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Does corporate social responsibility initiative dissuade the increasing electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa? Evidence from Nigeria's oil producing region

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A G D I Working Paper

WP/21/063

Does Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Dissuade the Increasing Electoral Violence in sub-Saharan Africa? Evidence from Nigeria's Oil Producing Region

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Research Department

Does Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Dissuade the Increasing Electoral Violence in sub-Saharan Africa? Evidence from Nigeria's Oil Producing Region

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Abstract

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to critically examine the multinational oil companies' (MOCs) corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives in Nigeria. Its special focus is to investigate the impact of the global memorandum of understanding (GMoU) on reducing incidents of electoral violence in the oil-producing communities.

Design/methodology/approach – This paper adopts a survey technique, aimed at gathering information from a representative sample of the population, as it is essentially cross-sectional, describing and interpreting the current situation. A total of 1200 households were sampled across the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.

Findings – The results from the use of a combined propensity score matching and logit model indicate that GMoU model made significant impact in deterring occurrences of electoral violence, when interventions on cluster development boards (CDBs) are designed to mitigate the intricate of political clashes in the region.

Practical implication – This implies that CSR interventions of MOCs play a vital role in reducing incidents of electoral violence in Nigeria's oil producing region.

Social implication – Reducing the increasing electoral violence in the oil host communities, will in turn create an enabling environment for more extensive and responsible business of Multinational Corporation in sub-Saharan Africa.

Originality/value – This paper extends and contributes to the literature on CSR initiatives of multinational enterprises in developing countries and rationale for demands for social projects by host communities. It concludes that business has an obligation to help in solving problems of public concern.

Keywords Electoral violence, corporate social responsibility, multinational oil companies, sub-Saharan Africa.

Paper type Research paper

1. Introduction

Electoral violence – seen as coercive force, targeted at electoral actors and/ or objects, that takes place in the context of electoral competition – can occur before, within the duration of or after elections and it can aim at a variety of factors, including candidates, election observers, activists, journalists, poll workers and voters (Birch & Muchlinski, 2018; USAID, 2013). Fresh analysis of patterns and trends in election violence have established that it is a global phenomenon upsetting mainly electoral authoritarian or hybrid states, principally those in Asia, the middle East and Africa (Birch & Muchlinski, 2017; UNDP, 2016). For instance, in Nigeria, politics has often been regarded as high stakes issue and contest between not just platforms but also personalities. Elections in the country have often been flawed by violence, especially during presidential, gubernatorial and local contests (Collier & Vicente, 2014; Campbell, 2010). While there were occasions of violence during the election cycles in Nigeria, the oil zone of Nigeria, Niger Delta, often experienced the most of it than any region during the contest, mainly as a result of its political relevance, location, size and natural resource wealth (PIND, 2018; Edigin & Obakhedo, 2010). Meanwhile, the multinational oil companies (MOCs) operating in Nigeria sustained a significant presence in Niger Delta; and have participated in plethora of corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities in the region, which may consist of building of markets, hospitals, schools and provision of pipe borne water amongst others (Ekhaton, 2014; Amaeshi *et al*, 2006). Yet, in 2005 amid clashes between age long ethnic rivals, many of the MOCs projects and production facilities were spoilt or destroyed. As a result, MOCs introduced a new CSR model in the region called Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMOU). This public private partnership tactic towards community engagement encompasses participatory development processes that help in the resolution of conflict and violence, and address the needs of community near MOCs operations (SPDC, 2013).

The GMOUs were signed between collections of communities, MOCs and state governments, creating a distinctive public-private model to encourage economic, social and political stability (Chevron, 2014). Through the GMOUs, the communities in due course assumed responsibility for how to use finance provided by the MOCs and for how to implement the projects selected. MOCs stay active by partaking in local communities and boards that review and approve projects and by making available yearly project funding (Chevron, 2017). MOCs, by 2012, had signed agreement with 33 GMOU clusters, covering 349 communities, which is roughly 35% of the local communities around their business activities in the region.

723 projects were well completed, with a cumulative total funding of \$117 million. As it were, nine of the 33 Cluster Development Boards (CDBs) have developed into registered foundations now receiving third party funding (SPDC, 2013; Chevron, 2014, 2017; Alfred, 2013). Yet, the extents to which the GMoU initiatives have contributed to community development in the region remain disputed. For example, scholars such as Frynas (2009), Akpan (2006), Tuodolo (2009), Eweje (2006), Idemudia (2014), Ekhaton (2014), Edoho (2008), Marchant (2014) and others have reasoned that the GMoU initiatives of MOCs have failed to add to community development and in some cases have resulted in inter – and intra-community clashes and violence. Contrariwise, Ite (2007), Lompo & Trani (2013) and others opined that the GMoU model of MOCs have really assisted in the community development in the region given the extent of failures of the government. Besides, Uduji & Okolo-Obasi (2017, 2018c, 2018d, 2019a) in recent times added some tone to the debate as they put forward that the GMoU initiatives of MOCs have added positively to the need of rural farmers, livestock keeping, women in small-scale fisheries, and youths in traditional industries livelihood, but also deteriorated the relational capabilities in those communities. In the same way, Uduji *et al* (2018b, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c) pointed that the GMoU activities of MOCs have to a certain degree contributed to the enhancement of rural youths in cultural tourism, women in agriculture, HIV/AIDS response in host communities, but have also weakened equalities.

