Koskela, Erkki; Schöb, Ronnie

Working Paper
Tax progression under collective wage bargaining and individual effort determination

CESifo Working Paper, No. 2024

Provided in Cooperation with:
Ifo Institute – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich

Suggested Citation: Koskela, Erkki; Schöb, Ronnie (2007) : Tax progression under collective wage bargaining and individual effort determination, CESifo Working Paper, No. 2024, Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich

This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26069

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Terms of use:
Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.
TAX PROGRESSION UNDER COLLECTIVE WAGE BARGAINING AND INDIVIDUAL EFFORT DETERMINATION

ERKKI KOSKELA
RONNIE SCHÖB

CESifo WORKING PAPER NO. 2024
CATEGORY 4: LABOUR MARKETS
JUNE 2007


An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded
• from the SSRN website: www.SSRN.com
• from the RePEc website: www.RePEc.org
• from the CESifo website: www.CESifo-group.de
Abstract

We study the impact of tax policy on wage negotiations, workers’ effort, employment, output and welfare when workers’ effort is only imperfectly observable. We show that the different wage-setting motives – rent sharing and effort incentives – reinforce the effects of partial tax policy measures but not necessarily those of more fundamental tax reforms. Although a higher degree of tax progression always leads to wage moderation, the well-established result from the wage bargaining literature that a revenue-neutral increase in the degree of tax progression is good for employment does not carry over to the case with wage negotiations and imperfectly observable effort. While it remains true that introducing tax progression increases employment and output, we cannot rule out negative effects from an increase in tax progression when tax progression is already very high. Welfare effects are ambiguous a priori but we derive sufficient conditions for welfare improving revenue-neutral increases in tax progression.

JEL Code: J41, J51, H22.

Keywords: wage bargaining, effort determination, tax progression.

Erkki Koskela
Department of Economics
P.O. Box 17
Arkadiankatu 7
00014 University of Helsinki
Finland
erkki.koskela@helsinki.fi

Ronnie Schöb
School of Business & Economics
Free University Berlin
Boltzmannstr. 20
14195 Berlin
Germany
Ronnie.schoeb@wiwiss.fu-berlin.de

June 2007

This paper has been part of the CESifo project “How to construct Europe”.
Koskela thanks Otto-von-Guericke-University Magdeburg for great hospitality as well as the Research Unit of Economic Structures and Growth at the University of Helsinki, the Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation and the Academy of Finland (grant No. 1117698) for financial support.
Schöb thanks the WZB in Berlin for great hospitality. The authors are grateful for comments by Lazlo Goerke, Thomas Moutos and from seminar participants at the WZB, Göteborg University, Nordic Tax workshop in Bergen and CESifo area conference on Employment and Social Protection. The usual disclaimer applies.
1. Introduction

The result that tax progression leads to wage moderation and is good for employment has been derived for different assumptions about the wage-setting motives such as rent sharing in wage bargaining models (see, e.g., Holm and Koskela 1996, Koskela and Vilmunen 1996, Koskela and Schöb 1999). The results for efficiency wage models, where firms unilaterally decide upon both the wage rate and the employment level, are, however, still mixed. Wage moderation has a positive effect on labour demand but a negative effect on individual labour effort and thus workers’ productivity. Hoel (1990) was the first to analyze the overall effect of tax progression in such a framework by showing that a higher marginal income tax rate, which leaves the average tax level unchanged at the initial equilibrium wage rate, will decrease the gross wage and unemployment (see also Goerke 1999) but Fuest and Huber (1998) show that, for a rise in tax progression such that the tax burden per worker is the same in the old and new equilibrium, the result might be reversed.1

It is important to emphasize that the effect of tax progression, however, has not yet been analyzed in a uniform framework that combines these different wage-setting motives. So far, only very few papers have combined wage bargaining and effort considerations at all. Early contributions by Lindbeck and Snower (1991) and Sanfey (1993) do not provide a uniform answer to the question as to how far different wage-setting motives analyzed in efficiency wage and union bargaining models reinforce or weaken each other. Later, Bulkley and Myles (1996) show that with imperfect monitoring of workers’ effort, monopoly trade unions will set a higher wage than the pure efficiency wage set by the firms. This provides a higher bonus for non-shirking and results in a higher level of effort than we would observe in a competitive labor market. Garino and Martin (2000), on the other hand, show that efficiency wages offset

---

1 All these results do not carry over to models where workers differ in their productivity or when we allow for market entry. A tax reform that raises marginal tax rates at all income levels and increases (decreases) average taxes at high (low) income levels may lead to higher gross wages and unemployment (see Andersen and Rasmussen 1999). With free entry and exit of firms, Rasmussen (2002) shows that in the long run, changes in profits may imply that higher wage tax progressivity will negatively affect employment if the marginal tax rate is too high.
the cost of higher wages and induce firms to make more concessions in wage negotiations. Thus there is theoretical evidence that the different wage-setting motives reinforce each other.

Within such a framework, Altenburg and Straub (1998) analyze variations of the benefit-replacement ratio. They find that, in contrast to the standard result in both efficiency wage and union bargaining models, the effect of a higher reservation utility on wages, employment, and effort is ambiguous when benefits are financed through lump-sum taxes. A higher replacement ratio may then reduce the wage rate and raise employment. A higher reservation utility of workers will induce firms to reduce their demand for effective labor. If, as a consequence, the labor share decreases, firms experience a higher relative reduction in profits from a wage increase. This explains why the wage may actually fall and – in the end – employment will rise.

To our knowledge, only Garcia and Rios (2004) analyze the impact of taxes in this framework. They adopt the Altenburg and Straub (2002) model to analyze revenue-neutral tax reforms only numerically. Their numerical calculations suggest that a revenue-neutral increase in the tax exemption that is financed by an increase in the wage tax increases employment. This indicates that the result by Koskela and Schöb (1999), according to which a revenue-neutral shift from payroll taxes to wage taxes raises employment when there is a higher tax exemption for the latter, also applies when effort is unobservable. Furthermore, they argue that it is better for employment in the case of constant fiscal revenues to compensate higher tax exemption through increases in wage taxes rather than payroll taxes. Since Garcia and Rios (2004) only provide numerical, rather than analytical, results, we first present an analytical framework to elaborate the way in which tax policy affects wage negotiations and employment when effort is only imperfectly observable and trade unions and firms negotiate on wages and then study the impact of a revenue-neutral increase in tax progression on wage formation, effort determination and employment.

Our comparative statics analysis indicates that the standard results from the trade union literature must be modified in the case of imperfect monitoring of individual effort determination. In these standard models, tax policy only affects wages by altering the size of
the labor surplus. When both wage-setting motives are present, however, tax policy also affects the strength with which tax policy parameters affect the negotiated wage and employment. When effort is not observable, tax policy affects the wage elasticity of effort, which in turn affects the wage elasticity of labor demand. Since these elasticities alter the scope with which workers can attract labor rents, this constitutes an additional channel by which tax policy can influence the wage negotiation. As it turns out, this additional impact reinforces the effects of *partial tax policy measures* that we observe in the standard bargaining and efficiency models.

