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How Civilian Is the ESDP?

Reinhardt Rummel

Publicly, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) tends to be associated with the creation of a military component of the EU. Yet the first operation within the framework of the ESDP is being executed using exclusively civilian means – through the European Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina since January 2003. On 31 March 2003, the EU took over the military mission Allied Harmony (now called Concordia) in Macedonia, and from 2004 on, this could also be the case with SFOR. With the ESDP, Europe has set itself the goal of “a balanced parallel development of military and civilian capabilities,” in order to bolster Europe’s influence in international crisis management. Meanwhile, the civilian component of the ESDP is not just less well-known, but so far, it is also significantly underdeveloped. The European police force may represent a beginning, but further non-military instruments must also be deployable if a broad civilian-military approach is to become a trademark of future EU security policy.

The EU is gearing up to be better prepared for crisis situations, and to be able to participate in international stabilisation missions with the whole spectrum of its capabilities. Until now, the Union has employed traditional economic, financial and diplomatic channels in order to bring its weight to bear in crisis management. Since 1999, specific intervention instruments have been developed in the framework of the ESDP: a task force comprising 60,000 soldiers, including the necessary infrastructure, and some civilian instruments, for instance police personnel and experts in the rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection. Though these capacities will remain with the member states for the time being, they are prepared

in Brussels for deployment under the command of the EU. In the Council of Ministers, additional committees have been established, and staff has been earmarked for this by the member states.

The civilian spectrum of the ESDP

Although the ESDP has taken on its first operative task with the EUPM, it is still in the process of development. After the policy resolution of Helsinki (December 1999) to equip the ESDP with a military and a non-military component, four priority areas were settled on at the European Council in Santa Maria da Feira (June 2000), in which the EU intends to charge civilian capacities for deployment in crisis regions.

Numerically, the planned civilian contingent of the ESDP is not very impressive, especially when compared with the size of the military contingent. Nevertheless, the civilian component of the ESDP is underrated amongst the general public and, sometimes, in politics too. After all, it does cover areas that can be decisive for stability in crisis areas, and which, until now, often had to be done by soldiers in the context of peacekeeping measures. At the beginning of 2003, the level of development of the non-military component of the ESDP is as follows:

Police. The member states provide the EU with 5000 police officers, of whom 1400 can be mobilised within less than 30 days. The vast majority of these are police staff with a civilian status. Only France, Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal also dispatch paramilitary personnel, where the line dividing them from the armed forces can be fluid. The EU has drawn up a police-action plan for two types of operation: interventions to replace local police staff are required if public order and security, as well as criminal and civil law systems have to be restored because the local authorities do not function; interventions in support of local police capacities are required if the abilities of local police forces are to be improved to conform to international norms. Experience shows that close cooperation with local authorities is essential.

Legal experts. The fifteen states have committed to the EU 282 experts (including 72 judges, 48 public prosecutors, 72 prison officers and 38 civil service staff), of whom 60 can be mobilised within 30 days, while 43 officials are to be available for investigative missions. Just as with the police staff, the legal experts will be trained for two types of interventions: on one hand, to reinforce local structures through consulting and training; on the other, to restore the rule of law, whereby officials are to be entrusted with executive tasks for the time being. An EU pilot project promotes the

networking of the national training establishments in the area of the rule of law and civilian administration, in order to be able to develop training modules and implement instruction.

Civilian administration. The exact size of the pool of experts to be set up has not yet been laid down, since the area of civilian administration comprises a very large field of operation. It includes everything from the land registry, health services and education to waste management in a crisis region. In this respect, open lists are first drawn up, composed of qualified personnel who can take on consultancy and supervision activities, as well as executive functions, at short notice. During the Spanish presidency, guidelines and fundamental principles were compiled for the deployment of the experts. The Danish presidency has appealed to the member states to earmark appropriate administration experts.

Civil protection. There are three obvious fields of activity: the coordination of refugee influxes, the protection of civilians in the event of armed conflict or terror attacks and assistance in the event of epidemics, illnesses and famine in the wake of crisis situations. The member states have confirmed their contributions for these tasks to the appropriate surveillance and coordination centre in the European Commission. In the meantime, the objectives set have been nominally reached:

- ▶ three teams of 10 experts each, who can mobilise within 3 to 7 hours in order to assess the necessary measures, and to ensure their coordination;
- ▶ 2000 experts who have been trained in the various fields of civil protection, and are available at short notice;
- ▶ highly specialised experts on standby from national authorities and non-governmental organisations.

The quality of the confirmed contingents, their training and equipment, and their ability to function as integrated teams, remain to be assessed.

