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Weak states and successful elites: Extraversion strategies in Africa

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Denis M. Tull

Weak States and Successful Elites

Extraversion Strategies in Africa

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Weak States and Successful Elites Extraversion Strategies in Africa

Ever since the terror attacks of 11 September 2001, Western states have identified security problems in Sub-Saharan Africa no longer as purely regional issues, but as international challenges as well. As a result, the EU and its member states and the USA have considerably expanded their attempts to tackle security-related challenges in Africa. Focus has been placed on the prevention and resolution of conflict, institutional and governance reforms, state building, and combating terrorism. The objective is to engineer political change in so-called weak states – in fact crisis-ridden states – such as the DR Congo, Somalia and Chad so that security problems can be eliminated.

The results of this policy have often failed to meet expectations. In some situations, the objectives have proven to be too ambitious, while in others, Western policies have suffered from shortcomings of their own making, for example, low levels of coordination and a lack of coherency. An additional factor, however, is often paid insufficient attention: the attitudes and behaviour of the very governments and political elites that rule weak states. These actors, indiscriminately called “partners” because Western actors rely on their cooperation, often do not share the interests of their external supporters. They are generally authoritarian regimes, which are threatened by political conflicts and violent opponents. Their highest priority is maintaining their own power, rather than aspiring to their (Western) partners’ goal of solving collective problems.

In many cases, Western actors lack awareness of such differences in interests. Crisis states in Africa are largely dependent on diplomatic, economic and security-related support from the West. Their governments therefore feel obliged to signal willingness to cooperate with their Western partners, at least on a rhetorical level. This says nothing, however, about the degree to which they actually do cooperate, since external demands often conflict with their domestic interests. This study delves into the question of how the governments of externally dependent crisis-ridden states in Africa deal with Western expectations of cooperation. Under what conditions and with which strategies do the elites in such states succeed in using external political intervention efforts to reconcile them with or even use them for their own domestic interests?

Three examples of Western efforts *vis-à-vis* weak states will be analysed with a view to fairly typical security policy risks and how they are handled by ruling elites: crisis and conflict prevention in Chad, security sector reform in the DR Congo, and combating terrorism in Uganda and East Africa.

In the case of Congo, the overarching goal of the donors after the 2006 elections was to stabilise the country through security sector reform. President Kabila only complied with this target to the extent that he agreed to establish or strengthen selected security organs that he could use to combat domestic opponents. As a result, the collaboration remained largely limited to traditional military cooperation. Donors accepted that the Congolese government blocked more ambitious reform plans. For in terms of their efforts to stabilise the country, they were more dependent on the government's readiness to cooperate than vice versa. Donors also feared that a reduction in aid would endanger hard-won progress. Kabila was aware of his partners' pressure to succeed and he used this to dictate the terms of cooperation to them.

Mechanisms to instrumentalise Western reform efforts were also apparent in Chad. In 2003, the World Bank called for drastic reforms in the country, meant to promote crisis prevention and good governance. Chad's government agreed, because the World Bank's proposals were a pre-condition for investment in the oil sector and therefore, future state revenues as well. Against the background of sharpening domestic political crises, however, President Déby rolled back the reforms, in fact disrupting the World Bank project. He got away with this by using the weakness of the Chadian state to his advantage. With a view to the conflict in Darfur, he played on Western fears that Sudan's Islamic regime could ignite a regional conflagration with expansionist policies and thereby transform Chad into a failed state. As a result, Déby received both diplomatic and military support from Western states, which at the same time looked past the sabotage of the World Bank project and growing domestic political repression.

In Uganda, the government used the Western, especially US anti-terrorism policies as a domestic political instrument. Immediately after 2001, President Museveni successfully positioned himself as a key partner of the USA in Africa in its fight against international terrorism. Ever since Uganda also became engaged in Somalia, the imperative of fighting terrorism has defined the Western perception of the country. Museveni succeeded in securing the hoped

for domestic benefits. The regime became immune to Western criticism regarding corruption and authoritarian rule; at the same time it was able to delegitimise internal opponents under the guise of fighting terrorism.

Western policies towards Africa's crisis-ridden states run the risk of being used as instruments of local government elites. They can fail in their objectives (as in Congo and Chad) or have unexpected consequences, which present new problems such as authoritarian tendencies and increased levels of corruption (as in Uganda). The fact that such states are politically and economically dependent on Western donors does not provide enough of an impulse for a change in policy if local elites see it as a threat to their power. The actions of these elites, however, are not limited to damage control. They pick up on external initiatives and attempt to shape them to match their own interests. They take full advantage of the conflicting objectives of their Western partners knowing that, when in doubt, Western governments prefer stability over other concerns such as democracy and human rights.

When engaging crisis-ridden states in Africa, Western governments should far more critically scrutinise the interests of local powerholders as has hitherto been the case. Every form of engagement carries the risk of unintended or negative consequences. Solutions to this problem are not self-evident. One solution could be a greater use of conditionality policy, i.e. tie support to clear conditions and results. Conditionality is not, however, a silver bullet. But it is more suited than untied aid for preventing unintended consequences of Western policies or their instrumentalisation. In addition, dispensing with conditions can contribute to the blocking of reforms.

Conditionality can only be successful if Western states coordinate their policies effectively. The prerequisite for such coordination is that the different (and often divergent) interests within the Western community are stated openly. In addition, one needs to critically address conflicting objectives, which will otherwise be mercilessly exploited by local elites.

Introduction: The Strategy of Extraversion

In the past decade, political turmoil and violent conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa have increasingly come under the focus of Western security policies. This applies to a group of currently about ten countries where the lack of a state monopoly on the use of force is perceived as a particular risk to local, regional and international security.¹ For this reason, Western and international actors have deployed measures aimed at minimising security threats within and emanating from these countries.

Western attempts to tackle security threats in Africa are a relatively recent phenomenon – in contrast to longstanding efforts to address political and economic problems (like poverty, corruption, state control, authoritarianism) on the continent. Both types of efforts are characterised by optimistic assumptions about their own capacities. That is, Western actors believe that they can successfully export effective solutions to countries in Africa. It is implied that local government elites share the same objectives as Western actors. As a result, the intended solutions – and therefore cooperative behaviour as well – are believed to be of mutual interest. Based on this logic, government elites in Africa are referred to as “partners”.

Another assumption is based on the high degree of Africa’s external dependence. Most weak states in Africa are highly indebted to Western states and international organisations dominated by the West (like the World Bank, IMF and Paris Club). The volume of development assistance often equals more than 10 percent of GDP. Consequently aid is astronomical when compared with government expenditures. In 2005, development assistance corresponded to 301 percent of government expenditure in Congo, 141 percent in Chad, and 91 percent in Uganda.² This external

dependency underpins the hope among Western actors that, if necessary, intended “solutions” can be implemented even in the face of local resistance. At the least, it is expected that African governments can be steered in the desired direction by offering them incentives. The dependency of weak African states therefore suggests *a priori* that Western actors wield a high degree of influence. There is a great deal of pressure weighing down on African government elites to react cooperatively and in conformance with Western actors and their preferences.³

Numerous empirical studies, however, have shown that these assumptions are flawed and that, as a consequence, Western policies often lead to results that fall short of the intended goals or carry unintended side effects.⁴ This indicates that Africa’s government elites are in no way simply passive recipients of external concepts. While dependency may reduce their range of actions, it does not eliminate it entirely. This becomes apparent when the interests of African elites diverge from those of their Western supporters. In such cases, African actors frequently raise a subtle, but entirely effective, resistance to Western policies and even instrumentalise them. There is every reason to believe that the more recent security policies towards Africa are also exposed to this hazard; that is, they can fail to achieve their desired results, at best, or they may carry indirect, unintended consequences.

Although the strategies of African government elites in dealing with outside objectives (such as economic reforms or democratisation) have been relatively well documented, the knowledge obtained in this process has thus far hardly been transferred into the realm of security policy. This becomes evident for ex-

¹ This group currently includes, among others, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, South Sudan, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Chad, the Central African Republic, Mauritania and Somalia.

² *Developing Aid in Africa*, <http://media.ft.com/cms/7398f192-6d99-11dfb5c9-00144feabdc0.swf> (retrieved on May 12, 2011). This means that in the case of Congo, for example, the total sum of development assistance was three times larger than government expenditures.

³ Of course, the growing influence of “new” non-Western actors in Africa is rapidly diversifying the external relations of African states and, as a result, minimizing their dependence on Western states.

⁴ Nicolas van de Walle, *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999*, Cambridge 2001; Ian Taylor, “‘Advice Is Judged by Results, Not by Intentions’: Why Gordon Brown Is Wrong about Africa”, *International Affairs* 81, no. 2, 2005, pp. 299–310; Pierre Englebert and Denis M. Tull, “Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa. Flawed Ideas about Failed States”, *International Security* 32, no. 4, 2008, pp. 106–139.

ample in debates over why the ambitious goals of external actors, in terms of state building and post-conflict reconstruction are seldom achieved. This question is largely dominated by arguments that focus on the external or “supply side”, i.e. the policies of the UN and Western donors, their shortcomings in terms of strategy, instruments, resources, coherency, etc. On the other hand, there has been scant attention placed on the interests of the “recipients”, i.e. African governments, and how they deal with Western intentions, concepts and policies.

In the rare cases in which local factors are actually taken into account, attention is focused on structural problems. If African partners do not exhibit the desired attitudes, this is attributed to them just being unable to influence structural factors.⁵ This type of interpretation leads to dubious conclusions. Instead of understanding corruption as an inherent and locally useful part of power, for example, outsiders tend to explain corruption in terms of institutional deficits and weak state capacities. A similar logic is at work when outsiders explain why the governments of post-conflict states do not adequately protect the civilian population. It is argued that governments lack effective armed forces and police units; hence, they are incapable of maintaining security.⁶ This kind of reasoning is unconvincing. It places just as little scrutiny on causes and effects as it does on the interests and strategies of the alleged partners in weak states.

