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The impact of natives' attitudes towards immigrants on their integration in the host country

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on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research

The Impact of Natives' Attitudes Towards Immigrants on Their Integration in the Host Country

Pia Schilling and Steven Stillman

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The Impact of Natives' Attitudes Towards Immigrants on Their Integration in the Host Country*

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Abstract

Exploiting the random allocation of asylum seekers to different locations in Germany, we study the impact of right-wing voting on refugees' integration. We find that in municipalities with more voting for the right-wing AfD, refugees have worse economic and social integration. These impacts are largest for groups targeted by AfD campaigns and refugees are also more likely to suffer from harassment and right-wing attacks in areas with greater AfD support. Positive interactions with locals are also less likely and negative opinions about immigration spillover to supporters of other parties in these areas. On the other hand, stronger support for pro-immigrant parties enhances social integration.

JEL-Classification: J15, J61, Z13,

Keywords: Immigrants' integration, Refugees, Hostile attitudes, Voting behavior.

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1 Introduction

The EU received almost 2.6 million asylum applications in 2015 and 2016, with over 75% of these individuals fleeing conflict in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan (Eurostat 2020, Spindler 2015). This sudden inflow quickly dominated media headlines and the political debate, and became known as the “European Refugee Crisis” (Fengler and Kreutler 2020). Past immigrants to Europe as well as their children have been found to generally integrate slowly both economically and socially (Algan *et al.* 2010, 2012). Given the size and context of this recent inflow, it is crucial that better integration outcomes are achieved. While initial attitudes towards these refugees were positive in many countries, opinions were polarized with right-wing political groups accusing them of importing crime and regressive social attitudes (Hoven and Hestermann 2019).¹

This paper studies how the host society’s attitude towards immigrants influences the integration of recent refugees. Specifically, we examine the relationship between local (municipality) support for the right-wing populist political party, Alternative for Germany (AfD), and the economic and social integration of refugees who arrived in Germany during the European Refugee Crisis, controlling for a wide variety of other local characteristics. As discussed below, anti-immigrant and anti-refugee rhetoric is a core part of the AfD’s party platform.² Recent work has argued that the attitudes of locals are potentially an important factor influencing immigrant integration and that negative attitudes can potentially lead to either better *or* worse integration depending on other factors (Bisin and Tura 2019).

We are able to identify the causal impact of local attitudes because new refugees to Germany are randomly allocated to municipalities based on a quota system and they

¹The term “refugee” is used in this paper to describe any immigrant who has applied for or has received asylum status or who resides in Germany under any other protection status. It does not necessarily reflect an immigrant’s legal status.

²Several papers show a correlation between right-wing voting and unfavorable attitudes towards immigrants (Avdeenko and Siedler 2017, Billiet and De Witte 1995, Bukow 2017, Lubbers and Scheepers 2000)

normally cannot move to other municipalities until their status is accepted.³ Importantly, previous research has found that immigrants are less likely to move to municipalities that have voiced anti-immigrant attitudes (Bracco *et al.* 2018, Slotwinski and Stutzer 2019), hence it is critical to have an identification strategy that eliminates the possibility of this type of selection.⁴

We measure integration outcomes using high quality data from a representative sample of refugees who came to Germany between 2013 and 2016 (the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees). This is the largest representative survey of refugees in Europe and asks a variety of questions about economic and social integration, as well as detailed questions about each refugee’s sociodemographic background. We are also able to identify the municipality of residence for all sample members in the secure access version of the data. Germany was a particularly large recipient country during the latest refugee inflows; by the end of 2016, around 1.22 million asylum seekers had arrived in Germany, which accounted for 47.3% of all applications in the EU in those years (BAMF 2017, European Migration Network 2017).

We first show that the quota is implemented as it is designed and refugees are randomly assigned to locations in Germany conditional on population shares, and importantly that there is no relationship between past election outcomes and the number of refugees assigned to each county. Hence, from the refugees’ perspective, the attitude of Germans in their municipality of residence is randomly allocated.

We then examine the relationship between local attitudes and integration outcomes. Controlling for a wide variety of local characteristics, including voting for the mainstream

³Since 2016, accepted refugees are no longer allowed to move between federal states and in several states are even obliged to stay in the municipality of assignment for three further years if they receive benefits (residence restriction, § 12a AufenthG). We limited our analysis to refugees who arrived in 2015 or later and hence face these further mobility restrictions.

⁴A number of papers have used the random allocation of refugees to examine the impact on the host community, for example, Dustmann *et al.* (2019) examine the impact on right-wing voting in Denmark, Dahlberg *et al.* (2012) examines the impact on preferences for redistribution also in Denmark, Entorf and Lange (2019) examine the impact on right-wing attacks in Germany and both Gehrsitz and Ungerer (2017) and Schaub *et al.* (2021) look at the impact on voting for the AfD in Germany. Glitz (2012) uses the distribution of ethnic Germans across German labor markets between 1996 and 2001 and finds short-run displacement effects but no effects on relative wages.

center-right party as well as state-fixed effects, we find that refugees who are allocated to municipalities where more people vote for the AfD have worse economic and social integration. The result for social integration is robust to controlling for county fixed effects, while that for economic integration does not change qualitatively but loses statistical significance. Furthermore, our results are robust to instrumenting for a refugee's current location with that of their initial placement showing that endogenous mobility is not a concern in our setting.

We next examine the mechanisms behind our results. In line with our interpretation of voting for the AfD as a proxy for negative attitudes towards immigrants, we find that local AfD voting has the largest negative effect on groups targeted directly by AfD campaigns, specifically individuals from countries with a mostly Muslim population and single men. We also find that the local AfD vote share is strongly correlated with the share of racist attacks and reported harassment of refugees in that area. Supporting the model of Bisin et al. (2011), which predicts that immigrants are more likely to emerge as an oppositional minority culture when there is an increasing amount of harassment and racists in the host society, increased attacks are also related to worse integration. On the other hand, local support for the Green party, which favors a more liberal immigration policy, has a positive effect on refugees' social integration in the host society.

We also show that local voting is related to the behavior of natives in regard to their interactions with refugees. In areas with more AfD support, natives are less likely to volunteer their time or donate money, and overall offer less support to refugees. On the contrary, in areas with more support for the Green party, natives are more likely to demonstrate in favor of refugees and generally offer more support. These are clearly pathways through which the action of natives can improve the integration of refugees.

Furthermore, with increasing local AfD vote share, supporters of other parties think immigration rules should be more restrictive and that it is important that immigrants assimilate to the German culture. Therefore, concerns about immigration voiced by the

AfD spillover to supporters of other parties when they are likely more exposed to anti-immigrant campaigns and rhetoric in their daily life. This likely creates an even stronger oppositional culture in these areas.

