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## Working Paper Large fiscal episodes and sustainable development some international evidence

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# LARGE FISCAL EPISODES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

SOME INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE

Joshua Aizenman, Yothin Jinjarak, Hien Nguyen, and Donghyun Park

NO. 644

December 2021

## ADB ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER SERIES



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**ADB Economics Working Paper Series** 

## Large Fiscal Episodes and Sustainable Development Some International Evidence

Joshua Aizenman, Yothin Jinjarak, Hien Nguyen, and Donghyun Park

No. 644 | December 2021

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## ABSTRACT

This paper examines the association between episodes of large fiscal impulses (expansions and adjustments) and sustainable development indicators (prosperity, resilience, and inclusivity). We provide country studies of Chile, Poland, South Africa, and Thailand, examining the components of government expenses and tax revenues, and reporting four stylized patterns from the analysis as follows: (i) Fiscal expansions led to higher growth rates and reduced negative trade-offs, e.g., pollution and poor-health mortalities associated with economic growth. (ii) Fiscal adjustments led to a more inclusive economy, lowered poverty headcounts, improved sanitation, and increased cleaner technology access. (iii) Fiscal expansions followed an increase in direct taxes (especially corporate taxes) and a decline in social contributions, and preceded a decline in other direct taxes and social contributions, an increase in wage bills, and preceded a decline in government consumption expenditure and transfers. In light of these findings, domestic resource mobilization should consider the time paths of the taxes and expenditure components to understand their empirical linkages with sustainable development outcomes in the respective countries.

*Keywords:* sustainable development, tax base, government expenses, large fiscal changes

*JEL codes:* E62, H11, O11

### I. INTRODUCTION

This paper studies the intertemporal feedbacks between fiscal policy and sustainable development. We focus on the inclusivity of economic growth and domestic revenue mobilization around large fiscal mobilization episodes, including reforms of indirect taxes and exemptions, tax administration, and transfer programs. Inclusive growth reduces poverty, improves health and education, among others, and may enhance the tax capacity, spending efficiency, and resource mobilization (e.g., greater compliance, higher income, lower informality). In turn, higher tax mobilization may fund pressing social policies and redistribution, thereby deepening inclusive growth and better social infrastructure. Such associations are subject to structural factors, including governance, polarization, civil wars and conflicts, ethnic and religious fragmentation, quality of institutions, a share of manufacturing, farming, commodity dependence, and urbanization rates.

To deepen our understanding amid the challenges posed by multidimensional data requirements, we provide country studies that are combined with a panel estimation of selected emerging markets. We ask three questions. The first is the relationship between economic structure and the composition of government revenues and expenses. Second, we address the association between episodes of large fiscal impulses (expansions and adjustments) and sustainable development outcomes (prosperity, inclusivity, and resilience). Third, we ask whether past changes in the budget's specific components led to fiscal expansions and adjustments, which relied on future changes in certain budget items.

After putting together the necessary data, we identify Chile, Poland, South Africa, and Thailand as the emerging markets that provide sufficient fiscal aggregates and represent a diverse sample set for the analysis. For these countries, a third of gross domestic product (GDP) is the industry, and more than half are services, based on the World Bank's World Development Indicators database as of 2018. Despite the similarity, there are structural differences. Chile's largest exports are metals, minerals, and agricultural products; South Africa's largest exports are stone, minerals, and agricultural products based on The Growth Lab at Harvard University (2019) as of 2018: the fiscal stance is vulnerable to commodity price fluctuations. Poland's largest exports are machinery, services, and agricultural products; Thailand's largest exports are services, machinery, electronics, vehicles, and chemicals: the fiscal conditions are sensitive to global industrial production and related supply-chain services. Thus, different terms of trade shocks are responsible for large episodes of fiscal expansions and adjustments across these economies. There are also differences in their politico-economic structure, i.e., liberal versus conservative tendency and single-party versus coalition government. These subtleties are beyond the scope of our paper.

The analysis proceeds with the decomposition of fiscal revenues and expenses and their linkages with sustainable development. The estimation then tests these linkages' strengths, identifying prevalent useful feedback as the guidelines for dealing with the present and future challenges. We find some stylized patterns in the sample countries: (i) fiscal expansions led to higher growth rates and reduced negative trade-offs, e.g., pollution and poor-health mortalities associated with economic growth; (ii) fiscal adjustments led to a more inclusive economy, lowered poverty headcounts, improved sanitation, and cleaner technology access; (iii) fiscal expansions followed an increase in direct taxes (especially corporate taxes) and a decline in social contributions, and preceded a decline in other direct taxes and an increase in wage bills; and (iv) fiscal adjustments followed a decline in other direct taxes and social contributions, an increase in wage bills, and preceded a decline in government

consumption expenditure and transfers. In light of these findings, the domestic resource mobilization should consider the time paths of the taxes and expenditure components to understand their empirical linkages with the sustainable development outcomes in the respective countries.

Section II describes the data. Section III discusses fiscal aggregates and sustainable development and follows with the estimation of the linkages in section IV. The conclusion is in section V.

## II. DATA

Data on the main components of the general government spending are from Government Finance Statistics database of the International Monetary Fund, including wage bills (*Wage*), nonwage expenditure (*Nonwage*), subsidies to firms (*Subsidies*), and expenditure on social benefits (*Transfers*); all in percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Because data on fixed capital consumption are not available for Thailand and only available for South Africa from 2003, we exclude it from the study. This exclusion should not influence our analysis as the fixed capital consumption is only a minor part of the general government expenditure (0.93% in Chile 2000–2018, 2.45% in Poland 1995–2018, and 0.7% in South Africa 2003–2018). Following the literature, we also exclude interest expense to focus on the discretionary change of fiscal impulse. Our data indicate that the interest expense accounts for a small fraction of the general government expenses (0.76% in Chile 2000–2018, 2.78% in Poland 1995–2018, 3.81% in South Africa 1996–2018, and 1.1% in Thailand 2000–2018).

We use the Government Revenue Dataset of the United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) for the main components of total tax revenue. The data include personal income taxes (*PIT*), corporate income taxes (*CIT*), payroll and workforce taxes and property taxes (*Other*), indirect taxes (*INDT*), and social security contributions (*SSC*); all in percent of GDP. For Chile, we interpolate the 1993–2005 nonresource *CIT* from the total *CIT*—total income and profit taxes on corporations, including taxes on resource firms—over the 1993–2005 period, using the 2006–2018 ratio of the nonresource *CIT* to total *CIT*.<sup>1</sup>

We calculate the primary balance as follows:

- Total tax revenue (% of GDP) = PIT + CIT + Other + INDT + SSC
- Primary expenses (% of GDP) = Wage + Nonwage + Subsidies + Transfer
- Primary deficit (% of GDP) = Primary expenses Total tax revenue

Our analysis considers economic growth, taking into account its inclusivity and sustainability. For comprehensiveness, we use 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) indicators, covering poverty headcount ratio (*Poverty*); population share of undernourished (*Undernourishment*); mortality ratio from cardiovascular disease (CVD), cancer, diabetes, or chronic respiratory disease (CRD) between age 30 and age 70 (*Mortality*); enrollment ratio to pre-primary school (*Enrollment*); proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (*Women power*); population share with access to basic sanitation services (*Sanitation*); population share with access to clean fuels and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Specifically,  $CIT_{Chile,t} = \left(\frac{1}{13}\sum_{i=2006}^{2018} \frac{CIT_{Chile,i}}{TCIT_{Chile,t}}\right) \times TCIT_{Chile,t}$ , x where t = 1993–2005; TCIT is total income and profit taxes on corporations, including taxes on resource firms.

technologies for cooking (*Fuel-tech*); youth population share not in education, employment or training (*Non-education*); fixed broadband subscriptions (*Broadband*); mean consumption of bottom 40% of population (*Bottom consumption*); exposure to atmospheric particulate matter (PM) that have a diameter of less than 2.5 micrometers or PM<sub>2.5</sub> air pollution (*Pollution*); carbon dioxide damage (*Carbon dioxide damage*); number of displaced persons associated with disasters (*Displacement*); marine-protected areas (*Marine*); terrestrial protected areas (*Terrestrial*); bribery incidence experienced by firms (*Bribery*); and personal remittances (*Remittances*). Details of these indicators are in the Appendix. We collect the annual data from World Bank's World Development Indicators database and use linear interpolation for the missing data. Our final sample of fiscal and sustainable development variables includes Chile 2000–2018, Poland 1995–2018, South Africa 1996–2018, and Thailand 2000-2018.

## III. FISCAL AGGREGATES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Section III looks at the structure of total tax revenue and primary expenses across countries. Figure 1 plots the time paths of fiscal components (as share of gross domestic product or GDP) during 2000–2018 (Poland and South Africa data went back to 1995). We also compute the variations (changes and standard deviation or s.d.) of total tax revenue, primary expenses, and each country's fiscal components over the sample period.