In the second main part of the paper, we then analyze revenue-neutral tax reforms that change the degree of tax progression, and derive the qualitative effects such tax reforms have on the negotiated wage, individual effort, and aggregate employment. Table 1 highlights the importance of such an analysis. The labor tax systems in all the OECD countries are progressive and show significant differences in the degree of tax progression. We measure tax progression by the difference between marginal and average tax rates that are shown in the first and second columns.² This difference, reported in the third column, is known as the *average wage tax progression ARP* (see Lambert 2001, chapters 7 and 8 and our section 5). The higher this difference, the more progressive wage taxation is. The highest difference is for France, with 19.2 percentage points, and the lowest one for Canada, with only 1.4 percentage points.

---

² To make these figures comparable with our stylized model framework below, all tax rates are with reference to the gross wage, including payroll taxes paid by the employer.
Table 1: Labor taxation in the OECD countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>(1) Average wage tax</th>
<th>(2) Marginal wage tax</th>
<th>(3) average wage progression</th>
<th>Calculated relative tax exemption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>44.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>95.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>64.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>78.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>56.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>43.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Legend: Tax rates are for the year 2004 for a single person with 100% of average wage, relative to the gross wage including the social security contributions paid by employees. Column (3) shows the difference between marginal and average rate of income tax. As an approximation it is assumed that for each country the tax schedule consists of a tax exemption and a constant marginal tax rate. The exchange rate between US dollar and euro was assumed to be unity. Social assistance level does not include housing costs. Numbers for social assistance are from 2002 and taken from OECD (2004), Benefits and Wages, OECD Indicators.

Our first main result shows that an increase in wage tax progression always leads to wage moderation. In this respect, our model shows that the wage moderation effect of higher tax progression that is present in both the efficiency wage model and the bargaining model carries over to the more general case when both wage-setting motives are at work. The effect of higher tax-revenue neutral progression on effort and, consequently, on labor demand, however, is a priori ambiguous. Although it remains true that introducing tax progression raises employment, it turns out that the claim “tax progression is good for employment” (Koskela and Vilmunen 1996) only applies to moderate degrees of tax progression.
In section 2 below, we present the basic structure of the model and describe the time sequence of decisions with respect to wage bargaining, labor demand, and individual effort determination. The workers’ individual effort determination and the firms’ labor demand are elaborated in section 3. Section 4 uses the Nash bargaining approach to analyze wage negotiations subject to firms’ labor demand and workers’ effort determination and presents the essential comparative static results. Section 5 applies the analysis to revenue-neutral changes in the labor tax structure and explores the effects of tax progression on the negotiated wage, individual effort, and employment. The main findings are summarized in section 6.

2. Basic framework

Concerning the time sequence of decisions, we assume that the government behaves as a Stackelberg leader who fixes the tax parameters in the first stage. To raise revenues, the government can employ a wage tax $t$, which is levied on the gross wage $w$ minus a tax exemption $a$. Thus the tax base for the wage tax $t$ equals $(w-a)L$, where $L$ denotes total employment. In the presence of a positive tax exemption $a$, the marginal tax rate $t$ exceeds the average tax rate $t^a \equiv t(1-a/w)$ so that we have a linearly progressive tax system, with progression depending positively on the wage rate. The net-of-tax wage workers receive is given by $w^n = (1-t)w + ta$. We abstract away from payroll taxes.

At stage 2, firms and trade unions bargain with respect to the gross wage. They take the tax parameters as given and anticipate the consequences that the negotiated gross wage has for labor demand by firms and also that the resulting net labor income has for individual effort determination by workers. After the wage negotiations are settled, at stage 3 the firms decide about their labor demand. Since firms cannot perfectly observe effort, the firms have to anticipate the workers’ individual effort decisions. At the final stage, stage 4, workers make their individual effort choice. The time sequence of decisions is summarized in Figure 1. In

---

3 Since tax parameters are given from the viewpoint of firms and trade unions, it does not matter whether they bargain over gross or net-of-tax wages (see Koskela and Schöb 2002).
the subsequent sections we derive the decisions taking place at different stages by using backward induction.

*Figure 1: Time sequence of decisions*

3. Individual effort determination and labor demand

We start by analyzing the 4th stage, where workers decide about their working effort, taking the tax policy, the negotiated wage, and aggregate employment as given. Then we analyze stage 3, where firms determine employment.

3.1. Individual effort determination

We focus on the choice that a single worker faces when employed by a representative firm in a static framework. Since effort cannot be fully controlled by firms, they can set a standard effort that we normalize to one. If workers meet this standard, their jobs are secure. If they shirk by providing less effort, however, firms can fire them. The employment probability can thus be described by a minimum function. For effort lower than the standard we assume, for analytical convenience, an iso-elastic probability function of employment $e^d$ where $d > 0$ denotes the (constant) employment probability elasticity of effort.\(^4\) The employment probability rises with effort for $e < 1$ and is 1 for higher effort level so that we have the employment probability function $\rho = \min(1, e^d)$ and the probability of being laid off is $1 - \min(1, e^d)$. The parameter $d$ is increasing in both monitoring intensity and monitoring

\(^4\) We exclude the case where $d = 0$ because in this case, the job would be secure even without providing effort and total output would fall to zero. This would lead firms to set a wage rate equal to zero. Both employment supply and demand would then be indetermined. Furthermore, note that if the detection probability should be concave in effort, we would have to assume $d \leq 1$. 
efficiency. Low values of $d$ makes it less risky for workers to shirk while $d \to +\infty$ implies perfect monitoring and the firing of all workers who do not meet the working effort standard.

Imperfect monitoring implies that when assuming a representative risk-neutral worker and applying a specific utility function $V$ that is additively separable and quasi-linear, we obtain

\begin{equation}
V^w = \min(1,e^d)[w^n - g(e)] + \left(1 - \min(1,e^d)\right)b ,
\end{equation}

where $b$ denotes the workers’ outside option, which equals some exogenous unemployment income, and $g(e)$ denotes the disutility of effort $e$ as a convex function, i.e. $g'(e) > 0$, $g''(e) > 0$. Working time per worker is assumed to be fixed and normalized to unity.