Our paper makes an important contribution to the literature that examines how local attitudes and behaviors influence the assimilation of migrants in the host society. While previous papers have shown that specific events have negative impacts on immigrant integration, we are one of the first papers to focus on a more general measure of local hostile attitudes in a setting where migrants are randomly allocated to locations.⁵ Our paper shows that hostile attitudes do not need to have an extreme expression to have a negative impact on the minority group's integration. We also contribute more broadly to a recent literature examining the economic and social integration of these recent refugees (Bauer and Schu 2017, Brell *et al.* 2020, Becker and Ferrara 2019) as well as to the larger literature looking at the impact of local conditions on outcomes for immigrants (e.g., Gould *et al.* (2004, 2011), Battisti *et al.* (2021), Keita and Valette (2019), Åslund and Rooth (2007), Barsbai *et al.* (2022))

Our paper is closely related to recent work by Jaschke *et al.* (2021), Aksoy *et al.* (2020) and Müller *et al.* (2022) who all use similar identification strategies as in our paper to examine the impact of the local environment on outcomes for refugees. Jaschke *et al.* (2021) focus on the impact of attitudes towards immigrants in Germany on cultural and economic assimilation. Similar to the historical work for German immigrants in the USA by Fouka (2019), they find that refugees converge faster towards the German culture when there are more negative attitudes in their region, while they find no effect on the speed of labor market integration. Their results are consistent with our findings as one would expect trade-offs between investing in cultural assimilation as opposed to economic and social integration.

⁵Examples include Steinhardt (2018) which examines the impact of xenophobic attacks, Deole (2019) which examines anti-immigrant biases in the German justice system, and Gould and Klor (2016) which examines the impact of the increase in hate crimes against Muslims after the 9/11 attack on the assimilation of Muslims in the USA. In contrast to these papers, which all find negative impacts, Fouka (2019) finds that increased hostility towards German immigrants in the USA during World War I led to increased assimilation by this group.

Aksoy *et al.* (2020), on the other hand, focus on the role of local unemployment rates, as well as positive self-reported attitudes towards migrants measured at the state level, on refugee integration in Germany. Consistent with our findings that use the Green party vote share as a proxy for positive attitudes towards immigration, they find that favorable attitudes promote refugee integration. Both of these papers examine the placement of refugees at a fairly aggregate geography, while we focus on municipality level variation, which gives us more power to identify effect heterogeneity. In contrast to the evidence for Germany, Müller *et al.* (2022) find that refugees in Switzerland integrate faster economically if they face more hostile local attitudes measured through referendum votes.⁶

The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides background information on asylum seekers and right-wing voting in Germany. Section 3 describes the data and the empirical strategy used for the analysis. Section 4 describes the main results as well as additional evidence on heterogeneity and the mechanisms behind our findings. Section 5 concludes.

2 Background

2.1 German Asylum Policy

With the very well known “Wir schaffen das”(“We can handle this”) the German chancellor Angela Merkel decided in the fall of 2015 to suspend the Dublin rules for refugees stuck on the Balkan route, leading to around 1.2 million asylum seekers arriving in Germany (BAMF 2020). This event can be seen in Figure 1; the number of refugees arriving in Germany increased slowly starting in 2011, then there was a sudden spike in 2015 and 2016. The refugee arrival rate has been declining since and by 2018 returned to

⁶This paper examines refugee arrivals from 1998 to 2018 so potentially the diverging results are explained by changes over time in the relationship between local attitudes and economic assimilation and/or differences in the type of refugees who came to Switzerland in the past and those who arrived in Germany in recent years.

the level seen in 2014.

Refugees arriving in Germany must report their intention to seek asylum to a state organization where they are registered, and their data is then stored in the Central Register of Foreigners. After being accommodated in short-term facilities during the registration process, asylum seekers are randomly sent to an initial reception facility according to a quota based on the “Königsteiner Schlüssel” (§45 AsylG)(BAMF 2020). This quota is commonly used to distribute the costs of joint tasks between the federal states and is updated yearly based on the tax revenue (2/3rds) and population (1/3rd) of each state. The “Königsteiner Schlüssel” was initially designed in 1949 to determine the financial contribution to scientific research institutions, hence its structure is unrelated to the supply of asylum seekers. Appendix Table A1 shows that the final refugee allocation to the federal states aligns largely with the targeted quota.⁷

Upon arrival in the assigned state, asylum seekers file a personal application, after which they are assigned randomly to a county and then to a municipality based on the population shares as well, and finally to a particular accommodation. They are required to stay in this location until a decision about their asylum application has been made.⁸ Since 2016, even accepted refugees receiving benefits are not allowed to move to another federal state. Certain regions further restrict accepted refugees to remain in particular municipalities (residence restriction, § 12a AufenthG).⁹ Crucial for our identification strategy, asylum seekers cannot influence their allocation, and hence some cannot avoid being assigned to municipalities with

⁷According to the BAMF, minor deviations occur because the quota does not apply to applicants that are imprisoned, in other public custody, in a hospital or other sanatoriums, nor for those that have a permit to reside for more than six months.

⁸The only exception is when a core family member lives in another state, in which case a refugee can apply to change states. According to a small inquiry (“Kleine Anfrage”) to the Government by members of the Left party, the average processing time for the asylum decision was 6 months in the first quarter of 2016. This time does not reflect the period refugees had to wait to register. According to the Ministry for Migration and Refugees half a million asylum seekers that arrived in 2015 were not registered until 2016 (BAMF 2017)

⁹These policies are intended to prevent clustering of nationalities in certain locations and enhance integration. Accepted refugees can move in these situations if they have a job offer for more than 15 hours per week that guarantees an earning of at least 712 Euro (gross) and payment of social security taxes; if they start professional training, an apprenticeship or a university education program; or if a direct family member lives in another federal state.

strong xenophobic and anti-immigrant sentiments. Local politicians are also unable to affect the allocation of asylum seekers into their municipality (Schaub et al. 2021).¹⁰

Column (1) in Table 1 shows the relationship between refugee placements at the county level and county characteristics in 2015 – 2017.¹¹ The allocation of asylum seekers with an open status in Germany is mainly related to the county’s population share with a weak relationship to local GDP which should be related to tax revenue.¹² The remaining characteristics, including the identity of the local ruling parties and vote shares for the main political parties, are not jointly significantly related to the allocation of the newly arriving asylum seekers, including when we also control for state fixed effects in Column (2). In our main regression model, we nonetheless control for all of the county characteristics shown here.

2.2 Alternative for Germany

The “Alternative for Germany” (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) was formed in 2013 as a Eurosceptic party that had the goal to end the German rescue packages for foreign states and banks and to devolve certain policies back to national states instead of the EU (Beyme 1991). At the federal elections in September 2013, they only barely failed to enter the German Bundestag with 4.7% of second votes in Germany’s Mixed Member Proportional System (MMP).¹³ Quickly members of the two main right-extremist parties in Germany, the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) and the Republikaner, as well as from other small local far-right-wing parties, found their way into key roles of the AfD, uniting into one bigger right-wing movement (Niedermayer 2015).

As attention to the financial crisis declined, the AfD focused on the high inflow of asylum seekers in 2015 and started campaigning against immigrants. This caused conflict within the

¹⁰While wishes from counties can be voiced e.g., due to the currently available housing situation, they are only considered if they fall within the quota.

¹¹The official allocation of refugees to municipalities is not publicly available.

¹²Regressing the share of asylum seekers on the population share as the only explanatory variable already explains 91.8% of the variance in asylum seeker allocation.

