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# Global Engagement and the Occupational Structure of Firms

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# Global Engagement and the Occupational Structure of Firms

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**Abstract:** Engagement in foreign markets can have an impact on firm organization and on the type of occupations that a firm needs. We examine the effect of globalization on the occupational mix using detailed Swedish data that cover all firms and a representative sample of the labor force for 1997-2005. We find a robust relationship between a firm's degree of international integration and its occupational mix. Multinationals, which are the most globally engaged firms, have a distribution of occupations skewed toward the more skilled. Non-multinational exporters have a distribution of occupations less skewed toward skilled compared to multinationals, but more skewed toward skilled occupations compared to Swedish non-exporters (which are the least globally engaged). Moreover, firms tend to have an even more skill intensive distribution of occupations when they mainly export to far away markets, or when they export differentiated goods. Our results are little changed (1) when we control for firm size, productivity, capital intensity, and firm age, (2) when we control for offshoring and R&D expenditures; (3) when we use alternative methods to rank occupations, or (4) when we conduct alternative robustness tests. In addition, the results are very similar for manufacturing and non-manufacturing, and for foreign and Swedish multinationals. We interpret our results using a decomposition motivated by recent theoretical models of selection into exporting and FDI.

**JEL:** F14; F16; J20

**Keywords:** Occupational mix; Globalization; Multinational Enterprises; Export; Firms

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## 1. Introduction

Profits are the *raison d'être* for firms. Toward this end, firms undertake a variety of tasks in addition to production. These supporting tasks include *inter alia* research, financial management, logistics, marketing, and sales. Each of these activities, including actual production, requires the input of workers who are trained in various occupations (e.g., managers, professionals, operators, and clerks). It is likely that the mix of occupations required to undertake various activities varies across firms. In particular, the tasks required to support a multinational enterprise (MNE) are likely to differ from those required to support a non-MNE that exports, which in turn are likely to differ from a firm that has no global engagement at all. However, a decade after the seminal work of Melitz (2003), “[t]he productivity of the firm remains largely a black box and we still have relatively little understanding of the separate roles played by production technology, management practice, firm organization and product attributes towards variation in revenues across firms” (Melitz and Redding, 2013).<sup>1</sup> In this paper we aim at shedding light on the organization of production within firms, as captured by the distribution of occupations, and its relationship with a firm’s international orientation.

In our empirical investigation we focus on workers that are included within a firm’s boundaries. We use comprehensive and detailed Swedish matched employer-employee data spanning the period 1997-2005. The data include all Swedish firms with at least 20 employees and detailed information on a representative sample of the labor force. In particular, we have information on the occupations for all included employees at a very detailed level (100 occupations). We are therefore able to examine how the degree of a firm’s global integration relates to the distribution of occupations within the firm.

A first look at the results is seen in Figure 1 which displays the aggregate distribution of occupations by skill levels for three different firm types: (i) the most integrated ones – MNEs; (ii) the least integrated ones – Local firms (i.e., non-MNEs that do not export); and (iii) the intermediate firm type – Exporters (i.e., non-MNEs that export). The horizontal axis is the ranking of 100 occupations by skill levels, from the least skilled to the most skilled. The vertical axis is the cumulative

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<sup>1</sup> See also Arkolakis (2010), who argues that the nature of entry costs to foreign markets remains largely unexplained.

employment share of the labor force accounted for by the skill category that is indicated on the horizontal axis. Panel (a) shows occupations ranked according to the average wage for all firms in 1997 and panel (b) is based on a regression ranking.<sup>2</sup>

Figure 1 shows that roughly 50 percent of the employees hired by Exporters are in the 50 percent lowest ranked occupations. The corresponding figures for MNEs and Local firms are roughly 40 and 70 percent respectively. Moreover, Exporters have a distribution close to the 45 degree line, meaning that their employees are evenly distributed over occupations by skill categories. Looking at MNEs, it is seen that their distribution is skewed towards high skilled occupations. The opposite is true for Local firms which have a distribution skewed towards low skilled occupations.

More elaborated econometric estimations in the paper show a robust relationship between the degree of international integration and the distribution of occupations at the firm level. MNEs, which are the most globally engaged, have a distribution of occupations skewed toward the more skilled. Non-MNE exporters have a distribution of occupations less skewed toward the skilled compared to multinationals, but more skewed toward the skilled compared to Swedish non-exporters (which are the least globally engaged). Our benchmark estimates imply that relative to Local firms, the average wage is about 9 percent higher in MNEs, and about 7 percent in Exporters. Note that these wage differentials arise from the difference in the occupational structure across firm types rather than the pay gap between Local firms and MNEs/Exporters within the same occupation.

Furthermore, firms tend to be even more skill intensive when they mainly export to far away markets or when they produce differentiated products. Our results are little changed (1) when we control for firm size, productivity, capital intensity, and firm age; (2) when we control for offshoring and R&D expenditures; (3) when we use alternative methods to rank occupations; or (4) when we use wage shares instead of employment shares. In addition, the results are very similar for manufacturing and non-manufacturing, and for foreign and Swedish MNEs.

In order to explain the empirical results, we develop a decomposition that relates to the literature emphasizing fixed costs associated with internationalization. For instance, Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) stress the different productivity requirements for engaging in production for

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<sup>2</sup> The beta ranking is derived from Mincer wage regressions. See Section 2.C. for more details.

domestic sales, export, and foreign direct investment (FDI). Compared to non-exporters, exporters need to incur an iceberg transport cost and an additional fixed cost for entering a foreign market which is higher than the fixed cost for domestic production. A firm can also choose to sell to the foreign market via foreign affiliates, which implies an even higher fixed cost, but no transport cost. Their model suggests that the most productive firms can cover the highest fixed costs and will pursue FDI, firms with an intermediate level of productivity will export, and the least productive firms will produce for the domestic market only.

Motivated by Helpman et al. (2004), our decomposition focuses on the distinction between fixed and variable inputs. We first think of these inputs as being produced by workers in different occupations. We then assume that fixed inputs, needed for internationalization and production, are intensive in professional occupations such as managers and professionals; with variable inputs being intensive in lower-skilled occupations such as clerks and operators. It naturally follows that, holding all else equal, firms with a higher share of fixed costs also employ a higher share of high-skilled occupations relative to those with a lower share of fixed cost. From Helpman et al. (2004), the share of fixed cost is positively correlated with the degree of global engagement, therefore a positive correlation between the degree of global engagement and the skill-intensity of occupational mix.<sup>3</sup>

There are few previous theoretical papers that examine the relationship between globalization and the organization of production within firms. One exception is Matsuyama (2007) who constructs a model where factor intensities can differ within products. Production for export is assumed to be more skill intensive than production for domestic sales since export requires “white-collar workers, particularly those with language skills, international business experiences and/or specialists in export finance and maritime insurance.” Matsuyama shows that an increase in the world supply of skilled labor will therefore increase the degree of globalization.

Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) construct a model with heterogeneous firms in a monopolistically competitive market. Managers solve problems that production workers are not able to solve and a firm can have many layers of managers where higher layers solve more complicated

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<sup>3</sup> As we note in Section 3 and Appendix B, this is only a partial effect since firms with different degrees of global engagement differ along other dimensions (e.g., size and productivity) that could also correlate with occupational mix.

problems. Adding a layer of managers involves new fixed costs but reduces variable costs. Productivity is endogenous in this model and depends on the number of layers of management. The number of layers is in turn dependent on the demand for the firm's product since the extra fixed cost of layers can only be motivated if the scale of production is sufficiently high. Demand is exogenous and only firms with a large demand for their products can afford enough layers to make the firms so productive that it can cover the fixed cost for exporting.

Our paper also relates to a small but growing empirical literature on globalization and firm organization. For instance, Rajan and Wulf (2006) find that U.S. firms have become flatter over time in that they have fewer layers of management. Moreover, Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) find that trade liberalization makes firms flatten their organizations by removing layers between the CEO and division managers, and by increasing the number of positions that report directly to the CEO, a result that is in contrast with the theoretical predictions by Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012). Caliendo et al. (2012) use French firm level data with information on five different occupation categories - three types of management, clerks and blue-collar workers – to examine the wage effect of adding a layer (one of the above categories) or by expanding existing layers. They report that exporters are more likely to add layers than non-exporters, and that firms that exit the export market are more likely to drop layers than firms that continue to export.<sup>4</sup> In addition, new exporters that add layers decrease average wages in existing layers, while exporters that do not add layers increase average wages. Unlike these empirical studies that focus on organizational hierarchy, our work focuses on the occupational mix in firms with different degrees of global engagement.

Finally, the previous FDI literature has documented that multinational firms are more skill intensive than domestic firms (e.g., see Markusen 1995 and Barba-Navaretti and Venables 2004 for a survey of this literature). Bernard and Jensen (1997) and others have provided strong evidence that exporters are more skill intensive than non-exporters. However, due to data limitations, these previous studies usually define production workers as the unskilled and non-production workers as the skilled.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Tåg (2013), using Swedish data, also finds firms with more layers being larger in size, in value added, and pay higher wages. His analysis is however not related to internationalization of firms.

<sup>5</sup> One exception is Handwerker, Kim and Mason (2011) who find that the U.S.-based multinational companies employ a disproportionate larger number of engineers compared to other U.S. establishments.

Our data allows us to dig deeper into this issue because we have a much finer classification of occupations. We are therefore able to offer new insights that build on the previous work. For example, as we indicated earlier, Figure 1 reveals that Exporters tend to use a workforce evenly distributed across occupations while the distribution for MNEs is heavily skewed towards the high skill occupations. Furthermore, our study reveals new patterns of the variation in the occupational mix across firms that serve different destination markets or specialize in different export products.

The paper is organized as follows. In the following section we begin with some descriptive statistics of the comprehensive Swedish matched employer-employee data. In Section 3 we sketch out a simple theoretical framework to understand the empirical facts revealed by our data. Our model suggests systematic differences in occupational mix across firm modalities. We then turn to detailed empirical analysis in Section 4. We offer concluding remarks in Section 5.

## **2. Data and descriptive statistics**

We use register-based matched employer-employee data from Statistics Sweden covering the period 1997-2005. The firm data contain detailed firm-level information on all Swedish firms. Variables such as value added, capital stock (book value), number of employees, wages, ownership status, sales, and industry are included. Moreover, regional labor market statistics provide information on education and demographics at the plant level, which we aggregate to the firm level. The worker data cover detailed information on a representative sample of the labor force, including full-time equivalent wages, education, occupation (ISCO-88), and gender.<sup>6</sup>

Firm level data on export and import of goods originate from the Swedish Foreign Trade Statistics, collected by Statistics Sweden and available by products and countries at the firm level. Based on compulsory registration at the Swedish Customs, the data covers all trade transactions from outside the EU. Trade data for EU countries are available for all firms with a yearly import or export of approximately 1.5 million SEK and above. According to the figures from Statistics Sweden, the

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<sup>6</sup> The worker data originate from the Swedish annual salary survey (*Lönestrukturstatistiken*). The sampling units of survey consist of firms included in Statistics Sweden's firm data base (FS). A representative sample of firms is drawn from FS and stratified according to industry affiliation and firm size (number of employees). The sample size consists of between 8,000 and 11,000 firms. The Central Confederation of Private Employers then provides employee information to Statistics Sweden on all its member firms that have (i) at least ten employees and (ii) are included in the sample. Firms with at least 500 employees are examined with probability one. The final sample includes information on around 50% of all employees within the private sector.



data covers around 92 percent of total goods trade within the EU. Material imports are defined at the five-digit level according to NACE Rev 1.1 and grouped into major industrial groups (MIGs).<sup>7</sup> The MIG code classifies imports according to their intended use. We use the MIG definition of intermediate inputs as our offshoring variable.

All data sets are matched by unique identification codes. To make the sample of firms consistent across the time periods, we restrict our analysis to firms with at least 20 employees in the non-agricultural private sector, which are available throughout the period.

#### *A. Distribution of firms*

Firms can be classified by their international integration along different criteria. One possible classification scheme is seen in Figure 2 where the different categories are mutually exclusive. Figures on the share of different firm categories are for the period 1997-2005. The first criterion is ownership, where we distinguish between MNEs or non-MNEs. MNEs can be Swedish or foreign owned. The next criteria is whether the firm is an exporter or only sells to the domestic market, and the final criteria is whether the firm is engaged in offshoring or not.

Most Swedish firms are internationally integrated in at least some respects. About 27 percent of the firms are internationally integrated in all three dimensions: they are MNEs that both export and offshore. A relatively large number of non-MNEs are also engaged in exporting and/or offshoring. For instance, 21 percent of the firms are non-MNEs that are engaged in both exporting and offshoring. Finally, around 30 percent of the firms are not internationally integrated in any dimension.

Moreover, we have data on 8,236,835 individual-year observations divided by firm types and industries. About 46 percent of these individuals work in MNEs that both export and offshore and another 24 percent in non-MNEs that both export and offshore. In manufacturing industries the majority of employees work in the most internationally integrated firms – MNEs that export and offshore, or in non-MNEs that export and offshore. Firms that have low levels of international integration are mainly found in non-manufacturing, especially in Health and Education.

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<sup>7</sup> MIG is a European Community classification of products: Major Industrial Groupings (NACE rev1 aggregates).

Because the vast majority of MNEs are also engaged in both export and offshoring, and non-MNE exporters tend to offshore at the same time, we group firms into three types which will be used in the analysis: MNEs – defined as multinational firms; Exporters – defined as non-MNEs that export; and Local firms – defined as non-MNEs that do not export. Since the number of Local firms is very small in manufacturing industries, for the manufacturing sector we mainly show the difference between MNEs and non-MNEs (most of which are exporters).

*B. Do firms differ in the distribution of occupations?*

We begin by considering four broad occupation categories: clerks, operators, professionals and managers.<sup>8</sup> These four occupations are ranked from low to high in terms of wages. Figure 3 shows the employment shares differ in key sectors of the economy. For the two largest manufacturing industries, Motor Vehicles and Machinery & Equipment, the main difference between MNEs and Exporters is in the shares of professionals and operators: MNEs have a significantly higher share of professionals, but a lower share of operators. For non-manufacturing, we also have a large number of Swedish firms that neither export nor offshore. Thus, we plot the occupation mix for all three types of firms. We choose Transport, Storage & Communication, and Wholesale & Retail because they are tied to domestic and international trade. Again, we find that MNEs and Exporters have a higher share of professionals, but Local firms have the lowest share of professionals.<sup>9</sup> Thus, there is evidence that more globally engaged firms have an occupational mix skewed toward higher skills.