From Figure 1, Chile (Figure 1a) saw the primary expenses decreased (2.8% [s.d. 1.2%]), while the total tax revenue to GDP increased (1.8% [s.d. 0.8%]) during 2000–2018. The expenditure on subsidies to firms decreased (3.8% [s.d. 1.2%]), and the wage bills increased (1.1% [s.d. 0.7%]). The shares of nonwage bills and transfer expenses remained stable over time [s.d. 0.3% and 0.4%, respectively]. The corporate income taxes to GDP increased (2.6% [s.d. 1.3%]), while the indirect taxes decreased (1% [s.d. 0.8%]). Other tax components' contributions remained largely unchanged.

Poland (Figure 1b) saw the primary expenses decreased (3.4% [s.d. 1.9%]) and the total tax revenue to GDP increased (2% [s.d. 1.1%]). The transfer and nonwage bills to GDP decreased (1.3% [s.d. 1%] and 1% [s.d. 0.5%], respectively). The personal income taxes and indirect taxes to GDP increased (1% [s.d. 0.4%-0.6%]). Other expenses and tax components were relatively stable during the 2000-2018 period.

South Africa (Figure 1c) saw both primary expenses to GDP and tax revenue to GDP increased (7.7% [s.d. 2.9%] and 3.9% [s.d. 1.5%], respectively). Transfer expenses to GDP increased (3.1% [s.d. 0.8%]) and the nonwage bills increased (2.5% [s.d. 1%]). The indirect taxes and personal income taxes to GDP increased (1.7% [s.d. 0.8%] and 1% [s.d. 0.8%], respectively.

Thailand (Figure 1d) saw both primary expenses to GDP and total tax revenue to GDP increased (3% [s.d. 1.7%] and 3% [s.d. 1.3%]), respectively). The nonwage bills to GDP increased the largest (2% [s.d. 0.9%]), followed the share of transfer expenditure to GDP (1% [s.d. 0.5%]). The corporate income taxes to GDP increased most significantly (1.3% [s.d. 0.8%]), followed by indirect taxes to GDP (1.1% [s.d. 0.7%]). The shares of other expenses elements are largely unchanged.



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CIT = nonresource corporate income taxes, GDP = gross domestic product, INDT = indirect taxes, Nonwage = expense on good and services, Other = taxes on payroll and workforce and taxes on the property, PIT = nonresource personal income taxes, SSC = social security contributions, Subsidies = subsidies to firms, Transfer = expense on social benefits, Wage = compensation on employees.

#### Notes:

1. Each component is a share of GDP.

2. Taxes to GDP ratio increased in the developing countries sampled; Chile and Thailand more on the CIT and INDT (value-added tax, consumption tax), while Poland and South Africa more on PIT and INDT.

Sources: International Monetary Fund. Government Finance Statistics. https://data.imf.org/?sk=A0867067-D23C-4EBC-AD23-D3B015045405 (accessed 7 September 2020); UNU-WIDER. Government Revenue Dataset. https://doi.org/10.35188/UNU-WIDER/GRD-2021 (accessed 7 September 2020).

Figure 2 reports each tax component's contribution to the total tax revenue and each expenditure component to the primary expenses. For Chile (Figure 2a), wage bills (34%) account for the largest share of expenses, followed by expenditure on transfer expense (28%), subsidies to firms (22%), and nonwage bills (15%). Indirect taxes (60%) and corporate income taxes (20%) account for most of the total tax revenue.

For Poland (Figure 2b), transfer expense (49%) accounts for the largest share of primary expenses, followed by wage bills (30%) and nonwage expenditures (17%). Poland's tax structure has a large share of indirect taxes (37%) and social contributions (36%) in total tax revenue.

For South Africa (Figure 2c), wage bills (47%) and nonwage expenditures (34%) are the main components of the primary expenses. Indirect taxes (40%) account for the largest share of total tax revenue, followed by personal income taxes (32%) and corporate income taxes (19%).

For Thailand (Figure 2d), wage bills (44%) are the largest expenditure components, followed by nonwage expenditures (36%). Indirect taxes (57%) account for the largest share of total tax revenue, followed by corporate income taxes (25%) and personal income taxes (10%).



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#### Figure 2 continued

CIT = nonresource corporate income taxes, INDT = indirect taxes, Nonwage = expense on good and services, Other = taxes on payroll and workforce and taxes on the property, PIT = nonresource personal income taxes, SSC = social security contributions, Subsidies = subsidies to firms, Transfer = expense on social benefits, Wage = compensation on employees. Notes:

1. Units are the percentage of primary expenses (left panel) and the total tax revenue (right panel). Primary expenses exclude interest expense and fixed capital consumption.

2. Wage bills accounted for a significant share in the primary deficits, except Poland, where transfers dominated the total government expenditures. Indirect taxes accounted for a third to half of the revenues in all countries.

Sources: International Monetary Fund. Government Finance Statistics. https://data.imf.org/?sk=A0867067-D23C-4EBC-AD23-D3B015045405 (accessed 7 September 2020); UNU-WIDER. Government Revenue Dataset. https://doi.org/10.35188/UNU-WIDER/GRD-2021 (accessed 7 September 2020).

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Figure 3 shows the correlation coefficients between total tax revenue, primary expenses, primary deficit, the fiscal components, and 17 SDGs. For Chile (Figure 3a), total tax revenue is *negatively* associated with primary expenses and primary deficit. Corporate income taxes and transfer components represent this association with the primary deficit. Given that corporate income tax is the second-largest component of revenue, its association with carbon dioxide damage (negative [-]), fuel/clean technology (-), and bribery (positive [+]) are favorable. The association between indirect taxes (the largest component of revenue) with remittances (-), carbon dioxide damage (+), and fuel/clean technology (-) suggest that a better understanding of their linkages should be useful for domestic resource mobilization.

For Poland (Figure 3b), primary expenses are *positively* associated with total tax revenues and primary deficit. Transfer and wage-bill components represent this association with the primary deficit. Given that social security contributions are the second-largest component of revenue, its association with bribery (-), displacement (-), and bottom-income consumption (+) are favorable. The association between transfers (the largest component of expenses) with carbon dioxide damage (+), broadband access (-), sanitation quality (-), enrollment (-), and mortality (+) suggest that a better understanding of their linkages should be useful for domestic resource mobilization.

For South Africa (Figure 3c), primary expenses are *positively* associated with total tax revenues and primary deficit. Transfers, subsidies, wage-bill, and nonwage components represent this association with the primary deficit. The association between transfers and broadband access (+), non-education ratio (-), fuel/clean technology (+), sanitation quality (+), women power/gender equity (+), mortality (-), and poverty (-) are favorable.

For Thailand (Figure 3d), primary expenses are *positively* associated with total tax revenues and primary deficit. Indirect-tax, wage-bill, and nonwage components represent this association with the primary deficit. The association between corporate income taxes (the second-largest revenue component) and carbon dioxide damage (-), fuel/clean technology (+), mortality (-), undernourishment (-), and poverty (-) are favorable. A weak association between indirect taxes (the largest revenue component) and SDG outcomes suggests their efficient domestic resource mobilization utilization should be useful.



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CIT = nonresource corporate income taxes, INDT = indirect taxes, Nonwage = expense on good and services, Other = taxes on payroll and workforce and taxes on the property, PIT = nonresource personal income taxes, SDG = Sustainable Development Goal, SSC = social security contributions, Subsidies = subsidies to firms, Transfer = expense on social benefits, Wage = compensation on employees.

Notes:

1. Statistical associations greater than 0.5 have asterisk(s) in the heatmaps; \*\*\* = p<0.01, \*\* = p<0.05, \* = p<0.1. 2. The associations between fiscal expenses, taxes, and sustainable development outcomes differed across Chile, Poland, South Africa, and Thailand. The differences motivate a focal study on fiscal episodes as the lowest-hanging fruit in understanding the empirical linkages between fiscal aggregates and domestic resource mobilization's role in inclusive growth and sustainable development.

Sources: International Monetary Fund. Government Finance Statistics. https://data.imf.org/?sk=A0867067-D23C-4EBC-AD23-D3B015045405 (accessed 7 September 2020); UNU-WIDER. Government Revenue Dataset. https://doi.org/10.35188/UNU-WIDER/GRD-2021 (accessed 7 September 2020).

## IV. LINKING FISCAL EPISODES TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

#### A. Identifying Fiscal Episodes

Following Alesina and Ardagna (2010) and Alesina et al. (1995), we define fiscal episodes using the *significant* change in the primary deficit (as a share of GDP) from the previous year. The underlying assumption is that the unemployment rate remained stable in period t as in period t-1. According to Blanchard (1990), this approach takes the previous year as the benchmark period (t-1) and estimates the government expenses and tax revenue in the current year (t), thereby filtering out the variations in fiscal variables induced by business cycle fluctuations. Subject to data availability, we follow this approach for simplicity, avoiding the challenges posed by country-specific calculation of potential outputs.