It is not clear how CSR operations by the MOCs can have an impact on electoral violence in Niger Delta without addressing the issue of unemployment among youths and political dynamics in the region. For one, it is unclear how MOCs CSR policy could do this when violence within the Delta has only escalated in recent decades with attacks on oil infrastructure and industry personnel making the region essentially ungovernable. However, in line with this rhetoric and apparent gap in the literature, this research has two main aims which agree with the MOCs new CSR model (GMoUs) relative to peace, stability, human right and effective governance in sustainable development goals (SDGs):

- Ascertain the level of MOCs CSR intervention in averting electoral violence in Nigeria's oil producing communities.
- Examine the role of MOCs GMoUs in reducing incidents of electoral violence in Niger Delta region of Nigeria.

1.1 Study hypothesis

The adoption of CSR was not simply a corporation-lead movement; rather it was part of a shift in the thinking of development practitioners within a new world order where ‘rolling back’ incompetent states provided space for a far greater role for the private sector in all areas of life. Included in this thinking was the potential for self-regulated CSR by industries to contribute to development goals. However, in the Nigeria’s oil producing communities, MOCs have implemented a new model of CSR policies since 2006, particularly focusing on ‘development’ projects in the region. Yet politics has time and again been characterized as high stakes issue and contest between platforms and the personalities in them. Election cycles in the region have also been flawed by violence, especially during elections at gubernatorial and local levels. Among the Nigerian states, while there were some cases of violence during election cycle, states in Niger Delta region witnessed the worst occurrences of electoral violence and fatalities; mainly due to their political significant, locations, sizes and natural resource wealth. Thus, we postulate that the new CSR model (GMoUs) of MOCs has not made a considerably impact on reducing the incidents of electoral violence in the Niger Delta, Nigeria.

The other sections of the paper can be summarized as follows: a brief look at the issues of electoral violence in Nigeria (Section 2); the theoretical underpinnings (Section 3); the method and materials (Section 4); the main findings and discourse (Section 5); then, implication, caveats and future research directions as conclusion (Section 6).

2. Issues of Electoral Violence in Nigeria

Despite the fact that electoral violence can be a broad concept, studies of it have normally depended on a number of general measures (Birch & Muchlinski, 2017). Electoral violence has been perceived as violent protests against election results, political parties, or opposition groups; in addition to attacks by gangs and mobs against evident manifestations of elections, like polling places (UNDP, 2009; Alihodzic, 2012). Electoral violence can take place before elections as elites tactically shift repression to pre-electoral periods in order to discourage voters from going to the polls; or it might take place later after elections if elites decide on employing violence to deal with certain segments of society for voting in particular ways (Van Ham & Lindberg, 2015; Taylor *et al*, 2017). While state actors can pull off electoral violence, non-state groups like opposition parties, militants and rebels may also engage in electoral violence to promote their own ideas (Soderstron, 2017; Goldsmith, 2015; Asongu *et al*, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c, 2020d, 2020e). In Nigeria, violence as witnessed in elections are

often rooted in social, economic and political deficiencies including but not restricted to: a lack of information, polarization and divergent preferences; large-scale inequalities; cultural, tribal, religious and ethnic clefs; scarcity of ongoing clashes over resources; history of civil conflict or hostilities; weak security and rule of law institutions (Adebayo, 2016; Bardall, 2013; Bratto, 2007; Campbell, 2010; Daxcker, 2014; Collier & Vincente, 2012). In figure 1 below, reported electoral violence by year in Niger Delta, 2011-2018 is shown.




Figure 1. Reported electoral violence by year in Niger Delta, 2011-2018

Source: PIND, 2018/Authors' modification

The main triggers of electoral violence in Niger Delta region include extensive accusation of vote buying by politicians and political parties, ballot-box snatching, vote rigging, and road blockage to prevent voters from entering the polling stations (Egobueze & Ojirika, 2017; Ikyase & Egberi, 2015; Joab-Peterside, 2018; Ladan-Baki, 2016). Politicians also allegedly used intimidation tactics, such as harassment, property destruction, kidnappings, and assassinations to gather political power and cause mayhem in the region (Dundas & Ojo, 2014; Nkwede, 2016). Cultism, communal conflict, youth unemployment, arms proliferation, and political tension have raised electoral violence in Niger Delta (Orji, 2017). By tradition, the people of the Niger Delta have been farmers and fishermen; but decades of oil spillage and gas flaring in addition to a fast growing population, has meant such traditional sources of livelihood are either no longer sustainable or have experienced significant drop; as a result, the rate of unemployment in the region is higher than the national average (Uduji & Okolo-Obasi, 2018a, 2018b; Uduji *et al*, 2018a, 2019a, Ugwuanyi *et al*, 2021). This factor has resulted in the formation of militant groups that provide significant context for high level of cult violence, communal conflict, and political/ electoral violence in the region (Obakhedo,

2011; NDDC, 2001, 2004). According to Watts, this has added to the rise of militant youth groups who line up themselves with chiefs and engage in disruption of oil company equipment (and clash with competing groups) in order to attract compensation and concessions from the oil companies for their communities. Reported fatalities in conflict by state in Niger Delta are shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2. Reported conflict fatalities by state in Niger Delta, 2011-2018

Source: PIND, 2018/Authors' modification

A fundamental problem with electoral violence in Niger Delta is that specific histories and complex contexts are usually ignored. The elaborate historical causes of the socioeconomic marginalization of Niger Delta communities are a case in point (Uduji & Okolo-Obasi, 2018a, 2018b; Uduji *et al*, 2018a, 2019a). Watts (2004) reveals that the Niger Delta is characterized by notable ethno-linguistic diversity and that its communities were economically relegated during British rule where indirect governance through a warrant chief system was practiced. Since independence, the communities have protested that they remain marginalized by a federation that is controlled by the ethnic majorities of the Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba (Marchant, 2014; Uduji *et al*, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c, 2020d, 2020e, 2021). The inclusion of oil extraction in this conflict has added a new vigor to the complaints of these communities; they have protested that oil returns are not shared with local governments and thus they continue to be barred from economic gains, even when oil is derived from their communities (Watts, 2004). This history of marginalization has also intermingled with many more recent political developments outside of the oil industry. Figure 3 shows reported level and type of violence by states in Niger Delta.