The pattern revealed by Figure 3 holds for a wide range of industries. In Table 1 we show the regression results of the following specification

$$(1) \quad \lambda_{ft}^k = \alpha_M^k M_{ft} + \alpha_X^k E_{ft} + Z_{ft} \gamma^k + D_i^k + D_t^k + \varepsilon_{ft}^k$$

where  $k$ ,  $f$ ,  $i$  and  $t$  index occupations, firms, industries and years respectively;  $\lambda_{ft}^k$  is the employment

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<sup>8</sup> Using the ISCO88 (International Standard Classification of Occupations), “managers” correspond to major group 1 (legislators, senior officials and managers), “professionals” correspond to major groups 2 (professionals) and 3 (technicians and associate professionals), “operators” correspond to major groups 7 (craft and related trades workers) and 8 (plant and machine operators and assemblers), and “clerks” correspond to major groups 4 (office clerks), 5 (service workers and shop and market sales workers), 6 (skilled agricultural and fishery workers), and 9 (elementary occupations). See Table A1 in Appendix A for a list of occupations at the 3-digit ISCO.

<sup>9</sup>We also looked at the occupation mix for aggregate manufacturing or services. Again, MNEs and Exporters have a substantially higher share of professionals than Local firms.

share of occupation  $k$  at firm  $f$  in year  $t$ ; <sup>10</sup>  $M_{ft}$  is an indicator of multinational firms (MNE);  $E_{ft}$  is an indicator of non-MNE exporters;  $Z_{ft}$  is a vector of firm characteristics that might affect the employment share, including firm size (the number of employees), capital intensity (capital-labor ratio), labor productivity (value added per worker), and firm age;  $D_i^k$  and  $D_t^k$  are occupation-industry and occupation-year fixed effects; and  $\varepsilon_{ft}^k$  is the error term. The occupation-industry fixed effects control for technology differences across industries, and the occupation-year fixed effects control for common macro-level shocks that may affect firm-level employment decisions. Since Local firms are the excluded firm group, the coefficient  $\alpha_M^k$  represents the difference in employment shares between MNEs and Local firms, and the coefficient  $\alpha_X^k$  represents the difference in employment shares between non-MNE exporters and Local firms.

As shown in Table 1, MNEs and Exporters have, as expected, relatively high shares of managers and professionals, and low shares of operators and clerks. Moreover, the result is not sensitive to inclusion of various firm level characteristics. It is also seen that the difference between MNEs and Local firms is larger than the difference between Exporters and Local firms: the coefficient for MNEs is always larger than the coefficient for Exporters. The difference seems to be particularly large for professionals and operators and smaller for managers and clerks.

Finally, looking at our control variables we note that productivity is positively correlated with the share of professionals, and capital intensity has a positive correlation with the share of operators. Further, the coefficient on size is negative for managers and operators and positive for clerks.

### *C. A more detailed look at the occupational mix across firm types*

Since skill requirements may vary substantially within the four broad occupation groups, we turn to occupation categories at the 3-digit ISCO in order to provide a more detailed analysis of the occupational mix across firm types. After merging occupations with very few observations, we end up with 100 different occupations. We run separate regressions of equation (1) for each of the 100 occupations. The regression results are shown in Table A1 in Appendix A.

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<sup>10</sup> In the rest of the paper our core estimates use employment shares of different occupations. Some empirical work on globalization and labor demand uses changes in wage shares as the dependent variable (e.g. Becker et al., 2013 and Hakkala et al., 2014). We will therefore also use wage shares as a robustness test. Results are basically unchanged when we use wage shares rather than employment shares. See Section 4.F for more details.

To better illustrate the results, we rank occupations by skill levels. Our preferred measure, the “beta ranking”, is based on estimated Mincer wage regressions at the worker level. For each year we run regressions with individual wages as the dependent variable and with experience, experience squared, gender, education and occupation at the 3-digit level as independent variables. Industry fixed-effects are also included. We then compute the skill level of an occupation using the estimated coefficient for that occupation plus the product of the estimated coefficient on education and the median education for the particular occupation. In the following analysis we use the ranking for the initial year (1997) of the sample. The results are unchanged when the average ranking over the entire sample period is used. As a robustness check, we use two alternative ways to measure the skill level of occupations. The first alternative measure is based on the mean wage for each occupation in 1997. Because of the concern about the dominate effect of MNEs on wages, we also compute the mean wage for each occupation using the sample of non-MNE firms.<sup>11</sup> Since there are very high correlations between different ranking measures (over 95%), our results are unchanged when the alternative measures are used.

We rank occupations by skill levels from the lowest ( $k = 1$ ) to the highest ( $k = 100$ ). For a particular occupation  $k = k_0$ , we compute the cumulative employment share differential between MNEs and Local firms as  $\sum_{k=1}^{k_0} \alpha_M^k$  where  $\alpha_M^k$  is the difference between MNEs and Local firms in the employment share of occupation  $k$  estimated from equation (1). In Figure 4 panel (a) we plot the cumulative employment share differential  $\sum_{k=1}^{k_0} \alpha_M^k$  against the beta ranking of occupation  $k_0$ . Since the sum of employment shares across all occupations should be one for any firm type, it is easy to show  $\sum_{k=1}^{100} \alpha_M^k = 0$ , meaning that the curve must meet the horizontal axis at the most skilled occupation (“Directors and chief executives”).

Two interesting patterns emerge from this plot. First, the curve declines over two-thirds of the occupations at the lower end, indicating that MNEs have a smaller employment share of these occupations (mostly clerks and operators) than Local firms.<sup>12</sup> Overall, the employment share of these

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<sup>11</sup> Some studies find multinational firms to pay higher wages than local firms (see e.g. Heyman et al. 2007).

<sup>12</sup> Note that  $\alpha_M^{k_0} = \sum_{k=1}^{k_0} \alpha_M^k - \sum_{k=1}^{k_0-1} \alpha_M^k$  is the difference between MNEs and Local firms in the employment share of occupation  $k_0$ . This is the marginal difference in employment shares. Thus, if  $\alpha_M^{k_0} < 0$  meaning that

lower skilled occupations is nearly 25 percentage points lower in MNEs than in Local firms. More than half of the difference is attributable to these three occupations: Motor-vehicles drivers (beta ranking = 16 and  $\alpha_M^k = -5.95\%$ ); Building finishers and related trade workers (beta ranking = 35 and  $\alpha_M^k = -4.46\%$ ); and Shop, stall and market salespersons (beta ranking = 37 and  $\alpha_M^k = -5.39\%$ ). On the other hand, this lower-end portion of the curve also has a small jump at the occupation ranking slightly above 20. As reported in Table A1 in Appendix A, it corresponds to “Material-recording and transport clerks” (beta ranking = 25 and  $\alpha_M^k = 2.01\%$ ). This difference in employment share is relatively large compared to the average employment share of 1.96 percent for the whole economy, and could arise from the need by MNEs to operate a more complex production and sales network than Local firms.

Second, for one-third of the occupations at the higher end, the curve is almost monotonically increasing, which indicates that for these occupations, MNEs have higher employment shares than Local firms (see footnote 12). Since these higher skilled occupations are mostly professionals and managers, the result suggests that the pattern displayed by Figure 3 and Table 1 holds for more detailed occupation classifications. As shown in Table A1, the employment share difference is largest for professionals specialized in finance and sales (ISCO 341, 241), computing (ISCO 213, 312), and engineering (ISCO 311, 214). The difference in the employment share for these six professional occupations is almost 16 percentage points between MNEs and Local firms.

Figure 4 panel (b) displays the cumulative employment share differential between non-MNE exporters and Local firms against the beta ranking of occupations. The key patterns are similar to those in panel (a). Compared to Local firms, non-MNE exporters have smaller employment shares of less skilled occupations and higher employment shares of more skilled occupations. Comparing the two plots in panels (a) and (b), we can see that MNEs have a distribution of employment even more skewed toward skilled, and the difference from Local firms in skill distribution is even larger.

In panels (c) and (d) we show the plots based on the estimates of  $\alpha_M^k$  and  $\alpha_X^k$  when firm

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MNEs have a smaller employment share of occupation  $k_0$  than Local firms, the cumulative employment share differential declines i.e.,  $\sum_{k=1}^{k_0} \alpha_M^k < \sum_{k=1}^{k_0-1} \alpha_M^k$ . Similarly, the cumulative employment share differential increases if MNEs have a bigger employment share of a particular occupation than Local firms.

characteristics are controlled for. After adding controls for firm characteristics, the difference in skill distribution between MNEs and Local firms becomes slightly smaller, suggesting that part of the difference between MNEs and local firms is attributable to differences between these two firm types in terms of firm productivity, size, capital intensity, and firm age. However, the key patterns remain unchanged after controlling for firm characteristics. A similar observation can be made for panel (d) for the difference between non-MNE exporters and Local firms.

### 3. A Conceptual Framework

Before continuing our exploration of the data, we develop a conceptual framework to better understand why we might expect systematic differences in the occupational structure of employment across firms with different characteristics. Our framework builds on the Melitz (2003) model of selection into exporting as modified by Helpman et al. (2004) to account for multinationals.<sup>13</sup>

Let  $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$  be a vector of characteristics that describe a firm. Characteristics could be exogenous or endogenous; continuous or discrete; observable or unobservable. Examples include productivity, distance to market, whether the firm is an exporter, age, capital stock, and so on. All of these factors potentially affect the firm's occupational mix and production costs.

Given market conditions each single-product firm chooses its profit-maximizing output level, denoted by  $q$ , which depends on  $\mathbf{x}$ . We assume that firms hire workers to fill particular occupational categories and define a production function  $q(\mathbf{x}) = F(L^1, \dots, L^K, \mathbf{x})$ , where  $L^k$  represents the number of workers employed in occupation  $k$ . Letting  $w^k$  represent the occupation-specific wage, the firm's occupational structure is the solution of the following cost-minimization problem:

$$(2) \quad \min_{(L^1, \dots, L^K)} \sum_{k=1}^K w^k L^k \quad \text{subject to } F(L^1, \dots, L^K, \mathbf{x}) \geq q$$

From (2), we can write occupation-specific employment as  $L^k(q, \mathbf{x})$ , emphasizing that it is a function of the firm's vector of characteristics.<sup>14</sup> Summing over all occupations, we obtain the firm's total employment, which we denote as  $L(q, \mathbf{x}) = \sum L^k(q, \mathbf{x})$ .

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<sup>13</sup> See Appendix B for a brief outline of the Helpman et al. (2004) model.

<sup>14</sup> Occupation-specific employment also depends on the vector of occupation-specific wages; however we take that vector as unchanged throughout the analysis. This allows us to simplify the notation.

In addition to classifying employment by occupation, we can also classify employment according to whether it is fixed or variable. In principle, any given occupation can consist of both components. For example, a large firm may employ more managers than a small firm, but all firms need at least one manager. Using subscripts to represent fixed and variable and assuming that variable employment of any occupation is proportional to output, we can then define  $L_f(\mathbf{x}) = \sum L_f^k(\mathbf{x})$  and  $L_v(q, \mathbf{x}) = q \sum L_v^k(\mathbf{x})$ . Using this notation, the firm's total employment is represented by (3):

$$(3) \quad L(q, \mathbf{x}) = L_f(\mathbf{x}) + L_v(q, \mathbf{x}).$$

In accord with our empirical work, define  $\lambda^k(q, \mathbf{x})$  as employment in occupation  $k$  as a share of the firm's total employment. This share can be decomposed into three parts. The first part is fixed employment as a share of the total, represent by  $\Lambda_f(q, \mathbf{x}) \equiv L_f(\mathbf{x})/L(q, \mathbf{x})$ . The remaining two parts are the employment of workers in occupation  $k$  relative to all workers associated with fixed employment and relative to all workers associated with variable employment. We use  $\lambda_f^k(\mathbf{x}) = L_f^k(\mathbf{x})/L_f(\mathbf{x})$  and  $\lambda_v^k(\mathbf{x}) = L_v^k(\mathbf{x})/L_v(\mathbf{x})$  to represent these components. Using this notation:

$$(4) \quad \lambda^k(q, \mathbf{x}) = \Lambda_f(q, \mathbf{x})\lambda_f^k(\mathbf{x}) + (1 - \Lambda_f(q, \mathbf{x}))\lambda_v^k(\mathbf{x}).$$

Our interest is in describing how occupational mix varies with a firm's characteristics. Toward that end, consider two different firms defined by  $(q^i, \mathbf{x}^i)$  and  $(q^j, \mathbf{x}^j)$ . From (4):

$$(5) \quad \begin{aligned} \lambda^k(q^j, \mathbf{x}^j) - \lambda^k(q^i, \mathbf{x}^i) &= \Lambda_f(q^j, \mathbf{x}^j)\{\lambda_f^k(\mathbf{x}^j) - \lambda_f^k(\mathbf{x}^i)\} + \{1 - \Lambda_f(q^j, \mathbf{x}^j)\}\{\lambda_v^k(\mathbf{x}^j) - \lambda_v^k(\mathbf{x}^i)\} \\ &\quad + \{\Lambda_f(q^j, \mathbf{x}^j) - \Lambda_f(q^i, \mathbf{x}^i)\}\{\lambda_f^k(\mathbf{x}^i) - \lambda_v^k(\mathbf{x}^i)\} \end{aligned}$$

The decomposition in (5) reveals that the difference in occupational structures of two firms results from a combination of effects. Specifically, the two firms differ in their use of occupations within fixed and variable employment (the *within* effect); and they differ in their balance between fixed and variable employment (the *between* effect).

We need to add some structure to the problem in order to sign the left-hand side of (5). As in our empirical work, we order occupations such that occupation 1 is the least skilled, and occupation  $K$  is the most skilled. We then make several assumptions.

Assumption 1: For any vector of characteristics  $\mathbf{x}^i$ ,  $\lambda_f^k(\mathbf{x}^i) - \lambda_v^k(\mathbf{x}^i)$  is weakly increasing in the occupational index. Because  $\sum_k \lambda_f^k(\mathbf{x}^i) = \sum_k \lambda_v^k(\mathbf{x}^i) = 1$ , there exists an occupation  $\hat{k}$  such that  $\lambda_f^k(\mathbf{x}^i) \geq \lambda_v^k(\mathbf{x}^i)$  for  $k \geq \hat{k}$ , and  $\lambda_f^k(\mathbf{x}^i) \leq \lambda_v^k(\mathbf{x}^i)$  for  $k < \hat{k}$ .

