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Working Paper

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Queen's Economics Department Working Paper, No. 1471

Provided in Cooperation with:

Queen's University, Department of Economics (QED)

Suggested Citation: Corazzini, Luca; Cotton, Christopher; Longo, Enrico; Reggiani, Tommaso (2021) : The Gates Effect in public goods experiments: How donors focus on the recipients favored by the wealthy, Queen's Economics Department Working Paper, No. 1471, Queen's University, Department of Economics, Kingston (Ontario)

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260477>

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The Gates Effect in Public Goods Experiments: How Donors Focus on the Recipients Favored by the Wealthy*

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November 18, 2021

Abstract

Experiments involving multiple public goods with contribution thresholds capture many features of charitable giving environments in which donors try to coordinate their contributions across various potential recipients. We present results from a laboratory experiment that introduces endowment and preference differences into such a framework to explore the impact of donor heterogeneity on public good success and payoffs. We observe that wealthier donors tend to provide larger contributions to the public goods, and that the contributions of all other donors are most likely directed to the public good preferred by the wealthiest donor as other group members try to coordinate their donations to ensure public good success. We refer to this collective focus on the preferred good of the wealthiest as the Gates Effect. The Gates Effect can reduce inequality among donors groups that succeed in funding a public good; however, it also affects the philanthropic agenda, reducing the variety of public goods that receive funding.

Keywords: Multiple public goods, Donor heterogeneity, Crowdfunding, Charitable giving, Philanthropy, Lab experiment.

JEL codes: C91, C92, H40, H41, L31.

*Acknowledgements: We thank Diya Elizabeth Abraham, Michele Bernasconi, Katarína Čellárová, Miloš Fišar, Valeria Maggian for useful suggestions and discussion. Financial and research support from the University of Venice "Ca' Foscari" VERA-lab, Masaryk University–MUEEL lab, and the Czech Science Foundation (grant: GA20-06785S) are gratefully acknowledged. The experimental protocol was approved by the IRB of the Queen's University (GECO-018-20).

1 Introduction

Providing donations to support causes and organizations is ubiquitous across socio-economic groups, as people from all walks of life contribute to religious and educational institutions, community projects, international development efforts, political campaigns, and social movements. While many organizations rely on donations from across the income spectrum, a wealthy donor can have a disproportionate effect in determining the allocation of funding and the success of donor-supported organizations.

To explore the flow of donations in such an environment, we introduce donor heterogeneity into a threshold public goods game experiment, where a potentially diverse set of donors choose how to contribute across a potentially diverse set of recipients (e.g., projects, charities, political candidates, or causes). In a threshold public goods game, for a public good to be successful, it needs total donations to be above a given threshold, which requires attracting contributions from multiple donors (Andreoni, 1998). Such an environment captures many of the nuances of fundraising environments, in which multiple recipients, including charities (Corazzini, Cotton, & Reggiani, 2019) or crowdfunding projects (Corazzini, Cotton, & Valbonesi, 2015), vie for a limited pool of donor funding. In the current paper, we extend the multiple threshold good environment to allow donors to differ in both their wealth and preferences over public goods (e.g., projects, charities, candidates, or causes).

We show that the wealthiest donors tend to set the contribution agenda for all donors. They not only direct their own contributions to funding their favorite public goods, but their focus on these goods also attracts the contributions of other donors to the same opportunities. Less-wealthy donors tend to contribute to the options preferred by the wealthiest donor even if the less-wealthy would have preferred the group to collectively focus on different opportunities.

We refer to this result as the “Gates Effect” through which wealthy donors effectively influence the philanthropic or political agenda. This greater influence goes beyond being able to provide greater financial support to the causes or candidates they prefer, but also stems from how their capacity to contribute pulls in contributions of others to their preferred recipients. In our environment, this is true even in the absence of seed money or matching grants, but is rather because the preferences of the wealthy serve as a focal point enabling the broader donor base to coordinate their support on recipients where contributions are less-likely to be wasted.

The public good preferred by the wealthiest donor is more likely to succeed compared to any other good not only because the wealthy donor contributes more, but also because other donors direct their contributions to the good preferred by the wealthiest (even if it is not their own preferred option). On the surface, this result appears socially inequitable, favoring the wealthy

at the expense of others. We show, however, that other donors are not necessarily worse off, as the wealthy donor takes on more of the funding burden when the focus is on their own preferred recipient, effectively compensating other donors for going along with good the wealthiest donor prefers to provide. At the same time, however, the focus on the public good preferred by the wealthy means that when a public good is successfully funded, it is almost always that good, representing a reduction in the variety of public goods that receive funding.

These results provide insights into a variety of real world interactions and lessons for organizational strategy within these settings. In a political campaign, less-wealthy party members may coordinate their campaign contributions and support on the party candidate preferred by the wealthiest members of the party, even if such candidates would not be their own first choice. While this means the party puts forward a candidate preferred more by wealthier party members, other party members may not be worse off because the wealthier party members provide a greater share of funding. Similarly, in philanthropic giving, smaller donors may contribute to the projects or causes that are more likely to excite larger donors, with the expectation that such initiatives may be more likely to get off the ground or effect social change. Even though they would prefer the focus to be on a different opportunity, smaller donors recognize that their individual contributions will not unilaterally effect change unless coordinated with others. Furthermore, the focus on the causes or projects preferred by the wealthy leads to wealthy to contribute more. Importantly, our results suggest that in each of these environments, the tendency of donors to focus their contributions on the recipients preferred by the wealthiest does not require matching funds or seed money, or the less wealthy mistakenly believing that the recipients preferred by the wealthiest are also best for their own interests.

The insights may extend to settings with institutional donors and stakeholders, such as foundations, NGOs, and government funders. In international development and global health, for example, the largest funders such as the Gates Foundations with its roughly \$47 billion endowment (or other large private foundations and western country donor organizations such as USAID) directly control which causes, projects, or approaches to support with their own funding. But, in doing so, they also indirectly steer the funds and efforts of other smaller foundations, organizations, or local governments who recognize that their own initiatives are more likely to succeed when they are aligned with the funding priorities of the larger donors. As McCoy and McGoey (2011) explain, “other donors look to the Gates Foundation in order to decide whether to fund a particular project or programme.”¹ Such arguments are consistent with the results from our experiment.

¹Kessler, Milkman, and Zhang (2019) show how rich donors give more when they have more control over how the money will be used. See also Birn (2014); Faubion, Paige, and Pearson (2011); Marquis, Davis, and Glynn (2013); Orbinski (2009); Rushton and Williams (2011) and Martens and Seitz (2015).

The key contributions of our paper are as follows. First, this is the first paper to consider a threshold public goods environment with multiple contribution options and donor heterogeneity (in wealth and preferences), exploring the role of donor heterogeneity through several experimental treatments. Second, we present experimental evidence that the wealthiest donors have a determinant role on the contribution agenda, attracting the contributions of other donors to their own preferred cause. This is true even in our environment without first mover positions, seed funding, matching grants, or other financial mechanisms that wealthier donors or organizations often use to attract additional funding; rather, it is because the preferences of the wealthy help coordinate the contribution strategies of other donors.² We refer to this phenomenon as the Gates Effect. Third, we consider the potential implications of donor heterogeneity, finding no evidence that it reduces coordination or individual donor payoffs (the potential payoff effects of a shift in which good is funded is primarily offset by a shift in the distribution of contributions across donors); though it does reduce the variety of goods that receive funding, which may impact charitable recipients more broadly.

The paper is presented as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on threshold public goods and then extends the existing theoretical models to incorporate donor heterogeneity and provide testable predictions to guide the experimental analysis. Section 3 presents the experimental design, describing each treatment and the experimental procedure. Section 4 presents the results from the analysis. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of some of the real world environments into which our analysis provides insights.

2 Threshold Public Goods with Donor Heterogeneity

2.1 Related Literature

Traditional public goods games involve groups of donors individually choosing how much of their endowments to contribute towards the funding of a public good, which provides benefits to all donors based on total funding and independent of any individual contribution. Threshold public good games extend the traditional public goods framework to introduce a minimum contribution threshold that must be reached before a public good provides benefits (e.g., whether the “save the clocktower” fund did collect enough contributions to effectively “save the clocktower”). This framework has been used to model charitable organizations or fundraising projects, as for these projects, to be realized, total funding must reach a minimum threshold (Andreoni, 1998).³

²Karlan and List (2012) argue that charities like the Gates’ Foundation can help solve information asymmetry problems for smaller donors. These are surely important considerations, but absent in our framework where there is no information asymmetry, only preference and endowment differences.