Figure 3.Reported level and type of violence by states in Niger Delta
Source: PIND, 2018/Authors' modification

The approach to this research is contrary to contemporary electoral violence literature which has concentrated on, *inter alia*: causes and consequences of electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa (Burchard, 2015); the contradictions of pre-election violence (Bekoe & Burchard, 2017); the cost of exposing cheating, international election monitoring, fraud, and post-election violence in Africa (Daxecker, 2012); electoral institutions and electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa (Fjelde & Hoglund, 2016); the role of private sector in prevention of election violence in Kenya (De Vidograd, 2015) amongst others. Following the preceding differing of view of electoral violence in the Niger Delta, this paper contributes to sustainable practices for the avoidance of electoral violence from the CSR perspective.

3. Theoretical underpinnings

The conceptualization of this study considers electoral violence as a subset of political violence and thus theoretically similar to communal violence and rebellion. It is also seen as a type of election malfeasance, similar to vote buying, election rigging, and electoral fraud which CSR interventions that focus on grassroots peacemaking and local community empowerment may influence. Granting organizations are not a state, country or region; they are part of the infrastructure of society and as such must consider how they bear on it (Asongu *et al*, 2019a, 2019b). According to Frynas (2009), various kinds of crisis associated with developing countries often have an effect of catalyzing CSR responses. This crisis can be economic, social, environmental, health related, or industrial. For example, Newell (2005) notes that the economic crisis in Argentina in 2001-2002 marked a significant turning point in CSR, prompting debate about the role of business in poverty alleviation. Catastrophic events

with immediate impact are often more likely to elicit CSR responses, especially of the philanthropic kind. An example was the MOCs response to the hanging of human right activist Ken Saro-Wiwa in Nigeria in 1995, that attracted increasing international criticism of MOC and the associated reputational risk, that MOCs rapid adoption of CSR should be seen (Asgil, 2012; Slack, 2012; Boele *et al*, 2001).

Carroll's CSR Pyramid is probably the most recognized model of CSR, with its four levels showing the relative significance of economic, ethical, legal and philanthropic responsibilities separately. According to Carroll (1991), corporate social responsibility involves the conduct of a business so that it is economically profitable, law abiding, ethical and social supportive. To be socially responsible then means that profitability and obedience to the law are foremost conditions when discussing the firm's ethics and the extent to which it supports the society in which it exists with contributions of money, time and talent. Carroll (1991) presented this CSR model as a pyramid and introduced dependence as a rationale, beginning with the basic building block notion that economic performance undergirds all else. Finally, he suggested that, although the components are not mutually exclusive, it helps the manager to see that the different types of obligations are in a constant tension with one another. However, most of the research on Carroll's CSR pyramid has been in an American context; but several of empirical studies emerging suggest that culture may have an important influence on perceived CSR priorities (Frynas, 2009; Marchant, 2014; Visser, 2006; Akpan, 2006; Amaeshi *et al*, 2006; Eweje, 2006; Visser, 2006; Uduji and Okolo-Obasi, 2017).

The exploration of CSR in Africa has been used to test the accuracy and relevance of Carroll's CSR Pyramid. According to Visser (2006), if Carroll's (1991) basic four-part model is recognized, it is proposed that the relative priorities of CSR in Africa are likely to vary from the classic, American ordering. Amaeshi *et al* (2006) have disputed that the Nigerian conception of CSR remarkably differs from the Western version; they recommended that CSR in Nigeria should be targeted at addressing the uniqueness of the socio-economic development challenges of the country (e.g. poverty alleviation, infrastructural development, health care provision, education, etc.), and should be informed by socio-cultural influences (e.g communalism, charity, etc.); they might not essentially reproduce the popular Western stand/expectations of CSR (e.g consumer protection, climate change concerns, social responsible investments, fair trade, green marketing etc). Depending on the extant literature on CSR in Africa, Muthuri (2012) posited that the CSR issues predominant in Africa include poverty reduction, education and training, community development, sports, human rights,

economic and enterprise development, health and HIV/AIDS, environment, governance and accountability, and corruption. However, the purpose of this study or thesis statement has been articulated upfront in the introduction of this paper and the hypotheses are premised on arguments discussed in section 1. Moreover, from a statistical standpoint, only the null hypotheses are disclosed. Accordingly, this paper embraces quantitative methodology, but discusses the outcome from the perception of CSR in African context.

4. Method and material

According to Uduji *et al* (2019b, 2019c, 2019g, 2020f), investigations into CSR in Nigeria’s oil producing region is still comparatively in the low and tends to be adhoc with a heavy dependence on convenience-based case studies or descriptive accounts, with a general absence of comparable and laborious quantitative data. Therefore, this research adopted a quantitative approach, as cross sectional data were collected from a sample of the population (Figure 4).



Figure 4. Constituent administrative states of Niger Delta, Nigeria
Source: NDDC, 2004

4.1 Sample Size

We used the model of Yamane (1964) for finite population to determine the sample size used in the study. The model is stated thus:

$$n = \frac{N}{1+N(e)^2} \quad \text{Equation 1}$$

Here n represents the sample size, while the total or finite population is denoted by N and e is the level of significance (limit of tolerable error) while 1 is unity (constant).