¹³Only parties achieving 5% of the vote share or three direct mandates receive an allocation in parliament.

party leading neoliberal members to resign and the party to become more radical (Kroh and Fetz 2016). They now focus solely on xenophobic topics. Their posters campaign for 'Bikinis instead of Burkas', 'No Islam in German Schools', and more generally against a multicultural Germany. Party leaders suggest shooting at immigrants trying to cross the border, call the Holocaust memorial a monument of shame, and cooperate with the Islamophobic PEGIDA movement (Arzheimer and Berning 2019, BBC 2016, Chambers 2017).

While the socioeconomic characteristics of AfD voters are not entirely clear, since 2015, anti-immigrant attitudes are consistently named as the main driving factor for their support (Arzheimer and Berning 2019, Bukow 2017, Goerres *et al.* 2018). AfD voters typically have welfare chauvinist attitudes, are anti-Semitic, and view immigration very critically, especially towards refugees from ethnically different countries and those with a Muslim population (Arzheimer and Berning 2019, Goerres *et al.* 2018).¹⁴ Unique in the European context, the AfD also receives votes from previous immigrants, particularly ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union who have the feeling that refugees today are treated better than they were upon their arrival in Germany (Schade *et al.* 2019, Goerres *et al.* 2018).

The AfD obtained 12.6% of the vote in the 2017 federal election and, since 2018, has succeeded in crossing the 5% hurdle to enter parliament in all states. Between 2017 and 2021 they were the main federal opposition party as well as the main opposition in many states. So far, all of the mainstream parties have refused to cooperate with them, so they are not in government in any state. Figure 2 shows the variation across German counties in AfD voting as well as the location of refugees in 2017. Voting for the AfD is strongest in the former Eastern German states but also is high in rich states like Bavaria. The maps hint that there is little spatial correlation between the location of refugees and local support for the AfD.

¹⁴Goerres *et al.* (2018) find a relation between voting for the Republikaner in 1994 and the AfD more than 20 years later, which suggest that a local nationalist culture or infrastructure exists that lasts over time and is passed on between generations (using survey results see also Avdeenko and Siedler (2017)). Using electoral results from the Weimar Republic Cantoni *et al.* (2019) show that the persistence of right-wing ideology dates even further back and that support for the NSDAP in municipalities in 1933 correlates with the support for the AfD at the 2017 federal election.

To rule out that our results reflect some type of reverse causality, we examine the relationship between AfD vote shares at the municipality level and the characteristics of refugees in our analysis sample from the 2018 IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees (discussed in more detail in the next section). As seen in Table 2, being from an Asian origin is the only variable positively related to living in a municipality with more AfD voting. We believe that this occurs because individuals from countries where relatively uncommon languages are spoken are allocated to certain locations based on translators' availability for those languages. All remaining variables (excluding area of origin) are jointly unrelated to the local AfD vote share. Regardless, we control for all of these characteristics in our main regression analysis to rule out any small sample biases and also to improve the precision of the estimates.

3 Data and Empirical Strategy

3.1 Data

The study combines several datasets to measure the impact of local AfD voting on refugees' integration. Our main data source is the 2018 IAB-BAMF-SOEP subsample of the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP) (Bruecker and Schupp 2020, Goebel *et al.* 2019). Since 2016, this specifically developed survey has been conducted in collaboration with the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) and the Research Centre on Migration, Integration, and Asylum of the Federal Office of Migration and Refugees (BAMF-FZ) and is designed to be representative of the population of asylum seekers that arrived in Germany between 2013 and 2016 and were registered in the Central Register of Foreigners (Kroh *et al.* 2016, Kühne *et al.* 2019).¹⁵

¹⁵Overall, 7,430 adult refugees were interviewed along with more than 5,000 children at least once over the three waves since 2016. Interviews are undertaken in reception centers, communal accommodation facilities, and private housing using computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI). The questionnaire is available in the seven main languages and includes audio files in case of illiterate refugees. In case of any further problems, interpreters can be reached via a hotline to assist during the interview (Kühne *et al.* 2019).

We focus on a sub-sample of 3,334 working-age individuals (18 to 65 years-old) interviewed in the 2018 wave who arrived in Germany between 2015 and 2017. From this, we drop 300 individuals that did not answer key demographic or economic integration questions. We restrict our analysis to immigrants who have arrived since 2015 because, as discussed above, these individuals are the most likely to still be living in the location of their original assignment. Relying on the 2018 wave of the data allows us to capture a representative sample of arrivals during the entire period of the recent refugee arrivals and to focus on a period of time where the AfD was very successful in wide areas of Germany.¹⁶

Table 3 describes the characteristics of the analysis sample as well as those of both non-refugee immigrants and native Germans in the same age-range interviewed in the same round of the SOEP for comparison. Over half of refugees are in families with children and their average age is 34. 38% have only seven years or less schooling and, consequently, no accepted school degree in Germany. In comparison, non-refugee immigrants are, on average, ten years older and almost 15 percentage points more likely to have a secondary education. 23.7% of the observed refugees are working in 2018, while among Germans and other immigrants over 70% are employed. The majority of refugees arrived in 2015 and 59% immigrated from Syria. While only 1.4% of refugees are originally from South-East Europe, this group makes up the largest share of 'other' migrants (58.7%).

Election data is accessed from the German Statistical Authority's regional database. Germany has a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system where each voter has two votes: the first vote is a personal vote for a specific candidate, and the second vote for their preferred party. This second vote determines the party distribution in regional and the federal parliament. Our main explanatory variable is defined as the share of valid second votes for the AfD in a municipality in the 2017 federal election. This is updated to reflect

¹⁶The 2019 wave of the data has been released. Unfortunately, not all of the questions we rely on to measure integration were asked in this wave, making it difficult to examine changes in integration over time in a comparable way.

any regional election that took place after 2017 but before an individual’s interview date.¹⁷

We measure economic and social integration along a number of dimensions. Our main analysis examines the impact on two aggregated indexes. We focus on these measures because it reduces the numbers of statistical tests that have to be run and therefore decrease the chance of finding falsely significant results (Kling *et al.* 2007). Each outcome variable is first standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one for the entire sample with some variables reversed so that a higher value always represents a better outcome. We then average across each outcome variable in an index (i.e., each is given an equal weight). Hence, a higher score on each index means that a refugee is doing better.

Our economic index includes: i) whether or not the individual is employed; ii) whether individual participated in an integration course organized by the BAMF; iii) an individual’s German language skills (aggregated self-evaluated speaking, reading, and writing skills); and iv) their time spent studying German. Language skills have been shown to directly impact the labor market participation of immigrants which is why we include them in our economic index (Dustmann and Fabbri 2003, Lochmann *et al.* 2019). They could potentially also impact social integration, but we choose to focus on more direct measures in that index.

Following Ager and Strang (2008) and Harder *et al.* (2018), we measure the social integration of refugees based on their response to: i) whether they feel welcome in their municipality; ii) how much they trust others; iii) how often they feel disadvantaged due to their heritage; as well as social ties measured by: iv) how much time they spend with Germans in general; and v) more specifically, time spent with their German neighbors. Appendix Table A2 presents summary statistics for each unstandardized outcome variable.