³See Andreoni (2006) for an overview of the literature on philanthropy and charitable fundraising.

Our framework involves multiple public goods in the threshold public good environment, capturing settings in which multiple charities or crowdfunded projects vie for the same pool of donor funding. Such a framework was first considered in Corazzini et al. (2015) (CCV henceforth), which explores the coordination problems among donors in such a framework, showing how a greater number of charities or crowdfunded projects can discourage donations, and Corazzini et al. (2019) (CCR henceforth), which explores the role of donation intermediaries like the United Way in overcoming coordination issues between donors.⁴ While both CCV and CCR consider environments with homogeneous donors, who have the same endowments and preferences across public goods, the current paper extends the multiple threshold public goods framework to consider donor heterogeneity, with differences in donor endowments and preferences over which good is best. This heterogeneity allows us to explore how wealth differences across donors affect the flow of contributions and may influence which public goods succeed.

Several experiments have analyzed the impact of donor heterogeneity in preferences or endowments in the provision of public goods. However, they have never done so in an environment with multiple threshold public goods. A few papers, including Marks and Croson (1999) and Rappoport and Suleiman (1993), have considered heterogeneity in an environment with a single threshold public good, where Marks and Croson (1999) considers heterogeneity in payoffs from the good and Rappoport and Suleiman (1993) and Bernard, Reuben, and Riedl (2012) consider heterogeneity in donor endowments. Notably, Rappoport and Suleiman (1993) and Brekke, Konow, and Nyborg (2017) find that the contributions of subjects of different wealth levels contribute a similar portion of their endowments to the good. They also show that homogeneous groups are more likely to succeed in funding a good than heterogeneous groups, with Bernard et al. (2012) additionally showing that heterogeneous groups are less stable.

Several papers on traditional public goods are also relevant for our setting. Cherry, Kroll, and Shogren (2005) explores the impact of endowment heterogeneity in a standard public good experiment, finding that contribution levels are significantly lower in groups with heterogeneous endowments rather than homogeneous endowments. Levati, Sutter, and Van der Heijden (2007) study the effects of leadership on the private provision in a sequential public good when group members are heterogeneously endowed, and they show that the presence of a leader increases average contributions levels but less so than in the case of homogeneous endowments. Chan, Mestelman, Moir, and Muller (1999) consider heterogeneity in both endowments and preferences in a standard public goods setting and find in contrast a positive effect of heterogeneity on aggre-

⁴CCR finds that when the intermediary is formally committed to direct donations, the presence of an intermediary increases public good success. However, without this commitment, the presence of an intermediary has even a negative impact on contributions and coordination above the threshold. See also Andreoni and Serra-Garcia (2020).

gate contributions; they do not find a similar result when heterogeneity is only on one dimension (endowments or preferences).⁵ The differences among these findings could be partly explained by the differences in the details of the experimental designs across the literature, and it is likely that impact of donor heterogeneity on contribution patterns likely interacts with the complexity of the environment and donor expectations about their relative obligations, for example.

Our results highlight how donations can flow to the causes preferred by the wealthiest donors, even in the absence of early giving/seed money or matching gifts, two mechanisms through which wealthier donors are known to be able to influence the philanthropic agenda (e.g., Charness & Holder, 2019; Deutsch, Epstein, & Nir, 2017; Eckel, Guney, & Uler, 2020; Gong & Grundy, 2014; Karlan & List, 2012; Krasteva & Saboury, 2021; List & Lucking-Reiley, 2002).⁶ Our analysis is also related to the literature studying competition between charities for donations (e.g., Deryugina & Marx, 2021; Filiz-Ozbay & Uler, 2019; Meer, 2017; Schmitz, 2021) and crowdfunding public goods and charitable projects (e.g., Argo, Klinowski, Krishnamurti, & Smith, 2020; Cason, Tabarrok, & Zubrickas, 2021; Cason & Zubrickas, 2019; Hudik & Chovanculiak, 2018; Petruzzelli, Natalicchio, Panniello, & Romo, 2019).⁷

2.2 Basic Theoretical Framework

We begin by considering a one-period public good contribution game when donors face multiple threshold public goods. There are J agents (the donors), indexed $j \in \{1, \dots, J\}$. At the beginning of the game, every agent simultaneously decides how much of her private endowment, $y_j > 0$, to contribute to each of N public goods. We denote with $c_{j,n} \geq 0$ the contribution made by agent j to public good n . Let $C_n \equiv \sum_j c_{j,n}$ and $c_j = \sum_{n=1}^N c_{j,n}$ represent the aggregate contributions to public good n and the total contributions made by agent j , respectively. The total contributions made by agent j cannot exceed her endowment, $c_j \in [0, y_j]$.

Function $B_{j,n}(C_n)$ determines the benefit each agent receives from public good n . The benefit depends on whether the overall amount contributed by the J agents reach a threshold level, τ .

⁵When they add communication to the experiment, the results are reversed, and they conclude that heterogeneity increases voluntary contributions, but communication unexpectedly reverses the relative importance of single and double heterogeneity.

⁶Nownes and Neeley (1996) shows how such considerations may also influence the political agenda through the formation of interest groups.

⁷See also the broader recent literatures on crowdfunding (e.g., Belavina, Marinesi, & Tsoukalas, 2020; Chemla & Tinn, 2020; Cornelius & Gokpinar, 2020; Hildebrand, Puri, & Rocholl, 2017; Song, Li, & Sahoo, 2022) and the design of funding mechanisms for public goods and campaign finance (e.g., Buterin, Hitzig, & Weyl, 2019; Fuchs, de Jong, & Schreier, 2020).

Specifically, for each good n ,

$$B_{j,n}(C_n) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{when } C_n < \tau \\ C_n + b_{j,n} & \text{when } C_n \geq \tau. \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

By the previous expression, if agents fail to reach the threshold level, then the public good does not return any benefit, and the contributions are lost. Instead, when the threshold is reached, the public good returns a benefit to player j that is increasing in total contributions, plus a bonus of $b_{j,n}$ the size of which depends on the agent's preferences for that good. Any unit of endowment not contributed to a public good gets directed to private consumption, where it returns a marginal benefit of greater than that from any public good. Based on our experiment, we assume the marginal benefit from uncontributed funds is 2 (implying a marginal per capita return to the public good is $1/2$ that from private consumption). Therefore, player j earns total payoff:

$$u_j(c_j) = 2(y_j - \sum_{n=1}^N c_{j,n}) + \sum_{n=1}^N B_{j,n}(C_n) \quad (2)$$

Independently from the heterogeneity manipulations, parameters in our experiment are set to assure that group members can fund at most one public good at its threshold, that each group member has an endowment which allows them to fund at least an equal share of a public good, that each player is unable and unwilling to unilaterally fund a good at its threshold, and that players prefer to contribute to a public good only if they expect that others are also contributing to the same public good.⁸

As discussed in CCV, the setting admits two types of equilibria. First, there exists an equilibrium in which agents make no contributions to any of the public goods. Second, for each of the public goods, there exist equilibria in which agents successfully fund a public good by contributing an amount to it equal to the threshold while providing no contributions to any other good. There are $N + 1$ symmetric-contribution equilibria: one in which $c_{n,j} = 0$ for all n and j , and one for each good n in which each player contributes $c_{n,j} = \tau/J = 33$ and $c_{m,j} = 0$ for all $m \neq n$. There are also many asymmetric equilibria in which players contribute unequal amounts to the same public good such that total contributions equal the threshold and contribute nothing to the other $N - 1$ goods. In each of these equilibria, $C_n = \tau$ for one $n \in N$, and $C_m = 0, \forall m \neq n$. The multiplicity of equilibrium introduces the potential for coordination problems among donors,

⁸For later reference, in all treatments of our experiment, we set $J = 4$, $N = 8$ and $\tau = 132$. In the homogeneous donor treatment, *Homogeneous*, agents are homogeneous in both preferences and endowments, such as $y_j = y = 55$ and $b_{j,n} = b_n$, with $b_n = 20$ for four of the goods and $b_n = 30$ for the other four goods. In the treatments with heterogeneity, $y_j \in \{34, 48, 62, 76\}$ and $b_{j,n} = 20$ for four of the goods, and $b_{j,n} \in \{27, 39\}$ (with one player j having the higher bonus) for each of the other four goods.

who risk contributing to the “wrong” good (different from the one to which others contribute) or contributing when others choose not to; in both cases, their contribution is effectively wasted.