A shift in perspective is needed, since the responses of African political elites to Western concepts are largely determined by prevailing domestic conditions and interests.⁷ Crisis and conflict states are generally governed by authoritarian or pseudo-democratic regimes. They hold precarious legitimacy, which puts them in constant fear for their survival. Latent crises, uprisings and violent conflicts characterize the domestic political setting that local powerholders perpetually navigate. This, in turn, influences the way they engage the outside world.⁸

The concept of extraversion starts by asking how African actors shape their foreign relations and how they deal with external actors, particularly when considering their structural dependency *vis-à-vis* Western states.⁹ The proposal is that, to a certain degree, African elites find dependency politically desirable or at least useful. They tend to compensate for their domestic weaknesses – the lack of authority, legitimacy or resources – by orienting themselves in an outward-looking fashion towards the international system in general and Western states in particular. Dependency and outward orientation generate external resources, which Western states inject to solve what they perceive as problems in African countries. Development assistance, loans, investment, diplomatic support and security policy cooperation all fall under this umbrella. At the core of the extraversion strategy are efforts by African government elites to access these resources and thereby capitalise on their foreign dependency. If successful, these resources become rents, i.e. unearned income.

If there were no foreign dependence or influx of foreign funds, African rulers would find it necessary to mobilise local resources. Their preference for dependency is based on the premise that the extraction of local resources – e.g. through levying taxes – would carry high political costs. This, in turn, could generate societal demands for accountability from the government.¹⁰ Foreign dependency and the strategy of extraversion divest rulers of this danger and thereby help to strengthen their autonomy *vis-à-vis* domestic actors. This type of operating logic carries the consequence that the capacity of externally dependent states remains feeble, since the state plays no role in resource extraction – a key aspect of state building – or local elites intentionally avoid such a role. As a result, the weakness of state institutions is perpetuated in the interest of elites, who have little need for legitimacy, because they secure financial resources from external rents rather than local sources.¹¹

5 Nicolas van de Walle, *Overcoming Stagnation in Aid-Dependent Countries*, Washington, D.C., 2005, pp. 72f.

6 Cf. Department for International Development (DfID), *Democratic Republic of Congo, Country Plan (2008–2010)*, London, May 2008, p. 15.

7 Cf. Steven R. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment”, *World Politics* 43, no. 2, 1991, pp. 233–256; Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, *International Organization* 42, no. 3, 1988, pp. 427–460.

8 David, “Explaining Third World Alignment” [same as Footnote 7].

9 Jean-François Bayart, “Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion”, *African Affairs* 99, no. 395, 2000, pp. 217–267. For an application of the concept that informed this paper see Cédric Jourde, “The International Relations of Small Neauthoritarian States: Islamism, Warlordism, and the Framing of Stability”, *International Studies Quarterly* 51, 2007, pp. 481–503.

10 European University Institute, *Overcoming Fragility in Africa: Forging a New European Approach. European Report on Development 2009*, San Domenico di Fiesole 2009, p. 52.

11 Todd Moss, Gunilla Pettersson and Nicolas van de Walle, *An Aid Institutions Paradox? A Review Essay on Aid Dependency and*

Inflows from abroad do not need to be extensive. They already assume a relatively high level of importance, because resources in African states are so limited. Furthermore, external aid is not solely of an economic or financial nature.¹² Diplomatic or security-related support can also be important resources. Generally, however, this type of support goes hand-in-hand with developmental or financial assistance.

The way in which African governments handled the economic reforms that were imposed on them by the international financial institutions during the 1980s is exemplary of extraversion strategies. In numerous countries, governments generated political and economic capital from these reforms, e.g. over the course of “privatisation” of state-owned enterprises, which were often sold below market value to local political allies; that is, governments successfully used these reforms to maintain their patronage networks and consolidate their own power, but circumvented the objectives that the financial institutions had had in mind.

A similar process occurred when Western powers called for democratisation. Even long-established autocrats ceded to donor pressure in the 1990s and organised multi-party elections. Nevertheless, the authoritarian substance of the regime remained in place in many cases. Now, as in the past, opposition candidates seldom succeed in winning elections, because these are systematically faked and governments illegally use state resources for their own campaigns.¹³ African regimes have again and again used these methods to solve the dilemma of bowing to pressure to reform while safeguarding their own rule. Despite externally-demanded reforms, they managed to maintain power, while at the same time receiving dividends from Western donors for seemingly compliant behaviour.

Ruling elites in weak states by no means employ the extraversion strategy solely in a defensive or reactive manner. In order to secure support, govern-

ments often pick up on the tenets of fashionable discourses – currently, for example, economic transparency, gender equality, environmental and resource protection, or human rights. This does not mean that every Western attempt in support of such goals is inevitably running the risk of being instrumentalised. The assumption of this study, however, is that the security-related commitments of Western states in Africa’s crisis-ridden or even war-torn states is highly susceptible to such risks. The fact that Western actors are under pressure to address problems like state collapse or terrorism can present local elites with political opportunities.

The case studies in this paper follow three selection criteria. Firstly, they address states with security problems and weak government structures, which is evident, for example, in the lack of a state monopoly on the use of force. Secondly, the governments of these states are highly dependent on the support of Western countries, which *a priori* are assumed to have a high level of influence. Thirdly the case studies cover conventional security policies that Western actors are currently advancing in weak African states: stabilisation of latently vulnerable crisis states through support for good governance and conflict prevention (Chad), state building and reform of the security sector in post-conflict states (DR Congo), and combating terrorism (Uganda).

State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development, January 2006 (Working Paper No. 74), pp. 14f.

¹² Michael Barnett and Christoph Zürcher, “The Peacebuilder’s Contract: How External Statebuilding Reinforces Weak Statehood”, in: Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (eds.), *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Post-war Peace Operations*, New York 2010, p. 32.

¹³ Over the period from 1990 to 2005, this only occurred in 14 of 100 cases. Cf. Daniel N. Posner and Daniel J. Young, “The Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa”, *Journal of Democracy* 18, no. 3, 2007, p. 131.

Chad: Crisis Prevention and Oil Project

Since his successful coup in 1990, President Idriss Déby has directed Chad's facade democracy. He has safeguarded his power through repression and patronage policies. Déby benefits from revenues generated through oil production, which began flowing freely in 2004 and transformed Chad into a rentier state. A large-scale pipeline project created the basis for this process. In cooperation with the World Bank and the European Investment Bank (EIB), a consortium of oil corporations invested USD 7 billion into the project.¹⁴ Due to the World Bank's participation, the project became what is likely the most ambitious donor-driven attempt in the entire world of political and economic restructuring through deep intrusions into a state's sovereignty. Among other things, the World Bank was aiming to protect Chad from the impacts of the so-called resource curse, i.e. to reduce the vulnerability of this resource rich country to suffer from corruption, dictatorship, and violent conflicts. Today, however, it is indisputable that these efforts to promote crisis prevention and good governance in the country have failed.

The World Bank acted as the project's political guarantor, acceding to a request by the oil companies and thereby promising a minimisation of their investment risk in the unstable country. Together with Chad's government, the World Bank negotiated complicated control mechanisms, in order to ensure that oil profits would not be privatised by political elites, but rather employed in the fight against poverty.¹⁵ The agreement between the World Bank and the government stipulated that direct oil revenues (around 50 percent

of total revenues) would be allocated as follows:¹⁶ ten percent of this money was designated for a generation fund. Of the remaining 90 percent, only 15 percent was to flow directly into Chad's state coffers, while 5 percent was set aside for local development in the project region. The rest of the revenues would be used to benefit poverty reduction in five focus areas (education, health, etc.).

Legislation accepting these stipulations was passed by the parliament, which was under the control of President Déby. Thus the government waived direct access to roughly half of its oil revenues. But it had no other choice; it had to bow to the wishes of the World Bank, because the investment of the oil companies – and therefore the initiation of oil production – was dependent on the World Bank's participation. The agreement was praised by the World Bank as a groundbreaking model for avoiding the negative impacts of oil wealth.¹⁷

In July 2004, the first oil revenues flowed into Chad's state coffers. But hardly a year had passed before the government started a step-by-step revision of the control and distribution mechanisms imposed by the World Bank. At the end of 2005, Chad's parliament liquidated the generation fund and the government pocketed the deposits, which amounted to approximately USD 36 million. The proportion of oil production revenues that would flow directly into the government's purse was raised from 15 to 30 percent. At the same time, the strict criteria for the use of funds were softened. Originally, these were primarily intended for poverty reduction. Henceforth, however, the oil revenues could also be used to finance security-related spending.

The World Bank reacted to the breach of the agreement by suspending its loans to Chad and freezing the escrow account where indirect oil revenues were col-

¹⁴ At the time, the project was the largest private investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 2000, the World Bank board of directors approved support for the project via technical advising and a loan to Chad and Cameroon totalling USD 193 million. The World Bank mobilised an additional USD 300 million through a loan to commercial banks. The European Investment Bank supported the project with a loan of EUR 141 million.

¹⁵ Scott Pegg, "Can Policy Intervention Beat the Resource Curse? Evidence from the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project", *African Affairs* 105, no. 418, 2005, pp. 1–25; Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf of Guinea*, London 2009, pp. 278ff.

¹⁶ The World Bank model excluded indirect revenues generated by taxes.