Overall, the state of preparedness in the four priority areas can be described as advanced, but not as satisfactory. If one considers that the EU is not just preparing for independently coordinated interventions, but also for contributions to missions implemented by the OSCE and the UN, decisive improvements have yet to be made to transform the planned figures into full and adequate capabilities. At the same time, it has not yet been taken into consideration that the decision to deploy remains dependent on the respective national interests of the contributing states. Experience with the first EU-led deployments will show to what extent the EU's crisis capacities will prove their worth in practice. The progression and the results of the EUPM and the mission Concordia will provide important data in this respect.

Die EUPM – a test for the EU

The Council of Ministers already allocated the assignments for the EUPM in March 2002. The preparation period until December 2002 was needed to avoid a power vacuum at the takeover point from the UN's International Police Task Force (IPTF). Compared to the IPTF, the EUPM has a significantly lower number of personnel and a slightly different mandate. It is reduced to about one third, and only counts around 500 police officers and a good 300 international and local staff. Of the 30 states to have previously dispatched police personnel to the IPTF, 18 are still involved. Besides the EU member states and candidate states, Russia, Canada and Switzerland are also participating. From the point of view of its size and composition, the mission is manageable and, in this respect, a suitable test for the EU's leadership qualities.

EUPM personnel are answerable to the UN's High Commissioner in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Briton *Paddy Ashdown*, in his second function as the EU's Special Envoy. The operative management of the mission

is delegated to the Danish Police Inspector *Sven Christian Frederiksen*, whose reports are sent to the EU foreign ministers via *Ashdown* and the CFSP High Representative *Javier Solana*. The EU Council of Ministers' Political and Security Committee retains political control of the mission. Euro 38 m per year, divided between the EU budget and the contributions of the member states, have been set aside for the period 2003 to 2005 – an arrangement that took great efforts to achieve.

In contrast to the IPTF, the EU mission hardly deals with any executive responsibilities, but is instead intended to contribute to setting up a professional police in Bosnia-Herzegovina through monitoring, consultancy and inspection. The police is to be prepared to deal effectively with organised crime, human trafficking, drug trading and corruption. The objective is to bring about conformity with EU norms.

Overall, the task in a still tense post-war region remains as demanding as it is dangerous. For this reason, special importance is given to the cooperation between EUPM and SFOR.

Drawbacks of the civilian instruments

It can generally be stated that the civilian tasks are no less important than the military component of the ESDP. Rather, they complete a civilian-military continuum that is to be developed as a particular quality of the Union's security policy. Despite the pioneering nature of the EUPM and the mission Concordia, the ESDP can by no means be considered sufficiently advanced. This applies both to the civilian and the military components, which will not be discussed in greater detail here. Compared to the military component, progress has been cautious in the civilian area. Furthermore, the developments cannot be described as balanced, since the civilian component is significantly smaller from the point of view of personnel and material than the military. In the end, the two com-

ponents are not yet sufficiently prepared for a combined deployment.

In contrast to the rather modest progress of the ESDP, the requirement of civilian instruments has increased worldwide. In about half the UN peace missions currently under way, police personnel are being deployed alongside military personnel, while at the same time the proportion of civilian experts per mission is growing. Civilian stabilisation personnel have to take on the chief tasks in certain conflict areas, as in the examples set in East-Timor, in Kosovo and in Afghanistan. Depending on the crisis situation, either the civilian instruments complement the military, or vice-versa. In both cases, though, the division of tasks must be organised and permanently established.

As soon as experience with the current instruments has been assessed, additional civilian intervention reserves could become necessary for the EU: the reintegration of refugees, the treatment of ethnic-religious minorities, election monitoring, the introduction of independent media and disaster relief are priority areas for such an expansion of the scope of the tasks. For this, the EU could revert to the comprehensive catalogue from which priority areas were already identified during the Portuguese presidency. The following development tasks must be included in any initiative for a richer civilian arsenal of the EU:

- ▶ the full development of the four priority areas already begun with,
- ▶ considering additional civilian instruments in the context of the ESDP,
- ▶ setting up a management and coordination infrastructure for civilian field deployment,
- ▶ development of civilian-military cooperation, both within the EU and in the respective regions,
- ▶ coordination of the civilian ESDP components with the capacities of the UN, the OSCE, NATO and the Council of Europe,
- ▶ laying down the financing for civilian crisis management missions in the EU budget,

- ▶ increased use of the civilian instruments for crisis prevention.

How civilian is the ESDP? The answer to this question has long-term implications for the further development of EU external action. In this sense, the European Convention should address such structural questions in greater detail. The documents submitted so far only address the ESDP generally, without dealing more precisely with *both* its components. In the drafts of the constitutional treaty it remains unclear whether the ESDP is assigned to the section of "crisis management" or to the chapter on "Defence" or both. Moreover, the category "conflict prevention" is completely missing. Clarification of these points seems to be required.

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