For the following, it is convenient to define the workers’ surplus as the difference $s \equiv w^n - g(e) - b$. This allows us to rewrite the utility function as $V^w = e^d s + b$, which splits the utility into the expected surplus when working with effort $e$ and the basic income $b$, which the household receives in any case. The optimal individual effort level can be derived from the first-order condition $V^w_e = d e^{d-1} s - e^d g'(e) = 0$. The worker chooses an effort level at which the expected utility loss of working harder, which occurs with probability $e^d$, equals the expected utility gain from an increased probability of staying in employment and receiving the surplus $s$. Using the parameterization $g(e) = e^\theta / \theta, \theta > 1$, the effort function becomes:

\begin{equation}
\theta + 1 \frac{1}{\theta} e = \left( \frac{d\theta}{d + \theta} \right) \left( w^n - b \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \equiv \frac{1}{\theta} \left( w^n - b \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}}.
\end{equation}

It is straightforward to show that individual effort is increasing in the net-of-tax wage rate, and decreasing in the outside option. This implies that we have $e_i < 0$, because this lowers the net-of-tax wage and thus reduces the penalty when caught shirking. Accordingly, we observe

---

5 In what follows, the derivatives of functions with one variable will be denoted by using primes, while partial derivatives will be denoted by subscripts indicating what variable we are differentiating with respect to.
\( e_w > 0 \) and \( e_a > 0 \). In fact, we have \( e_t = \frac{(w-a)}{t} \), a property we will employ later on. The wage elasticity of effort is

\[
\varepsilon \equiv \frac{e_w w}{e} = \frac{w(1-t)}{\theta(w^n - b)} > 0.
\]

The respective partial derivatives with respect to the outside option \( b \), the tax exemption \( a \), and the tax rate \( t \) are

\[
\varepsilon_a = -\frac{w(1-t)t}{\theta(w^n - b)^2} < 0,
\]

\[
\varepsilon_t = \frac{w(b-a)}{\theta(w^n - b)^2} \begin{cases} > 0 & \text{as } b-a > 0 \\ < 0 & \text{as } b-a < 0 \end{cases}
\]

The partial derivatives (4) and (5) depend on the effects the respective parameters have on the net-of-tax wage relative to the income surplus of working. With respect to an increase in the tax rate, this effect is ambiguous since a rise in the wage tax lowers \( w(1-t) \) but at the same time raises the effective tax credit \( ta \). A higher tax rate always increases the difference between the net-of-tax rate in absolute terms, but it may lower the relative difference, which is decisive for the elasticity if the tax exemption \( a \) is very generous. If \( b = a \), the wage elasticity of effort is unaffected by \( t \) since in this case we have \( (w^n - b) = (1-t)(w-b) \). A higher tax exemption \( a \) implies that a wage rate increase has a lower relative impact on the net-of-tax wage and thus implies a lower wage elasticity of effort. Only if \( b > a \), a rise in the tax rate increases the impact a rise in the wage rate has on effort: the higher \( t \) is, the stronger the relative increase of \( w^n - b \) due to a wage increase is and thus the stronger the relative effect on individual effort.

The direct effect of a change in the tax exemption is unambiguous. An increase in the tax exemption implies that a marginal wage increase now has a lower relative impact.
3.2. Labor demand

In the 3rd stage of the game, each firm takes the tax parameters and the negotiated wage as given and decides about the labor demand $L$ by taking into account how the representative worker will adjust effort. To derive an explicit solution, we postulate a decreasing returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function in terms of labor and effort:

\[(6) \quad f(eL) = \frac{\delta}{\delta-1}(eL)^{\frac{\delta-1}{\delta}}, \quad \delta > 1.\]

Profit is given by $\pi = f(eL) - wL$. Since firms anticipate the effort level, workers will provide $(V_e = 0)$, and the first order profit maximization condition is $\pi_e = 0 = f'(eL)e - w$. Using this specification, we obtain the following labor demand function:

\[(7) \quad L = w^{-\delta} e^{\delta^{-1}}.\]

The partial derivative of labor demand with respect to the tax parameters and the negotiated wage rate are as follows: $L_t = L(\delta - 1) e_\epsilon e^{-1} < 0$, $L_a = L(\delta - 1) e_a e^{-1} > 0$, $L_w = -\delta w^{(-\delta-1)} e^{\delta^{-1}} + w^{-\delta} e^{\delta-2}(\delta-1)e_w = -L(\epsilon(1-\delta) + \delta)w^{-1} < 0$. Since the wage tax and the tax exemption are levied on workers, they only affect labor demand via the workers’ individual effort, which depends on the net-of-tax wage rate. The wage rate $w$ affects labor demand in two different ways. Note that the standard assumption that profit decreases with increases in the wage rate implies that the wage elasticity of effort is smaller than one, i.e. $\epsilon < 1$. For the concave production function (6), the wage elasticity of labor demand depends on both the technological parameter $\delta$ and the wage elasticity of individual effort $\epsilon$ as defined in (3):

\[(8) \quad -\frac{L_w w}{L} \equiv \delta^* = \epsilon(1-\delta) + \delta.\]

The wage elasticity of labor demand is lower compared to the case where wages do not affect effort. It now depends negatively on the wage elasticity of effort. For $0 \leq \epsilon < 1$ we have $1 < \delta^* \leq \delta$. Hence, in the presence of unobservable individual effort determination the wage elasticity of labor demand depends on the tax structure and thus tax policy levied on workers.
If, for instance, a tax reform increases the wage elasticity of effort, labor demand would become less elastic. A wage rise would then be less costly for a trade union since the firm would then lay off fewer workers.

The firm’s indirect profit function, which we will use in the next section, can be obtained by inserting labor demand (7) into the profit function $\pi = f(eL) - wL$:

$$\pi^*(w,e) = f(w^{\delta}e^{\delta}) - w^{1-\delta}e^{\delta-1} = \frac{w^{1-\delta}e^{\delta-1}}{(\delta - 1)}.$$  

Having analyzed workers’ and firms’ behavior with respect to effort and labor demand, we can now turn to the collective wage bargaining of stage 2.

4. Collective wage bargaining

To derive the negotiated wage, we apply the Nash bargaining solution within a ‘right-to-manage’ model according to which employment is unilaterally determined by the firms. The wage bargaining takes place in anticipation of the optimal employment decision by the firms and the optimal individual effort decision by workers (2).

The trade union maximizes the sum of the workers utility $V^w$, and the utility of the unemployed. Since those caught shirking and fired are replaced by unemployed workers, the expected utility of an unemployed worker is (for inner solutions with $\rho < 1$):

$$V^u = (1 - (1 - e^d) - \frac{L}{N - L})b + (1 - e^u) - \frac{L}{N - L} (w^n - g(e^*)).$$  

While we assume that a single worker who is caught shirking will become and remain unemployed as well as receive $b$, from the viewpoint of the trade union, an unemployed member will replace a laid-off worker with the lay-off probability, which is $1 - e^d$ times the