¹⁷ World Bank, "World Bank Group Approves Support for Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project", Press Release, Washington, D.C., June 6, 2000.

lected.¹⁸ In response, Chad's government threatened to cease oil exports and to deport the roughly 200,000 refugees from Darfur in the country's eastern part if it were refused access to the account. In July 2006, the World Bank accepted Chad's unilateral adjustment of the original agreement. World Bank loans as well as oil revenues began to flow again – apparently due to pressure from the USA, which was worried not only about international oil prices, but also the stability of the Déby regime.

Subsequently Déby turned against two of the partners in the oil consortium, Chevron and Petronas. Due to alleged tax evasion, he threatened to expel them from the country. The conflict was resolved after the companies paid USD 289 million to the government. China's growing influence played an indirect, but important role in this case. In August 2006, Chad established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic. This was a barely veiled indication from Déby that Chinese oil companies were available as alternative partners.¹⁹

When the World Bank could no longer ignore the failure of project, it was finally ended in September 2008.²⁰ Today the political situation in Chad is worse than it was ten years ago.²¹ The World Bank had missed its goal of avoiding the consequences of the resource curse. Conditions in the country continue to be characterised by military uprisings, political crises, poor governance, and persistently high levels of corruption.²² Economic conditions have also not improved – despite approximately USD 4.3 billion in oil revenues that Chad collected between 2003 and 2008.

The failure of the seemingly visionary project occurred for two reasons. Firstly, Chad's government was apparently not prepared to comply with the project agreements. Secondly, and more important, the World Bank overestimated its influence over the government

once oil production had started.²³ Prior to this, Déby had been in a position of extreme foreign dependency. In 2003, the total annual revenues of the state amounted to just USD 200 million.²⁴ Loans and subsidies from bilateral and multilateral donors made up 56 percent of state revenues in 2004.²⁵ In light of these conditions, Déby had to accede to the incursions into Chad's sovereignty sought by the World Bank so that oil production could begin. But when the investments of the companies had "sunken" into the ground and oil production started up, the World Bank no longer had leverage with which to influence Chad's government. Starting from a position of acute economic and political dependency, Déby gradually expanded his scope of action until he finally was able to dictate his own conditions on external partners – the World Bank and oil companies.

During this process, Chad's president was acutely aware that the World Bank lacked substantial leverage. Withdrawing from the project was – at least initially – not an option for the Bank, as it would have been an acknowledgment that the model it had praised as visionary, had failed spectacularly.²⁶ Likewise the Bank lacked options to punish the government as it had to respect Chad's state sovereignty, another trump card that was played by Déby. Although he had stressed at the outset of the project that his government had entered into the project's agreements "without external pressure", he later accused the World Bank of neo-colonialist behaviour and justified the accessing of oil production revenues as a defence of national sovereignty.²⁷

Déby proved to be a shrewd operator during his fight with the World Bank. But he also benefited greatly from a regional political conjuncture; that is, the Darfur conflict in Sudan, Chad's eastern neighbour. Due to the regional and international conse-

18 Scott Pegg, "Chronicle of a Death Foretold: The Collapse of the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project", *African Affairs* 108, no. 431, 2009, pp. 313f.

19 International Crisis Group (ICG), *Chad: Escaping from the Oil Trap*, Brussels 2009, p. 14.

20 "World Bank Pulls Plug on Chad Oil Pipeline Agreement", *Reuters*, September 9, 2008.

21 ICG, *Chad: Escaping from the Oil Trap* [same as Footnote 19].

22 For years, Chad has already occupied top positions on the Failed States Index. In 2010, it was second on the list – preceded only by Somalia and its absence of a state. Foreign Policy (ed.), *Failed State Index 2010*, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings (retrieved on May 12, 2011).

23 Soares de Oliveira, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf of Guinea* [same as Footnote 15], p. 279.

24 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), *Chad Country Report*, London, February 2003, p. 48.

25 Ian Gary and Nikki Reisch, *Chad's Oil: Miracle or Mirage? Following the Money in Africa's Newest Petro-State*, Baltimore: Catholic Relief Service and Bank Information Center, 2005, p. 79.

26 John A. Gould and Matthew S. Winters, "An Obsolescing Bargain in Chad: Explaining Shifts in Leverage between the Government and the World Bank", Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, March 2, 2007, p. 28.

27 Ibid., p. 31; "Chad: Oil Upheaval Unlikely to Impact Development in Short-term", *IRIN News*, August 29, 2006.

quences of the crisis in Darfur, the fragility of Chad's government paradoxically became a foreign policy advantage of the regime. Déby's strategy towards France and the USA – the most important Western actors in the region – consisted of linking Chad's precarious domestic situation with the conflict in Darfur. He branded rebels in Chad that were fighting against his regime as mercenaries hired by the Sudanese government.²⁸ He warned against a scenario in which Chad could become further destabilised by the Islamic and "genocidal" regime in Khartoum. Finally, he portrayed his own regime as a pro-Western bastion against the Islamisation and Arabisation of the region.²⁹

This proved to be an exceedingly successful strategy. Paris and Washington were both convinced that the best way to defend their interests in the region was through a stable Chad. Among their concerns were the containment of the crisis in Darfur, a weakening of Sudanese influence in the region, combating terrorism in the Sahel, and protecting Chad's oil production. The US and France saw in President Déby the most suitable ally for guaranteeing Chad's stability, or at least preventing a "Somalia-fication" of the country.³⁰ The conflict in Darfur and Sudan's support of rebels in Chad were therefore considerable boosts to Déby's strategic market value. Western states were dependent on his cooperation within the context of the crisis in Darfur and its regional impacts: As a perceptive Western diplomat observed: "The world can't afford for Chad to become a failed state and President Idriss Déby knows it."³¹ Not least for this reason, France pushed in 2007 for the dispatching of the EU military operation EUFOR Chad/CAR.³²

The regional crisis context as well as Déby's portrayal of Chad's internal problems being primarily a consequence of subversive policies from Khartoum

also carried consequences for the regime's conflict with the World Bank. On the French and American side, the prevailing view was that the Sudan conflict not only threatened the Déby regime, but also Chad's oil production. As a result, the country's stability was given higher priority than the implementation of the oil project according to its original rules and regulations.³³ The World Bank was forced to look past the fact that Déby had sabotaged the agreement.

From the viewpoint of Chad's leadership, having unlimited access to oil revenues was of vital importance. In the face of constant rebellions, some of them supported by Sudan, the toppling of Déby seemed to just be a matter of time. Since 2004, the regime had narrowly escaped coup attempts and rebel offensives on several occasions – most recently in February 2008 when French troops prevented rebels from capturing the capital Ndjamené.³⁴ Against this background, Déby used the oil revenues to invest enormous amounts of money into the security apparatus. In February 2006 alone, the regime purchased weapons valued at USD 60 million.³⁵ At a growth rate of 663 percent, Chad led the world in having the greatest increase in defence spending between 2000 and 2009.³⁶

In addition, the regime used oil revenues to finance patronage and clientelism. By 2007, Chad had spent 70 percent of its oil revenues, more than any other oil producer in the region (with the exception of Sudan).³⁷ The regime was able to consolidate its basis of power by co-opting government opponents, founding supposed "opposition parties", and carrying out infrastructure activities rife with corruption. Last but not least, Déby reacted to recurring rebellions by exercising state repression against his domestic opponents – Chad's already fragile experiment with democracy was effectively over.³⁸

28 "Chad's Rebels Say Govt Using Mercenaries, Deny Sudan Support", *IRIN News*, April 16, 2006; "Chad: Fighting on Two Fronts in Chaotic East", *IRIN News*, October 30, 2006.

29 Chrysantus Ayangafac, *Resolving the Chadian Political Epilepsy: An Assessment of Intervention Efforts*, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies (ISS), June 1, 2009 (Situation Report), p. 7.

30 According to a French diplomat quoted in: *ibid.*, p. 4. Cf. also "Déby Supreme, for Now", *Africa Confidential*, September 22, 2006; "Déby Hangs On", *Africa Confidential*, April 28, 2006.

31 Quoted in: Gould and Winters, "An Obsolescing Bargain in Chad" [same as Footnote 26], p. 32.

32 Denis M. Tull, *The Chad Crisis and Operation EUFOR Chad/CAR*, Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2008 (SWP Comments 2/2008); "French Defence Minister Delivers Message of Support to Chadian President", *Associated Press*, February 6, 2008.

33 Gary and Reisch, *Chad's Oil: Miracle or Mirage?* [same as Footnote 25], p. 85.

34 "Déby – Caught between Paris and Khartoum", *Africa Confidential*, February 15, 2008.

35 "Déby Supreme, for Now" [same as Footnote 30].

36 "Top 10 Military Spending Nations: Oil Countries Post Biggest Jumps this Decade", *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 3, 2010. Cf. also Pieter D. Wezeman, *Arms Flows to the Conflict in Chad*, Solna: SIPRI, 2009 (SIPRI Background Paper), <http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/SIPRIBP0908.pdf> (retrieved on May 12, 2011).

37 International Monetary Fund, *Chad: Selected Issues*, Washington, D.C., 2007 (IMF Country Report No. 09/67), p. 7.

38 Ayangafac, *Resolving the Chadian Political Epilepsy* [same as Footnote 29].

Even more remarkable than his sabotage of the World Bank project, was the strategy with which Déby transformed Chad's state weakness and vulnerability into a political resource. He purposefully bolstered concerns in the West that the country could become destabilised. The threat of rebels toppling the president was viewed as a greater danger to the oil project than the subversive policies with which Déby cancelled out the prescriptions of the World Bank. The wider geopolitical conditions in the region proved to be a godsend for Déby, particularly the conflict in neighbouring Darfur. The president successfully stated his argument that Khartoum's Islamic regime was responsible for the instability in Chad.

