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Risk exposure and acquisition of macroeconomic information

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**Risk Exposure and Acquisition of
Macroeconomic Information**

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Risk Exposure and Acquisition of Macroeconomic Information

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We conduct an experiment with a representative sample from the US to study households' demand for macroeconomic information. Respondents who learn of a higher personal exposure to unemployment risk during recessions increase their demand for an expert forecast about the likelihood of a recession. This finding is consistent with macroeconomic models of endogenous information acquisition, according to which the demand for information depends on its expected benefits. Moreover, respondents' updating about their personal unemployment risk suggests that households are imperfectly informed about their exposure to aggregate fluctuations, which may distort their beliefs about the benefits of acquiring macroeconomic information.

JEL: D12, D14, D83, D84, E32, G11

Keywords: Risk Exposure, Macroeconomic Conditions, Information Acquisition, Experiment.

Information frictions feature a central role in many theories of expectation formation. In some models, these frictions are assumed to be exogenous (Carroll, 2003; Klenow and Willis, 2007; Mankiw and Reis, 2002; Mankiw et al., 2003; Wiederholt, 2015; Woodford, 2003). By contrast, in models of endogenous information acquisition, economic agents with a limited capacity to acquire or process information choose how much information to acquire depending on its expected benefits. For instance, this prediction is at the core of theories of rational inattention (Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2009; Maćkowiak et al., 2018; Sims, 2003), sparsity (Gabaix, 2019) or sticky information with endogenous updating frequency (Reis, 2006).

In this paper, we test this prediction in the context of exposure to unemployment risk during recessions, and how it affects individuals' demand for a forecast about the likelihood of a recession. Perceived unemployment risk plays an

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important role in models of spending and saving decisions, investment choices and labor market behavior. Higher exposure to unemployment risk during recessions should increase the expected benefits of acquiring information about the likelihood of a recession, as – depending on individuals’ exposure – such information should allow them to predict their personal unemployment risk more accurately and make better economic decisions.

Testing how information acquisition depends on exposure to macroeconomic risk is challenging with observational data. Offering pieces of information to more and less exposed individuals and comparing their demand for this information is problematic as those who are more exposed to macroeconomic risk should already be better informed about pieces of news that are relevant for their macroeconomic outlook to begin with, which may crowd out their demand for additional information. Moreover, more exposed individuals differ from less exposed individuals in many unobservables, such as the cost of acquiring and processing information. To circumvent these identification challenges, we propose an experiment that exogenously varies people’s beliefs about their own exposure to macroeconomic risk. This allows us to compare otherwise similar individuals who hold differential beliefs about the relevance of a piece of information to themselves.

We conduct our experiment with an online sample representative of the US population in full-time employment in terms of age, income, region, education and gender. The experiment proceeds as follows: First, we measure respondents’ beliefs about the effect of the Great Recession in 2008-9 on the unemployment rate among people with similar characteristics as themselves. We then generate exogenous variation in perceptions of exposure to macroeconomic risk by providing the respondents with data on actual changes in the unemployment rate among people similar to them over the Great Recession. Respondents are randomly assigned to receive information based on data from either the American Community Survey (ACS) or the Current Population Survey (CPS). We exploit differences across the two Census surveys due to sampling variation and procedural differences as a source of exogenous variation in the provided information. Thereafter, we elicit the respondents’ perceptions of how exposed they personally are to unemployment risk during recessions. Finally, respondents have to choose between receiving an expert forecast about the likelihood of a recession, a forecast about inflation, a forecast about the return on government bonds, a forecast about government spending, or no forecast.

The main findings of our paper can be summarized as follows: First, information about changes of the unemployment rate among similar individuals during the last recession strongly affects respondents’ perceived risk of becoming personally unemployed during the next recession, indicating that individuals are imperfectly informed about their own risk exposure. Consistent with this, a substantial fraction of respondents report that they are uncertain about their group’s exposure to macroeconomic risk. This suggests that there exist frictions

in households' knowledge of how relevant macroeconomic information is for themselves. Second, an exogenous increase in perceived unemployment risk during the next recession increases respondents' demand for receiving a forecast about the likelihood of a recession, consistent with the basic prediction of models of endogenous information acquisition (Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2009; Maćkowiak et al., 2018; Reis, 2006; Sims, 2003). We find a corresponding decrease in the likelihood of choosing any of the other forecasts, but no significant effect on the likelihood of choosing no forecast at all.

We contribute to a research effort that aims to better understand how households form macroeconomic expectations, and how these expectations affect their decisions (Andre et al., 2019; Bachmann et al., 2015; Bailey et al., 2019; Coibion et al., 2020b; D'Acunto et al., 2019a,b; D'Acunto et al., 2020; Fetzer et al., 2020; Goldfayn-Frank and Wohlfart, 2020; Kuchler and Zafar, 2019; Qian, 2020). Our paper complements prior work that uses observational data to study the importance of information rigidities in macroeconomic expectation formation (Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2012, 2015; Mankiw et al., 2003), and in particular the role of rational inattention (Maćkowiak et al., 2018; Reis, 2006). Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) show that information frictions were more severe during the period of the Great Moderation, and that the rigidity of expectations drops during recessions. These findings are consistent with the mechanism for which we provide micro evidence in our experiment. Moreover, using a sample of firms, Coibion et al. (2018) provide evidence that attention to inflation is correlated with proxies for incentives to acquire information.