While the theoretical discussion focuses on a single period interaction, subjects in our experiment have repeated interactions over a finite number of periods with the same group members. The repeated nature of the interaction substantially increases the set of subgame-perfect equilibria. Indeed, in all periods but the last, a range of contribution profiles in which group members contribute strictly more than the threshold is consistent with equilibrium because subgame perfect strategies can credibly threaten to revert to no contributions in future if anyone deviates from contributing in an earlier period. In the last period, however, the equilibrium profiles of contributions coincide with those of the one-shot game described above. Despite the number of equilibrium profiles, the considerations regarding donor coordination discussed above continue to hold.

CCV shows that although donors benefit from coordinating their donations on a common public good, the multiplicity of public goods adds to the coordination problem between donors, makes coordination (and the success of any public good) less likely, and discourages contributions in general compared to an environment with fewer contribution options. CCV also shows, however, how donors tend to ignore less-efficient public goods in favour of more-efficient options, and how a focal point drawing the group’s attention to one of the public goods can help overcome the donor coordination problem, encourage donations, and increase the probability that one of the public goods successfully reaches its funding threshold.⁹ Building on these insights, CCR also showed how increasing the complexity of a contribution environment can effectively discourage contribution and lead to less coordination.

2.3 The Role of Donor Heterogeneity

Our environment builds on past work by introducing donor heterogeneity into a multiple threshold public goods environment. Where past work involving multiple threshold public goods assumes that all agents share the same endowments or preferences over the alternative goods, our work considers the possibility that agents differ in both y_j and $b_{j,n}$. Expanding on the previous insights in the literature, we discuss several results to help guide the experimental analysis.

In our experiment, apart from manipulating heterogeneity, we keep the threshold size and the overall group endowment unchanged across the four treatments. Moreover, in treatments with heterogeneous preferences, (i) the bonus assigned by a non-selected public good is, as in the baseline, equal to 20 points, and (ii) the bonus of any selected public good is strictly higher than

⁹CCV shows how such a focal point arises when one public good is preferred by all donors (or one good is singled out as “recommended”).

what assigned to a non-selected alternative. These features imply that the main conclusions of the equilibrium analysis in the baseline treatment, *Homogeneous*, continue to hold when adding heterogeneity in either preferences or endowments. We summarize their insights below.

First, all of the treatments in our experiment admit the same symmetric-contribution equilibria of the baseline setting, where each donor contributes an equal share of the threshold to one of the public goods. However, a re-framing of the symmetric equilibrium in terms of endowment share rather than threshold share is also possible. For each of the treatments, there also exists symmetric-endowment share equilibria in which each donor contributes the same share of their endowment to one of the public goods such that total contributions to that good equal its threshold. In the treatments with homogeneous endowments, the two types of symmetric equilibria are equivalent. In the treatments with endowment heterogeneity, however, the symmetric-endowment share equilibria involves donor contributions increasing in the relative size of their endowment.

Second, as in the baseline, any symmetric or asymmetric equilibrium in which heterogeneous agents successfully contribute above the threshold payoff-dominates the zero-contribution profile. This means that, independently from their specific preferences over the public goods, their initial endowments, and the amounts allocated to the funded public good, group members are always better off in any of the symmetric or asymmetric equilibria in which the threshold is reached than in the zero-contribution equilibrium.¹⁰

Although preference and endowment heterogeneity leave the main insights of the equilibrium analysis in the four treatments almost unchanged, they are likely to impact on how group members effectively choose the level of their contributions and the public good to allocate resources to.

Consider the implications of going from our *homogeneous* treatment to one with differences in donor preferences. Heterogeneity in preferences alone adds to the complexity of the environment and decreases the modal payoff associated with achieving coordination (even if one player sees an improvement and the average payoff from coordination remains constant, the other players all see a decrease in payoff). These components likely make coordination more difficult for the group, while reducing the incentives that players have to contribute to any public good. At the same time, preference heterogeneity adds nothing to the environment that is expected to serve as

¹⁰Consider the limit situation of a wealthiest agent in an asymmetric equilibrium in which (i) the agent contributes her endowment entirely to a "non-selected" public good and (ii) the group successfully reaches the threshold of that good. In this situation, the wealthiest agent earns 152 points, exactly as much as she could have obtained by deviating and allocating her endowment to the private good. Apart from this extreme case, all group members, independently from their preferences over public goods and their initial endowments, obtain strictly higher payoffs in any of the symmetric or asymmetric equilibria in which the threshold is reached than in the zero-contribution profile.

a common focal point for the group and help facilitate coordination.

Now consider the implications of going from our *homogeneous* treatment to one with differences in donor endowments. This treatment again increases the complexity of the environment without introducing an obvious focal point that would draw the group's collective attention to one of the goods ex-ante. At the same time, however, there are reasons to think that the coordination problems under endowment heterogeneity could be less severe than under preference heterogeneity. Here, endowment differences do not lead to disagreements within the group about which good is best, which was a key concern in the previous case. Rather, introducing heterogeneous endowments changes the relative weights of the four group members (who respectively dispose of 15.45%, 21.82%, 28.18%, and 34.55% of the overall group endowment in the experiment) and makes the ability of the group to reach the threshold strongly contingent on the contribution choice of the wealthiest subject, potentially making coordination easier in groups where the wealthiest individuals work towards that goal.¹¹ Together, these factors mean that the impact of adding endowment heterogeneity on overall group coordination and public good success is ambiguous prior to the experimental analysis.

Finally, consider the implication of introducing both preference and endowment heterogeneity, as is the case in our heterogeneous donor treatment *P&E_Diff*. In this case, potential focal points emerge. When donors have different preferred goods and can be ranked in terms of wealth, one good will be distinguishable as the public good preferred by the highest-wealth individual and another will be distinguishable as the public good preferred by the lowest-wealth individual. Although either of these goods may serve as a viable focal point and facilitate donor coordination, we expect coordination on the good preferred by the most-wealthy individual to be the more likely collective focal point.¹² At the same time, however, the additional complexity associated with multi-dimensional heterogeneity could make coordination more difficult and discourage contributions, offsetting the potential presence of the focal points. Therefore, whether overall contributions and public good success is higher in *P&E_Diff* than in the other treatments remains an empirical question. However, when coordination does occur, it will most likely involve the public good preferred by the wealthiest donor.

¹¹Indeed, when group members differ in the amount of resources they can potentially allocate to the public goods, there are many asymmetric equilibria in which the wealthiest subject, whose endowment alone accounts for around 58% of the threshold, contributes more than the other group members. In addition, although there still exist equilibria in which the wealthiest subject contributes less than the others and the threshold is reached, it is very unlikely that these contribution profiles will be effectively observed, as they require the remaining three group members to allocate too large shares of their endowments to the same public good. For instance, any asymmetric equilibrium in which one public good is successfully funded and the wealthiest agent contributes nothing requires the remaining three group members to allocate around 92% of their overall endowment to the public good.

¹²This expectation is consistent with an implicit pro-rich bias in society that has been documented in the psychology literature. See for example Fiske (2010) and Mattan and Cloutier (2020).

Together, the above discussion suggests a series of hypotheses that can be explored through the experimental analysis.

Hypothesis 1. *Coordination on more-efficient public goods.* *In all treatments, whenever agents succeed in reaching the threshold of a public good, they coordinate their contributions on one of the "selected" or "preferred" alternatives.*

Hypothesis 2. *Preference heterogeneity.* *When agents have homogeneous endowments, then introducing preference heterogeneity will reduce group coordination.*

Hypothesis 3. *Endowment heterogeneity.* *In treatments with heterogeneous endowments, subjects with larger endowments tend to contribute relatively more to public goods than subjects with smaller endowments.*

Hypothesis 4. *Endowment and preference heterogeneity.* *With heterogeneous endowments and preferences, groups tend to coordinate their contributions on the public good that is preferred by the agent with the highest endowment.*

These testable hypotheses are supported by the insights from theory and past experimental work. Additionally, our experimental analysis will compare the relative performance of public goods under the different treatments for which the theory is ambiguous, highlighting countervailing effects. Of particular interest are Hypotheses 3 and 4, which provide the foundation for the ‘Gates Effect,’ whereby wealthier donors are expected to contribute a larger share of total funding and all donors are more likely to contribute to the recipients preferred by the wealthiest donors. Such hypotheses suggest that the presence of endowment difference can result in wealthy donor preferences effectively driving the contribution agenda.

