Eichengreen, Barry; Ritschl, Albrecht

Working Paper
Understanding West German economic growth in the 1950s

SFB 649 discussion paper, No. 2008,068

Provided in Cooperation with:
Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk, Humboldt University Berlin

Suggested Citation: Eichengreen, Barry; Ritschl, Albrecht (2008) : Understanding West German economic growth in the 1950s, SFB 649 discussion paper, No. 2008,068, SFB 649, Economic Risk, Berlin

This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25311

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Terms of use:
Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.
Understanding West German Economic Growth in the 1950s

Barry Eichengreen*
Albrecht Ritschl**

*University of California, Berkeley, USA
**London School of Economics, UK

This research was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through the SFB 649 "Economic Risk".

http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de
ISSN 1860-5664

SFB 649, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Spandauer Straße 1, D-10178 Berlin
Understanding West German Economic Growth in the 1950s

Barry Eichengreen
Department of Economics
University of California, Berkeley

Albrecht Ritschl
Department of Economic History
London School of Economics

Revised final version, 18 November 2008

Abstract
We evaluate explanations for why Germany grew so quickly in the 1950s. The recent literature has emphasized convergence, structural change and institutional shake-up while minimizing the importance of the postwar shock. We show that this shock and its consequences were more important than neoclassical convergence and structural change in explaining the rapid growth of the West German economy in the 1950s. We find little support for the hypothesis of institutional shakeup. This suggests a different interpretation of post-World War II German economic growth than features in much of the literature.

JEL classification codes: N14, N44, O52
Keywords: economic growth, productivity, Germany

1 A draft of this paper was written while the first author was visiting the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford, whose hospitality is acknowledged with thanks. The second author acknowledges financial support from DGICYT, Project PB94-1001, and from Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft under SFB 649. We thank Sudarat Ananchotikul and Ye Wang for help with data and Ian McLean and Peter Temin for helpful comments.
Understanding West German Economic Growth in the 1950s

1. Introduction

There is no shortage of attempts to explain West Germany’s economic growth in the 1950s. With good reason: between 1950 and 1959, GDP rose by nearly 8 percent per annum, faster than anywhere else in Europe and in stark contrast to experience following World War I. Among European countries, only Austria, which shared many circumstances with Germany, came close to matching this performance. Germany’s rapid growth doubled living standards in a decade. By the early 1960s it had restored Germany’s status as the largest and potentially most influential economic and financial power in Europe.

Explanations for this experience are of three types. A first school of thought sees West Germany’s fast postwar growth in the context of productivity catching up and convergence. The West German economy grew rapidly after World War II, in this view, because it finally shed the shackles holding back structural change and productivity growth.\(^2\) As Table 1 indicates, German GDP per man hour was never as much as 75 percent of British GDP per man hour at any point before 1950 but converged to British levels in the 1960s.\(^3\) Lower output per worker in the first half of the 20th century reflected a lower economy-wide capital-labor ratio, which in turn reflected the disruptions of World War I, the inflationary 1920s and the slump of the early 1930s. In addition, Germany’s slow exit from peasant agriculture kept her economy away from the efficient frontier, even if in some sectors of manufacturing, Germany sur-

\(^2\) See for example Abramovitz (1986) and Baumol, Blackman and Wolff (1989).

\(^3\) Britain had been the technological and productivity leader in Europe throughout the 19th century and into the 20th and remains a useful point of comparison after World War II, as we shall see.
passed British productivity already before World War I.\(^4\) But there was no intrinsic reason why these differentials should persist. Germany could raise labor productivity by raising its capital-labor ratio. Inefficient labor could move from agriculture to industry, where its marginal product was higher, and economy-wide labor productivity could be raised to levels like those prevailing in Britain. West Germany’s economic growth could outpace Britain’s for the duration of this convergence process.\(^5\) Temple (2001) and Temin (2002) advance this interpretation for postwar Western Europe generally. Temin finds that the larger a country’s share of employment in agriculture – his proxy for delayed structural change – the faster its growth. West Germany is simply a case in point.

A second, related school of thought emphasizes institutional reasons for Germany’s growth spurt after World War II. It posits sharp changes in socioeconomic institutions following World War II in directions conducive to faster growth and to the absence of comparable changes in slower growing countries like Britain. Sweeping pro-market reforms under U.S. aegis, the argument goes, abolished cartels, reduced state intervention and planning, and put the West German economy on a path toward European and world market integration. The framework for this analysis is Mancur Olson’s (1982) model of the capture of policy by distributional coalitions.\(^6\) It argues that long-standing distributional coalitions were dissolved by the war and occupation, freeing Germany to enjoy a sustained acceleration in total factor productivity (TFP)

\(^4\) This point has been made by authors from Kindleberger (1967) to Broadberry (1997) to Temin (2002). Broadberry (2006) also presents evidence of lagging productivity in Germany’s service sector, which points in the same direction.

\(^5\) These were the predictions of the first generation of neoclassical growth theorists (see e.g. Solow 1957), whose work, not coincidentally, appeared at just this time.

\(^6\) This framework has been influentially applied to Germany by Giersch et al. (1992). Olson himself applied his theory to post-World War II Europe in Olson (1996). Critical views are provided by Paqué (1994, 1996) and Carlin (1996).
growth, both absolutely and relative to countries like Britain that did not experience such rapid institutional change.

Members of a third school, in contrast, focus on the negative output shock in the final phases of the war and immediately following it. GDP in the three zones of Allied occupation that became the Federal Republic was only 64 percent of 1938 levels in 1948. In the UK, in contrast, output was already 13 percent higher in 1948 than in the last pre-World War II year. Germany could grow quickly, it follows, because it had been pushed off its long-term growth path, but only temporarily. Janossy (1969), Abelshauser (1981), and Dumke (1990) argue this point for Europe generally – that the larger the drop in output that a country suffered between 1938 and 1950, the faster it grew subsequently. Manz (1968), Abelshauser (1975) and Borchardt (1976) make the argument specifically for Germany.

That these three views all have solid pedigrees suggests that there is probably at least a grain of truth in each. The resurgence of neoclassical growth theory has provided new impetus to the catching-up hypothesis. Temin (2002) has provided a powerful restatement of the delayed-structural-change view. Recent work on the economics of institutions has made it almost obligatory to emphasize socioeconomic arrangements as determinants of economic growth. In contrast, arguments emphasizing the postwar shock have fallen by the wayside.

In this paper we argue that this tendency to de-emphasize the postwar shock as a determinant of German economic performance in the 1950s has gone too far. Recent analyses have understated how dramatically Germany was pushed off of its growth path in 1944-46 and the scope this shock opened for TFP growth. Our analysis sug-

---

7 We describe the derivation of these estimates later in the paper.
8 For the former see Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005), and for the latter see Hall and Soskice (2001).
gests that this shock to TFP, together with its subsequent recovery, was vastly more important than neoclassical convergence and structural change in explaining differences between German and British growth in the 1950s.  

If a key explanation for the acceleration in German economic growth in the 1950s was the country’s ability to recover from the sharp negative shock at the end of World War II, the question then is why Germany was so successful in recovering – in contrast to experience after World War I. One possibility is changes in the institutional constellation as suggested by Olson. But we show that the discontinuities in Germany’s regulatory framework across World War II have been overstated. By today’s standards, West Germany in the 1950s was still a tightly regulated economy with an impressive degree of institutional continuity. West Germany’s pro-market reforms of 1948 were not a radical departure from the past. Nor do we detect an institutional shakeup that destroyed existing distributional coalitions. Collective bargaining and workplace co-determination, the principal mechanisms through which distributional coalitions had asserted themselves in the Weimar Republic, were quickly reinstated. A series of acts passed starting in the early 1950s cemented Germany’s system of industrial corporatism, drawing heavily on legislation from the Third Reich. In this reshaped form, the regulatory framework of the 1930s survived unscathed through the third quarter of the 20th century and beyond. Contrary to the Olson story, it was this very stability of institutional arrangements that facilitated the rapid postwar recovery and growth of the German economy.