---

6 Bulkley and Myles (1997) have analyzed the generalized Nash bargain between a trade union and a firm over employment level and effort level and showed that higher union power will lead to a reduction in the agreed effort level. But they do not study the impact of labor taxes on employment and effort levels.
employment share. We can rewrite the linear utilitarian objective function of the trade union as

\[ \hat{U} = V^w L + V^u (N - L) = s(e^*) L^* + b N, \]

where the first term captures the workers’ surplus from employment and the second term captures the exogenously given minimum income for all N members. \( L^* \) denotes optimal employment and \( e^* \) optimal effort in the \( s \) term. We denote the relative bargaining power of the union by \( \beta \), and that of the firm by \( (1-\beta) \), and assume that the threat points of the trade union and the firm are described by \( U^0 = Nb \) and \( \pi^0 = 0 \), respectively. Applying the Nash bargaining solution, the negotiating parties decide on the wage \( w \) in order to solve

\[ \text{Max}_{(w)} \Omega(w) = U^\beta \pi^*(1-\beta), \text{ s.t. } V_e = \pi_e = 0, \]

where \( U = \hat{U} - U^0 = s(e^*) L^* \) is the bargaining surplus to the trade union by including the disutility of effort and \( \pi^* \) is the indirect profit, presented in equation (9). The Nash bargaining solution satisfies the following first-order condition:

\[ \Omega_w = \beta \frac{U_w}{U} + (1-\beta) \frac{\pi^*_w}{\pi} = 0. \]

As shown in appendix A, we can solve the first-order condition (13) to find the following implicit Nash bargaining solution for the wage rate in the presence of individual effort determination:

\[ w = \left( \frac{\beta + (\delta-1)(1-\varepsilon)}{(\delta-1)(1-\varepsilon)} \right) \left[ \frac{b-ta}{1-t} \right] = M \left[ \frac{b-ta}{1-t} \right], \]

where \( M > 1 \) for \( \varepsilon < 1 \). The negotiated gross wage rate depends on the exogenous income \( b \) when unemployed, the wage tax \( t \) and the tax exemption \( a \). Furthermore, it also depends on the mark-up \( M \) that, apart from exogenous parameters, also depends on the wage elasticity of effort \( \varepsilon \).
Before we analyze comparative statics of the general case (14), we will first briefly discuss several special cases, which can be analyzed within the framework we have developed here.

A. Observable effort

When effort is observable and verifiable, it can become part of the wage contract. If the contract specifies some fixed effort level \( \bar{e} \), we obtain the standard right-to-manage model of union bargaining, where the wage depends on the bargaining power of the trade union and the (constant) wage elasticity of labor demand in the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function. Since a constant individual effort \( \bar{e} \) implies \( \varepsilon = 0 \) and a zero probability of being caught shirking, i.e. \( \rho = 1 \), we have

\[
(15a) \quad w = \left( \frac{\beta + (\delta - 1)}{(\delta - 1)} \right) \left[ \frac{g(\bar{e}) + b - ta}{1 - t} \right] = M_{e=0} \left[ \frac{g(\bar{e}) + b - ta}{1 - t} \right],
\]

which implies a surplus of \( s = \left( \frac{\beta}{(\delta - 1)} \right) (g(\bar{e}) + b - ta) \). From (15a), we can easily derive the special cases of a monopoly union

\[
w|_{e=0, \beta=1} = \left( \frac{\delta}{\delta - 1} \right) \left[ \frac{g(\bar{e}) + b - ta}{1 - t} \right]
\]

and the competitive labor market outcome where unions have no bargaining power and the gross wage only compensates for the disutility of working

\[
w|_{e=0, \beta=1} = \left[ \frac{g(\bar{e}) + b - ta}{1 - t} \right],
\]

in which case the firm exploits the complete workers’ surplus, i.e. \( s = 0 \).

Alternatively we can consider the case where worker can determine their effort unilaterally but the firm can observe the effort level. It could then pay a wage per unit of effective labor input \( eL \). This requires a modification of (1) such that

\[
V^w = w(1-t)e + ta - g(e).
\]

Since the tax exemption does not affect the wage rate anymore, in this case the optimal effort is \( e^* = \left[ w(1-t) \right]^{1/(\theta - 1)} \) and the effort elasticity \( \varepsilon = 1/(\theta - 1) > 0 \) is
constant. The profit function becomes \( \pi = f(eL) - weL \) with the firm maximizing with respect to \( eL \). This gives the following wage elasticity of labor demand \( -L_w w/L = \delta^* = \delta + \varepsilon \). The negotiated wage per worker then becomes\(^7\)

\[
\begin{align*}
\tilde{w}_{\beta=1} &= \left( \frac{(\delta - 1) + \beta(1 + \varepsilon)}{(\delta - 1) + \beta \varepsilon} \right)^{0-1} \left( \frac{g(e^*) + b - ta}{1-t} \right)^{0-1} \\
&= \left( \frac{(\delta - 1) + \beta(1 + \varepsilon)}{(\delta - 1) + \beta \varepsilon - \frac{\beta}{(\theta - 1)} (\theta - 1)} \right) \left( \frac{b - ta}{(1-t)} \right)^{0-1}
\end{align*}
\]

(15b)

The results are similar to the results by Hansen (1999, his case 2) who develops a model where workers can unilaterally determine their hours of work and where workers and firms then negotiate upon the hourly wage. The structure of the solution (15b) is qualitatively similar to that of (15a) in the sense that in both cases the mark-up is independent of tax instruments.

**B. Unobservable effort without bargaining**

When \( \beta = 0 \), the firm unilaterally sets the wage. From the first-order condition \( \pi_w^* = 0 \), it follows immediately that the firm acts according to the well-known Solow-condition (Solow 1979), i.e. we have \( \varepsilon = 1 \) and thus

\[
w = \left( \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \right) \left[ \frac{b - ta}{1-t} \right] = M |_{\varepsilon=0} \left[ \frac{b - ta}{1-t} \right].
\]

The model therefore also captures the essence of the efficiency models with a (constant) mark-up over the outside option.

**C. Unobservable effort with bargaining: comparative statics**

For the general case, we have \( (1 - \varepsilon) > 0 \) and the mark-up is larger than one when the trade union has some bargaining power, i.e. \( \beta > 0 \). It increases with the relative bargaining power

\(^7\) A proof is available from the authors upon request.
of the trade union $\beta$, and depends negatively on the direct wage elasticity of labor demand $\delta$.

The wage rate now depends, in addition to the relative bargaining power, the wage elasticity of labor demand, the exogenous income, and the tax parameters, on the elasticity of effort determination $\varepsilon$. Furthermore, unlike in the case of observable effort, the exogenous income $b$ when unemployed, the wage tax rate $t$, and the tax exemption $a$ will also affect the wage rate via the mark-up $M$.

The impact of a better monitoring of workers on the negotiated wage is zero as the wage elasticity of effort is not affected by monitoring. We can thus focus on the comparative statics of the tax parameters and the outside option in what follows.

