0.005
Mean Dep. Var.	0.24	0.24	0.57	0.56	15.55	15.48
Mean rainfall z-score 12-17 < -1.64	0.42	0.42	0.43	0.43	0.41	0.41
N	17423	17344	15876	15806	8956	8890

Standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Controls not shown: survey year dummies

Sum coeff. reports the sum of the coefficients on the shock variable and its interaction with the bride price indicator.

P-value reports the p-value of the test of Sum coeff. against zero.

Data source: Turkey DHS 1998 to 2013

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