The estimated total population of household in the study area is 6,091,012, as seen in Table 1. Therefore, $N = 6,091,012$, and the level of significance of the study is 5 percent, which is a 95 percent confidence level, indicating $e = 0.05$ percent

Thus:

$$n = \frac{6,091,012}{1 + 6,091,012(0.05)^2} = 400$$

The resultant quotient was multiplied by 3 to make sure that an adequate sample was picked for the study. Hence the total sample size determined is 1200.

4.2 Sampling procedure

To choose the respondent households, we employed a multi-staged sampling method. This requires the combination of quota, purposive and simple random sampling which were used at diverse stages of the sampling exercise. Firstly, we deliberately selected the two local government areas (LGAs), each from the nine States of Niger Delta region on the basis that the LGA is hosting an oil facility or is near to one hosting. We also applied purposive sampling to pick three rural communities from each of the selected LGAs, on the same basis that qualifies the LGAs. From the fifty-four rural communities selected, we used simple random sampling with the support of community gate keepers to choose 1200 household out of the selected rural communities and in line with the State population (Table 1).

Table 1. Sample Size Determination Table

| States | Total Population | Estimated Household Population | % of Total Population | Minimum Sample Per Community | Minimum Sample Per State |
|--------------|-------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Abia | 3,727,347 | 532,478 | 10% | 20 | 120 |
| Akwa Ibom | 5,482,177 | 783,168 | 12% | 24 | 144 |
| Cross River | 3,866,269 | 552,324 | 9% | 18 | 108 |
| Delta | 5,663,362 | 809,052 | 13% | 26 | 156 |
| Imo | 5,408,756 | 772,679 | 13% | 26 | 156 |
| Ondo | 4,671,695 | 667,385 | 11% | 22 | 132 |
| Edo | 4,235,595 | 605,085 | 10% | 20 | 120 |
| Bayelsa | 2,277,961 | 325,423 | 6% | 12 | 72 |
| Rivers | 7,303,924 | 1,043,418 | 16% | 32 | 192 |
| Total | 42,637,086 | 6,091,012 | 100 | | 1200 |

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2017/Authors' computation

4.3 Data collection

Data were collected from both households that are partaking in the GMoUs and the ones that are not. To distinguish the households, household heads were asked if they received any assistance directly from the MOCs in the area of CSR to make better their livelihood and even train the children. We administered a structured questionnaire to both the treatment and the control groups in a form that represents a suitable tool to assess qualitative issues by quantitative information. Scores were allotted on the questionnaire in line with the objectives of the study. The researchers and few research assistants employed administration the questionnaire. The research assistants were employed for two main reasons. Firstly, the study area is multi-lingual with over 50 ethnic groups that speak varying local languages and dialects. Secondly, the terrain is very rough with a high level of violence in some areas, and would require a local (an indigenous) assistant.

4.4 Analytical framework

This study joined two key methodologies to evaluate the effect of Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU) of multi-national oil companies on bringing down incidents of electoral violence in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Data generated from household valuation of the area which was carried out from April 2018 to August 2018, was used in the analysis. A combination of propensity score matching (PSM) and logit model was put to use in attaining both objectives 1 and 2. To regulate the difficulties of selectivity and endogeneity, we adopted the combined method for the study.

In Propensity Score Matching (PMS), we put into consideration the direct recipient of Corporate Social Responsibility via the Global Memorandum of Understandings (CG) first as a “treatment” so as to construe an average treatment effect of CG using propensity score matching approach. According Odozi *et.al*, (2010), propensity score matching includes speculating the probability of treatment on the basis of observed covariates for both control and the treatment group. It sums up the pre-treatment features of each subject into a single index variable and is then put to use in matching comparable individuals. In propensity score matching, an ideal comparison group selected from a larger survey and then matched to the treatment group based on set of observed characteristics on the predicted probability of treatment given observed characteristics (“propensity score”) (Ravallion, 2001; Odozi *et.al*, 2010). This said observed characteristics are those used in choosing individuals but not affected by the treatment; therefore, in this study, using this methodology, we assume that the

choice to be treated (that is, receiving CSR intervention), though not random, in the long run centers on the variables observed. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) reasoned that the ability to match on variable X implies that one can match on probability of X. Thus, estimating the effect of CG on capacity building of the rural youths, two groups are identified. In this two groups, those with CG (treated group) is denoted as $R_i = 1$ for youths₁ and $R_i = 0$ otherwise (control group). The treated are now matched to the control group on the basis of the propensity score: (Probability of receiving CG given observed characteristics).

Hence: $P(X_1) = \text{Prob}(R_2 = 1/X_2) \ (0 < P(X_2) < 1)$ Equation 2

Where X_1 is a vector of pre CG control variables, if R_1 's are independent over all 1 and the outcomes are independent of CG given X_1 then outcomes are independent of CG too given $P(X_1)$ just as they would do if CG is received arbitrarily. To draw precise deductions about the effect of CG activities on capacity building of the rural youths, we saw the need to side-step the selection bias on observables by matching on the probability of the treatment (covariates X) to this; we defined the PS of Vector X thus:

$P(X) = \text{Pr}(Z = 1/X),$ Equation 3

The Z represents the treatment indicator equating 1 if the individual youth chosen has received CG, and zero otherwise. Because the PS is a balancing score, the observables X will be spread same for both treated and non-treated and the variances are seen as to the attribute of treatment. To get this balanced impact estimates, we adapted the four steps from the literature (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Liebenehm, Affognon and Waibel, 2011). To begin with, we agreed that the probability of receiving CG is predicted by a binary response model with apposite observable characteristics. Thus, we pooled two individual group, (those who received CG (treated) and those who did not (Control)). After these, we appraised the logit model of CG receiving or not receiving as a function of some socio- economic characteristics variables. These variables include individual, domestic (household) and community variables represented in this equation as thus:

$P(x) = \text{Pr}(Z=1/X) = F(\alpha_1 x_1 + \dots + \alpha_n x_n) = F(x\alpha) = e^{x\alpha}$ Equation 4

We created value of the probability of receiving CG from the logit regression allocating each group a propensity score. The non- CG receiving group with very low PS outside the range found for receiver were plummeted at this point. For each domestic receiving CG a non-receiving that has the closest PS as measured by absolute difference in score referred to as nearest neighbour was acquired. We used close five neighbours to make the estimate more thorough. The mean values of the outcome of indicators for the close five neighbours were computed and the difference between the mean and actual value for CG receiving (treatment) is the assessment of the gain due to GMoU. This dissimilarity between treatment and control groups is evaluated by the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). The true ATT, based on PSM is written thus:

$$ATT_{PSM} = E_{p(x)} \{E(y_1/Z = 1, P(x)) - E(y_0/Z = 0, P(X))\}, \quad \text{Equation 5}$$

EP(X) stands for expectation in line with the sharing of PS in the population. The true ATT shows the mean difference in averting electoral violence. In this we attain an adequate match of a partaker with his counterfactual in as much as their observable characteristics are alike. Three different matching methods could be used in acquiring this matched pair. These approaches which vary in terms of bias and efficiency are: nearest neighbor matching (NNM) radius matching (RM) and kernel-based matching (KM), a non-parametric matching estimator. The third task was to check the matching estimators' quality by standardized differences in observables' means between receivers of CG and non-receivers. Representing difference in percent after matching with X for the covariate X, the difference in sample means for receivers as (\bar{X}_1) and matched non-receivers as (\bar{X}_0) . In line with Rosenbaum and Rubin, (1985), the sub-samples as a percentage of the square root of the average sample variances is put thus $(\int_1^2 \text{ and } \int_0^2)$.

Hence:

$$|SD = 100 * \frac{(\bar{X}_1 - \bar{X}_0)}{(.05 \int_1^2 \text{ and } \int_0^2)1/2} \quad \text{Equation 6}$$

We recognized a remaining bias below 5% after matching even when there is no obvious threshold of effective or ineffective matching. This we took as a signal that the balance among the varying observable characteristics between the matched groups is sufficient. Generally, while making an allowance for the quasi-experimental design of the MOC's GMoU activity, there might be a probability that unobservable factors like individual

household's intrinsic motivation and specific abilities or preferences, had influenced the decision to receive or not. This problem of hidden bias was avoided by the bounding approach. In equation 3 above, we complemented the logit model to estimate propensity score by a vector U comprising of all unobservable variables and their impacts on the possibility of receiving CG and captured by γ :

$$P(x)=Pr(Z=1/X)= F(X\alpha +U\gamma) = e^{X\alpha U\gamma} \quad \text{Equation 7}$$

With sensitivity analysis, we looked at the strength of the influence of γ on receiving CG in order to weaken the impact of receiving CG on potential outcomes. Simply put, the supposition is that the unobservable variable is a binary variable taking values 1 or 0. To this, the receiving probability of both groups is put to practice in line with the bounds on the odds ratio as stated thus:

$$\frac{1}{e\gamma} \leq \frac{P(Xm)(1-P(Xn))}{P(Xn)(1-P(Xm))} \leq e\gamma \quad \text{Equation 8}$$

Therefore, Rosenbaum (2002), could reason that both individual household have the same probability of receiving CG, so long as they are identical in X , only if $e\gamma = 1$

5. Results and discussion

5.1 Socio-economic characteristics analysis

We commence the analysis of the household in the study with an explanation of some of their social (gender, education), demographic (age, household size, marital status) and economic (occupation, income) features. These features are vital in understanding the differences in the socio-economic status of the households receiving direct CSR via the GMoUs when likened with their non-receiving counterparts in the oil producing region.