The derivative of the mark-up with respect to $\varepsilon$ is $M_{\varepsilon} = \beta(\delta - 1)^{-1}(1 - \varepsilon)^2 > 0$. The mark-up with respect to effort $e$ is $M_{e} = 0$. Since condition (14) is an implicit function of $w$, we can derive the partial derivative with respect to, for example, $a$ by taking the total derivative

$$dw \left[ 1 - (M_{e} e)(b - ta) \right] = \left[ (M_{e} e)(b - ta) + M \left( \frac{-t}{1-t} \right) \right] da.$$ 

By rearranging, we obtain

$$w_{a} = \frac{1}{\Delta} \left( \frac{M_{e} e}{1-t} \right) \left( \frac{b - ta}{1-t} \right) + \frac{M}{\Delta} \left( \frac{-t}{1-t} \right) < 0$$

with $\Delta = \left[ 1 - M_{e} e (b - ta)(1-t)^{-1} \right] > 0$. In the Nash bargaining solutions with observable effort (15a) and (15b), the mark-up is independent of $a$. With unobservable effort, however, workers will increase effort when the tax exemption rises. When workers have some bargaining power, i.e. $\beta > 0$, this ceteris paribus lowers the mark-up because a lower wage elasticity of effort implies a higher wage elasticity of labor demand (see equation (8)). A higher wage then induces less effort, which makes the worker less productive. As a consequence more layoffs result from a wage increase.

The effect of the wage tax rate can be expressed as
The total effect of a higher wage tax rate on the negotiated wage is \textit{a priori} ambiguous. When we assume \( b \geq a \), both the effect on the mark-up and the effect on the total outside option with the given mark-up are unambiguously positive.

Hence, tax parameters in our model with both Nash wage bargaining and individual effort determination affect both of these via a change in the difference between the net-of-tax wage income and the outside option as well as via a change in the mark-up.

We summarize our new characterization of the negotiated wage under individual effort determination in

\textbf{Proposition 1:} Unobservable individual effort determination strengthens the partial effects tax policy measures have on the negotiated wage compared to the case where effort is observable. Decreasing the tax exemption lowers the negotiated wage, while an increase in the wage tax rate increases the negotiated wage under a sufficient but not necessary condition \( b \geq a \).

We can easily verify that the effects indeed reinforce each other. If we take the partial derivative of (15a), we obtain the comparative statics effect for the standard bargaining model with

\[
(18) \quad w_t = \frac{1}{\Delta} \left( M_{e_t} + \frac{b-ta}{1-t} \right) + \frac{M}{\Delta} \left( \frac{b-a}{(1-t)^2} \right) > 0.
\]

For (15b), we similarly find

\[
M_{e_t} + \frac{b-ta}{1-t} < 0, \quad M = \frac{g(\bar{e}) + b-a}{(1-t)^2}.
\]

For \( b \geq a \), the effects tax parameter changes have on the negotiated wage when effort is observable are always reinforced when effort is not observable. The partial derivative of
equation (16) with respect to \( a \) shows the same result for the efficiency wage model: the different wage-setting motives thus reinforce the partial tax policy effects on gross wages. We should note, however, that in the case where \( b \leq a \) and \( g(e) + b - a > 0 \) we would obtain opposite partial effects for changes in the wage tax rate. An increase in the wage tax will then increase the gross wage when effort is observable but will lower the gross wage when effort is unobservable.\(^8\)

As we pointed out when discussing (15b), the reinforcing effect is also present in a model with endogenous effort determination.

### 5. The impact of a tax-revenue-neutral change in tax progression on wage formation, employment, effort, output, and welfare

We are now ready to analyze what are the impacts a revenue-neutral restructuring of the labor tax, i.e. the degree of wage tax progression, on wage formation, individual effort determination, and employment. The effect of wage tax progression, which keeps the tax revenue \( G = [t(w - a)]L \) constant, can be written in the following way:

\[
dG = 0 = (w - a)Ldt - tLda + \left[tL + t(w - a)L_n\right]dw.
\]

Recalling the definition of the average tax rate as \( t^\ast \equiv t(1 - a/w) \), this can be expressed as

\[
d\left[\frac{a}{G=0}\right] = \left(\frac{w-a}{t}\right)dt + \left(\frac{t-t^\ast \delta}{t}\right)dw.
\]

An appropriate and intuitive way to define tax progression is to look at the average tax rate progression (ARP), which is given by the difference between the marginal tax rate \( t \) and the average tax rate \( t^\ast \), \( ARP = t - t^\ast \). The tax system is progressive if ARP is positive, and tax progression is increased if the difference increases (at a given income level, see Lambert

\(^8\) We mentioned before that our model also allows us to capture the essence of a model where workers can endogenously determine working hours when working hours are observable, see the discussion of equation (15b). Interpreting our model as a model of imperfectly observable effective working hours we can i) confirm the results derived by Hansen (1999) for perfectly observable working hours and ii) also find the reinforcing effect when effective working hours cannot be perfectly monitored.
2001, chapters 7 and 8). The term \( t - t^* \delta \) indicates the marginal tax revenue per worker when the gross wage increases. It can be decomposed in such a way that we have a \textit{tax progression effect} and a \textit{tax level effect}: \( ARP + t^* (1 - \delta^*) \). The total effect is non-positive for a linear tax system with \( ARP = 0 \) since \( (1 - \delta^*) \leq 0 \), but may eventually become positive if the tax system is sufficiently progressive since the employment effect is weighted by the average tax rate only. As we will see later on, the degree of tax progression is decisive for the way in which a revenue-neutral change in tax progression affects both employment and individual effort.

5.1 Revenue-neutral tax progression and the negotiated wage

The total effect of changes in the tax parameters \( t \) and \( a \) on the negotiated wage is

\[
dw = w_t dt + w_a da ,
\]

with the partial derivatives derived in section 4. Substituting (19) into the RHS of (20) for \( da \) gives

\[
dw = w_t dt + \left( \frac{w-a}{t} \right) w_a dt + w_a \left[ t - t^* \delta^* \right] dw ,
\]

and, thus, the total effect of a revenue-neutral increase in the wage tax rate is

\[
\frac{dw}{dt} \bigg|_{G=0} = \frac{w_t + \left( \frac{w-a}{t} \right) w_a }{1 - w_a \left( t - t^* \delta^* \right) t^{-1}} .
\]

In what follows, we assume Laffer-efficiency in the sense that a higher wage tax increases tax revenues while a higher tax exemption leads to lower tax revenues even when we take account of the indirect effects via changes in \( w \). With respect to the tax exemption, we then have

\[
\hat{G}_a = -tL + G_w w_a = -tL \left( 1 - w_a \frac{t - t^* \delta^*}{t} \right) < 0 .
\]
Substituting the partial derivatives \( w_a \) from (17) and \( w_t \) from (18) into the numerator of (22) shows that the numerator is unambiguously positive (see appendix B). Hence, we have the following:

**Proposition 2 (wage moderation):** A revenue-neutral increase in wage tax progression will moderate the negotiated wage in the presence of individual effort determination.

The interpretation is straightforward as it turns out that the numerator in equation (22) denotes the compensated effect an increase in the tax rate has on the wage, keeping the value of the Nash maximand constant (see appendix C). The revenue-neutral increase in the tax exemption fully offsets the income effect of the higher wage tax so that only the substitution effect of this progression-enhancing tax reform remains. This finding shows that the result from conventional ‘right-to-manage’ models in the absence of effort considerations (see, e.g., Koskela and Vilmunen 1996) also applies when we allow for unobservable individual effort determination.