The essence of this assumption is that fixed employment is relatively intensive in the use of more skilled occupations. For example, we typically think of fixed costs as involving marketing, research and development, and management, all of which require highly skilled workers; whereas variable costs are tied to production, which requires operators and other low-skilled workers. This assumption does not preclude the possibility that occupations are used in the same proportions in both fixed and variable employment. Moreover,  $\hat{k}$  may itself be a function of  $\mathbf{x}^i$ .

Assumption 2: Define three types of firms: Local firms that serve only the domestic market ( $D$ ), those that serve the domestic market and export ( $E$ ) and those that are multinational ( $M$ ). As in Helpman et al. (2004), we assume that fixed employment is highest for  $M$  and lowest for  $D$ .

In terms of (4), Assumption 2 means that  $\Lambda_f(q, \mathbf{x}^M) > \Lambda_f(q, \mathbf{x}^E) > \Lambda_f(q, \mathbf{x}^D)$ , where the three firms all have the same characteristics except for their status as multinational, exporter, or domestic. Combining Assumptions 1 and 2 and focusing only on the between effect, we conclude that firms that are more globally engaged use larger shares of occupations  $k \geq \hat{k}$ . This is a ceteris paribus result as it disregards the within effects and neutralizes any between-firm differences other than the additional fixed employment needed to sustain greater international engagement.

In his model generalizing trade costs, Matsuyama (2007) makes the argument that supplying a foreign market requires more intensive use of workers with expertise in languages, export finance, and maritime insurance, all of which are associated with relatively skilled occupations.<sup>15</sup> We incorporate this argument in the following assumption.

Assumption 3: The share of high-skilled occupations used in fixed and variable employment is weakly increasing in international engagement. That is, there exists  $\hat{k}_f$  such that  $\lambda_f^k(\mathbf{x}^M) \geq \lambda_f^k(\mathbf{x}^E) \geq \lambda_f^k(\mathbf{x}^D)$  for  $k \geq \hat{k}_f$ ; and there exists  $\hat{k}_v$  such that  $\lambda_v^k(\mathbf{x}^M) \geq \lambda_v^k(\mathbf{x}^E) \geq \lambda_v^k(\mathbf{x}^D)$  for  $k \geq \hat{k}_v$ .

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<sup>15</sup> Matsuyama (2007) considers only the difference between domestic sales and exports.



Given Assumptions 2 and 3, the within and between effects work in the same direction for  $k \geq \max(\hat{k}, \hat{k}_f, \hat{k}_v)$  and for  $k \leq \min(\hat{k}, \hat{k}_f, \hat{k}_v)$ . In particular,  $\lambda^k(q, \mathbf{x}^M) \geq \lambda^k(q, \mathbf{x}^E) \geq \lambda^k(q, \mathbf{x}^D)$  for  $k \geq \max(\hat{k}, \hat{k}_f, \hat{k}_v)$ ; and  $\lambda^k(q, \mathbf{x}^M) \leq \lambda^k(q, \mathbf{x}^E) \leq \lambda^k(q, \mathbf{x}^D)$  for  $k \leq \min(\hat{k}, \hat{k}_f, \hat{k}_v)$ . The relationship between occupational share and the degree of global engagement is ambiguous for occupations  $\min(\hat{k}, \hat{k}_f, \hat{k}_v) < k < \max(\hat{k}, \hat{k}_f, \hat{k}_v)$  since the within and between effects tend to offset each other. This range of ambiguity is consistent with our scatter plots in Figure 4, where the relationships between the differences in cumulative employment shares and occupational rankings for different types of firms are fairly clear for low-ranking and high-ranking occupations, but less clear for those occupations with mid-range skill ranking.

In the Melitz (2003) model, firms self-select into exporters or non-exporters according to their exogenously-given productivity. The highest productivity firms have the lowest marginal cost, allowing them to reach a large enough export market to overcome the fixed costs of exporting. Helpman et al. (2004) extend the analysis to include multinational firms, demonstrating that the most productive firms select into multinational status, somewhat less productive firms export, and the least productive firms only serve the domestic market.<sup>16</sup> In both of these models, differences in productivity only appear in variable cost. We maintain that assumption here.

*Assumption 4:* Productivity differences between firms only affect variable employment, not fixed employment. Specifically, let  $\varphi$  represent productivity. Then  $L_f(\mathbf{x}^j) = L_f(\mathbf{x}^i)$  and  $L_v(\mathbf{x}^j) = \frac{\varphi_i}{\varphi_j} L_v(\mathbf{x}^i)$  where productivity is the only difference between  $i$  and  $j$ .

If we combine the modeling strategy of Melitz (2003) or Helpman et al. (2004) with our first two assumptions, there would be an indirect relationship between a firm's productivity and its occupational structure. The most productive firms would be multinationals, and these firms would use the highest share of the most skilled occupations. However, there would be no direct relationship between productivity and occupational structure. That is, holding the degree of global engagement (and all other variables) constant, occupational mix would not depend on firm productivity. We argue

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<sup>16</sup> One of the drawbacks of Helpman et al. is that firms can only be exporters *or* multinationals, not both. This is counterfactual. We address this issue in Appendix B.

that this is a narrow view of productivity. For example, firm productivity might be endogenous, with firms that are biased in the use of more-skilled occupations generating higher productivity. This would be the case if productivity is embodied in capital equipment, with the operation of more sophisticated (and presumably more productive) equipment requiring more intensive use of higher-skilled occupations (thus, technology and productivity would be a choice made by firms, as in Yeaple 2005). Neither of these complications are important for describing the selection in Melitz (2003) or Helpman et al. (2004), but they may be empirically relevant when examining cross-firm differences in occupational structure. We therefore make the following assumption.

*Assumption 5:* The share of high-skilled occupations within fixed and variable employment is weakly increasing in productivity. That is, there exist  $\hat{k}_{f\varphi}$  and  $\hat{k}_{v\varphi}$  such that  $\lambda_f^k(\mathbf{x}^j) \geq \lambda_f^k(\mathbf{x}^i)$  for  $k \geq \hat{k}_{f\varphi}$  and  $\lambda_v^k(\mathbf{x}^j) \geq \lambda_v^k(\mathbf{x}^i)$  for  $k \geq \hat{k}_{v\varphi}$  if the only difference between  $i$  and  $j$  is that  $\varphi_j > \varphi_i$ .

Suppose that  $\varphi_j > \varphi_i$ . From Assumption 4,  $\Lambda_f(q, \mathbf{x}^j) - \Lambda_f(q, \mathbf{x}^i) > 0$ . That is, the more productive firm has a higher share of fixed employment. This implies from Assumption 1, that the between effect increases the more productive firm's share of occupations  $k > \hat{k}$ . The within effect reinforces the between effect for occupations at the high and low end of the skill spectrum. Specifically,  $\lambda^k(q, \mathbf{x}^j) - \lambda^k(q, \mathbf{x}^i) \geq 0$  for  $k \geq \max(\hat{k}, \hat{k}_{f\varphi}, \hat{k}_{v\varphi})$  and  $\lambda^k(q, \mathbf{x}^j) - \lambda^k(q, \mathbf{x}^i) \leq 0$  for  $k \leq \min(\hat{k}, \hat{k}_{f\varphi}, \hat{k}_{v\varphi})$ . The sign of  $\lambda^k(q, \mathbf{x}^j) - \lambda^k(q, \mathbf{x}^i)$  is indeterminate for  $\min(\hat{k}, \hat{k}_{f\varphi}, \hat{k}_{v\varphi}) < k < \max(\hat{k}, \hat{k}_{f\varphi}, \hat{k}_{v\varphi})$  since the between and within effects offset each other.

The distance to the firm's market may also influence its mix of occupations. We may interpret distance literally to represent the geographic distance to market, or figuratively to represent cultural distance. In either case, we might surmise that relatively more skilled occupations are required to bridge greater distances, making the within effect positive. However, further distances likely require larger amounts of both fixed and variable inputs, and it is not clear how the balance between the two changes. Therefore, the between effect is ambiguous. It follows that the total effect of distance is also ambiguous.

Finally, we compare firms of different size. To do so, suppose that  $\mathbf{x}^j = \mathbf{x}^i \equiv \mathbf{x}$  while  $q^j > q^i$ . Since  $\lambda_f^k(\mathbf{x}^i)$  and  $\lambda_v^k(\mathbf{x}^i)$  are both independent of output, the within effect is zero. However,

$\Lambda_f(q^j, \mathbf{x}) < \Lambda_f(q^i, \mathbf{x})$ , while  $\lambda_f^k(\mathbf{x}^i) \geq \lambda_v^k(q^i, \mathbf{x}^i)$  for  $k \geq \hat{k}$ . The between effect implies that larger firms have a relatively smaller share of occupations  $k \geq \hat{k}$ .

We gather the above results in Table 2. The entries in this table represent the expected sign of  $\lambda^k(q^j, \mathbf{x}^j) - \lambda^k(q^i, \mathbf{x}^i)$  for high-skilled occupations as we change one variable at a time. High-skilled occupations are defined as  $k \geq \max(\hat{k}, \hat{k}_f, \hat{k}_v)$  when comparing firms with different degrees of global engagement;  $k \geq \max(\hat{k}, \hat{k}_{f\varphi}, \hat{k}_{v\varphi})$  when comparing firms with different productivity; and  $k \geq \hat{k}$  when comparing firms of different size.

The entries in the far right column of the table represent the expected total effect on occupational use of the most skilled occupations given a change in a single variable, holding all others constant.<sup>17</sup> However, (4) is constructed to allow for arbitrary differences between firms. It becomes more difficult to make unambiguous comparisons of occupational structures between firms when multiple characteristics can vary. As a simple example, consider Melitz (2003). As noted above, more productive firms are larger than less productive firms, and only the most productive firms can export. In terms of our notation, if  $\varphi_j > \varphi_i$ , it follows that  $q_j > q_i$  and (if firms differ in export status),  $j = E$ , and  $i = D$ . From Table 2, the facts that  $j$  is more productive than  $i$  and is an exporter whereas  $i$  serves only the domestic market both suggest that we would expect  $j$  to employ a higher share of skilled occupations than  $i$ . But the fact that  $j$  is also larger than  $i$  suggests the opposite, that  $j$  employs a smaller share of skilled occupations compared with  $i$ .

#### 4. Firm-level Results

##### A. Empirical specification

Rather than running regressions of employment shares separately for the 100 occupations, in the following empirical analysis the dependent variable will be the weighted average occupational rank employed by the firm; an index that summarizes the skill level of the occupational mix at a firm. Specifically, we compute  $S_{ft}$ , the skill index for firm  $f$  in year  $t$  as

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<sup>17</sup> The expected changes for the lowest-skilled occupations are the reverse, with the expected change in usage of mid-range occupations is indeterminate.

$$S_{ft} = \sum_k \frac{\lambda_{ft}^k R^k}{K}$$

where  $R^k$  is the skill-ranking of occupation  $k$  (a higher  $k$  meaning a more skilled occupation). We rank occupations by skills in three different ways, as detailed in Section 2.C. This index is bounded between zero and one. A value of 0.5 indicates that employment is evenly distributed across all occupations.<sup>18</sup> The index is higher if employment is allocated more toward higher skilled occupations. A similar index is used by Zhu and Trefler (2005) to measure the skill content of a country's exports.

The main specification is as follows:

$$(6) \quad S_{ft} = \delta_M MNE_{ft} + \delta_X Exporter_{ft} + Z_{ft}\gamma + D_i + D_t + \mu_{ft},$$

where  $D_i$  and  $D_t$  are industry and year fixed effects respectively; and  $\mu_{ft}$  is the error term. Local firms are the excluded group. Thus,  $\delta_M$  represents the difference in the skill index between MNEs and Local firms, and  $\delta_X$  represents the skill difference in between non-MNE exporters and Local firms.

Specifications (1) and (6) are closely related. Given the definition of  $S_{ft}$ , it is straightforward to show that  $\delta_M$  and  $\delta_X$  are weighted sums of  $\alpha_M^k$  and  $\alpha_X^k$  respectively, where the weight is the skill ranking of occupation  $k$  (divided by 100, the total number of occupations).

## B. Main Results

Table 3 shows the estimation results, using the skill index based on three different rankings of occupations (beta ranking, mean wages and non-MNE mean wages). It is seen that both MNEs and Exporters have a higher skill index than Local firms, irrespective of how occupations are ranked. It is also seen that the distribution of occupations is more skewed towards higher skilled for MNEs than for Exporters: the estimated coefficient for MNE is statistically larger in all estimations based on standard  $t$ -tests. The result is robust to our different ranking criteria for skills and to inclusion of firm level characteristics. Finally, our size variable has a negative and statistically significant coefficient in all estimations, and labor productivity is significantly correlated with skill intensity of a firm.

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<sup>18</sup> This is a limiting result as the number of occupations tends to infinity. For a finite number of occupations, the lower limit of the index is  $1/K$ , and  $S_{ft} = \frac{1}{2} \frac{K+1}{K}$  when  $\lambda_{ft}^k = \lambda_{ft}$  for all  $k$ .

As mentioned above,  $\delta_M$  and  $\delta_X$  can be viewed as a weighted sums of  $\alpha_M^k$  and  $\alpha_X^k$  respectively, where the weight is the skill ranking of occupation  $k$  (normalized by 100). This can be verified using the estimates reported in Table A1 in Appendix A. Alternatively, we can calculate a weighted sum of  $\alpha_M^k$  and  $\alpha_X^k$  using the mean wage of occupation  $k$  (normalized by the mean wage of all occupations) for 1997 as the weight. Since the employment at MNEs and Exporters is skewed toward more skilled and better paid occupations, these alternative weighted sums show us on average how much more MNEs or non-MNE exporters need to pay their workers given their difference in the skill distribution of occupations from Local firms. We find that relative to Local firms, the average wage is about 9 percent higher by MNEs, and about 7 percent by Exporters. Note that these wage differentials reflect the difference in the occupational structure across firm types rather than the wage gap between MNEs and Local firms or between Exporters and Local firms within the same occupation.

### *C Export destination markets*

The fixed costs of export, and thereby the distribution of occupations, might differ across export markets (Blanes-Cristóbal et al. 2008; Arkolakis 2010; Gullstrand 2011; Jienwatcharamongkhol 2013). For instance, exporting to markets that are more remote in terms of geographic distance, culture, preferences and business climate might require more fixed costs for marketing and logistics. It is therefore possible that the mix of occupations varies between firms that export to different markets.

We start examining this issue in Table 4 where we include a number of variables that capture aspects of differences between Sweden and a firm's main export market. Specifically, we include population weighted geographic distance and differences in GDP per capita, the latter used to capture differences in preferences. Moreover, we include a measure of how much Swedes trust people from other countries and a measure of how much Swedes are trusted by people from other countries. We also include two measures of cultural differences compared to Sweden: the traditional vs. secular variable that captures the contrast between societies where religion is important and those where it is not; and the survival vs. self-expression variable that is associated with the transition from industrial to post-industrial societies and reflects the differences in values ranging from survival (i.e., an

emphasis on economic and physical security above all) to self-expression (i.e., an emphasis on subjective well-being, self-expression and the quality of life). These two variables explain more than 70 percent of the cross-cultural variance on scores of more specific values according to the World Values Surveys. Finally, rule of law in other countries is used as a measure of institutional differences.<sup>19</sup> We expect that closeness to Sweden (in terms of geographic distance or differences in culture and preferences), high levels of bilateral trust, and good institutions in the destination markets may reduce transaction costs, thereby reducing the need for high-skilled occupations.

Column 2 of Table 4 shows that the estimated coefficient for geographic distance is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that firms that have their main export market far away from Sweden have an occupational structure skewed toward more skilled. This result is consistent with the Melitz model that only “better” firms are able to overcome a higher entry cost of entering a far-away export market. We note that those firms are paying a higher wage bill (due to a more skilled workforce) and incurring a higher shipping cost (due to a longer distance). To be profitable, those firms must be more productive. Our result also sheds light on the well-established fact in the gravity literature: the total trade volume is strongly and negatively related to distance. As implied by our result, only “better” firms are able to enter the export market when the distance rises. Thus, the total trade volume is reduced for more distant markets. This is the “extensive margin” of trade in response to distance, and is consistent with the finding by Bernard, Redding and Schott (2011) that all the negative effect of distance on bilateral trade flows is accounted for by the extensive margins of the number of exporting firms and exported products.

As an alternative we have also run separate regressions for different export markets. Unreported regressions support our results on the relationship between distance and the occupational structure: the distribution of occupations is relatively less skilled for firms that export to closer markets (e.g., Northern and Western Europe), and relatively skilled for those that export to more

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<sup>19</sup> Data on distance are based on CEPII’s distance measure, which is a weighted measure that takes into account internal distances and population dispersion (see Mayer and Zignago 2006); GDP per capita is from Penn World Tables; Cultural differences from World Value Surveys; Bilateral trust from Guiso et al. (2009); and Rule of law from Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). Note that the bilateral trust measure is only available for 14 European countries.

distant markets (e.g., Asia, North America).<sup>20</sup> We have also analyzed exporters to specific countries. There is, again, a positive relationship between distance and the skill level of occupations: exporters to European countries have less skilled labor mix compared to exporters to the U.S., China, and Japan.

Countries that are geographically close tend to be more similar in culture and income levels, and have a higher level of bilateral trust. This view is borne out in the data as shown in Table A2 in Appendix A: countries close to Sweden tend to have similar income levels as Sweden, and share similar religious beliefs. In addition, citizens in Nordic countries tend to have more trust toward Swedes and Swedes tend to have more trust toward people in Nordic countries. We include specific measures that capture these aspects in columns 3-6 to examine the effect of different aspects of destination markets. Because these measures are highly correlated, we enter them separately in the regressions to avoid multicollinearity. As shown in columns 3-4, coefficients on bilateral trust are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that firms with their main export market to countries which are relatively trusted by Swedes, or whose citizens trust Swedes relatively more, tend to have a distribution of occupations skewed toward less skilled. This result implies that a higher level of bilateral trust may reduce transaction costs, making it easier for “weaker” firms (i.e., less skilled intensive) to enter a foreign market. Thus, our result provides micro-level evidence supporting the view by Guiso et al. (2009) that lower bilateral trust reduces trade flows between two countries.

Columns 5-6 report results when cultural differences are included. Our two measures of cultural differences give mixed results. The coefficient for differences in secular vs. traditional values is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that firms with exports to countries that differ from Sweden in this respect have a more skilled labor mix. However, the measure of the survival vs. self-expression values is statistically insignificant. The stronger result for the traditional vs. secular values might be because this measure is closely linked with a wide range of other societal orientations that may have a larger impact on transaction costs and people’s view toward trade openness. For instance, societies in which religion is very important tend to emphasize the importance of deference to authority and have high levels of national pride. Societies with secular values have the opposite preferences on these topics.

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<sup>20</sup> The results are available upon request.

Columns 7-8 show that neither the rule of law nor income levels (a proxy for preferences) are significantly correlated with skill distribution of exporters to the particular market.

Except for income levels, all the other measures of differences between Sweden and the main export markets are time invariant. To fully capture unobserved characteristics of destination markets, in column 9 we include country fixed effects. The coefficients on the MNEs and Exporters are reduced by about half, indicating that the firm-level skill distribution of occupations varies substantially across firms that serve different main destination markets. In order to illustrate whether the destination fixed effects are systematically related to some of the observed country characteristics examined in columns 2-8, we plot the estimated destination fixed effects against those observed country characteristics in Figure 5. A bigger destination fixed effect indicates that exporters to that particular market on average have a more skilled labor mix.

Panel (a) of Figure 5 plots destination fixed effects against the log of geographic distance from Sweden. We exclude main destination markets that attract fewer than 20 exporters. We can see that almost all the destinations have fixed effects greater than zero. Hence, exporters, irrespective of their main export market, always have a more skilled labor mix than Local firms. In addition, there is a clear positive relationship between geographic distance and destination fixed effects,<sup>21</sup> which is consistent with our previously discussed correlation between distance and exporters' occupational mix: the distribution of occupations is skewed toward less skilled for exporters to closer markets, such as the Nordic countries, West- and East Europe, and is skewed toward higher skilled for exporters to more distant markets such as South Europe, America, Africa, Asia, and Oceania.

Panel (b) of Figure 5 shows a strong and positive relationship between destination fixed effects and a measure of cultural differences (traditional vs. secular values). Panels (c) and (d) plot destination fixed effects against measures of bilateral trust between Swedes and other European nationalities. We can see that destination fixed effects are smaller as bilateral trust is higher (recall that the destination fixed effects reflect the average skill level of occupational mix for exporters to a

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<sup>21</sup> As shown in Table A3 in Appendix A, destination fixed effects are positively related to geographic distance for the full sample of 120 destination markets, although this relationship becomes stronger when we drop destinations that attract fewer than 20 exporters. When we run the weighted least square regressions where the weight is the number of exporters to a particular market, the result differs little whether we use the full sample or the sample of destinations that attract more than 20 exporters.



particular destination). Portugal is an outlier to this relationship. When it is excluded, the negative relationship between destination fixed effects and bilateral trust becomes more statistically significant.

Both Table 4 and Figure 5 suggest that firms with their main export market in countries that are more distant from Sweden tend to skew employment toward more-skilled occupations. The distance can be in terms of geographic distance, or in terms of differences in bilateral trust or culture. All these factors may increase trade frictions. Thus, only stronger firms (i.e., with a more skill-intensive occupational mix) are able to overcome those frictions and export to more distant markets.

#### *D. Export product markets*

The amount of fixed investments, and thereby the occupational structure, might differ between firms that specialize in different export products. It is, for instance, plausible that more differentiated goods require adaptation to local markets and regulations to a larger extent than more homogenous products, which in turn will have an impact on organization and occupational mix. Moreover, Rauch (1999) argues that trade in differentiated goods involves more search costs, which should also have an impact on the organization of firms. We therefore examine the occupational mix across firms that export different types of goods. We follow Rauch (1999) and separate exports into differentiated, reference priced, and organized exchange.<sup>22</sup> We adopt the ‘liberal’ classification that maximizes the number of goods classified as organized exchange or reference priced when ambiguities arise.<sup>23</sup> Homogenous goods are those traded on organized exchanges. Reference priced products are not traded on organized exchanges but still possess reference prices. All the other goods are defined as differentiated. We then divide both MNE and non-MNE exporters into the three categories based on their main exports.<sup>24</sup>

Columns 1-3 in Table 5 show results where a firm’s main export is respectively differentiated, reference priced, and homogenous. As in previous estimations, the comparison group is Local firms.

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<sup>22</sup> The classification of goods can be found at:

<http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/page/haveman/Trade.Resources/TradeData.html#Rauch>

<sup>23</sup> An overwhelming share of export is of differentiated goods (around 79 percent), whereas organized exchange goods account for about 2 percent and reference priced goods account for about 13 percent. Around 16 percent of exports could not be classified in any of these three categories, and thus are excluded from the estimations.

<sup>24</sup> We are unable to identify the types of goods produced by MNE non-exporters and Local firms. We thus include them in all the regressions reported in Table 5. Given the small percentage of MNE non-exporters in the sample, the results are little changed when MNE non-exporters are excluded from the regressions. In all the regressions, Local firms are the comparison group.

We find that non-MNE exporters of all three types of goods have a higher skill index than Local firms and a lower skill index than MNEs. Moreover, as expected, exporters of differentiated products have more skilled labor mix than exporters of other products. The difference between exporters of homogenous products and reference priced products is small and statistically insignificant.<sup>25</sup>

Another way of looking at product markets is to group exports into capital goods, intermediate inputs, and final consumption goods. Capital goods might for instance be more technology-intensive than final consumption goods, thereby requiring a different set of occupations. In columns 4-6 of Table 5 we group exporters according to their main export categories – capital goods, intermediates, and consumption goods, respectively.<sup>26</sup> In each column, we compare them with Local firms. We find that the difference in the skill level of occupational distribution is largest between exporters (including both MNE and non-MNE exporters) of capital goods and Local firms, and is the smallest between exporters of final consumption goods and Local firms.

#### *E. Alternative explanations*

*Offshoring:* We previously discussed offshoring as an additional dimension of international integration. Some previous studies have examined the impact of imports of intermediate goods on the aggregate labor market (see e.g. Goos, Manning and Salomons 2009 for European countries, and Liu and Trefler 2011 for the U.S.). In Table 6 we examine whether offshoring has an impact on occupational mix. Offshoring is measured by imported inputs as a share of total sales. As shown in column 2, inclusion of offshoring share has little impact on our main results. The coefficient for offshoring is statistically insignificant, suggesting that our main result is not driven by the possibility that MNEs or exporters are more able to offshore lower skilled tasks than Local firms.

The relationship between offshoring and the occupational mix is not uniform across firm types. In column 3 we interact the offshoring share with firm types. Now the coefficient for offshoring represents the effect of offshoring for Local firms. The coefficients for the interaction between the

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<sup>25</sup> Using the alternative ‘conservative’ classification, which minimizes the number of goods classified as organized exchange or reference priced in cases of ambiguities, has no major impact on the results with the exception that the coefficient for export of homogenous (organized exchange) goods becomes statistically insignificant.

<sup>26</sup> This classification is based on BEC (Broad Economic Categories). More information on BEC can be found at: <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp>.

offshoring share and the other two firm types indicate the differential effect of offshoring between MNEs and Local firms<sup>27</sup>, or between Exporters and Local firms. Interestingly, offshoring has a significantly positive relationship with the skill distribution of occupations for Local firms, but not for MNEs or Exporters. This result suggests that compared with Local firms that do not offshore, Local firms that engage in offshoring might need to incur some fixed costs, e.g., searching for suitable foreign suppliers or tweaking existing production lines to fit imported inputs. As a result, the composition of workforce in those firms is skewed toward higher skilled occupations. By contrast, both MNEs and non-MNE exporters might have made such fixed investments in order to break into a foreign market. Offshoring decisions could be a part of their international expansion strategies. It thus becomes difficult to disentangle the effect of offshoring from the effect of exporting or FDI.

Overall, we find that our main results are unchanged after controlling for offshoring. Offshoring activities appear to have very modest effect on the occupational structure. Even for Local firms, the estimated effect of offshoring on the occupational mix is small. Given the average share of offshoring in total sales is just 0.013 among Local firms that have offshored, these Local firms on average have a skill index 0.006 ( $= 0.452 \times 0.013$ ) higher than Local firms that do not offshore.

*Innovation:* Technological innovation is associated with organizational changes and calls for a higher skilled labor mix (Caroli and van Reenen, 2001; Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2002). Thus, in column 4 of Table 6 we include R&D intensities to examine if the higher skilled labor mix in MNEs and Exporters is caused by engagement in innovation activities that require highly skilled professionals. The coefficient on R&D intensity is positive and significant, showing that high shares of R&D increase the share of high skilled occupations. In column 5, we add the interaction between R&D intensities and firm types. We find that the effect of R&D on the occupational mix does not differ significantly between firm types. For all firm types, R&D intensity is strongly and positively related to the skill mix. On the other hand, in columns 4-5 the coefficients on MNE and Exporter dummies are not significantly different from the benchmark estimates as shown in column 1. Hence, MNEs and Exporters have a distribution of occupations skewed toward more skilled even after

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<sup>27</sup> Recall that Local firms are defined as non-MNEs that do not export. As suggested by Figure 2, about 10 percent of Local firms purchased intermediate inputs from abroad.

controlling for firm differences in R&D intensity. Therefore, although we find a strong positive relationship between R&D intensity and skill mix at the firm level, the systematic pattern of the skill distribution across firms with different degree of international engagement remains little changed.

#### *F. Robustness*

*Are Swedish and foreign MNEs different?* In our analysis we pool both Swedish and foreign owned multinational firms. It is possible that outward and inward FDI have different effects on firm organization and the distribution of occupations. For example, Swedish owned MNEs might conduct more R&D and have more levels of management. We therefore repeat our previous estimations but with multinational firms divided between foreign and Swedish owned. As shown in column 1 of Table 7, both foreign and Swedish owned MNEs have a relatively skilled labor mix and there is no statistically significant difference between them.

There might be differences among foreign MNEs headquartered in different countries if, for example, the distance between the home country and Sweden impacts the operations of affiliates. In order to examine the role of the nationality of foreign MNEs, we have matched our firm-level data with data from the Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth (Tillväxtanalys) which contain information about the nationality of foreign owned MNEs operating in Sweden.<sup>28</sup>

We start by comparing Swedish MNEs with foreign MNEs from different regions. Columns 2-4 show that Non-European MNEs have a more skilled occupational mix than Swedish MNEs while European MNEs (both from Europe as a whole and from EU-15 countries) are slightly less skilled intensive than Swedish MNEs. We also find that on average MNEs from OECD countries and developed countries have a slightly less skilled occupational mix than Swedish MNEs (columns 5-6).

The groups of MNEs from different regions are quite heterogeneous. We therefore continue to examine the occupational mix in MNEs from individual countries. To be specific, we divide our foreign MNEs by their country of origin for the 11 largest investors: 9 European countries and 2 non-European Countries. Seven of the countries have MNEs with a less skilled occupational mix than

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<sup>28</sup> Data on nationality of firms can be found at <http://www.tillvaxtanalys.se/en/home.html>. The main owner's place of origin defines the nationality, which is in accordance with definitions by OECD and Eurostat.

Swedish MNEs and four with a more skilled labor mix, but most of the differences are statistically insignificant. The result ranges from Danish MNEs with a coefficient of 0.056 to Japanese MNEs with a coefficient of 0.163. Finally, MNEs from all countries have more skilled labor mix than local firms and only MNEs from Denmark have a statistically significant lower skilled occupational structure compared to Exporters.

Hence, foreign MNEs have on average a similar distribution of occupations as Swedish MNEs. Although there is variation in the occupational mix across foreign MNEs, the difference tends to be small and statistically insignificant.

*Are manufacturing different from non-manufacturing?* Next we divide our sample of firms into manufacturing and services. Results are presented in Table 8. Because manufacturing industries have very few Local firms (i.e., non-MNEs that do not export), in columns 1-2 we compare MNEs with non-MNEs (most of which are exporters).<sup>29</sup> MNEs have a more skilled labor mix than non-MNEs. The difference between MNEs and non-MNEs is 0.025 in column 1 (without firm control), and 0.018 in column 2 (with firm control). The magnitude is similar to the difference in the estimated coefficients on MNE and Exporter dummies as reported in columns 1-2 of Table 3 for all industries.

The result for non-manufacturing, where we have more firms in the category of Local firms, is also in line with previous results. Compared to the estimates for all industries, MNEs and Exporters have an even higher skill levels than Local firms.

Finally, the control variables change when we examine manufacturing and services separately. Size is only negative and statistically significant for services, as shown in column 4. Capital intensity has a positive impact on skilled occupations in manufacturing (column 2) but a negative impact in services (column 4). However, for both sectors, labor productivity is strongly and positively related to the firm-level skill mix.

*Examining changes in firm types:* In the above we have focused on the variation across firms in their occupational mix. We now turn to the question about possible changes in occupational mix when a

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<sup>29</sup> For instance, only in Printing and Publishing do we have a more substantial share of Local firms (24 percent). In other manufacturing industries the share of employees in Local firms ranges from 0 percent (Basic Metals) to 4 percent (Food, Beverages and Tobacco).

firm switches type. We examine three types of switches: from Local to Exporter; from Local to MNE; and from Exporter to MNE. Around 11.3 percent of the stock of Local firms switch into a non-MNE exporter in the following year and 2.6 percent into an MNE. The corresponding figure for the change from a non-MNE exporter to an MNE is 5.2 percent. Thus, only a small number of firms switch types in our sample.

Because switchers may be different from non-switchers prior to their change in firm type, we include firm fixed effects to control for unobserved firm characteristics. This is different from the specification used in previous estimations. Results are reported in Table 9. Columns 1-4 include firms that switch from Local to Exporter and those that remain as Local throughout the sample period. In column 1 *Change in firm type* is a dummy variable which equals one for the year when the transition occurs and thereafter, and equals zero before the transition. The coefficient on *Change in firm type* captures the change in the skill index as a result of the switch from a Local to an Exporter. We find a significant positive effect of this switch on the skill mix, although the estimate of 0.024 is smaller than the difference in skill index between Local and Exporters reported in Table 3.

In columns 2-4 we analyze the dynamics of the relationship between firm types and the occupational mix by examining how the effect is spread over time. The firm fixed-effects regression reported in column 2 examines whether the occupational structure started to change prior to the transition, where *Change t-1* is a dummy for the year before the change in firm type, and *Change t-2* is a dummy for the period that is two years prior to the change. Note that the base period for comparison is the period that is more than two years prior to the change in firm type. Compared to the base period, we find no significant shift in the occupational mix for the years prior to the change of firm type. In column 3, we study the over-time change in occupational mix after the switch of firm type. We now include a dummy for the year when the change occurs, *Change t=0*, and three dummies capturing the periods after the change of firm type: *Change t+1* is a dummy for the first year after the change, *Change t+2* for the second year after the change, and *Change >t+2* indicates the period that is more than two years after the change. In this column the base period is the period prior to the switch of firm type. The results in column 3 show an instant positive, although not significant, effect of the change in firm type. Interestingly, this effect increases over time, with positive and significant

estimates for the following periods. In the fourth column, we allow for changing effects both before and after the switch of firm type. Now the base period is the one that is more than two years prior to the change in firm type. Consistent with previous results, there is no significant effect before the switch, but an increasing impact over time after the switch.

The results in columns 1-4 suggest that adjusting the occupational mix is a slow process. We find modest changes in the skill mix when a firm switches from Local to Exporters. One explanation for the small observed changes in the occupational mix could be that switchers may have changed their occupational mix years before the actual switch takes place. Unfortunately, constrained by the period of our sample (1997-2005), we are unable to observe many years before a firm switches its type. However, based on the information available in our data, we find that switchers have a significantly higher skill mix than non-switchers at least two periods prior to their switch.

Finally, the results in columns 5-12 show that there is no significant change in the skill mix when a Local firm or a non-MNE exporter becomes an MNE. Again, the change in occupations might have taken place a long time before the change of firm type, which is supported in our data. In particular, our data reveal that switchers are more than twice as large as non-switchers several years before the actual ownership change takes place. The difference in firm size between switchers and non-switchers is sustained throughout the sample period.

To summarize, we find modest changes in the skill mix after the change of firm type. Firms changing from Local to Exporter or MNE, or from Exporter to MNE, already have a relatively skilled distribution of occupations several years before the change. The relative increase in the skill distribution continues after a change from Local to Exporter but not after the other types of changes.

Our benchmark estimates as reported in Table 3 should be interpreted as capturing the long-term steady state relationship between firm types and the skill mix. For instance, since most of the Exporters included in the benchmark estimations may have exported for a long period, the benchmark estimates reflect the difference between *established* Exporters and Local firms, which should be stronger than the immediate effect of the switch from a Local to an Exporter.

Controlling for size differences: One key difference between different firm types is their sizes.

Multinational firms tend to be relatively large and Local firms tend to be relatively small. This can be seen from Figure 2: MNEs account for 34.4 percent of firms and 56 percent of employment while Local firms (i.e., non-MNEs that do not export) account for 33.9 percent of firms and just 14 percent of employment. Although we control for firm size in our previous estimations, we still could fail to account for the following aspects: large firms may have a larger set of occupations than much smaller firms; and a variation in data coverage of workers within firms. Thus, we include a number of additional estimations in Table 10 to examine the robustness of our results when we consider a difference in size between firm types. More precisely, columns 1-2 show the results when we only include firms with more than 5 occupations; columns 3-8 examine firms with more than 10, 20, or 50 employees. In columns 9-10 we only include firms where we have information at the worker level on at least 75 percent of the firm's employees.<sup>30</sup>

The results show that our previous conclusions are not altered when we look at samples of firms in different size classes: international integration is positively related to the distribution of skills. Moreover, large firms have a lower skill index in all estimations with the exception of the largest firms above 50 employees where the coefficient for size is statistically insignificant. Across size classes, labor productivity is positively correlated with the skill index.

Using wage shares instead of employment shares: As previously mentioned, our index is constructed by weighing the skill ranking of occupations using the employment shares in these occupations. So our results are driven by differences in the employment allocation rather than the wages across firm types. Now we repeat our estimations with our index constructed using wage shares as weights. Results in Table 11 show that the alternative measure yields similar results: MNEs have a more skilled labor mix than Exporters, and both these firm types have a higher skill index than Local firms. The small difference in the results is that the coefficients for MNEs and for Exporters are somewhat larger with wages shares used as weights. The result reflect the fact that MNEs and Exporters pay relatively high wages for the most skilled employees and relatively low wages for the least skilled

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<sup>30</sup> Note that our sample includes firms with more than 20 employees according to balance sheet information in the firm data. However, we may observe less than 20 individual workers from the worker data for the firms with more than 20 employees.



employees, a result that is partly supported also in previous studies (e.g. Heyman et al. 2007, 2011 and Schank et al. 2007).

Shares of high, low, and medium skilled occupations: Table 12 shows some final robustness estimations where we divide our 100 different occupations into 3 groups: the high (low) skilled group has occupations ranked in the top (bottom) third of the skill distribution based on the beta ranking; and the median skilled group has occupations with the middle third of the skill distribution. We run firm level estimations where the employment share of high, medium, or low skilled occupations is the dependent variable, which differs from the employment share of four broad occupational categories used in the previous estimations reported in Table 1. For instance, occupations within the broad category of “operators” can end up in any of the above three skill groups depending on the ranking.

The results in Table 12 offer some new insights. Most importantly, MNEs and Exporters have relatively high shares only of the most skilled occupations. They have relatively low shares of not only low skilled occupations but also of medium skilled occupations.<sup>31</sup> This is consistent with the pattern revealed by Figure 4 and discussed in Section 2.C.

## 5. Concluding Remarks

The availability of firm level data has transformed the field of international trade over the past 20 years. Focus has shifted away from industry analysis and now rests squarely on the firm. While we have learned a great deal (see Melitz and Redding 2013 for a survey) there is still much to explore. As we noted in the introduction, we know very little about the nature of the fixed costs that firms must overcome to gain access to global markets and we are just beginning to explore how the organizational structure of the firm is affected by globalization. Moreover, one would expect that changes in organizational structure (as documented by Rajan and Wulf 2006 and Guadalupe and Wulf 2010) would lead firms to alter the occupational mix of workers that they employ.<sup>32</sup> Examining such organizational changes requires quite detailed firm-level data that includes information about the

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<sup>31</sup> *T*-tests showed a statistically significant difference between the coefficients for MNEs and Exporters in all estimations except for the estimation in column (6).

<sup>32</sup> For example, a firm that begins to export will likely need to hire new employees in occupations such as logistics and marketing. Or, a firm that sells goods on world markets through foreign affiliates will require information on foreign preferences, laws, regulations, distribution networks and a host of similar issues; and collecting such information requires a different set of occupations than producing for the domestic market.

workers employed by each firm and their occupations. In this paper we made use of an extensive, remarkably rich data set to examine one of these issues. In particular, we provided compelling evidence that the occupational mix of firms is systematically related to the degree to which they are globally engaged. Our main finding is that the most globally engaged firms (MNEs) are relatively intensive in the use of more skilled occupations whereas local firms (Swedish non-exporters) skew their mix toward less skilled occupations. Non-MNE exporters fall in between, using a more skill-intensive mix of occupations than local firms, but less skill-intensive occupation than MNEs.

We develop a conceptual framework designed to help us tease out the forces that are likely generating our results. We show that the shift towards a more skill-intensive workforce may be motivated by several factors including the need to cover new fixed costs as a firm increases its global engagement and the fact that more productive firms are likely to be more globally engaged. The first effect follows from an assumption that fixed costs make use of more skilled occupations (management and professionals) than variable costs (production workers), giving rise to what we call the “between effect” – differences in the occupational mix used by firms tied to their balance between fixed and variable employment. The second result follows naturally from a framework such as Helpman et al. (2004) in which heterogeneous firms self-select into different organizational structures. Our assumption is that the more productive firms in the Helpman et al. framework make use of more sophisticated technologies that rely more heavily on high-skilled occupations than their low-productivity counterparts. This gives rise to a “within effect” that relates differences in the occupational mix used by firms to their use of occupations within fixed and variable employment. Our analysis speaks only to the total effect that global engagement has on the occupational mix; further empirical work is needed to tease out the relative importance of the within and between effects.

Though not explored here, our findings suggest interesting general-equilibrium effects of globalization on income distribution. To the extent that trade costs fall and more firms become globally engaged, we might expect to see increased demand for more skill-intensive occupations relative to less skill-intensive occupations with the consequent change in their relative rewards.

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**Table 1: Firm types and employment share of different occupations: firm-level estimates.**

	Managers		Professionals		Operators		Clerks	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
MNE	0.028*** (0.002)	0.040*** (0.002)	0.180*** (0.009)	0.158*** (0.009)	-0.153*** (0.009)	-0.124*** (0.009)	-0.055*** (0.008)	-0.073*** (0.009)
Exporter	0.026*** (0.002)	0.032*** (0.002)	0.116*** (0.008)	0.103*** (0.008)	-0.087*** (0.008)	-0.071*** (0.008)	-0.054*** (0.007)	-0.063*** (0.007)
Log firm size		-0.009*** (0.001)		0.005 (0.003)		-0.017*** (0.003)		0.021*** (0.003)
Capital-labor ratio		0.001** (0.000)		-0.009*** (0.002)		0.006*** (0.002)		0.003*** (0.001)
Value added per employee		0.001 (0.002)		0.070*** (0.012)		-0.020* (0.010)		-0.051*** (0.007)
Firm age		0.000* (0.000)		-0.000 (0.000)		0.001** (0.000)		-0.001** (0.000)
Observations	25,871	25,871	25,871	25,871	25,871	25,871	25,871	25,871
R <sup>2</sup>	0.073	0.090	0.363	0.376	0.499	0.505	0.385	0.396

*Note:* The dependent variable is the share of different occupations in total firm employment. "MNE" is an indicator of multinational firms. "Exporter" is an indicator of non-multinational firms that export. "Local firms" (i.e., non-MNEs that do not export) are the base group. Firm size is measured by the number of employees. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered by firm. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

**Table 2: Expected sign of  $\lambda^k(q^j, \mathbf{x}^j) - \lambda^k(q^i, \mathbf{x}^i)$**

	Within Effect	Between Effect	Total Effect
$\varphi_j > \varphi_i$	Positive	Positive	Positive
$j = E, i = D$	Positive	Positive	Positive
$j = M, i = E$	Positive	Positive	Positive
$j = \text{far}, i = \text{near}$	Positive	Ambiguous	Ambiguous
$q^j > q^i$	Negative	Negative	Negative

*Note:* Entries in the table represent the expected sign of  $\lambda^k(q^j, \mathbf{x}^j) - \lambda^k(q^i, \mathbf{x}^i)$  for high-skilled occupations as we change one variable at a time. D = Local firm, E = Exporter, M = Multinational. High-skilled occupations are defined as  $k \geq \max(\hat{k}, k_f, k_v)$  when comparing firms with different degrees of global engagement;  $k \geq \max(\hat{k}, k_{f\phi}, k_{v\phi})$  when comparing firms with different productivity; and  $k \geq \hat{k}$  when comparing firms of different size.

**Table 3: Firm types and the skill distribution of occupations.**

	Beta ranking		Mean wages		Non-MNE Mean wages	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
MNE	0.110*** (0.005)	0.106*** (0.006)	0.112*** (0.005)	0.112*** (0.006)	0.099*** (0.005)	0.099*** (0.006)
Exporter	0.082*** (0.005)	0.079*** (0.005)	0.087*** (0.005)	0.086*** (0.005)	0.078*** (0.005)	0.077*** (0.005)
Log firm size		-0.004** (0.002)		-0.007*** (0.002)		-0.006*** (0.002)
Capital-labor ratio		-0.005*** (0.001)		-0.004*** (0.001)		-0.004*** (0.001)
Value added per employee		0.043*** (0.007)		0.046*** (0.007)		0.044*** (0.007)
Firm age		0.000 (0.000)		0.000 (0.000)		0.000 (0.000)
Observations	25,871	25,871	25,871	25,871	25,871	25,871
R <sup>2</sup>	0.347	0.359	0.390	0.402	0.385	0.395

*Note:* The dependent variable is a skill index that measures the skill level of the occupational distribution. It is bounded between zero and one. The index is higher if employment is allocated toward more skilled occupations. A value of 0.5 indicates that employment is evenly distributed across all 100 different occupations. See Section 4.A for more details about this index. "MNE" is an indicator of multinational firms. "Exporter" is an indicator of non-multinational firms that export. "Local firms" (i.e., non-MNEs that do not export) are the base group. Firm size is measured by the number of employees. All occupation rankings are based on the initial year (1997) of the sample. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered by firm. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

**Table 4: Major export destination markets**

	Benchmark	Geographic distance	Trust		Culture		Rule of law	GDP per capita	Destination FE
			By Swedes	Toward Swedes	Traditional vs. Secular	Survival vs. Self-expression			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
MNE	0.106*** (0.006)	0.095*** (0.006)	0.090*** (0.006)	0.063*** (0.007)	0.090*** (0.006)	0.106*** (0.006)	0.105*** (0.006)	0.105*** (0.006)	0.058*** (0.010)
Exporter	0.079*** (0.005)	0.065*** (0.005)	0.066*** (0.005)	0.040*** (0.007)	0.061*** (0.005)	0.080*** (0.005)	0.078*** (0.005)	0.078*** (0.005)	0.024*** (0.006)
Log firm size	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.007** (0.002)
Capital-labor ratio	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)
Value added per employee	0.043*** (0.007)	0.041*** (0.007)	0.048*** (0.009)	0.053*** (0.009)	0.041*** (0.007)	0.042*** (0.007)	0.043*** (0.007)	0.043*** (0.007)	0.039*** (0.007)
Firm age	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Geographic distance		0.006*** (0.001)							
Trust by Swedes			-0.050*** (0.009)						
Trust toward Swedes				-0.066*** (0.012)					
Traditional vs. Secular					0.023*** (0.002)				
Survival vs. Self-expression						0.000 (0.002)			
Rule of Law distance							0.001 (0.002)		
GDP capita distance								0.000 (0.000)	
Firm controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	25,871	25,785	21,138	15,878	25,618	25,618	25,845	25,781	25,853
R <sup>2</sup>	0.359	0.365	0.356	0.378	0.366	0.359	0.359	0.358	0.381

*Note:* The dependent variable is a skill index that measures the skill level of the occupational distribution. It is bounded between zero and one. The index is higher if employment is allocated toward more skilled occupations. A value of 0.5 indicates that employment is evenly distributed across all 100 different occupations. See Section 4.A for more details about this index. "MNE" is an indicator of multinational firms. "Exporter" is an indicator of non-multinational firms that export. "Local firms" (i.e., non-MNEs that do not export) are the base group. Geographic distance is based on CEPII's distance measure, which is a weighted measure that takes into account internal distances and population dispersion. The trust variables are from Guiso et al. (2009). Note that the trust measures are only available for 14 European countries. Cultural difference variables are from World Value Surveys. Rule of law originates from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). GDP per capita is from Penn World Tables. See Section 4.C for more details about these measures. Firm controls include the log of the number of employees, the capital-labor ratio, value added per employee and firm age. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered by firm. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.



**Table 5: Product markets**

	Differentiated goods	Homogeneous goods	Reference-priced goods	Capital goods	Intermediates	Consumption goods
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
MNE	0.122*** (0.006)	0.066*** (0.013)	0.077*** (0.011)	0.133*** (0.009)	0.112*** (0.007)	0.102*** (0.008)
Exporter	0.087*** (0.005)	0.039*** (0.012)	0.053*** (0.009)	0.089*** (0.007)	0.086*** (0.006)	0.060*** (0.006)
Log firm size	-0.004** (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.005* (0.003)
Capital-labor ratio	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)
Value added per employee	0.042*** (0.007)	0.051*** (0.012)	0.049*** (0.010)	0.040*** (0.009)	0.044*** (0.008)	0.054*** (0.010)
Firm age	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001* (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Observations	23,849	9,320	10,861	11,794	17,824	12,626
R <sup>2</sup>	0.366	0.374	0.378	0.384	0.364	0.375

Note: The dependent variable is a skill index that measures the skill level of the occupational distribution. It is bounded between zero and one. The index is higher if employment is allocated toward more skilled occupations. A value of 0.5 indicates that employment is evenly distributed across all 100 different occupations. See Section 4.A for more details about this index. "MNE" is an indicator of multinational firms. "Exporter" is an indicator of non-multinational firms that export. "Local firms" (i.e., non-MNEs that do not export) are the base group. The classification of differentiated goods, homogenous goods, and reference priced goods can be found at [www.macalester.edu/research/economics/page/haveman/Trade.Resources/TradeData.html#Rauch](http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/page/haveman/Trade.Resources/TradeData.html#Rauch). The classification of capital goods, intermediate goods and consumption goods can be found at <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regct.asp>. Firm size is measured by the number of employees. Industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered by firm. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

**Table 6: Alternative explanations: offshoring and innovation**

	Benchmark	Offshoring		R&D	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
MNE	0.106*** (0.006)	0.105*** (0.006)	0.106*** (0.006)	0.103*** (0.005)	0.102*** (0.005)
Exporter	0.079*** (0.005)	0.078*** (0.005)	0.080*** (0.005)	0.076*** (0.005)	0.076*** (0.005)
Offshoring/Sales		-0.005 (0.016)	0.452*** (0.088)		
MNE*(Offshoring/Sales)			-0.456*** (0.090)		
Exporter*(Offshoring/Sales)			-0.473*** (0.091)		
R&D				0.150*** (0.022)	0.146*** (0.042)
MNE*R&D					0.086 (0.056)
Exporter*R&D					-0.019 (0.033)
Firm controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	25,871	25,790	25,790	25,812	25,812
R <sup>2</sup>	0.359	0.362	0.362	0.368	0.368

*Note:* The dependent variable is a skill index that measures the skill level of the occupational distribution. It is bounded between zero and one. The index is higher if employment is allocated toward more skilled occupations. A value of 0.5 indicates that employment is evenly distributed across all 100 different occupations. See Section 4.A for more details about this index. "MNE" is an indicator of multinational firms. "Exporter" is an indicator of non-multinational firms that export. "Local firms" (i.e., non-MNEs that do not export) are the base group. Offshoring/sales is imports of intermediate goods as a share of sales, and R&D is R&D expenditures per employee. Firm level data on R&D is available for the period 1997-2002. Imputed values are applied for the period 2003-2005, based on firm and industry expenditures for the period 1997-2002. Firm controls include the log of the number of employees, the capital-labor ratio, value added per employee and firm age. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered by firm. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

**Table 7: Are Foreign MNEs different from Swedish MNEs?**

	Foreign vs. Swedish MNEs	EU 15 vs. Swedish MNEs	European vs. Swedish MNEs	Non-European vs. Swedish MNEs	OECD vs. Swedish MNEs	Developed vs. Swedish MNEs	Most important foreign vs. Swedish MNEs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Swedish MNE	0.110*** (0.006)	0.112*** (0.006)	0.109*** (0.006)	0.117*** (0.006)	0.112*** (0.006)	0.110*** (0.006)	0.113*** (0.006)
Foreign MNE	0.104*** (0.006)						
EU15 MNE		0.100*** (0.007)					
European MNE			0.098*** (0.006)				
Non-European MNE				0.134*** (0.009)			
OECD MNE					0.106*** (0.006)		
Developed MNE						0.104*** (0.006)	
Norwegian MNE							0.092*** (0.010)
Finnish MNE							0.115*** (0.010)
Danish MNE							0.056*** (0.015)
Dutch MNE							0.102*** (0.012)
German MNE							0.131*** (0.011)
British MNE							0.112*** (0.015)
French MNE							0.083*** (0.018)
Luxembourg MNE							0.078*** (0.027)
US MNE							0.128*** (0.010)
Japanese MNE							0.163*** (0.023)
Chinese MNE							0.108*** (0.017)
Other developed MNE							0.101*** (0.016)
Other developing MNE							0.116*** (0.023)
Exporter	0.079*** (0.005)	0.081*** (0.005)	0.079*** (0.005)	0.085*** (0.005)	0.081*** (0.005)	0.079*** (0.005)	0.081*** (0.005)
Firm controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	25,871	23,264	24,189	21,066	25,229	25,460	25,348
R <sup>2</sup>	0.358	0.372	0.372	0.390	0.373	0.361	0.376

*Note:* The dependent variable is a skill index that measures the skill level of the occupational distribution. It is bounded between zero and one. The index is higher if employment is allocated toward more skilled occupations. A value of 0.5 indicates that employment is evenly distributed across all 100 different occupations. See Section 4.A for more details about this index. "MNE" is an indicator of multinational firms. "Exporter" is an indicator of non-multinational firms that export. "Local firms" (i.e., non-MNEs that do not export) are the base group. Firm controls include the log of the number of employees, the capital-labor ratio, value added per employee and firm age. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered by firm. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

**Table 8: Manufacturing vs. Non-Manufacturing**

	Manufacturing		Non-manufacturing	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MNE	0.025*** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.005)	0.130*** (0.007)	0.128*** (0.007)
Exporter			0.100*** (0.006)	0.100*** (0.006)
Log firm size		0.002 (0.003)		-0.008*** (0.003)
Capital-labor ratio		0.006*** (0.002)		-0.006*** (0.001)
Value added per employee		0.038*** (0.007)		0.049*** (0.008)
Firm age		0.000 (0.000)		-0.000 (0.001)
Observations	10,792	10,792	15,079	15,079
R <sup>2</sup>	0.323	0.336	0.354	0.370

*Note:* The dependent variable is a skill index that measures the skill level of the occupational distribution. It is bounded between zero and one. The index is higher if employment is allocated toward more skilled occupations. A value of 0.5 indicates that employment is evenly distributed across all 100 different occupations. See Section 4.A for more details about this index. "MNE" is an indicator of multinational firms. "Exporter" is an indicator of non-multinational firms that export. Because the manufacturing sector has a small number of "Local firms" (i.e., non-MNEs that do not export), in columns 1-2 we compare MNEs with non-MNEs (most of which are exporters). In columns 3-4 the base group is non-MNEs that do not export. Firm size is measured by the number of employees. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered by firm. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

**Table 9: Skill distribution of occupations for switchers**

	Local to Exporter				Local to MNE				Exporter to MNE			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Change in firm type	0.024*	0.029*			0.018	0.028			0.001	0.007		
	(0.014)	(0.017)			(0.016)	(0.021)			(0.007)	(0.013)		
Change t-2		0.002		0.002		0.012		0.011		0.003		0.003
		(0.010)		(0.010)		(0.019)		(0.019)		(0.014)		(0.014)
Change t-1		0.016		0.016		0.027		0.026		0.015		0.015
		(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.017)		(0.017)		(0.015)		(0.015)
Change t=0			0.009	0.014			0.001	0.011			-0.007	-0.002
			(0.013)	(0.016)			(0.015)	(0.018)			(0.007)	(0.013)
Change t+1			0.022*	0.027*			0.013	0.023			0.006	0.011
			(0.013)	(0.016)			(0.012)	(0.017)			(0.008)	(0.014)
Change t+2			0.028**	0.034**			0.062	0.071			0.003	0.009
			(0.014)	(0.017)			(0.046)	(0.048)			(0.008)	(0.014)
Change > t+2			0.037*	0.043*			-0.006	0.005			0.005	0.011
			(0.020)	(0.023)			(0.012)	(0.019)			(0.012)	(0.016)
Firm controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,505	6,505	6,505	6,505	6,307	6,307	6,307	6,307	4,918	4,918	4,918	4,918
R <sup>2</sup>	0.012	0.013	0.014	0.014	0.009	0.010	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.013	0.013	0.013

*Note:* The dependent variable is a skill index that measures the skill level of the occupational distribution. It is bounded between zero and one. The index is higher if employment is allocated toward more skilled occupations. A value of 0.5 indicates that employment is evenly distributed across all 100 different occupations. See Section 4.A for more details about this index. "MNE" represents multinational firms. "Exporter" represents non-multinational firms that export. "Local" represents non-MNEs that do not export. *Change in firm type* takes the value of one in the transition year and thereafter; zero before. *Change t-2* is a dummy for the period that is two years prior to the change in firm type. The other Change t+/- variables are defined accordingly. In columns 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12, the base period for comparison is the one that is more than two years prior to the change in firm type. In columns 3, 7, and 11, the base period for comparison is the period before the change in firm type. See Section 4.F for more details about these variables. Firm controls include the log of the number of employees, the capital-labor ratio, value added per employee and firm age. Firm and year fixed effects are included in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered by firm. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

**Table 10: Controlling for size differences**

	>5 occupations		>10 employees		> 20 employees		>50 employees		Share worker obs $\geq$ 75 %	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
MNE	0.096*** (0.006)	0.095*** (0.006)	0.110*** (0.005)	0.106*** (0.006)	0.111*** (0.005)	0.106*** (0.006)	0.115*** (0.007)	0.105*** (0.007)	0.109*** (0.006)	0.104*** (0.006)
Exporter	0.070*** (0.005)	0.067*** (0.005)	0.081*** (0.005)	0.078*** (0.005)	0.083*** (0.005)	0.080*** (0.005)	0.092*** (0.006)	0.086*** (0.006)	0.082*** (0.005)	0.078*** (0.005)
Log firm size		-0.008*** (0.002)		-0.004** (0.002)		-0.004** (0.002)		-0.002 (0.002)		-0.006*** (0.002)
Capital labor ratio		-0.005*** (0.001)		-0.005*** (0.001)		-0.005*** (0.001)		-0.005*** (0.001)		-0.006*** (0.001)
Value added per employee		0.038*** (0.006)		0.043*** (0.007)		0.044*** (0.007)		0.050*** (0.009)		0.048*** (0.008)
Firm age		0.000 (0.000)		0.000 (0.000)		0.000 (0.000)		0.000 (0.000)		0.000 (0.000)
Observations	22,247	22,247	25,633	25,633	24,486	24,486	17,730	17,730	22,848	22,848
R <sup>2</sup>	0.299	0.315	0.356	0.367	0.360	0.373	0.369	0.384	0.370	0.385

*Note:* The dependent variable is a skill index that measures the skill level of the occupational distribution. It is bounded between zero and one. The index is higher if employment is allocated toward more skilled occupations. A value of 0.5 indicates that employment is evenly distributed across all 100 different occupations. See Section 4.A for more details about this index. "MNE" is an indicator of multinational firms. "Exporter" is an indicator of non-multinational firms that export. "Local firms" (i.e., non-MNEs that do not export) are the base group. Firm size is measured by the number of employees. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered by firm. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

**Table 11: Wage shares**

	Beta ranking		Mean wages		Non-MNE Mean wages	
	Employ. shares	Wage shares	Employ. shares	Wage shares	Employ. shares	Wage shares
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
MNE	0.106*** (0.006)	0.123*** (0.006)	0.112*** (0.006)	0.129*** (0.006)	0.099*** (0.006)	0.116*** (0.006)
Exporter	0.079*** (0.005)	0.090*** (0.005)	0.086*** (0.005)	0.097*** (0.005)	0.077*** (0.005)	0.087*** (0.005)
Log firm size	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)
Capital labor ratio	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)
Value added per employee	0.043*** (0.007)	0.044*** (0.007)	0.046*** (0.007)	0.047*** (0.007)	0.044*** (0.007)	0.044*** (0.007)
Firm age	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Observations	25,871	25,871	25,871	25,871	25,871	25,871
R <sup>2</sup>	0.359	0.359	0.402	0.395	0.395	0.388

*Note:* The dependent variable is a skill index that measures the skill level of the occupational distribution. It is bounded between zero and one. The index is higher if employment or wage is allocated toward more skilled occupations. A value of 0.5 indicates that employment or wage is evenly distributed across all 100 different occupations. See Section 4.A for more details about this index. "MNE" is an indicator of multinational firms. "Exporter" is an indicator of non-multinational firms that export. "Local firms" (i.e., non-MNEs that do not export) are the base group. Firm size is measured by the number of employees. All occupation rankings are based on the initial year (1997) of the sample. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered by firm. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.


**Table 12 Employment shares of different occupation groups by Beta ranking**

	High-skill occupations		Medium-skill occupations		Low-skill occupations	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
MNE	0.184*** (0.009)	0.170*** (0.010)	-0.178*** (0.009)	-0.131*** (0.010)	-0.088*** (0.008)	-0.077*** (0.009)
Exporter	0.121*** (0.008)	0.112*** (0.008)	-0.104*** (0.009)	-0.081*** (0.009)	-0.076*** (0.008)	-0.073*** (0.008)
Log firm size		-0.003 (0.003)		-0.024*** (0.004)		-0.007** (0.003)
Capital labor ratio		-0.009*** (0.002)		0.005*** (0.001)		0.001 (0.001)
Value added per employee		0.081*** (0.012)		-0.037*** (0.008)		-0.044*** (0.007)
Firm age		0.000 (0.000)		-0.001* (0.000)		-0.000 (0.000)
Observations	24,430	24,430	21,376	21,376	24,248	24,248
R-squared	0.273	0.288	0.336	0.348	0.390	0.396


*Note:* We divide 100 different occupations into 3 groups: the high (low) skilled group has occupations ranked in the top (bottom) third of the skill distribution based on the beta ranking of occupations; and the median skilled group has occupations with the middle third of the skill distribution. The dependent variable is the employment share of the three occupation groups by skill level. "MNE" is an indicator of multinational firms. "Exporter" is an indicator of non-multinational firms that export. "Local firms" (i.e., non-MNEs that do not export) are the base group. Firm size is measured by the number of employees. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered by firm. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.




**(a) Occupation ranking based on wages in 1997**



**(b) Occupation ranking based on betas estimated from Mincer wage regressions for 1997**






**Figure 1. Cumulative distribution of occupations by firm types**




**Figure 2. Classification of firms by their degree of international integration**

*Note:* In the parentheses, the first number indicates the percentage of firms and the second number indicates the percentage of employment.







**Figure 3. Employment shares of four broad occupation categories for 2005**



**Figure 4. Cumulative employment share differentials between MNE and local firms, and between exporters and local firms**

Note: This table plots the cumulative employment share differentials against the beta ranking of occupations. The cumulative employment share differentials are derived from the firm-level estimates of specification (1) in Section 2.B. See Section 2.C for more details.



**Figure 5. Export destination fixed effects and destination market characteristics**

Note: The export destination fixed effects are estimated using specification reported in column 9 of Table 4. A bigger destination fixed effect indicates that exporters to that particular market on average have a more skilled labor mix. See Section 4.B for more details.

Appendix A.

Table A1 Firm types and employment share at the 3-digit occupation classification

					Without Firm Controls		With Firm Controls		
			Beta ranking	Employ. share	Mean wage	$\alpha_M^k$	$\alpha_X^k$	$\alpha_M^k$	$\alpha_X^k$
<b>Managers</b>									
111; 112; 123	Legislators and senior officials		97	1.94%	33,883	<b>1.88%</b>	<b>1.29%</b>	<b>2.65%</b>	<b>1.68%</b>
122; 124	Production and operation managers, Foreman		86	3.85%	23,936	<b>1.04%</b>	<b>1.14%</b>	<b>0.87%</b>	<b>1.08%</b>
121	Directors and chief executives		100	0.36%	57,021	0.04%	<b>0.24%</b>	<b>0.64%</b>	<b>0.52%</b>
131	Managers of small enterprises		79	0.14%	20,913	<b>-0.16%</b>	<i>-0.12%</i>	<i>-0.15%</i>	<i>-0.12%</i>
<b>Professionals</b>									
341	Finance and sales associate professionals		80	5.67%	20,946	<b>3.90%</b>	<b>1.83%</b>	<b>5.40%</b>	<b>2.69%</b>
213	Computing professionals		88	2.25%	26,029	<b>3.83%</b>	<b>2.08%</b>	<b>2.90%</b>	<b>1.35%</b>
311	Physical and engineering science technicians		69	7.15%	20,225	<b>2.94%</b>	<b>1.77%</b>	<b>2.15%</b>	<b>1.53%</b>
312	Computer associate professionals		77	0.82%	20,398	<b>2.17%</b>	<b>1.26%</b>	<b>1.98%</b>	<b>1.07%</b>
214	Architects, engineers and related professionals		95	2.33%	26,894	<b>1.65%</b>	<b>1.53%</b>	<b>0.97%</b>	<b>1.15%</b>
241	Business professionals		89	2.12%	26,698	<b>1.37%</b>	<b>0.75%</b>	<b>1.08%</b>	<b>0.62%</b>
343	Administrative associate professionals		67	2.05%	18,973	<b>1.06%</b>	<b>0.65%</b>	<b>1.07%</b>	<b>0.71%</b>
342	Business services agents and trade brokers		63	0.35%	18,249	<b>0.86%</b>	<b>0.47%</b>	<b>1.01%</b>	<b>0.55%</b>
315	Safety and quality inspectors		75	0.74%	20,903	<b>0.37%</b>	<b>0.34%</b>	0.16%	<b>0.23%</b>
211	Physicists, chemists and related professionals		91	0.50%	26,879	<b>0.36%</b>	<b>0.51%</b>	<b>0.31%</b>	<b>0.47%</b>
314	Ship and aircraft controllers and technicians		92	0.05%	26,600	<b>0.33%</b>	<b>0.51%</b>	<b>0.37%</b>	<b>0.53%</b>
324	Life science technicians and related associate professionals		42	0.07%	16,126	0.22%	<i>0.22%</i>	<i>0.27%</i>	<i>0.23%</i>
347; 348	Artistic, entertainment and sports associate professionals		65	0.19%	18,736	<i>0.16%</i>	<b>0.23%</b>	<b>0.19%</b>	<b>0.24%</b>
323	Nursing associate professionals		59	0.29%	17,566	<i>0.13%</i>	<b>0.20%</b>	0.06%	<i>0.17%</i>
221	Life science professionals		90	0.09%	26,326	0.12%	<b>0.22%</b>	<i>0.16%</i>	<b>0.23%</b>
223	Nursing and midwifery professionals		74	0.05%	19,709	0.05%	<i>0.07%</i>	0.02%	0.05%
235	Other teaching professionals		85	0.06%	25,080	0.05%	0.08%	0.14%	0.12%
313	Optical and electronic equipment operators		36	0.22%	17,637	0.04%	0.21%	0.12%	0.23%
321	Agronomy and forestry technicians		51	0.17%	17,928	<i>0.04%</i>	<b>0.07%</b>	0.01%	<b>0.06%</b>
222	Health professionals (except nursing)		96	0.18%	30,385	0.03%	0.03%	-0.05%	-0.02%
344; 345	Customs, tax and related government associate professionals		68	0.04%	19,701	<i>0.03%</i>	0.01%	<i>0.04%</i>	0.01%
243	Archivists, librarians and related information professionals		83	0.04%	20,620	0.03%	0.05%	0.04%	0.06%
231	College, university and high education teaching professionals		81	0.19%	22,747	0.02%	0.08%	0.00%	0.06%
322	Health associate professionals (except nursing)		60	0.79%	18,560	0.02%	0.10%	-0.07%	0.06%
212	Mathematicians, statisticians and related professionals		94	0.16%	27,756	0.02%	0.01%	-0.01%	-0.01%
244	Social science and related professionals		98	0.10%	30,343	0.01%	0.05%	0.02%	0.05%
332	Other teaching associate professionals		71	0.12%	19,782	0.00%	0.02%	<i>-0.09%</i>	-0.02%
242	Legal professionals		99	0.10%	33,275	-0.01%	0.09%	-0.07%	0.06%
234	Special education teaching professionals		72	0.01%	20,566	-0.03%	-0.02%	-0.01%	-0.01%
249	Psychologists, social work and related professionals		87	0.02%	22,015	-0.04%	-0.03%	-0.06%	-0.04%

**Table A1 Firm types and employment share at the 3-digit occupation classification (con't)**

					Without Firm Controls		With Firm Controls	
		Beta	Employ.	Mean	$\alpha_M^k$	$\alpha_X^k$	$\alpha_M^k$	$\alpha_X^k$
		ranking	share	wage				
346	Social work associate professionals	44	0.01%	15,629	-0.07%	-0.07%	-0.03%	-0.05%
248	Administrative professionals of special-interest organisations	93	0.06%	28,720	<b>-0.13%</b>	-0.07%	-0.13%	-0.08%
331	Pre-primary education teaching associate professionals	26	0.01%	15,062	<b>-0.14%</b>	<b>-0.15%</b>	-0.09%	<b>-0.13%</b>
233	Primary education teaching professionals	61	0.01%	16,885	<b>-0.22%</b>	<b>-0.27%</b>	<b>-0.21%</b>	<b>-0.27%</b>
232	Secondary education teaching professionals	64	0.01%	20,325	<b>-0.24%</b>	<b>-0.29%</b>	<b>-0.30%</b>	<b>-0.32%</b>
245; 246; 247	Writers and performing artists, Public service administrative professionals	82	1.20%	22,538	<b>-0.94%</b>	<b>-0.93%</b>	<b>-1.59%</b>	<b>-1.26%</b>
<b>Operators</b>								
825	Printing-, binding- and paper-products machine operators	49	0.93%	17,812	<b>0.68%</b>	<b>1.21%</b>	<b>1.17%</b>	<b>1.43%</b>
829	Other machine operators not elsewhere classified	62	0.37%	17,986	<b>0.49%</b>	0.18%	<b>0.56%</b>	0.20%
822	Chemical-products machine operators	28	0.70%	16,495	0.35%	0.00%	<b>0.40%</b>	0.02%
824	Wood-products machine operators	50	1.20%	16,190	0.29%	-0.25%	0.33%	-0.25%
812	Metal-processing plant operators	70	1.89%	19,596	<b>0.27%</b>	0.01%	0.12%	-0.06%
722	Blacksmiths, tool-markers and related trades workers	52	2.93%	17,999	0.25%	0.10%	0.09%	0.02%
815	Chemical-processing-plant operators	78	0.50%	21,034	<b>0.23%</b>	-0.11%	0.12%	-0.15%
814	Wood-processing- and papermaking-plant operators	73	2.06%	20,486	0.22%	<b>0.49%</b>	-0.30%	0.26%
724	Electrical and electronic equipment mechanics and fitters	33	3.00%	17,169	0.18%	-0.25%	0.02%	-0.34%
827	Food and related products machine operators	39	2.28%	16,114	0.13%	0.23%	0.06%	0.20%
826	Textile-, fur- and leather-products machine operators	11	0.62%	14,464	0.11%	0.10%	-0.06%	0.02%
823	Rubber- and plastic-products machine operators	46	1.04%	16,626	0.10%	0.22%	0.14%	0.24%
831	Locomotive-engine drivers and related worker	24	0.07%	16,553	0.07%	0.09%	-0.02%	0.05%
813	Glass, ceramics and related plant operators	47	0.08%	17,628	0.05%	-0.03%	0.09%	-0.01%
732; 733	Potters, glass-makers, Handicraft workers in wood, textile, leather	43	0.23%	16,697	0.05%	0.01%	0.01%	-0.01%
828	Assemblers	32	2.91%	16,780	0.04%	0.12%	0.21%	0.18%
811	Mining- and mineral-processing-plant operators	76	0.07%	21,038	0.00%	-0.02%	0.00%	-0.03%
817	Industrial-robot operators	66	0.01%	18,046	-0.01%	0.01%	-0.01%	0.01%
711	Miners, shotfirers, stone cutters and carvers	84	0.17%	23,607	-0.02%	0.13%	-0.05%	0.12%
834	Ships' deck crews and related workers	10	0.00%	14,392	-0.02%	0.02%	-0.02%	0.02%
742	Wood treaters, cabinet-makers and related trades workers	27	0.02%	15,736	-0.07%	0.10%	-0.01%	<b>0.13%</b>
744	Pelt, leather and shoemaking trades workers	9	0.01%	14,001	-0.10%	-0.12%	-0.12%	-0.13%
743	Textile, garment and related trades workers	7	0.08%	13,981	-0.19%	0.19%	-0.08%	<b>0.24%</b>
731	Precision workers in metal and related materials	22	0.04%	15,946	<b>-0.20%</b>	-0.07%	-0.15%	-0.05%
734	Craft printing and related trades workers	58	0.37%	18,526	-0.23%	0.26%	-0.16%	0.29%
816	Power-production and related plant operators	48	0.14%	18,304	<b>-0.39%</b>	<b>-0.30%</b>	<b>-0.40%</b>	<b>-0.28%</b>
821	Metal- and mineral-products machine operators	57	1.07%	17,648	-0.53%	0.32%	-0.16%	0.49%
741	Food processing and related trades workers	54	0.36%	16,032	<b>-0.54%</b>	<b>-0.45%</b>	<b>-0.40%</b>	<b>-0.39%</b>
723	Machinery mechanics and fitters	38	2.55%	17,766	<b>-0.86%</b>	<b>0.85%</b>	<b>-0.85%</b>	<b>0.85%</b>

**Table A1 Firm types and employment share at the 3-digit occupation classification (con't)**

			Without Firm Controls		With Firm Controls			
		Beta ranking	Employ. share	Mean wage	$\alpha_M^k$	$\alpha_X^k$	$\alpha_M^k$	$\alpha_X^k$
714	Painters, building structure cleaners and related trades workers	55	0.78%	17,836	<b>-1.18%</b>	<b>-1.09%</b>	<b>-1.03%</b>	<b>-1.04%</b>
833	Agricultural and other mobile-plant operators	40	0.53%	17,731	<b>-1.23%</b>	<b>-0.94%</b>	<b>-1.10%</b>	<b>-0.91%</b>
712	Building frame and related trades workers	41	1.34%	17,684	<b>-1.37%</b>	<b>-0.97%</b>	<b>-1.11%</b>	<b>-0.88%</b>
721	Metals moulders, welders, sheet-metal workers, structural-metal preparers	53	0.94%	17,623	<b>-1.44%</b>	-0.06%	<b>-0.86%</b>	0.19%
713 - 7137	Building finishers and related trades workers	35	3.50%	17,169	<b>-4.46%</b>	<b>-4.03%</b>	<b>-3.28%</b>	<b>-2.99%</b>
832	Motor-vehicles drivers	16	3.06%	15,600	<b>-5.95%</b>	<b>-4.65%</b>	<b>-5.54%</b>	<b>-4.57%</b>
<b>Clerks</b>								
413	Material-recording and transport clerks	25	1.96%	16,179	<b>2.01%</b>	<b>1.63%</b>	<b>2.23%</b>	<b>1.73%</b>
411	Secretaries and keyboard-operating clerks	34	1.24%	16,492	<b>0.72%</b>	<b>0.56%</b>	<b>0.72%</b>	<b>0.55%</b>
422	Client information clerks	21	0.99%	15,338	<i>0.64%</i>	<i>0.37%</i>	<b>0.82%</b>	<i>0.44%</i>
932	Manufacturing labourers	14	4.36%	15,045	0.36%	<b>0.57%</b>	0.03%	<i>0.41%</i>
511	Travel attendants and related workers	18	0.04%	14,469	<b>0.31%</b>	<b>0.23%</b>	<i>0.24%</i>	<b>0.20%</b>
515	Protective services workers	56	0.77%	16,665	0.25%	0.23%	-0.13%	0.04%
412	Numerical clerks	29	1.62%	16,188	0.19%	0.14%	<b>0.57%</b>	<b>0.36%</b>
514	Other personal services workers	23	0.10%	15,902	0.06%	-0.02%	0.09%	-0.01%
415	Mail carriers and sorting clerks	12	3.47%	14,749	0.05%	<i>0.06%</i>	-0.10%	-0.01%
414	Library and filing clerks	5	0.07%	15,035	<b>0.03%</b>	<b>0.03%</b>	<i>0.02%</i>	<b>0.03%</b>
419	Other office clerks	19	1.76%	15,179	0.02%	-0.04%	<i>0.43%</i>	0.23%
933	Transport labourers and freight handlers	45	0.66%	16,934	0.00%	0.14%	-0.05%	0.12%
612; 613; 614; 615	Crop and animal producers, Forestry, Fishery, Hunters and trappers	2	0.04%	15,968	-0.01%	0.07%	0.01%	0.08%
921	Agricultural, fishery and related labourers	3	0.08%	14,129	-0.01%	-0.01%	-0.01%	-0.01%
919	Other sales and services elementary occupations	6	0.16%	15,297	-0.01%	0.10%	-0.16%	0.03%
611	Market gardeners and crop growers	8	0.05%	15,254	-0.06%	-0.08%	-0.06%	-0.09%
931	Mining and construction labourers	15	0.02%	16,076	<b>-0.11%</b>	<i>-0.09%</i>	<i>-0.10%</i>	<i>-0.08%</i>
913	Helpers in restaurants	1	0.73%	12,680	-0.15%	<i>-0.30%</i>	-0.22%	<i>-0.34%</i>
914	Messengers, porters, doorkeepers and related workers	31	0.50%	15,636	<i>-0.25%</i>	-0.20%	<i>-0.26%</i>	-0.20%
911; 915	Street vendors, Garbage collectors and related labourers	20	0.37%	16,019	-0.36%	-0.31%	<i>-0.46%</i>	<i>-0.35%</i>
512	Housekeeping and restaurant services workers	17	1.31%	13,728	<i>-0.38%</i>	-0.14%	-0.27%	-0.09%
513 - 5135	Personal care and related workers	13	1.77%	14,138	<i>-0.40%</i>	<b>-0.58%</b>	<b>-0.59%</b>	<b>-0.67%</b>
421	Cashiers, tellers and related clerks	30	1.31%	15,352	<b>-1.31%</b>	<b>-1.28%</b>	<b>-1.46%</b>	<b>-1.37%</b>
912	Helpers and cleaners	4	1.33%	13,138	<b>-1.74%</b>	<b>-1.66%</b>	<b>-2.01%</b>	<b>-1.84%</b>
521; 522	Shop, stall and market salespersons	37	4.91%	15,548	<b>-5.39%</b>	<b>-4.80%</b>	-6.65%	-5.46%

*Note:* This table reports regression results of equation (1) for each of the 100 occupations. For example, the estimated  $\alpha_M^k$  for ISCO 341 ("Finance and sales associate professionals") is 3.9%, meaning that the share of this occupation in MNEs is 3.9 percentage points higher than in Local firms. The coefficients in bold are significant at the 1% level, and those in italics are significant at the 5% level. Within each of the four broad occupational categories (Managers, Professionals, Operators, and Clerks), the rows are arranged in descending order based on the magnitude of  $\alpha_M^k$  estimated without adding firm controls. See Section 2.B for the specification, and Section 2.C. for discussions of the results.



**Table A2. Correlations between observed destination market characteristics**

	Log (Geographic distance)	Log(GDP per capita difference)	Traditional vs. Secular	Survival vs. Self-expression	Trust by Swedes
<i>Spearman rank correlations</i>					
Log(GDP per capita difference)	0.257 (0.022)				
Traditional vs. Secular	0.575 (0.0001)	0.429 (0.0001)			
Survival vs. Self-expression	-0.016 (0.891)	0.721 (0.0001)	0.061 (0.592)		
Trust by Swedes	-0.786 (0.002)	-0.841 (0.0003)	-0.346 (0.247)	-0.835 (0.0004)	
Trust toward Swedes	-0.901 (0.0001)	-0.790 (0.001)	-0.591 (0.033)	-0.829 (0.0005)	0.879 (0.0001)
<i>Pearson correlations</i>					
Log(GDP per capita distance)	0.330 (0.0002)				
Traditional vs. Secular	0.628 (0.0001)	0.410 (0.0002)			
Survival vs. Self-expression	0.106 (0.346)	0.690 (0.0001)	0.156 (0.166)		
Trust by Swedes	-0.842 (0.0001)	-0.649 (0.0121)	-0.466 (0.080)	-0.880 (0.0001)	
Trust toward Swedes	-0.895 (0.0001)	-0.770 (0.002)	-0.670 (0.009)	-0.845 (0.0001)	0.765 (0.002)

*Note:* This table reports the correlations between observed destination market characteristics, including geographic distance from Sweden, GDP per capita difference from Sweden, two measures of cultural differences – Traditional vs. Secular and Survival vs. Self-expression, and measures of bilateral trust between Swedes and people in the other 13 European countries. The *p*-values are in parentheses. It can be seen from the table that geographic distance is strongly correlated with all the other measures of destination market characteristics except for Survival vs. Self-expression. See Section 4.C for more details about the measures.

**Table A3: Regressing destination country fixed effects on observed destination market characteristics**

	Geographic distance		Bilateral trust				Culture difference			
	(1)	freq>20 & drop BOL (2)	(3)	(4)	drop PRT (5)	drop PRT (6)	(7)	freq>20 (8)	(9)	freq>20 (10)
<i>Panel (a): OLS estimates</i>										
Log (geographic distance)	0.0236*	0.0197***								
	(0.00909)	(0.00406)								
Traditional vs. Secular							0.0218**	0.0173***		
							(0.0102)	(0.00669)		
Survival vs. self-expression									-0.0109	-0.00782
									(0.00827)	(0.00637)
Trust by Swedes			-0.0652*		-0.0868**					
			(0.0427)		(0.0328)					
Trust toward Swedes				-0.0319		-0.129***				
				(0.0657)		(0.0442)				
Observations	120	41	14	13	13	12	80	40	80	40
R <sup>2</sup>	0.028	0.382	0.226	0.068	0.462	0.767	0.059	0.197	0.014	0.057
<i>Panel (b): WLS estimates</i>										
Log (geographic distance)	0.0184***	0.0202***								
	(0.00221)	(0.00233)								
Traditional vs. Secular							0.0203***	0.0208***		
							(0.00330)	(0.00408)		
Survival vs. self-expression									-0.00377	-0.00430
									(0.00359)	(0.00466)
Trust by Swedes			-0.0507***		-0.0520***					
			(0.0106)		(0.0103)					
Trust toward Swedes				-0.0595***		-0.0686***				
				(0.0157)		(0.0136)				
Observations	120	41	14	13	13	12	80	40	80	40
R <sup>2</sup>	0.371	0.658	0.657	0.566	0.697	0.718	0.326	0.407	0.014	0.022

*Note:* This table reports regression results of the estimated destination fixed effects on observed destination market characteristics. A bigger destination fixed effect indicates that exporters to that particular market on average have a more skilled labor mix. Panel (a) shows the ordinary least square (OLS) estimates. Panel (b) reports the weighted least square (WLS) estimates where the weights are the number of firms that sell more than half of their exports to a particular destination. See Section 4.C for more details. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

## Appendix B

Our conceptual framework is an extension of Helpman et al. (2004), which is itself an extension of Melitz (2003). Here we provide a brief, intuitive explanation of the structure of Helpman et al. (2004) and note two modifications that bring it closer to the data.

Consistent with the bulk of the large literature on monopolistically-competitive models of international trade, Helpman et al. (2004) assume that homogeneous labor is the only input. In essence, there is only one occupation. The amount of labor required for firm  $i$  is represented by equation (A.1):

$$(A.1) \quad L^i = f^i + \frac{\tau^i q^i}{\varphi}, \quad i = D, E, M$$

where  $\tau^i$  represents iceberg transportation costs. They assume  $\tau^i > 1$  for exporters, and  $\tau^i = 1$  for domestic firms and multinationals. They further rank fixed costs such that  $f^D < f^E < f^M$ .

Assuming CES preferences, it is well known that the profit-maximizing price is a fixed markup over marginal cost, which is decreasing in productivity; and that variable profit is increasing in productivity. Only the most productive firms can generate enough variable profit to enter a foreign market by means of exporting or FDI. Moreover, there is a proximity-concentration tradeoff between exporting and FDI since exporters have lower fixed costs but higher variable costs compared with multinationals. This tradeoff resolves in favor of becoming a multinational firm if productivity is sufficiently high, otherwise the globally-engaged firm chooses to export.

There are two minor issues to be considered when using this framework to think about the data. First, all relevant outcomes depend uniquely on the productivity parameter. In particular, once this is known, the firm's status as an exporter, multinational, or domestic firm becomes completely determined. There are no low-productivity multinationals or high-productivity domestic firms. This issue can be resolved by assuming that once firms know the result of the productivity lottery, they draw another random shock that affects their ability to export or to become multinational. Let  $\xi$  represent a random shock with mean value equal to zero. Then we can re-write (A.1) as follows:

$$(A.2) \quad L^i = f^i + \frac{\tau^i q^i}{\varphi} + \xi^i, \quad i = D, E, M.$$

With this formulation, it is possible that two firms with the same productivity could make different choices about global engagement. In practice, we could think of  $\xi$  as capturing some unobserved variation. For example, personal networks might allow one firm to negotiate favorable tax treatment to establish a subsidiary, with that tax treatment being denied to an otherwise identical firm.

The second problem is that within the Helpman et al. framework each firm is uniquely identified as either being an exporter *or* a multinational (or neither). In fact, as seen in Figure 2, this is counterfactual. Almost all multinational firms are also exporters. We could of course have models of vertically integrated firms, shipping intermediate parts back and forth between a foreign subsidiary and domestic parent. But there is also an interpretation of Helpman et al. that is consistent with the data. Consider a firm that faces multiple foreign markets and assume that iceberg transportation costs and/or the fixed costs of entering the market via exporting or FDI vary by location. It is entirely consistent with the model that the firm would choose to export to some markets while establishing subsidiaries in others. Unfortunately, our data is not sufficiently detailed to test this conjecture.