How can we reach such different conclusions from previous investigators? For four reasons:

---

9 This, of course, being the very period for which others argue that convergence and structural change were most important.
• Based on Maddison’s (1991, 1995) estimates German wartime GDP, we generate new data on the sources of economic growth during World War II. We consider performance during the war rather than simply comparing the last prewar and first postwar years and treating the war economy as a black box. This enables us to more precisely identify the magnitude of the postwar shock.
• We compare these data with the predictions of neoclassical growth theory, pinpointing the observable implications of alternative hypotheses.
• We place the performance of the economies with which we are concerned in longer-term perspective. We do not imagine that history starts in 1950 or 1938 but go back further in time as a way of helping to identify the economy’s growth potential.
• Finally, we make detailed use of the Anglo-German comparison. This allows us to explore the roles of institutions and policies, using the experience of Europe’s historical productivity leader (and post-World War II growth laggard) as a benchmark.10

2. Comparative evidence on labor productivity and growth accounts

The Anglo-German differential persisted through the first half of the 20th century. Table 1 shows that German output per capita and the country’s capital/labor ratio remained far behind those of Britain at the end of the 1940s. Germany could grow faster, it follows, because she inherited a lower capital/labor ratio, implying lower output per worker. In this view, fast growth in the 1950s reflected convergence to the

10 International comparisons like those of Abramovitz (1986), Baumol, Blackman and Wolff (1989), and Broadberry (1997) emphasize that Britain had been Europe’s technological leader in the 19th century, with its highest output per capita and the highest capital/labor ratio.
productivity frontier, a process during which investment and growth were higher than normal until steady-state levels of output-per-worker and capital-per-worker were achieved.

The rate of growth of West Germany’s capital stock was indeed higher than in Britain: 6 versus 4 percent per annum (see Table 2). This is consistent with the idea that convergence helps to explain why Germany was now the faster-growing economy. But this differential capital-stock growth was too small to explain differences in the two countries’ growth performance.

Table 2 reports two measures of the contribution of capital stock growth to total GNP growth and uses them to derive estimates of the growth of TFP. The first, TFP 1, is calculated from a Cobb-Douglas production function under standard assumptions: the elasticity of output with respect to capital is set to one third, capital’s share in national income.\textsuperscript{11} Under neoclassical convergence, the gap between actual and steady state output is explained by the gap between actual and steady-state capital/labor ratios. Along the convergence path the growth rate of labor productivity \((Y/L)\) equals the growth rate of the capital/labor ratio \((K/L)\) times the contribution of capital to output.\textsuperscript{12} Under these assumptions, \(K/L\) should return to its steady state three times as fast as \(Y/L\). This, clearly, was not the case in 1950s Germany: capital grew more slowly than output, not three times faster. Evidently, other factors resulting

\textsuperscript{11} In the neoclassical model with perfect competition and no externalities, the elasticity of output with respect to capital and capital’s share in national income can be shown to be equal.

\textsuperscript{12} Assuming that TFP growth is unchanged (see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995). We return momentarily to the assumption of an unchanged TFP growth rate.
in further increases in the rate of TFP growth must have also contributed to the 
\textit{Wirtschaftswunder}.  \footnote{Under present assumptions, as much as three quarters of output growth remains to be explained.}

We construct an alternative measure, TFP 2, by doubling the elasticity of output with respect to capital from to 0.66 (as in Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992). This can be thought of as capturing the external effects of capital-stock growth suggested by new growth theories. Although this second variant assigns a larger role to investment, it is still the case that K/L should be growing faster than Y/L, which is counterfactual. More than half the economy’s growth in the 1950s remains to be explained.

The conclusion is reinforced by the comparison of Germany and Britain. The difference in aggregate growth rates between the two countries is larger than the difference in their capital stock growth rates. Even extreme versions of new growth theory, such as Romer (1987), which assume strong positive externalities from capital accumulation, do not posit an elasticity of output with respect to capital of greater than one. As a matter of arithmetic, then, differences in the rate of capital accumulation between Germany and Britain can only explain part of observed differences in their growth performance.

So why, then, did TFP grew so fast in postwar Germany and so much faster than in Britain? One possibility is that TFP levels had received a sharp negative shock from which it bounced back subsequently. This relatively straightforward explanation for Germany’s rapid growth has not received much attention in this literature. To explain why, we show that previous investigators have tended to underestimate the magnitude of this shock by comparing 1938 with 1948. In 1938 the German economy was still significantly below its steady-state growth path as a result of sharp negative
shocks during World War I, the turbulent post-WWI period, and the slump of the early 1930s. The economy then expanded strongly through 1944, bringing it closer to its historical steady-state growth path.

This may seem surprising given wartime Allied efforts to destroy the productive capacity of the German economy. Yet, as Table 3 shows, the capital stock in Germany in fact manufacturing grew substantially during the war. The available estimates put West German industrial capacity around mid-1944 at more than one third above 1936 levels.\footnote{While the capital stock grew strongly, labor input in the German war economy actually fell. Table 4 provides rough estimates for the civilian population in 1944, including forced laborers. The German war economy relied massively on slave labor: the available estimates rise to 8.5 million for mid-1944, of whom about 3.8 million may have been in West Germany. At the same time, the cumulative figure for military recruiting stood at 18 million, of which 8.4 million were from West Germany. As female labor force participation was discouraged, (voluntary) female employment declined by about 10 percent during the war.} In 1948, surviving industrial capacity was 13 percent higher than in 1936.\footnote{In East Germany, the decline from the 1944 peak was stronger due to intense dismantling by the Soviets. However, even here the total decline just undid the wartime additions to the capital stock.} Data for aggregate capital stock in 1950 suggest a slight decline below prewar levels, caused mainly by the destruction of urban housing. The data look even better for equipment and suggest that, at the beginning of the Wirtschaftswunder, productive capacity in West Germany was as high as before the war. In comparison to Britain’s capital stock, Germany’s position around 1950 looked worse, but not dramatically so. Certainly, differences in capital stock growth and surviving capital endowment cannot account for the dramatically different growth performance in the 1950s.

And if the war did surprisingly little to reduce the capital stock, it actually increased West Germany’s population and labor force. Returning soldiers and refugees from the provinces lost to Poland and Russia, as well as from Eastern Europe, swelled...
the population by almost 20 percent over the 1939 census. At the same time, more
than eight million surviving slave laborers were repatriated or emigrated. Overall,
West Germany’s population increased by 9 percent from 1946 to 1950.

In Britain, unlike Germany, the capital stock increased only little during the
war. The available estimates put the cumulative increase between 1936 and 1944 at 5
percent (Table 3). But wartime damage was even more limited. Thus, in 1946, Brit-
ain’s aggregate capital stock was probably 7 percent higher than a decade earlier. On
balance, this is very similar to West Germany (Table 3), aggregate data for which
show a net increase from 1936 to 1950 by 7 percent as well. In the immediate postwar
years, the civilian labor force rose considerably as soldiers were demobilized. Com-
parative evidence thus shows that the net changes in factor endowments in the two
countries were not very different.

Yet the behavior of output was very different. Britain suffered a substantial
postwar recession, with the fall in output per worker averaging 7 percent per annum in
the first two postwar years. But if Britain’s postwar shock was severe, Germany’s was
a catastrophe. Table 5 shows output, capital, and labor on constant postwar territory.
From 1944 to 1946, output in what became West Germany fell at an annualized rate
of 38 percent. Most if not all of this decline occurred between mid-1944 and mid-
1945, implying that output fell by two thirds in that year.

The decline was more pronounced still in per capita terms. Table 4 suggests a
rise in West German population by 20 percent between 1944 and 1946.16 Dividing the

16 In Table 5 we have attempted to exclude former slave laborers waiting to be repatriated
from the population data for 1946. A population census in 1946 attempted to do just that
but has been criticized for lacking reliability. However, most of these problems concern
the Soviet occupation zone, whose data do not enter in Table 5. For a discussion, see
decline of output by the population increase, we arrive at an annualized rate of decline of per capita output of almost 50 percent between 1944 and 1946.

The fall in the capital/labor ratio of nearly 20 percent a year, or a cumulative 31 percent, was again an order of magnitude higher than the decline in Britain’s capital/labor ratio. But comparing this with the decline in German per capita output of 47 percent per year—in other words, 7 times the British rate—it is clear that most of the loss in German output came from reduced efficiency in production rather than from a lower capital/labor ratio. On an annualized basis, West German TFP declined by almost 40 percent, which is two times as much as the decline in the capital/labor ratio.