### 5.2 Revenue-neutral tax progression and individual effort determination

The total effect of changes in the tax parameters \( t \) and \( a \) and the negotiated wage on effort determination is \( de = e_t dt + e_a da + e_w dw \). Substituting the RHS of the tax-revenue neutrality (19) for \( da \) and using \( e_w = \frac{(1-t)}{t} e_a \) gives

\[
\frac{de}{dt} \mid_{G=0} = e_t + \frac{(w-a)}{t} e_a + \left( e_w + \frac{1}{t} \left( t - t^a \delta^* \right) \right) e_a 
\]

\[
dw \mid_{G=0} \]

(23)

\[
= \frac{e_a}{t} \left( (1-t) + t \delta^* \right) \frac{dw}{dt} \mid_{G=0}.
\]

The direct effects of tax progression parameters on effort will cancel out so that it is only the induced wage-moderation that affects individual effort decisions. The term \( e_a / t \) measures the
impact one additional euro has on individual effort. A wage reduction of one euro reduces the net-of-tax wage by \((1 - t)\) so that effort falls by \(e_{a}(1 - t)/t\). But wage-moderation also affects the amount by which the tax exemption can be raised. It will be lower than the neutral effect of raising \(a\) by \((w - a)/t\) if \(t - t^{\ast}\delta^{\ast} < 0\). This always holds in a linear tax system because in this case \(t(1 - \delta^{\ast}) < 0\). But if the tax system becomes very progressive, so that given the marginal tax rate \(t\) the average tax rate \(t^{\ast} \equiv t(1 - a/w)\) becomes lower and thereby \(1 - t^{\ast}\delta^{\ast} > 0\) might be the case, individual effort eventually will fall. This case is also the more likely, the smaller the wage elasticity of labor demand and the average tax burden are. If we assume a labor share of 2/3, we have \(\delta = 3\), and an average tax below 1/3 would suffice to let effort fall when tax progression rises. Formally, we have

\[
\frac{de}{dt} \begin{cases} > 0 \quad \text{if} \quad t^{\ast} \delta^{\ast} > 1 \\ < 0 \quad \text{if} \quad t^{\ast} \delta^{\ast} < 1 \end{cases}
\]

A sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for individual effort to fall is \(t\delta < 1\) since we have \(\delta^{\ast} < \delta\) and \(t_{a} < t\). These findings can be summarized in

**Proposition 3 (individual effort determination):** A revenue-neutral increase in wage tax progression will decrease (increase) individual effort if (i) the wage elasticity of labor demand and/or (ii) the marginal tax rate are sufficiently low (high). A sufficient condition is \(t\delta < 1\) \((t\delta > 1)\).

### 5.3 Revenue-neutral tax progression and employment

Finally, we consider the employment effect. The total effect of changes in the tax parameters \(t\) and \(a\) and the negotiated wage on employment is \(dL = L_{t}dt + L_{a}da + L_{w}dw\). Substituting the RHS of the tax-revenue neutrality for \(da\) and using \(e_{a}^{\ast} = (w - a)/t\), \(L_{w}^{\ast} = -\delta L_{w}^{\ast}/w\) and \(L_{a}^{\ast} = (\delta - 1)e_{a}^{\ast}/e^{\ast}\) gives
\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{dL}{dt}igg|_{\delta=0} &= \left( \delta \frac{1}{e} \left( e_i^* + \frac{w-a}{t} e_a^* \right) \right) L_w^* + \frac{1}{t} (t-t^a \delta^*) L_a^* \left( \frac{dw}{dt} \right)_{\delta=0} \\
&= \left[ \left( \frac{\delta - 1}{e t} \right) (t-t^a \delta^*) e_a^* - L_w^* \frac{\delta^*}{w} \right] \left( \frac{dw}{dt} \right)_{\delta=0}
\end{align*}
\]

The first two terms cancel out since they cover the change in \( t \) and \( a \) that \textit{ceteris paribus} would leave the average tax burden, and thus the net-of-tax wage, constant. Hence, we are left with two effects. As we have seen in section 5.2, the tax reform affects individual effort depending on the wage elasticity of labor demand and the size of tax parameters. If – as is likely - effort decreases, labor productivity falls and \textit{ceteris paribus} employment. On the other hand, the wage-moderating effect increases labor demand for any given effort level. The total effect thus becomes ambiguous. From proposition 3 we can immediately infer

**Proposition 4 (rising employment):** A sufficient, but not necessary, condition that a revenue-neutral increase in wage tax progression will increase employment is \( t^a \delta^* \geq t \).

From proposition 4 follows immediately that starting from a linear tax system with \( t^a = t \), employment will definitely rise. This leads to

**Corollary 1 (rising employment):** Introducing tax progression is good for employment when wages are negotiated and effort is determined individually.

Although we have seen that different wage-setting motives reinforce tax policy effects on gross wages, this is not no longer true with respect to employment. With observable and verifiable effort, employment is always increasing when tax progression rises. When effort is unobservable and not verifiable, we find a countervailing effect via the adverse effect a rise in tax progression has on individual effort.
5.4 Revenue-neutral tax progression and output

Effort and employment may go in opposite directions so that the output effect is *a priori* ambiguous. Substituting equation (7) in equation (6) shows that output is proportional to $wL$.

The total effect of a revenue-neutral tax reform is then given by $df(eL) = \delta(\delta - 1)^{-1}[wdL + Ldw]$. Substituting in equation (25) thus yields for a revenue-neutral rise in tax progression

$$\left. \frac{df(eL)}{dt} \right|_{\delta_0} = \frac{\delta}{\delta - 1} L \left[ \frac{(\delta - 1)e^*}{e^*} (t - t^* \delta^*) + 1 - \delta^* \right] \frac{dw}{dt} \bigg|_{\delta_0}.$$  

If $t^* \delta^* \geq t$, i.e. $\delta^*(1 - aw^{-1}) \geq 1$, output is increasing. This can be summarized in

**Proposition 5 (rising output):** A sufficient, but not necessary, condition that a revenue-neutral increase in wage tax progression will increase employment is

$$t^* \delta^* \geq t.$$  

Proposition 5 implies that starting from a linear tax system with $t^* = t$, output will also rise when tax progression is introduced so that we have

**Corollary 2 (rising output):** Introducing tax progression raises output when wages are negotiated and effort is determined individually.

5.5 Revenue-neutral tax progression and welfare

Finally we want to briefly discuss the welfare implications. An appropriate measure of welfare in our framework is the sum of profits and workers’ surplus, i.e.

$$W = f(eL) - wL + [w(1 - t) + ta - g(e)] L + b(N - L) + G$$  

$$= f(eL) - [b + g(e)] L + bN = \frac{\delta}{\delta - 1} wL - [b + g(e)] L + bN$$

where $f(eL) = \delta(\delta - 1)^{-1} (eL)^{\delta - 1}$. In general the welfare effects are affected in different directions by the parameters that specify the production
technology and the disutility from effort so that general unambiguous statements cannot be derived. However, the properties of the model allow us to derive at least some sufficient conditions for welfare to improve.