The fact that Déby succeeded in transforming foreign dependency and regime vulnerability into a resource proved beneficial to him in three different ways. Firstly, the regime subsequently received direct diplomatic and military support, primarily from France and the USA. The EU provided indirect support by sending the EUFOR Chad/CAR military operation in 2008. Secondly, donors looked beyond the sabotage of the World Bank project. Thirdly, Déby was ultimately given free hand to centralise his power. Increases in corruption and political repression in Chad did not cost him the goodwill of his Western supporters. Since 2006, bilateral aid has risen dramatically, particularly from the US.³⁹ The World Bank was alone in calling for corrective measures and even sanctions, at least in the early stages of the project. But since the World Bank wanted to limit the foreseeable damage to its image, efforts to continue with the project at any price ultimately outweighed other concerns – even though it was long since clear that the project had failed.⁴⁰

³⁹ The USA's development cooperation with Chad in 2009 encompassed a total volume of USD 221 million; in 2003, this was still just USD 8 million. Cf. US Overseas Loans and Grants, <http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/> (retrieved on May 12, 2011).

⁴⁰ Shortly after the World Bank's failure in Chad, the IMF declared its readiness to assist the country. Cf. EIU, *Chad Country Report* [same as Footnote 24], pp. 16f.

DR Congo: State Building and Security Sector Reform

Over the past ten years, the international community has invested enormous political, financial and military resources to end the conflict in Congo, which began in 1998. According to conservative estimates, between 2002 and 2009, approximately USD 14 billion have flowed into the country in the form of donor assistance.⁴¹ In addition to this, there is the annual budget of the UN mission MONUC (since 2010, MONUSCO) of over one billion dollars, as well as grants from international financial institutions. While large swathes of Congo are presently at peace, violence still continues, particularly in the Northern and Eastern parts of the country. In May 2011, more than 1.7 million people were still internally displaced in these areas, demonstrating that so far the international community has failed to achieve its most important objective – establishing effective state institutions with which a viable peace arrangement can be protected. The “post-conflict” elections of 2006 did nothing to change this situation. The democratically elected government of President Joseph Kabila did not prove to be the partner with which the international community could jump-start the country’s reconstruction.

At first glance, it may seem surprising that Western donors have had little influence in the Congo. For its government is dependent on international support in every respect. The country’s fragile stability continues to be ensured by 20,000 UN peacekeepers, which compensate for the lack of effective government troops. Congo is also economically dependent on external support. Around one third of state expenditures are financed by donors. At the end of 2009, the country’s foreign debt totalled USD 13.5 billion.⁴² Nevertheless, it has proven to be a mistake to assume that Congo’s foreign dependency for security, finances and development could provide outside actors with leverage to press for much needed reforms. This was particularly apparent as regards the reform of the security sector

(SSR), i.e. the construction and reform of army, police and judiciary.

Following the 2006 elections, donors declared that the transformation of the security sector would be their foremost priority to build peace in the Congo. The Kabila government also committed itself to this objective.⁴³ Nevertheless, the results have thus far been disappointing. Observers are only split on whether SSR failed or if the reform never even took place.⁴⁴ This is astonishing since numerous donors (UN mission, Great Britain, EU, USA, China, Angola, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, South Africa, etc.) have been implementing cost-intensive projects in the security sector for many years.⁴⁵

Surely, the poor balance sheet has many causes. An effective security apparatus in line with Western prescriptions has never existed in Congo, so there is virtually no institutional basis for the reforms currently envisioned by donors. This cannot hide the fact, however, that the country’s government – as the key partner and recipient of the SSR – has demonstrated little readiness to support the project. Even today, building up the army and police continues to primarily be a donor concern. Congolese ownership of the process is limited to the extent that the government *allows* donors to work on SSR projects. So far, it has failed to throw its political or financial support behind SSR.

The same is true of the judicial sector, the third pillar of the SSR. The government slogan of “zero tolerance” for corruption and the endemic sexual violence exercised by the military (and non-state

⁴¹ Cristina Barrios, *Assessing Democracy Assistance: Democratic Republic of the Congo*, Madrid: Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, 2010, p. 3.

⁴² EIU, *DR Congo Country Report*, London, March 2010, p. 6.

⁴³ “Discours de Joseph Kabila sur l’Etat de la nation, le 8 décembre 2010”, *Radio Okapi*, December 8, 2010; “Muzito présente le Programme de stabilisation des zones sortant de conflits armés”, *Le Potentiel* (Kinshasa); “An Interview with Joseph Kabila”, *New York Times*, April 4, 2009.

⁴⁴ Hans Hoebeke, Henri Boshoff and Koen Vlassenroot, “Monsieur le Président vous n’avez pas d’armée. Evaluation de la réforme du secteur de sécurité et son impact sur les provinces du Kivus”, in: Theodore Trefon (ed.), *Réforme au Congo (RDC). Attentes et désillusions*, Paris 2010, p. 136.

⁴⁵ By itself, the SSR project implemented by the British Department for International Development (DFID) cost USD 131 million. Cf. “A Multinational Road to Army Reform”, *Africa Confidential*, July 24, 2009.

armed groups) has remained an empty phrase. In 2009, only 24 people across the entire country were charged with rape.⁴⁶ The government's draft budget for 2011 speaks volumes.⁴⁷ It shows that the judiciary is supposed to receive a budget of just USD 7 million. This corresponds to just 0.1 percent of the total budget. No more than USD 141,621 is provided for the anti-corruption department of the Ministry of Justice. Either the government has no interest in SSR or its perceptions and priorities deviate considerably from those of donors.

The fact is that Kabila refused to cooperate with Western backers and the UN mission. This was made evident by the government's resistance to donors' desire to develop a coordinated, multilateral SSR programme. Following his election, Kabila sharply rejected a possible coordination among donors as an attack on Congo's sovereignty. Instead, he only accepted bilateral SSR cooperation. This contributed to the duplication of SSR activities by donors and maximised the foreign influx of resources for the government. A lack of coordination also meant, however, that donors lacked leverage needed to influence decisions relevant to the SSR.

The government turned negotiations over SSR into donor conferences during which external partners were confronted with astronomical demands. For the 2009–2011 period alone, the government asked donors for USD 3 billion in support of army reform.⁴⁸ However, it did not provide a serious plan or a strategy on how it intended to spend this money effectively.⁴⁹ Over the years, evidence has mounted that the government systematically blocked the SSR, among other things, with the help of obscure decision-making processes within its own apparatus. For example, donors were under the illusion that the army's leadership was under the mandate to negotiate a SSR strategic plan with them. When the chief of staff of the Congolese army and the donors had finally worked out a joint SSR plan (2008), donors were shocked when the plan was unceremoniously shelved by the Minister of Defence.

What is the rationale of the Congolese government to reject SSR? First of all, the government seeks to contain the influence of international actors in Congo's internal affairs. Kabila has domestic and security policy motivations for seeking unlimited control over the security sector. Above all, the defence sector, consisting of the army and presidential guard, represents an important pillar within the patronage system on which Kabila's rule is based. The regime's security is dependent on it "purchasing" the loyalty of political elites and high-ranking army officers. Access to state resources is at the centre of this patronage. To date, for example, Congo's leaders have refused to disclose the defence budget. Sparse payments for the army's upkeep indicate that a large portion of the budget is embezzled by government elites, including military officers.⁵⁰

Such abuses are an expression of an "endemic corruption",⁵¹ which nips reform efforts in the bud since they threaten the interests of Congo's political and military elites. The illegal use of state resources is not a temporary pathology, but rather an integral element of the political system. The scale of this phenomenon is naturally difficult to determine, but just within the oil sector in 2007, around 15 percent of revenues went "missing".⁵²

Corruption, however, is just one of several explanatory factors for the government's obstructionist attitude towards SSR. In the interest of preserving his regime, Kabila has absolutely no intention to building up a powerful army. Ongoing disorder in Eastern Congo, far from the capital city, is something the government can tolerate as long as it does not result in any serious security threats. The military security of the country's leadership is based on the presidential guard loyal to Kabila, not on the existence of an effective army. The latter would in fact constitute a potential source of danger to the regime, because the spectre of coup attempts from within the leadership would be raised. From Kabila's viewpoint, it is there-

⁴⁶ EIU, DR Congo Country Report, London, June 2010, p. 17. In the first quarter of 2010, 1244 rapes were reported in Congo.

⁴⁷ Pascal Kambale, "'Tolérance Zéro' en quelques chiffres dans le budget 2011", *Le Potentiel*, December 30, 2010.

⁴⁸ ICG, *Congo: l'enlèvement du projet démocratique*, Brussels 2010, p. 16.

⁴⁹ Henri Boshoff et al., *Supporting SSR in the DRC: Between a Rock and a Hard Place*, The Hague 2010, p. 25.

⁵⁰ Caty Clément, "Security Sector Reform in the DRC: Forward to the Past", in: Hans Born and Albrecht Schnabel (eds.), *Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments*, Hamburg 2009, p. 19. At present, salaries for simple soldiers amount in theory to USD 50 per month.

⁵¹ According to a spokesperson for the UN mission quoted in: "Failing Army Reforms Threaten Congo Peace", *Reuters*, June 19, 2009.

⁵² "Payments Don't Add up in Congo's Resources Report", *Reuters*, March 22, 2010. Cf. also "Kinshasa's Missing Millions", *Africa-Asia Confidential*, February 25, 2010; ICG, *Congo: l'enlèvement du projet démocratique* [same as Footnote 48], p. 10.

fore rational to prevent the professionalisation of the army. He is thereby following the strategy that already proved effective for one of his predecessors, long-serving President Mobutu, who also weakened the army in order to prevent military coups.⁵³

The failure of SSR in Congo has far reaching consequences, one of which – paradoxically – is the strengthening of the regime. Despite a lack of success with their reforms and amid increasing frustration, donors continue their bilateral SSR projects in the country. In this manner, they provide the regime with valuable resources – money and equipment – of which at least a portion benefits the state patronage system. In effect, donors have not supported security sector reform, but rather the government's security apparatus.

Kabila's insistence on bilateral SSR projects led to a fragmentation of the donor approach, which first and foremost was comprised of training activities and supplying equipment to the military and police. Some Western donors like the USA and Belgium participate in the training and provisioning of elite units like rapid intervention battalions, which selectively strengthen the military clout of the regime.⁵⁴ This responds to the government's operative needs, but has nothing to do with structural reforms.⁵⁵ The SSR activities conducted in Congo therefore remain primarily limited to classical security cooperation. Key issues like corruption or the impunity of members of the security sector, on the other hand, recede into the background.

The attitude of the US government is exemplary of how Western partners deal with the fact that Congo's regime is obviously not interested in their reform concepts. Washington would actually be obliged to cease its security cooperation with the country, because the Congolese army also recruits child soldiers, thereby

violating American law.⁵⁶ In October 2010, however, President Obama enacted an exemption that would make it possible to continue the cooperation. Obama justified the decision by saying that a suspension of SSR cooperation would threaten the national interests of the USA.⁵⁷

The case of Congo is exemplary of a predominantly defensive and reactive strategy, which is used by an externally dependent African government in dealing with Western concepts and preferences. Unlike its external partners, who want to promote peace and perhaps collective security, the government wants to consolidate its fragile power. The fact that the interests of the two sides are divergent has significant consequences. While the donors call for structural reforms, which affect the security sector and governance issues, the government focuses on repression and patronage policies to strengthen its position. As a result, the proposed solutions do not correspond with one another. Due to the key role corruption plays within the Congolese security sector, it would endanger the government's rule if it were to follow Western reform suggestions. In this respect, its focus is on blocking and circumventing SSR without, however, risking the support of the Western community within or outside of the security sector. In November 2010, the Congolese government even benefited from an almost complete debt cancellation of USD 7 billion by the Paris Club.⁵⁸ It cannot be excluded that China's growing involvement in the Congo – and the fear that the West could simultaneously lose influence – have contributed to this decision.

Kabila's delicately balanced dealings with Western demands have proven to be very successful. The President has demonstrated a minimum level of rhetorical readiness to cooperate, which has left the partners at least partially satisfied. Even more important, Kabila has successfully speculated that donor patience with the regime is almost without limits. Donors see no alternative to ongoing support for state-building, including the security sector; they assume that a continuation of their commitment will yield better results than a reduction in involvement and aid. As a result, they have not corrected their fledgling and ineffective support for SSR.

⁵³ Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, Madison 1985, pp. 264ff; Paul Collier, *The Political Economy of Fragile States and Implications for European Development Policy*, Oxford: Department of Economics, University of Oxford, 2010, p. 6.

⁵⁴ Nicole Dalrymple, "U.S. and DRC in Partnership to Train Model Congolese Battalion", U.S. African Command, Public Affairs, February 18, 2010; "La Belgique et la RDC relancent leur coopération militaire", *La Libre Belgique*, June 16, 2009; "RDC: formation de 12 bataillons pour constituer une force de dissuasion", *Associated Press*, May 31, 2008.

⁵⁵ Boshoff et al., *Supporting SSR in the DRC* [same as Footnote 49], pp. 4, 10.

⁵⁶ Cf. U.S. Department of State, *Child Soldiers Prevention Act (2008)*, Washington, D.C., 2008.

⁵⁷ Other states that benefit from this exemption are Chad, Sudan and Yemen.

⁵⁸ EIU, *Country Report D.R. Congo*, London, March 2011, p. 22.

The Congolese government is all too aware of the dilemma that donors are facing. The regime fully understands that external actors are at least as dependent on its readiness for cooperation as is vice versa the case. Kabila's scope of action widens accordingly, which allows him to employ Western aid to defend his own domestic interests. Despite a high degree of foreign dependency, Congo's regime has succeeded in blocking all international efforts to reform its security sector and has thereby protected its patronage function. Since Kabila rejected a structural and coordinated SSR, donors resorted to bilateral security cooperation, which has increased the clout of select contingents of troops. As a result, Congo has a militarily ineffectual army, which commits serious human rights violations across the entire country. On the other hand, Kabila now has individual battalions at his command, which are strong enough to effectively combat direct security threats to his regime. In a nutshell, the politics of SSR failure can be summarized as follows: the power of the Kabilas regime was reinforced, political repression against opponents has increased, and Congo's fragile democracy is increasingly hollowed out.

Uganda: Combating Terrorism in East Africa

Since the early 1990s Western donors have praised Uganda as an African success story and its president, Yoweri Museveni, as a representative of the continent's "new" reform-minded elites.⁵⁹ From the ruins of a nearly failed state, he had built up a new political order following his assumption of power in 1986, liberalizing the economy and reforming state institutions.⁶⁰ Success was rewarded with high levels of Western development assistance. For a long time, it has comprised over 10 percent of GDP. Since the mid-1990s, donors have financed half of the state budget and 80 percent of development investments. Compared with countries across Africa, this makes Uganda one of the states with the highest degree of aid dependency.⁶¹

These transfers have made it possible for the Ugandan state to leave the financing of social services to donors. The resources that this freed up were then used to expand the administrative apparatus and to raise the defence budget. While the latter was still just USD 44 million in 1991, it had risen to approximately USD 200 million by 2004.⁶² This policy contradicted donor prescriptions for a lean and development-oriented state.

The fact that Western assistance nevertheless continued to grow can primarily be attributed to the tactics employed by the regime, which emphasized its economic successes.⁶³ Indeed, the regime received recognition and loans first and foremost thanks to its course of economic liberalism. Political reform, on the other hand, was implemented in a piecemeal and contradictory manner. This was meant to ensure donor support without threatening the regime's

patronage abilities, and thereby a source of its legitimacy.⁶⁴ Museveni correctly assumed that Western donors had already "invested too much political capital in Uganda" to still be able to punish the government.⁶⁵ The institutional self-interests of the donors in continuing to write the Ugandan "success story" also played a role in the government's calculations.

The uncritical donor attitude did not begin to fade until the turn of the millennium as concerns over corruption democratic reforms gained ground. An initial occasion for concern was the constitutional referendum of 2000 that would decide whether or not Uganda would adopt a multi-party system. The vote delivered the result Museveni had been hoping for – the governing party maintained a hold on its political monopoly. It was to a large degree due to an aggressive campaign by the government that touted the status quo and intimidated opponents.⁶⁶ The 2001 elections were overshadowed by violence and irregularities, and likewise strained donor relations.⁶⁷ For the first time, donors began publicly criticising the Ugandan government.⁶⁸ This shift was also brought on, in part, by Uganda's involvement in the Congo conflict, which Ugandan officers were using to participate in the illegal exploitation of natural resources. In 2000, the US had already halted military support that Uganda had been receiving within the framework of the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI).⁶⁹ The regime's high levels of military spending led the IMF,

⁵⁹ Marina Ottaway, *Africa's New Leaders: Democracy or State Reconstruction?*, Washington, D.C., 2000.

⁶⁰ Aili Mari Tripp, *Museveni's Uganda: Paradoxes of Power in a Hybrid Regime*, Boulder 2010, p. 2.

⁶¹ Michael Atengi-Ego, *Budget Support, Aid Dependency, and Dutch Disease: The Case of Uganda*, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005. The most important donors are the World Bank (23 percent), USA (21), EU (12) and Great Britain (9).

⁶² Andrew M. Mwenda and Roger Tangri, "Patronage Politics, Donor Reforms, and Regime Consolidation in Uganda", *African Affairs* 104, no. 416, 2005, p. 456.

⁶³ Edward A. Lynch, "Uganda and U.S. Foreign Policy", *Orbis* 50, no. 1, 2006, pp. 103–116.

⁶⁴ Mwenda and Tangri, "Patronage Politics" [same as Footnote 62], pp. 456–459.

⁶⁵ "Uganda: Democracy or Dictatorship?", *The Economist*, March 2, 2006.

⁶⁶ Michael Bratton and Gina Lambright, *Uganda's Referendum 2000: The Silent Boycott*, Michigan 2001 (Afrobarometer Paper No. 6).

⁶⁷ EIU, *Uganda Country Profile*, London 2002, p. 42.

⁶⁸ For more details, Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2000*, New York, pp. 86f; Thomas Cargill, "Still the Donors' Darling", *The World Today* 60, no. 2, 2004, pp. 26f.

⁶⁹ William Reno, *War, Debt, and the Role of Pretending in Uganda's International Relations*, Copenhagen: Centre of African Studies, 2000 (Occasional Paper), p. 11. ACRI was a training programme for African armed forces that were to be deployed on peacekeeping missions.

the US, Great Britain and the Netherlands to repeatedly either reduce or delay aid programmes.⁷⁰

Following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, Museveni saw an opportunity to improve relations with his most important donors, the US in particular. In the fight against terrorism, Uganda's government unconditionally cooperated with Washington in every respect. It embarked on numerous activities in order to accommodate the security policy interests of the US, among other things, by tightening existing security laws or passing new ones (these included the Anti-Terrorism Act as well as guidelines against money laundering). The government also provided diplomatic and military support to the United States in its fight against international terrorism. Uganda was one of the few African states – along with Rwanda, Ethiopia and Eritrea – which marched into Iraq in 2003 as part of the “Coalition of the Willing”.