To define the cyclically adjusted variables and episodes of large fiscal impulse:

- Cyclically adjusted Primary expenses (% of GDP) = Cyclically adjusted Transfer + (Wage + Nonwage + Subsidies)
- Cyclically adjusted *Total tax revenue* (% of GDP) = Cyclically adjusted *PIT* + Cyclically adjusted *CIT* + Other + Cyclically adjusted *INDT* + Cyclically adjusted *SSC*
- Cyclically adjusted *Primary deficit* (% of GDP) = Cyclically adjusted *Primary expenses* Cyclically adjusted *Total tax revenue*
- Fiscal impulse<sub>t</sub> (% of GDP) = Cyclically adjusted Primary deficit<sub>t</sub> Primary deficit<sub>t-1</sub>

We correct each of the fiscal variables at period t (denoted as  $X_t$ ) the variations caused by cyclical factors. For each country in the sample, we first regress each fiscal variable  $(X_t)$  on a time trend  $(TREND_t)$  and the unemployment rate  $(U_t)$ .

$$X_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 TREND_t + \alpha_2 U_t + \varepsilon_t \tag{1}$$

Next, we estimate what each fiscal variable would be in period t if the unemployment rate were to remain the same as in the previous year  $(U_{t-1})$ , i.e., the cyclically adjusted fiscal variable.

$$X_t(at \ U_{t-1}) = \widehat{\alpha_0} + \widehat{\alpha_1} TREND_t + \widehat{\alpha_2} U_{t-1} + \widehat{\varepsilon_t}$$
(2)

where the terms,  $\widehat{\alpha_0}$ ,  $\widehat{\alpha_1}$ ,  $\widehat{\alpha_2}$ , and  $\widehat{\varepsilon_t}$  are coefficient estimates.

Having estimated  $Transfer_t(at U_{t-1})$ ,  $PIT_t(at U_{t-1})$ ,  $CIT_t(at U_{t-1})$ ,  $INDT_t(at U_{t-1})$ , and  $SSC_t(at U_{t-1})$ , we calculate  $Primary \ expenses_t(at U_{t-1})$ ,  $Total \ tax \ revenue_t(at U_{t-1})$ , and then  $Primary \ deficit_t(at U_{t-1})$ . The Fiscal impulse at period t is the difference between the cyclically adjusted primary deficit at period t  $[Primary \ deficit_t(at U_{t-1})]$  and the actual primary deficit at period t-1  $[Primary \ deficit_{t-1}]$ .

We estimate fiscal impulse using the balanced data of expenses and tax revenue components in each country: Chile 2000–2018, Poland 1995–2018, South Africa 1996–2018, and Thailand 2000–2018. We have 81 observations of fiscal impulse in the four sample countries; the mean fiscal impulse is 0.036% of GDP and a standard deviation of 1.308% of GDP. Appendix Table A1 provides

more detailed statistics. We identify episodes of large fiscal impulse (discretionary fiscal policy): fiscal adjustment and fiscal stimuli as follows:

- strong fiscal adjustment if Fiscal impulse (% of GDP) is less than -1.5
- strong fiscal stimuli if Fiscal impulse (% of GDP) is larger than 1.5

Figure 4 plots episodes of large fiscal impulse and GDP growth by country. The identification results in six episodes of fiscal adjustment and six episodes of fiscal stimuli. The longest episode persisted for 2 years (fiscal stimuli in Poland during 2008–2009 and fiscal adjustment in South Africa during 2005–2006). Many fiscal stimuli episodes occurred during the 2007–2010 global financial crisis. The time path of GDP growth suggests some association with the fiscal episodes of stimuli (positive) and adjustment (negative) in the sample period.



Sources: International Monetary Fund. Government Finance Statistics. https://data.imf.org/?sk=A0867067-D23C-4EBC-AD23-D3B015045405 (accessed 7 September 2020); UNU-WIDER. Government Revenue Dataset. https://doi.org/10.35188/UNU-WIDER/GRD-2021 (accessed 7 September 2020).

#### B. Fiscal Episodes, Gross Domestic Product Growth, and Development Outcomes

For our baseline estimation, we conduct fixed effects regressions on the four sample countries. First, we examine the association between GDP growth and large fiscal stimuli/adjustment changes across the years using the following equations:

$$GDP \ growth_{it} = \varphi_0 + \varphi_1 Fiscal \ Episode_{it-1} + u_{it}$$
(3)

$$Fiscal \ Episode_{it} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 GDP \ growth_{it+1} + \mu_{it}$$
(4)

$$Fiscal \ Episode_{it} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 GDP \ growth_{it-1} + v_{it}$$
(5)

Table 1 reports the estimates of equation 3 in column 1 and equation 4 in column 2, focusing here on the statistically significant coefficients.<sup>2</sup> We find a positive association between current GDP growth and lagged fiscal stimuli (column 1) and between current fiscal stimuli and lead GDP growth (column 2). While these findings do not pin down causality, they suggest that GDP growth tends to follow fiscal stimuli episodes. There is no association between lagged GDP growth and fiscal adjustment (equation 5).

	(1)	(2)
	GDP Growth <sub>t</sub>	Fiscal Stimuli <sub>t</sub>
Fiscal stimuli <sub>t-1</sub>	0.398*	
	(0.129)	
GDP growth <sub>t+1</sub>		0.009*
		(0.003)
Observations	81	81
p-value	0.054	0.058
R-squared (within)	0.004	0.004

#### Table 1: Large Fiscal Impulses and Gross Domestic Product Growth

GDP = gross domestic product.

Notes:

1. Fixed-effects estimation with country-fixed effects included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* = p < 0.1.

2. GDP growth followed fiscal expansions. There was no association between growth rates and fiscal adjustments.

Source: Authors' calculations.

Next, we look at the associations of development outcomes, GDP growth, and the interaction between GDP growth and fiscal impulses (i.e., episodes of fiscal stimuli and adjustment).

$$SDG_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 GDP \ growth_{it} + \beta_2 Fiscal \ Episode_{it} + \beta_3 (GDP \ growth_{it} \times Fiscal \ Episode_{it}) + \vartheta_{it}$$
(6)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Full estimations are in Appendix Table A2.

We regress equation 6 using both the fiscal stimuli and the fiscal adjustment, one at a time.<sup>3</sup> The total effect of large fiscal impulses on SDGs are thus  $(\widehat{\beta}_2 + \widehat{\beta}_3 GDP \ growth)$ . Similarly, the total effect of GDP growth on SDGs are  $(\widehat{\beta}_1 + \widehat{\beta}_3 Fiscal \ Episode)$ ; where  $\widehat{\beta}_1, \widehat{\beta}_2$ , and  $\widehat{\beta}_3$  are estimated coefficients. Having estimated equation 6 on all 17 SDG indicators, Tables 2 and 3 report the results, focusing on the development outcomes with statistically significant estimates.<sup>4</sup>

From Table 2, the current GDP growth is *positively* associated with current poverty headcount ratio, mortality ratio (CVD, cancer, diabetes, CRD for the people aged 30–70), and PM<sub>2.5</sub> air pollution. This finding implies the trade-off between GDP growth and these sustainable development goals in the country sample. Current fiscal stimuli episodes are *positively* associated with the current poverty headcount ratio and PM<sub>2.5</sub> air pollution and are *negatively* associated with the number of newly displaced people related to disasters. This finding suggests the impacts of fiscal stimuli on sustainable development goals differ between the long-term/persistent targets (poverty, health, pollution) and the short-term/pressing issues (disasters). Higher growth associated with the fiscal stimuli is *negatively* associated with the mortality rate from poor health conditions. Given the association between current GDP growth and lagged fiscal stimuli (Table 1), this finding implies that fiscal stimuli help mitigate the trade-off between GDP growth and some SDG outcomes.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Poverty <sub>t</sub>	Mortality <sub>t</sub>	Pollution <sub>t</sub>	Displacement <sub>t</sub>
GDP growth <sub>t</sub>	1.822* (0.589)	0.239* (0.077)	0.387* (0.137)	0.009 (0.024)
Fiscal stimuli <sub>t</sub>	6.786** (1.910)	0.749 (0.386)	2.477** (0.601)	-0.247* (0.091)
Fiscal stimuli <sub>t</sub>	-2.055	-0.248*	-0.297	-0.045
x GDP growth rate <sub>t</sub>	(1.114)	(0.084)	(0.228)	(0.024)
Observations	60	66	77	42
p-value	0.042	0.019	0.053	0.000
R-squared (within)	0.189	0.100	0.202	0.040

#### Table 2: Fiscal Stimuli, Growth, and Development Outcomes

GDP = gross domestic product.

1. Fixed-effects estimation with country-fixed effects included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\* = p<0.05, \* = p<0.1.