Our paper relates to a series of recent studies that examine how information provision affects expectations about inflation (Armantier et al., 2016, 2015; Binder, 2020; Binder and Rodrigue, 2018; Cavallo et al., 2017; Coibion et al., 2020a,c, 2018), house prices (Armona et al., 2019; Fuster et al., 2020), GDP growth (Roth and Wohlfart, 2020), or stock returns (Hanspal et al., 2020). These papers demonstrate that when individuals are exposed to information, the dispersion in expectations decreases, consistent with models of costly information acquisition. Fuster et al. (2020) provide important evidence that people's willingness to pay for information about house prices increases when prediction incentives about future house price changes increase. We provide the first direct causal evidence that perceptions of exposure to macroeconomic risk affect the demand for information about different macroeconomic variables. A unique aspect of our design is that we experimentally change the real world benefits of acquiring information, in the context of a risk that should matter for the real world decisions of individuals. This should increase the empirical validity of our test (Maćkowiak et al., 2018). Ciani et al. (2019) use observational data to show that information acquisition costs matter for information search in the context of pension reform expectations, complementary to our evidence on the role of expected benefits.

I. Experimental design and data

A. Survey administration

We collected data in September 2019 in collaboration with the widely used online panel provider Luc.id (Haaland et al., 2020). Respondents were recruited through generic invitation forms sent out by email. In the following, we outline the experimental design. The full instructions can be found in appendix section E.

B. Design

Prior beliefs about group-level exposure to recessions.—We start by eliciting some background characteristics of our respondents. We then ask them to think about the effect of the Great Recession in 2008-9 in the US on people with similar characteristics as them, namely people who before the recession had the same occupation, education, age, gender and census division of residence as they have now.¹ Next, we inform all participants what the unemployment rate among people similar to them was in the year 2007, just before the recession. The purpose of this information is to provide respondents with an anchor on unemployment rates that illustrates the relevant scale and allows respondents to meaningfully express their prior beliefs (Ansolabehere et al., 2013). Moreover, this ensures that our information treatment does not shift beliefs about the baseline unemployment rate before the recession. This anchor is based on either the American Community Survey (ACS) or the Current Population Survey (CPS) on a random basis, i.e. respondents are, already at this point, prior to the actual information treatment, assigned to one of two randomized (treatment) groups. Subsequently, we elicit the respondents' prior estimate of the unemployment rate among people similar to them in 2010, after the Great Recession, when the unemployment rate peaked. Thereafter, we measure their self-reported confidence in this estimate on a qualitative scale. While data on the group-level increase in unemployment in principle can be obtained online from the ACS or the CPS, this is quite costly and time-consuming as the data need to be found, downloaded and processed. Respondents' reported priors should therefore not be confounded by spontaneous online searches.

Information treatment.—Next, we provide all respondents with truthful information about the unemployment rate among people with similar characteristics as them in 2010, after the Great Recession. We illustrate this information by means of a bar chart, in which we display i) the pre-recession unemployment rate in the respondent's demographic group which had been provided as an anchor, ii)

¹We use relatively narrowly defined cells, specifically occupation groups based on 3-digit Census 2000 occupational classifications; educational attainment of below highschool, highschool, and college; 5-year age brackets; and Census divisions of residence.

the respondent's prior estimate of the unemployment rate in her demographic group after the Great Recession, and iii) the actual unemployment rate after the Great Recession in this demographic group (see Figures A.1 and A.2 for an illustration). Those respondents who were randomly assigned to receive the 2007 anchor based on the ACS during the prior belief elicitation now receive the information treatment based on the ACS, and similarly for those exposed to the CPS.² Sampling variation and procedural differences across these two randomly assigned data sources allow us to provide similar individuals with differential information on group-level recession exposure in a non-deceptive way. This ultimately aims to induce exogenous treatment variation in respondents' perceived exposure to macroeconomic risk. We define exposure to macroeconomic risk as the *change* in the group-level unemployment rate from 2007 to 2010. As explained in section II.B, in our regressions we control for the 2007 anchor to account for the fact that respondents exposed to different information have also seen different anchors.

To illustrate the variation between the two data sources, consider the following hypothetical participant in our experiment: a male, without a High School degree, from census division Mountain, aged between 18 and 24, with the occupation "Vehicle and Mobile Equipment Mechanics, Installers, and Repairers". Out of 1,000 ACS respondents with those characteristics, 58 were unemployed in 2007, while 240 were unemployed in 2010, after the recession. In the CPS, by contrast, 61 out of 1,000 respondents with those characteristics were unemployed in 2007, while 322 were unemployed in 2010. Thus, while the group-level unemployment rate increased by 18.2 percentage points according to ACS data, it increased by 26.1 percentage points according to CPS data. Figures A.1 and A.2 display the information screens for the two treatment arms for this example. In online appendix A, we provide more details on the variation in the signal respondents receive.

Posterior beliefs about own exposure to recessions.—After the information treatment, we measure participants' perceptions of their own risk exposure using both qualitative and quantitative questions. First, we ask our respondents to imagine that they still work in their current job just before the next recession occurs in the US, and to assess the probability (in percent) that they would become involuntarily unemployed during that recession. Second, we elicit the respondents' agreement on 5-point scales with the following three statements: (i) A recession would adversely affect my job security; (ii) A recession would adversely affect the financial situation of my household; (iii) My job situation depends on the macroeconomic environment.

²Both the ACS and the CPS are official Census surveys. While the ACS has a somewhat higher number of respondents, the CPS is used to calculate unemployment statistics as issued by the BLS. Thus, neither ACS nor CPS dominates the other survey.

Demand for forecasts.—Our main outcome of interest is respondents’ demand for a recession forecast. We first inform all participants that the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) is a quarterly expert survey on macroeconomic forecasts for the US economy issued by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. We also tell them that experts participating in the survey forecast the change in total federal government spending, the annual rate on 10-year government bonds, and the rate of inflation over the next 12 months, as well as the probability of a decline in real GDP in the first quarter of 2020 compared to the fourth quarter of 2019. Throughout, we add explanations to make these concepts easier to understand. For instance, we tell our respondents that inflation refers to the change in the general price level. The respondents can then choose between five options, namely receiving the average expert forecast from the most recent wave of the SPF for any of these four variables, or receiving no information. Subsequently, our respondents see the forecast they chose to receive. Finally, we elicit respondents’ perceived risk of becoming unemployed over the next 12 months, as well as their intended savings and job search behavior.