We also collect county level data from the German Statistical Authority to use as additional control variables, specifically GDP per capita, share foreign-born, share male, share over age 65, and the number of asylum seekers. We also use data from the Federal Criminal Police Office to measure criminality at the county level and data from the Federal

¹⁷All of our main results are qualitatively similar if we only use the information from the 2017 federal election

Labor Office to measure the unemployment rate and the share of employees with an academic degree at the county level. We also control for the population size of the municipality. All of the data discussed here is at the annual frequency besides the unemployment rate which is available at a monthly level and can be matched to our analysis sample based on each refugee’s interview date.

3.2 Empirical Approach

As the location of each refugee is randomly assigned, we can estimate the impact of local AfD voting on economic and social integration using a simple OLS regression of the form:

$$Y_{imcs} = \alpha + \beta AfD_m + X_{imcs} + Pop_m + Z_{cs} + \zeta_s + e_{imcs} \quad (1)$$

where Y_{imcs} is either the index for economic or social integration for individual i living in municipality m in county c in state s in the year 2018. AfD_m is the share of second votes for the AfD in that municipality, and X_{imcs} are individual controls including a quadratic in age, and indicator variables for gender, family status, education, area of origin, household size, housing type, year of arrival and the interview month. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level as this is the aggregation where election results are measured (Cameron and Miller 2015).

One concern with interpreting, β , the coefficient on local voting for the AfD, is that this might be measuring other local characteristics that are correlated with voting for the AfD besides xenophobic attitudes. In our preferred specification, we also control for the log of the population size in the municipality Pop_m , a host of county level controls, Z_{cs} , including the foreign-born share of the population, share male, share older than 65, share who are refugees, share of workers with academic degree, population density, log GDP per capita, unemployment rate in the interview month, number of reported crimes per capita and proportion of crimes committed by the foreign-born, as well as state fixed effects ζ_s .¹⁸

¹⁸The city states of Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen are included in the surrounding federal states.

These controls cover the main alternative pathways that could be correlated with both local AfD voting and integration outcomes. Unfortunately, besides population size, this information is only available at the county-level, but in general we expect this to be the more relevant aggregation for measuring local economic conditions. We also estimate a model specification where we instead control for county fixed effects and hence just focus on within-county across municipality variation in AfD voting.

4 Results

This section presents the results from the main empirical analysis. We first examine the impact of local AfD voting on our economic and social integration indexes. We then examine heterogeneity in the impacts and discuss potential mechanisms for the effect of local AfD support on integration outcomes.

4.1 The Impact of AfD Voting on Refugee Integration

Our main regression analysis examines the effect that hostile attitudes towards immigrants, voiced through right-wing voting, have on the economic and social integration of refugees. Table 4 reports the estimates of β , the effect of the AfD vote share in a municipality on economic (Panel A) and social (Panel B) integration of refugees placed there, from various specifications. Standard errors in all cases are clustered at the municipality level. In column (1), we only control for individual characteristics. Refugees in municipalities with a 10 percentage point higher local vote share (a little more than the difference between the 25th and 75th percentile of the municipalities in our sample) for the AfD have 0.09 standard deviations (SDs) worse economic integration and 0.15 SDs worse social integration.¹⁹ Both effects are statistically significant at the 1% level.

In column (2), we add controls for the county level characteristics discussed above as

¹⁹We tested whether the effect found here is non-linear but did not find any evidence for this.

well as the municipality (log) population and state fixed effects. Adding this comprehensive set of local control variables has almost no impact on our results. This is a very strong indication that it is the xenophobic attitudes of locals expressed by voting for the AfD that has negative impacts on refugee integration as opposed to some other local characteristic (for example, a poor economic outlook) that is correlated with both AfD voting and worse outcomes for refugees.

In column (3), we control for county fixed effects instead of our county controls besides the unemployment rate which also varies depending on the month of an individual's interview. We now find a slightly larger impact of local AfD voting on social integration (refugees in locations with a 10 percentage point higher local vote share have 0.18 SDs worse social integration), while the impact on economic integration is no longer statistically different from zero but also is not statistically different from the previous results. Standard errors are much larger in this specification as within counties there is less variation in the outcome variables, especially for economic outcomes. Because of the decreased precision of these findings, we focus on the previous specification that includes county controls and state fixed effects in our further analyses.

In column (4), we further test whether the impact we are finding is because of higher levels of voting for the AfD as opposed to higher mainstream conservatism in a particular municipality. We do this by adding local support for the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party as a control variable. We find no evidence for a relationship between local voting for the CDU and refugee integration, and a slightly stronger negative impact of local AfD support on both economic and social integration. This further supports the idea that there is something in particular about local support for the AfD that causes worse outcomes for refugees.

Our results for the impact of local voting for the AfD are also unaffected by controlling for the vote share received by far-right parties in the 2013 federal election (which was generally low) and vote shares for the Nazi party (NSDAP) in the 1933 federal election (column

5).²⁰ While Cantoni *et al.* (2019) found voting for the Nazis in 1933 to be correlated with voting for the AfD in 2017, we find no significant effect of previous right-wing attitudes on the integration of refugees today. It seems that underlying right-wing extremist views are less harmful to refugees' integration than openly voiced anti-immigrant opinions that are commonly spread through the wider public. According to the head of the Federal Criminal Police Office, "the AfD has made xenophobia acceptable in our society," (Jansen and Tretbar 2016) therefore, making it also more visible and possible to experience in every day life. This interpretation is in line with a recent study from Bursztyn *et al.* (2020) finding that Donald Trump's rise in popularity and success in the election made individuals more willing to engage in public xenophobic behavior, as well as observers becoming less likely to sanction xenophobia knowing it is the more popular view.

One concern with our identification strategy is that some refugees in our sample may have been able to move from their original placement municipality if their application for asylum was quickly accepted, and hence could potentially move away from locations with hostile attitudes. For 2/3rds of the refugees in our main sample, we know the location of their first place of residence (this is self-reported and, unfortunately, it is not possible to see what type of residence this is, and whether a later move was voluntary or decided by the authorities). For this sample, we can account for the potential endogenous mobility of some refugees by instrumenting for the AfD share in their current location with the AfD share in their initial municipality.

The results for this analysis are presented in column (6). Our findings here are quite similar to all of our previous findings with a slightly smaller negative impact of local AfD voting on economic integration and a slightly larger negative impact on social integration. Selection into moving does not appear to be a problem for our analysis.²¹ Since not all

²⁰The crosswalk for the 1933 NSDAP vote share was provided by Cantoni *et al.* (2019). We drop a small number of observations where the current municipality could not be matched to its historical counterpart.

²¹Our results are also qualitatively similar if we limit our sample to states that restrict the mobility of accepted refugees. To exclude the possibility that the initial sorting because of the availability of translators plays a role, we also limit the sample to Syrian refugees and again find similar results.

respondents indicated their first place of residence and the attitudes where someone currently lives as opposed to where they were initially placed should have a larger impact on current outcomes, we proceed with the OLS specification presented in column (2) in our further analyses.

We next look separately at the impact on the individual outcomes that are components of the two indexes. Table A3 shows that the negative impact of greater local support for the AfD on economic integration is driven by lower employment rates among refugees in these municipalities; the impacts on the remaining components are consistently negative and large, but not statistically significant. The negative impact on social integration is driven by individuals being more likely to report feeling disadvantaged because of their heritage and having spent less time with their German neighbors in areas with higher AfD support. There are also large negative but insignificant impacts of higher AfD support on time spent with Germans in general and trusting people.

4.2 Heterogeneity and Mechanisms

Bisin *et al.* (2011) provide a theoretical framework which we use to structure our investigation of the heterogeneity in and mechanisms behind why refugees living in areas with higher AfD support have worse integration outcomes.²² As the AfD and their voters target asylum seekers regardless to their degree of integration, we consider what Bisin *et al.* (2011) call the unconditional harassment model. Here, racist native individuals are negatively affected by being matched with a minority individual, unconditional on their integration status. This causes them to feel a loss of identity, which leads to increased harassment of the minority group. In response, minorities can either adopt mainstream values or choose an oppositional identity. They assume that harassment negatively affects the expected economic payoff of assimilation and increases the psychological cost of

²²While their model is generally concerned with why ethnic minorities might adopt oppositional identities and how these are passed on to the next generation, part of the model focuses on how harassment and the number of racists among the majority society may contribute to the emergence of oppositional minority cultures.

interacting with the majority group. Therefore, an oppositional minority culture is more likely to arise with increasing harassment and a higher numbers of racists in the society.

In this context of our paper, this model leads to a number of testable hypotheses. First, the negative impact of higher local AfD support on economic and social integration should be larger for the groups directly targeted by the AfD since members of these groups are the most likely to experience harassment and develop an oppositional identity. Second, refugee integration should be worse in areas with more conflict between natives and refugees and better in areas with more support for refugees. Finally, positive investments by natives towards refugees should be less in areas with more support for the AfD as an oppositional culture is more likely to develop in these areas.

The AfD largely campaigns against refugees from Muslim majority countries, openly stating that Islam is not part of Germany (AfD 2017). They also stereotype single men as criminals from “misogynist medieval societies” (Hoven and Hestermann 2019). Interestingly, as noted in the background section, they openly recruit supporters among Eastern European migrants, even publishing their manifesto in Czech, Russian and Hungarian.

In Table 5, we examine heterogeneity in the impact of AfD voting by refugee country of origin and family status. As hypothesized, we find worse integration among Syrian refugees (the majority of our sample) in municipalities with more support for the AfD and even worse social integration for refugees from other Middle Eastern countries (see Panel A). On the other hand, refugees from Eastern Europe (of which 43% are from Russia), are more integrated in areas with more support for the AfD. Also, as hypothesized, we find that the negative impact of local AfD support is larger for single men relative to other family types (i.e., couples and single women); this is especially true for social integration where the effect size doubles (see Panel B).²³ Interestingly, this is the case even though single men, on average, are actually more integrated than other refugees.

As discussed above not only the number of racists but also the local level of harassment

²³The impact of local AfD support on the integration of single women and couples is not statistically distinguishable so here we pool them together to increase our power to detect differences from single men.

increases the emergence of an oppositional minority culture. The relationship between right-wing party support and xenophobic attacks is theoretically ambiguous. On the one hand, strong right-wing parties could mitigate violence against foreigners as the hostile opinion could be voiced through the electoral system (Braun 2011, Koopmans 1996). On the other hand, right-wing parties often legitimize violence and anti-immigrant networks could easily lead to more harassment (Braun 2011, Jäckle and König 2017).

Therefore, before examining the impact of conflict between natives and refugees on the integration of refugees, we examine whether local support for the AfD is correlated with hostile behavior towards refugees in a local area. Specifically, we use data from the German Federal Criminal Police on the number of attacks on refugee shelters, refugees and asylum seekers, and NGOs supporting refugees in a particular municipality in 2018.²⁴ In 2018, there were a total of 2,037 attacks on shelters, NGOs, or refugees, of which 1,979 attacks have been classified as politically motivated (right-wing).

Figure 3 presents the correlation (point estimate and 95% confidence interval) between AfD vote share and right-wing attacks on refugees, shelters, and NGOs, separately and aggregated, relative to the number of refugees all at the county level as a large proportion of municipalities do not experience an attack. There is a positive and significant correlation between AfD voting and the total number of right-wing attacks at the country level. The result is driven by the relationship between support for the AfD and harassment and attacks against asylum seekers and refugees. While this is only a correlation, the results are in line with findings by Albarosa and Elsner (2022) finding right wing attacks to increase stronger in places with a high share of right-wing voters which is consistent with support for the AfD

²⁴This is published quarterly in response to “small inquiries“ (“kleine Anfrage”) made by parliamentary members of the Left Party (Die Linke). Each attack is listed with the date, the federal state, the municipality name, the type of crime, and whether the attack was registered as politically motivated. Attacks on shelters include amongst others property damage (Sachbeschädigung §303 StGB), sedition (Volksverhetzung § 130 StGB), use of signs of unconstitutional organizations (Verwenden von Kennzeichen verfassungswidriger Organisationen § 86a StGB). Registered attacks on asylum seekers and refugees include for example sedition, insult (Beleidigung § 185 StGB), personal injury (Körperverletzung § 223 StGB; Gefährliche Körperverletzung § 224 StGB), violations of the gun law (Waffengesetz WaffG). Attacks against NGO’s include insults, sedition, and property damage.

encouraging more open expressions of hostile feelings towards refugees.

Therefore, we analyze whether the harassment also directly affects refugee integration and run our main regression model but now examining the relationship between the share of right-wing motivated attacks per refugee in a county and economic and social integration among refugees living in that county. The number of attacks is negatively related to refugees' social integration (Table 6, Panel A). We also find a large negative relationship between attacks and economic integration as well, however, the estimate is very imprecise. As hypothesized, with increasing numbers of negative interactions, we find that the minority group is less likely to integrate with the majority society.

To see if positive and supportive attitudes have the opposite effect, we estimate our main regression model from Table 4 adding the share of votes for the Green party in the 2017 federal election or later regional elections in the municipality as an explanatory variable. While immigration policy is not the primary focus of the Green party, their manifesto in 2017 had a very positive attitude towards migration and argued for a more liberal immigration law and rejecting the inhumane tightening of the asylum law during the last years (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2017). Hence, on average, Green party supporters are likely to have a more liberal opinion about immigration. Consistent with the Bisin *et al.* (2011) model, we find that refugees have better social integration in municipalities where more locals support the Green party, conditional on local support for the AfD (Table 6, Panel B). In fact, the effect sizes nearly offset. This is also consistent with Aksoy *et al.* (2020) who find that more favorable attitudes enhance refugees' integration in Germany.

Next, we examine whether positive investments by natives towards refugees are lower in areas where there is more support for the AfD. Specifically, we examine the impact on whether individuals without a refugee background in Germany donating their time and material goods, and whether they demonstrate for asylum seekers and refugees. We find that, in municipalities with greater support for the AfD, Germans are less likely to support refugees through volunteering or donating money or goods to them (Table 7, Panel A). The

results for the AfD are unaffected by also controlling for the local vote share for the Greens and, furthermore, we find that voting for the Greens is related to more direct local support for refugees (Panel B).