2. The linkages of fiscal expansions and sustainable development outcomes differed between the long-term objectives/persistent issues (i.e., poverty, health, pollution) and the short-term objectives/urgent issues (i.e., disasters). Fiscal expansions reduced the negative trade-off between GDP growth and some development indicators, e.g., pollution and poor-health mortalities associating with economic growth. Source: Authors' calculations.

From Table 3, the GDP growth rate is *positively* associated with the poverty headcount ratio and mortality from CVD, cancer, diabetes, or CRD for the people aged 30–70. However, GDP growth is *negatively* correlated with broadband subscriptions. Fiscal adjustment episodes are *negatively* 

Notes:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Both the fiscal stimuli or adjustment and economic growth are considered endogenous regressors. As shown in Table 1, the lags and leads of these variables are correlated. The two stage-least-squares estimation can be appropriately done in a larger than the current sample, with more economies and time periods.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Full estimations for 17 SDGs are in Appendix Tables A3-A4.

associated with the poverty headcount ratio and are *positively* associated with access to basic sanitation services and clean fuels and cooking technologies. The association between fiscal adjustment episodes and poverty headcount ratio declines as GDP grows: the threshold of GDP growth is 5.24% (12.014  $\div$  2.294), above which the effect of fiscal adjustment dissipated. The GDP growth coinciding with fiscal adjustment episodes is negatively associated with access to clean fuels and technologies for cooking (the GDP growth threshold is 5.96%). It is *positively* associated with the young population share, not in education, employment, or training.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Poverty	Mortality	Sanitation	Fuel-Tech	Non-Education	Broadband
GDP growth rate <sub>t</sub>	1.071**	0.194**	-0.558	-0.677	-0.093	-0.462*
	(0.257)	(0.044)	(0.309)	(0.509)	(0.182)	(0.150)
Fiscal adjustment <sub>t</sub>	-12.014**	-0.819	3.261**	9.805***	-3.060	5.485
	(3.055)	(0.506)	(0.933)	(1.591)	(1.500)	(2.754)
Fiscal adjustment <sub>t</sub>	2.294***	0.054	-0.465	-1.644**	0.640*	-0.641
x GDP growth rate <sub>t</sub>	(0.211)	(0.056)	(0.248)	(0.460)	(0.230)	(0.361)
Observations	60	66	70	66	62	71
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.013	0.000	0.000	0.011
R-squared (within)	0.170	0.089	0.118	0.115	0.008	0.056

#### Table 3: Fiscal Adjustment, Growth, and Development Outcomes

GDP = gross domestic product.

Notes:

1. Fixed-effects estimation with country-fixed effects included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* = p < 0.01, \*\* = p < 0.05, \* = p < 0.1. 2. Lowered poverty headcounts and improved sanitation, and cleaner technology followed fiscal adjustments. However, there was some trade-off between GDP growth and such association in the sample.

Source: Authors' calculations.

We also adjust equation 6 by entering lead (period t+1) and lagged (period t-1) variables of GDP growth, large fiscal impulses, and the interaction between GDP growth and large fiscal impulses as regressors. Appendix Tables A5 and A6 report detailed results using lead explanatory variables and Tables A7 and A8 for lagged variables. The extended results are largely supportive to the baseline findings from equation 6 regression for the four sample countries that: (i) there is the trade-off between (lagged, current, and lead) GDP growth rate and the development goals; (ii) the fiscal adjustment (stimuli) episodes are favorable (or unfavorable) to development goals; and (iii) the GDP growth coinciding with fiscal adjustment (stimuli) episodes deteriorates (or improves) the development goals. These findings are not applicable for all SDGs, however.

#### C. Large Fiscal Impulses and Tax-Spending Components

We further test whether fiscal episodes are associated with any components of the fiscal trends by estimating the following equation of fiscal episode at time *t* on the fiscal components at time *t*+1 and *t*-1:

$$Fiscal \ episode_{it} = \mu_0 + \mu_1 Tax \ (or \ Expense) components_{it+1} + \varepsilon_{it}$$
(7)

 $Fiscal \ episode_{it} = \theta_0 + \theta_1 Tax \ (or \ Expense) components_{it-1} + \epsilon_{it}$ (8)

We estimate equations 7 and 8 separately for fiscal stimuli and fiscal adjustment episodes. The independent variables include cyclically adjusted tax (or expense) components as a share of GDP. We report the significant findings on the tax components' estimates in Table 4 and the expense elements in Table 5.<sup>5</sup> Note that entering each (lead and lagged) component as an explanatory variable at a time does not alter the significant findings below. The results are available upon request.

		Fiscal	Stimuli <sub>t</sub>		Fiscal Adj	ustment <sub>t</sub>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Personal income tax <sub>t+1</sub>	0.058 (0.049)					
Corporate income $tax_{t+1}$	0.003 (0.056)					
Other direct taxes $_{t+1}$	-0.242 (0.220)					
Direct taxes <sub>t+1</sub>		0.025 (0.050)				
Indirect taxes <sub>t+1</sub>	-0.077 (0.055)	-0.072 (0.049)				
Social contributions $_{t+1}$	-0.218** (0.066)	-0.232** (0.060)				
Personal income tax <sub>t-1</sub>			0.019 (0.037)		-0.054 (0.030)	
Corporate income tax $_{t-1}$			0.095*** (0.007)		-0.039 (0.036)	
Other direct taxes $_{t-1}$			-0.225*** (0.027)		-0.632*** (0.086)	
Direct taxes <sub>t-1</sub>				0.067** (0.018)		-0.043 (0.045)
Indirect taxes <sub>t-1</sub>			0.031 (0.092)	0.015 (0.076)	-0.007 (0.060)	-0.014 (0.064)
Social contributions t-1			-0.089** (0.020)	-0.087** (0.017)	-0.103* (0.037)	-0.135** (0.035)
Observations	77	77	81	81	81	81
p-value		0.010		0.000		0.099
R-squared (within)	0.142	0.124	0.137	0.097	0.124	0.059

#### **Table 4: Large Fiscal Impulses and Tax Components**

... = no value. Notes:

1. Explanatory variables are cyclically adjusted. Fixed effects estimation with country-fixed effects included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* = p < 0.01, \*\* = p < 0.05, \* = p < 0.1.

2. The time paths of fiscal aggregates differ across countries. Fiscal expansions followed an increase in direct taxes, especially corporate tax, and a decline in social contributions. Fiscal adjustments followed a decline in other direct taxes and social contributions. Source: Authors' calculations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Full estimations are in Appendix Tables A9–A10.

We note that tax components, including personal income tax, corporate income tax, indirect taxes, and social contributions, are cyclically adjusted but not other direct taxes; all are in GDP percentage. However, a proper analysis requires more details on the budgetary process to account for the decisions on each of the items and square them with the stated fiscal stance. Fiscal stance is typically determined at the beginning of a fiscal year as part of the government's budget cycle based on macroeconomic and revenue projections, and the fiscal adjustments in the middle of the fiscal year may not be consistent with the budget credibility underlying the fiscal management practices.

Columns 1–4 in Table 4 show that fiscal stimuli episodes (period t) are *negatively* associated with lead and lagged social contributions (periods t+1, t-1), suggesting that the episodes of fiscal stimuli are associated with trends in the social contributions. Fiscal stimuli episodes are *positively* associated with lagged corporate income taxes and *negatively* associated with lagged other taxes, both of which were not subject to these tax components' trend.

As an additional test, we aggregate cyclically adjusted direct taxes and re-estimate equations 7-8. Specifically,

Cyclically adjusted *direct tax* (% of GDP) = Cyclically adjusted *PIT* + Cyclically adjusted *CIT* + *Other*.

Columns 2 and 4 of Table 4 provide the results, further supporting the *negative* association between fiscal stimuli and social contributions. Fiscal stimuli episodes are also positively associated with lagged direct taxes.

For the fiscal adjustments, we find that they are negatively associated with lagged other direct taxes (column 5 of Table 4) and lagged social contributions (column 6 of Table 4). Fiscal adjustments are not associated with any lead tax components.

Table 5 reports the significant estimates of equations 7 and 8 for fiscal adjustment episodes and expense components. Fiscal stimuli episodes are not associated with any (lead and lagged) expenditure components. We include four expense components, including wage bills, nonwage bills, subsidies expenditure, and cyclically adjusted transfer (all as a share of GDP). Columns 1 and 3 of Table 5 show that fiscal adjustment episodes (period t) are *negatively* associated with lead transfer expenses (period t+1) but not with the lagged transfer expense (period t-1). Aggregating government consumption expenditure:

Government consumption expenditure (% of GDP) = Wage + Nonwage, shown in column 2, we find that the lead transfer component (period t+1) is still negatively associated with current fiscal adjustment episodes (period t). Besides, lead government consumption expenditure is negatively associated with current fiscal adjustment episodes. We also find that current fiscal adjustment episodes (period t) are positively associated with the lagged expense on wage bills (period t-1), shown in column 3.