Table 2. Socio-economic characteristics of the respondents

| Sex of Respondent | Treatment | | Control | | Total | | Primary Occupation | Treatment | | Control | | Total | |
|---------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|------------|-----------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|------------|
| | Freq | % | Freq | % | Freq | % | | Freq | % | Freq | % | Freq | % |
| Male | 310 | 74 | 525 | 67 | 835 | 70 | Full Farming | 102 | 24 | 325 | 42 | 427 | 36 |
| Female | 110 | 26 | 255 | 33 | 365 | 30 | Trading | 63 | 15 | 107 | 14 | 170 | 14 |
| Total | 420 | 100 | 780 | 100 | 1200 | 100 | Fishing | 76 | 18 | 211 | 27 | 287 | 24 |
| Marital Status | | | | | | | Paid Employment | 32 | 8 | 18 | 2 | 50 | 4 |
| Single | 12 | 3 | 21 | 3 | 33 | 3 | Handicraft | 58 | 14 | 93 | 12 | 151 | 13 |
| Married | 312 | 74 | 612 | 78 | 924 | 77 | Unemployed | 51 | 12 | 16 | 2 | 67 | 6 |
| Widow | 65 | 15 | 61 | 8 | 126 | 11 | Others | 38 | 9 | 10 | 1 | 48 | 4 |
| Divorced/Separated | 31 | 7 | 86 | 11 | 117 | 10 | | 420 | 100 | 780 | 100 | 1200 | 100 |
| | 420 | 100 | 780 | 100 | 1200 | 100 | Household Size | | | | | | |
| Level of Education | | | | | | | 1-4 Person | 264 | 63 | 425 | 54 | 689 | 57 |
| None | 8 | 2 | 164 | 21 | 172 | 14 | 5-9 Person | 102 | 24 | 276 | 35 | 378 | 32 |
| Primary | 160 | 38 | 301 | 39 | 461 | 38 | 10-14 Person | 45 | 11 | 55 | 7 | 100 | 8 |
| Secondary | 215 | 51 | 286 | 37 | 501 | 42 | 15 Person and above | 9 | 2 | 24 | 3 | 33 | 3 |
| Tertiary | 37 | 9 | 29 | 4 | 66 | 6 | | 420 | 100 | 780 | 100 | 1200 | 100 |
| | 420 | 100 | 780 | 100 | 1200 | 100 | Annual Income | | | | | | |
| Age of Respondents | | | | | | | 1000 - 50,000 | 12 | 3 | 65 | 8 | 77 | 6 |
| Less than 20 years | 11 | 3 | 28 | 4 | 39 | 3 | 51,000 - 100,000 | 28 | 7 | 72 | 9 | 100 | 8 |
| 21-30 years | 38 | 9 | 108 | 14 | 146 | 12 | 101,000 - 150,000 | 91 | 22 | 145 | 19 | 236 | 20 |
| 31-40 years | 52 | 12 | 368 | 47 | 420 | 35 | 151,000 - 200,000 | 126 | 30 | 224 | 29 | 350 | 29 |
| 31 - 40 years | 86 | 20 | 155 | 20 | 241 | 20 | 201,000 - 250,000 | 71 | 17 | 121 | 16 | 192 | 16 |
| 41 - 50 years | 130 | 31 | 76 | 10 | 206 | 17 | 251,000 - 300,000 | 51 | 12 | 95 | 12 | 146 | 12 |
| Above 50 years | 103 | 25 | 45 | 6 | 148 | 12 | Above 300,000 | 41 | 10 | 58 | 7 | 99 | 8 |
| | 420 | 100 | 780 | 100 | 1200 | 100 | | 420 | 100 | 780 | 100 | 1200 | 100 |

Source: Authors' compilation based on household survey

Analysis (Table 2) shows that while about 74% of the treatments are male headed household, 67% of the controls are also male headed household. This reveals that only 26% of the treatments are female headed household, and 33% of the controls are female headed household. 70% of the respondents, on average, are male while only 30% are female. This is a clear suggestion of male domination in decision-making in the region, and it is also in line with the recent discoveries of Uduji & Okolo-Obasi,(2018b, 2018c), in that women rarely take part in the decision-making due to the cultural and traditional context, anchored in norms, beliefs, and practices that breed discrimination, and women's susceptibility to poverty. Also, only 3% of the respondents are single while about 77% are married. About 21% have been married before, but have become divorced, separated or widowed. The analysis (Table 2) also indicates that about 14% of the respondents are completely

uneducated, while only 6% concluded tertiary education. About 32% completed primary education and the remaining 42% finished their secondary education. The average age of the treatment group is 39 years, while that of the control group is 47 years. The result also reveals that 6% of the respondents are unemployed (12% for the treatment and 2% for the control). Remarkably, the result also reveals that a good number of GMOU partakers are unemployed and maybe reliant on handout from the GMOU’s CDB members. However, average annual income of the respondent in the treatment group is 270,000 naira (885 USD), while that of the control group is 180,000 naira (590 USD). This shows that both the treatment and even the control groups are either below or near the poverty line. In general, for both treatment and control, the average size of household is 7 persons.




Figure 5. Percentage distribution of CGs intervention of MOCs by sectors in the Niger Delta.

Source: Authors’ compilation based on household survey.

Analysis (Figure 5) shows the catchment areas of MOCs’ investment/intervention using GMOU as follows: 29% in peaceful engagement training, while 26% is in operation and maintenance of gas/power plants; agro enterprise development received only 6% while artisanal skill acquisition got 9%. Finally, other enterprise development programme, scholarship and school support, received 15% each. This result is compatible with Chevron (2014, 2017) in that MOCs contribute to the economic and social wellbeing of the people in communities where they function as they have learnt through decades of experience that their business is deeply associated to society’s progress in the region.

¹ASA = Artisanal skill acquisition, SCH = Scholarship and school support, PET= Peaceful engagement training AGE = Agro Enterprises, OPMG&PP = Operational maintenance of Gas and power pipeline, OED&T = Other Entrepreneurship development and training,




Figure 6. Rate of household receipt of GMoU intervention.

Source: Authors' compilation based on household survey.

Analysis (Figure 6) reveals that 65% of the household have not receive any direct intervention from GMoU to improve on their livelihood, while 2% got above 300,000 naira (830 USD); roughly 9% have received 200,000 naira (551 USD) and above; while only 3% received between 1,000 to 50,000 naira (2-188 USD); and 8% were given 51,000 to 100,000 naira (138-276 USD). This result gives consent to SPDC (2013) in that MOCs work with the host communities and partners to focus their support on strategic social investments in health, economic and educational development.




Figure 7. Rate of political awareness of the respondents.

Source: Authors' compilation based on household survey.