Another decisive moment came when Somalia's Islamic regime was toppled by Ethiopian troops in late 2006. In the following year, Uganda became the first, and for a while, sole country that answered the US call for African states to provide soldiers for an African peace mission in Somalia (AMISOM).⁷¹ This cemented Museveni's status as a partner of the US in the War on Terror, but carried the indirect consequence of causing Uganda itself to become a target of international terrorists. Suicide bombings in July 2010 resulted in the deaths of 64 people in Uganda's capital, Kampala. The radical Islamic Shabaab militia from Somalia claimed responsibility for the attack, justifying it as an act of revenge for Uganda's military support to the Somalia's transitional government (TFG) within the context of AMISOM.⁷² Museveni reacted by deploying additional soldiers to Somalia.⁷³ In Somalia, Uganda also cooperated with the EU. Since April 2010, the EU has been training Somali recruits in Uganda

(EU mission EUTM Somalia) who are subsequently transferred to Somalia to serve in the TFG army.⁷⁴

Museveni's active participation in the fight against international terrorism is primarily based on domestic concerns. Since the late 1980s, Uganda's government has fought the rebellion of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the northern part of the country. The group was supported by Sudan, which, for its part, accused Kampala of cooperating with the Sudanese rebellion of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). This partially explains the longevity of the LRA rebellion. Observers, however, doubted for a long time that Museveni really wanted to neutralise the LRA. According to their interpretation, the LRA provided, at least until very recently, a welcome justification for high levels of spending on the Ugandan military, which represents one of the key pillars of the regime.⁷⁵

Like the LRA, the Ugandan government labels the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebel group as a terrorist organisation. The ADF has been active since 1996 in the border region between Uganda and Congo; in 1996 and 1998 it provided Uganda's government with the reason for invading Congo. Following the terrorist attacks in Kampala, Museveni speculated about possible ties between the ADF, Shabaab and Al Qaida. An advisor to the President used the opportunity not only to deflect local criticism regarding the AMISOM involvement, but also to underscore Uganda's key, long-term role in the fight against international terrorism. According to him, the Kampala attacks had not been a consequence of Uganda's participation in AMISOM, but instead that Uganda had actually been a target of terrorist activities since the 1990s. Even then, Osama bin Laden and Sudan's Islamic regime had seen Museveni as an obstacle to efforts to establish an “international caliphate in Africa”.⁷⁶ Uganda's anti-terrorism activities were therefore not something new, and not limited just to Somalia. Museveni had always been fighting at “the heart of the global war against extremism”.⁷⁷

⁷⁰ Ibid., pp. 11f.

⁷¹ In March 2007, 1,700 soldiers were sent to Somalia. In January 2008, troops from Burundi joined them. “Uganda: America's Friend”, *The Economist*, March 15, 2007; “Rough Justice”, *Africa Confidential*, March 30, 2007.

⁷² At the time of the attacks, Uganda was party to AMISOM with 2,700 soldiers.

⁷³ Apparently the Uganda's engagement in Somalia is also linked to commercial profits for the regime's tightest circle of leaders. Cf. “Somalia: New Guns on the Block”, *Africa Confidential*, December 17, 2010; “Blackwater Founder Said to Back Mercenaries”, *New York Times*, January 20, 2011.

⁷⁴ “Bildet die Bundeswehr Kindersoldaten aus?”, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, July 22, 2010; “L'Europe forme en Ouganda les troupes de Mogadiscio”, *Le Monde*, July 18, 2010.

⁷⁵ Kevin C. Dunn, “Uganda: The Lord's Resistance Army”, in: Morten Boås and Kevin C. Dunn (eds.), *African Guerillas: Raging against the Machine*, Boulder 2007, pp. 131–149.

⁷⁶ Bin Laden lived from 1991 until 1996 in Sudan.

⁷⁷ Kintu Nyago, “Al Qaeda Is Responsible for Kampala Bomb Blasts”, *The New Vision*, August 5, 2010. Cf. also Yoweri Museveni, “Somalia's Hour of Need”, *Foreign Policy*, August 25, 2010.

This was not a new line of argument. In 2001, Museveni had already begun to construct a direct connection between Uganda's internal conflicts and international terrorism. He adopted the anti-terror discourse of the Bush administration and characterised the LRA and ADF rebel groups as terrorist organisations that needed to be fought without compromise. Along with Al Qaida, the two groups were explicitly mentioned by the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) passed in 2002. It quickly became apparent, however, that these were not the sole targets of the government. The law's expansive definition of terrorism afforded the government's security forces wide-reaching powers. The regime used this to act against domestic opponents.⁷⁸ Journalists and representatives of the opposition became targets, including the two-time presidential candidate Kizza Besigye, who became the focus of legal proceedings initiated by the government in 2005 accusing him of treason and terrorist activities. As a consequence, Besigye spent most of the 2006 presidential election campaign in prison (still, Besigye received 37 percent of the votes).⁷⁹

Following the 2010 terror attacks in Kampala, the government once more tightened internal security. Major restrictions were placed on the freedom of assembly. A current draft law goes a step further and states that gatherings of three or more people need to be approved by the general inspector of police and can be prohibited for "reasonable" reasons that are not further specified.⁸⁰ In the run-up to the 2011 presidential and parliamentary elections, these plans were sharply criticised by opposition parties and civil society groups.⁸¹ Museveni blamed the persistent protests on "hooligans", "drug addicts" as well as local and foreign media (like the BBC and Al Jazeera). At the same time, he announced further restrictions on freedom of the press.⁸²

It cannot be denied that Uganda is faced with terrorist threats. But a closer look at the international dimension of the problem (Shabaab) and the local

dimension (ADF, LRA), suggests that Museveni has been developing a strategic discourse since 2001 that is primarily aimed at Western states. At its core, it focuses on presenting Uganda as an African bastion against Islamic dangers, as a dependable partner, and as an active protagonist in the fight against global terrorism. The government has meshed this external depiction with the country's domestic situation. By confronting local terrorist groups, Uganda is seeking to underscore the credibility of its anti-terrorism efforts and to establish a merging of interests between Kampala and Western states.

The perception of Uganda among Western governments and their policies towards the country demonstrate that Museveni's strategy has found the intended resonance. His strategy has contributed to restoring Uganda's international reputation, which had been damaged by corruption, authoritarianism, and the Congo conflict.⁸³ This is particularly apparent in the stance of the US government, for which fighting terrorism became the highest priority in East Africa after 2001. President George W. Bush, who met with Museveni in 2003 and 2008, praised the Ugandan president's "excellent work" in solving regional conflicts.⁸⁴ Washington's perception of Uganda as a reliable partner has precipitated wide-ranging US support. At Museveni's request, the US administration placed the ADF and LRA rebel groups on the Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL) in 2001.⁸⁵ In 2008, the Americans intensified their military support for Uganda in an effort to eliminate LRA leader Joseph Kony.⁸⁶ In 2003, military cooperation had already been re-established, and in 2009, it had a total volume of USD 4 million.

Uganda also benefits from American programmes, which strengthen the country's security apparatus. Kampala participates in the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATA), which encompasses training activities for police. Additional cooperation includes technology

⁷⁸ Human Rights Watch, *Open Secret: Illegal Detention and Torture by the Joint-Anti Terrorism Task Force in Uganda*, New York 2009, pp. 72ff.

⁷⁹ The process against him was halted in October 2010 by Uganda's constitutional court.

⁸⁰ Peter Girke and Marta Majewska, *Uganda: Presse- und Versammlungsfreiheit auf dem Prüfstand*, Kampala: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, December 7, 2010.

⁸¹ Sheila Naturinda, "Uganda: Uproar over New Law on Public Gatherings", *The Monitor*, September 22, 2010.

⁸² "Museveni's Autumn", *Financial Times*, May 22, 2011.

⁸³ "Uganda: A Pawn in the US's Proxy African War on Terror", *The Guardian*, September 25, 2010.

⁸⁴ "Remarks by Bush and Uganda President Museveni", The White House, September 23, 2008; Lynch, "Uganda and U.S. Foreign Policy" [same as Footnote 63].

⁸⁵ Members of organisations that are on this list and are therefore viewed by US authorities as terrorists, are not allowed to travel to the United States. Cf. U.S. Department of State, "Terrorist Exclusion List", <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123086.htm> (retrieved on May 12, 2011).

⁸⁶ In 2009, President Obama signed a law (Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act), that aims to end the conflict in Northern Uganda and neutralise the LRA.

transfer for border and airport security, the financing of forensic laboratories, and increased intelligence co-operation.⁸⁷ In addition, Washington bears the financial costs of Uganda's AMISOM participation, totalling USD 185 million from 2007–2010. This funding covers training, equipment costs, and logistical support for the soldiers, as well as their transportation to Somalia.⁸⁸

In terms of development, the US has also considerably increased its bilateral cooperation with Uganda over the past decade. From 2001 to 2009, development assistance quadrupled to USD 470 million.⁸⁹ The US is by far Uganda's most important donor, providing over 25 percent of the country's total external development aid. Overall, the Obama government has continued the Uganda policy of its predecessor.

Needless to say, it is impossible to establish a causal link between America's policy towards Uganda policies and Museveni's strategy of representing his country as an indispensable partner to the US in the international fight against terrorism. It is clear, however, that America's view of Uganda corresponds with the image that Kampala has been trying to project abroad.⁹⁰ The US government and the Pentagon, in particular, view the country as being the most important ally – aside from Ethiopia – in the fight against Islamic terrorism in East Africa.⁹¹ This does not mean that Uganda's shortcomings in terms of democratic processes are fully ignored. In the past years, however, they have only generated muted criticism.

In summary, Museveni certainly reacted skilfully when, starting in 2001, Western states focused their East Africa policy primarily on combating terrorism. Uganda's president used this shift in security priorities to mend the cracks in relations with his key donors, first and foremost the USA. He embraced the anti-terrorism agenda and positioned himself as an

ally of the US in Africa. The hoped for returns quickly materialised: grievances over domestic policy that had been aired by donors in the past faded into the background. In addition to the Western anti-terror policy, Museveni was also able to take up the Somalia issue in order to benefit from the conflicting objectives of his partners – fully knowing that they would grant anti-terrorism efforts precedence over democracy and good governance. The regime succeeded in this way in protecting itself from overly harsh criticism. Uganda's "outstanding work" and "great sacrifice in troops" in Somalia are now the defining elements of its "strong partnership" with the USA.⁹²

Museveni is just as aware as Washington of how dependent the United States is on his cooperation. The most important factor, however, is that he has been able to gain more latitude for domestic action as a result of this situation. By falling back on its new anti-terrorism laws, Uganda's governments has discredited and intimidated its opponents, while further tightening the country's political sphere. This first became evident in the 2006 elections and has come into sharper relief since the 2010 terror attacks in Kampala and in the run-up to the 2011 elections.⁹³ At the same time, increased development assistance has further strengthened the regime's patronage system.⁹⁴ Its capacity for repressive actions was enhanced not least by security-related support (in the form of equipment or training programmes).

In summary Museveni's Uganda is a striking example of the extraversion strategies used by power elites in Africa to generate political capital from their external dependency.⁹⁵ In the case of Uganda, this consists of a "framing strategy",⁹⁶ which involves internationalising local problems in the country's external presentation, establishing shared interests between the government and Western partners, and using these

⁸⁷ Beth Elise Whitaker, "Compliance among Weak States: Africa and the Counter-Terrorism Regime", *Review of International Studies* 36, 2010, pp. 639–662.

⁸⁸ Statement by UN Ambassador Susan E. Rice, New York, September 16, 2010.

⁸⁹ US Agency for International Development (USAID), "U.S. Economic and Military Assistance to the World", US Overseas Loans and Grants, http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/query/do?_program=/eads/gbk/countryReport&unit=R (retrieved on May 25, 2011).

⁹⁰ This corresponds to Jourde's argument about Mauritania. See his "The International Relations of Small Neoauthoritarian States" [same as Footnote 9], p. 496.

⁹¹ "Uganda: America's Friend" [same as Footnote 71].

⁹² According to Jerry Lanier, US Ambassador to Uganda, quoted in: "U.S. Hopes 2011 Elections Will Be Better than Before", *The Independent* (Kampala), February 24, 2010.

⁹³ Peter Girke and Yusuf Kiranda, *Guarding the Guardians: Managing Peace and Non-Violence during the Elections in Uganda*, Kampala: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, February 10, 2011 (Country Report).

⁹⁴ "Die Geister sagen einen Sieg voraus", *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, February 17, 2011.

⁹⁵ Cf. Richard Banégas, "Introduction au thème: Les aléas d'une stratégie d'extraversion", *Politique Africaine*, no. 75, October 1999, pp. 5–19, as well as the other pieces on Uganda in the issue.

⁹⁶ Jourde, "The International Relations of Small Neoauthoritarian States" [same as Footnote 9].

tools to mobilise external assistance. In point of fact, the handling of foreign dependency and external resources is fulfilling a clear domestic function for the Ugandan government. Accordingly, Museveni strives to expand his domestic and foreign policy scope of action in order to increase his own authority over internal rivals. External resources that result from foreign dependency are therefore employed to resolve internal conflicts in his favour.

Conclusions

Western policy towards weak and crisis-ridden states is confronted with a recurrent problem. It runs the risk of being instrumentalised by government elites. As a foreign policy strategy, extraversion is arguably a common phenomenon in dependent, structurally weak states – within as well as outside of Africa.⁹⁷ The conclusions on the domestic consequences of Uganda's anti-terror engagement should therefore hold true for Ethiopia and, to a lesser extent, Kenya.⁹⁸ The Ethiopian government, in particular, has positioned itself *vis-à-vis* the US as an essential partner in the fight against terrorism in the Horn of Africa. It uses this to legitimise its high military spending and authoritarian rule. With an annual USD 900 million, Ethiopia ranks eighth worldwide in recipients of American development aid (2009).⁹⁹

The situation is similar for the countries in the Sahel region. Among Mauritanian opposition groups, for example, the view dominates that the country's shifting military regimes have intentionally played up the risk of Islamic terrorism in order to obtain political and financial support from the West. Mauritania's military governments have positioned the country as an anti-terror bastion, and use this status to justify to Western donors the key political role the

army occupies in the country.¹⁰⁰ In fact, the military coups of 2005 and 2008 only temporarily clouded Mauritania's relations with the USA and France. The cooperation with the Mauritanian government – particularly in regards to combating terrorism – is described by the American Department of State as “dynamic”, irrespective of the poor condition of democracy and human rights in the country.¹⁰¹

The behaviour of Somalia's transitional government (TFG) also suggests extraversion.¹⁰² The TFG elites are aware that they owe external support primarily to concerns among Western states that Islamic extremists could take power in the country. This is reflected in the discourse of the TFG and its president, who just a few years ago observed that external interference had only served to exacerbate the conflict in Somalia.¹⁰³ There is little evidence, however, that the TFG has been using external aid – as Western states had hoped – to resolve the Somalia conflict. Around 90 percent of its budget goes into government salaries, which means that hardly any money is left over for public services.¹⁰⁴ Corruption is ubiquitous and political rivals denounce one another in bitter power struggles as Islamic extremists. “Labelling and disinformation are the only successful industries in

⁹⁷ Outside of Africa, this phenomenon is virulent in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Cambodia, Haiti and the Central Asian states. Cf. Andrew Robert Cock, “External Actors and the Relative Autonomy of the Ruling Elite in Post-UNTAC Cambodia”, *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 41, no. 2, 2010, pp. 241–265; Miles Kahler, “Statebuilding after Afghanistan and Iraq”, in: Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (eds.), *Dilemmas of Statebuilding*, New York 2010, pp. 287–303; Andrea Schmitz and Esther Somfalvy, *Unintended Consequences. Western Soft Power as a Source of Legitimacy for Central Asian Autocrats*, Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, February 2011 (SWP Comments 7/2011).

⁹⁸ Jan Bachmann and Jana Hönke, “‘Peace and Security’ as Counter-Terrorism? The Political Effects of Liberal Interventions in Kenya”, *African Affairs* 109, no. 434, 2009, pp. 97–114; on Ethiopia, cf. Bronwyn E. Bruton, *U.S. Policy Shift Needed in the Horn of Africa*, Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, August 6, 2009.

⁹⁹ U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, “Foreign Assistance Fast Facts: FY2009”, <http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/fast-facts.html> (retrieved on May 25, 2011).

¹⁰⁰ Jourde, “The International Relations of Small Neo-authoritarian States” [same as Footnote 9]; ICG, *Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction?*, Brussels 2005, pp. 15f; Dafna Hochman, “Civil-Military Power Struggles: The Case of Mauritania”, *Current History*, May 2009, pp. 225f; “How Real Is Mauritania's Terror Threat?”, *BBC News*, August 26, 2008.

¹⁰¹ U.S. Department of State, *Background Note Mauritania*, Washington, D.C., April 4, 2010. On human rights, cf. U.S. Department of State, *2009 Human Rights Report: Mauritania*, March 11, 2010, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/af/135965.htm> (retrieved on May 12, 2011).

¹⁰² “Somalia's President Assails U.N. Report on Corruption”, *New York Times*, March 16, 2010.

¹⁰³ Zachary Devlin-Foltz and Binnur Ozkececi-Taner, “State Collapse and Islamist Extremism: Re-Evaluating the Link”, *Contemporary Security Policy* 31, no. 1, 2010, p. 97.

¹⁰⁴ ICG, *Somalia: The Transitional Government on Life Support*, Brussels 2011, p. 3.

Somalia".¹⁰⁵ Local elites use these tools in a targeted fashion to secure the support of Western states.

At the same time, it is not only governments, but also their domestic rivals, which seek to secure external actors and resources to serve their own interests.¹⁰⁶ This was evident, for example, in the efforts of the Darfur rebels to bring about an international military intervention in the region by pointing to the "genocide" organised by Sudan's government.¹⁰⁷ In the Ivory Coast, opposition candidate Alassane Ouattara called for a military intervention following the 2011 elections, because he hoped it would help him prevail in the power struggle with President Laurent Gbagbo.

This is not the place to assess whether such demands were "right" or "wrong", legitimate or illegitimate. The key point to recognise is that local actors try to mobilise external support to gain the upper hand in domestic conflicts. The following factors benefit the strategy of power elites in Africa when dealing with Western "partners":

- ▶ Interdependencies exist between Western states and African elites. The latter may be externally dependent, but external actors depend on local cooperation in pursuing their objectives. This puts into perspective the asymmetry of relations to the benefit of the local elites.
- ▶ From a Western viewpoint, security challenges generate greater pressure for action than other problems such as poverty. This contributes to decision makers paying less attention to the unforeseen consequences of their actions or even accepting them.
- ▶ Unintended consequences can be expected if the interests of external actors are only partially shared – or not at all – by African elites. This explains, in particular, why reforms called for by foreign powers have mixed results or fail entirely in the face of resistance from local elites. African governments seldom articulate the opposition that causes these results. Instead, they voice reformist rhetoric in order to suggest a readiness for cooperation and thereby ensure external support.

¹⁰⁵ Roland Marchal, "Warlordism and Terrorism: How to Obscure an Already Confusing Crisis? The Case of Somalia", *International Affairs* 83, no. 7, 2007, p. 1104.

¹⁰⁶ Clifford Bob, *The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism*, Cambridge 2005.

¹⁰⁷ Alan J. Kuperman, "The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans", *International Studies Quarterly* 52, no. 1, 2008, pp. 49–80.

- ▶ Western donors are often insufficiently aware of the opposing interests or only recognise them in hindsight.¹⁰⁸ This is not the case for the governments of the recipient countries: not only are they far more familiar with the local context than their Western partners, they are also extremely well informed about the objectives and preferences of these outsiders.
- ▶ This comparative advantage in term of knowledge is regularly shown in three different areas. Firstly, African elites are aware of the often conflicting objectives their partners have (e.g. democracy vs. fighting terrorism in Uganda, stability vs. reforms in Chad and Congo). They anticipate that, when in doubt, Western states will afford security concerns a higher priority *vis-à-vis* other preferences. Secondly, African elites are aware that their partners are under pressure to be successful, whether this is the World Bank (as in the case of Chad), a bilateral donor like the US (Uganda) or a UN mission (Congo). Past experience has shown that uncooperative behaviour by African government rarely produced abrupt policy shifts by their external partners or even sanctions such as reduced aid. Thirdly, African elites are aware of the pragmatism of Western donors, who anticipate to some degree that setbacks and unsatisfying compromises are inevitable.
- ▶ The growing influence of non-Western actors (especially China) has limited the influence of Western actors in Chad as well as Congo. This factor will gain increasing importance in the future. It can be expected to exacerbate the problem of a lack of international coherency, a challenge that shows no signs of diminishing in relevance even within the Western donor community. The bargaining power of African elites will increase accordingly.

Western states are often all too ready to view government elites in African countries as "partners" despite the fact that the interests of the two sides rarely match. Western actors should soberly question the domestic goals and operating logics of local elites. This requires a sufficient local presence, i.e. by providing embassies with adequate levels of diplomatic, developmental and security policy staff. Moreover Western states need to review their policies in respect to their unintended consequences. It generally holds that the greater the pressure on Western actors to take action, the greater the danger of external resources (of an eco-

¹⁰⁸ On this topic, see the literature listed in Footnote 4.

nomic, political or military nature) being used by local elites to resolve power struggles. The more critical the situation and the more urgent the need for action, the greater will be the need for conflict sensibility on the part of Western actors.¹⁰⁹

In some cases, Western support should be halted entirely. This is the case when clear-headed analysis leads to the conclusion that the impact of potential interference can be expected to be limited or even negative. Admittedly, this does nothing to reduce the existing pressure to take action. EU security policy in Africa offers pertinent examples in this regard. It is determined in many cases by a simple pressure to “do something”, or by particular interests within the EU (e.g. from former colonial powers) – this policy does not, however, automatically result in a problem-oriented approach. Examples included the dubious and largely ineffectual EU operation EU FOR Chad/CAR and the failed SSR mission in Guinea-Bissau (2008–2010), which was prematurely terminated.¹¹⁰ The same applies to the debate that was led within the EU at the end of 2008 about a potential military operation in Congo. The fact that such an operation ultimately was not initiated had a positive impact on the conflict. His failed attempt to enlist EU military support forced President Kabila to conduct negotiations with the rebels and seek a rapprochement with Rwanda.¹¹¹

It is now largely recognised that poor governance – characterised by human rights abuses, a lack of the rule of law, authoritarian and pseudo-democratic rule – represents a key cause of political crises and conflicts.¹¹² This is true of perpetual crisis states (e.g. Chad) as well as for post-conflict states (e.g. Congo). For this reason, the World Bank, for example, has pushed for reforms in Chad. The reconstruction of state structures in post-conflict societies is also connected with reform components. Security sector reforms therefore focus on the strengthening and the reform of security forces. The failure of such efforts in Congo and Chad indicates that the options open to

external actors are limited in terms of implementing steps against the will of the partner governments. It is, however, debatable whether Western states and donors have drawn the appropriate conclusions from this. External support has thus far not contributed to reform-mindedness of governments in either case, nor will it do so in the future. Even so, in 2010, Congo received an almost complete cancellation of its debt despite its government’s resistance to reforms.

These are evidently the wrong signals to send. Western policies that call for reforms and wish to avoid unintended consequences should apply conditionality.¹¹³ Within development cooperation, this tool has gone out of fashion because of past concerns over its effectiveness.¹¹⁴ Limited effectiveness, however, has primarily been the consequence of the inconsistent application of conditionality. In numerous cases, governments did not see a drop in aid when they circumvented donor conditions.¹¹⁵

Western government policies also make scant use of conditionality when dealing with crisis-ridden states. The donor slogan has been to “stay engaged”, which emphasises the chances of successful and long-term support, as well as the potential risks of limited or limiting external assistance.¹¹⁶ With a view to post-conflict states, this may seem plausible as hard-won progress should not be put at risk. If, however, Western support in the security sector shows no results over the long term or even carries counter-productive consequences, as in the case of Congo, the policy of “keep it up” needs to be re-evaluated.

It is a dubious assumption that every form of financial, developmental or security-related cooperation with states such as Chad is *per se* having a conflict preventative impact. Comparably high levels of development assistance have not spared Liberia, Sierra Leone

109 Mary B. Anderson, *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War*, Boulder 1999.

110 Council of the European Union, “The EU SSR Guinea-Bissau Mission Completes Its Mandate”, Brussels, August 2, 2010; “EU Pull-Out Hits Guinea-Bissau Reforms”, *BBC News*, August 4, 2010.

111 Denis M. Tull, *Kongo-Krise: Warum eine Militäroperation keine Lösung ist*, Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, December 2008 (SWP Comments 85/2008).

112 Louise Anten, *Strengthening Governance in Post-Conflict Fragile States*, The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael”, June 9, 2010 (Issue Paper).

113 Andrea Schmitz, *Conditionality in Development Aid Policy*, Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, May 2006 (SWP Research Paper 7/2006).

114 Jonathan Goodhand, *Conditioning Peace? The Scope and Limitations of Peace Conditionalities in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. Synthesis Study*, The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael”, 2006, pp. 3f.

115 Van de Walle, *Overcoming Stagnation in Aid-Dependent Countries* [same as Footnote 5], p. 39.

116 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States*, Paris 2007; OECD, *Ensuring Fragile States Are Not Left Behind, Summary Report*, Paris 2010.

or Rwanda from violent conflict.¹¹⁷ Why should the governments of fragile states implement reforms when they know that they can continue to expect assistance from Western donors even without political changes? These donors effectively reward poor governance if they guarantee their unconditional support. Experience drawn from the past 50 years has shown that a high level of external aid does not compel reform-shy governments to introduce political changes. Precise, results-based conditionalities are no silver bullet – especially not if Western donor states and international financial institutions fail to effectively coordinate their efforts. They do, however, create greater incentives for reforms than untied aid, which only helps to exacerbate poor governance, fragile statehood, and political conflict. If African elites choose not to implement reforms despite Western support, then outside support should be reduced or halted entirely.

If, however, crises and conflicts in Africa's weak states are a result of poor governance, then supposedly conflicting objectives also lose importance. Authoritarian regimes, which reject structural change, are not partners with whom crisis prevention (as intended in Chad) or stabilisation (as hoped for in Congo) can be achieved. Chad's regime under President Déby is not a guarantor, but rather a barrier to national as well as regional stability. In Congo, everything points to President Kabila's lack of political will to adopt reforms. Even five years after the democratic elections in 2006, the UN mission remains the sole bulwark against "absolute chaos" in the country.¹¹⁸ Strategic, regional and security-related interests may prompt Western states to closely cooperate with these governments at times. Such considerations, however, do not necessarily lead over the medium or long-term to conflicting objectives. These are primarily created by the governments of the recipient countries as especially the case of Chad suggests.

Dealing with the potential unintended consequences of the international war on terror is more difficult. From the viewpoint of Western states, this generates particularly high pressure for action and can indeed entail conflicting objectives (due to com-

peting concerns like democracy, good governance and civil rights). This is especially true of policies towards Uganda, Ethiopia and Somalia. The question to be asked is the extent to which the postulated conflicting objectives really exist. There has been little evidence so far, for example, that the stabilisation policies in Somalia, operating under the imperative of combating terrorism, will be successful.¹¹⁹ By extension, one must question the Western stance towards Ethiopia and Uganda, which directly derives from the Somalia problem. The West's unconditional support for these governments has contributed to aiding the authoritarian tendencies in both countries. With a look to Uganda, this study has suggested that Museveni's government has primarily seized on the USA's anti-terrorism agenda as an opportunity for improving its own international reputation. Western governments should pay greater attention to the logic of such strategies than has been the case in the past, in particular as concerns their implications for domestic politics and internal power struggles in weak states.

117 Van de Walle, *Overcoming Stagnation in Aid-Dependent Countries* [same as Footnote 5], pp. 86f; cf. also Peter Uvin, *Life after Violence: A People's Story of Burundi*, London 2009, p. 180.

118 According to Assistant Secretary of African Affairs of the US Department of State, Johnnie Carson: *Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Africa and Global Health*, Washington, D.C., May 25, 2010.

119 Markus V. Höhne, *Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: How External Interference Helped to Produce Militant Islamism*, Halle/Saale: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, 2010; ICG, *Somalia: The Transitional Government on Life Support*, Brussels 2011.

Abbreviations

ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative
ADF	Allied Democratic Forces (Uganda)
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ATA	Anti-Terrorism Act (Uganda)
ATA	Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (USA)
CAR	Central African Republic
DFID	Department for International Development (Great Britain)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EIB	European Investment Bank
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit
EUFOR	European Union Force
EUTM	European Union Training Mission
ICG	International Crisis Group
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army (Uganda)
MONUC	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo
MONUSCO	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
RDC	République démocratique du Congo
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TEL	Terrorist Exclusion List
TFG	Transitional Federal Government (Somalia)
UN	United Nations
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
USAID	United States Agency for International Development