On a smaller scale, the same conclusion holds for Britain. Between 1944 and 1946, TFP fell by 5-6 percent per year, which is again more than two times the fall of the capital/labor ratio in the same period. Cumulatively, the data in Table 5 suggest a decline in German TFP of 69 percent between 1944 and 1946, as opposed to a cumulative decline in British TFP of 12 percent.

The sources of this contrast are not hard to find. Beginning in mid-1944, Allied bombing changed its tactics to maximize damage to bottleneck sectors of the German economy (see Birkenfeld, 1964, Budraß, 1998). Bombing now targeted electric power, synthetic fuels generation, and the railroad network. Rather than destroying productive capacity, it simply disrupted the supply chain – most prominently supplies of coal, which were now much harder to get from the pithead to the power station and factory. Resulting shortages of raw materials and the consequent energy crisis persisted into 1947, limiting postwar production. This was especially true of

---

17 Even faster than in the slump of the early 1930s.
18 In 1946-7 coal was shipped across the Atlantic to make up for the supplies that were not forthcoming from the Ruhr, but these shipments made up only part of the shortfall.
West Germany, where coal production in 1947 was still only 52 percent of 1938 levels. In Britain, coal output in the same year reached 87 percent (see Table 3).

Both economies then rebounded from these shocks. In the immediate postwar years, British output growth outstripped the growth of capital and labor inputs, allowing TFP to rise by almost 2 percent a year. As Table 5 shows, the years 1948-1950 saw even more rapid recovery of German output. Reflecting inflows of refugees and returning prisoners of war, the labor force grew as well, together with the capital stock after 1948. But output grew faster, and very considerably so. As a result, between 1946 and 1950 TFP growth surged ahead at 15 to 20 percent per annum. These are big numbers compared to those associated with the capital deepening and structural change described above. The main factor explaining Germany’s rapid growth in 1948-50, in other words, was the negative shock to TFP in 1944-46 and the scope that now existed for reversing it.

The bottom panel of Table 5 suggests that there was still considerable scope for this process to continue after 1950. While British labor productivity and TFP had recovered to within 5 percent of 1944 levels by 1950, West German output per capita and TFP were still 30 to 40 percent below their 1941 levels.

We can gain further perspective on how much scope existed for rapid growth by reversing the immediate postwar shock and returning the German economy to its long-term growth path by looking more closely at that long-term growth path itself. Had the forces driving growth in Germany and Britain before World War I prevailed throughout the 20th century, the trend growth of output could simply be extrapolated from their respective paths prior to 1914. Figure 1 shows gross domestic product per capita for Britain and Germany/West Germany, along with their extrapolated trend
lines from 1900–1913. As can be seen, German GDP per capita hovered below historical trend throughout the interwar years and came close only during the war boom of the early 1940s. Following the catastrophic decline in German GDP at the end of the war, output per capita returned to the path established in the early 20th century. Like the preceding analysis, this suggests that the 1950s was essentially a period of recovery from a highly irregular starting point.

Not all of the productivity gains during World War II were sustainable. While the increase in German labor productivity between 1941 and 1944 was a cumulative 13 percent, much of this reflected the involuntary extension of hours and the exploitation of slave labor. Britain’s productivity record provides a counterfactual: while British productivity also increased between 1941 and 1943, it fell in 1944 despite intense efforts to keep going at the previous speed. The implication is that the productivity gain in the German war economy between 1941 and 1944 was not sustainable in peacetime. Consequently, the productivity gap between the 1941 level and the extrapolated trend in Figure 1 indicates potential for catching up that cannot be explained by the adverse TFP shock at the end of the war. That said, Figure 1 shows clearly that growth performance in the 1950s was driven not by the remaining distance from the historical steady state in 1941 but rather by the sharp dislocation from that position around 1945—in other words, not by neoclassical convergence but by recovery from the wartime shock to TFP.

---

19 Note that these expansion paths are plotted on a semi-logarithmic scale. We chose 1900–1913 as the base period instead of starting even earlier because of the limitations of the German data, whose quality is inferior before 1900, but also because the turn of the century marked a shift in away from extensive growth (accompanied by falling fertility and emigration rates) and therefore a significant structural break. A related exercise with data extending back to 1870 was first made by Borchardt (1977 [1991]).
The converse is true of Britain. Britain’s 1900–1913 trend is flatter than Germany’s, and from the mid-1930s the extrapolated German trend line is always above the British line.\(^20\) To be sure, previous authors have argued for a break in the British data around the time of the post-World War I depression (see Crafts and Mills 1996). After 1921, the British economy seems to have grown around a new trend path which is steeper than the historical one. This new trend is almost identical to the extrapolated German trend line of 1900–1913. But, importantly, Britain’s growth trajectory seems only mildly affected by World War II—unlike Germany’s. Germany’s exceptional position in the 1950s and the subsequent return to trend are reflected in Table 2 as well. Already in the 1960s, Germany TFP growth (measured as TFP 1) was back at the low British levels of two percent per year and less.\(^21\) In contrast, British TFP growth did not change much from the 1950s to the 1960s, again suggesting that Britain was already close to its steady state.

Thus, the acceleration in TFP growth that sets Germany apart in the 1950s should be understood as a reversal of the temporary collapse of TFP in the wake of World War II. Recovery from this collapse largely accounts for the subsequent acceleration in the 1950s. Capital accumulation and the associated process of neoclassical convergence can explain only a small fraction of the observed fluctuations even under the most favorable assumptions.

\(^{20}\) To establish the robustness of these results, we experimented with data from Maddison (1995) and Hoffmann and Müller (1959), extending the trend back to 1870. Although these backward extensions do affect the position of the German trend line, there is consistent evidence of German per-capita output growth having been about 40–50% higher than that of Britain in the last third of the 19th century. We also experimented with extending the British trend backwards and found it to be highly stable.

\(^{21}\) Note that our estimate of German TFP growth, derived from the standard data set of Maddison (1991), is below companion estimates for the 1960s, probably because we use hours, not persons, and standardized, not raw capital stock data here. Inspection of the data reveals that Germany experienced another investment boom during that decade. But unlike in the 1950s, this investment boom failed to produce similarly high growth.
3. Structural Change

One possible explanation for the TFP surge in Germany in the 1950s is structural change. Throughout the 1950s, labor moved out of unproductive sectors like peasant farming. The conventional growth accounting measures discussed in the previous section would then underestimate the growth of labor in the productive sectors, and accordingly overstate TFP growth. As emphasized by Temin, and as Table 1 bears out, the inherited imbalance between agricultural labor and agricultural output shares was larger in Germany than in Britain. Britain had seen the agricultural share of employment fall to low levels as a result of its early the abolition of agricultural protection, while Germany had maintained a tradition of agricultural protectionism since Bismarck’s tariff of 1879. 20th century Germany thus inherited a large agricultural sector dominated by small, unproductive family farms in the west and south and overstaffed, inefficient Junker estates in the east, which together still employed a quarter of the labor force in 1939. Agriculture then absorbed much of the influx of refugees into West Germany after 1945, such that the sector accounted for over 20 percent of total employment in the census year 1950.

By how much could structural change involving the reallocation of labor from agriculture to industry have raised growth? Answering this question requires extending the neoclassical model, inevitably making it more complex. But since we wish to argue that structural change cannot explain the very sharp acceleration in German economic growth in the 1950s, we can impose any simplifying assumption that biases our conclusions in favor of the structural change hypothesis. Imagine for example that the marginal product of labor in agriculture was zero. This biases our findings in favor

---

22 Previous attempts to do this include Sicsic and Wyplosz (1996), Barro (1999) and Temple (2001).
of the hypothesis that output and productivity were raised by shifting labor from agriculture to industry, since under this extreme assumption reallocating labor results in no fall in agricultural output. With agricultural output unchanged, we can ignore the contribution of that sector. We have:

\[ Y = (BL)^{(1-a)}K^a \]  

(1)

where \( Y \) is output, \( K \) is capital (which is employed in the industrial sector), \( L \) is labor, and \( B \) is the share of the labor force employed in the industrial sector. Log differentiating:

\[ \frac{dY}{Y} = (1-a)\left(\frac{dB}{B}\right) + (1-a)\left(\frac{dL}{L}\right) + a\left(\frac{dK}{K}\right) \]  

(2)

or

\[ \frac{dY}{Y} - \frac{dL}{L} = a\left[\frac{dK}{K} - \frac{dL}{L}\right] + (1-a)\left[\frac{dB}{B}\right] \]  

(3)

The rate of growth of output per worker is no longer just the rate of growth of the capital/ratio multiplied by the elasticity of output with respect to capital (the term appearing immediately to the right of the equality in equation 3). Now this expression is augmented by the rate of change in the share of the labor force in industry times one minus that same elasticity (labor’s share of output in the Cobb-Douglas case), which captures the additional effect of structural change on output growth.

