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Measuring Constitutional Loyalty: Evidence from the Covid-19 Pandemic

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Measuring Constitutional Loyalty: Evidence from the Covid-19 Pandemic

Jerg Gutmann*, Roe Sarel†, and Stefan Voigt‡

ABSTRACT

Constitutional loyalty, the importance ascribed to complying with constitutional rules, is difficult to measure across countries due to differences in context, history, and culture. We overcome this challenge by exploiting the COVID-19 pandemic as an ideal setting in which societies around the world face a novel and similar public health crisis, inducing governments to adopt comparable policies. Based on a survey carried out in 53 countries around the world in 2021, we show that citizens' support for Covid-19 mitigation policies declines if courts signal doubts about their constitutionality. We further demonstrate that this effect of constitutional loyalty depends on citizens' characteristics, such as their confidence in the courts and their moral convictions.

Keywords: Constitutional loyalty, Constitutions, Courts, Covid-19, Judicial power.

JEL classification: D02, H12, I18, K40, P48.

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I. Introduction

The degree to which governments comply with constraints laid down in their national constitution varies significantly across countries and over time. One factor determining the size of this “*de jure-de facto* gap” may be the extent to which citizens expect politicians to comply with their constitution. If citizens perceive their constitution as legitimate higher law, they are unlikely to tolerate government actions that violate constitutional rules. If this “constitutional loyalty” is pronounced, the government should be less inclined to overstep constitutional constraints, because it expects costly opposition. The courts play an important role in this process by dispersing information on governments’ compliance with the constitution. By declaring that a constitutional rule has (or might have) been breached, courts can help citizens to coordinate their resistance (see, e.g., Weingast 1997).

Evaluating this mechanism empirically is fraught with challenges. One important challenge is that constitutional loyalty is needed the most when governments are tempted the most to transgress constitutional constraints. The timing and nature of such episodes of constitutional stress varies across countries, making them difficult to pinpoint and compare. The COVID-19 pandemic is an exception, as it hit most countries at about the same time and gave rise to similar challenges for policymakers. We use the pandemic as an ideal setting for measuring constitutional loyalty, operationalized as the propensity of citizens to reject policies for the simple reason that they are (likely) in violation of the country’s constitution. We have devised a cross-country survey, which was answered by 991 individuals from 53 countries in 2021. It elicits support for three typical COVID-19 mitigation

policies and whether support changes in response to a court signal suggesting – with different levels of certainty – that the respective policy violates the constitution. We find that respondents reduce their support for policies if courts indicate they might be unconstitutional. This suggests that courts can invoke citizens’ constitutional loyalty to sway public opinion against government policies. The effect, however, depends on citizens’ (i) confidence in the courts and (ii) individual moral values.

We contribute to a recent literature that studies empirically how public support for policies is affected by information on their constitutionality. Interestingly, some studies found that supporters of populist governments favor a policy even more if it is unconstitutional (Chilton and Versteeg 2020; Cope and Crabtree 2021). However, these studies are limited to single country cases and are, therefore, hardly generalizable. In contrast, Chilton et al. (2021) measure support for COVID-19 mitigation policies in six countries (USA, Japan, Israel, South Korea, Taiwan, and China) during the early days of the pandemic. Using a between-subject experimental treatment, they find that some participants decrease their support for some policies if they are told that legal experts consider the policies unconstitutional.¹ While legal experts may help predict how courts would decide a case, it is ultimately the role of the courts to determine the constitutionality of such policies.

¹ However, in the only nondemocratic country studied, China, they find a positive association between the information treatment and support for mitigation policies.

We make three contributions to this literature. First, we ran our survey in 53 countries, many more than covered by previous studies.² As the validity of our theoretical arguments might be limited to democratic political systems, our survey is carried out only in democracies. Second, we study a signal sent by a court (rather than legal experts) and vary the signal's strength. This enables us to test whether individuals change their attitude based on the courts' evaluation of whether a policy violates the constitution. This is more relevant in practice than the ability of some undefined legal experts to sway public opinion. Third, we collect information on participants' personal characteristics, which allows us to test hypotheses regarding determinants of constitutional loyalty and citizens' receptiveness to court signals.

II. Theory

Constitutional law is the most basic law at the nation-state level. Thus, many people oppose breaches of constitutional law independently of their immediate consequences. We call an individual's propensity to oppose an action simply because it is unconstitutional constitutional loyalty.³ The existence of

² Note that the 991 respondents in our survey are distributed unequally across countries, as can be seen in Table OA.2 in the Online Appendix.

³ Stephanopoulos and Versteeg (2006) use the concept of "constitutional approval", which is based on people's stated approval of their constitution. They further explain that this concept implies specific rather than diffuse support (see Easton 1975), because approval is not abstract but based on the concrete content

constitutional loyalty in the population implies that courts can sway public opinion against government policies by signaling that a policy may be unconstitutional.

H1: Receiving a signal from a court that a policy is unconstitutional reduces individuals' support of the respective policy.

H2: A stronger signal that a policy is unconstitutional reduces individuals' support of the respective policy even more.

It has been argued that courts can influence public opinion only to the extent that they enjoy public confidence (Caldeira 1986). So far, we have implicitly assumed that courts' signals regarding constitutionality convey credible information. However, according to Caldeira (1986), the courts' ability to appeal to citizens' constitutional loyalty should depend on the level of confidence they enjoy in the population.

H3: Individuals with higher confidence in the courts react more strongly to a court's signal regarding the constitutionality of a policy.

Legal education may also influence the response to a court's signal: On the one hand, lawyers depend less on legal interpretation provided by courts. On the other hand, those with formal legal training are better situated to understand the importance of constitutional compliance and should hence respond more strongly to a court signal.

and effects of the constitution. Constitutional loyalty, in contrast, refers to diffuse support or perceived legitimacy.

H4: Individuals with a law degree react more strongly to a court's signal regarding the constitutionality of a policy.

Constitutional loyalty is likely grounded in an individual's broader cultural convictions. Moral Foundations Theory (MFT; see Haidt 2012; Graham et al. 2013) is the most well-established attempt to explain interpersonal variation in human moral reasoning based on a set of historically evolved cultural traits. MFT names fairness as one of six fundamental dimensions of human morality. As the fairness foundation supports cooperation and reciprocity, while encouraging opposition to unequal treatment of individuals, cheating, and rule violations, it is likely to predispose individuals to show constitutional loyalty.

H5: Individuals with a stronger fairness-based morality react more strongly to a court's signal regarding the constitutionality of a policy.

III. Experimental design

III.1. Survey design

Our experimental design relies on a simple within-subject treatment:⁴ Our survey asks subjects to rate their level of support for COVID-19 mitigation policies (on a 7-point Likert scale) under three treatment conditions. In the *baseline* condition, we ask each subject to what degree they support the policy. Then, we ask subjects in the *probable violation* condition for their level of support if the highest relevant

⁴ A within-subject design is ideal to test our hypotheses H3-H5, as these require measuring each subject's response to different treatments relative to a baseline.

court in their country decides that the policy *probably* violates a constitutional right. Finally, in the *clear violation* condition, we ask for subjects' level of support if the highest court decides that the policy *clearly* violates a constitutional right. Hence, the only difference between the treatments is the incremental signal subjects receive indicating that the policy might be unconstitutional. To ensure that the results are not policy-specific, we elicit individuals' level of support (under the three treatment conditions) for three very common mitigation policies: outdoor facial masks mandates, prohibitions of going on vacation abroad, and shutdowns of non-essential businesses. Policies are presented in a randomized order (but the three treatment conditions are always in the aforementioned order). We also collect information on basic demographics, confidence in various actors involved in fighting the pandemic, and answers to selected questions from the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; see Graham et al. 2011).

To test our hypotheses, we rely on three variables of interest, aside from our treatment indicator: confidence in the courts, whether the subject has a law degree, and how much the subject relies on the fairness foundation in their moral judgments. The latter is derived from an MFQ question asking the subject how important it is for their moral judgment whether “someone was denied his or her rights” (6-point Likert scale).

III.2. Survey distribution

The experiment is programmed in Qualtrics and distributed via MTurk, which is widely used in online experiments (see, e.g., Clifford et al. 2015; Johnson and Ryan 2020). Three measures serve to ensure data quality: First, the survey includes

three attention checks (we asked participants, e.g., to select the three mitigation policies they were just asked about from a list of mitigation policies). Respondents who fail an attention check are excluded. Second, we use an algorithm to identify and exclude users of VPNs (Kennedy et al. 2020). Third, we recruit only subjects with a positive track record (at least 100 completed tasks and at least 95% of those were approved). Data collection took place between March 2021 and November 2021. Our sample includes 991 respondents from 53 countries. Table OA.2 in the Online Appendix gives an overview of our sample.

IV. Results

IV.1. Summary statistics

Table 1 presents summary statistics. Average support for mitigation policies lies between 3.7 and 5.5 and it is lower for the probable and clear violation conditions than for the benchmark case without an information treatment. Although our sample contains respondents of every age, the average respondents are only in their mid-30s.⁵ Some 30% of the respondents are female. Five percent hold a law degree and average confidence in the courts seems rather high (2.8 on a 4-point scale).

⁵ One respondent reported an unlikely age of 99, the second-oldest person is 75.

TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS


Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
MASK MANDATE					
Base	991	5.52	1.84	1	7
Probable Violation	991	4.92	1.99	1	7
Clear Violation	991	4.66	2.08	1	7
TRAVEL BAN					
Base	991	5.11	1.82	1	7
Probable Violation	991	4.51	1.93	1	7
Clear Violation	991	4.21	2.03	1	7
BUSINESS SHUTDOWN					
Base	991	4.44	1.87	1	7
Probable Violation	991	4.01	1.86	1	7
Clear Violation	991	3.69	1.91	1	7
Confidence in Courts	991	2.78	0.82	1	4
Law Degree	991	0.05	0.23	0	1
Fairness	991	4.78	1.13	1	6
Age	991	34.59	9.81	19	99
Female	991	0.30	0.46	0	1

IV.2. Average effects of constitutionality signals on policy support

Figure 1 compares the distributions of the level of support for the three mitigation policies under the three different information treatments.⁶ When comparing the baseline conditions, we find that mask mandates, arguably the weakest intervention, enjoy the highest support, followed by travel bans and shutdowns. Comparing the different information treatments, we find that irrespective of the mitigation policy, support declines with stronger indications that a policy may be unconstitutional. Wilcoxon sign-ranked tests confirm that these differences are highly statistically significant (see Table OA.3 in the Online Appendix). These results are consistent with our first two hypotheses. Respondents who support a particular policy less after having received a signal that it may be unconstitutional display constitutional loyalty.

⁶ Figure OA.1 in the Online Appendix compares average support levels across the nine policy-treatment-combinations.

FIGURE 1: SUPPORT FOR COVID-19 MITIGATION POLICIES



Our level of analysis for the following regression models is the individual support decision (of which every respondent makes nine). As our dependent variable, *support*, is discrete, ordered, and bounded (7-point Likert scale), we estimate both ordered logit and OLS models. Once we estimate conditional effects, we rely only on OLS estimates, as they are easier to interpret in the presence of interaction terms. Our main independent variables of interest are two dummy variables for the information *treatment*. We control for the different mitigation *policies* using two more dummy variables and in our most conservative model specification we also include respondent fixed effects. Thereby, we account for (i) the different

invasive- and effectiveness of the studied policy measures, (ii) the (randomized) order in which we ask for these policies, and (iii) general personal characteristics of our survey respondents, including their country of residence and socioeconomic characteristics. The linear form of our regression model is then:⁷

$$support_i = \beta_1 pv_i + \beta_2 cv_i + \beta_3 trvl_i + \beta_4 shtdown_i + \mu_i + \epsilon_i$$

where the index i identifies the individual support decisions; pv (=probable violation) and cv (=clear violation) are dummy variables for the information treatment; $trvl$ (=travel ban) and $shtdown$ (=shutdowns) are dummies for the different mitigation policies; and μ are respondent fixed effects (which are replaced by control variables in some model specifications). Standard errors are clustered at the survey respondent-level.

Our main results are provided in Table 2. Both the ordered logit and the OLS estimates indicate that, in line with our first two hypotheses, the level of support for a policy decreases in the signal concerning its unconstitutionality. These effects are not only highly statistically significant ($p < 0.01$), but also substantial in size. Support falls between half a point and a full point on a 7-point scale, which is between 25% and 50% of a standard deviation. Again, we find that more restrictive mitigation policies enjoy less support in general.

⁷ The ordered logit model instead predicts the probability of each outcome $i \in \{1, \dots, 7\}$ as follows: $\Pr(y_j = i) = \Pr(\kappa_i < x_j \beta + u < \kappa_{i-1}) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-\kappa_i + x_j \beta)} -$

$\frac{1}{1 + \exp(-\kappa_{i-1} + x_j \beta)}$, where $\kappa_0 = -\infty$ and $\kappa_k = \infty$.

TABLE 2: MAIN RESULTS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Travel ban	-0.469***	-0.655***	-0.422***	-0.422***
	(0.057)	(0.094)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Shutdown	-0.987***	-1.522***	-0.986***	-0.986***
	(0.058)	(0.101)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Probable violation	-0.524***	-0.846***	-0.543***	-0.543***
	(0.030)	(0.048)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Clear violation	-0.782***	-1.297***	-0.835***	-0.835***
	(0.037)	(0.061)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Estimator	OLOGIT	OLOGIT	OLS	OLS
Respondent-FE	NO	YES	NO	YES
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.022	0.141	0.071	0.142
PV = CV, Chi2- / F-stat	315.3***	305.0***	307.7***	307.7***
Number of respondents	991	935	991	991
Number of observations	8,919	8,415	8,919	8,919

Note. — Regression coefficients with respondent-clustered standard errors in parentheses. The fixed effects ordered logit model is estimated following Baetschmann et al. (2015). The dependent variable is *support*. The omitted categories are “mask mandates” for the policy dummies and “baseline” for the treatment dummies. The constant is omitted. *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01.

IV.3. Moderating variables for the effect on policy support

To test our hypotheses H3 to H5, we interact each of the treatment dummies with (i) the level of confidence in the courts, (ii) a law degree dummy, and (iii) an indicator for fairness norms from the Moral Foundations Questionnaire. Results are shown in Table 3. Table OA.4 in the Online Appendix reports the same results, but without respondent fixed effects. Instead, we control for order-fixed effects, respondents' age, and their gender. The results are qualitatively similar. We find that the effect of a court signal that a mitigation policy may be unconstitutional on support for that policy depends on the level of confidence in the courts and the respondent's fairness norms. Respondents with a law degree do not react differently to our information treatment than respondents without a law degree. On a side note, we find that women are significantly more supportive of Covid-19 mitigation policies.

Figure 2 graphically illustrates the respective marginal effects based on Column (4) in Table 3. Even respondents without confidence in the courts reduce their support for a policy after being informed by a court that it may be unconstitutional, but the effect is more than twice as large for individuals with high confidence in the courts. For individuals with high confidence, a signal that a policy is clearly unconstitutional reduces support for that policy by more than one point on a 7-point scale. Respondents only react differently to a court signal depending on their fairness norms if the court signals a clear violation of the constitution. Respondents with more pronounced fairness norms react more strongly to such a signal by reducing their support for the policy. Moving from the lower end of the fairness norm scale to the upper end almost doubles the effect size. Therefore, we

find support for our hypotheses H3 and H5, whereas hypothesis H4 is not consistent with our data. Figure OA.2 in the Online Appendix shows the same marginal effects as Figure 2, except that our moderating variables are considered as categorical and not as continuous indicators. The main difference here is that the court signal has no effect on survey respondents who have no confidence at all in the courts, independent of whether courts signal a probable or a clear violation. All other survey respondents lower their support for policies after receiving such a signal of unconstitutionality.


TABLE 3: CONDITIONAL EFFECTS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Travel ban	-0.422***	-0.422***	-0.422***	-0.422***
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Shutdown	-0.986***	-0.986***	-0.986***	-0.986***
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Probable violation (PV)	-0.097	-0.546***	-0.443***	0.066
	(0.103)	(0.032)	(0.133)	(0.179)
Clear violation (CV)	-0.152	-0.840***	-0.505***	0.290
	(0.127)	(0.038)	(0.155)	(0.208)
PV * Confidence	-0.161***			-0.165***
	(0.037)			(0.037)
CV * Confidence	-0.246***			-0.257***
	(0.045)			(0.045)
PV * Law degree		0.053		0.041
		(0.151)		(0.147)
CV * Law degree		0.086		0.063
		(0.189)		(0.181)
PV * Fairness			-0.021	-0.032
			(0.028)	(0.028)
CV * Fairness			-0.069**	-0.087***
			(0.033)	(0.032)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Respondent-FE	YES	YES	YES	YES

R-squared	0.145	0.142	0.142	0.146
Number of respondents	991	991	991	991
Number of observations	8,919	8,919	8,919	8,919

Note. — See Table 2. *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01.

FIGURE 2: CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECTS



Note. — Average marginal effects of information treatments, conditional on confidence in courts and fairness norms, with 95%-confidence intervals. Dashed line: probable violation, solid line: clear violation.

V. Conclusion and Outlook

This study confronts participants with a potential dilemma: COVID-19 mitigation policies may be needed to protect public health, but they may also be incompatible with the constitution. We show that participants reduce their support of policies when given the information that courts consider them to be (probably or clearly) unconstitutional. This effect is larger for individuals who generally have higher confidence in the courts or who are morally inclined to care about fairness. Our results support the argument that courts who enjoy the public's trust can rely on constitutional loyalty in constraining a government. This finding is consistent with recent political events in Germany. Until recently, some political parties (e.g., the Free Democratic Party) were reluctant to adopt strict Covid-19 mitigation policies. However, after the German constitutional court ruled on November 19, 2021 that the mitigation policies adopted in the spring of 2021 were constitutional, politicians from the new governing coalition, some of whom even brought the previous government to court over its mitigation policies, quickly signaled their willingness to adopt harsher mitigation policies to curb the fourth wave of the pandemic. Our results, however, also indicate that constitutional loyalty is linked to deeply rooted and intergenerationally transmitted cultural convictions that are largely beyond the control of policy makers.

We have focused here on how individual support for mitigation policies depends on information about their constitutionality, the reliability of that information, and the traits of the respective individual. A few follow-up questions seem interesting: Does individual support for policies and its responsiveness to their constitutionality depend on an individual's exposure to the pandemic or to

the economic costs of mitigation measures? Are individuals who question the seriousness of the pandemic or the trustworthiness of public (health) authorities equally interested in the constitutionality of mitigation policies as others? And finally, what country level factors can explain the existence and strength of constitutional loyalty? We leave these questions for future research.

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Online Appendix

In compliance with their ethical obligations, the authors declare that:

- this research has been subject to review regarding its compliance with ethical standards and that survey respondents have given their consent to the collection of their data and its use for research purposes. All data is collected anonymously, and no apparent harm is to be expected for participants of this survey.
- the survey has been preregistered at OSF. Since the preregistration document is not anonymous, we are attaching an anonymized version to this submission.
- survey participants were paid between 2USD and 3USD for a survey that takes about five to ten minutes to fill in. Respondents from low and lower-middle income economies, according to the World Bank, received 2USD. Those in upper-middle income economies received 2.50USD. Respondents from high income economies received 3USD. This amounts to an hourly wage of 12 (/24) to 18 (/36) USD.
- they have no potential or perceived conflicts of interest arising from this research.
- replication files for our empirical analysis will be shared publicly after publication.

TABLE OA.1: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES

Variable name	Description
Support	Level of support for a mitigation policy (7-point Likert scale)
Travel ban	Dummy variable assigning 1 for the travel ban policy, and 0 otherwise
Shutdown	Dummy variable assigning 1 for the shutdown policy, and 0 otherwise
Probable violation	Dummy variable assigning 1 for the signal that the policy probably violates a constitutional right, and 0 otherwise
Clear violation	Dummy variable assigning 1 for the signal that the policy clearly violates a constitutional right, and 0 otherwise
Confidence in courts	Level of confidence in the courts (5-point Likert scale)
Law degree	Dummy variable assigning 1 if the respondent has a law degree, and 0 otherwise
Fairness	Extent to which the respondent considers “whether or not someone was denied their rights” when deciding whether something is right or wrong (6-point Likert scale)
Age	Age (in years)
Female	Dummy variable assigning 1 for females, and 0 otherwise

TABLE OA.2: SAMPLE COMPOSITION

Country name	# of respondents	Country name	# of respondents
Argentina	10	Lithuania	3
Australia	33	Malawi	1
Belgium	7	Malaysia	3
Brazil	101	Mauritius	1
Bulgaria	3	Mexico	25
Chile	2	Moldova	1
Colombia	9	Nepal	1
Costa Rica	1	Nigeria	12
Croatia	1	North Macedonia	10
Czech Republic	1	Pakistan	11
Denmark	2	Peru	2
Dominican Republic	2	Philippines	18
Ecuador	5	Poland	5
El Salvador	2	Portugal	14
Estonia	2	Romania	18
Finland	2	Slovenia	4
France	84	South Korea	1
Georgia	1	Spain	111
Germany	115	Sri Lanka	3
Ghana	1	Sweden	2
Greece	7	Switzerland	1
India	102	Taiwan	1
Indonesia	5	Trinidad and Tobago	3
Ireland	13	Tunisia	1
Italy	103	Ukraine	2
Jamaica	7	United States	109
Japan	7		

TABLE OA.3: WILCOXON SIGNED-RANK TESTS

Variable	Z-statistic	P-value
MASKS		
Base vs. Probable Violation	14.715	<0.001
Probable Violation vs. Clear Violation	11.187	<0.001
Clear Violation vs. Base	18.104	<0.001
TRAVEL BAN		
Base vs. Probable Violation	15.583	<0.001
Probable Violation vs. Clear Violation	11.383	<0.001
Clear Violation vs. Base	18.130	<0.001
SHUTDOWNS		
Base vs. Probable Violation	13.026	<0.001
Probable Violation vs. Clear Violation	12.761	<0.001
Clear Violation vs. Base	17.078	<0.001


Note. — Wilcoxon signed-rank tests comparing the levels of support for the three mitigation policies (mask mandates, travel bans, and shutdowns).

TABLE OA.4: CONDITIONAL EFFECTS W/O FIXED EFFECTS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Travel ban	-0.422*** (0.060)	-0.422*** (0.060)	-0.422*** (0.060)	-0.422*** (0.060)
Shutdown	-0.986*** (0.061)	-0.986*** (0.061)	-0.986*** (0.061)	-0.986*** (0.061)
Age	-0.032 (0.021)	-0.030 (0.022)	-0.034 (0.021)	-0.032 (0.022)
Age-squared	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Female	0.323*** (0.099)	0.321*** (0.098)	0.334*** (0.098)	0.334*** (0.098)
Probable violation (PV)	-0.097 (0.103)	-0.546*** (0.032)	-0.443*** (0.133)	0.066 (0.180)
Clear violation (CV)	-0.152 (0.127)	-0.840*** (0.038)	-0.505*** (0.155)	0.290 (0.208)
Confidence	0.154*** (0.059)			0.143*** (0.060)
PV * Confidence	-0.161*** (0.037)			-0.165*** (0.037)
CV * Confidence	-0.246*** (0.045)			-0.257*** (0.045)
Law degree		0.249 (0.164)		0.242 (0.165)
PV * Law degree		0.053 (0.151)		0.041 (0.147)
CV * Law degree		0.086 (0.189)		0.063 (0.181)
Fairness			-0.098** (0.038)	-0.087** (0.038)
PV * Fairness			-0.021 (0.028)	-0.032 (0.028)
CV * Fairness			-0.069** (0.033)	-0.087*** (0.032)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Respondent-FE	NO	NO	NO	NO
Order-FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
R-squared	0.082	0.081	0.085	0.088
Number of respondents	991	991	991	991
Number of observations	8,919	8,919	8,919	8,919


Note. — See Table 2. *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01.

FIGURE OA.1: SUPPORT FOR COVID-19 MITIGATION POLICIES, MEAN VALUES



Note. — Mean value of support for mitigation policies, depending on the policy and treatment.

FIGURE OA.2: CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECTS, NONLINEAR



Note. — See Figure 2. Confidence in courts and fairness norms are treated as categorical variables.