Finally, we examine whether the overall environment is more hostile in areas where the AfD receives more support. In particular, we analyze whether the AfD's anti-immigrant rhetoric spills over to supporters of other parties. Here, we use the GLES-Rolling Cross-Section 2017, which surveys a representative sample of the population that is eligible to vote in the 2017 federal election and asks questions about voting behaviors, attitudes and specifically about opinions about migration policies (GLES 2019). We examine the relationship between AfD voting in an individual's electoral district and their opinion about different immigration topics, excluding all individuals who indicated they intend to or have voted for the AfD in the 2017 election. Additional to individual and district control variables we include indicators for where individual's place themselves on a left-right political scale. We examine three outcomes: i) whether immigration rules should be stricter (1-11); ii) whether immigrants should assimilation to German culture (1-5); and iii) whether a migration-related topic is one of the top two problems Germany is currently facing (0/1).²⁵

In Panel A of Table 8, we find that individuals living in areas with stronger AfD vote are more likely to favor restrictive immigration policies and feel stronger that immigrants should assimilate to German culture. This is true even among left of center voters (unreported results). In Panel B, we also control for local support for the Green party. This has no impact on our main results and we find some evidence that individuals living in areas with more local support for the Green party are less worried about immigration-related topics.

Overall, our results indicate that it is more difficult for refugees to meet Germans in areas with higher AfD support and hence to get in touch with people who have a favorable

²⁵We generated the dummy variable "Worries" being equal to one, if the participant named Islamic fundamentalism, immigration, integration, restriction of immigration, asylum, percentage of foreigners, governmental benefits for foreigners, integration of Muslims, or integration of economic migrants to the question: "In your opinion, what is the most important problem facing Germany today?"

opinion about immigration. On top of that, individuals living in these areas who do not support the AfD also appear to adopt more anti-immigrant attitudes. Immigrants randomly placed in these areas are therefore more likely to interact with someone who is racist, which, as hypothesized in Bisin *et al.* (2011), should reduce investments in integration and increase the emergence of an oppositional minority culture. This is precisely what we see in our main results.

5 Conclusion

How does support for right-wing parties affect the integration of immigrants? While a large literature has focused on whether increased immigration causes a rise in support for right-wing parties (Barone *et al.* 2016, Halla *et al.* 2017, Otto and Steinhardt 2014, Steinmayr 2020, Hangartner *et al.* 2019), little is known about how expressed negative attitudes influence the lives of newly-arrived individuals. This paper analyzes this open question by examining the effect of local support for the right-wing political party AfD on the integration of refugees in Germany.

Using the quasi-random distribution of refugees to different locations in Germany to avoid self-selection bias, we show that refugees allocated to areas with higher support for the AfD have worse economic and social integration. This is especially true for groups targeted by AfD campaigns. Furthermore, right-wing support is correlated with attacks against refugees and hinders positive contacts with the majority society. In municipalities with strong right-wing support, Germans are also less likely to engage with refugees favorably by donating their time or money. In areas with strong right-wing support, even non-AfD voters want more restrictive immigration policies and for immigrants to assimilate to the German culture.

Our findings offer the first evidence that not only right-wing attacks but more general negative attitudes voiced through right-wing voting hinder immigrants' successful economic and social integration in their new country. Overall, local attitudes are an important factor

explaining why some refugees integrate better into German society, suggesting that the current policy of random placement might not be optimal.

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7 Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Asylum applications in Germany






Figure 2: AfD vote share and distribution of displaced individuals in Germany in 2017



(a) AfD Share Federal Election

(b) Displaced Individuals per 1000 inhabitants

Figure 3: Right-Wing Attacks and and AfD Voting



Notes: The Figure shows OLS estimates of the correlation of the share of right-wing attacks and the vote share for the AfD. Municipality controls include the population size. County level controls include share of foreign population, share of male population, share of refugees, share employees with academic degree, population density, GDP per capita, monthly unemployment rate, share criminal activity, criminal share where suspect is not German. City States Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen are included in surrounding federal states for state fixed effects.

Table 1: The Relationship Between County Characteristic and the Share of Asylum Seekers

Share of State Population	0.9700*** (0.0096)	0.9649*** (0.0106)
Local Log GDP per capita	0.0050* (0.0027)	0.0051* (0.0027)
Local Immigrant Share	-0.0999** (0.0414)	-0.1124*** (0.0403)
Local Share Male	0.1486 (0.1437)	0.1639 (0.1355)
Local Share Over Age 65	0.0569 (0.0621)	0.0589 (0.0488)
Local Share High Educated Employees	-0.0127 (0.0230)	-0.0127 (0.0204)
Local Unemployment Rate	0.0007 (0.0005)	0.0011 (0.0007)
Local Population Density	-0.0018 (0.0018)	-0.0016 (0.0016)
Local Crimes Per Capita	0.0382 (0.0527)	0.0196 (0.0553)
Local Criminal Cases with foreign suspect	0.0006** (0.0003)	0.0007*** (0.0002)
Left-Right Coalition Fed. State	0.0020 (0.0021)	0.0014 (0.0014)
Right Government Fed. State	0.0018 (0.0011)	0.0020 (0.0013)
Local CDU/CSU Share	-0.0308 (0.0265)	-0.0043 (0.0445)
Local SPD Share	-0.0157 (0.0173)	0.0135 (0.0456)
Local Green Party Share	0.0059 (0.0412)	0.0374 (0.0704)
Local Right-Wing Share	-0.1612 (0.1302)	-0.2016 (0.2365)
Joint test of county controls (excluding population share and gdp) being significant:	F(14, 400) = 1.46 Prob >F = 0.1247	F(14, 400) = 1.48 Prob >F = 0.1144
Observations	1,203	1,203
R-squared	0.9273	0.9279
Year FE	Yes	Yes
State FE	No	Yes

Notes: OLS of county's share of Asylum Seekers within each state on population share of the county within each state and other county characteristics. Data that was only collected by one institution for more counties (Saarland, Kassel (City and Kreis), Cottbus and Spree) was divided based on the population share. The share for the City-States Hamburg and Berlin are calculated based on the total national number. Government represents whether the federal state government is left (SPD, Left, Greens), a coalition between left and right parties, or right (CDU/CSU, FDP). County vote share for CDU, SPD, Green, and Right-Wing (NPD & Republikaner) is the vote share for each party in each county during the 2013 federal election. Robust standard errors are clustered on the county level and shown in parentheses. Significance: * Significance at 10%; ** Significance at 5%; *** Significance at 1%.

Table 2: Local Voting for the AfD and Refugee Characteristics

Characteristics Measured for:	Refugees	
Female	0.022	(0.142)
Age	0.063	(0.064)
Age2	-0.078	(0.087)
Family Status: Married no Kids Reference		
Family with kids	0.333	(0.463)
Single with kids	0.128	(0.525)
Single no kids	-0.018	(0.357)
Education: No Degree Reference		
Elementary School	0.253	(0.228)
Secondary I & II	-0.399*	(0.209)
Tertiary	-0.158	(0.259)
HH Size	-0.033	(0.090)
Private Housing	-0.374	(0.304)
Immigration Year		
2016	0.159	(0.255)
2017	0.322	(0.565)
Area of Origin: Syria Reference		
South East Europe	-0.451	(1.012)
Asia	0.897**	(0.365)
Middle East	-0.223	(0.280)
Africa	-0.085	(0.418)
Joint test of all controls being significant: With Area of Origin	F(18, 796) = 1.52	Prob >F = 0.0763
Joint test of all controls being significant: Without Area of Origin	F(14, 796) = 1.14	Prob >F = 0.3174
Observations	3,034	
R-squared	0.452	
County Controls	Yes	
StateFE	No	

Notes: The table reports the relationship between the vote results for the AfD at the 2017 federal election and federal state elections that took place after and the individual characteristics of the refugees and immigrants. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses. * Significance at 10%; ** Significance at 5%; *** Significance at 1%.