First, note that the worker’s surplus $s$ is increasing in effort. This follows from the worker’s optimal effort choice, i.e. $V_e = de^{d-1} s - e^d g'(e) = 0$, from which follows that $s = \theta d^{-1} g(e)$. Hence, when worker chooses a higher level of individual effort they are always better off. Second, when employment rises those additional workers that find employment are better since $w^\alpha - g(e) - b > 0$. Thus no worker will lose when employment is rising. Finally, profit is increasing in output, as profit is given by $\delta \theta L = \delta f(eL)$. Hence, a sufficient condition for a positive welfare effect is that the reform does not lead to a fall in effort, employment and output. A necessary condition for the first requirement to hold is $\theta \delta^* \geq 1$. A sufficient condition for the latter two requirements is $\alpha \delta^* \geq t$. Thus $\theta \delta^* \geq 1$ suffices to fulfill all three requirements. This leads to our last proposition.

**Proposition 6 (rising welfare):** Welfare is always increasing when a revenue-neutral increase in wage tax progression will increase effort.

Workers only increase effort when they are better off. Since for a revenue-neutral increase in tax progression, higher effort is always associated with higher employment and output, more workers benefit from the higher surplus per worker and profit increases as well.

### 6. Conclusions

We have provided an extended framework to study the implications of the imperfectly observable individual effort of workers on the negotiated wage and the impact of a revenue-neutral change in the wage tax progression on wage negotiations, individual effort, employment, output and welfare. The first, and most important, result is that a higher degree of tax progression in this framework always leads to wage moderation. Our model confirms this result for the case of observable effort and wage bargaining as well as for the case where...
firms set efficiency wages unilaterally: the different wage-setting motives reinforce partial tax policy effects present in each model. However, when effort is not observable and verifiable, the clear-cut effect well-known from the wage bargaining literature that tax progression is good for employment does not carry over to the case of imperfectly observable effort. In the general case, it remains true that introducing tax progression is good for employment, but if the adverse effect on effort becomes sufficiently large due to too high a degree of tax progression, we cannot rule out the case where employment falls as a consequence of a progressivity-enhancing tax reform. Since higher effort level are only observed when workers are better off by providing more effort, increasing effort indicates that welfare is unambiguously improving. Since in this case both profits and workers’ surplus increase, increasing effort as a consequence of a revenue-neutral increase in tax progression is even a sufficient condition for a strict Pareto improvement.

References

Appendix A: the negotiated wage

This appendix develops the expressions for the terms \(\pi^*_w/\pi^*\) and \(U_w/U\) in the first-order condition (13) that determines the Nash bargaining solution. We start by looking at the profit response of the firm to a change in the wage rate. The indirect profit function was presented in equation (9). By applying the envelope theorem, according to which the effect which takes place through the labor demand vanishes at the optimum, we find that

\[
\pi^*_w = \frac{1}{(\delta-1)} \left[ (\delta-1)(w)^{1-\delta} e^{\delta-2} e_w - (\delta-1)(w)^{-\delta} e^{\delta-1} \right] 
\]

\[
= (w)^{1-\delta} e^{\delta-1} \left[ \frac{e_w}{e} - 1 \right] = -\frac{(w)^{1-\delta} e^{\delta-1}}{w} [1 - \varepsilon] < 0, 
\]

from which it follows that

\[
\frac{\pi^*_w}{\pi^*} = -\frac{(\delta-1)(1-\varepsilon)}{w} < 0 \tag{A2}
\]

as \(\varepsilon < 1\). With respect to the trade union’s utility, we find that

\[
U_w = \frac{L'}{w} \left[ w(1-t) - g'(e_w w - \delta^* (w^n - g(e') - b)) \right], \tag{A3}
\]
where \( \delta^* = \delta (1 - \varepsilon) + \varepsilon = - \frac{\bar{L}^* w}{\bar{L}} \). Thus, it follows that

\[
(A4) \quad \frac{U_w}{U} = \frac{1}{w} \left[ \frac{w (1-t) - g' e_w w - \delta^* (w^* - g(e^*) - b)}{w^* - g(e^*) - b} \right].
\]

Substituting (A4) and (A2) into (14) yields

\[
(A5) \quad \beta \left[ w (1-t) - g' e_w w - \delta^* (w^* - g(e^*) - b) \right] / \left[ w^* - g(e^*) - b \right] = (1 - \beta) (\delta - 1) (1 - \varepsilon).
\]

This can be rewritten as:

\[
(A6) \quad \beta \left[ w (1-t) - g' e_w w - \delta^* (w^* - g(e^*) - b) \right] - w^* (1 - \beta) (\delta - 1)(1 - \varepsilon) = -(g(e^*) + b) (1 - \beta)(\delta - 1)(1 - \varepsilon) \Leftrightarrow \\
\beta \left[ w (1-t) - g' e_w w - \delta^* w^* \right] - w^* (1 - \beta)(\delta - 1)(1 - \varepsilon) = -(g(e^*) + b - t\theta) (1 - \beta)(\delta - 1)(1 - \varepsilon) \Leftrightarrow \\
\beta \left[ w (1-t) - g' e_w w - \delta^* w (1-t) \right] - w (1-t) (1 - \beta)(\delta - 1)(1 - \varepsilon) = -(g(e^*) + b) [(1 - \beta)(\delta - 1)(1 - \varepsilon) + \beta \delta^*].
\]

Using the definition of the total wage elasticity of labor demand \( \delta^* \), we obtain by making use of equations (2) and (3)

\[
(A7) \quad w (1-t) \left[ (\delta - 1)(1 - \varepsilon) + \beta \frac{g' e_w w}{w (1-t)} \right] = [g(e^*) + b - t\theta] \beta + (\delta - 1)(1 - \varepsilon)
\]

so that

\[
(A8) \quad w (1-t) \left[ (\delta - 1)(1 - \varepsilon) + \beta \frac{d}{\theta + d} \right] = [g(e^*) + b - t\theta] \beta + (\delta - 1)(1 - \varepsilon)
\]

Using the explicit functional form for effort yields for the disutility of effort \( g(e^*) = d (d + \theta)^{-1} [w (1-t) + t\theta - b] \). Substituting in (A8) yields

\[
(A9) \quad w (1-t) \left[ (\delta - 1)(1 - \varepsilon) + \beta \frac{d}{\theta + d} - \frac{d}{\theta + d} \beta + (\delta - 1)(1 - \varepsilon) \right] = \left[ 1 - \frac{d}{\theta + d} \right] (b - t\theta) \beta + (\delta - 1)(1 - \varepsilon)
\]
Rearranging yields

\[
(A10) \quad \frac{w(1-t)}{\Delta} \left[ (\delta - 1)(1 - \varepsilon) \frac{\theta}{d + 0} \right] = \frac{\theta}{d + 0} \left[ (1 - \gamma) \left( \theta + (\delta - 1)(1 - \varepsilon) \right) \right]
\]

which gives equation (14).

**Appendix B: the sign of the numerator of (22)**

Substituting the partial derivatives (19) and (20) into the numerator of (22) yields

\[
(B1) \quad w_t + \frac{(w-a)}{t} w_a = M_\varepsilon \left( \varepsilon + \frac{(w-a)}{t} \varepsilon_a \right) + M_\Delta \left[ \frac{b-a}{(1-t)^2} - \left( \frac{w-a}{1-t} \right) \right]
\]

\[
= - M_\varepsilon \frac{\varepsilon}{\Delta (1-t)} - M_\Delta \frac{(w^*-b)}{\Delta (1-t)^2} < 0.
\]

**Appendix C: the Slutsky-decomposition for the total effect of the wage tax on the negotiated wage**

Differentiating the indirect Nash maximand \( \Omega^* = U^\theta \pi^{*1-\beta} = \Omega^0 \), where \( U = sL^* \) and \( \pi^* = f(e^*L^*) - w(1+s)L^* \), with respect to \( t \) and \( a \) gives

\[
(C1) \quad (i) \quad \Omega^*_t = \beta U^{\theta-1} \pi^{*1-\beta} U_t = - \beta U^{\theta-1} \pi^{*1-\beta} \pi^* (w-a) < 0.
\]

\[
(ii) \quad \Omega^*_a = \beta U^{\theta-1} \pi^{*1-\beta} U_a = \beta U^{\theta-1} \pi^{*1-\beta} \pi^* L^* > 0.
\]

The wage tax has a negative effect and tax exemption has a positive effect on the Nash maximand. Using the comparative statics, the indirect Nash maximand can be inverted in terms of \( a \) for the function \( a = h(t, \Omega^0) \). Substituting this for \( a \) in \( \Omega^* = U^\theta \pi^{*1-\beta} = V^0 \) gives the compensated indirect Nash maximand \( \Omega^* (t, h(t, \Omega^0)) = \Omega^0 \).\(^9\) Differentiating this compensated indirect Nash maximand with respect to \( t \) gives \( \Omega^*_t + h_t \Omega^*_a = 0 \) so that \( h_t = - \Omega^*_t / \Omega^*_a = (w-a)/t \). This describes the relationship of tax parameters to keep the Nash maximand constant.

---

\(^9\) See Diamond and Yaari (1972).
According to the duality theorem, the Nash maximand wage function \( w \) and the compensated wage function \( w^c \) at the same Nash maximand level are equal, so that we have
\[
w(t, h(t, \Omega^0)) = w^c(t, \Omega^0).
\]
Differentiating this with respect to the wage tax gives
\[
w_t + h w_a = w^c_t
\]
so that we obtain the Slutsky equation
\[
(C2) \quad w_t = w^c_t - \frac{(w - a)}{t} w_a,
\]
where the total effect of the wage tax rate has been decomposed into the negative substitution effect \( w^c_t < 0 \), see Appendix C) and the positive income effect \( \left( - \frac{(w - a)}{t} w_a \right) \). QED.


1959 Thiess Buettner and Georg Wamser, Intercompany Loans and Profit Shifting – Evidence from Company-Level Data, March 2007

1960 Per Pettersson-Lidbom and Mikael Priks, Behavior under Social Pressure: Empty Italian Stadiums and Referee Bias, April 2007


1964 Steven Brakman and Charles van Marrewijk, It’s a Big World After All, April 2007

1965 Mauro Ghinamo, Paolo M. Panteghini and Federico Revelli, FDI Determination and Corporate Tax Competition in a Volatile World, April 2007

1966 Inés Macho-Stadler and David Pérez-Castrillo, Optimal Monitoring to Implement Clean Technologies when Pollution is Random, April 2007


1968 Michela Redoano, Does Centralization Affect the Number and Size of Lobbies?, April 2007


1972 Rainald Borck and Matthias Wrede, Commuting Subsidies with two Transport Modes, April 2007

1973 Frederick van der Ploeg, Prudent Budgetary Policy: Political Economy of Precautionary Taxation, April 2007


1976 Andreas Haufler and Ian Wooton, Competition for Firms in an Oligopolistic Industry: Do Firms or Countries Have to Pay?, April 2007


1978 Gernot Doppelhofer and Melvyn Weeks, Jointness of Growth Determinants, April 2007


1980 Marco Pagano and Giovanni Immordino, Optimal Regulation of Auditing, May 2007

1981 Ludger Woessmann, Fundamental Determinants of School Efficiency and Equity: German States as a Microcosm for OECD Countries, May 2007

1982 Bas Jacobs, Real Options and Human Capital Investment, May 2007


1986 Ondřej Schneider, The EU Budget Dispute – A Blessing in Disguise?, May 2007


1989 Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Juncal Cunado and Luis A. Gil-Alana, Deterministic versus Stochastic Seasonal Fractional Integration and Structural Breaks, May 2007


1999 Petra M. Geraats, Political Pressures and Monetary Mystique, May 2007


2001 Andreas Freytag and Friedrich Schneider, Monetary Commitment, Institutional Constraints and Inflation: Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries since the 1970s, May 2007


2004 Harrie A. A. Verbon, Migrating Football Players, Transfer Fees and Migration Controls, May 2007


2007 Andreas Schäfer and Thomas M. Steger, Macroeconomic Consequences of Distributional Conflicts, May 2007

2008 Mikael Priks, Judiciaries in Corrupt Societies, June 2007

2009 Steinar Holden and Fredrik Wulfsberg, Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity in the OECD, June 2007


2013 Axel Dreher and Martin Gassebner, Greasing the Wheels of Entrepreneurship? The Impact of Regulations and Corruption on Firm Entry, June 2007


2018 Hartmut Egger and Gabriel Felbermayr, Endogenous Skill Formation and the Source Country Effects of International Labor Market Integration, June 2007

2019 Bruno Frey, Overprotected Politicians, June 2007

2020 Jan Thomas Martini, Rainer Niemann and Dirk Simons, Transfer Pricing or Formula Apportionment? Tax-Induced Distortions of Multinationals’ Investment and Production Decisions, June 2007

2021 Andreas Bühn, Alexander Karmann and Friedrich Schneider, Size and Development of the Shadow Economy and of Do-it-yourself Activities in Germany, June 2007

2022 Michael Rauscher and Edward B. Barbier, Biodiversity and Geography, June 2007

2023 Gunther Schnabl, Exchange Rate Volatility and Growth in Emerging Europe and East Asia, June 2007

2024 Erkki Koskela and Ronnie Schöb, Tax Progression under Collective Wage Bargaining and Individual Effort Determination, June 2007