3 Experimental Design

Our experiment introduces donor heterogeneity in endowments and preferences into a threshold public goods game with multiple viable alternatives (building on CCV). The experiment includes four distinct treatments using a between subject design. Our main experimental treatment is one in which donors differ in both their endowment and preferences, allowing for us to consider questions related to donor coordination on goods that are, for example, preferred by the wealthiest donors. We also run treatments involving endowment heterogeneity and preference heterogeneity alone and a treatment with homogeneous donors as points of comparison to understand how the distribution of donations across donors and recipients depends on both types of heterogeneity.

A total of 240 subjects participated in the experiment, with 60 individuals participating in each of the 4 treatments. For each treatment, we run 5 sessions with 12 subjects divided into unchanging groups of 4 people. This implies that, for each treatment, we collected data on 15 independent groups. Each group interacted for 12 sequential periods, in each period playing a threshold public good game with each other. Between periods, participants received feedback about their group's contributions during the previous period.

At the beginning of each experiment, group members are assigned an endowment level, which represents their budget in each period. Total endowments across all individuals equal 220 token in each period of each treatment, but the distribution of these tokens across individuals depends on the treatment. In each period of each treatment, each subject simultaneously chooses how much of their individual endowment to contribute to each of eight available public goods. Any amount of their endowment that they do not contribute to a public good goes into a private account, which provides an individual payout of two points per token at the end of the experiment. Any amount contributed to a public good potentially provides a benefit to each group member, but only if total contributions to that public good reached the threshold of 132 tokens (60 percent of the total group allocation) in a given period. If the total number of tokens contributed by the group to a collective account is lower than 132, then the subjects do not receive any points from that account, and contributions to that account are forfeited. If the overall number of tokens contributed to a collective account is at least 132, each group member receives one point for every token contributed into that account plus an additional bonus. When we introduce preference heterogeneity, it will come through differences in the size of the individual bonus subjects receive with the success of different public goods.

3.1 Donor heterogeneity (main treatment)

The main treatment, *P&E.Diff*, involves donor heterogeneity in both endowments and preferences over the public goods. At the beginning of the experiment, before the first period of interaction, participants are randomly assigned to one of four possible endowment levels (34, 48, 62, or 76), defining the endowment they receive in each of the 12 periods of play. Each group involves one subject assigned to each of the four endowment levels. The total group endowment is 220. The initial assignment remains unchanged throughout the 12 periods of the experiment. The endowment distribution used in the experiment presents a relatively large variance, with the highest endowment in the group more than doubling the one assigned to the poorest group member.

Additionally, each of the four subjects is assigned a separate one of the eight available public goods to be the 'preferred' alternative throughout the experiment. We refer to the four public

goods preferred by the group members as the ‘selected’ goods, while the remaining alternatives are simply indicated as ‘non-selected’. When contributions to a subject’s preferred public good reach its threshold in a period, that subject receives a bonus payment of 39 points, and the three other group members receive bonus payments of 27 points in addition to the uniform payout to all group members equal to one point per token contributed to that good’s account in that period. If one of the four non-selected public goods is funded at or above its threshold, then each subject receives a uniform bonus of 20 points in that period, plus the payout of one point per token contributed to that good. Each subject’s endowment and preferred good is observable by the other group members.

The differences in bonus payments represent a relatively small-magnitude difference in preferences. If, for example, the public good preferred by one subject is funded at its threshold, that goodwill return a total payout of 171 points to one subject that prefers it and a payout of 159 points to each of the other group members. It should be clear that subjects prefer to coordinate their contributions on one public good and reach the threshold, even if coordination takes place on a public good preferred by one of the other subjects.

3.2 Homogeneous donor and one-dimensional heterogeneity treatments

In addition to the full-heterogeneity treatment described above, we conduct three other treatments.

In the baseline treatment with homogeneous donors, *Homogeneous*, all four donors in each group have the same endowment (55 tokens) each period and share preferences over the public goods. In this treatment, four of the public goods are ‘selected’ goods, any of which will provide a uniform bonus of 30 points plus one point for each contributed token to each of the four group members in any period in which it reaches its threshold of 132 tokens. If one of the other four (‘non-selected’) goods has total contributions above its threshold, the bonus from that good is only 20 points combined with one point per contributed token. The bonuses are calibrated so that the total group bonus across all four groups members is the same as for the four preferred goods in the *P&E_Diff* treatment.

The homogeneity treatment is most similar to the baseline treatment in CCV, where homogeneous donors faced four public goods none of which stood out as strictly preferred for the group. In this environment, the multiplicity of reasonable donation options makes coordination among donors more difficult to achieve compared to the case of a single public good.¹³ In the

¹³In contrast, CCV showed that the coordination problems that arise from the multiplicity of public goods is reduced if one of the goods stands out as the best available option for all donors. Such an alternative environment would leave little room for endowment or preference differences to improve coordination across goods.

homogeneous treatment, four goods stand out as equally reasonable options.

Additionally, we run both *E_Diff* and *P_Diff* treatments, which represent environments in which only one source of donor heterogeneity is present. In *E_Diff*, donors differ in their endowments in the same way they did in the heterogeneous donor treatment but have the same preferences in the way that they did in the homogeneous donor treatment. In *P_Diff*, donors have the same endowments as in the homogeneous donor treatment but differ in their preferences as in the heterogeneous donor treatment.

3.3 Procedures

The experiment was run in February 2021. In accordance with the lockdown restrictions in force to contrast the COVID-19 outbreak, all sessions were run online in a "lab-on-the-web" environment (Buso et al., 2020). In particular, in order to participate in the experiment, subjects were required to join a Zoom session from a computer with a well-functioning internet connection, webcam, microphone, and audio. They were also asked to connect from an isolated and quiet room and to remain seated throughout the experiment. At their arrival, subjects were initially moved to a virtual waiting room that guaranteed their anonymity. Subjects accessed the virtual welcome room one by one, keeping their microphone and webcam switched on. After ascertaining participants' identity and checking the quality of their digital infrastructure, experimenters disabled subjects' webcam and microphone and made their zoom profiles entirely anonymous by removing any possible distinctive element (such as pictures, colors, initials) and assigning a random identification number. Then, subjects were moved to the experimental room, and, in case of necessity, they could communicate through the zoom chat. In particular, the chat allowed subjects to send private messages to the experimenter only, being any further possibility to interact with the other participants disabled.

At the beginning of the experiment, experimenters shared their video and read the instructions aloud (the English translation of the instructions in *P&E_Diff* is included in the appendix). Before the first period started, subjects were asked to answer control questions at their terminal. When necessary, answers to the questions were privately checked and explained through the chat. At any time during the experiment, subjects had the possibility to click a button and access a table summarizing the main instructions of the experiment.

At the beginning of each period, the computer showed each subject nine boxes, one for the private account and eight for the collective accounts. In order to avoid frame effects, the eight collective accounts were presented to subjects using neutral color names. Moreover, the order in which the collective accounts appeared on the screen was randomly determined by the computer

for each subject. Finally, each of the eight boxes of the collective accounts showed the threshold and the size of the corresponding bonus. Given the nine boxes, in each period, every subject chose how to allocate her endowment entirely over the alternative accounts.

In treatments with heterogeneity, the assignment of endowments and preferences was common knowledge. In particular, at the beginning of each session, subjects were randomly assigned one of four letters, either *A*, *B*, *C*, or *D*. In *E_Diff* and *P&E_Diff*, the order of the letters matched the order of the endowments, with *A* and *D* being respectively associated with the lowest (34 tokens) and highest (76 tokens) endowments. To facilitate subjects' assimilation of the information, a summary table reporting, for each letter, the corresponding endowment and, in *P&E_Diff* and *P_Diff*, the corresponding preferred collective account was included in the screen used by subjects to make their choices.¹⁴

In order to enhance comparability across treatments and rule out potential framing effects that are related to the particular color distribution used in the experiment, we kept the assignment of colours to the selected and non-selected public goods to each group unchanged across sessions. This feature of our experimental design allowed us to compare, group by group, the coordination rate and the contribution to the type-specific preferred public goods in *P&E_Diff* and *P_Diff* to the corresponding benchmarks in *E_Diff* and *Homogeneous*.

At the end of every period, each subject was informed about the number of tokens allocated by the group to (each of) the collective account(s), whether the corresponding threshold was reached, and any bonus paid. Additionally, following each period, subjects learned the number of points they received from each account and in total. At the end of the experiment, subjects were privately paid using a payment rate of one euro per 100 points.

On average, they earned 11.42 euros for sessions lasting about 90 min, including the time for identification, instructions, a post-experimental questionnaire. All payments were made through PayPal. Participants were drawn from the subject pool of the VERA-lab of the University of Venice, "Ca' Foscari" (Italy), including more than 2,500 subjects. Participants were mainly undergraduate students in Economics, Management, Language Studies, and Philosophy, and they were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). The experiment was computerized and executed online employing z-Tree Unleashed (Duch, Grossmann, & Lauer, 2020).

4 Experimental Results

The analysis proceeds in four steps. First, we investigate whether the nature of the public good - either selected or non-selected and, in *P&E_Diff* and *P_Diff*, either preferred or non-preferred - acts

¹⁴A picture of the choice screen used in *P&E_Diff* is included in the appendix.

as a viable coordination device for subjects' contributions. Second, in order to shed light on how subjects' heterogeneity impacts on group performance, we look at differences across treatments in coordination, contributions and individual profits. Third, we concentrate our attention on *P&E_Diff* and *P_Diff* to study the relationship between subject's endowment and the amount of resources she contributes to the public goods. Together, the first three steps will provide evidence on the Gates effect, whereby the public good preferred by the wealthiest subject effectively attracts contributions of the rest of the group members. As a final step, we analyze the implications of the Gates effect on group welfare and inequality across group members. In the statistical analysis, we use both non-parametric and parametric techniques. The non-parametric tests are based on 12 independent observations at the group level per treatment. Similarly, in order to account for potential dependence across periods, the estimated coefficients in the parametric regressions are based on standard errors clustered at the group level.

4.1 To which public goods do group members contribute?

For each treatment, Table 1 reports the proportion of successful contributions to selected and non selected public goods overall periods.

P&E_Diff is the treatment with the highest coordination rate (56.7%), followed by *E_Diff* (53.9%), *Homogeneous* (50.0%), and, finally, *P_Diff* (34.4%). In all treatments, successful coordination occurred on one of the selected public goods only, thus providing evidence in favor of Hypothesis 1. In line with this result, contributions to selected public goods are significantly higher than what allocated to non-selected alternatives (according to a two-side Wilcoxon signed-rank, $p < 0.001$ in all treatments).

Table 1 also shows the distribution of successful coordination over the four selected public goods in every treatment. Conditional on having reached the threshold, group members in *P&E_Diff* coordinate their contributions on the public good preferred by the wealthiest subject, *D*, around 96% of the times, with this proportion being higher than in any other treatment (according to a two-side proportion test, $p < 0.001$ for any pairwise comparisons between *P&E_Diff* and the other treatments in the proportion of coordination on the public good preferred by *D*).

Result 1. In all treatments, subjects coordinate their contributions exclusively on the selected public goods. Moreover, in *P&E_Diff*, successful coordination almost entirely occurs on the public good preferred by the wealthiest subject.

By the previous result, in *P&E_Diff*, the public good preferred by the wealthiest subject represents an effective coordination device for the rest of the group. To further validate this result, Table 2 unpacks, for each type of subject in *P&E_Diff*, the mean (overall) contributions to the four

Table 1: Selected and non-selected public goods: descriptive statistics.

	<i>Homogeneous</i>	<i>P_Diff</i>	<i>E_Diff</i>	<i>P&E_Diff</i>	Obs.
Coordination on Selected PGs	0.500	0.344	0.539	0.567	180
PG preferred by A	0.211	0.161	0.156	0.017	
PG preferred by B	0.050	0.150	0.089	0.000	
PG preferred by C	0.039	0.000	0.028	0.006	
PG preferred by D	0.200	0.033	0.267	0.544	
Coordination on Non-Selected PGs	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
Overall Contribution	32.474 (19.722)	29.435 (21.608)	32.169 (22.696)	34.022 (23.766)	720
Contribution to Selected PGs	31.200 (20.171)	28.574 (21.525)	31.674 (22.649)	33.519 (23.879)	
Contribution to Selected PGs	1.274 (6.975)	0.861 (5.385)	0.496 (3.369)	0.503 (3.151)	

Notes. This table reports, for each treatment, the proportion of successful coordination on selected and non-selected public goods, as well as on each of the four selected public goods according to preferences of the types of subjects. The preferred public goods in *Homogeneous* and *E_Diff* refer to the corresponding benchmark alternatives. The table also reports the mean contributions (standard deviations are reported in parentheses) to the four selected public goods. The table also shows, for each treatment, successful coordination on each of the four selected public goods according to the preferences of the types of subjects.

Table 2: Type-specific contributions to selected public goods in *P&E_Diff*.

Contribution	<i>P&E_Diff</i>			
	A	B	C	D
PG preferred by A	2.522 (3.951)	2.250 (6.025)	2.828 (8.829)	2.422 (7.168)
PG preferred by B	0.061 (0.149)	2.411 (3.280)	0.250 (0.533)	0.711 (1.063)
PG preferred by C	0.361 (0.696)	1.356 (2.112)	4.372 (8.247)	1.372 (1.926)
PG preferred by D	16.561 (9.219)	18.517 (12.029)	32.661 (16.720)	45.422 (23.280)
Obs.	180	180	180	180

Notes. This table reports, for each type of subject, the mean contributions (standard deviations are reported in parentheses) to the four selected public goods in *P&E_Diff*.

selected public goods.

The public good preferred by the wealthiest subject attracts the contributions of every other group member. Indeed, all types of subjects contribute significantly more to the public good preferred by *D* than to any of the remaining three selected public goods (according to a two-side Wilcoxon signed-rank test, when comparing the amount contributed to the public good preferred by *D* to any other alternative, $p < 0.001$ for each type of subject), indicating that *A*, *B*, and *C* are willing to give up from their own preferred public good to reach coordination on one selected alternative.¹⁵

Result 2. In *P&E_Diff*, all subject-types contribute substantially more to the public good preferred by the wealthiest group member than to any other alternative.

4.2 Coordination, contributions and profits: differences across treatments

Figure 1 shows the mean (overall) contributions to the public good(s), the proportion of successful coordination, and the mean profits in the four treatments over periods.

¹⁵The salience of the public good preferred by *D* is observed only when heterogeneity in preferences is combined with heterogeneity in endowments. Indeed, compared to *P&E_Diff*, contributions in *P_Diff* follow a less polarized pattern as (i) groups tend to equally coordinated on two selected public goods, the one preferred by *A* and the one preferred by *B*, and (ii) the distribution of type-specific contributions over selected public goods is more sparse than in *P&E_Diff*.




Figure 1: Coordination, contributions, and profits in the four treatments.

Apart from the low performance of *P_Diff*, we do not observe any remarkable difference in the three dimensions across treatments. These preliminary observations are confirmed by Table 3 that reports results from parametric, probit and random effects panel regressions.

We use estimates in column (1) to perform pairwise comparisons between treatments in the ability to coordinate contributions on the same public good. We detect no significant differences between *Homogeneous* and *P_Diff*, between *Homogeneous* and *E_Diff*, between *Homogeneous* and *P&E_Diff*, and between *E_Diff* and *P&E_Diff* (in all cases, $p > 0.1$). The only differences that turn to be significant are between *P_Diff* and *E_Diff* ($p = 0.065$), and between *P_Diff* and *P&E_Diff* ($p = 0.038$).¹⁶

Similar observations hold when analyzing overall contributions in column (2). Even in this case, we detect negligible differences as any pairwise comparison yields no significant results ($p > 0.1$ for the differences between *Homogeneous* and *P_Diff*, between *Homogeneous* and *E_Diff*, between *Homogeneous* and *P&E_Diff*, between *P_Diff* and *E_Diff*, between *P_Diff* and *P&E_Diff*, and between *E_Diff* and *P&E_Diff*, $p = 0.604$).

Finally, estimates reported in column (3) are used to compare treatments in the level of (per pe-

¹⁶According to a two-side Mann-Whitney rank-sum test, the difference between *P_Diff* and *P&E_Diff* remains marginally significant ($p = 0.054$).

Table 3: Coordination, contribution and profits in the four treatments: parametric results.

	Coordination (1)	Overall contribution (2)	Profit (3)	Profit (4)
<i>P_Diff</i>	-0.157 (0.103)	-3.039 (3.572)	-24.928* (13.810)	-30.515*** (9.484)
<i>E_Diff</i>	0.039 (0.097)	-0.304 (3.572)	6.836 (13.810)	3.572 (10.719)
<i>P&E_Diff</i>	0.067 (0.099)	1.549 (3.572)	9.914 (13.810)	4.890 (11.316)
<i>HC</i>				55.969*** (7.942)
<i>HC*P_Diff</i>				19.968 (12.414)
<i>HC*E_Diff</i>				11.660 (12.632)
<i>HC*P&E_Diff</i>				7.536 (13.023)
<i>Constant</i>		32.474*** (2.526)	140.642*** (9.765)	107.060*** (7.003)
Log likelihood	-488.058	-12303.933	-16661.266	-16622.666
Wald chi2	4.90	1.71	7.86	185.70
Prob >chi2	0.179	0.634	0.049	0.000
Observations	720	2,880	2,880	2,880
Number of groups	60	60	60	60

Notes. Column (1) reports results of the marginal effects from a probit regression with standard error clustered at the group level. The dependent variable is *coord*, a dummy that assumes value 1 if the group reaches the threshold and 0 otherwise, *P_Diff*, *E_Diff* and *P&E_Diff* are treatment dummies. Column (2), (3), and (4) report coefficient estimates (standard errors in parentheses) from two-way linear random effects models accounting for both potential individual dependency over periods and dependency within the group. The dependent variable in column (2) is the total contributions made by the subject to the eight collective accounts in the period. *HC* is a dummy that assumes a value of 1 if the subject belongs to a "high coordination" group (that successfully coordinated for a number of periods above the median in the treatment) and 0 otherwise; *HC * P_Differences*, *HC * E_Differences* and *HC * P&E_Diff* are interactions between treatment dummies and *HC*. Significance levels are denoted as follows: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, and *** $p < 0.01$.

riod) profits. In line with the hypothesis that preference heterogeneity makes coordination more difficult to reach, we find evidence that profits in *P_Diff* are lower than in any other treatment (with respect to *Homogeneous*, $p = 0.071$; to *E_Diff*, $p = 0.0214$; to *P&E_Diff*, $p = 0.012$).¹⁷ When focusing on *Homogeneous*, *E_Diff*, and *P&E_Diff* only, we document no significant pairwise differences (in all cases, $p > 0.1$). We summarize the previous empirical observations in the following result.

Result 3. Apart from some mild evidence on the difficulties faced by groups to coordinate on one public good in *P_Diff*, there are no remarkable differences across treatments in successful coordination, overall contributions and profits.

We also run a set of auxiliary regressions in which we included additional controls to the specifications to columns (1), (2), and (3). Specifically, we included a linear trend in all regressions and, only in column (2), a dummy taking a value of one if the group successfully coordinated on one public good. We find a positive and highly significant linear trend in both probability to successfully coordinate on one public good and in the per-period profits in all treatments. Moreover, when considering overall contributions, we document a negative and highly significant linear trend and a positive and highly significant effect of previous coordination in all treatments. Adding these controls does not leave the results on the differences across treatments in coordination, overall contributions, and profits unchanged.¹⁸

Contrary to Hypothesis 2, we do not detect remarkable differences in cooperation and coordination between *Homogeneous* and *P_Diff*. This result can be explained by the fact that, as discussed in the theoretical framework, preference heterogeneity does not remarkably alter the equilibrium analysis with respect to the baseline setting with homogeneous agents. First, *Homogeneous* and *P_Diff* admit the same symmetric and asymmetric equilibrium profiles of contributions. Second, independently from their specific preferences over the four selected public goods, all group members are better off in an equilibrium with positive contributions than in the 0-contribution profile. The Pareto superiority of equilibria in which one public good is financed represents a strong motive for subjects to do their best to coordinate even at the cost of giving up from contributing to their preferred alternative. In this respect, column (4) performs the same regression reported in column (3) by distinguishing between groups that successfully coordinated for a large number of periods during the experiment (*HC*—groups henceforth) and groups performing poorly. Estimates show that, as expected, *HC*—groups earn significantly more than low coordination groups

¹⁷According to a two-side Mann-Whitney rank-sum test, these differences remain significant: for the difference between *P_Diff* and *Homogeneous*, $p = 0.085$; for the difference between *P_Diff* and *E_Diff*, $p = 0.065$; for the difference between *P_Diff* and *P&E_Diff*, $p = 0.027$.

¹⁸Results of the auxiliary regressions are available upon request.

(*LC*–groups henceforth) in all treatments ($p < 0.001$ in all cases). Moreover, when focusing on *LC*–groups only, we find that profits in *P_Diff* are significantly lower than in any other treatment ($p < 0.001$ in all of the pairwise comparisons), suggesting that the lower welfare in *P_Diff* highlighted by column (3) is mainly driven by the groups experiencing more difficulties in reaching successful coordination.

4.3 Endowment heterogeneity and contributions

In two treatments, *E_Diff* and *P&E_Diff*, subjects differ in the levels of their endowments. Endowment heterogeneity does not necessarily imply that wealthy subjects contribute more than the poor group members. Indeed, as discussed in the theoretical section, treatments with endowment heterogeneity always admit a symmetric equilibrium profile in which everyone contributes the same amount. Moreover, since the sum of the endowments of *A*, *B*, and *C* is greater than the threshold, there is a large number of equilibria in *E_Diff* and *P&E_Diff* in which the wealthier subject, *D* contributes nothing. Nevertheless, as argued above, the (perceived) need to have those disposing of larger shares of the group endowment to make their part to reach the threshold on one public good put forward the hypothesis of a positive relationship between subject's contribution and the level of her endowment (hypothesis 3).

Figure 2 shows, for each treatment, the mean (overall) contributions of the four subject-types over periods.




Figure 2: Contributions by subject-type in the four treatments.

While we do not observe any remarkable differences in contributions across subject-types in the two treatments with homogeneous endowments, there is a clear positive relationship between contributions and endowments in *E_Diff* and *P&E_Diff* whereby the wealthier subject, *D*, makes the largest contributions (the mean overall contribution is 50.428 in *P&E_Diff* and 43.972 in *E_Diff*), followed by *C* (40.272 in *P&E_Diff* and 36.844 in *E_Diff*), *B* (25.583 in *P&E_Diff* and 28.028 in *E_Diff*) and *A*, the poorest subject in the group (19.806 in *P&E_Diff* and 19.833 in *E_Diff*).

These preliminary observations are confirmed in Table 4 that reports results from parametric, random effects panel regressions.

Estimates in column (3) are used to assess pairwise differences between subject-types in *E_Diff*. *D* contributes more than *A* and *B* (in both cases, $p < 0.001$), while we find a non significant difference with respect to *C* ($p = 0.141$). We also find that *C* contributes more than *A* ($p < 0.001$) and *B* ($p = 0.069$), while the difference between *A* and *B* is only slightly significant ($p = 0.091$).¹⁹ Similar results hold when considering estimates in column (5) that refer to *P&E_Diff*. *D* contributes more

¹⁹According to a two-side Wilcoxon signed-rank test, player *D* contributes more than *A* ($p < 0.01$) and *B* ($p < 0.05$).

Table 4: Contributions of the subject-types in the four treatments: parametric results.

	Homogeneous	P_Diff	E_Diff		P&E_Diff	
Overall contribution	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>B</i>	-9.106** (3.912)	0.089 (4.221)	8.194* (4.847)	7.987 (6.325)	5.778 (4.120)	4.180 (5.900)
<i>C</i>	-8.306** (3.912)	-2.078 (4.221)	17.011*** (4.847)	17.709*** (6.325)	20.467*** (4.120)	11.480* (5.900)
<i>D</i>	-4.294 (3.912)	0.172 (4.221)	24.139*** (4.847)	9.640 (6.325)	30.622*** (4.120)	10.863* (5.900)
<i>HC</i>				7.296 (4.821)		2.904 (4.635)
<i>B*HC</i>				0.345 (7.625)		2.396 (6.909)
<i>C*HC</i>				-1.164 (7.625)		13.480* (6.909)
<i>D*HC</i>				24.165*** (7.625)		29.638*** (6.909)
<i>Constant</i>	37.900*** (3.260)	29.889*** (3.912)	19.833*** (3.758)	15.942*** (4.036)	19.806*** (3.613)	18.063*** (3.927)
Log likelihood	-3.047.931	-3084.696	-3064.207	-3053.942	-3063.017	-3050.913
Wald chi2	6.87	0.40	28.13	61.62	68.53	120.46
Prob >chi2	0.076	0.941	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Observations	720	720	720	720	720	720
Number of groups	15	15	15	15	15	15

Notes. This table reports coefficient estimates (standard errors in parentheses) from two-way linear random effects models accounting for both potential individual dependency over periods and dependency within the group. The dependent variable is the overall contribution made by the subject to the eight collective accounts in the period. *B*, *C* and *D* are subject-type dummies. The other remarks of Table 3

than any other group member (with respect to C , $p = 0.014$; in all of the other cases, $p < 0.001$), C contributes more than B and A (in both cases, $p < 0.001$), and, finally, there is no significant difference between A and B ($p = 161$).²⁰

Differences across subject-types are less pronounced in the two treatments with homogeneous endowments. Estimates in column (1) show that, in *Homogeneous*, A contributes more than B ($p = 0.020$) and c ($p = 0.034$). Apart from these differences, all the remaining pairwise comparisons yield non significant results (between A and D , $p = 272$; between B and C , $p = 0.838$; between B and D , $p = 0.219$; C and D , $p = 0.305$). Finally, from column (2), all the pairwise comparisons between subject-types in *P.Diff* are non significant (between A and B , $p = 0.983$; between A and C , $p = 0.623$; between A and D , $p = 0.967$; between B and C , $p = 0.608$; between B and D , $p = 0.984$; between C and D , $p = 0.594$).