Analysis (Figure 7) indicates that 55% of the treatment group partakes in political process like campaign, voting and the likes, while 25% are involved as the real actors like contestants

and electoral officers. Moreover, 15% are political watchers who see and are very much aware of what happens, while only 5% have apathy for political process. On the other hand, only 38% of the control group participates, 13% contest, 27% observed, while 22% are unresponsiveness. This indicates that a large percentage of the population both treatment and control are politically aware. This is an indicator to why there is always high tension in the region during electoral campaign. This outcome comes to an understanding with Joab-Peterside (2018) in that politics is the key driving factor of criminality and cult violence in the oil producing regions of Nigeria; youth criminality and even cult. Violence seems to increase during election cycle in the Niger Delta, as many cult groups and organized criminal gangs hang on the patronage of political elites, who either hire them as informal security or use them against their (the politicians) opponents.




Figure 8. Rate of Unemployment among youths in the region.

Source: Authors' compilation based on household survey.

Analysis (Figure 8) indicates that 9% of the youths in the treatment group are employed in the government sector (the three levels of government). Private sector employed 25% of youths in the treatment group and 10% in the control group which is an average of 18% of the youths. 28% of the control groups are self-employed while for the treated it is 22% that are self-employed and the average is 25%. The average rate of underemployment is 17%, which means that about 17% of the youths are doing jobs that are probably not sustainable, productive or decent for them. About 42% of the control groups are unemployed while 26% of the treatments are unemployed. This shows that the rate of youth unemployment and underemployment is still in the high. Such condition is a motivating factor for engagement in

electoral violence. This result has the same view with Edigin & Obakhedo (2010) in that politically inspired violence in the Niger Delta region is also a driver of supremacy clashes among the many rival youth gangs, in an attempt to attract the patronage of the political elites. For example, PIND (2018) established that in March 2016, over 40 people were purportedly killed by political thugs during a re-run election in Tai LGA; and it is believed that the more sophisticated the gang group the higher their chances of being hired by the political elites in the region.

5.2 Econometric analysis

In analysis (Table 3), we reveal the average variances in the four basic scores and independent observable characteristics between treatment and control groups. In all, the variance in means shows that the level of scores on access to information, household involvement in politics, economic capability, and adult youth employment of household heads in the region is rationally low. However, the treatment group (GMOU cluster receiving CSR) reach considerably higher scores in all categories than those who did not receive. The variance is from average of 5% in the category of access to information to 15% in the economic capability of household head. Also the chosen observable individual and household profiled characteristics studied indicate that substantial positive differences in means exists for: Age (2.38%); Primary Occupation, (4.16%); Education, (13.61%); Annual Income, (15.9) and income of other household members, (2.93%). Similarly, we also observed negative significant mean in the treatment group as recorded in household size (-8.06), marital status (-6.06) and sex (4.09). On political engagements of the households, the treatment groups are more considerably involved than the control. This means that the control groups have more participants and more actors, but also have less observers and are less indifferent to politics with the mean difference as 1.03, 11.15, -3.69 and -8.12 respectively. However, the existing literature (UNDPA, 2016; UNDP, 2009; USAID, 2013) have proposed that such political systems based on patronage and clientele are more probable to experience election violence. In such political systems in which formal political institutions are succeeded by informal relationships on the basis of the exchange of resources and political loyalty, political enthusiasts seem willing to carry out election violence in support of their preferred candidates.

Table 3. Comparison of mean knowledge score and observable characteristics across participants and non-participants (N = 1200)

| Access and Knowledge Score as Percentage of Treatment maximum score | Control | Difference | |
|--|----------------|-------------------|----------|
| Score on access to information | 23.12 | 18.25 | 4.87** |
| Score on household involvement in politics | 34.18 | 22.56 | 11.62** |
| Score on adult youth employment | 21.13 | 14.14 | 6.99** |
| Score on Economic capability of household heads | 28.29 | 12.81 | 15.48** |
| Socio-Economic Characteristics | | | |
| Age | 19.13 | 16.75 | 2.38 |
| Sex | 10.62 | 14.71 | -4.09 |
| Education | 32.32 | 18.71 | 13.61* |
| Marital Status | 19.10 | 25.16 | -6.06** |
| Household Size | 9.12 | 17.18 | -8.06 |
| Primary Occupation | 18.32 | 14.16 | 4.16* |
| Annual Income | 48.14 | 32.24 | 15.9 |
| Income of other Household Members | 18.24 | 15.31 | 2.93 |
| Electoral Involvement | | | |
| Participating | 21.31 | 11.28 | 10.03** |
| Actors | 32.80 | 21.65 | 11.15** |
| Observation | 14.72 | 18.41 | -3.69* |
| Indifference | 16.67 | 24.79 | -8.12*** |
| Observation | 420 | 780 | |

Source: Authors' compilation based on household survey.

In line with the selected characteristics which capture the GMoU receiving cluster (treatment) and the non-receiving cluster (control), the likelihood of receiving CSR using the GMoUs is predicted. The Logit model as built in equation 4 has the reported analysis (Table 4), the projected coefficients; the odd ratio are expressed in terms of odds of $Z=1$, *the marginal effect and standard error*. Examining single observables, it is indicated that educational level, primary occupation, political involvement and view of the GMoU are factors that positively impact on the household participation in the GMoU cluster. On the other side, farming experience unexpectedly affects it considerably in negative way. This finding arrives at a settlement with Uduji & Okolo-Obasi (2017, 2019), in that the GMoUs guarantees sustainable community-driven development process and institutionalizes the spirit of partnerships, economic empowerment cum human capacity building. In addition, it has

brought remarkable socio-economic gains to communities around MOCs operation in the Niger Delta.