Between 1950 and 1960 the share of the labor force outside of agriculture rose at an annual rate of 1.1 percent.\(^{23}\) Even assuming a relatively high elasticity of output with respect to labor such as 0.66, as in the TFP 2 variant in Section 2 above, this can account only for an additional \(0.66 \times 1.1\) or 0.73 percentage points of annual GDP.

\(^{23}\) From 77.8 percent in 1950 to 86.7 percent in 1960. (Authors’ calculations from Table 1.)
growth, which is only a small part of the observed acceleration in growth, which averaged close to 8 percent. Under the more standard assumptions of an elasticity of 0.33, the point is reinforced. Thus, while the move out of agriculture was clearly there, it hardly accounts for the fast growth of the West German economy in the 1950s.\(^{24}\)

This appears to be a general pattern. Building on earlier work of Dumke (1990), Temin (2002) presented econometric evidence to evaluate the various explanations for postwar growth in Europe, and came out in favor of declining agriculture. In his cross-country convergence regressions, the agricultural employment share in 1950 showed up with large and significant coefficients, and dominated rival explanations. Germany appeared to be just a case in point, not an exception to the rule.

The Dumke/Temin regressions have the form:

\[
dY/Y = a + b(Y^*-Y) + c(GAP) + f(A^*-A) \tag{4}
\]

where \(Y\) is output per capita and \(Y^*\) is its corresponding steady state, \(GAP\) is the change in output between 1938 and 1948 as a measure of the wartime and postwar shocks, and \(A\) is the share of employment in agriculture, with \(A^*\) its corresponding steady state level. \(a, b, c,\) and \(f\) are parameters to be estimated.\(^{25}\) Assuming that \(Y^*\) and \(A^*\) are the same across European countries, they can be collected with the constant term, giving:

\[
dY/Y = (a+bY^*+fA^*) -b(Y) + c(GAP) - f(A) \tag{5}
\]

\(^{24}\) Using a more complex model, Temple (2001, p.17) reaches similar results, that “the labour reallocation effect generally accounts for between a twentieth and a seventh of annual growth in output per worker.” For the period 1950-55 his point estimate is 0.82 percent of output per worker per annum, almost exactly what we find under the TFP 2 variant. For 1955-60 his point estimate is 0.58, midway between our TFP 1 and TFP 2 variants.

\(^{25}\) Here we follow Temin, whose specification is more general.
Here $b$ measures the speed of neoclassical convergence, $c$ the impact of recovery from the wartime shock, and $f$ the importance of arrested development giving way to structural change. Temin estimates this equation for 15 Western European countries. He shows that the share of employment in agriculture ($A$) is often significant. In contrast, the GAP variable designed to capture the importance of wartime and postwar shocks is not significant at conventional confidence levels in any of his equations. On its face this would seem to be evidence against our interpretation.

We were able to partly replicate the results in Temin (2002) (Table 6, left panel). For the same specification and data, we find that the 1950s the coefficients on both GAP and $A$ differ significantly from zero, $A$ at the 95 percent level, GAP at the 99 percent confidence level. Temin, in contrast, reports an insignificant coefficient on GAP for the 1950s; this was one result that we were not able to replicate. But, notwithstanding the good fit of the equation, Germany is still an outlier. Adding a dummy variable for Germany to the equation for the 1950s yields a coefficient of 1.08,26 (and then does render the GAP coefficient insignificant). In other words, these variables provide only a partial explanation for German growth in the 1950s.

As we argued previously, the 1938/48 output gap may underestimate the disruptive effect of World War II on European growth. A better comparison is with 1944, which marks the height of the war economy in Germany. However, it could be argued that this is not an appropriate basis for gauging postwar productivity capacity, since 1944 levels were artificially boosted by longer hours of work and by contributions from slave laborers and prisoners of war that did not continue after that year. As

\[26\text{ That is, Germany grew by an additional 1.08 percent per annum over and above what can be explained by the three independent variables and average European experience. The coefficient in question differs from zero at the 90 percent confidence level.}\]
a compromise, we choose 1941 as a benchmark, when Germany was more or less back on its long-term growth path and in a position more analogous to Britain.

When we measure the wartime disruption with the 1941/1946 gap, the fit of the regression improves, and the coefficient on the output gap becomes larger.\(^{27}\) Moreover, Germany becomes less of an outlier: unexplained German growth is now down to approximately 0.6 percentage points per year, and the dummy variable for Germany no longer differs from zero at conventional confidence levels.

In addition, the dominant role of GAP compared to A during the Golden Age is confirmed if we measure growth not by the log difference in GDP, as in Temin (2002), but by the geometric growth rate (Table 6, right hand panel).\(^{28}\) Log differences accurately approximate growth rates only for small values. The faster the growth rate, the larger the margin by which it is understated by this approximation. Measuring our data in growth rates, the coefficient on the dummy variable for Germany is reduced further, to below 0.3, and it is not different from zero. The regressions in growth rates thus capture the German case better and again confirm the importance of the drop in output across the end of World War II.

Support for our view that structural change and the postwar shock both matter is that both coefficients are also significant when we run the regression again for the 1960s and 1970s. As one would expect, the coefficients on both variables decline over time, signaling a weakening influence of the postwar’s starting conditions on growth performance. Pooling the data for the three periods (the 1950s, 1960s, and the 1970-

\(^{27}\) Inserting the 1944/1946 gap, which underlies also the calculations in Table 5 above, would have yielded even better results. Working instead with the 1941/46 gap thus biases the results in Table 6 against our working hypotheses of high GAP effects on the German economy.

\(^{28}\) In the RHS panel of Table 6, we also measure the independent variables in logs, as is common in the literature on convergence regressions. Doing so improved the fit further and reduced the size of the dummy variable for Germany.
89 period) and running one regression on all 45 observations again delivers significant coefficients on both variables.\textsuperscript{29} We also regressed the difference in average growth rates after 1970 and during the 1960s. Results again point to a strong role for the GAP variable: the stronger a country’s wartime shock, the faster its growth slowdown since the 1970s. By comparison, agriculture appears to play a lesser role in explaining the slowdown, and remains insignificant.

This comparative evidence suggests that both Janossy (1969) and Temin (2002) were right on the causes of Europe’s postwar growth. Wartime disruptions caused output to be displaced from potential, creating scope for fast recovery as the economies of Europe moved back toward trend; this is the reconstruction hypothesis specified by Janossy (1969) and tested by Dumke (1990). At the same time, the scope for growth was greater where agriculture predominated, the delayed modernization of agriculture having depressed output and productivity in many countries of continental Europe. The result of sectoral shift from low-productivity farming to high-productivity industries was now faster aggregate growth of output and productivity; this is the agricultural labor share hypothesis spelled out by Temin (2002). But the wartime and postwar shock emphasized by Janossy and Dumke is quantitatively more important, and certainly so in postwar Germany.

4. Institutional Change: The Image

Olson’s (1982) institutional-change hypothesis posits a sharp shift in German institutions after World War II and an equally sharp break in the growth process. It claims that the shake-up of traditional structures caused by the Nazis and Ordo-

\textsuperscript{29} All of the results reported in Table 6 go through in a panel regression. We retained a specification closer to Temin’s (2002) and Dumke’s (1990) regressions to facilitate comparison. Results for the panel regressions are available on request.
liberalism destabilized traditional rent-seeking coalitions, unleashing a

*Wirtschaftswunder* that continued until new coalitions formed and sclerosis again set in. Adherents to this view cite the break-up of industrial conglomerates, the weakening of business associations, the currency reform, the elimination of price controls, and the creation of an intensively competitive market environment as leaving little scope for lobbying by special interests. In this view, West Germany’s Social Market Economy was a new economic system free of both the social divisions of Weimar and the excessive state intervention of the Nazis. ³⁰ This explains both why growth was faster in the 1950s than the 1920s and why the performance of the German economy surpassed that of other economies like Britain’s where a comparable institutional shakeup was absent.

In this section we argue that this view is more image than reality. West Germany’s postwar political establishment was eager to depict postwar economic reform as a radical departure from the state socialism of the Third Reich, and this image was taken up by contemporary scholars. But subsequent scholarship has shown that actual reforms were in fact quite limited.³¹ Differences in the institutional constellation and the policies that flowed from it differed surprisingly little between Weimar and post- 

³⁰ Coined by ordo-liberal economist Alfred Müller-Armack in 1947, the term was originally supposed to hint to the welfare efficiency of the market process itself. Soon, however, it came to denote the specific West German synthesis between regulated capitalism and the Bismarckian welfare state. A collection of seminal essays of Germany’s ordo-liberals on the Social Market Economy is Koslowski (1998). Its architect, Ludwig Erhard, became a figure of mythical fame, as did the *Bundesbank* as the guardian of the deutschmark. Emblematic of this is a book by Erhard (1960) entitled *Wohlstand für alle* (or *Prosperity for Everyone*). Aimed to capitalize on Erhard’s reputation as the architect of Germany’s economic recovery, it shows a visibly overweight Erhard with his typical big cigar. Both the weight gain and the tobacco product conveyed the message that not just Erhard but everyone had made it.

World War II Germany and, for that matter, between Germany and Britain. It is thus hard to point to those institutions and policies as the explanation for differences in growth and productivity performance.

A delicate issue in this context is that Weimar’s regulatory framework had been extended by the Third Reich. Under the aegis of Hjalmar Schacht, industry and professional organizations were given legal power to regulate entry, to set prices and conditions of contract, and to enter into binding collective agreements. Reforms affected most major sectors from banking and insurance to energy, transport, the free professions and the traditional crafts (which were basically exempted from competition). As a result, large parts of the German economy were tightly regulated even before the inauguration of wartime planning. Reforms included mandatory collective bargaining in the health sector, the extension of the vocational training system from the traditional crafts to manufacturing, banking and the service sector, the tight regulation of pharmacies, and even the mandatory presence of midwives at childbirth, a profession that was itself newly regulated through vocational training (see Barkai, 1990). Much of this legislation was a reaction to the Great Depression. It reflected a corporatist zeitgeist among Weimar’s ministerial bureaucracy, which continued to be influential through the mid-1930s. Far from having a coherent view on economic policy, the Nazis were initially glad to accept the proposals presented by these experts so long as they did not conflict with their power political goals. These regulations from the first years of Nazi rule, as well as the institutions they created, all existed in 1945 and could be reactivated once wartime rationing was lifted.

Yet we are not claiming entirely seamless continuity. After 1936, Schacht’s influence waned, and a second, more ideological wave of economic policy began to develop. Large economic planning boards were created during the Four Year Plan of
1937-40, as well as the *Hermann Goering Werke*, a state-run steel trust that soon became the world’s largest industrial conglomerate. As the regime pressed for accelerated war preparation, more and more stringent wartime controls were superimposed on the existing regulatory framework. But the centralization of economic planning provoked sharp criticism and, eventually, a reaction. The turnaround came in 1941, when Goering and the bureaucracies under his control lost influence. As a consequence, the German war economy was reprivatized. The large state agencies associated with Goering’s industrial empire were partly reorganized and partly dismantled. Responsibility for economic war planning was divided between a new armament ministry and the umbrella organizations of German business created in the early years of the Third Reich. Prominent economists lobbied for relying more heavily on the market mechanism for guiding the allocation of resources. Not without success: in 1943, the Commerce Ministry established a task force to plan for postwar economic and currency reform. Upon the recommendation of and with financial support from the top industry association, a lobbyist was found who was willing to take the job—no small risk, as it violated orders against any sort of postwar planning. The successful candidate was a certain Ludwig Erhard.

Since the work of Herbst (1982) that explores these interconnections between the pro-market economists within the perimeters of power and those outside, a consensus on the continuity of economic policy doctrine between the Third Reich and early postwar Germany has emerged.\footnote{Opposition to central planning came from circles both within and outside the party. From within, microeconomist von Stackelberg tried to build a network of pro-market experts, and to lobby the Berlin ministries (Anderson 1987). From outside, economists around von Beckerath (formerly Stackelberg’s thesis adviser at Cologne) and Eucken voiced their concerns and kept in close contact with political resistance circles. Despite strict censorship, Eucken (1940) published a book on economic systems, arguing that all forms of central planning inevitably led to socialism. This book later became formative for a generation of economists who would oppose interventionist policies.} Erhard’s 1948 reforms are not a radical departure...
ture from a socialist past but rather as putting into practice a program that had developed since the early 1940s.

5. Institutional Change: The Reality

If institutional shake-up had been widespread, the result would have been far-reaching changes in German policy and sharp differences from policy in other countries where institutional sclerosis was more pronounced. In this section we show that this was not the case.

Competition policy. The British occupation authorities had relied on a revitalized version of existing entrepreneurs’ associations for economic planning. American pressure and allied anti-cartel legislation gradually reduced their power again, although occupation authorities admitted that reconstruction without the expertise of these associations was impossible, and there were suspicions that the old cartels continued to operate in a more covert form into the 1950s (Plumpe 1987). Grunenberg (2006) highlights the continuity of business career networks across the war. The same people who organized the war economy in the early 1940s were at the helm of German big business and its associations in the 1950s, except for a few of the most compromised collaborators with the Nazi regime.

The U.S. occupation authorities had also sought to deconcentrate big business. In some cases this was successful, as with IG Farben. The company was divided into four enterprises, creating a market structure that survived to the 1990s. One explanation for this stability is precisely that stable oligopolistic structures had always charac-
terized the chemical industry. In the cases of heavy industry and banking, deconcentration was less lasting (Mollin 1988, Wixforth 1995). An additional problem was interdependencies within German heavy industry, which relied on the joint production of coal, steel, gas and electricity. This made it difficult to deconcentrate without replacing cartel agreements by an equally complicated regulatory framework. The solution found in the Schuman Plan of 1950 was to put the industries of the Ruhr under the control of a European-wide regulatory board. However, this did not prevent reconcentration of West German heavy industry (Abelshauser 1984, Gillingham 1991).

The most obvious defeat of American-inspired competition policies was in banking. US regulators had attempted to create a state banking system for postwar Germany. The big Berlin banks were split up and successor institutions were created on a zonal basis. The German government was pressed to cast the new situation into federal law. However, after West Germany regained its sovereignty in 1955, these laws were lifted, and the zonal banks merged. Even during the years of deconcentration, the regional successor banks of the old Deutsche Bank continued to operate a joint shadow executive board that coordinated their strategies, approved large credits, and distributed revenues (Holtfrerich 1995).

Under American aegis, the economic administration under Erhard and later the federal government attempted to adopt tight anti-cartel legislation, but a proposal drafted by Ordo-liberals failed in 1951. Resistance from heavy industry delayed the

33 The influence of large banks on German big business and the possible unofficial cartel structures created by this has continued to attract scholarly attention (e.g. Edwards and Fischer 1994), although historical research seems to imply that the influence of banks and financial conglomerates on German industry may in fact have been quite limited (see Wellhoeener, 1989, for the imperial period, Wixforth, 1995, for the Weimar Republic, and James, 1995, James, 2001, and Feldman, 2001, for the Nazi years).
passage of an antitrust law until 1957, when finally a bill was adopted (Berghahn 1986).

The new law did significantly widen the scope of anti-cartel policy. Since 1897, cartels had been fully enforceable in court. Legislation in 1933 allowed for cartels to be banned if they were against the public interest, and the aforementioned wave of regulations in large sectors of the economy substituted for the old cartel arrangements. Now, most cartels were made illegal, but with exceptions precisely in the areas that had been regulated after the Great Depression. For the most part, the legislation adopted to fill the gaps was a carbon copy of law from the 1930s. As a result, large swaths of the German economy continued to be tightly regulated under rules set in the 1930s. Mandatory vocational training, collective bargaining in the health sector, as well as the midwife monopoly and the restrictions on pharmacies still exist in Germany today, as do many other such regulations. Deregulation of banking, insurance, transport and energy only began in the 1990s, mostly through European legislation and usually against bitter German resistance.

Thus, Erhard’s struggle to push a market-friendly agenda for competition policy was uphill. Based on a consensus that formed in the early 1950s, earlier regulations limiting competition were reintroduced with only minor modifications. In contrast to the Eastern European transformation countries after 1989, Germany had inherited a fully functional, albeit highly regulatory framework of economic institutions from the 1930s. Rather than embarking on radical reform, German policymakers in the 1950s preferred the constitution inherited from the past. Only such minor changes were adopted as were needed to avoid a rupture with the Allies. An Olsonian structural break in German competition policy after World War II is nowhere in sight.
All this was not dissimilar from the situation in Britain. Collusive arrangements were a British tradition: during the 1930s and the war some 60 percent of British manufacturing was covered by such agreements. They were used in the 1930s to shelter weak firms from the slump, and during the war to smooth the flow of inputs to the military. Officials saw cartels as convenient for pursuing their industrial agendas; it was easier to meet with a few industrial leaders than to organize a large number of small entrepreneurs. Yet another motive for disregarding the potential for abuses by industrial rings was to exploit economies of scale and scope. America’s example suggested that units of production had to be enlarged to compete, and cooperation and consolidation were viewed as means to this end.

Legal restraints did little to inhibit collusion, Britain possessing no analog to the U.S. Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Not until 1956 with the adoption of the Restrictive Practices Act was a serious effort made to discourage collusive practices. Even then, mergers were rarely discouraged as restraints to trade, and the Conservative Government extended legal sanction to price maintenance schemes. The impact on competition was debilitating.34

Postwar Labour Governments, hostile to high prices and profits, acknowledged the costs of price maintenance schemes. Their solution was not to break up collusive arrangements or regulate natural monopolies, however, but to bring the offending industries under government ownership and control.35 Nationalization proceeded

---

34 As one contemporary observed, the restrictive practices of trade associations were “the greatest single cause of the lack of all dynamism in British industry.” Cited in Harris (1972), p.222. One attempt to measure this effect is in Crafts (1995): he includes in a cross-section model of the determinants of the determinants of productivity growth in the period 1954-63 (using data for 57 British industries) the change in the five-firm concentration ratio (as a measure of the scope for collusion), finding a negative coefficient on the margin of significance at the 10 percent confidence level.

35 The commitment to nationalization had been given official status in Clause IV of the party’s 1918 constitution drafted by Sidney Webb.
from the Bank of England, the coal industry and BOAC in 1946 to the railways, waterways and electricity in 1947, gas in 1948, and iron and steel in 1949. By 1951 more than two million workers were employed in public corporations.

The productivity and profitability of these public companies was hardly admirable. Between 1948 and 1958, labor productivity in nationalized industry grew by only 1.5 percent per year, a percentage point below the average for the British economy as a whole. With unionists on both sides of the bargaining table, public corporations provided generous wage settlements. Soft budget constraints gave management little incentive to minimize costs. Pressured to help with political problems like the existence of depressed regions, managers had mixed motives when allocating resources.

Thus, there is a striking degree of parallelism in competition policy in Britain and in West Germany. Neither country possessed an antitrust culture resembling the Sherman Act. In Britain, nationalization, not competition, was the order of the day. In Germany, Allied decartelization had limited impact on corporate culture. Although there was much talk of privatization and competition, little happened outside the chemical industry. Privatization of the huge state-owned conglomerates in iron and steel, machinery or auto industry hardly got off the ground until the 1970s, nor did competition policy. In both countries antitrust laws passed in the 1950s left large loopholes that insulated the respective national economies from competition, a condition that changed only in the 1980s in Britain and the 1990s in Germany.

**Labor markets.** Similar continuity is event in the structure of labor markets. The occupation authorities quickly resurrected Weimar’s trade unions, even rehabilitating many of the same individuals who had occupied high positions prior to National Socialism. They encouraged the resumption of industry-level bargaining for the
convenience of having recognized labor spokesmen with whom to deal. Unions were organized along the same lines as in the 1920s (with some 16 industrial unions, each with a corresponding employers’ association) and participated in the same kind of national congress. As in the 1920, unions were dedicated to democratic socialism and in some cases openly hostile to markets. They demonstrated their renewed strength in 1948, soon after the currency reform, when a sharp increase in the price level led to real wages losses and provoked a wave of strikes (Buchheim 1990). The subsequent rise in unemployment fueled resistance to Erhard’s supply-side policies. The government felt the pressure so strongly that it contemplated a Keynesian job creation program, which was rejected only when recovery gained sufficient momentum to pacify union demands (Berger and Ritschl 1995, Berger 1997).36

For iron and coal, the Co determination Act of 1951 placed workers’ representatives on company boards, allowing them to surveil their employers and verify that the latter were keeping their investment commitments. The Works Constitution Act of 1952, based on similar Allied acts of the late 1940s and on slightly less comprehensive legislation from the Weimar Republic, had similar effects; moreover, it secured monopoly for the trade union in representing firm workers.

Given that German mining and heavy industry enjoyed the most elaborate system of industrial relations, it was there that the success of trading wages for high investment should have been most evident. But in fact, investment rates in this sector were so low that an energy crisis developed in 1950. The Investment Aid Act of 1951 imposed a levy on wide segments of German industry in order to pour into coal, steel,

36 A similar point could be made for agriculture whose lobby remained intact and powerful despite the disappearance of the “Junker” class of the politically influential landed nobility. Here as much in iron and steel, German regulations, often inherited from Nazi economic planning, were successively replaced by EEC-wide market control that attempted to regulate the market with very similar instruments (on this, see Kluge, 1988).
electricity generation and transport funds that owners, capital markets, and banks could not or would not supply. In 1950 when this crisis was mounting, the miners’ union managed to obtain pay increases of 9 and 10 percent (Abelshauser 1984), hardly consistent with the picture of restraint. If anything, successful wage restraint began having its effects only in the mid-1950s, at a time when economic recovery at fast rates had consolidated.

What markets could not deliver, governments sought to provide. In West Germany, extensive use was made of Marshall Plan counterpart funds to finance investment in coal, steel, public utilities, and transport. After the currency reform of 1948, coal prices had continued to be fixed at levels far below cost, and the same held true for electricity and railway transport prices; this was a deliberate policy to keep production costs low and to boost consumer purchasing power. Rents were kept artificially low, and heavy federal subsidies were provided for residential construction. This is hardly in line with the traditional praise for Erhard’s free-market policy, and has induced writers to question Erhard’s actual influence on policy (Abelshauser, 1984) as well as the pro-market character of his creeds (Laitenberger, 1986).

Similar continuity was evident in Britain. Early industrialization had bequeathed a myriad of small, craft-based trade unions. Their number and the autonomy of shop stewards on the factory floor frustrated efforts to achieve the industry-wide, much less economy-wide, coordination of bargaining. None of this changed as a result of World War II. With scores of unions squabbling over their members’ shop-floor rights, work rules proved difficult to modify. Bean and Crafts (1996) analyze TFP growth in 137 British industries: they find that the presence of multiple unions sig-

37 The act laid the administration of this levy in the hands of the entrepreneurs’ associations, again strengthening the informal cartels that allied legislation had sought to abolish (Abelshauser, 1984).
significantly depressed TFP growth, with multiple-union workplaces exhibiting annual TFP growth as much as one percentage point lower than that achieved by single-union workplaces.\textsuperscript{38} In this environment, attempts to import American-style mass production methods under the aegis of the Anglo-American Council on Productivity (AACP) had little impact on growth (Crafts 1995). Unions and employers agreed that neither restrictive practices nor work rules were fair game for investigation by the AACP.

The labor market implications of these policies were mixed. Aggregate labor-market statistics for the two countries paint sharply contrasting pictures (Table 7). British unemployment was low. Many feared a postwar surge in unemployment like that which had followed World War I, but their expectations were disappointed. Between 1945 and 1951 unemployment averaged an astonishingly low 1.5 percent. For the remainder of the decade the annual average rate never once crept above 2 percent.

Germany, on the other hand, entered the 1950s with unemployment close to 10 percent. Only toward the end of the decade had German unemployment rates attained British levels. The persistence of high unemployment during the first years was itself a consequence of a very high influx of refugees after World War II. Therefore, it is not an indication of failing labor market institutions. However, the initially high level of unemployment and its subsequent decline may have contributed to an initially low but increasing bargaining power of trade unions. All this leads us to conclude that the contrasting structure of labor relations in the two countries may have mattered less for the course of the first postwar decade than is commonly supposed.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{38} Here too there is impressive evidence of institutional continuity: Broadberry and Crafts (1992) provide remarkably similar estimates for the interwar years.

\textsuperscript{39} In a Nash bargain over the wage rate, unemployment may affect the bargaining position of the trade union. Broadberry and Crafts (1996) find evidence of this effect in postwar Britain. According to Lindlar and Holtfrerich (1997), unit labor costs started to rise at the end of the decade, and continued doing so until the labor market was opened to immigration.
Macroeconomic policies. Many comparisons of the British and German recoveries credit superior German growth performance to more stable and prudent macroeconomic policies. The British stereotype is of low savings, budgetary stop-and-go, and chronic balance of payments deficits. The German image, in contrast, is of a more cautious and stable macroeconomic stance.

But Table 7 shows that private savings rates were actually quite similar in the two countries. Moreover, in both countries public sector’s contribution to national saving was positive. Both countries were capital exporters.40 The question therefore is how two such similar patterns could have produced such different outcomes. The answer is less different postwar policies than different financial inheritances.—specifically, very different debt/income ratios. West Germany’s started out lower and remained below 25 percent until the 1970s. Britain's debt ratio started out at 175 percent and remained higher than Germany’s until the 1990s (Ritschl 1996). Different levels of debt meant different balance-of-payments positions, given similar savings rates. The British balance of payments was weak owing to the large amount of service due on debt to foreigners, while the German balance of payments benefited from the country’s debts having been written down by the currency reform of 1948 and the London Agreement of 1953 (Buchheim 1986). Thus, the main difference lay in postwar debt arrangements which favored Germany, allowing her to accumulate foreign currency reserves despite savings rates only marginally different from Britain’s. And

40 Commentators have sometimes argued that the country’s propensity to export capital was harmful for domestic investment, and also that Germany’s ability to generate current-account and export surpluses was an important engine of growth. Table 3 reminds the reader that these views cannot be true at the same time.
that accumulation of reserves freed macroeconomic policy from the constraint imposed by the balance of payments.

British policymakers were single-minded in their pursuit of output and employment goals. But every time their policies of aggressive demand stimulus bumped up against the balance-of-payments constraint, they were forced to retrench. The result, it has been widely argued, was an unstable pattern of stop-go policies, which disrupted the process of economic growth. In Germany, where pressing foreign exchange constraints were absent, one might expect more stable fiscal policy.

But, once again, Table 7 shows that this was not the case. The German government ran a series of surpluses in the 1950s, the proceeds of which were spent in subsequent years. This spike in German public saving was caused by the attempt of the German government to pour money into a sinking fund for rearmament. Surpluses were added to the government’s central bank account and removed from circulation. Soon, however, a grand coalition of politicians determined that a better use of these monies was to expand social security, and the government’s account was run down. This fiscal conduct was criticized at the time for its procyclicality (Musgrave 1956). None of this is consistent with the stereotype of a stabilizing fiscal policy.

What really seems to have mattered for Germany’s fiscal system was the absence of large interest burdens on the public budget that allowed Germany to keep tax rates low and insulated the public budget from balance-of-payments pressures. Thus, the two countries’ macroeconomic policies seem to explain less than might be supposed.

41 This arrangement came to be known as the “Juliusturm.” The original Juliusturm was a tower in the fortress of Spandau near Berlin where Imperial Germany had hoarded French gold paid as reparations after the Franco-Prussian War of 1871.

42 Analyzing German full employment budget surpluses, Berger (1997) similarly finds that the “Juliusturm” hoarding had strong procyclical effects.
6. Conclusion

Between 1950 and 1960, output in West Germany grew at an average of 8 percent per year, much faster than in earlier German history and faster than in Europe as a whole. This paper has reviewed popular explanations for this out-performance, identifying a kernel of truth in each of them. But of the convergence, structural change and postwar shock hypotheses, both theory and evidence suggest that the third factor was the most important. Output per capita converged back to its steady state faster than the capital/labor ratio, not three times slower as suggested by the standard neoclassical model, which suggests that neoclassical convergence explains only a fraction of observed growth in this period. The additional fillip to growth due to the reallocation of labor from agriculture to industry was even smaller. Far and away the most important of these three factors was the collapse of output in the final phases of the war and immediately thereafter. This was reflected in the concomitant collapse and subsequently in a fast recovery of total factor productivity. Given that capacity had not fallen, indeed that it continued to rise in the 1950s, there was scope for Germany to grow rapidly by closing this output and TFP gap.

All this presumes the institutional capability to restore normal levels of capacity utilization and growth. This brings us to the fourth explanation for the *Wirtschaftswunder*, namely the institutional shake-up that supposedly eliminated rent-seeking coalitions, creating scope for rapid growth. Here the evidence suggests that the Germany economy in fact remained tightly regulated, both absolutely and relative to more slowly-growing economies like Britain. The postwar model of Rhenish capitalism drew heavily on a regulatory model established in the early and mid-1930s, complemented by an improved version of the corporatist model of collective wage bargaining that had prevailed in the Weimar Republic before 1933. While questions have been raised about the sustainability of this model in recent years, it provided ac-
countability and predictability in the 1950s and enabled the German economy to grow back to its historical trend after heavy disruptions in the aftermath of World War II.

None of this is to imply that policy did not matter. Socialist alternatives to the German model were considered and could have been followed. The German labor movement and its moderate political wing began moving away from their socialist leanings only in the late 1950s. Inspired by organized Catholicism, German conservatism in the postwar period favored corporatist organization and heavy regulation over an adjustment to market forces, leaving a lasting imprint on West Germany’s socio-economic system of Rhenish capitalism, as this model has come to be called. As we have argued, this model was by no means a radical departure from German traditions. If there is anything surprising about Germany’s postwar setup, it is the high degree of institutional continuity and the absence of any radical turn in policy.
References


Erhard, Ludwig, 1960, Wohlstand für alle (Düsseldorf: Econ).

Eucken, Walter, 1940. Die Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie (Fischer, Jena).


Harris, Nigel, 1972, *Competition and the Corporate Society: British Conservatives, the State and Industry, 1945–1964* (London: Methuen).


Table 1
Comparative levels of productivity and agricultural employment shares, 1870-1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>$Y/L$ (UK=100)</th>
<th>$K/L$ (UK=100)</th>
<th>Agricultural employment and income shares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1907/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>1925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>1938/39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>109.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>1973</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
Output per capita: Calculated from Maddison (1991, 2003), Feinstein (1972)
Capital/labor ratio: Hoffmann (1965)
Agricultural employment and income shares: Germany: Calculated from Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer das Deutsche Reich, various issues; Deutsche Bundesbank (1976)
Britain: Calculated from Maddison (1991), Feinstein (1972)
Table 2
Comparisons of output growth and its determinants, 1960-1973

Percentage growth per year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Output Y</th>
<th>Capital K</th>
<th>Labor L</th>
<th>Y/L</th>
<th>K/L</th>
<th>TFP I</th>
<th>TFP II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(a) 1950-1960</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>7.96</td>
<td>5.66</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>6.94</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>5.39</td>
<td>3.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(b) 1960-1973</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>-0.81</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>7.31</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>-0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>5.32</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>6.01</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Methods: Approximate TFP growth:
- \( \text{TFP I} = \frac{Y}{L} - \frac{1}{3} \frac{K}{L} \)
- \( \text{TFP II} = \frac{Y}{L} - \frac{2}{3} \frac{K}{L} \)
Table 3

Gross Capital Stock and Coal Output in Germany and Britain across World War II
(1936 = 100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germany (Postwar Territory, at 1936 prices)</th>
<th>Britain (at 1938 prices)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mining and Manufacturing</td>
<td>Aggregate Economy (West)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td></td>
<td>East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Stock</td>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>Equipment (i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>108.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(i) West Germany and West Berlin, Krengel (1958)
(iii) East Germany and East Berlin, Melzer (1980)
(iv-vi) West Germany, Gehrig (1961)
(vii) Feinstein (1972), Table 43.
(viii) Calculated from Feinstein (1972), Table 40.
(ix) Linear interpolation of (vii) by (viii).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1937 territory</th>
<th>1942 territory*</th>
<th>1946 territory*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West</td>
<td>42.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944 Extrapolation from 1939 census (i)</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slave laborers (ii)</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servicemen abroad (iii)</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 1944</td>
<td></td>
<td>89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 1946</td>
<td></td>
<td>64.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 1950</td>
<td></td>
<td>68.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources and Methods:

- (i) Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland
- (ii) Spoerer and Fleischhacker (2002).
- (iii) Overmans (1999).

* 1942 territory includes Germany in 1937 borders, annexed Austria, as well as annexed parts of Czechia, France, Poland, Lithuania, and Yugoslavia. “Protektorat” part of Czechia and “Generalgouvernement” part of Poland not included.

**1946 territory includes Germany in 1937 borders, less territories annexed by Poland and Soviet Union, and less Sarre region. Figures exclude former slave workers waiting to be repatriated.
Figure 1: Growth of GDP Per Capita in Britain and Germany, 1901-1993

Sources: see legend to Table 5.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average percentage growth, annualized†</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Output Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) 1913-1929</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (rev.)</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) 1929-1938</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (rev.)</td>
<td>3.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) 1938-1944</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>3.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany/Greater Germany</td>
<td>8.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>3.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) 1944-1946</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>-37.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>-4.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) 1946-1950</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Level of Reconstruction in 1950**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indices 1944=100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>80.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>106.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Calculated using data from Feinstein (1972), Maddison (1991, 2003), and Ritschl and Spoerer (1997) as described in text.

Methods:

*Data in growth rates.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{TFP I} & = \frac{Y}{L} - \frac{1}{3} \times \frac{K}{L} \\
\text{TFP II} & = \frac{Y}{L} - \frac{2}{3} \times \frac{K}{L}
\end{align*}
\]

**Data in levels.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{TFP I} & = \exp[\log \left(\frac{Y}{L}\right) - \frac{1}{3}\log \left(\frac{K}{L}\right)] \\
\text{TFP II} & = \exp[\log \left(\frac{Y}{L}\right) - \frac{2}{3}\log \left(\frac{K}{L}\right)]
\end{align*}
\]

Rough estimates in italics.

Capital stock estimates for 1944 and 1946 from Table 4 as described in text.
### Table 6

Convergence of Per-Capita Income in Postwar Europe, 1950-1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Log differences</th>
<th>Annualized growth rates</th>
<th>Growth slowdown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>2.754</td>
<td>1.859</td>
<td>-0.915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;2.834&gt;</td>
<td>&lt;1.820&gt;</td>
<td>&lt;0.918&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAP &lt;1938-1948&gt;</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;3.057&gt;</td>
<td>&lt;1.727&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAP &lt;1941-1946&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.198</td>
<td>0.975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;5.015&gt;</td>
<td>&lt;3.091&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP PER CAPITA 1950</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>0.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;1.032&gt;</td>
<td>&lt;0.809&gt;</td>
<td>&lt;0.821&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGRIC.EMPL’SHARE 1950</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;2.145&gt;</td>
<td>&lt;2.203&gt;</td>
<td>&lt;2.555&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEST GERMANY</td>
<td>1.083</td>
<td>0.582</td>
<td>0.218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;1.778&gt;</td>
<td>&lt;1.076&gt;</td>
<td>&lt;1.385&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.614</td>
<td>0.707</td>
<td>0.783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* t statistics in italics
## Table 7

Macroeconomic Performance in Britain and Germany, 1950-1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Private savings ratios, per cent</th>
<th>Public debt/GNP ratio, per cent</th>
<th>Public savings rates, per cent</th>
<th>Unemployment rates, per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GB</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>GB</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>193.5</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>175.4</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>162.7</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>152.3</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>147.3</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>139.1</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>128.9</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>121.8</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>117.6</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>112.5</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>107.7</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources:* Britain: Calculated from Mitchell (1990), Feinstein (1972). Germany: Calculated from Deutsche Bundesbank (1976).
SFB 649 Discussion Paper Series 2008

For a complete list of Discussion Papers published by the SFB 649, please visit http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de.

003 "The Bayesian Additive Classification Tree Applied to Credit Risk Modelling" by Junni L. Zhang and Wolfgang Härdle, January 2008.
004 "Independent Component Analysis Via Copula Techniques" by Ray-Bing Chen, Meihui Guo, Wolfgang Härdle and Shih-Feng Huang, January 2008.
005 "The Default Risk of Firms Examined with Smooth Support Vector Machines" by Wolfgang Härdle, Yuh-Jye Lee, Dorothea Schäfer and Yi-Ren Yeh, January 2008.
006 "Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall when there is long range dependence" by Wolfgang Härdle and Julius Mungo, January 2008.
007 "A Consistent Nonparametric Test for Causality in Quantile" by Kiho Jeong and Wolfgang Härdle, January 2008.
008 "Do Legal Standards Affect Ethical Concerns of Consumers?" by Dirk Engelmann and Dorothea Kübler, January 2008.
009 "Recursive Portfolio Selection with Decision Trees" by Anton Andriyashin, Wolfgang Härdle and Roman Timofeev, January 2008.
010 "Do Public Banks have a Competitive Advantage?" by Astrid Matthey, January 2008.
011 "Don't aim too high: the potential costs of high aspirations" by Astrid Matthey and Nadja Dwenger, January 2008.
012 "Visualizing exploratory factor analysis models" by Sigbert Klinke and Cornelia Wagner, January 2008.
017 "Adaptive Forecasting of the EURIBOR Swap Term Structure" by Oliver Blaskowitz and Helmut Herwatz, January 2008.
020 "The Impact of International Outsourcing on Labour Market Dynamics in Germany" by Ronald Bachmann and Sebastian Braun, February 2008.
021 "Preferences for Collective versus Individualised Wage Setting" by Tito Boeri and Michael C. Burda, February 2008.

SFB 649, Spandauer Straße 1, D-10178 Berlin
http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de

This research was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through the SFB 649 "Economic Risk".
"Lumpy Labor Adjustment as a Propagation Mechanism of Business Cycles" by Fang Yao, February 2008.


"Skill Specific Unemployment with Imperfect Substitution of Skills" by Runli Xie, March 2008.

"Price Adjustment to News with Uncertain Precision" by Nikolaus Hautsch, Dieter Hess and Christoph Müller, March 2008.

"Information and Beliefs in a Repeated Normal-form Game" by Dietmar Fehr, Dorothea Kübler and David Danz, March 2008.

"The Stochastic Fluctuation of the Quantile Regression Curve" by Wolfgang Härdle and Song Song, March 2008.

"Are stewardship and valuation usefulness compatible or alternative objectives of financial accounting?" by Joachim Gassen, March 2008.

"Genetic Codes of Mergers, Post Merger Technology Evolution and Why Mergers Fail" by Alexander Cuntz, April 2008.

"Using R, LaTeX and Wiki for an Arabic e-learning platform" by Taleb Ahmad, Wolfgang Härdle, Sigbert Klinke and Shafeeqah Al Awadhi, April 2008.

"Beyond the business cycle – factors driving aggregate mortality rates" by Katja Hanewald, April 2008.

"Against All Odds? National Sentiment and Wagering on European Football" by Sebastian Braun and Michael Kvasnicka, April 2008.

"Are CEOs in Family Firms Paid Like Bureaucrats? Evidence from Bayesian and Frequentist Analyses" by Jörn Hendrich Block, April 2008.


"Can Education Save Europe From High Unemployment?" by Nicole Walter and Runli Xie, June 2008.

"Solow Residuals without Capital Stocks" by Michael C. Burda and Battista Severgnini, August 2008.

"Unionization, Stochastic Dominance, and Compression of the Wage Distribution: Evidence from Germany" by Michael C. Burda, Bernd Fitzenberger, Alexander Lembcke and Thorsten Vogel, March 2008


"Modeling Dependencies in Finance using Copulae" by Wolfgang Härdle, Ostat Okhrin and Yarema Okhrin, June 2008.

"Numerics of Implied Binomial Trees" by Wolfgang Härdle and Alena Mysickova, June 2008.