Discussion of the experimental design.—Our main challenge for identification is that (perceived) exposure to macroeconomic risk is potentially endogenous to individual characteristics. For instance, more exposed individuals may be better informed to begin with, which may crowd out their demand for new information. Alternatively, more exposed individuals may have higher information processing costs and therefore be less likely to acquire relevant information. In our design, respondents are randomly assigned to receive information from the ACS or the CPS, which varies because of sampling variation and procedural differences. As explained in detail in section II.B, our identification strategy generates exogenous variation in perceived risk exposure in a non-deceptive way by exploiting the component of the provided information that is due to the difference in this noise across the two signals.

Our identification strategy based on an active control group has several advantages compared to an alternative design that provides a random subset of respondents with information and another subset (a passive control group) with no information (Haaland et al., 2020). First, receiving information about risk exposure may not only shift the level of individuals’ beliefs but may also have side-effects, such as reducing their uncertainty about their risk exposure or making recessions and job loss risk more salient. This is particularly relevant in our setting, since our main outcome is our respondents’ demand for information. For instance, being primed on exposure to unemployment risk during recessions could increase the demand for the recession forecast. Such side-effects should arguably be similar across respondents (who all receive information) in our design. Second, identification in the alternative design hinges on the respondent’s prior belief, which determines the expected direction and strength of the information treatment. Prior beliefs, however, are likely correlated with other characteristics

that, in turn, determine individuals' demand for information and its elasticity to perceived risk exposure. Moreover, prior beliefs may be measured with error, which could attenuate estimated treatment effects. In our design, the identifying variation is orthogonal to priors.

Previous evidence highlights that large fractions of the population tend to be uninformed about recession forecasts, and revise their beliefs about job loss risk and their consumption plans when provided with such forecasts (Roth and Wohlfart, 2020). Participants in our survey are offered direct and easy access to a recession forecast immediately after an exogenous change in their perceived recession exposure, and it would likely take respondents much more time to look up this information themselves. These points suggest i) that respondents will likely perceive the recession forecast as valuable, and ii) that our setup should be immune to crowd-out of the demand for the recession forecast through information acquisition outside the survey.

Our measure of information acquisition captures changes in behavior along two margins. First, respondents can decide between i) receiving a forecast and ii) not receiving a forecast and thereby more quickly completing the survey (which is required for receiving payment). Second, respondents can choose between forecasts on four different macroeconomic variables – government spending, interest rates, inflation and the likelihood of a recession. We believe that these features capture in a stylized way basic aspects of prominent macroeconomic models of endogenous information acquisition, such as models of rational inattention. Specifically, agents in such models optimally choose how much attention to pay overall, e.g. how much time to spend on collecting information (Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2009, 2015), but also how to allocate attention across different signals (Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2009). An increase in a respondent's perceived exposure to recessions should increase his or her expected benefits of receiving the recession forecast, and thereby make the participant more willing to pay the opportunity cost of receiving the recession forecast, which consists primarily of not receiving the forecasts on other variables and also the small time cost.³

C. Data

Table 1 shows summary statistics of our sample as well as benchmarks from the 2017 American Community Survey. Our sample consists of 1,008 full-time employees and is roughly representative of the corresponding part of the US population in terms of gender, age, region, education and total household income. Our sample also resembles the population along non-targeted dimensions such as occupation and industry of employment, hours worked and log of personal labor earnings. Table 1 also shows that respondents randomly assigned to

³Our measure of information demand is low cost in nature and therefore resembles the low cost nature of most online news consumption. Future work could explore news consumption with higher costs involved, for example, by eliciting willingness to pay.

receive information from the ACS or the CPS are very similar in terms of a large set of observables.

II. Beliefs about exposure

A. Prior beliefs about risk exposure

Levels of prior beliefs.—Figure A.3 highlights that there is substantial variation in respondents' prior beliefs about the change in the unemployment rate in their demographic group over the Great Recession. On average, respondents believe that the unemployment rate among people with similar characteristics as themselves increased by 11 percentage points during the last recession. 25 percent of respondents believe that the unemployment rate among individuals similar to themselves did not increase over the Great Recession. As shown in Table A.1, columns 1-2, those who were personally unemployed during the Great Recession perceive a significantly higher exposure of their demographic groups. Age, income, education, gender, job tenure and news consumption are not significantly correlated with priors.

How closely aligned are respondents' beliefs about their group's exposure to the Great Recession with reality? Figure A.4 displays binned scatter plots of respondents' prior beliefs against the actual change in the unemployment rate in their demographic group based on the source of information they were assigned to (the ACS or the CPS), and on which the provided anchor of the pre-recession unemployment rate was based. Individuals who are more exposed according to our objective group-level measure estimate significantly stronger increases in their group-level unemployment rate. At the median, respondents perceive a similar increase in their group-level unemployment rate (3 percentage points) as indicated by the data from the ACS or CPS they were subsequently provided with (3.4 percentage points).^{4,5}

Despite these similarities between respondents' beliefs and the objective benchmarks, Figure A.4 also illustrates a lot of unexplained variation in respondents' beliefs about their group's exposure. Given the importance of sampling variation in the ACS and CPS estimates of unemployment rates in high-dimensional demographic cells, these patterns likely understate how well respondents' beliefs are aligned with reality. That said, the described patterns suggest i) that overall respondents' beliefs seem to be directionally aligned with reality; and ii) that respondents are not perfectly informed about their group's exposure to

⁴Perceiving no increase in the group-level unemployment rate is associated with a 5.3 percentage points higher likelihood of no increase according to the shown objective benchmark ($p=0.115$). 23.3 percent of respondents belong to groups that experienced no increase in unemployment over the Great Recession according to the objective signal based on ACS or CPS they subsequently received, in line with previous evidence (Farber, 2015; Hoynes et al., 2012). This is comparable to the fraction of respondents perceiving no increase (25 percent).

⁵Table A.1, columns 3-4 display correlates of absolute deviations from the benchmarks. Those who became unemployed during the Great Recession exhibit larger absolute deviations.

macroeconomic risk, leaving room for our information treatment to change these beliefs.

Confidence in prior beliefs.—66 percent of respondents indicate that they are at least somewhat unsure about their group’s exposure to the Great Recession, consistent with frictions in households’ knowledge of their own group’s exposure to macroeconomic risk. Men, those who follow news about the economy, those who became unemployed during the Great Recession, and those with a college degree exhibit higher confidence in their beliefs about exposure to macroeconomic risk (Table A.1, columns 5-8).

B. Updating of beliefs about exposure

Specification.—We next establish that our respondents’ perceived exposure to macroeconomic risk is shifted through the randomly assigned information treatment. To do so, we estimate the following empirical specification:

$$(1) \quad \text{Perceived exposure}_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \Delta \text{Unempl. Incr.} + \alpha_2 \text{Unempl. Incr.}^{alt} \\ + \alpha_3 \Delta \text{Unempl. 2007} + \alpha_4 \text{Unempl. 2007}^{alt} + \mathbf{\Pi}^T \mathbf{X}_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where *Perceived exposure_i* is a quantitative or qualitative measure of the respondent’s posterior belief about his or her exposure to macroeconomic risk. $\Delta \text{Unempl. Incr.}$ is the difference between the information shown to the respondent, $\text{Unempl. Incr.}^{shown}$, and the alternative information that was not shown, $\text{Unempl. Incr.}^{alt}$.

Our identification strategy relies on the following argument: Both the signal shown to the respondent and the alternative signal are noisy proxies for the unknown true exposure of the respondent’s demographic group to the Great Recession:

$$\text{Unempl. Incr.}^{shown} = \text{Unempl. Incr.}^{true} + \text{noise}^{shown} \\ \text{Unempl. Incr.}^{alt} = \text{Unempl. Incr.}^{true} + \text{noise}^{alt}$$

When taking the difference between the two signals, the unknown true increase in unemployment, $\text{Unempl. Incr.}^{true}$, cancels out. Thus, this difference will purely reflect the difference in noise between the two signals due to sampling variation and procedural differences between ACS and CPS:

$$\begin{aligned}
\Delta Unempl. \text{ Incr.} &= Unempl. \text{ Incr.}^{true} + noise^{shown} \\
&\quad - Unempl. \text{ Incr.}^{true} - noise^{alt} \\
&= noise^{shown} - noise^{alt}
\end{aligned}$$

Including both $Unempl. \text{ Incr.}^{alt}$ and $\Delta Unempl. \text{ Incr.}$ in our regressions is equivalent to splitting the displayed information, $Unempl. \text{ Incr.}^{shown}$, into a potentially endogenous and an exogenous component. The coefficient estimate of α_2 on the alternative, non-shown signal $Unempl. \text{ Incr.}^{alt}$ captures the effect of information on a higher group-level exposure to the Great Recession to the extent it is driven by true exposure and the noise in the alternative signal. This coefficient cannot be given a causal interpretation because it could capture i) effects of the displayed information, ii) effects of actual exposure not working through the displayed information, or iii) effects of omitted variables that are correlated with actual exposure. By contrast, the coefficient α_1 captures the effect of information about a higher increase in group-level unemployment to the extent it is driven by the *difference in noise* between the two signals. This difference in noise should only matter for respondents' posterior beliefs because the information was shown to them. It should be orthogonal to respondents' true risk exposure and to omitted variables, as such variables should not vary differentially with the noise in the shown signal and the noise in the alternative signal. Since the shown and the alternative signal are both equally likely to be based on the ACS or on the CPS, they have the same statistical properties.⁶ Thus, the coefficient α_1 captures exogenous variation in provided information about group-level unemployment changes over the Great Recession, and can be given a causal interpretation. Throughout the main analysis, we focus on the coefficient estimates of α_1 , which are based on the exogenous component of the information.

We similarly split the pre-recession group-level unemployment rate, which was provided as an anchor to facilitate the elicitation of prior beliefs, into an exogenous part, $\Delta Unempl. \text{ 2007}$, and a potentially endogenous part, $Unempl. \text{ 2007}^{alt}$. These variables should capture permanent differences in unemployment risk across groups and any potential effect of the anchor itself. Finally, to increase statistical power, we also control for the vector \mathbf{X}_i , which includes fixed effects for age group, occupation, gender, education, and census region. We report robust standard errors throughout the analysis.

First-stage treatment effects.—Does the information change our respondents' perceived risk exposure? As reported in Table 2, Panel A, column 1, information on a one percentage point higher increase in the unemployment rate among peo-

⁶Figure A.5 shows that the distributions of the two signals are indeed very similar in our sample, and that the difference between them has a mean close to zero.

ple with similar characteristics during the last recession (driven by the difference in noise between shown and alternative signal) significantly increases respondents' perceived probability of job loss during the next recession by 0.49 percentage points. Figure 1 Panel A illustrates this estimate in a binned scatter plot.^{7,8} Thus, respondents perceive data on changes in unemployment rates among similar people during the last recession as relevant for their own personal future exposure to unemployment risk during recessions. We also confirm our findings using qualitative survey measures of risk exposure (Table 2, Panel A, columns 2-5). People who received information indicating a stronger increase in unemployment are more likely to agree that recessions affect their job security and that they are exposed to macroeconomic risk.⁹ In Appendix B.1, we discuss the coefficient estimates on the other included variables, such as the alternative signal.

How does updating about personal future risk exposure vary with confidence in prior beliefs about changes in the group-level unemployment rate during the last recession? Table 3 separately estimates the first stage equation 1 among subsamples of respondents who were "very unsure", "unsure" or "somewhat unsure" (Panel A) and who were "very sure" or "sure" (Panel B) about their prior beliefs. Updating of beliefs about personal risk exposure is fully driven by those individuals who were at least somewhat unsure about their prior beliefs, and the effect of the provided information differs significantly across these two groups ($p < 0.1$).

Taken together, our first main result can be summarized as follows:

RESULT 1: *The information provision strongly shifts our respondents' perceived unemployment risk during future recessions. This suggests that there exist frictions in households' knowledge of their own exposure to macroeconomic risk. Changes in beliefs about recession exposure are fully driven by respondents with less confidence in their prior beliefs.*

III. Perceived risk exposure and demand for information

A. Descriptive evidence on demand for macroeconomic information

There is substantial variation in the demand for different forecasts, even though all respondents were primed on how recessions affect the unemployment rate of

⁷About one in six workers lost a job during the Great Recession 2008-9 (Farber, 2015). Expected job loss risk during the next recession among our respondents is somewhat higher with a median of 25 percent and a mean of 33 percent, reflecting the skewed distribution of these beliefs (see Figure A.6).

⁸Our estimated learning rate is of comparable size as learning rates in experiments that study how individuals update their expectations about macroeconomic variables in response to the provision of expert forecasts or data on past realizations (Armona et al., 2019; Cavallo et al., 2017; Coibion et al., 2020c; Roth and Wohlfart, 2020).

⁹The corresponding treatment effect on perceptions of whether recessions affect the financial situation of the respondent's household is smaller in size and statistically insignificant, potentially due to insurance within the household.

their group. While about 25 percent choose to receive the forecast about the likelihood of a recession, an equally large share select the inflation forecast. 17 percent of respondents decide to receive the government spending forecast, and 15 percent choose the interest rate forecast. 18 percent of respondents prefer not to receive any forecast, potentially because they would like to complete the survey more quickly.

Table A.2 sheds light on the demographic correlates of the demand for different macroeconomic forecasts. For instance, men are 7.6 percentage points more likely to acquire the recession forecast, in line with their higher exposure to macroeconomic risk (Hoynes et al., 2012). Similarly, those who experienced a phase of unemployment during the Great Recession are around 8 percentage points ($p < 0.1$) more likely to select the recession forecast. Moreover, those with a college degree and those who regularly follow news on the economy are around 8 and 6 percentage points ($p < 0.01$) more likely to pick the recession forecast, respectively.

B. Main evidence

Reduced form estimates.—We estimate the reduced form effect of our information treatment on the respondents' demand for the recession forecast using the following specification:

$$(2) \quad \text{Demand for info}_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \Delta \text{Unempl. Incr.} + \beta_2 \text{Unempl. Incr.}^{alt} \\ + \beta_3 \Delta \text{Unempl. 2007} + \beta_4 \text{Unempl. 2007}^{alt} + \Phi^T \mathbf{X}_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Demand for info_i stands for a set of dummy variables representing the different pieces of information respondents can choose from. The main dummy outcome of interest, $\text{RecessionForecast}_i$ takes the value one if the respondent chooses to receive the professional forecast on the likelihood of a recession and zero otherwise. We include the same set of control variables as in the first stage specification 1. We again focus on our estimate of β_1 , which captures the effect of the exogenous component of the information driven by the difference in noise between the two signals, and discuss other coefficient estimates in Appendix B.1.

Panel B of Table 2 shows that respondents who learn about a one percentage point higher exposure to unemployment risk among people similar to themselves are 0.6 percentage points more likely to choose the recession forecast ($p < 0.01$, column 1), while their demand for the interest rate forecast is lower ($p < 0.05$, column 3). We find small and noisily measured effects on the likelihood of choosing the government spending forecast (column 2) or the inflation forecast (column 4). Overall, our average estimated treatment effect is driven by how agents allocate attention across different signals (Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2009) (column 5) and less by how much attention agents pay overall, i.e. whether they choose any piece of information or none (Maćkowiak and Wieder-

holt, 2015) (column 6). Figure 1, Panels B-D illustrate our reduced form evidence as binned scatter plots.

Instrumental variables estimates.—For a more intuitive interpretation of magnitudes, we estimate a two stage least squares model. Specifically, we instrument respondents' posterior belief about their own unemployment risk during the next recession by the exogenous component of the provided information on group-level unemployment risk during the last recession, which is due to the difference in noise between shown and alternative signal:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Demand for info}_i &= \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \widehat{\text{Perceived unempl. risk next recession}}_i \\
 &\quad + \gamma_2 \text{Unempl. Incr.}^{alt} + \gamma_3 \Delta \text{Unempl. 2007} \\
 &\quad + \gamma_4 \text{Unempl. 2007}^{alt} + \mathbf{\Omega}^T \mathbf{X}_i + \varepsilon_i \\
 \widehat{\text{Perceived unempl. risk next recession}}_i &= \hat{\alpha}_0 + \hat{\alpha}_1 \Delta \text{Unempl. Incr.} \\
 &\quad + \hat{\alpha}_2 \text{Unempl. Incr.}^{alt} + \hat{\alpha}_3 \Delta \text{Unempl. 2007} \\
 (3) \quad &\quad + \hat{\alpha}_4 \text{Unempl. 2007}^{alt} + \hat{\mathbf{\Pi}}^T \mathbf{X}_i
 \end{aligned}$$

This specification allows us to quantify the causal effect of perceived personal unemployment risk during the next recession on the probability of demanding the professional forecast about the likelihood of a recession.

Panel C of Table 2 shows that a one percentage point increase in the perceived likelihood of personal job loss during the next recession increases respondents' demand for the recession forecast by 1.2 percentage points (column 1, $p < 0.05$). The demand for receiving any of the other forecasts (column 5) or no forecast (column 6) decreases accordingly, but these effects are noisily measured in the IV setup.

What is the economic magnitude of our findings? Relative to the average probability of choosing the recession forecast of 25 percent, the increase by 1.2 percentage points in response to a one percentage point higher perceived exposure corresponds to an increase in information demand by 5 percent. For comparison, having been unemployed during the Great Recession increases information demand by as much as an increase in the perceived risk of becoming unemployed during the next recession by 6 percentage points. Similarly, a 5 percentage points higher unemployment risk has an effect that is comparable to the difference in information demand between those who generally follow news about the economy and those who do not. Thus, the expected benefit of acquiring the forecast has a substantial causal effect on respondents' demand for it.

Taken together, our second main result can be summarized as follows:

RESULT 2: *People's demand for receiving a forecast about the likelihood of a recession causally increases in their perceived exposure to unemployment risk during recessions,*

consistent with a basic prediction of macroeconomic models of endogenous information acquisition.

In Appendix B.2 we demonstrate that our findings are robust to varying the set of controls, and that experimenter demand effects and numerical anchoring are unlikely to be a concern.

C. *Treatment effect heterogeneity*

We also examine heterogeneity in the treatment effects, starting with the role of confidence in prior beliefs about group-level exposure to the Great Recession. In Table 3, Panels C and D we estimate the reduced-form equation 2 on subsamples of individuals who were more or less confident in their prior beliefs. Receiving information on a higher group-level exposure to the Great Recession significantly increases the demand for the recession forecast, but only significantly so among those who are less confident in their prior. Given that the information treatment changes perceived job loss risk during the next recession only among less confident respondents (see Panel A), this finding suggests that treatment effects on information demand indeed work through changes in perceived exposure to future recessions. In Panel E we report estimates of the IV specification 3 on the subsample of less confident individuals, which confirms a strong causal effect of perceived recession exposure on demand for the recession forecast in this subsample ($p < 0.05$). In Appendix B.3 we discuss heterogeneous treatment effects across different demographic groups.

IV. Other outcomes

To validate the relevance of our measure of perceived macroeconomic risk exposure, we examine the causal effect of perceived risk exposure on personal unemployment expectations, planned savings behavior and intended job search. Panel A of Table A.3 shows reduced form evidence. In this section, we focus on Panel B, where we report results from our 2SLS specification (equation 3). A one percentage point higher perceived probability of becoming unemployed during the next recession causes an increase in respondents' perceived likelihood of becoming unemployed over the next 12 months by 0.47 percentage points (column 1).¹⁰ Similarly, it increases respondents' likelihood of looking for a new job in a different occupation (column 4) or in another industry (column 5) over the next 12 months by 0.53 percentage points and by 0.44 percentage points, respectively.¹¹ These effects could be driven by a desire to move to a job with lower

¹⁰In combination with the treatment effect on perceived unemployment risk during the next recession (see Table 2) this implies a perceived probability of a recession in the coming 12 months of close to 50 percent, higher than the expert forecast of 18 percent. This is consistent with greater pessimism about the macroeconomy among households than among experts (Das et al., 2020; Roth and Wohlfart, 2020).

¹¹Respondents receiving different information about exposure have different probabilities of choosing each forecast. However, our findings on other outcomes remain very similar if we control for the (endogenous) choice of information.

exposure to macroeconomic risk.

In contrast, respondents' perceived exposure to recessions does not significantly affect their planned precautionary saving (columns 2 and 3). This could be due to a large fraction of respondents exhibiting hand-to-mouth consumption behavior (Kaplan and Violante, 2014). Indeed, 42 percent of our respondents report that they did not engage in precautionary saving over the four weeks before the survey. Alternatively, the lack of significant effects may reflect low statistical power. Taken together, perceived exposure to unemployment risk during recessions affects some relevant economic expectations and intended behaviors in expected directions.

V. Conclusion and implications

Our findings have implications for the modeling of information frictions in macroeconomics. First, our main finding that perceived risk exposure increases demand for the recession forecast suggests that information acquisition depends on its expected benefits – a basic prediction of macroeconomic models of endogenous information acquisition, such as models of rational inattention (Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2009; Maćkowiak et al., 2018; Sims, 2003), sparsity (Gabaix, 2019) or sticky information with endogenous updating frequency (Reis, 2006).

Second, our first stage evidence that households' beliefs about their own risk exposure strongly respond to information suggests that there are important frictions in the context of individuals' knowledge about their exposure to business cycle fluctuations. Such frictions could distort households' beliefs about the expected benefits of acquiring macroeconomic information. Exploring the consequences of frictions in households' knowledge of their own risk exposure in quantitative macroeconomic models could be a fruitful avenue for future research.

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


FIGURE 1. BINSCATTER: EFFECTS OF INFORMATION ON PERCEIVED RISK EXPOSURE AND DEMAND FOR MACROECONOMIC FORECASTS

Note: This figure shows binned scatter plots of the first-stage specification (equation 1) measuring the effect of the treatment information on perceived recession exposure (Panel A) as well as the reduced form specification (equation 2) measuring the effect of the treatment information on demand for macroeconomic forecasts (Panels B-D). The outcomes are “Perceived unemployment risk next recession” – the respondent’s perceived percent chance of job loss during the next recession conditional on working in the same job as now (Panel A) – as well as dummy variables taking value one if the respondent chose the recession forecast (Panel B), if the respondent chose any other (non-recession) forecast (Panel C), or if the respondent chose no forecast (Panel D). “ Δ Unempl. Incr.” indicates the difference between the 2007-2010 change in the group-level unemployment rate according to the information shown to the respondent and the change according to the alternative, non-shown information source, i.e. the exogenous component of the provided information. The specifications also control for the increase in the unemployment rate as calculated from the alternative source (the potentially endogenous component of the information), as well as the difference in the baseline unemployment rates in 2007 between shown source and alternative source, and the baseline rate according to the alternative source. All plots additionally partial out a polynomial in age, a dummy for college education, dummies for census region of residence, dummies for 1-digit occupation classification, as well as a dummy indicating high confidence in prior beliefs about group-level exposure to the Great Recession.

TABLE 1—SUMMARY-BALANCE TABLE

	ACS	Online Sample					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	2017 Mean	Full Sample Mean	Full Sample Median	Full Sample SD	Info: ACS Mean	Info: CPS Mean	p-value (5) = (6)
Female	0.46	0.49	0.00	0.50	0.49	0.49	0.998
Age	41.73	40.25	37.00	11.38	40.48	40.02	0.513
At least Bachelor's degree	0.36	0.43	0.00	0.50	0.43	0.42	0.921
Log(Household Income)	11.22	11.00	11.04	1.16	10.99	11.00	0.249
Northeast	0.18	0.17	0.00	0.38	0.18	0.16	0.502
Midwest	0.21	0.24	0.00	0.43	0.23	0.25	0.629
South	0.37	0.41	0.00	0.49	0.41	0.41	0.825
West	0.23	0.18	0.00	0.39	0.18	0.19	0.688
Management, Business and Financial Occupations	0.16	0.25	0.00	0.43	0.25	0.26	0.745
Professional and Related Occupations	0.24	0.22	0.00	0.41	0.21	0.23	0.612
Service Occupations	0.15	0.14	0.00	0.35	0.15	0.13	0.534
Sales and Office Occupations	0.22	0.25	0.00	0.43	0.25	0.25	0.744
Construction, Extraction, and Maintenance Occupations	0.08	0.08	0.00	0.27	0.07	0.08	0.591
Production, Transportation, and Material Moving Occupations	0.13	0.06	0.00	0.24	0.07	0.06	0.485
Other Occupation	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.320
Industry: Construction and Manufacturing	0.18	0.16	0.00	0.37	0.17	0.16	0.807
Industry: Wholesale Trade and Retail Trade	0.13	0.13	0.00	0.33	0.14	0.11	0.093
Industry: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate	0.07	0.12	0.00	0.32	0.13	0.11	0.267
Industry: Professional Services	0.11	0.16	0.00	0.36	0.16	0.16	0.836
Industry: Education and Health Care	0.24	0.13	0.00	0.34	0.12	0.14	0.217
Industry: Leisure and Hospitality and Other Services	0.17	0.20	0.00	0.40	0.19	0.21	0.384
Other Industry	0.10	0.11	0.00	0.31	0.10	0.11	0.591
Log(Personal Labor Earnings)	10.60	10.59	10.65	0.74	10.60	10.59	0.787
Hours Worked	42.38	40.98	45.00	7.05	40.77	41.19	0.339
Tenure at Main Job (Years)		7.95	7.50	7.20	7.76	8.14	0.403
Unemployed during Great Recession 2007-9		0.16	0.00	0.37	0.18	0.14	0.170
Prior Belief Unempl. Incr.		11.00	3.00	16.27	10.78	11.23	0.660
High Confidence in Prior Belief		0.28	0.00	0.45	0.28	0.29	0.873
Unempl. Incr. ^{shown}		4.36	3.40	7.62	3.71	5.00	
Unempl. 2007 ^{shown}		4.05	2.80	4.17	4.25	3.86	
Unempl. Incr. ^{alt}		3.87	3.20	7.55	4.23	3.51	
Unempl. 2007 ^{alt}		4.21	3.00	4.26	3.90	4.51	
Observations		1008	1008	1008	501	507	

Note: This table displays summary statistics of our full sample (columns 2-4), benchmarks for key demographics from the ACS (column 1) and a balance check between the two treatment arms who have received information calculated from the ACS or from the CPS (columns 5-7). "Unempl. Incr. Shown" indicates the 2007-2010 change in the group-level unemployment rate that was provided to the respondent, and "Unempl. Incr. Alt" indicates the change in the group-level unemployment rate as calculated from the alternative source that was not shown to the respondent. "Unempl. 2007 Shown" and "Unempl. 2007 Alt" denote the 2007 baseline group-level unemployment rate that was provided as an anchor and from the alternative source, respectively.

TABLE 2—FIRST STAGE, REDUCED FORM AND IV RESULTS

	Perceived unemployment risk next recession	Agree: Recession affects job security (z)	Agree: Recession affects household situation (z)	Agree: Exposed to macroeconomy (z)	Index (1)-(4) (z)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
Panel A: First Stage						
Δ Unempl. Incr.	0.489*** (0.134)	0.012** (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)	0.013*** (0.004)	0.016*** (0.005)	
Observations	1008	1008	1008	1008	1008	
R ²	0.06	0.07	0.04	0.08	0.07	
Mean outcome	32.98	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	
St. dev. outcome	25.94	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	
	Forecast: Recession	Forecast: Government spending	Forecast: Interest rate	Forecast: Inflation rate	Forecast: any other (2)-(4)	Forecast: None
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel B: Reduced Form						
Δ Unempl. Incr.	0.006*** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003** (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Observations	1008	1008	1008	1008	1008	1008
R ²	0.07	0.04	0.08	0.04	0.08	0.06
Panel C: IV						
Perceived unemployment risk next recession	0.012** (0.006)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.006* (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.004)
Observations	1008	1008	1008	1008	1008	1008
First stage F-stat	13.28	13.28	13.28	13.28	13.28	13.28
Mean outcome	0.25	0.17	0.15	0.25	0.57	0.18
St. dev. outcome	0.43	0.37	0.36	0.43	0.50	0.39

Note: This table shows estimates of the first-stage specification (equation 1) measuring the effect of the treatment information on perceived recession exposure (Panel A), as well as the reduced form specification (equation 2, Panel B) and the IV specification (equation 3, Panel C) measuring the effect of perceived recession exposure on demand for macroeconomic forecasts. The outcome in Panel A column 1, "Perceived unemployment risk next recession", denotes the respondent's perceived percent chance of job loss during the next recession conditional on working in the same job as now. The outcomes in Panel A columns 2-4 are respondents' agreement on categorical scales to verbal statements describing their exposure to macroeconomic risk, and are z-scored using the mean and the standard deviation in the sample. The outcome in Panel A column 5 is the z-scored unweighted average of the outcomes from columns 1-4 (also standardizing the outcome from column 1). The outcomes in Panel A columns 2-5 are z-scored using the mean and the standard deviation in the sample. The outcomes in Panels B and C are dummy variables taking value one if the respondent chose a particular forecast (columns 1-4), if the respondent chose any other (non-recession) forecast (column 5), or if the respondent chose no forecast (column 6). " Δ Unempl. Incr." indicates the difference between the 2007-2010 change in the group-level unemployment rate according to the information shown to the respondent and the change according to the alternative, non-shown information source, i.e. the exogenous component of the provided information. The specifications also control for the increase in the unemployment rate as calculated from the alternative source (the potentially endogenous component of the information), as well as the difference in the baseline unemployment rates in 2007 between shown source and alternative source, and the baseline rate according to the alternative source. All specifications additionally control for a polynomial in age, a dummy for college education, dummies for census region of residence, dummies for 1-digit occupation classification, as well as a dummy indicating high confidence in prior beliefs about group-level exposure to the Great Recession. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.

TABLE 3—HETEROGENEITY BY CONFIDENCE IN PRIOR BELIEFS ABOUT GROUP-LEVEL RISK EXPOSURE

	Perceived unemployment risk next recession	Agree: Recession affects job security (z)	Agree: Recession affects household situation (z)	Agree: Exposed to macroeconomy (z)	Index (1)-(4) (z)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
Panel A: Low confidence						
Δ Unempl. Incr. (a)	0.642*** (0.181)	0.017*** (0.007)	0.011** (0.005)	0.020*** (0.006)	0.023*** (0.007)	
Observations	722	722	722	722	722	
Panel B: High confidence						
Δ Unempl. Incr. (b)	0.149 (0.238)	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.011)	
Observations	286	286	286	286	286	
p-value (a=b)	0.095	0.117	0.192	0.029	0.047	
	Forecast: Recession	Forecast: Government spending	Forecast: Interest rate	Forecast: Inflation rate	Forecast: Any other (2)-(4)	Forecast: None
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel C: Low confidence						
Δ Unempl. Incr. (c)	0.007*** (0.003)	-0.003* (0.002)	-0.002 (0.001)	0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.004* (0.002)
Observations	722	722	722	722	722	722
Panel D: High confidence						
Δ Unempl. Incr. (d)	0.004 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.009* (0.004)	0.005 (0.005)
Observations	286	286	286	286	286	286
p-value (c=d)	0.462	0.642	0.443	0.270	0.261	0.096
Panel E: Low confidence (IV)						
Perceived unemployment risk next recession	0.011** (0.005)	-0.005* (0.003)	-0.004 (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.007* (0.004)
Observations	722	722	722	722	722	722
First stage F-stat	12.63	12.63	12.63	12.63	12.63	12.63

Note: This table shows estimates of the first-stage specification (equation 1, Panels A and B), the reduced form specification (equation 2, Panels C and D) and the IV specification (equation 3, Panel E), separately on subsamples of respondents who are at least somewhat unsure (Panels A, C, E) and respondents who are sure or very sure (Panels B and D) about their prior beliefs about their group's exposure to the Great Recession. The outcome in Panels A and B column 1, "Perceived unemployment risk next recession", denotes the respondent's perceived percent chance of job loss during the next recession conditional on working in the same job as now. The outcomes in Panels A and B columns 2-4 are respondents' agreement on categorical scales to verbal statements describing their exposure to macroeconomic risk, and are z-scored using the mean and the standard deviation in the sample. The outcome in Panels A and B column 5 is the z-scored unweighted average of the outcomes from columns 1-4 (also standardizing the outcome from column 1). The outcomes in Panels C-E are dummy variables taking value one if the respondent chose a particular forecast (columns 1-4), if the respondent chose any other (non-recession) forecast (column 5), or if the respondent chose no forecast (column 6). " Δ Unempl. Incr." indicates the difference between the 2007-2010 change in the group-level unemployment rate according to the information shown to the respondent and the change according to the alternative, non-shown information source, i.e. the exogenous component of the provided information. The specifications also control for the increase in the unemployment rate as calculated from the alternative source (the potentially endogenous component of the information), as well as the difference in the baseline unemployment rates in 2007 between shown source and alternative source, and the baseline rate according to the alternative source. All specifications additionally control for a polynomial in age, a dummy for college education, dummies for census region of residence, dummies for 1-digit occupation classification, as well as a dummy indicating high confidence in prior beliefs. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.