The previous results, which provide supporting evidence in favor of hypothesis 3, are summarized in the following statement.

Result 4. In the two treatments with endowment heterogeneity, *E.Diff* and *P&E.Diff*, there is a positive relationship between subject's (overall) contribution and the level of her endowment: the wealthiest subjects contributes more than the poor group members.

Two additional observations qualify the previous results. First, in line with existing studies analyzing the effects of endowment heterogeneity in threshold public good settings (see for instance, Rappoport & Suleiman, 1993), the differences in contributions observed in our experiment are associated with the fact that subject-types tend to contribute the same fraction of their endowment. Indeed, when considering individual contributions relative to the level of their endowment, differences across subject-types disappear in both *E.Diff* and *P&E.Diff* (relative contributions are included between 0.533 and 0.664 in *P&E.Diff*, and between 0.579 and 0.594 in *E.Diff*. Only for the difference between B and D in *P&E.Diff*, $p = 0.078$; for any other pairwise comparison, $p > 0.1$).

Second, as shown by columns (4) and (6) of Table 4, we find that, in both *E.Diff* and *P&E.Diff*, the wealthiest subject D contributes to the public goods more than the other group members only when she belongs to a *HC*-group (for any pairwise comparison between D and the other subject-types, $p < 0.01$). Instead, we detect no remarkable differences between the amount contributed by D and what contributed by the other subject-types in *LC*-groups (only for the difference between D and A in *P&E.Diff*, $p = 0.066$; for any other pairwise difference, $p > 0.10$).

²⁰According to a two-side Wilcoxon signed-rank test, player D contributes more than A ($p < 0.01$), B ($p < 0.01$) and C ($p < 0.05$).

4.4 The Gates effect and welfare considerations

The previous results provide evidence in favor of the two hypotheses (3 and 4) at the core of the Gates effect. When group members differ in both endowments and preferences over the public goods, the alternative preferred by the wealthiest agent becomes an effective coordination device for the other group members. Indeed, the higher propensity of the wealthiest agent to contribute to her preferred public good increases the probability of the group to reach the threshold of that alternative. Therefore, redirecting contributions to the public good preferred by the wealthiest agent gives the possibility to all group members, especially those disposing of limited resources, to benefit of the returns of a public good they would not have gained otherwise.

By focusing on the two treatments with endowment heterogeneity, *E.Diff* and *P&E.Diff*, Table 5 investigates the welfare implications of the Gates effect by comparing profits across subject-types in both *HC*– and *LC*– groups.

Estimates reported in the table highlight three relevant results. First, in both *E.Diff* and *P&E.Diff* and for every subject-type, profits are higher in *HC*–groups than in *LC*–groups (for *A*, *B*, and *C*, in both treatments, $p < 0.001$; for *D*, in both treatments, $p < 0.05$), thus confirming the positive welfare effects of successful coordination.²¹

Second, in both treatments, every subject-type in *HC*–groups obtains a higher profit than what she would have earned in the zero-contribution equilibrium (in all cases, $p < 0.001$). Instead, when focusing on *LC*–groups, we detect no significant difference between actual profits and the corresponding level in the zero-contribution equilibrium.²²

Third, the non-excludability nature of the returns of the public goods, together with the higher propensity of the wealthiest subject to contribute, imply that reaching the threshold on the alternative preferred by the wealthiest agent is not only beneficial for all group members but also reduces welfare inequality within their group. In line with this observation, when focusing on *HC*–groups, all differences in profits between *D* and any other group member become non significant (in all cases, $p > 0.1$). Results change when focusing on *LC*–groups. Indeed, in both treatments with heterogeneous endowments, the profits of the wealthiest subject are higher than what obtained by any other group member (in both treatments, $p < 0.001$ for the difference between *A* and *D*, and $p < 0.01$ for the difference between *B* and *D*; for the difference between *C* and *D*, $p < 0.01$ in *E.Diff*, and $p < 0.05$ in *P&E.Diff*).²³

²¹ According to a two-side Mann-Whitney rank-sum test, $p < 0.01$ in all cases but for *D* in *E.Diff* for which $p < 0.05$.

²² According to a two-side Wilcoxon signed-rank, when focusing on *HC*–groups: $p < 0.01$ for all subject-types in *P&E.Diff*; $p < 0.05$ for all subject-types in *E.Diff*. When considering *HC*–groups, $p > 0.1$ in all cases.

²³ According to a two-side Wilcoxon signed-rank, when focusing on *HC*–groups, $p > 0.1$ for all pairwise differences between *D* and the other subject-types in *P&E.Diff*. In *E.Diff*, instead, $p > 0.1$ for the differences

Table 5: Profits of the subject-types in *P&E_Diff* and *E_Diff*: parametric results

Profit	<i>P&E_Diff</i>	<i>E_Diff</i>
<i>B</i>	6.005 (13.332)	1.831 (13.091)
<i>C</i>	19.405 (13.332)	10.386 (13.091)
<i>D</i>	51.038*** (13.332)	54.525*** (13.091)
<i>HC</i>	69.779*** (13.087)	61.976*** (11.713)
<i>B*HC</i>	15.359 (15.954)	16.301 (16.191)
<i>C*HC</i>	-6.708 (15.954)	19.319 (16.191)
<i>D*HC</i>	-32.924** (15.954)	-31.338* (16.191)
<i>Constant</i>	93.621*** (10.593)	97.096*** (9.278)
<i>Log likelihood</i>	-4151.091	-4164.836
<i>Wald chi2</i>	59.79	82.22
<i>Prob > chi2</i>	0.000	0.000
<i>Observations</i>	720	720
<i>Number of groups</i>	15	15

Notes. This table reports coefficient estimates (standard errors in parentheses) from two-way linear random effects models accounting for both potential individual dependency over periods and dependency within the group. The dependent variable is the profit obtained by the subject in the period. The other remarks of Tables 3 and 4 apply.

We summarize these findings on the welfare implications of the Gates effect in the following statement.

Result 5. In the two treatments with endowment heterogeneity, *E_Diff* and *P&E_Diff*, all group members benefit from successful coordination. Moreover, welfare inequality across members is lower in groups experiencing strong coordination over periods than in groups that perform poorly.

between *D* and *B*, and between *D* and *C*; for the difference between *D* and *A*, $p < 0.05$. When considering *LC*-groups, in *P&E_Diff*, for the differences between *D* and *A*, and between *D* and *B*, $p < 0.05$; for the difference between *D* and *C*; $p < 0.10$. In *E_Diff*, for the difference between *D* and *A*, and between *D* and *B*, $p < 0.05$.

5 Conclusion

Our results are broadly consistent with the idea that wealthy donors, whether individuals, foundations, or government donor agencies (e.g., USAID in international development efforts), have influence over the philanthropic agenda that goes beyond simply their higher donations. We show how their presence in the philanthropic landscape can pull the donations of other donors to their own preferred causes and opportunities. We refer to this tendency as the Gates' Effect.

Although we see no evidence in our experiment that the effect makes any donors worse off, it does reduce the variety of public goods that receive contributions and successfully reach their funding thresholds. In real world donation environments, this reduction in variety could have important implications for social welfare, if for example the preferences of the wealthiest donors are not representative of the broader needs of society. For example, this could be the case if donor preferences are driven by visibility or financial interests (or potentially national strategic interests in the case of USAID) rather than the needs of society as a whole, including non-donors and marginalized groups. Such possibilities are discussed in surveys of wealthy donors (e.g., Andrews, Bartczak, Brest, Shamash, & Tantia, 2020; Konrath & Clark, 2020; Steuerle et al., 2018) and political economy assessments of aid organizations (e.g., Rahman & Giessen, 2017).

It is important to recognize that no aspect of our study requires that the wealthiest donors are ultra-rich. In our experiment, for example, the wealthiest simply have moderately larger endowments than the next wealthiest donor, and yet the donor groups almost always focus on the good preferred by the wealthiest and ignore the good preferred by any others. This suggests that our results may give insights into a variety of settings, whether they involve several high net worth donors, or local fundraising efforts where the budget any donor can contribute is much smaller.

While the paper has largely interpreted the results in terms of philanthropic giving, the analysis may also give insight into donations to political causes or candidates. The model fits well an environment where party members choose which potential party candidate to contribute to during the primary stage of an election campaign in which the party candidate is selected for the general election. While party members may have different preferences over which internal candidate is best to lead the party, their ultimate goal is to eventually coordinate support around a single candidate for the general election. Our results, interpreted literally, illustrate how the larger giving power of the rich attract donations from other party members to the rich-preferred candidates. This does not mean that the other party members are worse off, but it does have implications for the type or representativeness of the candidates who receive enough funding to mount a viable campaign.

The results have important implications for fundraising environments, whether in philanthropy, crowdfunding, or politics. We show how the focus of donors on the recipients preferred by the wealthiest contributors exists even when the wealthy donors do not have a first mover advantage or the ability to set up matching funds or seed money, and even when less-wealthy donors understand that they individually prefer other recipients.

Just as we abstract from several complexities of fundraising environments, we also abstract from several important factors that facilitate donor coordination on the causes or projects preferred by those other than the wealthiest donors. Future research should consider in more detail the potential of common preferences among the less wealthy, sequential giving, or communication among donors to facilitate grassroots efforts or otherwise bring the donor focus to other contribution options.

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6 Appendix. Instructions and choice screen in *P&E_Diff*

[Instructions were originally written in Italian. The difference in the instructions between P&E_Diff and treatments with homogeneous endowments (Homogeneous and P_Diff) concerns the fact that, in the latter, all group members were endowed with 55 tokens. The difference in the instructions between P&E_Diff and treatments with homogeneous preferences (Homogeneous and E_Diff) concerns the fact that, in the latter, the bonus assigned to the selected public goods was equal to 30 points for all group members.]

Instructions

Welcome. Thanks for participating in this experiment. By following the instructions carefully, you can earn, based on your choices, an amount that will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. During the experiment it is not allowed to speak or communicate in any way with the other participants. If you have any questions, do not hesitate to contact the researcher through the chat. The following rules are the same for all participants.

General rules

At the beginning of the experiment you will be assigned randomly and anonymously to a group of 4 people respectively indicated with the letters A, B, C, and D. Of each of the other three members of your group you will not know either the earnings. The composition of your group and the initial assignment of the letters will remain the same throughout the entire experiment. The experiment consists of 12 periods, in each of which you will interact exclusively with the subjects of your group. At the start of the experiment, you and every other subject in your group will be given one of four possible sets of tokens so that subject A will receive 34 tokens, B will receive 48 tokens, C will receive 62 tokens, and finally D will receive 76 tokens. This means that, overall, your group will therefore have a total of 220 tokens in each period.

How earnings are determined in each period of the experiment Given your token allocation, you must decide how to divide it between an INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT and eight COLLECTIVE ACCOUNTS called respectively "WHITE", "YELLOW", "GREEN", "RED", "BLUE", "PURPLE", "BLACK" and "ORANGE". The nine ACCOUNTS generate a return expressed in points based on the following rules: INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT. You receive points from the INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT every time you pour tokens into it. In particular, for each token you paid into the INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT you will receive 2 points. "WHITE", "YELLOW", "GREEN", "RED", "BLUE", "PURPLE", "BLACK" and "ORANGE" COLLECTIVE ACCOUNT. Receive points from a COLLECTIVE ACCOUNT if and only if the total number of tokens paid into it by the subjects of your group is greater than or equal to a "threshold" of 132 tokens.

In particular: If the number of tokens paid by your group into a COLLECTIVE ACCOUNT is below the threshold of 132 tokens, then you do not receive any points either from the tokens you paid or from those paid by your group to that COLLECTIVE ACCOUNT. If the number of tokens paid by your group into a COLLECTIVE ACCOUNT is greater than or equal to the 132 chip threshold, then: for each token paid by you or any other person in your group into that COLLECTIVE ACCOUNT you receive 1 point; in addition, you are awarded a "bonus" in points whose size depends on the COLLECTIVE ACCOUNT to which the tokens were paid. What is the size of the bonus? In period 1, the computer will select four of the eight COLLECTIVE ACCOUNTS at random. The four COLLECTIVE ACCOUNTS selected by the computer will be called "SELECTED", while the remaining four will be called "NOT SELECTED". The bonus awarded to each person in the group by the four "NOT SELECTED" COLLECTIVE ACCOUNTS will be equal to 20 points. The bonus recognized by a "SELECTED" COLLECTIVE ACCOUNT depends on whether the subject considers that COLLECTIVE ACCOUNT as "FAVORITE" or "NOT FAVORITE": if for the subject that COLLECTIVE ACCOUNT is "FAVORITE", then the bonus awarded to the subject is of 39 points; if instead for the subject that COLLECTIVE ACCOUNT is "NOT FAVORITE", then the bonus awarded to the subject is 27 points. At the beginning of the first period, the computer will assign each participant a "FAVORITE" COLLECTIVE ACCOUNT from the four "SELECTED" so that each "SELECTED" COLLECTIVE ACCOUNT is preferred by only one person in the group.

How do you make your choices?

The computer will show you your token allocation and nine fields where you can enter your choices, one for the INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT and one for each of the eight COLLECTIVE AC-

COUNTS. In each of the eight fields, the computer will also show you the size of the bonus, 20, 27 or 39 points, awarded in the period to that COLLECTIVE ACCOUNT. A table will also show you which COLLECTIVE ACCOUNTS are PREFERRED by the other parties in the group and their token allocations. For each member of your group, the order in which the fields of the eight COLLECTIVE ACCOUNTS will appear on the screen will be determined randomly by the computer. The sum of the payments made by you in the nine ACCOUNTS must always be equal to your endowment of tokens; this means that in each period you will have to use the full amount of tokens at your disposal.

At the end of each period, the computer will show you how many tokens you have paid into the INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT, how many tokens you have paid into each of the eight COLLECTIVE ACCOUNTS, how many tokens your group has paid into each of the eight COLLECTIVE ACCOUNTS, how many points you have obtained from the ACCOUNT INDIVIDUAL, how many points you have obtained from each of the eight COLLECTIVE ACCOUNTS and how many points you have gained in the period. At the end of the experiment, the points gained over the 12 periods will be converted into Euros at the exchange rate of 150 points = 1 EUR.

Periodo
1 di 12

Tempo rimanente 55

PERIODO 1: VERSAMENTO GETTONI AI FONDI
DOTAZIONE DI GETTONI: 34
Tu sei il soggetto: A
FONDI COLLETTIVI SELEZIONATI: BLU, ARANCIONE, NERO, VERDE

SOGGETTO	DOTAZIONE DI GETTONI	FONDO COLLETTIVO PREFERITO
A	34	BLU
B	48	ARANCIONE
C	62	NERO
D	76	VERDE

FONDO INDIVIDUALE
GETTONI da te versati (da 0 a 34): 0

FONDO COLLETTIVO "BIANCO" SOGLIA: 132 BONUS in punti: 20 GETTONI da te versati (da 0 a 34): 0	FONDO COLLETTIVO "BLU" SOGLIA: 132 BONUS in punti: 39 GETTONI da te versati (da 0 a 34): 0	FONDO COLLETTIVO "VIOLA" SOGLIA: 132 BONUS in punti: 20 GETTONI da te versati (da 0 a 34): 0	FONDO COLLETTIVO "VERDE" SOGLIA: 132 BONUS in punti: 27 GETTONI da te versati (da 0 a 34): 0
FONDO COLLETTIVO "GIALLO" SOGLIA: 132 BONUS in punti: 20 GETTONI da te versati (da 0 a 34): 0	FONDO COLLETTIVO "NERO" SOGLIA: 132 BONUS in punti: 27 GETTONI da te versati (da 0 a 34): 0	FONDO COLLETTIVO "ARANCIONE" SOGLIA: 132 BONUS in punti: 27 GETTONI da te versati (da 0 a 34): 0	FONDO COLLETTIVO "ROSSO" SOGLIA: 132 BONUS in punti: 20 GETTONI da te versati (da 0 a 34): 0

OK

Figure A.1: Choice Screen in *P&E_Diff*.