We also test whether current tax or expense components (period t) are associated with lagged fiscal episodes (period t-1) by estimating the following equation:

$$Tax (or Expense) components_{it} = \pi_0 + \pi_1 Fiscal Episode_{it-1} + \epsilon_{it}$$
(9)

		Fiscal Adjustment <sub>t</sub>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Wage <sub>t+1</sub>	0.020		
	(0.031)		
Nonwage <sub>t+1</sub>	-0.059		
	(0.056)		
Government consumption expenditure $_{t+1}$		-0.016*	
		(0.006)	
Subsidies <sub>t+1</sub>	-0.070	-0.083	
	(0.060)	(0.048)	
Transfer <sub>t+1</sub>	-0.060*	-0.073**	
	(0.022)	(0.015)	
Wage <sub>t-1</sub>			0.042*
			(0.016)
Nonwage <sub>t-1</sub>			0.003
			(0.017)
Subsidies t-1			-0.009
			(0.025)
Transfer <sub>t-1</sub>			-0.071
			(0.042)
Observations	77	77	81
p-value		0.061	
R-squared (within)	0.084	0.074	0.029

#### **Table 5: Large Fiscal Impulses and Expense Components**

... = no value.

Notes:

1. Explanatory variables are cyclically adjusted. Fixed effects estimation with country-fixed effects included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\* = p < 0.05, \* = p < 0.1.

2. Fiscal adjustments followed an increase in wage bills and preceded a decline in government consumption expenditure and transfers. Source: Authors' calculations.

As shown in Table 6 column 1, the other direct taxes (period t) are *negatively* associated with lagged fiscal stimuli (period t-1); in contrast, wage bills are *positively* associated with the lagged fiscal stimuli (column 2). We also find that cyclically adjusted transfer expense is *negatively* associated with the lagged fiscal adjustment (column 3). Appendix Table A11 provides full estimation results across tax and expense components.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Others <sub>t</sub>	Wage <sub>t</sub>	Transfer <sub>t</sub>
Fiscal stimuli <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.051*	0.512*	
	(0.016)	(0.183)	
Fiscal adjustment <sub>t-1</sub>			-0.535*
			(0.195)
Observations	77	77	77
p-value	0.050	0.068	0.071
R-squared (within)	0.016	0.037	0.049

#### Table 6: Tax/Expense Components and Fiscal Stimuli/Adjustment

Notes:

1. Transfer expense is cyclically adjusted. Fixed effects estimation with country-fixed effects included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* = p < 0.1.

2. A decline in other direct taxes and an increase in the wage bills followed fiscal expansions, while a decline in transfers followed fiscal adjustments.

Source: Authors' calculations.

## V. CONCLUSION

We find stylized patterns on the linkages between large fiscal episodes and sustainable development outcomes in selected developing countries. The findings suggest that domestic resource mobilization should consider differences in tax base and expenditure components and their linkages with sustainable development outcomes. By focusing on country studies of Chile, Poland, South Africa, and Thailand, we have gained insights into distinct country challenges. Poland, for instance, benefited significantly from European Union transfers and the proximity of Germany. This specific circumstance suggests that Poland's experience is less transferable to other non-European Union countries.

Future studies may consider the case of federal countries controlling for provincial-state heterogeneity, i.e., provincial states in a federal system in larger states (India, the Philippines, Indonesia, among others). This approach will require information on the inclusive growth and tax mobilization at the provincial state level and the transfer of tax revenue and grants between the provincial and the federal levels. The quality of the data will determine the feasibility and success of such a study. Extensions may incorporate public debt evolution, examining the paths of fiscal components and development outcomes in times of fiscal stress vis-à-vis in normal times in the sample countries. Evidently, prior to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic crisis, many developing economies had not achieved a tax to GDP of 15%, the level considered to be the minimum for sustainable development. Thus, the administrative measures to strengthen the domestic resource mobilization are necessary (see, for example, the analysis of Southeast Asia in Chongvilaivan and Chooi 2021). An empirical issue is the situation in 2020-2021 has been shaped by the assessments of the multilateral organizations that this time the crisis differs from other past crises, and therefore the concerted effort on the international cooperation. Thus, the explanatory power of a study based on the earlier sample period for 2020–2021 is limited, and further analysis is warranted.

## APPENDIX

Variables description

Expense components

- Wage: General government expenditure on wage bill (% of GDP), i.e., compensation of employees.
- Nonwage: General government expenditure on nonwage bills (% of GDP), i.e., use of goods and services.
- Investment: General government expenditure on fixed capital (% of GDP), i.e., consumption of fixed capital.
- Subsidies: General government subsidies to firms (% of GDP).
- Transfer: General government expenditure on social benefits (% of GDP).

Tax revenue components

- PIT: Total income, capital gains, and profit taxes on individuals (% of GDP), exclusive of resource revenues.
- CIT: Total nonresource income and profits taxes on corporations (% of GDP).
- Other: Other direct taxes, including taxes on payroll and workforce and taxes on property (% of GDP).
- INDT: Total nonresource indirect taxes, including taxes on goods and services, taxes on international trade, and other taxes (% of GDP).
- SSC: Total social contributions (% of GDP).

Unemployment rate: The unemployed share of the total labor force (modelled International Labour Organization estimate).

Sustainable Development Goals

- Poverty: Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of the population).
- Undernourishment: Population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption (% of the population).
- Mortality: Percent of 30-year-old people who would die before their 70th birthday from cardiovascular disease, cancer, diabetes, or chronic respiratory disease.
- Enrollment: School enrollment at pre-primary education level (% gross).
- Women power: Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%).
- Sanitation: People using at least basic sanitation services (% of the population). These services include flush/pour flush to piped sewer systems, septic tanks or pit latrines, ventilated improved pit latrines, compositing toilets or pit latrines with slabs.
- Fuel-tech: The population primarily use clean cooking fuels and technologies for cooking (% of the population).
- Non-education: Young people who are not in education, employment, or training to the population of the corresponding age group: youth (ages 15–24); persons ages 15–29; or both age groups (% of the youth population).
- Broadband: Fixed broadband subscriptions (per 100 people).

- Bottom consumption: Survey mean consumption or income per capita, Bottom 40% of the population (2011 purchasing power parity \$ per day).
- Pollution: PM<sub>2.5</sub> air pollution mean annual exposure (micrograms per cubic meter).
- Carbon dioxide damage: Cost of damage because of carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel use and cement manufacture (% of gross national income).
- Displacement: Internally displaced persons, new displacement associated with disasters (million cases).
- Marine: Marine-protected areas (% of territorial waters).
- Terrestrial: Terrestrial protected areas (% of total land area).
- Bribery: Percentage of firms experiencing at least one bribe payment request across six public transactions dealing with utility access, permits, licenses, and taxes.
- Remittances: Personal remittances received, including personal transfers and compensation of employees (% of GDP).

			Standard		
Country	Observations	Mean	Deviation	Min	Max
Fiscal impulse					
Chile	18	-0.188	1.267	-2.300	2.568
Poland	23	0.081	1.120	-2.548	2.729
South Africa	22	-0.003	1.560	-1.968	4.836
Thailand	18	0.249	1.309	-1.385	3.353
Fiscal stimuli					
Chile	18	0.111	0.323	0.000	1.000
Poland	23	0.130	0.344	0.000	1.000
South Africa	22	0.045	0.213	0.000	1.000
Thailand	18	0.111	0.323	0.000	1.000
Fiscal adjustment					
Chile	18	0.167	0.383	0.000	1.000
Poland	23	0.043	0.209	0.000	1.000
South Africa	22	0.227	0.429	0.000	1.000
Thailand	18	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000

#### Table A1: Statistics Description of Fiscal Impulse/Stimuli/Adjustment by Country

Max = maximum, Min = minimum.

Note: Data to compute fiscal impulse/stimuli/adjustment episodes are Chile 2000-2018, Poland 1995-2018, South Africa 1996-2018, and Thailand 2000-2018. Fiscal impulse's unit is the percentage of gross domestic product. Fiscal stimuli and Fiscal adjustment are binary variables.

Source: Authors' calculations.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	GDP Growth <sub>t</sub>	GDP Growth <sub>t</sub>	Fiscal Stimuli <sub>t</sub>	Fiscal Stimuli <sub>t</sub>	Fiscal Adjustment <sub>t</sub>	Fiscal Adjustment <sub>t</sub>
Fiscal stimuli <sub>t-1</sub>	0.398*					
	(0.129)					
Fiscal adjustment <sub>t-1</sub>		0.594				
		(0.579)				
$GDPgrowth_{t-1}$			0.019		0.023	
			(0.021)		(0.020)	
$GDPgrowth_{t^{+1}}$				0.009*		0.014
				(0.003)		(0.018)
Observations	81	81	81	81	81	81
p-value	0.054	0.380	0.446	0.058	0.345	0.486
R-squared (within)	0.004	0.008	0.015	0.004	0.022	0.008

#### Table A2: Fiscal Impulses and Gross Domestic Product Growth

GDP = gross domestic product.

Note: Fixed-effects estimation with country-fixed effects included. Robust standard errors in parentheses.\* = p < 0.1.

Source: Authors' calculations.

	:		1	::	į	:	į	į	:
	E	(2)	(3)	(4)	(2)	(9)	6	(8)	(6)
	Poverty <sub>t</sub>	$Undernourishment_{t}$	<b>Mortality</b> <sub>t</sub>	Enrollment <sub>t</sub>	Women Power <sub>t</sub>	Sanitation <sub>t</sub>	$Fuel-tech_{t}$	Non-Education <sub>t</sub>	$Broadband_{t}$
GDP growth <sub>t</sub>	1.822*	0.207	0.239*	0.068	-0.547	-0.755	-0.853	-0.046	-0.589
	(0.589)	(0.211)	(0.076)	(0.938)	(0.355)	(0.440)	(0.694)	(0.321)	(0.330)
Fiscal stimuli <sub>t</sub>	6.786**	0.526	0.749	-0.279	0.715	-2.570	-2.208	-0.582	-2.007
	(016.1)	(0.688)	(0.386)	(2.466)	(1.953)	(1.416)	(2.030)	(2.436)	(1.526)
Fiscal stimuli <sub>t</sub>	-2.055	-0.198	-0.248*	-1.140	-0.030	0.703	0.622	-0.372	0.601
x GDP growth rate <sub>t</sub>	(1.114)	(0.204)	(0.084)	(0.834)	(0.394)	(0.418)	(0.539)	(0.532)	(0.453)
Observations	60	70	66	78	80	70	66	62	71
p-value	0.042	0.639	0.019	0.054	0.339	0.398	0.486	0.001	0.071
R-squared (within)	0.189	0.045	0.100	0.022	0.062	0.134	0.102	0.010	0.039
		ŝ		Į			Í		į
	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	~	(15)	(16)	(17)
	Bottor Consumpt	n tion <sub>t</sub> Pollution <sub>t</sub>	Carbon Dioxi Damage <sub>t</sub>	de Displacer	nent <sub>t</sub> Marir	ne <sub>t</sub> Ter	restrial <sub>t</sub>	Bribery, R	lemittances <sub>t</sub>
$GDP\operatorname{growth}_{\mathrm{t}}$	0.521	0.387*	-0.037	0.00	9 1.14	T	0.342	0.230***	0.009
	(0.366	(0.137)	(0.053)	(0.02	4) (0.83	2) (0	.488)	(0.009)	(0.027)
Fiscal stimuli <sub>t</sub>	-2.265	3 2.477**	-0.267	-0.24	7* 0.00	0	000.	1.533***	0.172
	(0.842	(0.601)	(0.135)	(0.0)			:	(0.040)	(0.245)
Fiscal stimuli <sub>t</sub>	0.000	-0.297	0.037	-0.04	5 0.00	0	000.	1.291***	-0.072
$x {\sf GDP}$ growth rate ${\sf t}$	:	(0.228)	(0.041)	(0.02	(+			(0.012)	(0.041)
Observations	16	77	81	42	12		12	17	81.000
p-value	:	0.053	0.000	0.00	0 0.26	3	).534	:	0.018
R-squared (within)	0.458	0.202	0.028	0.04	0.06	0	0.038	0.386	0.030

Table A3: Fiscal Stimuli, Growth, and Development Outcomes

... = no value; GDP = gross domestic product.

Note: Fixed-effects estimation with country-fixed effects included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* = p<0.01, \*\* = p<0.05, \* = p<0.1. Source: Authors' calculations.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(2)	(9)	(2)	(8)	(6)
	<b>Poverty<sub>t</sub></b>	Undernourishment <sub>t</sub>	Mortality <sub>t</sub>	Enrollment <sub>t</sub>	Women Power <sub>t</sub>	Sanitation <sub>t</sub>	$Fuel-Tech_t$	Non-Education <sub>t</sub>	$Broadband_{t}$
GDP growth <sub>t</sub>	1.071**	0.180	0.194**	-0.417	-0.657	-0.558	-0.677	-0.093	-0.462*
	(0.257)	(0.177)	(0.044)	(0.751)	(0.472)	(0.309)	(0.509)	(0.182)	(0.150)
Fiscal adjustment <sub>t</sub>	-12.014**	-0.543	-0.819	-3.947	-4.377	3.261**	9.805***	-3.060	5.485
	(3.055)	(0.591)	(0.506)	(2.562)	(4.916)	(0.933)	(1.591)	(1.500)	(2.754)
Fiscal adjustment <sub>t</sub>	2.294***	-0.006	0.054	2.184	0.817	-0.465	-1.644**	0.640*	-0.641
x GDP growth rate <sub>t</sub>	(0.211)	(0.182)	(0.056)	(1.157)	(0.879)	(0.248)	(0.460)	(0.230)	(0.361)
Observations	60	20	99	78	80	70	99	62	71
p-value	0.000	0.014	0.000	0.016	0.560	0.013	0.000	0.000	0.011
R-squared (within)	0.170	0.046	0.089	0.047	0.081	0.118	0.115	0.008	0.056
	(10)	(11)	(12)	IJ	3)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)
	Bottom Consumpt	i ion <sub>t</sub> Pollution <sub>t</sub>	Carbon Dio Damage <sub>t</sub>	cide Displac	cement <sub>t</sub> M	larine <sub>t</sub> T	-errestrial <sub>t</sub>	Bribery, I	Remittances <sub>t</sub>
GDP growth <sub>t</sub>	0.396	0.222**	-0.013	0.0	028	2.875	-0.431	-0.004	-0.008
	(0.394)	(0.066)	(0.040)	(0.0)	(2)	2.832)	(0.645)	(0.077)	(0.018)
Fiscal adjustment <sub>t</sub>	1.564*	-1.093	-0.484	0 -	153 12	2.830*	-0.661	-8.407***	-0.071
	(0.499)	(1.673)	(0.266)	.0)	(2	1.649)	(1.058)	(0.300)	(0.062)
Fiscal adjustment <sub>t</sub>	0.000	0.258	-0.000	.0_	024 C	000.0	0.000	1.976***	0.019
x GDP growth rate <sub>t</sub>	:	(0.373)	(0.031)	(0.0	)42)	:	:	(0.086)	(0.017)
Observations	16	77	81	7	2	12	12	17	81
p-value	÷	0.146	0.000	0.6	529	÷	:	:	0.461

Table A4: Fiscal Adjustment, Growth, and Development Outcomes

... = no value; GDP = gross domestic product.

Note: Fixed-effects estimation with country-fixed effects included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* = p<0.01, \*\* = p<0.05, \* = p<0.1. Source: Authors' calculations.

0.002

0.219

0.047

0.547

0.036

0.128

0.102

0.337

R-squared (within)

		Table A5: Futu	re Fiscal Stin	nuli, Growtl	n, and Develop	ment Outco	mes		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	6	(8)	(6)
	Poverty <sub>t</sub>	$Undernourishment_{t}$	Mortality <sub>t</sub>	Enrollment <sub>t</sub>	Women Power <sub>t</sub>	Sanitation <sub>t</sub>	Fuel-Tech <sub>t</sub>	Non-Education <sub>t</sub>	Broadband <sub>t</sub>
GDP growth <sub>t+1</sub>	1.953*	0.237	0.217	-0.160	-0.467	-0.730	-0.914	-0.223	-0.901**
	(0.626)	(0.252)	(0.100)	(0.598)	(0.331)	(0.498)	(0.712)	(0.668)	(0.207)
Fiscal stimuli <sub>t+1</sub>	8.796**	0.570	0.827	0.700	-2.073	-2.995	-2.971	-0.931	-3.752***
	(2.307)	(0.749)	(0.452)	(3.779)	(2.076)	(1.731)	(2.324)	(2.505)	(0.611)
Fiscal stimuli <sub>t+1</sub>	-2.379*	-0.188	-0.199	0.103	0.372	0.689	0.795	-0.290	0.854
x GDP growth rate <sub>t+1</sub>	(0:950)	(0.214)	(0.098)	(1.053)	(0.517)	(0.499)	(0.608)	(0.622)	(0.454)
Observations	60	72	68	81	78	72	68	59	68
p-value	0.013	0.718	0.000	0.004	0.151	0.036	0.670	0.001	0.001
R-squared (within)	0.183	0.046	0.080	0.002	0.032	0.124	0.118	0.018	0.092
	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)		(15)	(16)	(17)
	Bottom Consumpt	ion <sub>t</sub> Pollution <sub>t</sub>	Carbon Dioxid Damage <sub>t</sub>	e Displacen	1ent <sub>t</sub> Marin	e <sub>t</sub> Ten	estrial <sub>t</sub>	Bribery <sub>t</sub> F	Remittances
GDP growth <sub>t+1</sub>	0.681*	0.235	-0.003	0.053	** 5.468*	0	.503	-0.428	0.008
	(0.219)	(0.132)	(0.037)	(0.015	) (0.59	0) (1	.778)	(0.515)	(0.017)
Fiscal stimuli <sub>t+1</sub>	0.000	1.832**	-0.203*	-0.09	0.00	0	000	-2.853	0.048
	:	(0.553)	(0.084)	(0.101	:		:	(3.432)	(0.318)
Fiscal stimuli <sub>t+1</sub>	0.000	-0.101	0.033	-0.095	** 0.00	0	000	0.000	-0.021
x GDP growth rate <sub>t+1</sub>	:	(0:199)	(0.025)	(0.018			:	:	(0.020)

... = no value; GDP = gross domestic product.