Table 4. Logit model to predict the probability of receiving CG conditional on selected observables

| Variables | Coefficient | Odd Ratio | Marginal Effect | Std. Error |
|---|--------------------------|-----------|-----------------|------------|
| Age | -.438 | .534 | .0006 | .015 |
| PriOcc | .432 | .685 | .105* | .125 |
| Edu | .215 | 2.112 | .072** | .025 |
| AY | -.023 | .720 | .00042 | .031 |
| Polinv | .019 | 1.030 | .0321** | .132 |
| MS | -.024 | 1.121 | -.00056 | .130 |
| HHcom | .115 | .462 | .0026 | .205 |
| Inpsou | .451 | 0.91 | .0021 | .034 |
| Perception of GMoU | 1.121 | 8.413 | .081* | .028 |
| Constant | 1.526 | 6.321 | .00210 | .672 |
| Observation | 1,200 | | | |
| Likelihood Ratio - LR test ($\rho=0$) | $\chi^2 (1) = 1243.34^*$ | | | |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.32 | | | |

*= significant at 10% level; ** = significant at 5% level; and * * * = significant at 1% level

Source: Authors' compilation based on household survey.

Following the probability of getting involved in the GMoU predicted in the model, the effect of the CSR using GMoU on reducing electoral violence by empowering household is evaluated by the ATT expressed in equation 5. After cautiously certifying that observations are ordered randomly and that there are no large discrepancies in the sharing of propensity scores, the result (Table 5) reveals that NNM (nearest neighbor matching) yields the highest and most substantial treatment effect estimate in all four outcome categories of access to information, adult youth employment, household participation in politics, and economic capability of household heads. This is in line with Uduji *et al*, (2018b, 2019b), in that the GMoU process continues to work with stakeholders to draw other partners in giving assistance towards the development of these communities. The Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, in this respect, has been fascinated to partner with the various CDBs.

Table 5. Estimated impacts of CSR activities using GMoU on Electoral violence prevention

| Description | Access and Knowledge Score in Percentage of Maximum Score | | Average Treatment effect on the treated |
|---|---|------------|---|
| | Treatment | Control | |
| Nearest neighbor matching | Using single nearest or closest neighbor | | |
| Score on access to information | 37.65 | 33.56 | 4.09** |
| Score on household involvement in politics | 42.87 | 34.64 | 8.23** |
| Score on adult youth employment | 31.53 | 25.64 | 5.89** |
| Score on Economic capability of household heads | 30.75 | 26.95 | 3.8** |
| Observations | 420 | 420 | |
| Radius matching | Using all neighbors within a caliper of 0.01 | | |
| Score on access to information | 37.14 | 31.43 | 5.71** |
| Score on household involvement in politics | 42.23 | 37.34 | 4.89** |
| Score on adult youth employment | 28.41 | 25.25 | 3.16** |
| Score on Economic capability of household heads | 27.31 | 22.22 | 5.09** |
| Observations | 382 | 536 | |
| Kernel-based matching | Using a bi-weight kernel function and a smoothing parameter of 0.06 | | |
| Score on access to information | 36.18 | 31.04 | 5.14** |
| Score on household involvement in politics | 44.61 | 37.82 | 6.79** |
| Score on adult youth employment | 28.15 | 24.32 | 3.83** |
| Score on Economic capability of household heads | 31.31 | 21.62 | 9.69** |
| Observations | 411 | 689 | |

*= significant at 10% level; ** = significant at 5% level; and * * * = significant at 1% level

Source: Authors' compilation based on household survey.

The nearest neighbor estimate of economic capability of household heads due to receiving CSR is just about 4%. But, in as much as NNM method produces relatively poor matches as a result of the limitation of information, we focused on the other two matching method (KM and RM). The estimated effect using radius matching algorithm is about 5%, while Kernel-

based matching algorithm yields a substantial average treatment effect on the treated of 10%, which is the highest impact estimate for total economic capability of household head. Due to this, we established that CSR generate noteworthy gains in household heads' economic capacity, and if encouraged and made better will lift many out of poverty line as pointed out in PIND (2018) as the main reason for partaking in electoral violence. Yet, this fails to agree with Burchard (2015) which puts forward that income levels do not dependably predict rates of election violence. Similarly, Taylor *et al.* (2017) saw no effect of income within sub-Saharan Africa, as wealthier countries such as South Africa and Equatorial Guinea are victims of high level of electoral violence whereas poorer countries such as Benin and Ghana are not.

Following the model in equation 6, we looked at the imbalance of single observable characteristics as the third step and it reveals that the quality of KM and RM in matching is much higher than that of the simple method of picking the only closest neighbor in line with the propensity score. The summary (Table 6) statistics for the overall balance of all covariates between treatment group and control group ascertains the higher quality of kernel-based matching and radius matching. Both the mean and the median of the absolute standardized difference after matching are below the starting point of 5%.

Table 6. Imbalance test results of observable covariates for three different matching algorithms using standardized difference in percent

| Covariates <i>X</i> | Standardized differences in percentage | | |
|---|--|-----------------|-----------------------|
| | Nearest neighbor matching | Radius matching | Kernel-based matching |
| <i>Age</i> | 16.8 | 2.8 | 1.8 |
| <i>PriOcc</i> | 13.3 | 6.1 | 2.8 |
| <i>Edu</i> | 29.1 | 5.8 | 6.9 |
| <i>AY</i> | 10.3 | 2.9 | 3.3 |
| <i>Polinv</i> | 11.4 | 3.2 | 1.5 |
| <i>MS</i> | 24.8 | 4.2 | 1.8 |
| <i>HHcom</i> | 18.4 | 6.1 | 1.3 |
| <i>Inpsou</i> | 25.3 | 3.8 | 2.1 |
| <i>Perception of GMOU</i> | 76.2 | 4.7 | 7.8 |
| Constant | 41.6 | 3.1 | 9.4 |
| