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How Civilian Attitudes Respond to the State's Violence: Lessons from the Israel- Gaza Conflict

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ABSTRACT

How Civilian Attitudes Respond to the State's Violence: Lessons from the Israel-Gaza Conflict*

States, in their conflicts with militant groups embedded in civilian populations, often resort to policies of collective punishment to erode civilian support for the militants. We attempt to evaluate the efficacy of such policies in the context of the Gaza Strip, where Israel's blockade and military interventions, purportedly intended to erode support for Hamas, have inflicted hardship on the civilian population. We combine Palestinian public opinion data, Palestinian labor force surveys, and Palestinian fatalities data, to understand the relationship between exposure to Israeli policies and Palestinian support for militant factions. Our baseline strategy is a difference-in-differences specification that compares the gap in public opinion between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank during periods of intense punishment with the gap during periods when punishment is eased. Consistent with previous research, we find that Palestinian fatalities are associated with Palestinian support for more militant political factions. The effect is short-lived, however, dissipating after merely one quarter. Moreover the blockade of Gaza itself appears to be only weakly associated with support for militant factions. Overall, we find little evidence to suggest that Israeli security policies towards the Gaza Strip have any substantial lasting effect on Gazan support for militant factions, neither deterring nor provoking them relative to their West Bank counterparts. Our findings therefore call into question the logic of Israel's continued security policies towards Gaza, while also raising the possibility more generally that populations violently targeted by state actors may exhibit greater inertia in their support for militancy (or lack thereof) than is typically theorized in standard models of deterrence.

JEL Classification: D72, D74, H56, J21, J45

Keywords: Israeli-Palestinian conflict, political preferences, public opinion, conflict, Palestine

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1. Introduction

Do policies of collective punishment, carried out by the state with the intention of weakening support for non-state actors embedded in a civilian population, tend to chasten or provoke the ire of that population? This question is relevant to many conflicts between states and political-militant groups around the globe. Political-militant groups posing a challenge to state authority typically form in the midst of aggrieved and marginalized civilian populations, remaining embedded in and dependent upon those civilians for their continued support -- to paraphrase Mao, 'as fish in water'. It is of great interest to states, then, to know whether repressive or retaliatory policies carried out by the state, and adversely impacting civilian welfare, tend to provoke their ire or, alternatively, dissuade them from supporting militancy.

We attempt to shed light on this question in the context of Israel's security policies towards the Gaza Strip. Over the past two decades, Palestinian civilian support for politically militant factions has grown in the occupied Gaza Strip relative to the occupied West Bank (Figure 1). Notably, this divergence in public opinion has widened even as Israel has pursued increasingly divergent security policies towards Gaza and the West Bank. In the West Bank, Israel and the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority (PA) resumed and even deepened security cooperation after the end of the Second Intifada (2000-2004), leading to a general relaxation of trade and travel restrictions and a reduction in Israeli military incursions, accompanied by unprecedentedly low levels of Palestinian violence against Israelis in the latter 2000s and throughout the 2010s. In the Gaza Strip, by contrast, the Hamas-controlled PA has tended to permit, fail to stop, and occasionally participate in, the launching of thousands of rockets and mortar shells targeting southern Israel; and Israel has concomitantly intensified its blockade of the Gaza Strip, carried out frequent airstrikes, and occasionally undertaken massive ground invasions of the Gaza Strip, inflicting thousands of civilian casualties and billions of dollars of infrastructural damage. The growing divergence between Israel's security policies in the West Bank versus Gaza, simultaneous with the growing divergence between support for militancy in the West Bank versus Gaza, raises the plausible conjecture that these two diverging trends may be causally interrelated. Indeed, Israel often justifies its harsh measures towards Gaza as an effort to turn ordinary Gazans away from Hamas; yet the effectiveness of this policy has never been empirically evaluated.

In this analysis, we combine data on Palestinian public opinion with data on Palestinian labor force and Palestinian fatalities from politically motivated violence. To understand the effect of Israeli policy on political attitudes, we use a difference-in-differences regressions, comparing the gap in public opinion between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank during the wars and the blockade, with the gap during quieter times. We exploit several sources of variation: (i) time variation in the Israeli-Hamas confrontation (before, during, and after each confrontation) and (ii) geographic variation in exposure to confrontation (between the Gaza Strip which is directly affected by these confrontations and the West Bank which is not directly affected, and between districts within the two regions).

The theoretical literature suggests that such policies are likely to have two effects. According to the deterrence approach, such a policy will deter the other side from political violence (Lyall, 2009; Padró i Miquel & Yared, 2012) and deter public opinion from supporting militants. According to the "boomerang approach," such action will only encourage the other side to retaliate and escalate the situation, and increase the public support of militant (Kalyvas, 2006; Wood & Jean, 2003; Bueno de Mesquita & Dickson, 2007) or decrease public support of compromise (Hatz 2020). So far, there have not been only a few attempts to determine how effective such policies are on public support of militants. We find weak evidence for the boomerang approach and even weaker evidence for the deterrence approach. Fatalities are strongly associated with Palestinian support of politically militant factions, but the association of this support with specific policies, such as the Gaza Blockade, is weak.

The rest of this article is as follows. The next section provides background information on the Israeli-Gaza conflict. The related literature section presents literature related to this article. The data section presents the data we use on political violence and the Palestinian labor market. The methodology section presents the econometric techniques and the specifications of the model we use to study the effect of Israeli policies on Palestinian political preferences. The results section reports our main findings. The discussion section provides interpretation of the results, discusses the mechanism implied by them, and considers caveats in our study. The last section concludes.

2. The Israel-Gaza conflict

Particularly since the 2007 Fatah-Hamas 'schism', Gaza and the West Bank have been ruled as two separate territories by two separate political-militant organizations. Hamas, the Palestinian Islamist resistance movement, has consolidated authoritarian control over the Gaza Strip, while Fatah has simultaneously consolidated a monopoly on violence over the West Bank. While Hamas has (at least rhetorically) maintained its commitment to armed struggle against Israel, Fatah has pursued deepening security cooperation with Israel under the logic of the Oslo Accords. During Hamas' tenure in the Gaza Strip, thousands of rockets and mortars have been launched targeting southern Israel, even while Israeli casualties in the West Bank have fallen concomitantly to historical lows under Fatah's watch. In response, Israel has pursued divergent security policies in the two territories. While Israel has largely stood down its movement restrictions in the West Bank, it has intensified its blockade of the Gaza Strip. And while largely remaining aloof and relying on Fatah/PA security forces to police the West Bank, Israel regularly and directly carries out interdictions in the Gaza Strip, and has launched several massive military operations that cost thousands of civilian lives and inflicted billions of dollars of damage to infrastructure. This policy has been justified by the Israeli government to domestic and international audiences as a means of turning the Gazan population against Hamas. By contrast, over the same time period in the West Bank, the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority (PA) has deepened its security cooperation with Israel. To date, however, there has so far been no attempt to empirically examine this argument empirically.

Even before the Hamas takeover, Israel engaged in two large-scale operations: (i) "Summer Rains," in the summer of 2006, after the capture of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) soldier Gilad Shalit and (ii) "Autumn Clouds," in the Autumn of the same year, following an increase in rocket and mortar attacks from Gaza into Southwestern Israel. Hamas mortar and rocket attacks were the proximate catalyst for most of the large-scale military operations in the following years, including operation "Hot Winter" in February 2008, operation "Cast Lead" in the winter of 2008-2009, operation "Pillar of Defense" in November 2012, operation "Protective Edge" in the summer of 2014, and several smaller-scale clashes and military strikes. These operations resulted not

only in the loss of thousands of civilian lives but also in massive damage to property and infrastructure¹.

Israeli-sanctioned restrictions on trade in the Gaza Strip have also played an essential part in the Israeli-Gaza conflict. Etkes and Zimring (2015) outline the Gaza trade restrictions, which culminated during the 2007-2010 Gaza Blockade. The beginning of the Gaza Blockade was by two events that occurred at the end of September 2007. First, it was marked by decision B/34 of the Israeli government to declare the Gaza Strip a hostile territory and to restrict the movement of people and goods into and out of it. Second, it was marked by Egypt's closing of the land crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. These restrictions included a ban on all exports and limited imports to a small list of goods, allowing for humanitarian considerations (Etkes & Zimring, 2015). This list was expanded in February 2009, but the Blockade effectively ended only in June 2010 when, following a clash between Israeli naval forces and political activists on the Gaza-bound "Freedom Flotilla," Israel replaced the "white list" of permitted goods with a blacklist of forbidden goods (majorly easing imports restrictions) and removed the ban on exports (Etkes & Zimring, 2015).

Both military operations and the Gaza Blockade were enacted and enforced by force and used to achieve political goals, such as stopping political violence and deterring Palestinians from supporting Hamas. The fact that they were enacted only towards the Gaza Strip allows us to use the West Bank as a counterfactual. Our empirical strategy draws on this feature of the conflict to examine the impact of the Israeli policies on the political preferences of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.

3. Related literature

This article is related to literature discussing the effects of state violence on the political preferences of the population it afflicts. One approach, which we will refer to as the "deterrence approach," argues that violent measures by the state are useful not only in disrupting militant organizations (Lyall, 2009; Padró i Miquel & Yared, 2012) but also in deterring civilians from supporting them. The evidence for a deterring effect

¹ During Operation Protective Edge alone, between 7 July and 26 August 2014, 17,000 housing units, comprising about 5% of the Gaza Strip housing stock, were damaged or destroyed, rendering about 100,000 people homeless (OCHA, 2014).

on public opinion is limited and dependent on the civilians' affiliation with the state and on their exposure for nonstate violence: In the Columbian conflict, voters affected by nonstate violence tended to support state violence as punishment. However, when exposed to both, they prefer a pro-peace policy (Pechenkina & Gamboa, 2020). In Turkey, the government's collective punishment policies (such as curfews) against the Kurd Insurgency targeted Turks and Kurds indiscriminately. Kurds subject to this type of state-violence became disengaged from politics altogether, while Turks tended to reward the governing parties electorally (Aksoy, Menger, & Tavits, 2020). The second, more prevalent approach, argues that militant state policies have a "boomerang effect" of radicalizing public opinion and escalating political violence. We will therefore refer it as the "boomerang approach". This radicalization is not just the consequence of hatred or a desire to revenge, but also a consequence of a rational response to the desire for protection (Kalyvas, 2006), or even a response to being unable to "free ride" on the effort of militants (Wood & Jean, 2003).

More specifically, Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson (2007) argue that radicalization is expected when the state is employing a "collective punishment" policy, in which violence is indiscriminate and damages the population that the militants claim to represent. Several empirical attempts have been made to test these hypotheses empirically. Most of them focused on the "cycle of violence," attempting to examine whether violence from one side leads to violence on the other side. Jaeger and Paserman (2008) examined whether levels of Israeli fatalities can be predicted by previous levels of Palestinian fatalities, and vice versa. They found that only Israelis react to Palestinian political violence in that manner, but no such relationship was found for Palestinians (Jaeger & Paserman, 2008). This "tit-for-tat" pattern in fatalities is problematic to examine because it is difficult to establish the direction of causality. One way to address this problem is to focus on a specific policy or type of political violence and its association with political violence from the other side. This method was employed by Jaeger and Paserman (2007) who studied the effectiveness of Israeli assassinations of Palestinian leaders. They found that low levels of these killings increased the number of attempts of Palestinian violence, while high levels of killings reduced them. The successful attempts (those who end in Israeli fatalities) decrease for all levels of killings (Jaeger & Paserman, 2007). Benmelech et al. (2010) show that while demolition of houses belonging to suicide bombers discouraged further suicide attacks,

"precautionary demolitions" which were unrelated to the actions of the house's owner, only triggered further suicide bombings (Benmelech, Berrebi, & Klor, 2010), seeming to support the theory of Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson (2007). Abrahams and colleagues (2019) examined the retaliation patterns between Israel airstrikes and Gaza Militants mortars and rockets launches, and the effectiveness of Israel's deterrence approach. They find that Israeli retaliation provides only "narrow deterrence," which limits the intensity of Gazan attacks but does not completely stops them, nor prevents cycles of violence.

Another way to deal with causality problems is to observe the relationship between political violence and public opinion: whether employing violent means on a population will increase its support of more radical and militant factions. While not technically a state actor, exposure to violence from the International Forces active in Afghanistan has decreased local support in these forces (Lyall, Blair, & Imai, 2013), especially indiscriminate violence (Schutte, 2017). In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, researchers found that Israeli violence in the West Bank during the Second Intifada "pushed" Palestinian public opinion away from positions that are more moderate, but only on the short term (Jaeger, Klor, Miaari, & Paserman, 2012). In a more recent study, Hatz (2020) found that indiscriminate house demolition policy was associated with opposition to political compromise among Palestinians. A vital shortcoming of existing studies, however, is the lack of external control group that did not experience political violence at that time. Our use of the West Bank as a counterfactual to Gaza Strip allows us to improve on the methods used in the existing literature and contribute to understanding the consequences of political violence.

4. Data

4.1. Public opinion

We use a public opinion dataset that contains complete data from polls conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) between the first quarter of 1998 and the second quarter of 2011. Each poll was conducted on an average of 1,326 adult participants from all Palestinian National Authority (PNA) districts. Different adults are sampled in each poll. Polls include questions on faction support and questions regarding the Israeli Palestinian conflict and rich demographic data. Questions on policies within these surveys, such as support of peace negotiations or suicide bombings, change over the sample period. Instead, we make use of a question

that has remained constant throughout: which political faction does the respondent support? We divide the various factions presented over the years into three political blocks, based on definitions by Cali and Miaari (2017)²: "moderate" factions (such as Fatah), which support the two-state solution and the peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, "militant" factions (such as Hamas), who oppose these policies, and "other," which represents the undecided respondents. The precise division appears in Table I, and descriptive statistics of the sample appear in Table II.

Table I in here

Table II in here

Figure 2 shows that the support of moderate factions dropped following the break of the Intifada at the end of 2000, recovering only at the end of 2004. Support of militant factions increased starting the break of the Intifada, peaking in 2006, right before the Palestinian general election, and decreasing afterward. While the increase in support of militant factions after the break of the Intifada coincided with a decrease in support of moderate factions, the increase in support of both blocks after 2004 was at the expense of the "other" block. Figure 2 also shows that the post-elections decrease in support of militant factions coincided with an increase in the share of undecided. Figure 1 shows that patterns of support for militant factions did not, initially, differ between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. However, starting at the beginning of 2006, the support of militant factions in the West Bank decreased, while in Gaza Strip, it remained high, with a growing gap in public opinion between the two regions.³

4.2. *Palestinian Labor Force Survey (PLFS)*

² We add a third category – "other", for factions who were unclassified by them. We also replace the term "radical" with "militant", which better suits our purposes.

³ It should be noted that even after the 2006 elections and the 2007 Hamas takeover, there was a considerable share (about 30%-40%) of Gazans supporting moderate factions, mainly Fatah.

The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) administers the PLFS of the West Bank and Gaza. This survey began in 1995, after the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). In this survey, the same household is surveyed four times over six quarters. Two surveys are conducted in two consecutive quarters, and then, after a two-quarter break, there are two more consecutive surveys. Households are subsequently dropped from the sample. Each annual survey round, after 1998, contains approximately 7,600 households with 22,000 individuals aged 15 years and above residing in the West Bank or Gaza Strip. Nomads and persons living in institutions such as prisons or shelters are excluded from the survey.

For our purposes, we restrict the sample to individuals of ages 18-64 sampled between quarter one of 1998 and quarter two of 2011.⁴ We focus on aggregate average daily wage and unemployment rate at the district level for 722 district-quarter clusters. We provide descriptive statistics in Table III. Both are used as additional controls.

Table III in here

4.3. *Palestinian Fatalities*

The number of fatalities from politically motivated violence is considered a good indicator of the intensity of political violence and is widely used in literature (León, 2012; Valente, 2014; Libois, 2016; Brück, Di Maio, & Miaari, 2019). Our dataset contains information on all Palestinian fatalities from 1995 to 2011. This data is collected by the Israeli NGO B'Tselem and is considered accurate and reliable by both the Israelis and the Palestinians. For each Palestinian fatality, this dataset indicates the location of the event and a description of the circumstances of the event, including whether the offending party was a Palestinian, an Israeli civilian, or an Israeli security force (like the IDF or the Israeli Border Police), member. For each Israeli fatality, this dataset indicates the identity of the victim, (civilian or security force), the location of the event, the district from which the attacker originated, and which faction (if any)

⁴ The rounds of the survey made prior to 1998 are excluded because the sample design methodology was substantially different in the early years of the survey. In 1995, the survey was conducted in one quarter only as an experimental sample. In 1996, the survey was conducted over three quarters. It wasn't until 1998, after the Palestinian census in 1997, that the survey was conducted in all four quarters of the year.

took responsibility. We aggregate the number of Palestinian fatalities in each district in each quarter for 722 district-quarter clusters and provide descriptive statistics in Table III.

5. Methodology

Figure 1 shows that the gap between the share of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip who support militant factions and the share of Palestinians in the West Bank who support militant factions grows over time, with this share remaining high in Gaza Strip while decreasing in the West Bank. To understand which events are associated with this pattern, we employ a difference-in-difference approach with the West Bank as a control group for the Gaza Strip.⁵ The validity of this approach hinges on the ‘parallel trends’ assumption that, *but for the Israeli security interventions studied here*, public opinion in the West Bank would be on a similarly trajectory to that of the Gaza Strip. We test the validity of this assumption in section 6.1. We examine the relationship between Palestinian political preferences and several policies and events that occurred in the Gaza Strip, but not in the West Bank. Since our data is limited to the years 1998-2011, we include only events occurring within this time frame. Within this period, four military operations in the Gaza Strip occurred: Summer Rains, Autumn Clouds, Hot Winter, and Cast Lead.⁶ In addition to the military operations, we also include the Gaza Blockade and the Hamas takeover of Gaza⁷.

To establish the dates of the Hamas takeover and operations Summer Rains, Hot Winter, and Cast Lead, we use the Economic Cooperation Foundation's (ECF) interactive database on the Israeli Palestinian Conflict (Economic Cooperation Foundation, 2019). We date Operation Autumn Clouds according to official statements of the IDF (Israel Defense Forces, 2019). We date the Gaza Blockade based on the approach of Etkes and Zimring (2015). Since our time unit in the analysis is quarterly,

⁵ Etkes and Zimring likewise argue that the West Bank is a valid counterfactual for the Gaza Strip, and conduct a difference-in-differences estimate of the economic impact of the Gaza blockade (2015). Until 2007, these two regions had similar political and economic institutions, and generally experienced the same economic trends, at least before and after the blockade (Etkes and Zimring, 2015). Furthermore, as Figure 1 shows, trends in supporting militant factions were similar between Gaza and the West Bank prior to the operations and events we study. We get a similar trend even when we take a more conservative approach and compare the Gaza Strip only to the five most similar district of the West Bank, based on Hansen and Klopfer's (2006) matching method (Figure A1).

⁶ These operations were described in the background section.

⁷ While this is not an operation enacted by Israel, it is still a large-scale armed operation occurring within the civilian population of Gaza. Because it was enacted by a Palestinian armed group, it can be thought of as a counterfactual to operations enacted on Gazans by Israel.

we define for each event a set of quarters in which it took place. The full list of events, dates, and quarters can be found in Table IV.

Table IV in here

In our analysis, we combine three datasets on the West Bank and Gaza Strip: The PLFS dataset, the Palestinian fatalities dataset, and the public opinion dataset. The combined dataset allows us to examine the relationship between the Israeli policies and political preferences of individual i in district d , during quarter q of year y . Our baseline difference-in-differences regression exploits several sources of variation: (i) time variation before, during, and after each policy, (ii) geographic variation across regions (Gaza Strip which was affected by the policy vs. West Bank which was not), and (iii) geographic variation within regions and across districts (5 districts in Gaza Strip and 11 districts in the West Bank). We use the following multinomial regression model for outcomes k of individual i given a set of linear predictors contained in Ω_i , as shown in Equations (1) and (2):

$$P_i(\Omega_i) \quad (1)$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \Omega_i = & \alpha + \beta_1 \cdot Gaza_d + \beta_2 \cdot Treatment_{yq} + \beta_3 \cdot Gaza_d \cdot Treatment_{yq} + \\ & \beta_4 \cdot Fatalities_{d,yq} + \beta_5 \cdot Fatalities_{d,yq-1} + \beta_6 \cdot Unemployment_{d,yq} + \\ & \beta_7 \cdot Wage_{d,yq} + \beta_8 \cdot X_i + \beta_9 \cdot district_d + \beta_{10} \cdot quarter_{yq} + \varepsilon_{i,d,yq} \quad (2) \end{aligned}$$

The dependent variable is the probability of the individual to support one of the three political blocks, with *moderate* as the baseline. *Gaza* is an indicator equals to one for Gaza residents and zero for West Bank residents. *Treatment* is a vector of P dummy variables, each referring to a policy or event in Table IV, and each equal to one during the time the specific policy p was in effect and to zero otherwise. *Gaza* · *Treatment* is a vector of interaction terms between the *Gaza* dummy and the *Treatment* dummies. *Fatalities* is the number of Palestinian fatalities in the district during the quarter or lagged by one quarter. *Unemployment* is the quarterly

unemployment rate in the district. *Wage* is the quarterly average real daily wage in the district. X is a vector of individual characteristics, such as gender, age, marital status, education level, refugee status, type of residence (city, village or refugee camp), and labour market participation characteristics (e.g. unemployed vs. employed). *district* and *quarter* are district-level and time-period controls. ε is the robust, district-clustered, error term.

For a given policy p , such as the blockade, β_1 is the average difference in political attitudes between a Gazan and a West Bank resident. β_2 is the average change in the opinion of West Bank residents during the quarters this policy took place. β_3 is our difference-in-differences estimate which represents the average change in opinions, caused by the policy, among Palestinians in Gaza. This is identified by comparing the gap in public opinion between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank during the quarters the policy took place with the gap when it did not.

6. Results

We present our results in Tables V and VI. For clarity's sake, we take as our dependent variable the odds ratio between the *militant* and *moderate* variables. We start by aggregating all events and policies into a single treatment variable, and report the results in column 1 of Table V. We find that the odds of Gazans supporting militants during treated quarters were about 1.291 times that of West Bankers. These events and policies, however, are not necessarily comparable, and we therefore disaggregate them. We first limit the treatment to only Israeli military operations (Summer Rains, Autumn Clouds, Hot Winter and Cast Lead), and find no significant difference between Gazans and West Bankers, with both becoming about 1.423 times likelier to support militant factions (Table V, column 2). We then add separate treatment variables for the blockade (column 3) and the Hamas takeover, and find that the during the Gaza blockade Gazans were 1.411-1.421 times likelier to support militants compared to West Bankers, while all Palestinians were about 1.48 times likelier to support militant factions during the takeover.

Table V in here

To better understand the contribution of each event or policy to the explanatory power of our model, we perform six separate regressions and add the treatment and interaction variables sequentially and chronologically. The order of addition and the results of the regression are presented in Table VI. In Figure 3 we present the net effect associated with each event to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Only two treatments have a significantly different effect on Palestinians in the Gaza Strip compared to Palestinians in the West Bank and are robust to the inclusion of all treatments. These are the Gaza Blockade, during which the odds of Gazans supporting militant factions were 1.399-1.452 times that of West Bankers (Table V, columns 4-6), and Operation Cast Lead, when the odds of Gazans supporting militant factions were 0.554 times that of West Bankers (Table V, column 6). The results for the blockade and military operations are robust to omitting the Hamas takeover variable (Table V, column 5). Lagged fatalities appear to be consistently associated with an increase in the odds of supporting militant factions (Table V, columns 1-6), consistent with the idea that exposure to violence may radicalize civilians. The coefficients for average wage and unemployment rate are consistently statistically insignificant in all models (Table V and VI, all columns).

Table VI in here

6.1. *Sensitivity analysis*

We perform three types of sensitivity analyses: (1) sensitivity to alternative specifications of the model, (2) sensitivity to assumptions about the general trend in Palestinian Public opinion and (3) sensitivity to OLS analysis.

The sensitivity to alternative specifications analysis is required due to possible correlations between some of the variables. The first possible source of multicollinearity is between the period of the blockade and military operations that occurred during it. This correlation was accounted for by sequentially adding the treatment and interaction variables, as shown in Table VII. The second source of multicollinearity is between the treatment and interaction terms and fatalities. The

omission of fatalities from the model does not alter the results significantly (Table VII, column 1). The third potential source is between fatalities and lagged fatalities. However, omitting either lagged fatalities (Table VII, column 2) or fatalities (Table VII, column 3) does not alter the results for either of these variables. The fourth potential source is between the treatment and interaction terms and unemployment increases and average wages. The omission of unemployment and wages, however, does not change the results for the treatment and interaction variables (Table VII, columns 4-6)⁸.

Table VII in here

The second sensitivity test is required to rule out the alternative interpretation that the radicalization observed during the Gaza blockade is not related to the blockade but rather is part of a general trend in radicalization within the Gaza Strip. To address this, we add the polynomial *Trend* and the interaction term $Gaza_d \cdot Trend_{yq}$, as shown on Equations (3) and (4):⁹

$$P_i(\Omega_i) \quad (3)$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \Omega_i = & \alpha + \beta_1 \cdot Gaza_d + \beta_2 \cdot Treatment_{yq} + \beta_3 \cdot Gaza_d \cdot Treatment_{yq} + \\ & \beta_4 \cdot Trend_{yq} + \beta_5 \cdot Gaza_d \cdot Trend_{yq} + \beta_6 \cdot Fatalities_{d,yq} + \\ & \beta_7 \cdot Unemployment_{d,yq} + \beta_8 \cdot Wage_{d,yq} + \beta_9 \cdot X_i + \beta_{10} \cdot district_d \\ & + \beta_{11} \cdot quarter_{yq} + \varepsilon_{i,d,yq} \quad (4) \end{aligned}$$

We tested the model with different assumptions regarding the trend (linear, squared, or cubic; the existence of different trends for Gaza or the lack of it). Regardless

⁸ Results shown in Table VII do not include the sequential addition of event. We show the sequential regressions for the sensitivity analysis in Tables A1-A7 in the appendix

⁹ Note that in this model, we do not include dummies for the quarter, because of possible multicollinearity with the trend variables

of the assumptions we make on the time-trend, our findings on fatalities and the Cast Lead-Gaza interaction hold. On the other hand, our finding on the effect of the Blockade-Gaza interaction depends on whether our time-trend assumption holds (Table VIII). The Blockade-Gaza interaction is statistically insignificant for specifications with a Gaza-specific time trend (Table VIII, columns 1-3). It is only significant when we assume an identical trend between Gaza Strip and the West Bank (Table VIII, columns 4-6). The Summer Rains-Gaza interaction is almost opposite and is only significant if we assume different time trends between the two regions (Table VIII, columns 1-3), or a shared linear time trend (Table VIII, column 6)¹⁰.

Does our original assumption regarding the lack of distinct time trends hold? When assuming a linear (Table VIII, column 3) or squared (Table VIII, column 2) form, there is a statistically significant difference between the Gaza and West Bank trends, but not when assuming a cubic form (Table VIII, column 1). Furthermore, the model's R^2 decreases when adding time trends, compared to the baseline model in Table VI. It is therefore not completely clear whether our results merely reflect a general trend of radicalization of Gazans, which is not necessarily explained by the 2007-2010 blockade.

Another sensitivity test examines whether the results hold when using an OLS analysis instead of multinomial. We run three OLS regressions with the same independent variables in equations (1) and (2). In each regression, the dependent variable is a binary variable receiving the value of one if the respondent supports the militant, moderate or other blocks, respectively. We present the results in Table AXIV. Many results from the benchmark model are robust to the OLS model: all the *treatment* variables that increased the odds of supporting militant factions (Table VI, column 6) are significantly associated with supporting militant factions (Table AXIV, column 1). Like the benchmark model, the Gaza blockade has a radicalizing effect on Gazans, increasing their militant faction support by about nine percentage points (Table AXIV, column 1). The moderating effect of Operation Cast Lead in Gaza is also robust, increasing support of moderate factions by about 12 percentage points (Table AXIV, column 2). The effect of lagged fatalities is robust to the OLS model as well. Unlike

¹⁰ Results shown in Table VIII do not include the sequential addition of event. We show the sequential regressions for the sensitivity analysis in Tables AVIII-AXIII in the appendix

the benchmark model, the Hamas takeover has a significant radicalizing effect in Gaza (Table AXIV, column 1).

The final sensitivity test runs the basic model presented in Tables V and VI but limits the data to the period after the Hamas takeover (2007q3-2011q2). We present the results in Table AXV. When limiting the data to that period, only one treatment variable shows significant difference between the West Bank and Gaza Strip – "Israeli military operation" (column 4), but it is not robust to the inclusion of other treatment variables (column 5).

7. Discussion

We have tested for the validity of two theories regarding support of militant factions: the deterrence approach, and the boomerang approach. We performed this analysis in the context of the Gaza Strip during the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. Consistent with the existing literature (Jaeger, Klor, Miaari, & Paserman, 2012), fatalities are associated with public opinion radicalization, which is evidence of the boomerang effect. After controlling for fatalities and socioeconomic variables, however, results are less conclusive. Most policies and events are not associated with public opinion changes specific to Gaza. Only the Gaza Blockade is associated with radicalization in Gaza, and only operations Summer Rains and Cast Lead are associated with deradicalization in Gaza. For the former two, our sensitivity analysis suggest that these findings may be due to noise or due to a more general, unexplained trend.

Moreover, our model explains less than 5% of the variance in Palestinian public opinion¹¹. The evidence for both deterrence and boomerang effects is therefore weak. We believe that our results weaken the claim that Israeli policies in the Gaza Strip can turn public opinion against Hamas. The indicators for two of the military operation may indicate de-radicalization, but since both of them included massive loss of Palestinian life and since fatalities are strongly associated with radicalization, the net effect is unlikely to be deterrence. Our results also provide novel evidence on the persistent support of militant factions in Gaza under the existing conditions. Changing this pattern requires both political and economic reconstruction.

¹¹ This can also reflect a data limitation – our dependent variable is individual-level, but our independent variables of interest are either clustered on the district level (fatalities) or the region level (Treatment * Gaza). This reduces the possible variance in the model.

7.1. Hamas as a moderate faction

After taking over the Gaza Strip in 2007, Hamas has become increasingly transformed from a rejectionist and revolutionary movement into a more conciliatory government of the Gaza Strip. Often, Hamas polices the border, trying to stop other factions, like the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, from firing rockets or mortars at Israel (Abrahams 2020). One might argue that within the Gaza Strip, Hamas is the moderate choice for civilians to support.

To address this criticism, we must first understand which factions does the Gazan public consider as militant. The support of Hamas' main alternative, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, has remained low¹², compared to Hamas or Fatah, throughout the period described in the data, even in the Gaza Strip (Figure A2). We do, however, see an increase in the share of the "other" block, on the expense of the militant block, although it predates the Hamas takeover (Figure 2). If the criticism holds true, then radicalization may also be manifested by abandoning both moderate and militant factions in favor of the "other" block. The results in column 3 of Table AXIV show us which variables can explain such transition. The coefficient for residing in the Gaza Strip is significant and negative, indicating that Gazans are, on average, less likely to support this political block. The only variable that significantly contributes to the support of this block is non-lagged fatalities, but considering the opposite effect of lagged fatalities, this effect is only short-term. These results imply that Israeli military actions did not significantly affected Palestinian or Gazan political preferences in that direction.

7.2. Militant factions' support as an instigator of Israel-Gaza violence

Another potential challenge to our study is the plausible story that bouts of conflict with Israel precede changes in militant factions' support among Palestinians, and specifically changes in the support gap between the West Bank and Gaza.¹³ If true, our regression analysis faces an endogeneity concern.

If support among Palestinians for militancy is waning before military operations, then how should we interpret our null findings above? Since our outcome variable of

¹² The same is true for other radical factions mentioned in Table I, such as the Democratic and Popular Fronts for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP and PFLP)

¹³ We thank an anonymous reviewer for prompting us to consider this endogeneity issue.

interest is the gap in public opinion between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, the overall pre-violence trend of Palestinian support for militancy is not a concern; only the gap in trends between the two territories. If operations start when that gap is widening, then there would be a tendency to find a positive effect of Israeli invasions on the public opinion gap even in the absence of one. As it happens, however, we do not find much evidence of any effect, so this particular endogeneity concern seems less applicable to our study. On the other hand, if operations start when the gap is narrowing, then this would tend to mask the effect of Israeli violence on the territorial gap in Palestinian support for militancy. Since we do indeed observe a limited impact, this particular type of endogeneity bias worries us, especially if there is a pattern of either significant increase or decrease in the gap. In Figure A3 we plot the change in the gap of militant factions' support share between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (the difference-in-difference over time). In the periods immediately before Operation Summer Rains and Operation Hot Winter, the change in the gap is very small compared to other changes, both during the operations and across the timeline (-0.7 and -2.5 percentage points, respectively). The change immediately before Operation Cast Lead is larger, a gap increase of about 3.5 percentage points. Overall, we observe no single pattern of an increase or a decrease in the gap stems from these results. This finding can discourage some of our doubts. Nevertheless, this remains a concern, and interpretation of our results should be qualified by this consideration.

7.3. Authenticity of professed political preferences under an authoritarian regime

During the time period depicted in the data, residents of the Gaza Strip were living under an increasingly authoritarian regime.¹⁴ It is therefore possible that they are

¹⁴ Freedom House (2017a), for example, lists the Gaza Strip as "not free", as early as 2017, and depicts earlier authoritarian tendencies that predate this year. While the West Bank is also considered "not free" (Freedom House, 2017b), its indicators for political rights and civil liberties are higher, compared to the Gaza Strip.

unwilling to respond to surveys truthfully and or may be shading their opinion.¹⁵ Such a phenomenon is not unheard of in non-democratic regime (Moyo-Nyede, 2020 provide a notable and recent example). If there is a significant effect, we would expect to see smaller variance in the data and lower support for Fatah and other non-Hamas factions following 2007. However, Figures 1 and A2 indicate that even following the Hamas takeover there was significant variance in political preferences of Gazans over time, and Fatah maintained a large base of supporters in that region. One might point at the general trend of increased support of militants within the Gaza Strip as evidence for reluctance to respond truthfully. However, Figure 1 indicates that this trend may predate the Hamas takeover, and as we discuss in section 6.1, our results on little to no effect for military operations hold when considering the trend.¹⁶

8. Concluding remarks

Do state policies of collective punishment discourage or provoke civilian support for militants? The question is of interest to asymmetric conflicts around the world. In this article we offered evidence from the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Whereas previous research on this conflict has focused almost exclusively on the West Bank, or on the Second Intifada (2000-2004), our paper is one of only a few to focus on the Gaza Strip and include data from after the 2006-7 Fatah-Hamas conflict.

Our findings are inconclusive. Despite our best efforts to uncover a gap between support for militant factions in the Gaza Strip versus the West Bank, we find that public opinion responded neither significantly nor persistently to Israel's blockade and military invasions of Gaza over the 1998-2011 period. As such, our evidence validates neither Israel's presumptive logic of deterrence – where Palestinian support for militancy is theorized to erode in the face of collective punishment – nor the counter-argument often voiced by critics, that Israel's harsh policies towards Gaza only serve to radicalize Gazans relative to their West Bank counterparts.

¹⁵ We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing up this important point.


¹⁶ The same can be said about a possible concern that respondents in the West Bank are masking their preferences – Hamas maintains strong support in the West Bank following 2007, and the overall trend of increasing militancy gap between regions predates 2007 and does not qualitatively change results.

Our study faces substantial limitations and the findings should be interpreted with caution. Our public opinion data run only to 2011, neglecting the eventful 2011-2014 period. Notably, however, the single study that does cover that period (Abrahams et al 2019) reaches broadly similar conclusions. The West Bank, meanwhile, is inevitably an imperfect counterfactual for the Gaza Strip, and so the same caveats raised by Etkes and Zimring (2015) apply here. Finally, some concerns on the direction of causality still remain. It remains possible and indeed plausible that future research with more granular data or a longer time series will manage to show sustained and significant impacts on public opinion. While awaiting such work, however, the inconclusive findings of this study should give pause to policymakers and pundits supportive of Israel's continued security measures against the Gaza Strip. Against the uncertain efficacy of these policies we must weigh the very real certainty of death, destruction, and despair, that these policies are well known to cause. Ought these policies to continue until scholars finally discover the optimal combination of data and method to prove them ineffective? Or should the burden of proof lie instead with proponents of the blockade and the invasions, to offer rigorous evidence that the benefits outweigh the costs? We hope that our study will prompt further investigation by scholars and more circumspection by decision-makers vis a vis the use of force in the Israel-Gaza conflict.

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
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Source: PCPSR surveys, authors' adaptation

This is the share of militant factions supporters in the West Bank compared to the share in the Gaza Strip. Boxed area marks period of the Gaza blockade


Figure 1: share of respondents who support militant factions in Gaza Strip and the West Bank, 1998q1-2011q2



Source: PCPSR surveys, authors' adaptation

Boxed area marks the Gaza blockade

Figure 2: Share of respondents support for various political blocks by quarter, 1998q1-2011q2



Source: Table V, column 6

The blue columns are the vector of coefficients β_{2p} , that represent the average change in the opinion of West Bank residents during the quarters each policy p took place. The red columns are the vector of sums $\beta_{2p} + \beta_{3p}$, the average change in the opinion of Gaza Strip residents during the quarters each policy p took place.

Figure 3: Changes in odds of supporting militant factions due to policies and events

Table I: Factions classification

<i>Faction</i>	<i>Classification</i>
DFLP	Militant
Fateh	Moderate
h.al-sha'b	Moderate
Hamas	Militant
PFLP	Militant
Fida	Moderate
Independent Islamists	Militant
Independent Nationalists	Militant
Independent	Other
Islamic Jihad	Militant
Others	Other
No one	Other
PPP	Moderate
Independent leftist	Militant
National initiative (almubadara al wa-taniyya)	Moderate
Third Way headed by salam feyyad	Moderate

Source: *Calì and Miaari (2017)*

Not all factions appear in all surveys

Table II: Descriptive statistics for public opinion dataset

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>
Moderate	0.371	0.483
Militant	0.318	0.466
Other/don't know	0.311	0.463
Female	0.509	0.500
Married	0.757	0.429
Refugee	0.436	0.496
Occupation:		
Student	0.085	0.279
Waged laborers	0.091	0.287
Housewives	0.408	0.491
Employee/Low-Professional	0.141	0.348
Merchants	0.053	0.223
Farmers	0.017	0.128
Craftsmen	0.072	0.258
High Professional	0.008	0.091
Unemployed	0.108	0.310
Retired	0.018	0.133
Sector:		
Public	0.112	0.315
Private	0.257	0.437
Other/no work	0.632	0.482
Locality type:		
City	0.418	0.493
Village/town	0.412	0.492
Refugee camp	0.171	0.376
Age group:		
18-24	0.215	0.411
25-31	0.212	0.409
32-38	0.178	0.382
39-45	0.157	0.364
46-52	0.095	0.293
53+	0.143	0.350
Education level:		

Illiterate	0.106	0.307
Elementary	0.154	0.361
Preperatory	0.242	0.428
Secondary	0.295	0.456
College	0.084	0.278
BA	0.109	0.312
MA & over	0.010	0.101

Source: PCPSR surveys, authors' adaptation

Table III: descriptive statistics for PLFS dataset and fatalities

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>
Unemployment rate	0.221	0.105
Real daily wage	74.734	16.805
Fatalities	8.391	28.456

Source: PLFS surveys and B'Tselem, authors' adaptation

Table IV: List of treatment indicators

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Period</i>
Operation "Summer Rains"	28 June-26 November 2006	2006q3- 2006q4
Operation "Autumn Clouds"	31 October-8 November 2006	2006q4
Hamas' takeover of Gaza	10-15 June 2007	2007q2
Gaza Blockade	19 September 2007-June 2010	2007q4- 2010q2
Operation "Hot Winter"	28 February-3 March 2008	2008q1
Operation "Cast Lead"	27 December 2008-18 January 2009	2009q1

Source: *Economic Cooperation Foundation (2019); Israel Defense Forces (2019)*

Table V: Results with aggregated treatment variables

Variables	Militant	Militant	Militant	Militant	Militant
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Gaza	0.939	0.979	0.962	0.955	0.959
	(0.0452)	(0.0548)	(0.0486)	(0.0470)	(0.0501)
Treatment	0.849				
	(0.102)				
Gaza * Treatment	1.291**				
	(0.129)				
Israeli military operation		1.423**	1.687***	1.701***	
		(0.209)	(0.197)	(0.197)	
Gaza * Israeli military operation		0.881	0.831*	0.841*	
		(0.0955)	(0.0899)	(0.0873)	
Blockade			0.828	0.824	0.821*
			(0.0972)	(0.0975)	(0.0963)
Gaza * blockade			1.411***	1.421***	1.443***
			(0.149)	(0.153)	(0.166)
Hamas Takeover				1.480***	
				(0.183)	
Gaza * Hamas takeover				1.271	
				(0.190)	
Summer Rains					1.991***
					(0.231)
Autumn Clouds					0.901
					(0.125)
Hot Winter					1.786***
					(0.182)
Cast Lead					1.902***
					(0.208)
Gaza * Summer Rains					0.775*
					(0.111)
Gaza * Autumn Clouds					1.320
					(0.252)

Gaza * Hot Winter					0.877 (0.131)
Gaza * Cast Lead					0.535** (0.146)
Fatalities	1.000 (0.000398)	1.000 (0.000415)	1.000 (0.000416)	1.000 (0.000404)	1.001 (0.000570)
Lagged Fatalities	1.001*** (0.000206)	1.001*** (0.000246)	1.001*** (0.000217)	1.001*** (0.000218)	1.001*** (0.000197)
Unemployment Rate	1.190 (0.405)	1.600 (0.566)	1.145 (0.368)	1.151 (0.365)	1.101 (0.386)
Average real wage	0.998 (0.00142)	0.998 (0.00142)	0.999 (0.00144)	0.999 (0.00146)	0.998 (0.00146)
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R2	0.0444	0.0438	0.0444	0.0446	0.0445
Observations	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454

*The regressions are estimated using a multinomial logit. Coefficients are odds ratios between supporting militant and moderate factions. **Other controls include:** gender, age, marital status, education level, refugee status, type of residence (city, village or refugee camp), occupation, employment sector, and dummies for district and quarter. See Table 2 for the definitions of the independent variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.*

Table VI: Results with disaggregated treatment variables

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gaza	0.977	0.978	0.973	0.947	0.948	0.953
	(0.0515)	(0.0514)	(0.0508)	(0.0439)	(0.0447)	(0.0491)
Summer Rains	1.871***	1.961***	1.957***	1.994***	1.995***	1.988***
	(0.207)	(0.236)	(0.235)	(0.228)	(0.229)	(0.231)
Autumn Clouds		0.911	0.911	0.902	0.902	0.901
		(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.125)
Hamas Takeover			1.469***	1.479***	1.479***	1.473***
			(0.186)	(0.183)	(0.183)	(0.182)
Blockade				0.828	0.829	0.818*
				(0.101)	(0.0994)	(0.0965)
Hot Winter					1.770***	1.789***
					(0.183)	(0.183)
Cast Lead						1.905***
						(0.209)
Gaza * Summer Rains	0.832**	0.733**	0.737**	0.811	0.811	0.784*
	(0.0739)	(0.0911)	(0.0896)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.109)
Gaza * Autumn Clouds		1.290	1.287	1.303	1.304	1.316
		(0.248)	(0.248)	(0.254)	(0.254)	(0.253)
Gaza * Hamas takeover			1.194	1.300*	1.299*	1.230
			(0.191)	(0.205)	(0.204)	(0.189)
Gaza * blockade				1.399***	1.402***	1.452***
				(0.162)	(0.165)	(0.169)
Gaza * Hot Winter					0.951	0.882
					(0.122)	(0.130)
Gaza * Cast Lead						0.554**
						(0.142)
Fatalities	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.001
	(0.000358)	(0.000361)	(0.000362)	(0.000391)	(0.000389)	(0.000537)
Lagged Fatalities	1.001***	1.001***	1.001***	1.001***	1.001***	1.001***
	(0.000253)	(0.000255)	(0.000257)	(0.000208)	(0.000206)	(0.000201)
Unemployment Rate	1.632	1.625	1.641	1.159	1.153	1.108

	(0.581)	(0.579)	(0.584)	(0.372)	(0.375)	(0.382)
Average real wage	0.998	0.998	0.998	0.998	0.998	0.998
	(0.00141)	(0.00140)	(0.00142)	(0.00144)	(0.00145)	(0.00148)
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R ²	0.0437	0.0437	0.0438	0.0445	0.0446	0.0447
Observations	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454

*The regressions are estimated using a multinomial logit. Coefficients are odds ratios between supporting militant and moderate factions. **Other controls include:** gender, age, marital status, education level, refugee status, type of residence (city, village or refugee camp), occupation, employment sector, and dummies for district and quarter. See Table 2 for the definitions of the independent variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.*

Table VII: Multicollinearity sensitivity analysis results

Variables	Militant	Militant	Militant	Militant	Militant	Militant
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gaza	0.947 (0.0446)	0.953 (0.0480)	0.950 (0.0463)	0.981 (0.0498)	0.974 (0.0495)	0.978 (0.0488)
Summer Rains	2.013*** (0.231)	2.004*** (0.231)	1.992*** (0.231)	2.032*** (0.218)	2.057*** (0.219)	2.039*** (0.218)
Autumn Clouds	0.902 (0.126)	0.902 (0.126)	0.901 (0.125)	0.902 (0.122)	0.902 (0.122)	0.901 (0.122)
Hamas Takeover	1.489*** (0.184)	1.483*** (0.182)	1.476*** (0.183)	1.504*** (0.182)	1.520*** (0.185)	1.508*** (0.184)
Blockade	0.808* (0.0956)	0.811* (0.0967)	0.816* (0.0958)	0.836 (0.0961)	0.825* (0.0960)	0.834 (0.0957)
Hot Winter	1.829*** (0.188)	1.815*** (0.189)	1.795*** (0.182)	1.798*** (0.181)	1.839*** (0.187)	1.805*** (0.180)
Cast Lead	1.944*** (0.215)	1.932*** (0.213)	1.910*** (0.209)	1.909*** (0.201)	1.949*** (0.207)	1.915*** (0.202)
Gaza * Summer Rains	0.813 (0.113)	0.783* (0.109)	0.803 (0.110)	0.782* (0.114)	0.813 (0.117)	0.802 (0.114)
Gaza * Autumn Clouds	1.352 (0.257)	1.370* (0.254)	1.299 (0.253)	1.322 (0.256)	1.357 (0.260)	1.304 (0.256)
Gaza * Hamas takeover	1.295* (0.197)	1.223 (0.191)	1.276 (0.195)	1.222 (0.186)	1.289* (0.194)	1.270 (0.193)
Gaza * blockade	1.511*** (0.188)	1.492*** (0.183)	1.460*** (0.171)	1.477*** (0.148)	1.537*** (0.164)	1.488*** (0.149)
Gaza * Hot Winter	0.890 (0.123)	0.864 (0.126)	0.900 (0.127)	0.863 (0.116)	0.872 (0.112)	0.880 (0.116)
Gaza * Cast Lead	0.682** (0.131)	0.570** (0.149)	0.616*** (0.108)	0.552** (0.136)	0.681** (0.126)	0.616*** (0.103)
Fatalities		1.001 (0.000532)		1.001 (0.000520)		
Lagged Fatalities			1.001***	1.001***		1.001***

			(0.000228)	(0.000200)		(0.000223)
Unemployment Rate	1.113	1.113	1.122			
	(0.374)	(0.374)	(0.377)			
Average real wage	0.998	0.998	0.998			
	(0.00157)	(0.00157)	(0.00147)			
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R ²	0.0445	0.0445	0.0446	0.0446	0.0445	0.0446
Observations	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454

*The regressions are estimated using a multinomial logit. Coefficients are odds ratios between supporting militant and moderate factions. **Other controls include:** gender, age, marital status, education level, refugee status, type of residence (city, village or refugee camp), occupation, employment sector, and dummies for district and quarter. See Table 2 for the definitions of the independent variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.*


Table VIII: Time-trend sensitivity analysis results

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gaza	0.730*	0.768**	0.650***	0.874**	0.883**	0.799***
	(0.136)	(0.0979)	(0.0823)	(0.0527)	(0.0540)	(0.0577)
Summer Rains	1.142	1.080	1.272***	1.107	1.035	1.217**
	(0.122)	(0.104)	(0.114)	(0.117)	(0.101)	(0.117)
Autumn Clouds	0.941	0.936	0.946	0.941	0.935	0.947
	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.127)	(0.129)	(0.129)	(0.127)
Hamas Takeover	0.948	0.885	1.018	0.906	0.834	0.969
	(0.111)	(0.0986)	(0.132)	(0.111)	(0.0976)	(0.128)
Blockade	0.835**	0.789***	0.702***	0.737***	0.690***	0.651***
	(0.0630)	(0.0567)	(0.0611)	(0.0797)	(0.0703)	(0.0648)
Hot Winter	1.238**	1.220**	1.380***	1.293**	1.269**	1.397***
	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.162)	(0.133)	(0.130)	(0.162)
Cast Lead	1.572***	1.558***	1.548***	1.570***	1.555***	1.546***
	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.107)	(0.108)	(0.107)	(0.106)
Gaza * Summer Rains	0.704***	0.679***	0.618***	0.762*	0.759*	0.687**
	(0.0928)	(0.0966)	(0.0888)	(0.108)	(0.110)	(0.110)
Gaza * Autumn Clouds	1.279	1.282	1.243	1.289	1.294	1.248
	(0.242)	(0.241)	(0.219)	(0.242)	(0.243)	(0.219)
Gaza * Hamas takeover	1.087	1.039	1.042	1.259	1.248	1.197
	(0.259)	(0.183)	(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.196)	(0.203)
Gaza * blockade	0.990	0.970	0.919	1.332**	1.339**	1.120
	(0.129)	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.161)	(0.164)	(0.149)
Gaza * Hot Winter	1.061	1.036	1.138	0.972	0.961	1.104
	(0.142)	(0.151)	(0.181)	(0.138)	(0.137)	(0.171)
Gaza * Cast Lead	0.584**	0.578**	0.494**	0.581**	0.574**	0.479**
	(0.144)	(0.145)	(0.139)	(0.144)	(0.146)	(0.138)
Fatalities	1.000	1.000	1.001*	1.000	1.000	1.001*
	(0.000441)	(0.000468)	(0.000569)	(0.000474)	(0.000519)	(0.000596)
Lagged Fatalities	1.001***	1.001***	1.002***	1.001***	1.001***	1.002***
	(0.000212)	(0.000184)	(0.000386)	(0.000218)	(0.000235)	(0.000418)
Unemployment Rate	2.017*	1.899*	7.145***	2.476**	2.338**	7.970***

	(0.774)	(0.725)	(3.025)	(1.068)	(1.004)	(3.269)
Average real wage	0.996*	0.996*	0.993*	0.996*	0.997	0.993*
	(0.00221)	(0.00225)	(0.00434)	(0.00211)	(0.00215)	(0.00382)
Trend	1.077***	1.056***	0.992***	1.077***	1.052***	0.996*
	(0.00793)	(0.00625)	(0.00262)	(0.0140)	(0.00451)	(0.00225)
Trend ²	0.998***	0.999***		0.998***	0.999***	
	(0.000412)	(0.000103)		(0.000608)	(8.84e-05)	
Trend ³	1.000**			1.000*		
	(5.73e-06)			(7.28e-06)		
Gaza * trend	1.009	0.997	1.009***			
	(0.0376)	(0.00850)	(0.00310)			
Gaza * trend ²	1.000	1.000**				
	(0.00171)	(0.000142)				
Gaza * trend ³	1.000					
	(2.05e-05)					
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R2	0.0408	0.0379	0.0342	0.0398	0.037	0.0337
Observations	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454

*The regressions are estimated using a multinomial logit. Coefficients are odds ratios between supporting militant and moderate factions. **Other controls include:** gender, age, marital status, education level, refugee status, type of residence (city, village or refugee camp), occupation, employment sector, and dummies for district. See Table 2 for the definitions of the independent variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.*


Online appendix: additional figures and tables



Source: PCPSR surveys, authors' adaptation


This is the share of militant factions supporters in the Gaza Strip, compared to the share in the five West Bank districts most similar to the Gaza Strip districts. These districts include Hebron, Nablus, Jenin, Qalqilya and Tulkarem. To construct this list, we used the optimal pair matching method of Hansen and Klopfer (2006) to match the five Gaza Strip districts with five West Bank districts on the variables of average wage, unemployment and fatalities. Boxed area marks period of the Gaza blockade.

Figure A1: share of respondents who support militant factions in Gaza Strip and in the five West Bank districts most similar to Gaza Strip districts, 1998q1-2011q2



Source: PCPSR surveys, authors' adaptation

Figure A2: share of respondents who support Fatah, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza Strip, 1998q1-2011q2



Source: PCPSR surveys, authors' adaptation

This figure depicts the change in the gap of militant factions' support share between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank – the difference-in-difference over time. Boxed areas mark quarters with military operations. They are, from left to right, Operations Summer Rains and Autumn Clouds (both partly overlap and are represented as one box), Operation Hot Winter and Operation Cast Lead.

Figure A3: Change in the militancy gap between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank

Table AI: Sensitivity analysis results – no fatalities variables

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gaza	0.978	0.979	0.974	0.945	0.947	0.947
	(0.0502)	(0.0502)	(0.0493)	(0.0435)	(0.0443)	(0.0446)
Summer Rains	1.913***	1.984***	1.979***	2.008***	2.010***	2.013***
	(0.212)	(0.235)	(0.234)	(0.229)	(0.230)	(0.231)
Autumn Clouds		0.913	0.913	0.903	0.902	0.902
		(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.126)
Hamas Takeover			1.486***	1.488***	1.489***	1.489***
			(0.188)	(0.184)	(0.184)	(0.184)
Blockade				0.822	0.822*	0.808*
				(0.0991)	(0.0977)	(0.0956)
Hot Winter					1.795***	1.829***
					(0.184)	(0.188)
Cast Lead						1.944***
						(0.215)
Gaza * Summer Rains	0.861*	0.743**	0.746**	0.811	0.812	0.813
	(0.0783)	(0.0946)	(0.0937)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.113)
Gaza * Autumn Clouds		1.342	1.342	1.352	1.352	1.352
		(0.254)	(0.254)	(0.257)	(0.257)	(0.257)
Gaza * Hamas takeover			1.224	1.295*	1.295*	1.295*
			(0.186)	(0.197)	(0.197)	(0.197)
Gaza * blockade				1.435***	1.443***	1.511***
				(0.172)	(0.177)	(0.188)
Gaza * Hot Winter					0.933	0.890
					(0.119)	(0.123)
Gaza * Cast Lead						0.682**
						(0.131)
Unemployment Rate	1.750	1.741	1.755	1.150	1.140	1.113
	(0.637)	(0.636)	(0.640)	(0.369)	(0.371)	(0.374)
Average real wage	0.998	0.998	0.998	0.999	0.999	0.998

	(0.00154)	(0.00153)	(0.00155)	(0.00151)	(0.00153)	(0.00157)
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R ²	0.0435	0.0435	0.0436	0.0444	0.0445	0.0445
Observations	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454

*The regressions are estimated using a multinomial logit. Coefficients are odds ratios between supporting militant and moderate factions. **Other controls include:** gender, age, marital status, education level, refugee status, type of residence (city, village or refugee camp), occupation, employment sector and dummies for district and quarter. See Table 2 for the definitions of the independent variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.*

Table All: Sensitivity analysis results – non-lagged fatalities variable only

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gaza	0.978	0.979	0.975	0.946	0.947	0.953
	(0.0510)	(0.0510)	(0.0503)	(0.0431)	(0.0439)	(0.0480)
Summer Rains	1.908***	1.976***	1.972***	2.008***	2.010***	2.004***
	(0.213)	(0.236)	(0.235)	(0.228)	(0.229)	(0.231)
Autumn Clouds		0.912	0.912	0.903	0.902	0.902
		(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.126)
Hamas Takeover			1.480***	1.488***	1.489***	1.483***
			(0.186)	(0.183)	(0.183)	(0.182)
Blockade				0.822	0.822	0.811*
				(0.101)	(0.0995)	(0.0967)
Hot Winter					1.795***	1.815***
					(0.189)	(0.189)
Cast Lead						1.932***
						(0.213)
Gaza * Summer Rains	0.843*	0.723***	0.727***	0.809	0.809	0.783*
	(0.0759)	(0.0858)	(0.0839)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.109)
Gaza * Autumn Clouds		1.359*	1.358*	1.353	1.354	1.370*
		(0.248)	(0.248)	(0.255)	(0.255)	(0.254)
Gaza * Hamas takeover			1.169	1.290	1.289	1.223
			(0.199)	(0.208)	(0.207)	(0.191)
Gaza * blockade				1.433***	1.441***	1.492***
				(0.176)	(0.180)	(0.183)
Gaza * Hot Winter					0.930	0.864
					(0.118)	(0.126)
Gaza * Cast Lead						0.570**
						(0.149)
Fatalities	1.001*	1.001*	1.001	1.000	1.000	1.001
	(0.000417)	(0.000424)	(0.000435)	(0.000418)	(0.000417)	(0.000532)
Unemployment Rate	1.676	1.666	1.681	1.148	1.137	1.093

	(0.605)	(0.603)	(0.607)	(0.368)	(0.370)	(0.377)
Average real wage	0.998	0.998	0.998	0.999	0.999	0.999
	(0.00152)	(0.00150)	(0.00153)	(0.00152)	(0.00153)	(0.00156)
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R ²	0.0435	0.0436	0.0437	0.0444	0.0445	0.0446
Observations	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454

*The regressions are estimated using a multinomial logit. Coefficients are odds ratios between supporting militant and moderate factions. **Other controls include:** gender, age, marital status, education level, refugee status, type of residence (city, village or refugee camp), occupation, employment sector and dummies for district and quarter. See Table 2 for the definitions of the independent variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.*

Table AIII: Sensitivity analysis results – lagged fatalities variable only

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gaza	0.977	0.977	0.973	0.948	0.949	0.950
	(0.0512)	(0.0511)	(0.0503)	(0.0446)	(0.0454)	(0.0463)
Summer Rains	1.870***	1.963***	1.958***	1.992***	1.993***	1.992***
	(0.207)	(0.236)	(0.235)	(0.229)	(0.230)	(0.231)
Autumn Clouds		0.911	0.911	0.902	0.902	0.901
		(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.125)
Hamas Takeover			1.470***	1.477***	1.478***	1.476***
			(0.187)	(0.183)	(0.183)	(0.183)
Blockade				0.831	0.832	0.816*
				(0.0994)	(0.0980)	(0.0958)
Hot Winter					1.762***	1.795***
					(0.178)	(0.182)
Cast Lead						1.910***
						(0.209)
Gaza * Summer Rains	0.837**	0.741**	0.744**	0.803	0.803	0.803
	(0.0742)	(0.0955)	(0.0946)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.110)
Gaza * Autumn Clouds		1.278	1.278	1.311	1.311	1.299
		(0.252)	(0.252)	(0.256)	(0.256)	(0.253)
Gaza * Hamas takeo- ver			1.213	1.281	1.281	1.276
			(0.185)	(0.197)	(0.197)	(0.195)
Gaza * blockade				1.387***	1.391***	1.460***
				(0.153)	(0.157)	(0.171)
Gaza * Hot Winter					0.950	0.900
					(0.123)	(0.127)
Gaza * Cast Lead						0.616***
						(0.108)
Lagged Fatalities	1.001***	1.001***	1.001***	1.001***	1.001***	1.001***
	(0.000303)	(0.000308)	(0.000309)	(0.000233)	(0.000232)	(0.000228)
Unemployment Rate	1.653	1.648	1.661	1.160	1.153	1.122

	(0.584)	(0.584)	(0.586)	(0.371)	(0.374)	(0.377)
Average real wage	0.998	0.998	0.998	0.998	0.998	0.998
	(0.00140)	(0.00139)	(0.00141)	(0.00143)	(0.00144)	(0.00147)
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R ²	0.0437	0.0437	0.0438	0.0444	0.0445	0.0446
Observations	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454

*The regressions are estimated using a multinomial logit. Coefficients are odds ratios between supporting militant and moderate factions. **Other controls include:** gender, age, marital status, education level, refugee status, type of residence (city, village or refugee camp), occupation, employment sector and dummies for district and quarter. See Table 2 for the definitions of the independent variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.*

Table AIV: Sensitivity analysis results – no socioeconomic variables

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gaza	1.041	1.041	1.038	0.977	0.977	0.981
	(0.0541)	(0.0541)	(0.0538)	(0.0484)	(0.0484)	(0.0498)
Summer Rains	1.966***	2.077***	2.075***	2.045***	2.045***	2.032***
	(0.203)	(0.219)	(0.219)	(0.217)	(0.217)	(0.218)
Autumn Clouds		0.902	0.902	0.901	0.901	0.902
		(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.122)
Hamas Takeover			1.537***	1.513***	1.513***	1.504***
			(0.182)	(0.184)	(0.184)	(0.182)
Blockade				0.848	0.848	0.836
				(0.101)	(0.0994)	(0.0961)
Hot Winter					1.781***	1.798***
					(0.182)	(0.181)
Cast Lead						1.909***
						(0.201)
Gaza * Summer Rains	0.843**	0.739**	0.743**	0.812	0.811	0.782*
	(0.0728)	(0.0974)	(0.0957)	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.114)
Gaza * Autumn Clouds		1.302	1.301	1.310	1.310	1.322
		(0.255)	(0.254)	(0.258)	(0.258)	(0.256)
Gaza * Hamas takeover			1.164	1.292	1.291	1.222
			(0.186)	(0.202)	(0.201)	(0.186)
Gaza * blockade				1.425***	1.431***	1.477***
				(0.150)	(0.151)	(0.148)
Gaza * Hot Winter					0.928	0.863
					(0.112)	(0.116)
Gaza * Cast Lead						0.552**
						(0.136)
Fatalities	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.001
	(0.000315)	(0.000319)	(0.000318)	(0.000382)	(0.000381)	(0.000520)
Lagged Fatalities	1.001***	1.001***	1.001***	1.001***	1.001***	1.001***

	(0.000241)	(0.000248)	(0.000248)	(0.000205)	(0.000204)	(0.000200)
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R ²	0.0436	0.0436	0.0437	0.0445	0.0446	0.0446
Observations	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454

*The regressions are estimated using a multinomial logit. Coefficients are odds ratios between supporting militant and moderate factions. **Other controls include:** gender, age, marital status, education level, refugee status, type of residence (city, village or refugee camp), occupation, employment sector and dummies for district and quarter. See Table 2 for the definitions of the independent variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.*

Table AV: Sensitivity analysis results – no socioeconomic and fatalities variables

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gaza	1.048	1.048	1.044	0.974	0.974	0.974
	(0.0542)	(0.0542)	(0.0537)	(0.0494)	(0.0494)	(0.0495)
Summer Rains	2.022***	2.118***	2.115***	2.057***	2.057***	2.057***
	(0.210)	(0.220)	(0.219)	(0.219)	(0.219)	(0.219)
Autumn Clouds		0.902	0.902	0.902	0.902	0.902
		(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.122)
Hamas Takeover			1.563***	1.520***	1.520***	1.520***
			(0.185)	(0.185)	(0.185)	(0.185)
Blockade				0.841	0.840	0.825*
				(0.1000)	(0.0982)	(0.0960)
Hot Winter					1.806***	1.839***
					(0.183)	(0.187)
Cast Lead						1.949***
						(0.207)
Gaza * Summer Rains	0.878	0.754**	0.757**	0.812	0.812	0.813
	(0.0761)	(0.101)	(0.100)	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.117)
Gaza * Autumn Clouds		1.356	1.356	1.357	1.357	1.357
		(0.260)	(0.260)	(0.260)	(0.260)	(0.260)
Gaza * Hamas takeo- ver			1.200	1.289*	1.289*	1.289*
			(0.181)	(0.194)	(0.194)	(0.194)
Gaza * blockade				1.461***	1.470***	1.537***
				(0.158)	(0.159)	(0.164)
Gaza * Hot Winter					0.912	0.872
					(0.108)	(0.112)
Gaza * Cast Lead						0.681**
						(0.126)
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R ²	0.0433	0.0434	0.0435	0.0444	0.0445	0.0445
Observations	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454

*The regressions are estimated using a multinomial logit. Coefficients are odds ratios between supporting militant and moderate factions. **Other controls include:** gender, age, marital status, education level, refugee status, type of residence (city, village or refugee camp), occupation, employment sector and dummies for district and quarter. See Table 2 for the definitions of the independent variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.*

Table AVI: Sensitivity analysis results – no socioeconomic variables; non-lagged fatalities variable only

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gaza	1.043 (0.0542)	1.043 (0.0542)	1.041 (0.0538)	0.974 (0.0490)	0.974 (0.0490)	0.978 (0.0502)
Summer Rains	2.007*** (0.210)	2.096*** (0.221)	2.095*** (0.220)	2.056*** (0.218)	2.056*** (0.218)	2.044*** (0.218)
Autumn Clouds		0.902 (0.122)	0.902 (0.122)	0.902 (0.122)	0.902 (0.122)	0.902 (0.122)
Hamas Takeover			1.550*** (0.183)	1.520*** (0.184)	1.520*** (0.184)	1.512*** (0.183)
Blockade				0.841 (0.102)	0.840 (0.1000)	0.827 (0.0967)
Hot Winter					1.805*** (0.188)	1.823*** (0.187)
Cast Lead						1.935*** (0.205)
Gaza * Summer Rains	0.856* (0.0746)	0.730** (0.0921)	0.733** (0.0899)	0.810 (0.113)	0.809 (0.113)	0.781* (0.114)
Gaza * Autumn Clouds		1.375* (0.253)	1.374* (0.253)	1.358 (0.258)	1.358 (0.258)	1.374* (0.257)
Gaza * Hamas takeover			1.138 (0.195)	1.283 (0.205)	1.282 (0.204)	1.216 (0.189)
Gaza * blockade				1.458*** (0.163)	1.467*** (0.165)	1.515*** (0.160)
Gaza * Hot Winter					0.910 (0.108)	0.848 (0.112)
Gaza * Cast Lead						0.567** (0.143)
Fatalities	1.001** (0.000371)	1.001** (0.000378)	1.001** (0.000389)	1.000 (0.000410)	1.000 (0.000408)	1.001 (0.000517)

Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R ²	0.0434	0.0434	0.0435	0.0444	0.0445	0.0446
Observations	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454

*The regressions are estimated using a multinomial logit. Coefficients are odds ratios between supporting militant and moderate factions. **Other controls include:** gender, age, marital status, education level, refugee status, type of residence (city, village or refugee camp), occupation, employment sector and dummies for district and quarter. See Table 2 for the definitions of the independent variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.*

Table AVII: Sensitivity analysis results – no socioeconomic variables; lagged fatalities variable only

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gaza	1.043 (0.0542)	1.043 (0.0542)	1.039 (0.0538)	0.977 (0.0487)	0.977 (0.0487)	0.978 (0.0488)
Summer Rains	1.968*** (0.202)	2.083*** (0.219)	2.080*** (0.218)	2.043*** (0.218)	2.043*** (0.218)	2.039*** (0.218)
Autumn Clouds		0.901 (0.122)	0.901 (0.122)	0.901 (0.122)	0.901 (0.122)	0.901 (0.122)
Hamas Takeover			1.540*** (0.183)	1.511*** (0.184)	1.511*** (0.184)	1.508*** (0.184)
Blockade				0.851 (0.1000)	0.851 (0.0982)	0.834 (0.0957)
Hot Winter					1.774*** (0.177)	1.805*** (0.180)
Cast Lead						1.915*** (0.202)
Gaza * Summer Rains	0.850* (0.0725)	0.750** (0.102)	0.752** (0.101)	0.805 (0.114)	0.804 (0.114)	0.802 (0.114)
Gaza * Autumn Clouds		1.287 (0.259)	1.287 (0.259)	1.317 (0.260)	1.316 (0.260)	1.304 (0.256)
Gaza * Hamas takeover			1.190 (0.180)	1.274 (0.194)	1.274 (0.194)	1.270 (0.193)
Gaza * blockade				1.414*** (0.141)	1.420*** (0.141)	1.488*** (0.149)
Gaza * Hot Winter					0.927 (0.113)	0.880 (0.116)
Gaza * Cast Lead						0.616*** (0.103)
Lagged Fatalities	1.001*** (0.000280)	1.001*** (0.000288)	1.001*** (0.000289)	1.001*** (0.000229)	1.001*** (0.000228)	1.001*** (0.000223)

Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R ²	0.0435	0.0436	0.0437	0.0444	0.0445	0.0446
Observations	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454

*The regressions are estimated using a multinomial logit. Coefficients are odds ratios between supporting militant and moderate factions. **Other controls include:** gender, age, marital status, education level, refugee status, type of residence (city, village or refugee camp), occupation, employment sector and dummies for district and quarter. See Table 2 for the definitions of the independent variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.*

Table AVIII: Time-trend sensitivity analysis results – one treatment variable

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gaza	0.716*	0.761**	0.648***	0.910	0.910	0.791***
	(0.136)	(0.0966)	(0.0879)	(0.0537)	(0.0550)	(0.0543)
Summer Rains	1.138**	1.091*	1.347***	1.142***	1.082*	1.314***
	(0.0584)	(0.0509)	(0.0584)	(0.0553)	(0.0499)	(0.0636)
Gaza * Summer Rains	0.826*	0.799**	0.742***	0.824**	0.823**	0.778**
	(0.0820)	(0.0790)	(0.0841)	(0.0795)	(0.0806)	(0.0959)
Fatalities	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.001
	(0.000259)	(0.000233)	(0.000357)	(0.000301)	(0.000319)	(0.000413)
Lagged Fatalities	1.001***	1.001***	1.001**	1.001***	1.001***	1.001***
	(0.000235)	(0.000203)	(0.000542)	(0.000244)	(0.000275)	(0.000554)
Unemployment Rate	1.807*	1.814*	7.544***	2.575**	2.636**	8.847***
	(0.609)	(0.625)	(3.332)	(0.992)	(1.033)	(3.430)
Average real wage	0.996*	0.996*	0.992*	0.996*	0.996	0.992*
	(0.00216)	(0.00225)	(0.00481)	(0.00205)	(0.00217)	(0.00423)
Trend	1.087***	1.059***	0.988***	1.086***	1.052***	0.991***
	(0.0105)	(0.00643)	(0.00316)	(0.0129)	(0.00404)	(0.00258)
Trend ²	0.998***	0.999***		0.997***	0.999***	
	(0.000456)	(0.000120)		(0.000544)	(8.12e-05)	
Trend ³	1.000**			1.000***		
	(5.65e-06)			(6.57e-06)		
Gaza * trend	1.015	0.997	1.008**			
	(0.0357)	(0.00881)	(0.00351)			
Gaza * trend ²	0.999	1.000*				
	(0.00157)	(0.000158)				
Gaza * trend ³	1.000					
	(1.86e-05)					
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R ²	0.039	0.0369	0.0323	0.0371	0.0352	0.0314
Observations	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454

*The regressions are estimated using a multinomial logit. Coefficients are odds ratios between supporting militant and moderate factions. **Other controls include:** gender, age, marital status, education level,*

*refugee status, type of residence (city, village or refugee camp), occupation, employment sector and dummies for district. See Table 2 for the definitions of the independent variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.*

Table AIX: Time-trend sensitivity analysis results – two treatment variables

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gaza	0.715*	0.761**	0.648***	0.910	0.910	0.791***
	(0.136)	(0.0965)	(0.0879)	(0.0536)	(0.0549)	(0.0543)
Summer Rains	1.173*	1.127	1.383***	1.175*	1.116	1.348***
	(0.111)	(0.101)	(0.115)	(0.105)	(0.0975)	(0.118)
Autumn Clouds	0.942	0.939	0.950	0.946	0.942	0.953
	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.127)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.127)
Gaza * Summer Rains	0.727**	0.704***	0.664***	0.726**	0.725**	0.697**
	(0.0908)	(0.0928)	(0.0915)	(0.0933)	(0.0953)	(0.103)
Gaza * Autumn Clouds	1.288	1.286	1.246	1.288	1.288	1.245
	(0.242)	(0.242)	(0.216)	(0.239)	(0.239)	(0.215)
Fatalities	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.001
	(0.000268)	(0.000236)	(0.000362)	(0.000305)	(0.000322)	(0.000418)
Lagged Fatalities	1.001***	1.001***	1.001**	1.001***	1.001***	1.001***
	(0.000208)	(0.000181)	(0.000512)	(0.000232)	(0.000262)	(0.000527)
Unemployment Rate	1.808*	1.815*	7.553***	2.577**	2.637**	8.859***
	(0.615)	(0.630)	(3.352)	(0.999)	(1.041)	(3.454)
Average real wage	0.996*	0.996*	0.992	0.996*	0.996	0.993*
	(0.00216)	(0.00225)	(0.00482)	(0.00204)	(0.00217)	(0.00424)
Trend	1.087***	1.059***	0.988***	1.086***	1.052***	0.991***
	(0.0105)	(0.00642)	(0.00316)	(0.0129)	(0.00402)	(0.00258)
Trend ²	0.998***	0.999***		0.997***	0.999***	
	(0.000456)	(0.000120)		(0.000545)	(8.11e-05)	
Trend ³	1.000**			1.000***		
	(5.65e-06)			(6.58e-06)		
Gaza * trend	1.015	0.997	1.008**			
	(0.0358)	(0.00881)	(0.00352)			
Gaza * trend ²	0.999	1.000*				
	(0.00157)	(0.000158)				
Gaza * trend ³	1.000					

(1.86e-05)

Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R ²	0.039	0.037	0.0323	0.0371	0.0352	0.0315
Observations	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454

*The regressions are estimated using a multinomial logit. Coefficients are odds ratios between supporting militant and moderate factions. **Other controls include:** gender, age, marital status, education level, refugee status, type of residence (city, village or refugee camp), occupation, employment sector and dummies for district. See Table 2 for the definitions of the independent variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.*

Table AX: Time-trend sensitivity analysis results – three treatment variables

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gaza	0.709*	0.762**	0.647***	0.905*	0.906	0.786***
	(0.137)	(0.0973)	(0.0878)	(0.0537)	(0.0548)	(0.0541)
Summer Rains	1.172*	1.124	1.387***	1.177*	1.113	1.352***
	(0.111)	(0.100)	(0.115)	(0.106)	(0.0968)	(0.118)
Autumn Clouds	0.943	0.938	0.951	0.946	0.942	0.954
	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.127)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.127)
Hamas Takeover	0.981	0.931	1.124	0.977	0.912	1.094
	(0.0984)	(0.0921)	(0.129)	(0.101)	(0.0946)	(0.129)
Gaza * Summer Rains	0.734**	0.706***	0.669***	0.730**	0.729**	0.702**
	(0.0894)	(0.0904)	(0.0906)	(0.0922)	(0.0939)	(0.103)
Gaza * Autumn Clouds	1.286	1.286	1.241	1.284	1.287	1.240
	(0.241)	(0.240)	(0.216)	(0.238)	(0.239)	(0.216)
Gaza * Hamas takeover	1.138	1.090	1.163	1.211	1.213	1.257
	(0.244)	(0.190)	(0.210)	(0.204)	(0.203)	(0.218)
Fatalities	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	(0.000247)	(0.000256)	(0.000340)	(0.000302)	(0.000329)	(0.000393)
Lagged Fatalities	1.001***	1.001***	1.001**	1.001***	1.001***	1.001***
	(0.000235)	(0.000185)	(0.000512)	(0.000237)	(0.000264)	(0.000524)
Unemployment Rate	1.843*	1.799*	7.891***	2.636**	2.638**	9.250***
	(0.640)	(0.635)	(3.475)	(1.014)	(1.045)	(3.548)
Average real wage	0.996*	0.996*	0.992*	0.996*	0.996	0.993*
	(0.00215)	(0.00225)	(0.00479)	(0.00207)	(0.00219)	(0.00423)
Trend	1.086***	1.059***	0.988***	1.086***	1.052***	0.991***
	(0.0103)	(0.00660)	(0.00318)	(0.0133)	(0.00410)	(0.00258)
Trend ²	0.998***	0.999***		0.997***	0.999***	
	(0.000460)	(0.000122)		(0.000570)	(8.16e-05)	
Trend ³	1.000**			1.000***		
	(5.81e-06)			(6.94e-06)		
Gaza * trend	1.017	0.997	1.008**			

	(0.0374)	(0.00897)	(0.00358)			
Gaza * trend ²	0.999	1.000*				
	(0.00166)	(0.000160)				
Gaza * trend ³	1.000					
	(1.98e-05)					
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R ²	0.0393	0.0371	0.0325	0.0374	0.0354	0.0316
Observations	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454

*The regressions are estimated using a multinomial logit. Coefficients are odds ratios between supporting militant and moderate factions. **Other controls include:** gender, age, marital status, education level, refugee status, type of residence (city, village or refugee camp), occupation, employment sector and dummies for district. See Table 2 for the definitions of the independent variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.*

Table AXI: Time-trend sensitivity analysis results – four treatment variables

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gaza	0.729*	0.765**	0.648***	0.875**	0.884**	0.797***
	(0.137)	(0.0965)	(0.0812)	(0.0508)	(0.0518)	(0.0561)
Summer Rains	1.135	1.078	1.274***	1.100	1.032	1.218**
	(0.122)	(0.104)	(0.114)	(0.116)	(0.101)	(0.117)
Autumn Clouds	0.941	0.936	0.946	0.940	0.935	0.948
	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.127)	(0.129)	(0.129)	(0.127)
Hamas Takeover	0.942	0.883	1.019	0.899	0.832	0.969
	(0.111)	(0.0981)	(0.133)	(0.112)	(0.0976)	(0.128)
Blockade	0.894	0.846**	0.761***	0.793**	0.743***	0.706***
	(0.0664)	(0.0601)	(0.0633)	(0.0849)	(0.0746)	(0.0698)
Gaza * Summer Rains	0.707***	0.683***	0.629***	0.768*	0.766*	0.701**
	(0.0909)	(0.0929)	(0.0861)	(0.104)	(0.106)	(0.108)
Gaza * Autumn Clouds	1.282	1.284	1.242	1.291	1.295	1.246
	(0.240)	(0.239)	(0.217)	(0.240)	(0.241)	(0.218)
Gaza * Hamas takeover	1.092	1.047	1.069	1.270	1.262	1.235
	(0.276)	(0.197)	(0.216)	(0.218)	(0.215)	(0.225)
Gaza * blockade	0.953	0.931	0.883	1.270**	1.275**	1.074
	(0.108)	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.151)	(0.154)	(0.144)
Fatalities	1.000	1.000	1.001*	1.000	1.000	1.001*
	(0.000253)	(0.000266)	(0.000384)	(0.000289)	(0.000309)	(0.000401)
Lagged Fatalities	1.001***	1.001***	1.001***	1.001***	1.001***	1.002***
	(0.000224)	(0.000195)	(0.000421)	(0.000222)	(0.000236)	(0.000451)
Unemployment Rate	1.955*	1.846*	7.140***	2.422**	2.290**	8.026***
	(0.711)	(0.669)	(2.973)	(0.978)	(0.922)	(3.175)
Average real wage	0.996*	0.996*	0.993*	0.996*	0.997	0.993*
	(0.00217)	(0.00220)	(0.00434)	(0.00206)	(0.00208)	(0.00382)
Trend	1.076***	1.057***	0.992***	1.076***	1.053***	0.996*
	(0.00786)	(0.00647)	(0.00260)	(0.0140)	(0.00450)	(0.00230)
Trend ²	0.998***	0.999***		0.998***	0.999***	

	(0.000408)	(0.000107)		(0.000616)	(8.54e-05)	
Trend ³	1.000*			1.000*		
	(5.71e-06)			(7.42e-06)		
Gaza * trend	1.009	0.997	1.009***			
	(0.0381)	(0.00863)	(0.00309)			
Gaza * trend ²	1.000	1.000**				
	(0.00173)	(0.000145)				
Gaza * trend ³	1.000					
	(2.07e-05)					
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R ²	0.0405	0.0375	0.0336	0.0395	0.0366	0.0331
Observations	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454

The regressions are estimated using a multinomial logit. Coefficients are odds ratios between supporting militant and moderate factions. **Other controls include:** gender, age, marital status, education level, refugee status, type of residence (city, village or refugee camp), occupation, employment sector and dummies for district. See Table 2 for the definitions of the independent variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

Table AXII: Time-trend sensitivity analysis results – five treatment variables

Variables	Militant	Militant	Militant	Militant	Militant	Militant
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gaza	0.725*	0.766**	0.646***	0.873**	0.882**	0.795***
	(0.136)	(0.0963)	(0.0809)	(0.0513)	(0.0524)	(0.0560)
Summer Rains	1.139	1.080	1.273***	1.105	1.035	1.217**
	(0.122)	(0.104)	(0.114)	(0.116)	(0.101)	(0.117)
Autumn Clouds	0.942	0.936	0.947	0.941	0.936	0.949
	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.127)	(0.129)	(0.129)	(0.127)
Hamas Takeover	0.946	0.885	1.019	0.904	0.834	0.970
	(0.111)	(0.0988)	(0.133)	(0.111)	(0.0977)	(0.128)
Blockade	0.879*	0.831***	0.739***	0.777**	0.727***	0.684***
	(0.0660)	(0.0596)	(0.0633)	(0.0840)	(0.0741)	(0.0680)
Hot Winter	1.173*	1.158	1.310**	1.225**	1.204*	1.327**
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.152)	(0.126)	(0.124)	(0.152)
Gaza * Summer Rains	0.709***	0.683***	0.629***	0.766**	0.765*	0.701**

	(0.0909)	(0.0924)	(0.0852)	(0.103)	(0.105)	(0.107)
Gaza * Autumn Clouds	1.277	1.279	1.236	1.286	1.291	1.240
	(0.241)	(0.240)	(0.218)	(0.241)	(0.242)	(0.219)
Gaza * Hamas takeover	1.100	1.050	1.074	1.272	1.264	1.240
	(0.276)	(0.198)	(0.217)	(0.219)	(0.216)	(0.226)
Gaza * blockade	0.936	0.915	0.859	1.256*	1.263*	1.048
	(0.115)	(0.108)	(0.107)	(0.150)	(0.153)	(0.139)
Gaza * Hot Winter	1.133	1.108	1.245	1.039	1.029	1.212
	(0.133)	(0.141)	(0.180)	(0.131)	(0.129)	(0.172)
Fatalities	1.000	1.000	1.001	1.000	1.000	1.001
	(0.000271)	(0.000284)	(0.000406)	(0.000305)	(0.000325)	(0.000424)
Lagged Fatalities	1.001***	1.001***	1.002***	1.001***	1.001***	1.002***
	(0.000204)	(0.000182)	(0.000374)	(0.000209)	(0.000224)	(0.000406)
Unemployment Rate	2.056*	1.934*	7.446***	2.525**	2.384**	8.355***
	(0.760)	(0.710)	(3.050)	(1.043)	(0.981)	(3.282)
Average real wage	0.996*	0.996*	0.993*	0.996*	0.997	0.993*
	(0.00217)	(0.00222)	(0.00431)	(0.00208)	(0.00211)	(0.00379)
Trend	1.076***	1.056***	0.992***	1.076***	1.052***	0.996*
	(0.00792)	(0.00629)	(0.00263)	(0.0143)	(0.00460)	(0.00227)
Trend ²	0.998***	0.999***		0.998***	0.999***	
	(0.000411)	(0.000104)		(0.000617)	(9.03e-05)	
Trend ³	1.000*			1.000*		
	(5.73e-06)			(7.36e-06)		
Gaza * trend	1.010	0.997	1.009***			
	(0.0378)	(0.00865)	(0.00312)			
Gaza * trend ²	1.000	1.000**				
	(0.00171)	(0.000146)				
Gaza * trend ³	1.000					
	(2.05e-05)					
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R ²	0.0406	0.0377	0.034	0.0396	0.0368	0.0335
Observations	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454

*The regressions are estimated using a multinomial logit. Coefficients are odds ratios between supporting militant and moderate factions. **Other controls include:** gender, age, marital status, education level, refugee status, type of residence (city, village or refugee camp), occupation, employment sector and dummies for district. See Table 2 for the definitions of the independent variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.*

Table AXIII: Time-trend sensitivity analysis results – all treatment variables

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gaza	0.730*	0.768**	0.650***	0.874**	0.883**	0.799***
	(0.136)	(0.0979)	(0.0823)	(0.0527)	(0.0540)	(0.0577)
Summer Rains	1.142	1.080	1.272***	1.107	1.035	1.217**
	(0.122)	(0.104)	(0.114)	(0.117)	(0.101)	(0.117)
Autumn Clouds	0.941	0.936	0.946	0.941	0.935	0.947
	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.127)	(0.129)	(0.129)	(0.127)
Hamas Takeover	0.948	0.885	1.018	0.906	0.834	0.969
	(0.111)	(0.0986)	(0.132)	(0.111)	(0.0976)	(0.128)
Blockade	0.835**	0.789***	0.702***	0.737***	0.690***	0.651***
	(0.0630)	(0.0567)	(0.0611)	(0.0797)	(0.0703)	(0.0648)
Hot Winter	1.238**	1.220**	1.380***	1.293**	1.269**	1.397***
	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.162)	(0.133)	(0.130)	(0.162)
Cast Lead	1.572***	1.558***	1.548***	1.570***	1.555***	1.546***
	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.107)	(0.108)	(0.107)	(0.106)
Gaza * Summer Rains	0.704***	0.679***	0.618***	0.762*	0.759*	0.687**
	(0.0928)	(0.0966)	(0.0888)	(0.108)	(0.110)	(0.110)
Gaza * Autumn Clouds	1.279	1.282	1.243	1.289	1.294	1.248
	(0.242)	(0.241)	(0.219)	(0.242)	(0.243)	(0.219)
Gaza * Hamas takeover	1.087	1.039	1.042	1.259	1.248	1.197
	(0.259)	(0.183)	(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.196)	(0.203)
Gaza * blockade	0.990	0.970	0.919	1.332**	1.339**	1.120
	(0.129)	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.161)	(0.164)	(0.149)
Gaza * Hot Winter	1.061	1.036	1.138	0.972	0.961	1.104
	(0.142)	(0.151)	(0.181)	(0.138)	(0.137)	(0.171)
Gaza * Cast Lead	0.584**	0.578**	0.494**	0.581**	0.574**	0.479**
	(0.144)	(0.145)	(0.139)	(0.144)	(0.146)	(0.138)
Fatalities	1.000	1.000	1.001*	1.000	1.000	1.001*
	(0.000441)	(0.000468)	(0.000569)	(0.000474)	(0.000519)	(0.000596)
Lagged Fatalities	1.001***	1.001***	1.002***	1.001***	1.001***	1.002***

	(0.000212)	(0.000184)	(0.000386)	(0.000218)	(0.000235)	(0.000418)
Unemployment Rate	2.017*	1.899*	7.145***	2.476**	2.338**	7.970***
	(0.774)	(0.725)	(3.025)	(1.068)	(1.004)	(3.269)
Average real wage	0.996*	0.996*	0.993*	0.996*	0.997	0.993*
	(0.00221)	(0.00225)	(0.00434)	(0.00211)	(0.00215)	(0.00382)
Trend	1.077***	1.056***	0.992***	1.077***	1.052***	0.996*
	(0.00793)	(0.00625)	(0.00262)	(0.0140)	(0.00451)	(0.00225)
Trend ²	0.998***	0.999***		0.998***	0.999***	
	(0.000412)	(0.000103)		(0.000608)	(8.84e-05)	
Trend ³	1.000**			1.000*		
	(5.73e-06)			(7.28e-06)		
Gaza * trend	1.009	0.997	1.009***			
	(0.0376)	(0.00850)	(0.00310)			
Gaza * trend ²	1.000	1.000**				
	(0.00171)	(0.000142)				
Gaza * trend ³	1.000					
	(2.05e-05)					
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R ²	0.0408	0.0379	0.0342	0.0398	0.037	0.0337
Observations	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454	69,454

*The regressions are estimated using a multinomial logit. Coefficients are odds ratios between supporting militant and moderate factions. **Other controls include:** gender, age, marital status, education level, refugee status, type of residence (city, village or refugee camp), occupation, employment sector and dummies for district. See Table 2 for the definitions of the independent variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.*

Table AXIV: OLS sensitivity analysis results

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Other</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Gaza	-0.00523 (0.00777)	0.0192* (0.0103)	-0.0139** (0.00635)
Summer Rains	0.148*** (0.0214)	-0.0673** (0.0260)	-0.0809*** (0.0254)
Autumn Clouds	-0.00561 (0.0259)	0.0307 (0.0316)	-0.0251 (0.0296)
Hamas Takeover	0.0524*** (0.0168)	-0.0661** (0.0252)	0.0137 (0.0194)
Blockade	-0.0272 (0.0185)	0.0386* (0.0201)	-0.0114 (0.0199)
Hot Winter	0.0944*** (0.0192)	-0.0838*** (0.0165)	-0.0106 (0.0223)
Cast Lead	0.104*** (0.0241)	-0.0936*** (0.0145)	-0.0101 (0.0228)
Gaza * Summer Rains	-0.000553 (0.0319)	0.0860** (0.0307)	-0.0855*** (0.0263)
Gaza * Autumn Clouds	0.0316 (0.0342)	-0.0737 (0.0481)	0.0421 (0.0408)
Gaza * Hamas takeover	0.0951*** (0.0314)	0.0282 (0.0316)	-0.123*** (0.0335)
Gaza * blockade	0.0906*** (0.0211)	-0.0153 (0.0276)	-0.0753** (0.0263)
Gaza * Hot Winter	0.0428 (0.0411)	0.0551** (0.0256)	-0.0979** (0.0419)
Gaza * Cast Lead	-0.0845 (0.0515)	0.118** (0.0426)	-0.0334 (0.0228)
Fatalities	8.96e-06 (0.000112)	-0.000197** (8.33e-05)	0.000188** (8.17e-05)
Lagged Fatalities	0.000281*** (3.45e-05)	-0.000154*** (5.05e-05)	-0.000127** (5.42e-05)

Unemployment Rate	0.0302 (0.0624)	-0.0161 (0.0651)	-0.0141 (0.0437)
Average real wage	-0.000172 (0.000450)	0.000593** (0.000255)	-0.000421 (0.000348)
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	69,454	69,454	69,454
Adjusted R-squared	0.040	0.044	0.055

Table AXV: Post-Hamas takeover sensitivity analysis results

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>	<i>Militant</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gaza	1.626***	1.594***	1.597***	1.594***	1.577***	1.659***
	(0.196)	(0.167)	-0.173	(0.167)	(0.207)	(0.189)
Treatment				0.918		
				(0.0967)		
Gaza * Treatment				0.806		
				(0.107)		
Israeli military operation					1.640***	1.859***
					(0.124)	(0.226)
Gaza * Israeli military operation					0.732**	0.786
					(0.112)	(0.134)
Blockade	0.916	0.918	0.919			0.908
	(0.0933)	(0.0967)	(0.0976)			(0.0950)
Hot Winter	1.815***		1.805***			
	(0.216)		(0.216)			
Cast Lead	1.948***					
	(0.226)					
Gaza * blockade	0.827	0.806	0.808			0.841
	(0.114)	(0.107)	(0.113)			(0.118)
Gaza * Hot Winter	0.898		0.956			
	(0.142)		(0.132)			
Gaza * Cast Lead	0.631*					
	(0.162)					
Fatalities	1.000	0.999	0.999	0.999	1.000	1
	(0.000501)	(0.000388)	(0.000391)	(0.000388)	(0.000443)	(0.000437)
Lagged Fatalities	1.000*	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	(0.000226)	(0.000239)	(0.000239)	(0.000239)	(0.000245)	(0.000238)
Unemployment Rate	1.085	1.214	1.204	1.214	0.762	0.979
	(0.676)	(0.685)	(0.693)	(0.685)	(0.458)	(0.624)
Average real wage	0.997	0.997	0.997	0.997	0.999	0.998
	(0.00512)	(0.00458)	(0.00480)	(0.00458)	(0.00434)	(0.00459)

Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R ²	0.0502	0.0498	0.0501	0.0498	0.05	0.0501
Observations	18,654	18,654	18,654	18,654	18,654	18,654