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The Role of Firewalls in Universal Banks: Evidence from Commercial Bank Securities Activities before the Glass-Steagall Act

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Activities Before The Glass-Steagall Act**

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ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes the trade-off between the potential for conflicts of interest and the possible improvements in information flows and monitoring that may arise when commercial lending and securities underwriting are united in a universal bank. We examine the two ways in which U.S. commercial banks structured their investment banking activities before the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 forced them to leave the securities business: as an internal securities department within the bank and as a separately incorporated and capitalized securities affiliate. For the two organizational forms, we contrast the types of securities and firms underwritten, the initial market pricing and rating of the securities, and the ex post performance of the issues. Our results suggest that the costs of close ties between the commercial bank operations and underwriting activities outweigh the benefits. Consistent with this, during the 1920s, commercial banks almost uniformly moved towards the affiliate structure where there was greater separation between lending and underwriting. We conclude by discussing the implications for bank regulatory policy.

JEL Classifications: G21, G24, N22

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I. Introduction

Before 1933 commercial banks, either through their securities departments or through separately incorporated securities affiliates, competed directly with investment banks in originating and underwriting securities issues. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 ended this competition by legislating the separation of commercial and investment banking in the U.S. The commercial banks were accused of succumbing to the conflicts of interest inherent in their dual capacity as underwriter and lender, and hence, of systematically misrepresenting the quality of securities to a gullible public. Recent studies, however, have found no evidence that such systematic fooling did indeed take place.¹ A number of economists and policy makers have argued that since the rationales for Glass-Steagall Act do not appear to be justified, it should be repealed, and there is growing support for repeal in the Federal Reserve Board and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (see, e.g., Greenspan 1988 and Benston 1990).

Legislators and regulators, however, are not unconcerned about the potential for conflicts of interest. The policy focus has begun to shift away from the merits of a blanket prohibition on the underwriting of corporate securities by commercial banks to debating how to structure underwriting activities by commercial banks such that the potential for conflicts of interest and misuse of public trust is minimized. Recently, the Federal Reserve Board and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency have granted securities powers to certain banks on a case-by-case basis. Through a flexible interpretation of section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act (which forbids commercial banks from affiliating with any organization "engaged principally" in securities underwriting and dealing), the regulators have authorized banks to set up separately incorporated and capitalized "section 20" subsidiaries that are engaged, but not principally, in the otherwise forbidden securities activities (see Macey and Miller 1992, pp. 491-571). Concerns about "conflicts of interest and loss of public confidence" have led the regulators to require extensive "firewall" separations to provide "an insulating framework" between a commercial bank and

¹ For instance, Kroszner and Rajan (1994) find that the securities underwritten by the commercial banks defaulted less often and generally performed better than similar securities underwritten by the investment banks. This finding has since been confirmed by Ang and Richardson (1993) and Puri (1993a). See also Benston (1990).

its securities activities (Greenspan 1988).

Economic theory is ambiguous on whether commercial banks should place underwriting activities in separately incorporated and capitalized affiliates. A commercial bank which has made prior loans to a firm which subsequently becomes financially distressed may have strong incentives to extol the virtues of the firm to public investors in order to get its loan repaid out of the proceeds of a public issue. Public investors, aware of the potential for this conflict of interest, will demand higher yields for issues underwritten by conflicted commercial banks than for issues underwritten by impartial investment banks. The costs of conflicts of interest, thus, are not that the public investor is fooled on average, but that they can impair the effectiveness of banks in certifying firms to the market. When underwriting and lending are conducted through separately incorporated and capitalized organizations, presumably the appearance of conflicts diminish relative to when they are conducted under the same roof. Consequently, firewalls may enhance the ability of banks to certify firms. In doing so, however, the firewalls also may reduce the lending arm's incentives and ability to share information with the underwriting arm. Firewalls, thus, can reduce the amount of information the underwriting arm has and reduce its ability to certify the firm to the public. The net effect of firewall separations is an empirical question which this paper seeks to answer.

Commercial banks in the United States, before the Glass Steagall Act, underwrote both through separately capitalized affiliates and through in-house departments. We analyze the consequences of the organizational structure chosen by the commercial banks for their securities businesses.² More specifically, we examine how the relative independence of the securities and commercial lending businesses of different banks affects the types of securities and companies they underwrite, the way the market prices the securities, and the subsequent performance of the issues.

We find that firewalls appear to have been valuable in enhancing an underwriter's credibility in

² By restricting our attention to commercial banks, we are able to hold constant all other factors that relate to the combination of lending and underwriting, as for example, regulation and the existence of lending relationships. We would not be able to do this if investment banks were included.

the market. Our results suggest that the cost of underwriting securities in-house rather than through an arm's length affiliate is that the issue price is discounted by a market concerned about potential conflicts of interest. This effect seems to outweigh the potential for more informed certification whereby in-house securities departments use their easier access to information about a firm's prospects to identify and certify "jewels in the rough." Even though we do find the organizational segregation of underwriting and lending activities increased the ability of underwriters to certify firms to the market, we find that market pressures, and not regulation, led to the adoption of some form of firewalls. During our sample period, the organization of securities activities in a separate affiliate rapidly became the dominant form for commercial banks and trusts that were lead underwriters and syndicate managers.

Section II describes the structure and operation of commercial banks' securities activities prior to Glass-Steagall. Section III outlines our theory and derives the hypotheses to be tested. Section IV describes the data collection procedures and sources. Section V contains the empirical results, and Section VI concludes.

II. Organizational Structures of Commercial Bank Involvement in the Securities Business before the Glass-Steagall Act

To investigate the consequences of the different organizational forms, that is, the extent of the firewall separations, we will contrast the types of underwriting activities and the performance of the underwritten securities across the two main organizational structures for the commercial banks' securities businesses: "captive" internal securities departments and separately capitalized and separately incorporated affiliates.³ The affiliates were chartered under state laws as regular corporations, free of

³ The degree of autonomy of the affiliate varied across banks. For many affiliates, the directors and officers of the bank were only a minority of the directors and officers of the affiliate, while for others the management control was more complete.

the regulations associated with banking.⁴ There were no minimum capital regulations, and some affiliates were incorporated with small amounts of capital (see, e.g., Peach 1941, p.81). Since the affiliates typically shared the name of their parent, affiliates enjoyed the "full benefit of the goodwill of their parent banks" (Peach 1941, p.52).

While many bank and trust companies entered the securities business during the 1920s, the movement was not universal. Some banks and trusts argued that having an internal department which underwrote and distributed securities could compromise the "soundness, integrity, and conservatism" of their investment advice, and such institutions proudly advertised that they did not have such a department (Peach 1941, p. 72). In 1925, for example, the Farmers' Loan and Trust Company of New York announced in the Commercial and Financial Chronicle (May 2, 1925, p. 2228):⁵

Due to our policy and firm conviction that, as a trustee, we should never place ourselves in the position of a buyer and seller of securities at the same time, we have never had a bond department. Our whole security department is organized for the impartial study of securities for the benefit of our customers and not for the sale of bonds to the public.

The 1920s saw a dramatic increase in the extent of bank and trust involvement in non-bank activities, either directly or through affiliates (see Kroszner and Rajan forthcoming). In part, this movement was in response to increasing reliance by commercial firms on public debt and equity markets to finance their operations and investment.⁶ Peach (1941, p.83) reports that the number of national banks operating securities affiliates rose from 10 in 1922 to a peak of 114 in 1931. The number of banks engaged in the securities business through their securities departments doubled from 62 to 123 during this period. The extent of activities legally permissible in-house for national banks had been uncertain

⁴ The Union Trust Company of Detroit, for example, incorporated an affiliate named the Union Commerce Investment Company under a Delaware charter. The Delaware charter permitted the company to do almost anything "except solemnize marriages and hold religious ceremonies" (US Senate, 1934, p. 4776).

⁵ The Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company is another example (Peach 1941, p.72).

⁶ Evaluating the entry of commercial banks during the 1920s into "financial emporiums," White (1984, p.102) concludes "... banks' new financial services were not begun as part of a speculative lark ... [but] represented a move by these firms to offset the decline of their traditional business..."

until the McFadden Act of 1927 clarified the scope of activities for nationally-chartered banks by codifying existing practice (Kaufman and Mote 1990). The McFadden Act explicitly authorized the national banks to deal in and underwrite "investment securities" through internal securities departments.⁷ Regulations on the in-house activities of state-chartered institutions differed across the states but generally placed little, if any, restriction on the organization of their securities activities (Peach 1941).

III. Theoretical Debates

Political debate on universal banking has focused, since the Pecora Committee hearings in 1933 (see U.S. Senate, 1933-34), on two main issues. First, legislators have been concerned about the adverse effects of extending bank powers on bank risk taking. It has been argued that the wave of bank failures in the U.S. in the early 1930s may have resulted from bank involvement in the excessively risky underwriting business (see the discussion in White, 1986). Second, conflicts of interest may arise when a bank combines lending and deposit taking with underwriting. If a firm suffers an adverse shock without the public realizing it, for example, a commercial bank may have an incentive to underwrite public issues on behalf of the firm and use the proceeds to repay earlier bank loans made to the firm.

Theoretically, however, it is not clear that before the Glass Steagall Act bank incentives were distorted in such a way that banks wanted to increase the riskiness of their activities. Furthermore, there is no justification for assuming that underwriting activities were riskier than lending. Consistent with the lack of theoretical justification for the argument that bank involvement in underwriting lead to excessive risk taking, White (1986) finds that securities operations of commercial banks did not impair their stability prior to Glass-Steagall. Banks engaged in the securities business had no higher earning variance or lower capital ratios than banks without such operations. In addition, those banks with securities operations were less likely to fail. Although 5000 banks failed during the 1920s, virtually none were the

⁷ Kaufman and Mote (1990, p.393) provide the following quotation from the Senate and House Reports accompanying the McFadden Act: "this [securities dealing and underwriting] is a business that is regularly carried on by state banks and trust companies and has been engaged in by national banks for a number of years. The effect of this provision, therefore, is primarily regulative."

city banks which were the most likely to have securities affiliates (Carosso 1970, p. 242; see also White 1983). In the bank crises between 1930 and 1933, more than a quarter of all national banks failed but less than ten percent of those with large securities operations closed (White 1986, p. 40).

Concerning the second issue, Saunders (1985) and Benston (1990) argue that even if underwriters harbor conflicts of interest, rational investors will not be systematically fooled if they are aware of these conflicts. Kroszner and Rajan (1994) compare the performance of bonds underwritten by the affiliates of commercial banks with those of independent investment banks. The bonds underwritten by commercial banks outperformed similarly rated bonds underwritten by investment banks.⁸ Furthermore, Kroszner and Rajan find that the difference in performance was especially pronounced amongst lower quality bonds where the incentives and the potential for commercial bank affiliates to dupe the public investor would have been the greatest.

While the theory and evidence imply that the focus of policy on safeguarding the interests of the public investor by prohibiting banks from underwriting is misplaced, they do not imply that conflicts of interest are costless. Rajan (1992) argues that the presence of conflicts of interest can impair the effectiveness of banks in certifying firms to the market. Public investors rationally will require a higher promised yield from bank underwritten than for similar investment bank underwritten issues. The effect should be most pronounced for small, low quality junior issues underwritten by small, relatively less well known affiliates.⁹ We term this the 'rational discounting' hypothesis. There is, however, an alternative hypothesis which has contrary implications. Banks may have better access to information through the lending process than do independent investment banks. Consequently, they may be better able to certify firms to the market. This would imply that, compared to issues underwritten by affiliates, investors would discount issues underwritten by independent investment banks because these investment banks

⁸ Ang and Richardson (1992) and Puri (1993a) have subsequently found similar results.

⁹ Given the convexity of bond payouts, the more uncertainty there is about the true quality of bonds, the higher the promised yield has to be in order to satisfy investors. The inability of affiliates to certify true quality to investors thus will lead to a higher promised yield.

are less informed. We term this the 'informed certification' hypothesis.¹⁰ Which effect dominates — the investors' suspicion that banks harbor conflicts of interest or the better certification because banks have better information and/or enjoy scope economies in gathering it — is an empirical question.¹¹

Kroszner and Rajan (1994) provide evidence for the rational discounting hypothesis from a comparison of the underwriting activities of the investment banks with those of the commercial banks. (In that paper, we do not distinguish between the two organizational forms in which commercial banks were involved in investment banking and use the term "affiliate" to describe both forms.) We find that, compared to similar investment banks, the commercial banks underwrote safer securities (debt rather than equity) for older, larger, and less indebted firms. The differences in the kinds of firms underwritten by affiliates and investment banks is most pronounced for the smallest banks who, presumably, had the least credibility. This suggests that commercial banks reacted to their lack of credibility by underwriting less informationally intensive securities than did comparable investment banks.

This evidence, while consistent with rational discounting, is not definitive. The nature of bank lending or the kinds of firms that banks interact with, for example, might make banks specialize in underwriting safer securities of older, larger, and less indebted firms. Correcting for this effect thus is important. As we discuss below, different ways of structuring the affiliate presumably affect the credibility of the underwriter, as well as the flow of information within the institution. By focusing only on commercial banks, the lending activities of the banks, as well as the relationships such activities generate, are held constant. Comparisons between the underwriting activities of banks structured in different ways thus should provide more power in discriminating between the 'rational discounting' and 'informed certification' hypotheses than if independent investment banks were included.

The 'rational discounting' hypothesis and the 'informed certification' hypothesis make

¹⁰ In addition to the literature on universal banking emphasizing this point (see Saunders (1985), Benston (1990), Puri (1993b)) there is a substantial literature which emphasizes the role of banks in information production and certification. For example, see Leland and Pyle (1977), Diamond (1984), Fama (1985), James (1987), Lummer and McConnell (1989), and James and Wier (1990).

¹¹ Work by Kanatas and Qi (1994) establishes the conditions under which each effect predominates.

contrasting predictions about the kind of underwriting activities departments would undertake and the market pricing of underwritten securities vis a vis affiliates. There is a greater degree of independence between the profits, survival and managerial control of the separately capitalized affiliate and that of the parent bank than between a securities department and lending department which are both within a bank. Because in-house departments would be more likely to be suspected of harboring conflicts of interest (for instance, of issuing securities on behalf of risky or distressed firms so that loans made by the lending department can be repaid out of the proceeds) than the more arm's length affiliates, the 'rational discounting' hypothesis predicts that departments should be at a competitive disadvantage in underwriting the riskier firms and the more informationally sensitive junior securities. In-house securities departments, however, might have easier access to prior lending information from in-house lending departments than would the more arm's length affiliates. The 'informed certification' hypothesis thus predicts that departments would underwrite relatively riskier firms and informationally sensitive securities. In addition, if the 'rational discounting' is empirically important, then banks should try to avoid the associated costs by moving their underwriting out from an internal department to the more arm's length affiliate structure over time. On the other hand, if the 'informed certification' hypothesis is empirically important, then banks would bring their securities operations in house in order to enjoy the benefits of the economies of monitoring and information processing.

Although the rational discounting and informed certification explanations clearly have opposite empirical implications, they are not logically inconsistent. It is quite possible that both rational discounting and informed certification may be occurring; however, our tests will determine which effect is stronger in the data.

An alternative explanation for differences in activities between departments and more arm's length affiliates could be the bank's aversion to risk. A bank concerned about a loss of confidence that could precipitate a run might be more circumspect about the activities undertaken by its in-house department than about activities undertaken by an arm's length affiliate which is separately capitalized.

While a portfolio of relatively conservative activities for the in-house securities department may be consistent with both rational discounting and the bank risk aversion argument, the latter has no implications about initial yields and ratings. We examine whether and how, conditioning on the intrinsic observable quality of the firm being underwritten, the market's willingness to pay for securities and the initial rating depend on the degree of independence of the underwriter.

Finally, it is possible to examine the ex post performance of securities underwritten by departments and those underwritten by affiliates. Unfortunately, without stronger assumptions about perfect foresight, the 'rational discounting' hypothesis does not have specific predictions on the relative ex post performance. Let us assume, for the sake of discussion, that conflicts of interest are indeed related to organizational form, so that the fraction of banks who have an incentive to misrepresent the quality of securities to the public is higher for those underwriting through departments than those underwriting through affiliates. Furthermore, assume that the public is aware of the relationship between organizational form and the propensity to misrepresent, but only knows the distributions of the fractions of each type of underwriters who might misrepresent (the 'rogues') but not the realizations. The public will rationally discount issues underwritten by departments more, but the relative performance of department issues relative to affiliate issues depends on the realizations of the fractions. If ex post, the population of departments contain more 'rogue' underwriters than the average anticipated for departments, department underwritten issues will appear to default more (or have lower realized returns) and vice versa.

With the assumption of perfect foresight, however, testable differences between the two hypotheses emerge. Conditioning on ex ante observable characteristics of the issuing firm, department underwritten securities should return less (or default more) if departments are indeed subject to greater conflicts of interest. Conversely, if the certification hypothesis is true, departments should be able to pick out the "jewels in the rough," which are unobservable to the public eye. This would imply that conditioning on ex ante observable characteristics of the issuer, department underwritten securities should return more (or default less).

in investment banking prior to the Glass-Steagall Act: Carosso (1970), Peach (1941), Preston and Findlay (1930a and 1930b), Moore (1934), White (1986), the Commercial and Financial Chronicle (CFC) and the National Securities Dealers of North America (1929). To be included in our sample, the bank or trust must be listed in the Moody's Banking Manual. Moody's provides information on each bank's balance sheet and on the organization of the securities operations. Some, but not all, affiliates report a separate balance sheet.

In order to determine which of these banks were actively engaged in securities underwriting, as opposed to simply acting as brokers, we examine the two volume American Underwriting Houses and Their Issues (1928 and 1930). This source groups all new public securities issues between January 1, 1925 and December 31, 1929 by underwriter. The listings include common and preferred stock and short and long bonds of private corporations and governments. The entry for each security lists the month of issue, issue size, the coupon, the price, and the underwriter(s).¹² The monthly new capital flotations section of the CFC reports the implied yield to maturity for bonds.¹³ The lead underwriter or syndicate manager is listed first, if more than one house is involved. As in our earlier work (Kroszner and Rajan forthcoming), we include in our sample only those securities in which the commercial bank, trust, or its securities affiliate is the lead underwriter or syndicate manager.¹⁴ This process yields a total of 893 securities underwritten by 24 commercial banks and trusts in-house and 33 securities affiliates.

¹² Any ambiguities or missing information is resolved by examining the monthly reports in the Commercial and Financial Chronicle.

¹³ We checked that the prices (associated with the implied yields) reported in the CFC and American Underwriting Houses do correspond to the trading prices soon after the issue. When the CFC did not report the implied yield to maturity for an issue, we calculate the yields from the data in American Underwriting Houses. Our results do not change if we drop observations for which we calculated the yields.

¹⁴ In future work, we plan to collect and analyze the securities in which the commercial bank, trust, or affiliate was involved in the syndicate, but not as lead underwriter or syndicate manager.

For the corporate bonds, we collect initial ratings from Moody's Manuals and Poor's Manuals. We assign numbers to the specific rating (e.g., Aaa = 1, Aa = 2,..., Unrated = 8 etc.). We measure bond performance by whether the bond defaults.¹⁵ We follow the bonds until 1940 using Moody's, Poor's, Fitch's Bond Book, The National Monthly Corporation Bond Summary, and the Fisher Manual of Valuable and Worthless Securities. To adjust the yield for changes in discount rates over time, we subtract the long term government bond yield as reported in Banking and Monetary Statistics (1976) from the initial yields.

V. Results

Our results indicate that the effects of rational discounting on the kinds of securities brought to market and the market's pricing of those securities outweigh the effects of informed certification. In this section, we first contrast the underwriting choices of the departments and the affiliates, then compare the size of their operations. Our main results on the relative pricing and relative rating of bonds underwritten by the two organizational structures are in subsections 3 and 4. Subsection 5 compares our results to other findings, and the last subsection describes our results on ex post performance.

1. Underwriting activities of departments and affiliates.

Table 1, from Charles E. Mitchell's testimony in 1931 (US Senate 1931, p.299), provides information on the roles of different types of underwriters in the securities markets of the late 1920s. The commercial banks were eroding the market share of independent investment banks in the bond underwriting business. Commercial banks underwrote roughly 22 percent of this market in 1927 and 45 percent by 1929. Separate affiliates were becoming the dominant organizational form for commercial bank underwriting. In particular, the share of bond issuance underwritten by separate affiliates of commercial banks tripled between 1927 and 1929, while the share underwritten through the securities

¹⁵ We consider a bond to be in default if it defaults on interest or principal payments. Following Dewing (1953, pp. 1175-82) voluntary extensions of a bond involving no interest or principle reduction are not considered defaults.

during our sample period, we would see a pattern similar to the aggregate trend reported in Table 1. The share of securities underwritten in-house decreases steadily, and the number of depository institutions underwriting through in-house departments also falls. Table 2 describes the changes in organizational form of underwriting by depository institutions with state and national charters. The vast majority of the issues underwritten by national banks in our sample were done through arm's length affiliates, both before and after the McFadden Act of 1927. The Act does not appear to have an important impact on the organizational form for the underwriting activities of the national banks, thereby confirming the interpretation of the Act as codifying existing practice (Kaufman and Mote 1990). The state-chartered institutions in our sample display a strong trend toward reliance on affiliates: the share of securities they underwrite through affiliates grows from under 50 percent to roughly 85 percent between 1925 and 1929. State banks and trusts generally faced no regulatory constraints on their securities activities, and Peach (1941) does not report any regulatory changes that would have resulted in this organizational change. The evolution away from the department structure and widespread adoption of the affiliate structure is less consistent with informed certification and more consistent with the 'rational discounting' hypothesis according to which the greater independence and credibility of the affiliate improves their competitive position in the underwriting market.

Panel A of Table 3 compares the types of securities issued by the two organizational structures in our sample. Note that roughly three-quarters of the 893 securities in the sample were underwritten by affiliates, so the relative size of the activities undertaken by the two organizational structures in our sample appears to be representative of the overall market described in Table 1. In our sample, the market share of in-house underwriting increases monotonically with the seniority and safety of the security. The in-house share is highest for short bonds (38 percent), which are the closest substitute for bank loans, lower for long bonds (26 percent) and preferred (19 percent), and least for equity (8 percent).

affiliates underwrote. Internal departments focused a majority of their activity (63 percent) on industrial firms, whereas about 40 percent of securities underwritten by affiliates were for industrial companies. By contrast, public utility issues constitute a larger fraction of affiliates' activities (30 percent) than for the departments (18 percent). These contrasts can be consistent with any of the hypotheses about commercial bank underwriters discussed above.

There are a number of other potentially illuminating differences in issuer type across the organizational structures, but the numbers are sufficiently small that one must be cautious in drawing strong conclusions. Fully collateralized (hence relatively conservative) real estate mortgage issues are slightly more important for the departments than for the affiliates. Investment trusts, which tended to be more speculative, are a larger part of the affiliates' operations. Affiliates also tended to underwrite relatively more for foreign issuers, which may have been more costly for domestic owners to monitor than domestic issues. These differences, where the departments specialize in the less information intensive and more conservative issuers, are consistent with the rational discounting hypothesis.

2. Comparability of underwriting capacity.

Before analyzing the activities of the departments and affiliates further, we must ensure that the two entities are comparable in terms of their underwriting capabilities. The departments in our sample underwrite a median of 5 issues, while the affiliates underwrite a median of 6. The means, however, are much more different. The departments underwrite an average of 7 issues each while the affiliates underwrite an average of 16. The skewness is caused by a few large affiliates.

Another measure of underwriting capacity is outstanding capital. While we do not have the outstanding capital for the departments (because they are not separately capitalized) or for a number of the affiliates (because a separate balance sheet was not reported), a comparison of the outstanding equity

capital of the banks themselves in 1927 reveals a similar pattern.¹⁶ The median capital outstanding medians, however, are not statistically significant at conventional levels. For the affiliates for which we have the capitalization data, the average affiliate capital is about 21 percent of the bank's capital, and the median is 16 percent. In testing the robustness of our results, we will check whether the capacity differences affect the comparisons across the organizational forms and find that our results are unaffected.

3. The relative pricing of bonds.

Both the 'rational discounting' hypothesis and the 'informed certification' hypothesis make predictions about the difference in promised yields between otherwise similar department and affiliate underwritten bonds. The possibility of conflicts of interest make it difficult for departments to convey the quality of bonds accurately to investors.¹⁷ According to the 'rational discounting' hypothesis, the added uncertainty about the quality of bonds underwritten by departments would lead investors to demand a higher yield. By contrast, according to the 'informed certification' hypothesis, departments are better informed about the quality of bonds they underwrite. If conflicts of interest do not impede the credible communication of this information to the public, *ceteris paribus*, the informed certification should lead to lower yields of department underwritten bonds.

In Table 4, we report unconditional means, medians, and standard deviations of the initial net yield promised on bonds underwritten by the two organizational structures. We define the initial net yield as implied yield to maturity at the offering date minus the long-term government bond yield in the month of issue. The mean and median initial net yields for the affiliates are roughly 35 and 50 basis

¹⁶ We picked 1927 because it is the middle year of our sample period.

¹⁷ Rajan (1992) derives a coarse equilibrium in which an underwriter suspected of conflicts of interest conveys noisier information about the quality of issues than does an impartial underwriter.

points lower than for the departments and the differences are statistically significant.¹⁸ Although this difference in the unconditional means is consistent with the rational discounting hypothesis, we must correct for differences in the quality of issues underwritten by the two organizational structures before drawing conclusions.

Table 5 attempts to make such adjustments by regressing initial net yield on a variety of ex ante observable proxies for creditworthiness and an indicator variable for the organizational structure of the underwriter. Larger and more established firms on average tend to be of better credit quality than smaller and younger firms. As proxies for this, we include the log of the asset size (in thousands) of the firm being underwritten and the log of one plus the firm age in years.¹⁹ We also include an indicator which is one if the firm's securities are listed on an exchange as a proxy for other aspects of quality associated with such a listing, e.g., minimum disclosure requirements and, perhaps, reputation. All of the regressions include year of issue indicators to capture any changes in overall quality or market pricing over time and a constant, but for clarity, we do not report these coefficient estimates.

Column (i) of Table 5 includes the three quality controls and a department indicator which is one if the underwriter is an internal securities department. Unsurprisingly, the firm size and firm age proxies are strongly negatively correlated with initial net yield. The exchange listing indicator coefficient is positive but not statistically significant. The department indicator is positive and economically and statistically significant. This result suggests that the public discounted the prices of department underwritten securities, instead of imputing higher value to them as the 'informed certification' theory would suggest.

In column (ii) of Table 5, we add the debt to total assets ratio at the time of issue as another ex

¹⁸ The table reports the data for the sample of issuers for which we have balance sheet data, which permits us to include them in the regressions in the next section. For the whole sample of long-term bonds, the mean (median) initial net yield for affiliates is 2.08 (2.06) and for internal departments is 2.43 (2.56), and the differences are again highly statistically significant.

¹⁹ We also used the amount of the issue, which is highly correlated with total assets of the issuing firm, as a proxy for size, and our results are unchanged.

ante observable control for credit quality. The department indicator remains positive and statistically significant. Curiously, higher leverage is (marginally) statistically significantly associated with lower initial net yields. Column (iii) helps to clarify this puzzle. We include indicators for issuer type, since certain industries tend to have both high leverage but also high ex ante creditworthiness. When indicators for railroads and public utilities are included, the debt to assets ratio coefficient changes sign to become positive but not statistically significant. While diminished somewhat in magnitude, the department indicator continues to be positive and highly statistically significant. After these quality adjustments, the initial net yield on a department underwritten bond is roughly 19 basis points higher than one underwritten by an affiliate. As a comparison, the difference in net yields between a bond rated Aa and a bond rated A in our sample is about 12 basis points. The effect of underwriting through a department thus is economically sizeable.

Column (iv) of Table 5 checks the robustness of our earlier results by adding three proxies which might affect the commercial bank's reputation and credibility: age, capitalization, and regulation. The first is log of one plus the age in years since incorporation of the parent commercial bank. The second is log of parent bank's capital, defined as the book value of equity plus surplus plus undivided profits. The third is an indicator variable that is one if the parent institution has a national charter and zero if it has a state charter. This variable may proxy for both differences in regulatory treatment and differences in the public's perception of the quality of monitoring by state versus national authorities. We find that older and larger banks, that is, as banks with greater non-monetary (i.e. reputational) and monetary capital, tend to have lower initial net yields on the securities they underwrite, although only the age variable is statistically significant.²⁰ Holding bank age and bank capitalization constant, the securities underwritten by national banks have higher initial net yields. Adding the three variables increases both the size and the precision of the estimated coefficient for the securities department

²⁰ An alternative interpretation is that older and larger banks have been able to gather more information about firms for which they underwrite and enjoy greater economies of scope. The signs on these coefficient thus do not help to distinguish between informed certification and rational discounting.

indicator, confirming our previous results.²¹

In our earlier discussion, we noted that on average banks with securities affiliates were larger than those that were underwriting through departments. Larger banks are associated with underwriting larger and older clients firms (e.g., the correlation between the amount of capital of the underwriting bank and the asset size of the issuing firm is a statistically significant 0.56, and the correlation between the capital of the underwriting bank and the age of the issuing firm is 0.13). The securities department indicator thus could be proxying for an omitted quality variable. We perform a further robustness test to adjust for the size, and perhaps quality, difference across the organizational structures. In our sample, the bank with the largest capital which underwrites through a bond department has total capital of \$69 million. We then exclude all issues underwritten by affiliates with greater total capital (the sum of bank capital and, if available, affiliate capital) than \$69 million.²² We are left with 16 affiliates. The banks in this sub-sample underwrote a total of 183 bond issues. Of these 70 are underwritten by affiliates and 113 by departments belonging to organizations of comparable size.

Comparing the activity choices in this sub-sample, affiliates have a larger percentage of their underwriting activities in junior securities: more equity (6 percent of issues versus 2 percent) as well as more preferred (14 percent versus 10 percent). Not only did the departments focus on more senior debt securities, but an analysis of the characteristics of firms issuing long-term bonds suggests that they

²¹ In another robustness check for capitalization (but not reported), we include three indicators for the size of the departments, instead of a simple department indicator: The top third of banks, ranked by capital, with securities departments are classified as "large," the middle third as "medium," and the bottom third as "small." Consistent with the rational discounting hypothesis, smaller securities departments have higher initial net yields than medium departments, and medium departments have higher initial net yields than the large departments. The difference between the coefficients on the small and the large department indicators (0.296 versus 0.082) is statistically significant. In addition, the large department indicator coefficient is not statistically different from zero, which implies that there is little difference in initial net yield between the top third of departments and the average affiliate. Thus banks that can put up a sufficiently large hostage -- as proxied here by bank capital -- can increase credibility and overcome discounting.

²² We also have excluded all affiliates for whom we do not have capitalization information. The results are little changed if we make the assumption that the unreported affiliate capital is small and measure only parent bank capital.

underwrote safer firms. The mean assets of firms underwritten by the departments is \$7.5 million which is statistically higher than the mean of \$6.2 million for the affiliates. The mean debt to assets ratio before the issue is 0.15 for departments while it is 0.17 for affiliates, and 53 percent of department underwritten firms are listed while 46 percent of affiliate underwritten firms are. The mean age since founding of the company is 17 for both. These data suggest that, except along the dimension of age, departments underwrite marginally safer, higher quality firms than comparably sized affiliates. If the department indicator is a proxy for omitted quality variables in the regressions reported in columns (i) to (iii) of Table 5, the effect should weaken or reverse in this sub-sample.

Column (v) in Table 5 reports the results of running the regression in column (iii) using the sub-sample of 183 bonds from the comparably sized underwriters. Contrary to what would be expected if the bond department indicator was a proxy for omitted quality variables, the coefficient on bond department is roughly the same magnitude (0.210 versus 0.192 for the full sample) and remains statistically significant at the one percent level. The stability of most of the coefficient estimates also gives us some confidence in the robustness of the specification.

A final possibility is that a only a small subset of departments which underwrite many bonds could be responsible for the premium we estimate, rather than it being a systematic effect. Since the regressions in Table 5, in a sense, weight the yield premium or price discount associated with a house by the number of bonds underwritten by that house, these specifications could overstate the effect. To determine whether this is driving our results, first, we calculate the average yield premium (or price discount) on issues underwritten by each house as follows. We estimate the model in column (iii) of Table 5 except that we drop the department indicator as an explanatory variable. For each department and affiliate, we average the residual from that regression across all securities underwritten by that department or affiliate. This number is the average yield premium for the house. We then run a cross sectional regression of the average yield premium for each house on the department indicator, the log of the bank's capital, and the log of one plus the age of the bank. If the organizational structure is important, the department indicator should be positively correlated with the average yield premium, even

after correcting for the age and capital of the bank. The coefficient estimate for the department indicator is positive — a department obtains a yield for an issue which is 17 basis points higher than an affiliate — and statistically significant at the 10 percent level.²³ Neither the age nor capital of the bank are statistically significant.

In summary, investors appear to ask for higher promised yields for issues underwritten by departments. This difference persists even after we correct for the underlying quality of the firm making the issue and characteristics of the underwriter besides its organizational structure.

4. Pricing by sophisticated analysts: initial ratings.

Investors appear to have discounted the price of bonds underwritten by the departments relative to those underwritten by the affiliates. A possible concern is that the price may have been determined by relatively unsophisticated investors like depositors. One way to check the validity of our prior findings is to examine the initial ratings that a rating agency such as Moody's ascribes to the bonds. Presumably, Moody's analysts are more sophisticated than the average individual investor. Furthermore, analysts are less likely to be 'managed' by the underwriting bank. If investors base their pricing on ratings or use the same information that the rating agencies do, however, we will find results similar to those reported in the previous sub-section.

We obtain the initial ratings for the bonds from Moody's Manuals for the year in which the bond is issued. In the 1920s, as today, Moody's rates a large number of bonds on a scale from the highest quality, Aaa, to lowest quality, Caa, in our sample. Bonds for which Moody's could not obtain sufficient information or were thought to be highly speculative did not receive a rating.²⁴ For our empirical work, we convert the ratings into numbers assigning 1 to a bond rated Aaa, 2 to a bond rated

²³ The regression result is: (average yield premium) = 0.03 + 0.17(securities department indicator) + 0.06(log of bank age) - 0.03(log of bank capital) and the t-statistics are 0.07, 1.75, 1.0, and -0.63. There are 40 observations (16 affiliates and 24 departments) and the R² is 0.10.

²⁴ A handful of large and very well established issuers, however, did not obtain ratings, so the "unrated" category contains some noise.

is made about the "distances" between each of the ratings categories.

Table 6 contains the results of the ordered logit regression of the determinants of the initial Moody's bond rating, and the results parallel to those reported in Table 5. In each of the first three specifications, the department indicator coefficient again is positive and statistically significant. Estimating the marginal effects at the mean of the independent variables for the specification in column (iii), being underwritten by a department reduces the probability of being rated investment grade (Baa and above) by 0.11 and correspondingly increases the probability of being rated below investment grade by 0.11. The estimates for the creditworthiness control variables for size and age of firm are negative and statistically significant. When entered without the issuer type indicators in column (ii), the debt to assets ratio coefficient is negative and statistically significant. When the railroad and public utility issuer indicators are included in column (iii), the level of the coefficient drops an order of magnitude and loses statistical significance.

As in the previous sub-section, we can examine the robustness of our earlier results by adding the three proxies which might affect the commercial bank's reputation and credibility: age, capitalization, and regulation. Column (iv) of Table 6 includes the log of one plus the bank's age, the log of bank capital, and the indicator for national bank charter. Consistent with the results in Table 5, the securities underwritten by the older and larger banks are more likely to be of the highest rating, and less likely to be of the lowest rating. The bank capital variable is now statistically significant while the bank age variable is not. National banks on average tend to receive lower ratings. Adding these variables once again increases both the size and the precision of the estimated coefficient for the securities department indicator, confirming the results in columns (i) to (iii) in Table 6.

²⁵ In other words, a higher number indicates a lower quality evaluation by Moody's, just as in the previous section where a higher initial net yield suggests a lower quality evaluation by the market.

5. Comparison with related literature.

The closest work to ours is Puri (1993b). Puri compares the yields of commercial bank underwritten issues with those of investment bank underwritten issues. While Puri (1993b) does not report univariate means for initial yields of securities underwritten by departments and affiliates,²⁶ she reports the results of a multivariate regression. Relative to the yields on securities underwritten by investment banks, she finds the yields on commercial bank underwritten securities to be lower. She concludes that this is evidence for the 'informed certification' hypothesis. Furthermore, when she includes separate indicators for affiliates and departments, she finds a difference between the coefficient on the department indicator and that on the affiliate indicator.²⁷ Relative to comparable securities underwritten by investment banks, department underwritten securities appear to have marginally lower yields than do affiliates. This evidence, and Puri's conclusions, are apparently in direct contrast to ours.

We consider a number of possible explanations for the difference. First, Puri's sample period is 1927 to 1929, whereas ours is 1925 to 1929. When we drop the bonds issued in the first two years of our sample, however, our coefficient estimates for the department indicator in Table 5 are little changed and remain statistically significant.

Second, Puri does not include indicator variables for changes in net yields over time. In our sample, the average initial net yields are higher in the later years. As noted above, there were relatively more issues by affiliates and fewer by in-house departments as the 1920s progressed. Without time indicators in the regression, Puri may be spuriously attributing higher net yields to the affiliates.

A third source of difference may be that Puri includes a proxy for the bond rating as an explanatory variable. As we show in Table 6, rating agencies subject the issues underwritten by the departments to a discount. Since the rating already contains the discount, the organizational structure

²⁶ Puri notes in a footnote that she did not find interesting differences in the univariate comparisons.

²⁷ She does not report whether the difference is statistically different from zero. Given the small size of the difference relative to the standard errors reported for the coefficients on her department and affiliate indicators, the difference would not appear to be.

indicators in her regression do not capture the market discount (or premium) associated with each organizational structure. Instead, her coefficient estimates on those indicators represent the difference between initial ratings and yields.²⁸

A fourth, and what we believe is a more important, explanation is the difference in benchmarks. Puri compares the yields on commercial bank underwritten issues with those underwritten by investment banks. As Kroszner and Rajan (1994) show, the commercial bank underwritten issues were of higher quality than investment bank underwritten issues. If the regression model does not proxy correctly for the quality of the issue, the indicator for commercial bank will pick up the difference in quality. Thus, commercial bank underwritten issues could incorrectly appear to have lower yields.

Similarly, our analysis has shown that securities departments are typically smaller than both affiliates and investment banks. Kroszner and Rajan (forthcoming, Tables 8-10) show that the differences in quality of issues underwritten were the largest between small commercial banks and small independent investment banks. The bias due to omitted quality variables may be most pronounced for department underwritten issues than for affiliate underwritten issues. This may indicate why Puri finds departments have lower yields relative to investment banks than do affiliates.

Some evidence consistent with this explanation comes from Puri's finding of economically and statistically stronger results when she compares the initial net yields on preferred stock issues. She argues that this bolsters her results on the bonds because, she asserts based on Myer's pecking order theory, that only lower quality firms would issue junior securities such as preferred stock. In the 1920s, however, higher quality firms issued preferred stock.²⁹ The more pronounced difference for the

²⁸ Puri also attempts to correct for the selectivity bias in the kinds of issues the commercial banks choose to underwrite. To do this, she specifies a model of the variables that enter the bank's choice set in deciding whether to underwrite a firm or not. A potential problem in estimating this model is that she does not have access to the firms the commercial bank chose not to underwrite. By contrast, both the structures in our paper could lend. So under the null that the two structures did not have different information or incentives, our test is not misspecified.

²⁹ Puri's univariate comparisons show that firms issuing preferred stock were, on average, older than those issuing bonds. We also find in our sample that preferred stock issuers were older and larger than firms issuing bonds.

preferred stock thus can be interpreted that she has omitted relevant quality variables which could be driving her results.

Finally, Puri uses sample selection criteria which tend to omit proportionately more of the higher quality issues underwritten by affiliates (and investment banks) than underwritten in-house. Puri's sample of bonds is a subset of our sample for 1927 to 1929. She includes only industrial issues, for example, but our results are unchanged if we drop the non-industrials (e.g., railroads and public utilities) from our sample. We have tried to employ her other selection criteria to attempt to replicate her subsample. In doing so, we find that the issues she omits have, on average, lower initial net yields, higher ratings, greater total assets, lower debt to assets ratios, and are more likely to be listed on an exchange than the industrial issues that would be included in her sample. Applying her selection criteria led us to exclude approximately one-fifth of the in-house issues in our sample but roughly one-half of the affiliate issues in our sample. By excluding proportionately more of the higher quality issuers underwritten by the affiliates, she may be biasing her subsample towards the results she finds.

While any model predicting yields, including ours, can be criticized on grounds that it does not include all relevant quality variables, we believe our results are less subject to the above criticism. We find that the quality of issues underwritten by departments is marginally better than those underwritten by comparable affiliates. An omission of proxies for quality thus should bias our results against the direction of the effect we do find.

6. Evidence on ex-post default performance.

The ex ante evidence on measures of quality, yields and ratings indicates that department underwritten issues appear more heavily discounted than affiliate underwritten issues. This is consistent with the 'rational discounting' hypothesis. We now examine the ex post performance of bonds underwritten by affiliates and departments.

Unfortunately, the ex post relative performance of bonds has less power to help us discriminate against the two alternatives. Consider the implications of the 'informed certification' hypothesis for comparisons of ex post performance. If the net yield is a sufficient statistic for the perceived quality of

the issue, and investors rationally price the information the underwriters have, we should find no difference between the return performance of affiliate issues and department issues *conditional* on the initial net yield. Similarly, if the investors discount appropriately for the presence of rogues (underwriters who have such low reputations/franchise value that they succumb to conflicts of interest), we should find no difference in performance conditional on initial net yields. Differences in performance can arise, however, if the division of commercial bank underwritten issues into those underwritten by affiliates and those underwritten by departments happens to also sort on the proportion of rogues.

As argued earlier, a stronger theoretical assumption is needed in order that the test have power. Under the assumption of perfect foresight, conditional on ex ante observables other than the yields or ratings, department returns should be lower if the conflict of interest hypothesis is true, while it should be higher if the informed certification hypothesis is true. Of course, as with our previous tests, this test has the strong requirement that we include all ex ante observables at the time of issue. In addition, we do not have returns but only defaults. In what follows, we assume that defaults are (an inverse) proxy for returns.³⁰

The overall long-term bond default rate of 22 percent in the sample is very close to the default rate found by Kroszner and Rajan (1994) in another sample of bonds underwritten by commercial banks and their affiliates.³¹ The aggregate number, however, conceals important differences between the two groups. By 1940 (the last year we examine), 19 percent of the long bonds underwritten by the affiliates default, but 37 percent underwritten by departments default. As discussed above, we are interested in the influence of the bond department after correcting for ex ante observable differences in quality.

³⁰ To the extent that the underwriter is a lender in both cases here, the possibility of a successful workout/bankruptcy should not differ systematically. So bankruptcy costs, and the returns to bondholders after the resolution of bankruptcy should not differ systematically. This assumption is, therefore, not as strong as it might seem.

³¹ Kroszner and Rajan (1994) analyze the 121 bonds underwritten by commercial banks and trust in the first quarter in the years 1921 to 1929.

Subject to the caveats discussed earlier, we present the results for our logit default prediction model in Table 7. The dependent variable is one if the bond issue defaults on interest or principal between the time of issue and 1940. Column (i) includes only the department indicator (without year indicators). The coefficient is statistically significant and positive. Column (ii) adds the initial observable quality control variables and year indicators. Larger firms appear to be less likely to default. The firm age coefficient is positive but not statistically significant (but it is highly correlated with firm size). The debt to total assets ratio enters positively and statistically significantly. A listed firm is marginally less likely to default but the coefficients are imprecisely estimated. The department indicator is positive and statistically significant, implying that department underwritten bonds were more likely to default than those underwritten by affiliates. An issue underwritten by a department has a 0.12 higher probability of default than an issue underwritten by an affiliate where the marginal probability is calculated with the independent variables set at their means. The unconditional difference in probability of default is 0.18 (that is, 37 percent minus 19 percent), so the department indicator appears to account for two-thirds of this difference.

As in the previous sub-sections, we can examine the robustness of these results by adding the three proxies which might affect the commercial bank's reputation and credibility: age, capitalization, and regulation. Column (iii) of Table 7 includes the log of one plus the bank's age, the log of bank capital, and the indicator for national bank charter. The securities underwritten by the older and larger banks tend to default less frequently, and those underwritten by the national banks tend to default more frequently. Only the coefficient on the age of the banks, however, is statistically significant. Including these variables only slightly diminishes the size and the precision of the estimated coefficient for the securities department indicator, thereby confirming the estimate in column (ii).

It is possible that the bond department indicator is a proxy for either omitted ex ante observable quality variables, or other attributes of the underwriter that we have not captured. One measure of this is the average yield premium (price discount) on issues underwritten by a bank which we described

earlier. The average yield premium for the house may proxy for observable quality variables that we have not included in the yield model, or it may proxy for attributes like house reputation. We include this variable as a regressor in column (iv) of Table 7. While it is positive and statistically significant, the indicator for department is only slightly diminished and remains statistically significant.

As a robustness exercise, we again drop the bank and affiliate combinations which are larger, in terms of capital, than the largest bank underwriting in-house (see the previous section and Table 5). The results are in column (v) of Table 7. When we restrict the sample to comparably sized underwriters, the securities department indicator remains statistically significant and roughly the same magnitude as in the other specifications in Table 7. The coefficient estimate on the average excess discount for each underwriter, however, is now diminished and no longer statistically significant.

VI. Conclusions

Our results on the ex ante measures of the choice of underwriting activities, the initial market pricing of bonds, and the initial rating of bonds consistently support a more important role for rational discounting than informed certification in explaining the nature of commercial bank underwriting before the Glass-Steagall Act. Adjusting for ex ante observable characteristics of issuer quality, we find that yields are higher and ratings are lower for bonds underwritten by internal securities departments of banks and trusts relative to bonds underwritten by their separately incorporated and capitalized affiliates.

The concern about the potential for conflicts of interest when commercial lending and underwriting are combined within a bank appear to outweigh the certification benefits that might arise from improved information flows and economies of scope when the two functions are combined within an institution. While the bank may still retain the ability to refer business cultivated by its lending activities to its securities affiliate, the ability of the lending department to control the activities of the affiliate may be weaker. In turn, this enhances the credibility of the affiliate and improves its ability to certify firms to the market. As Tables 1 and 2 show, the market did appear to be converging toward the

affiliate structure for underwriting. If the separately incorporated and capitalized affiliate form was more advantageous, why would any banks still underwrite through departments? One possibility is that there were fixed costs in setting up affiliates, so some smaller banks did not find it worthwhile. Another possibility is that the market was evolving during the 1920s and had not yet reached final equilibrium when the Crash of 1929 occurred.³²

The evolution toward separate affiliates also may shed some light on the policy issues of whether firewalls should be required if Glass-Steagall were to be repealed. Our evidence indicates that firewalls can be effective at improving underwriter credibility. It also appears that such value was internalized by the banks since they voluntarily chose the arm's length structure. At least as far as conflict of interests rationales are concerned, it does not appear necessary to mandate firewalls to mitigate potential problems. Certainly, further detailed work on the organizational structure of banks in the 1920s and today is needed before strong conclusions for current policy can be drawn.

Our study leaves a number of questions unanswered. What is the effect of deposit insurance on the relative merits of the two organizational structures? What effect does the stricter securities regulation since the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (see Simon 1989) and the increased availability of public information have on the relative merits of the 'rational discounting' and 'informed certification' hypothesis? Answers to these questions await the examination of the post-Glass-Steagall evidence.

³² The evidence we present earlier suggests that the state chartered banks were slower than the national banks in adopting the affiliate structure. Rajan (1994) presents a theoretical argument for why banks with ex ante monopoly power may adopt inefficient structures so long as the inefficient structure is a source of ex post monopoly rents. To the extent that the state chartered banks were more likely to be from smaller communities, and were more likely to have ex ante local monopoly power, this may account for the slower rate of change for the state chartered banks.

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TABLE 1: Amounts in millions of dollars and market shares (percent) of originations of all bond issues by all types of underwriters, 1927 - 1929. Private investment banks are firms that underwrite securities but do not have a bank charter. The commercial banks and trusts are firms with either a state or national bank charter and underwrite securities either through separately incorporated and capitalized affiliates or through an in-house securities department.

Type of Underwriter	1927	1928	1929
All Private Investment Banks	4,567 (77.9%)	2,924 (70.4%)	1,586 (54.6%)
All Commercial Banks and Trusts, both organizational forms	1,296 (22.1%)	1,229 (29.6%)	1,319 (45.4%)
Separate Affiliates	755 (12.9%)	970 (23.4%)	1,204 (41.4%)
Internal Departments	541 (9.2%)	259 (6.2%)	115 (4.0%)
Total Amount of Bond Issues	5,863	4,153	2,905

Source: Mitchell testimony (US Senate 1931, p.299).

TABLE 2: Number of securities underwritten (and relative shares in percent) by separate affiliates and internal departments of depository institutions with national and state charters, 1925-1929. The numbers are calculated for the underwriters in our sample. State charter refers to depository institutions chartered under state banking laws. National charter refers to banks chartered under national banking laws.

	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929
State Charter					
Separate Affiliate	47 (48%)	44 (45%)	62 (58%)	68 (61%)	64 (85%)
Internal Department	51 (52%)	53 (55%)	45 (42%)	44 (39%)	11 (15%)
Total	98 (100%)	97 (100%)	107 (100%)	112 (100%)	75 (100%)
National Charter					
Separate Affiliate	54 (91%)	70 (95%)	78 (94%)	102 (96%)	82 (100%)
Internal Department	5 (9%)	4 (5%)	5 (6%)	4 (4%)	0 (0%)
Total	59 (100%)	74 (100%)	83 (100%)	106 (100%)	82 (100%)

Sources: Moody's Bank and Finance Manual and American Underwriting Houses and Their Issues, volumes I and II.

TABLE 3: Number (percent) of securities issued by the sample of commercial banks in-house and through their affiliates between January 1925 and December 1929, by type of security and type of issuer. Separate affiliate refers to the separately incorporated and capitalized securities affiliate of a commercial bank or trust. Internal department refers to the in-house securities department of a commercial bank or trust.

Panel A: Types of Securities Issued

Organization of Securities Operation	Common Stock	Preferred Stock	Short-term Bonds	Long-term Bonds	Total
Separate Affiliate	44 (6.6%)	91 (13.6%)	48 (7.2%)	488 (72.7%)	671 (100%)
Internal Department	4 (1.8%)	22 (9.9%)	29 (13.1%)	167 (75.2%)	222 (100%)

Chi²(3) = 15.7^a, p-value = 0.001

Panel B: Types of Securities Issuers

	Industrial Enterprises	Railroads	Public Utilities	Real Estate (Mortgages)	Investment Trusts	Foreign Government	Foreign Corporation
Separate Affiliate	270 (40.2%)	45 (6.7%)	203 (30.3%)	11 (1.6%)	36 (5.4%)	55 (8.2%)	51 (7.6%)
Internal Department	141 (63.5%)	8 (3.6%)	40 (18.0%)	8 (2.1%)	7 (3.2%)	12 (5.4%)	6 (2.7%)

Chi²(6) = 44.2^a, p-value = 0.000

^a Chi² is the Pearsons χ^2 for the hypothesis that the internal department and separate affiliate rows are from the same distribution.
Source: Compiled from American Underwriting Houses and their Issues (volumes I and II).

Underwriting Houses and their Issues minus the long-term government bond rate in the month of issue obtained from "Banking and Monetary Statistics." Separate affiliate refers to the separately incorporated and capitalized affiliate of a commercial bank or trust. Internal department refers to the in-house securities department of a commercial bank or trust.

Organization of Securities Operation	Mean Initial Net Yield	Median Initial Net Yield	Standard Deviation	Number
Separate Affiliate	2.02	1.99	0.57	328
Internal Department	2.37	2.50	0.57	113

t-statistic for the equality of means = 5.67, p-value = 0.000
z-statistic for the equality of medians = 6.49, p-value = 0.000

Source: Compiled from American Underwriting Houses and their Issues (volumes I and II).

TABLE 5: Estimates for OLS regression of the determinants of initial net yields on bonds underwritten by commercial banks' internal securities departments and commercial banks' separate affiliates, 1925-1929. Initial net yield is defined as the implied yield to maturity at the offering date reported in the Commercial and Financial Chronicle or American Underwriting Houses and their Issues minus the long-term government bond rate in the month of issue obtained from "Banking and Monetary Statistics." The securities department indicator is 1 if the underwriter of the issue is an in-house securities department and 0 if the underwriter is an affiliate. The total assets of the firm are book assets in the year before the issue as listed in Moodys. Firm age is the number of years that the firm has existed at the date of issue. A firm is listed on an exchange if Moodys describes its equity as being listed on any exchange. The debt to total assets ratio is the ratio of total debt (including notes) to book assets in the year before the issue, as obtained from Moodys. An issue is classified as a public utility or a railroad issue based on Moodys. A national bank has a federal bank charter. Bank age is the number of years since the founding of the bank with which the affiliate or the securities department is associated. Bank capital is the book capital of this bank. Summary statistics for the variables are in the Appendix. (Year indicators and a constant are included in each regression but are omitted from the table. T-statistics are in parentheses.)

Independent Variable	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(v) ^a
Indicator is 1 if the underwriter is internal securities department	0.239 (4.116)	0.214 (3.596)	0.192 (3.315)	0.278 (4.300)	0.210 (2.809)
Log of firm total assets in \$000	-0.127 (-7.670)	-0.114 (-6.367)	-0.091 (-5.158)	-0.063 (-3.154)	-0.107 (-3.947)
Log of firm age in years	-0.083 (-4.219)	-0.082 (-4.221)	-0.071 (-3.744)	-0.084 (-4.326)	-0.057 (-2.038)
Indicator is 1 if firm is listed on an exchange	0.070 (1.221)	0.046 (0.783)	0.028 (0.491)	0.002 (0.038)	0.054 (0.620)
Debt to total assets ratio before the issue	-	-0.246 (-1.821)	0.121 (0.844)	0.124 (0.861)	0.147 (0.640)
Indicator is 1 if issuer is a railroad	-	-	-0.460 (-4.762)	-0.430 (-4.414)	-0.681 (-3.387)
Indicator is 1 if issuer is a public utility	-	-	-0.311 (-5.233)	-0.249 (-4.067)	-0.388 (-3.782)
Indicator is 1 if bank is a national bank	-	-	-	0.254 (4.017)	-
Log of bank age in years	-	-	-	-0.147 (-2.892)	-
Log of bank capital	-	-	-	-0.011 (-0.460)	-
Number of Observations	441	441	441	431	183
Adjusted R ²	0.276	0.280	0.334	0.360	0.339

^a Regression includes only issues underwritten by departments and affiliates of comparable size. This is obtained by dropping all issues underwritten by affiliates with the sum of affiliate and bank capital exceeding \$69 million (the capitalization of the largest bank underwriting through securities departments).

TABLE 6: Estimates for ordered logit regression of the determinants of initial Moody's rating for bonds underwritten by commercial banks' internal securities departments and commercial banks' separate affiliates, 1925-1929. The dependent variable "rating" is defined by converting Moodys' letter ratings into a numerical scale where a security rating of Aaa is assigned the number 1, Aa is assigned 2, ..., Caa is assigned 7, and an unrated security is assigned 8. The securities department indicator is 1 if the underwriter of the issue is an in-house securities department and 0 if the underwriter is an affiliate. The total assets of the firm are book assets in the year before the issue as listed in Moodys. Firm age is the number of years that the firm has existed at the date of issue. A firm is listed on an exchange if Moodys describes its equity as being listed on any exchange. The debt to total assets ratio is the ratio of total debt (including notes) to book assets in the year before the issue, as obtained from Moodys. An issue is classified as a public utility or a railroad issue based on Moodys. A national bank has a federal bank charter. Bank age is the number of years since the founding of the bank with which the affiliate or the securities department is affiliated. Bank capital is the book capital of this bank. Summary statistics for the variables are in the Appendix. (Year indicators and a constant are included in each regression but are omitted from the table. T-statistics are in parentheses.)

Independent Variable	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)
Indicator is 1 if the underwriter is internal securities department	0.884 (3.969)	0.705 (3.110)	0.641 (2.822)	0.779 (2.963)
Log of firm total assets in \$000	-0.519 (-7.715)	-0.412 (-5.784)	-0.288 (-3.990)	-0.186 (-2.245)
Log of firm age in years	-0.233 (-3.161)	-0.224 (-3.000)	-0.215 (-2.807)	-0.248 (-3.112)
Indicator is 1 if firm is listed on an exchange	-0.349 (-1.713)	-0.598 (-2.815)	-0.733 (-3.346)	-0.772 (-3.440)
Debt to total assets ratio before the issue	-	-2.221 (-4.317)	-0.255 (-0.442)	-0.209 (-0.352)
Indicator is 1 if issuer is a railroad	-	-	-2.695 (-6.532)	-2.732 (-6.514)
Indicator is 1 if issuer is a public utility	-	-	-1.818 (-7.329)	-1.810 (-6.994)
Indicator is 1 if bank is a national bank	-	-	-	0.467 (1.756)
Log of bank age in years	-	-	-	-0.025 (-0.128)
Log of bank capital	-	-	-	-0.224 (-2.229)
Number of Observations	433	433	433	423
Chi ² for the Regression	164.43	183.29	254.64	258.02
[p-value of Chi ²]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]

number of years that the firm has existed at the date of issue. A firm is listed on an exchange if Moodys describes its equity as being listed on any exchange. The debt to total assets ratio is the ratio of total debt (including notes) to book assets in the year before the issue, as obtained from Moodys. An issue is classified as a public utility or a railroad issue based on Moodys. A national bank has a federal bank charter. Bank age is the number of years since the founding of the bank with which the affiliate or the securities department is affiliated. Bank capital is the book capital of this bank. Summary statistics for the variables are in the Appendix. (Year indicators and a constant are included in each regression but are omitted from the table. T-statistics are in parentheses.)

Independent Variable	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)
Indicator is 1 if the underwriter is internal securities department	0.884 (3.969)	0.705 (3.110)	0.641 (2.822)	0.779 (2.963)
Log of firm total assets in \$000	-0.519 (-7.715)	-0.412 (-5.784)	-0.288 (-3.990)	-0.186 (-2.245)
Log of firm age in years	-0.233 (-3.161)	-0.224 (-3.000)	-0.215 (-2.807)	-0.248 (-3.112)
Indicator is 1 if firm is listed on an exchange	-0.349 (-1.713)	-0.598 (-2.815)	-0.733 (-3.346)	-0.772 (-3.440)
Debt to total assets ratio before the issue	-	-2.221 (-4.317)	-0.255 (-0.442)	-0.209 (-0.352)
Indicator is 1 if issuer is a railroad	-	-	-2.695 (-6.532)	-2.732 (-6.514)
Indicator is 1 if issuer is a public utility	-	-	-1.818 (-7.329)	-1.810 (-6.994)
Indicator is 1 if bank is a national bank	-	-	-	0.467 (1.756)
Log of bank age in years	-	-	-	-0.025 (-0.128)
Log of bank capital	-	-	-	-0.224 (-2.229)
Number of Observations	433	433	433	423
Chi² for the Regression	164.43	183.29	254.64	258.02
[p-value of Chi²]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]

Chi² for the Regression	19.27	51.89	59.95	57.86	40.81
[p-value of Chi²]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]

^a Regression includes only issues underwritten by departments and affiliates of comparable size. This is obtained by dropping all issues underwritten by affiliates with the sum of affiliate and bank capital exceeding \$69 million (the capitalization of the largest bank underwriting through securities departments).

TABLE 7: Estimates for logit analysis of the determinants of defaults for bonds underwritten by commercial banks' internal securities departments and commercial banks' separate affiliates, 1925-1929. The dependent variable "default" equals 1 if the bond defaults on interest, principal, covenants, or sinking fund payments before 1940, and 0 otherwise. The securities department indicator is 1 if the underwriter of the issue is an in-house securities department and 0 if the underwriter is an affiliate. The total assets of the firm are book assets in the year before the issue as listed in Moodys. Firm age is the number of years that the firm has existed at the date of issue. A firm is listed on an exchange if Moodys describes its equity as being listed on any exchange. The debt to total assets ratio is the ratio of total debt (including notes) to book assets in the year before the issue, as obtained from Moodys. An issue is classified as a public utility or a railroad issue based on Moodys. Bank age is the number of years since the founding of the bank with which the affiliate or the securities department is affiliated. A national bank has a federal bank charter. Bank capital is the book capital of this bank. Average yield premium for each underwriter is calculated by averaging for each department or affiliate the residuals from the initial net yield model in column (iii) of Table 4 excluding the department indicator variable. Summary statistics for the variables are in the Appendix. (Year indicators and a constant are included in the regressions in columns (ii) to (v) and a constant in column (i) but are omitted from the table. T-statistics are in parentheses.)

Independent Variable	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(v) ^a
Indicator is 1 if the underwriter is internal securities department	0.943 (4.435)	0.828 (2.902)	0.795 (2.328)	0.701 (2.403)	1.028 (2.357)
Log of firm total assets in \$000	-	-0.243 (-2.548)	-0.178 (-1.625)	-0.225 (-2.348)	-0.448 (-2.654)
Log of firm age in years	-	0.025 (0.255)	0.007 (0.068)	0.029 (0.284)	-0.108 (-0.742)
Indicator is 1 if firm is listed on an exchange	-	-0.244 (-0.765)	-0.167 (-0.505)	-0.282 (-0.870)	-0.135 (-0.292)
Debt to total assets ratio before the issue	-	2.124 (2.712)	2.525 (3.047)	2.170 (2.734)	3.001 (2.286)
Indicator is 1 if issuer is a railroad	-	0.114 (0.239)	-0.088 (-0.178)	0.151 (0.313)	1.383 (1.296)
Indicator is 1 if issuer is a public utility	-	-1.385 (-3.871)	-1.440 (-3.853)	-1.343 (-3.728)	-3.553 (-3.146)
Indicator is 1 if bank is a national bank	-	-	0.313 (0.909)	-	-
Log of bank age in years	-	-	-0.527 (-2.192)	-	-
Log of bank capital	-	-	-0.090 (-0.696)	-	-
Average yield premium for the underwriter	-	-	-	1.291 (2.426)	0.686 (0.898)
Number of Observations	542	439	439	439	183

APPENDIX: Summary statistics for variables used in the regressions in tables 5, 6, and 7.

	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
<u>Dependent Variables:</u>					
Initial Net Yield	2.11	2.09	0.59	0.50	3.78
Rating	4.72	4	2.26	1	8
Default	0.22	0	0.41	0	1
<u>Independent Variables:</u>					
Indicator is 1 if the underwriter is internal securities department	0.26	0	0.44	0	1
Log of firm total assets in \$000	10.00	9.95	1.77	4.80	14.61
Log of one plus firm age in years	2.19	2.64	1.27	0	4.83
Indicator is 1 if firm is listed on an exchange	0.38	0	0.49	0	1
Debt to total assets ratio before the issue	0.25	0.26	0.20	0	0.90
Indicator is 1 if issuer is a railroad	0.09	0	0.28	0	1
Indicator is 1 if issuer is a public utility	0.36	0	0.48	0	1
Indicator is 1 if national bank	0.39	0	0.49	0	1
Log of one plus bank age in years	3.80	3.85	0.53	0	4.75
Log of bank capital	9.97	9.34	1.25	6.65	11.89
Average yield premium for the underwriter	0.00	-0.08	0.21	-0.48	0.70