Table 3: Sample Descriptive Statistics

	Refugees		Immigrants		Germans	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Proportion females	0.396	0.489	0.576	0.494	0.543	0.498
Average Age	33.9	10.4	42.5	11.1	43.8	13.5
Family Status						
Married No Children	0.069	0.253	0.239	0.427	0.254	0.435
Family with Children	0.565	0.496	0.444	0.497	0.269	0.443
Single Parent	0.139	0.346	0.115	0.319	0.139	0.346
Single	0.228	0.419	0.201	0.401	0.338	0.473
HH Size	4.13	2.25	3.31	1.50	2.91	1.39
Education						
Missing Education	0.059	0.235	0.029	0.169	0.049	0.215
No Degree	0.381	0.486	0.051	0.221	0.010	0.102
Elementary School	0.219	0.414	0.327	0.469	0.202	0.402
Secondary I or II	0.175	0.380	0.309	0.462	0.490	0.500
University	0.167	0.373	0.283	0.451	0.248	0.432
Proportion working	0.237	0.425	0.739	0.439	0.786	0.410
Proportion in private housing	0.818	0.386				
Immigration Year						
Immigrated 2015	0.772	0.420				
Immigrated 2016	0.201	0.401				
Immigrated 2017 or later	0.027	0.162				
Immigrated before 1989			0.183	0.386		
Immigrated 1990 - 1999			0.283	0.451		
Immigrated 2000 - 2009			0.302	0.459		
Immigrated 2010 - 2014			0.201	0.401		
Immigrated in/after 2015			0.031	0.174		
Area of Origin						
South-East Europe	0.014	0.118	0.587	0.493		
Asia	0.135	0.342	0.174	0.379		
Middle East	0.202	0.402	0.123	0.329		
Syria	0.591	0.492	0.006	0.078		
Africa	0.057	0.233	0.015	0.123		
Total	3,034		3,445		15,147	

Notes: Summary of individuals searching for protection (who immigrated after 2014), immigrants, and native Germans between the age of 18 and 65 in Germany in 2018. Source: SOEP v35

Table 4: The Impact of Local Voting for the AfD and the Integration of Refugees

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Economic Integration						
AfD Share Municipality	-0.902*** (0.232)	-0.988** (0.496)	-0.591 (0.743)	-1.004** (0.506)	-1.169* (0.633)	-0.859** (0.433)
CDU Share Municipality				-0.029 (0.276)		
Right Wing Share 2013					1.572 (2.748)	
NSDAP Share 1933					0.041 (0.111)	
Observations	3,034	3,034	3,034	3,034	2,967	2,136
R-squared	0.168	0.190	0.289	0.190	0.188	0.155
Panel B: Social Integration						
AfD Share Municipality	-1.457*** (0.267)	-1.430*** (0.478)	-1.816** (0.715)	-1.638*** (0.487)	-1.308** (0.653)	-1.655*** (0.454)
CDU Share Municipality				-0.388 (0.288)		
Right Wing Share 2013					-1.086 (3.272)	
NSDAP Share 1933					0.134 (0.137)	
Observations	2,624	2,624	2,624	2,624	2,565	1,865
R-squared	0.084	0.126	0.279	0.127	0.126	0.116
State FEs	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
County Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County FEs	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
OLS vs IV	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	IV

Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of the effect of AfD vote shares in municipalities on the integration indexes of refugees. The main explanatory variable AfD Share Municipality reports the vote share for the right-wing AfD based on the second vote during the 2017 federal election on the municipality level and is updated in case of later regional elections. All models include individual controls for gender, age, age-squared, family status, education, area of origin, household size, housing type, and year of immigration. County-level controls include share of foreign population, share of male population, share of population above 65 years, share of refugees, share employees with an academic degree, population density, GDP per capita, monthly unemployment rate, share criminal activity, criminal share where the suspect is not German as well as the log population size of the municipality. City-States Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen are included in surrounding federal states for state fixed effects. Using county fixed effects, included controls are monthly unemployment and municipality population. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Column (6) presents instrumental variable results, instrumenting AfD results with AfD results at the first place of assignment. F-statistic for economic variable: 1188 and F-Statistic for social variable: 1081. * Significance at 10%; ** Significance at 5%; *** Significance at 1%.

Table 5: Effects of AfD vote share on Integration by Origin and Family Status

	(1) Economic Integration	(2) Social Integration
Panel A: Origin		
AfD Share Municipality	-0.950* (0.521)	-1.247** (0.520)
Syria Reference Group		
East Europe	-0.361 (0.257)	-0.196 (0.139)
Middle East	0.074 (0.066)	0.126* (0.067)
East Europe#AfD Share	2.243 (1.712)	2.017** (0.922)
Middle East#AfD Share	-0.682 (0.478)	-0.891* (0.485)
R-squared	0.192	0.129
Panel C: Family Status		
AfD Share Municipality	-0.965* (0.519)	-1.172** (0.498)
Single Men	0.163*** (0.060)	0.157** (0.072)
Single Men#AfD Share	-0.463 (0.417)	-1.297*** (0.436)
R-squared	0.133	0.116
Observations	3,034	2,624

Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of the effect of AfD vote shares in municipalities on the integration indexes of asylum seekers and refugees in 2018. The main explanatory variable AfD Share Municipality reports the vote share for the right-wing AfD based on the second vote during the 2017 federal election on the county level and is updated in case of later regional elections. In Panel A, the AfD share is interacted with the area of origin, in Panel B and C with gender and family status. Individual, municipality, and county controls remain the same as in the previous table. City-States Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen are included in surrounding federal states for state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on the municipality level. * Significance at 10%; ** Significance at 5%; *** Significance at 1%

Table 6: Right-Wing Attacks and Green Party Voting and Integration Outcomes

	(1) Economic	(2) Social
Panel A: Attacks		
Attacks Per Refugee in County	-9,509 (8,094)	-16,505* (9,334)
R-squared	0,188	0,120
Panel B: Green and AfD vote share		
AfD Share Municipality	-1.037** (0.508)	-1.107** (0.517)
Green Share Municipality	-0.132 (0.469)	0.865** (0.429)
R-squared	0.190	0.127
Observations	3,034	2,624

Notes: Panel A reports OLS estimates of the effect of the share of right-wing attacks per refugee in 2018 in counties on the integration indexes of refugees. Individual control variables include: gender, age, age-squared, family status, education, area of origin, household size, housing type, and year of immigration. Municipality controls include the population size. County-level controls include share of foreign population, share of male population, share of population above 65 years, share of asylum seekers, share employees with an academic degree, population density, GDP per capita, monthly unemployment rate (and for Panel B also share criminal activity, criminal share where the suspect is not German). Panel B reports OLS estimates of the effect of Green Party vote shares in municipalities on the integration indexes of refugees. Individual, municipality, and county controls remain the same as in the previous table. City-States Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen are included in surrounding federal states for state fixed effects. Robust Standard errors are clustered on the county (Panel A) or municipality level (Panel B) and shown in parentheses. * Significance at 10%; ** Significance at 5%; *** Significance at 1%

Table 7: Support for Refugees from the Native Population and AfD vote share

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Support Refugees last year	Any Support	Volunteer Time	Donation	Demonstration
Panel A: Support and AfD vote share				
AfD Share Municipality	-1.183*** (0.296)	-0.693*** (0.254)	-1.066*** (0.289)	-0.239 (0.229)
R-squared	0.075	0.025	0.074	0.029
Panel B: Support and AfD and Green vote share				
AfD Share Municipality	-0.885*** (0.321)	-0.554* (0.283)	-0.856*** (0.314)	0.036 (0.250)
Green Share Municipality	1.025** (0.472)	0.480 (0.402)	0.723 (0.452)	0.942** (0.379)
R-squared	0.076	0.025	0.074	0.029
Observations	24,841	24,841	24,841	24,841

Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of the relation of AfD vote shares and Panel B also for Green Party vote shares and support for refugees. Individual control variables include: gender, age, age2, family status, education, household size. Municipality controls include the population size. County-level controls include share of foreign population, share of male population, share of population above 65 years, share of refugees, share employees with an academic degree, population density, GDP per capita, monthly unemployment rate, share criminal activity, criminal share where the suspect is not German. City-States Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen are included in surrounding federal states for state fixed effects. Robust Standard errors are clustered on the municipality level and shown in parentheses. * Significance at 10%; ** Significance at 5%; *** Significance at 1%

Table 8: Attitudes towards Immigration

	(1) Worries	(2) Restrictive	(3) Assimilation
Panel B: Attitudes and AfD vote share			
AfD 2017	0.092 (0.326)	5.852*** (1.391)	2.381*** (0.647)
Ref: Middle			
Left	-0.091*** (0.015)	-1.405*** (0.069)	-0.368*** (0.043)
Right	0.069*** (0.020)	0.895*** (0.121)	0.187*** (0.060)
R-squared	0.029	0.142	0.136
Panel B: Attitudes and AfD and Green vote share			
AfD 2017	-0.287 (0.356)	4.301** (1.845)	2.587*** (0.852)
Green	-0.759* (0.442)	-3.105 (2.168)	0.413 (1.080)
Ref: Middle			
Left	-0.090*** (0.015)	-1.402*** (0.069)	-0.368*** (0.043)
Right	0.069*** (0.020)	0.893*** (0.121)	0.187*** (0.060)
R-squared	0.030	0.142	0.136
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5824	5824	3331

Notes: Standard Errors clustered on district level. Sample excludes individuals indicating that they will or have voted for the AfD. Worries means participant named a migration related topic as the most or second most important problem facing Germany today. the higher the value for Restricted the more the respondent agrees that immigration rules should be tightened. The higher the value for Assimilate, the more the respondent agrees that immigrants should assimilate culturally. Individual controls: female, age, age square, hh size, employment, education. Distric controls: log population, population density, share foreign population, population share over 60, log gdp per capita, unemployment rate, school leavers with high school degree * Significance at 10%; ** Significance at 5%; *** Significance at 1%

Appendix

Table A1: Asylum Applications and Königsteiner Schlüssel Quota

	AfD Share in Federal States (Mean)	AfD Share in Federal States (SD)	Asylum Applications 2015-2018	Königsteiner Key 2015-2018	Population Share 2015-2018
Schleswig-Holstein	7.91%	0.030	3.65%	3.40%	3.49%
Hamburg	7.82%	.	2.54%	2.54%	2.20%
Niedersachsen	8.94%	0.027	9.79%	9.34%	9.63%
Bremen	11.04%	0.021	1.17%	0.95%	0.82%
Nordrhein-Westfalen	8.89%	0.022	23.42%	21.18%	21.66%
Hessen	12.93%	0.025	7.64%	7.36%	7.53%
Rheinland-Pfalz	11.09%	0.044	5.09%	4.83%	4.92%
Baden-Württemberg	13.08%	0.032	11.36%	12.96%	13.29%
Bayern	13.15%	0.035	13.10%	15.48%	15.69%
Saarland	9.94%	0.015	1.61%	1.21%	1.20%
Berlin	12.05%	.	5.28%	5.07%	4.34%
Brandenburg	22.93%	0.055	3.10%	3.05%	3.02%
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	21.59%	0.057	2.25%	2.02%	1.95%
Sachsen	32.14%	0.055	4.46%	5.07%	4.94%
Sachsen-Anhalt	21.40%	0.043	2.91%	2.81%	2.70%
Thüringen	25.10%	0.059	2.57%	2.71%	2.61%

Notes: Mean and standard deviation of AfD vote shares in municipalities in federal election 2017. Percentage of asylum applications per federal state and planned quota based on the Königsteiner Schlüssel for the respective state average of years 2015-2018. Population share of the federal state.

Table A2: Summary Statistics for the Outcome Variables

	Mean	Standard Deviation
<hr/> Economic <hr/>		
Employment	0.237	0.425
Enrolled in an Integration Course	0.493	0.5
German Language Skills	3.128	0.963
Hours Studying German	2.291	2.341
<hr/> Social <hr/>		
Feel Disadvantaged	1.449	0.607
Time Spent w/ Germans	3.617	1.875
Time Spent w/ German Neighbors	2.388	1.719
Feel welcome	4.112	0.879
Trust in people	2.787	0.914

Notes: Employment and Enrolled in Integration course are dummy variables indicating if the individual is in employment or has participated in a language course. 23.7% are employed, and almost 50% participated in an integration course. German language skills are self-evaluated on a scale from one to five, while hours studying German are self-reported hours the individual spends studying German per day. For the Variable "feel disadvantaged," a high number indicates individual feels more often disadvantaged (i.e., three indicated individuals feel often disadvantaged due to heritage, while a one means they never feel disadvantaged). This is recoded once the variables are standardized so that higher numbers indicate positive outcomes. The time spent with Germans or German neighbors lays between one and six, and fewer individuals spend time with their neighbors. Feel welcome is scaled between one and five, and trust in people between one and four.

Table A3: The Impact of Local Voting for the AfD on the Separate Integration Outcomes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Economic				Social				
	Employed	Integr Course	Language	Study German	Feel Disadv	Time Germans	Time German Neighbors	Feel Welcome	Trust People
AfD Share	-1.745** (0.823)	-0.395 (0.894)	-0.754 (0.851)	-1.056 (0.872)	-2.398** (0.978)	-1.120 (0.938)	-1.993** (0.910)	0.119 (0.975)	-1.758 (1.161)
R-squared	0.192	0.084	0.342	0.052	0.102	0.152	0.119	0.076	0.060
Observations	3,034	3,034	3,034	3,034	2,624	2,624	2,624	2,624	2,624

Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of the effect of AfD vote shares in municipalities on the separate integration indicators of refugees. The outcome variables are standardized. The main explanatory variable AfD Share Municipality reports the vote share for the right-wing AfD based on the second vote during the 2017 federal election on the municipality level and is updated in case of later regional elections. Individual, municipality, and county controls remain the same as in the previous table. City-States Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen are included in surrounding federal states for state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on the municipality level.