Note: Fixed-effects estimation with country-fixed effects included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* = p<0.01, \*\* = p<0.05, \* = p<0.1. Source: Authors' calculations.

Appendix 25

81 0.131 0.003

16 ... 0.054

> 0.564 0.055

0.003

0.000

0.034 0.011

0.017 0.109

0.090 0.614

R-squared (within)

0.078

∞

∞

38

8

8

15

Observations p-value

	Ð	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(2)	(8)	(6)
	Poverty <sub>t</sub>	Undernourishment <sub>t</sub>	Mortality <sub>t</sub>	Enrollment <sub>t</sub>	Women Power <sub>t</sub>	Sanitation <sub>t</sub>	Fuel-Tech <sub>t</sub>	Non-Education <sub>t</sub>	$Broadband_{t}$
GDP growth <sub>t+1</sub>	1.076**	0.215	0.165*	-0.432	-0.410	-0.489	-0.649	-0.292	-0.652**
	(0.296)	(0.216)	(0.063)	(0.537)	(0.252)	(0.328)	(0.477)	(0.578)	(0.141)
Fiscal adjustment <sub>t+1</sub>	-12.421***	-0.422	-0.671	-1.011	-3.994	3.160**	3.565	-3.535	4.978
	(1.754)	(0.658)	(0:430)	(3.308)	(2.980)	(0.884)	(2.657)	(2.186)	(2.766)
Fiscal adjustment <sub>t+1</sub>	2.330***	-0.045	0.058	1.401	0.754	-0.602*	-0.691	0.822	-0.624
x GDP growth rate <sub>t+1</sub>	(0.252)	(0.216)	(0.055)	(1.108)	(0.529)	(0.247)	(0.696)	(0.555)	(0.452)
Observations	60	72	68	81	78	72	68	59	68
p-value	0.000	0.002	0.006	0.001	0.003	0.001	0.018	0.000	0.027
R-squared (within)	0.142	0.049	0.067	0.031	0.039	0.098	0.102	0.021	0.084
	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14	0	(15)	(16)	(17)
	Bottom Consumptior	n <sub>t</sub> Pollution <sub>t</sub>	Carbon Dioxic Damage <sub>t</sub>	de Displacen	1ent <sub>t</sub> Marii	ne <sub>t</sub> Tei	rrestrial <sub>t</sub>	Bribery <sub>t</sub> R	emittances <sub>t</sub>
GDP growth <sub>t+1</sub>	0.777**	0.118	0.016	0.014	0.02	4	6.771	-0.079	0.001
	(0.119)	(0.053)	(0.036)	(0.033	(0.01	5) (	3.926)	(0.175)	(0.002)
Fiscal adjustment <sub>t+1</sub>	1.499***	-1.392	-0.650	-0.735	** -16.15	3*** 1	8.598	35.943***	-0.081
	(0.148)	(1.679)	(0.426)	(0.164	(0.04	(1)	0.839)	(0.761)	(0.068)
Fiscal adjustment <sub>t+1</sub>	0.000	0.305	0.030	0.301	0.00	0	0000.0	-6.509***	0.021
x GDP growth rate <sub>t+1</sub>	:	(0.328)	(0:050)	(0.129	(		:	(0.208)	(0.014)
Observations	15	81	81	38	8		8	16	81
p-value	:	0.217	0.010	0.014	:		:	:	0.528
R-squared (within)	0.757	0.049	0.139	0.280	1.00	0	0.695	0.327	0.002

Table A6: Future Fiscal Adjustment, Growth, and Development Outcomes

... = no value; GDP = gross domestic product.

Note: Fixed-effects estimation with country-fixed effects included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* = p<0.01, \*\* = p<0.05, \* = p<0.1. Source: Authors' calculations.

		Table A7: Past	Fiscal Stimu	ıli, Growth,	and Develop	ment Outco	mes		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	6	(8)	(6)
	Poverty <sub>t</sub>	Undernourishment <sub>t</sub>	Mortality <sub>t</sub>	Enrollment <sub>t</sub>	Women Power <sub>t</sub>	Sanitation <sub>t</sub>	Fuel-Tech <sub>t</sub>	Non-Education $_{\mathrm{t}}$	Broadband <sub>t</sub>
GDP growth <sub>t-1</sub>	1.469**	0.155	0.202*	-0.123	-0.535	-0.674	-0.523	0.822	-0.650*
	(0.437)	(0.178)	(0.064)	(0.912)	(0.479)	(0.325)	(0.401)	(0.627)	(0.245)
Fiscal stimuli <sub>t-1</sub>	4.031*	0.276	0.436	5.767	-0.017	-1.754	-0.523	1.676	-1.546
	(1.610)	(0.606)	(0.361)	(7.248)	(2.286)	(0.851)	(0.706)	(1.469)	(1.365)
Fiscal stimuli <sub>t-1</sub>	-1.294	-0.134	-0.237*	-2.011	-0.417	0.609	0.221	-0.623	0.825
x GDP growth rate <sub>t-1</sub>	(1.038)	(0.171)	(0.075)	(1.784)	(0.517)	(0.285)	(0.228)	(0.404)	(0.381)
Observations	58	68	64	74	81	68	64	65	69
p-value	0.101	0.537	0.022	0.171	0.607	0.345	0.463	0.002	0.011
R-squared (within)	0.143	0.036	0.081	0.051	0.068	0.108	0.043	0.112	0.056
	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(1)		(15)	(16)	(11)
	Bottom Consumption	յ <sub>t</sub> Pollution <sub>t</sub>	Carbon Dioxid <sup>.</sup> Damage <sub>t</sub>	e Displacen	ıent <sub>t</sub> Marii	ne <sub>t</sub> Tei	rrestrial <sub>t</sub>	Bribery, I	Remittances
GDP growth <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.134	0.449**	-0.056	0.028	-2.69	66	0.328	0.541	-0.006
	(0.143)	(0.101)	(0.043)	(0.063	(3.24	.2) (	0.418)	(0.364)	(0.024)
Fiscal stimuli <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.361	2.821**	-0.640	0.819	0.00	0	0.000	1.178	0.051
	(0.181)	(0.605)	(0.291)	(0.450			:	(1.554)	(0.179)
Fiscal stimuli <sub>t-1</sub>	0.000	-0.413	0.137	-0.133	0.00	0	0.000	0.970	-0.058
x GDP growth rate <sub>t-1</sub>	:	(0.217)	(0.084)	(0.100			:	(0.434)	(0.031)
Observations	16	73	77	46	12		12	18	81
p-value	:	0.049	0.154	0.431	0.46	9	0.490	:	0.039
R-squared (within)	0.056	0.247	0.114	0.309	0.14	2	0.015	0.786	0.035

Note: Fixed-effects estimation with country-fixed effects included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\* = p<0.05, \* = p<0.1. ... = no value; GDP = gross domestic product.

Source: Authors' calculations.

		Table A8: Past Fi	scal Adjustı	ment, Grow	th, and Develo	opment Out	comes		
	6	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(2)	(8)	(6)
	Poverty <sub>t</sub>	Undernourishment <sub>t</sub>	Mortality <sub>t</sub>	Enrollment <sub>t</sub>	Women Power <sub>t</sub>	Sanitation <sub>t</sub>	Fuel-Tech <sub>t</sub>	Non-Education <sub>t</sub>	<b>Broadband</b> <sub>t</sub>
GDP growth <sub>t-1</sub>	1.083**	0.144	0.172**	-1.070	-0.605	-0.560	-0.476	0.740	-0.540**
	(0.222)	(0.145)	(0.040)	(0.709)	(0.537)	(0.251)	(0.340)	(0.590)	(0.094)
Fiscal adjustment <sub>t-1</sub>	-2.983	0.187	-1.372*	-4.723*	-2.418	6.380***	12.408***	-0.965	5.753*
	(1.888)	(0.359)	(0.505)	(1.534)	(5.867)	(0.711)	(1.370)	(2.046)	(2.251)
Fiscal adjustment <sub>t-1</sub>	0.526	-0.106	0.142*	2.793*	0.354	-0.914***	-2.033**	-0.107	-0.574
x GDP growth rate <sub>t-1</sub>	(0.714)	(0.126)	(0.051)	(1.151)	(1.049)	(0.149)	(0.350)	(0.617)	(0.265)
Observations	58	68	64	74	81	68	64	65	69
p-value	0.000	0.236	0.000	0.061	0.328	0.004	0.001	0.062	0.001
R-squared (within)	0.116	0.036	0.081	0.102	0.065	0.117	0.088	0.110	0.077
	(10)	(11)	(12)		(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)
	Bottor	E	Carbon Di	oxide					
	Consump	tion <sub>t</sub> Pollution <sub>t</sub>	Damag	e <sub>t</sub> Disp	olacement <sub>t</sub>	Marine <sub>t</sub>	Terrestrial <sub>t</sub>	Bribery <sub>t</sub> R	le mittances <sub>t</sub>
GDP growth <sub>t-1</sub>	0.035	0.304**	-00.0-	4	-0.042	-1.615	0.386	0.610**	-0.018
	(0.369	) (0.083)	(0.014	0	(0.076)	(2.354)	(0.510)	(0.135)	(0.018)
Fiscal adjustment <sub>t-1</sub>	-2.32	0.785**	-0.179	•	-0.294	6.787**	0.363	-5.896***	-0.073
	(0.875	) (0.241)	(0.091	$\sim$	(0.367)	(1.927)	(0.418)	(0.598)	(0:050)
Fiscal adjustment <sub>t-1</sub>	0.000	-0.228	-0.03	10	0.037	0.000	0.000	0.949***	0.022
× GDP growth rate <sub>t-1</sub>	:	(0.124)	(0.022	) (	(0.079)	:	:	(0.162)	(0.017)
Observations	16	73	77		46	12	12	18	81
p-value	:	0.004	0.000		0.671	:	÷	:	0.026
R-squared (within)	0.361	0.118	0.061		0.054	0.294	0.018	0.296	0.009

Note: Fixed-effects estimation with country-fixed effects included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* = p<0.01, \*\* = p<0.05, \* = p<0.1. ... = no value; GDP = gross domestic product. Source: Authors' calculations.

			,					
		Fiscal St	timuli <sub>t</sub>			Fiscal Adj	ustment <sub>t</sub>	
1	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(2)	(8)
Personal income tax <sub>t+1</sub>	0.058 (0.049)				0.039 (0.073)			
Corporate income tax <sub>t+1</sub>	0.003 (0.056)				0.048 (0.058)			
Other direct taxes <sub>t+1</sub>	-0.242 (0.220)				-0.383 (0.314)			
Direct taxes <sub>t+1</sub>		0.025 (0.050)				0.046 (0.041)		
Indirect taxes <sub>t+1</sub>	-0.077 (0.055)	-0.072 (0.049)			0.011 (0.036)	0.008 (0.035)		
Social contributions <sub>1+1</sub>	-0.218** (0.066)	-0.232** (0.060)			-0.018 (0.014)	-0.033 (0.017)		
Personal income tax <sub>t-1</sub>			0.019 (0.037)				-0.054 (0.030)	
Corporate income tax <sub>t-1</sub>			0.095*** (0.007)				-0.039 (0.036)	
Other direct taxes <sub>t-1</sub>			-0.225*** (0.027)				-0.632*** (0.086)	
Direct taxes <sub>t-1</sub>				0.067** (0.018)				-0.043 (0.045)
Indirect taxes <sub>t-1</sub>			0.031 (0.092)	0.015 (0.076)			-0.007 (0.060)	-0.014 (0.064)
Social contributions <sub>t-1</sub>			-0.089** (0.020)	-0.087** (0.017)			-0.103* (0.037)	-0.135** (0.035)
Observations	17	77	81	81	77	77	81	81
p-value	:	0.010	:	0.000	:	0.184	:	0.099
R-squared (within)	0.142	0.124	0.137	0.097	0.054	0.025	0.124	0.059
= no value. Note: Explanatory variables are cyclically adii.	usted. Fixed effect	s estimation with	country-fixed eff.	ects included Rob	ust standard error	s in parentheses.	*** = n<0.01 **	<0.05 * = p<0.1

Table A9: Large Fiscal Impulses and Tax Components

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Components
Expense
mpulses and
'ge Fiscal I
e A10: Lar
Tabl€

		Fiscal Stii	nuli <sub>t</sub>			Fiscal Adju	istment <sub>t</sub>	
Ι	Ξ	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(2)	(8)
Wage <sub>t+1</sub>	0.066 (0.043)				0.020 (0.031)			
Nonwage <sub>t+1</sub>	0.065 (0.031)				-0.059 (0.056)			
Government consumption expenditure <sub>t+1</sub>		0.066 (0.036)				-0.016* (0.006)		
Subsidies <sub>t+1</sub>	-0.018 (0.037)	-0.018 (0.034)			-0.070 (0.060)	-0.083 (0.048)		
Transfer <sub>t+1</sub>	-0.071 (0.049)	-0.071 (0.048)			-0.060* (0.022)	-0.073** (0.015)		
Wage <sub>t-1</sub>			-0.020 (0.046)				0.042* (0.016)	
Nonwage <sub>t-1</sub>			0.002 (0.042)				0.003 (0.017)	
Government consumption expenditure <sub>t-1</sub>				-0.010 (0.024)				0.025 (0.016)
Subsidies t-1			0.029 (0.050)	0.031 (0.054)			-0.009 (0.025)	-0.013 (0.027)
Transfer <sub>t-1</sub>			-0.018 (0.039)	-0.012 (0.045)			-0.071 (0.042)	-0.080 (0.047)
Observations	77	77	81	81	77	77	81	81
p-value	:	0.292	:	0.285	:	0.061	:	0.253
R-squared (within)	0.059	0.059	0.009	0.008	0.084	0.074	0.029	0.026
-								

... = no value.

Note: Explanatory variables are cyclically adjusted. Fixed effects estimation with country-fixed effects included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\* = p<0.05, \* = p<0.1. Source: Authors' calculations.

			i ax/ Expension	e comp			Aujustinent			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	6	(8)	(6)	(01)
	$PIT_{t}$	$PIT_{t}$	$CIT_t$	$CIT_t$	Othert	Other <sub>t</sub>	$INDT_{t}$	$INDT_t$	SSCt	SSC
Fiscal stimuli <sub>t-1</sub>	0.267		0.025		-0.051*		-0.331		-0.408	
	(0.344)		(0.249)		(0.016)		(0.300)		(0.412)	
Fiscal adjustment <sub>t-1</sub>		0.133		0.423		-0.069		0.052		-0.056
		(0.167)		(0.451)		(0.039)		(0.176)		(0.055)
Observations	77	77	77	77	77	77	77	77	77	77
p-value	0.494	0.484	0.926	0.418	0.050	0.177	0.350	0.788	0.395	0.383
R-squared (within)	0.013	0.003	0.000	0.023	0.016	0.031	0.024	0.001	0.096	0.002
	(11)	(12)	(13)		(14)	(15)	(16)	Ð	7)	(18)
	Wage <sub>t</sub>	Wage <sub>t</sub>	Non_w	age <sub>t</sub>	Non_wage <sub>t</sub>	Subsidies <sub>t</sub>	Subsidies	t Transf	er_hat,	Transfer_hat <sub>t</sub>
Fiscal stimuli <sub>t-1</sub>	0.512*		0.396	50		-0.131		0.0	)36	
	(0.183)		(0.165	(*		(0.205)		(0.1	l63)	
Fiscal adjustment <sub>t-1</sub>		-0.158			-0.593		-0.282			-0.535*
		(0.117)			(0.357)		(0.356)			(0.195)
Observations	77	77	77		77	77	77	7	7	77
p-value	0.068	0.272	0.102	0	0.195	0.568	0.486	0.8	339	0.071
R-squared (within)	0.037	0.004	0.02	2	0.051	0.005	0.022	0.0	000	0.049
Note: Dependent variables a Source: Authors' calculations	re cyclically adjus	sted. Fixed effects (	estimation with co	ountry-fixeo	d effects included. F	lobust standard er	rors in parenthese	s. * = p<0.1.		

Table A11: Tax/Expense Components and Fiscal Stimuli/Adjustment

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#### Large Fiscal Episodes and Sustainable Development

#### Some International Evidence

The link between fiscal policy and sustainable development is country specific. Tax revenues remain a major source of green and social finance. Analysis of episodes of fiscal expansion and tightening in four emerging markets finds that the association between fiscal aggregates and domestic resource mobilization and sustainable development differs across countries. Further, the time paths of tax and expenditure components are important for domestic resource mobilization to target sustainable development outcomes. More granular fiscal data may shed more light on the association between fiscal conditions and sustainable development in the coming years.

#### About the Asian Development Bank

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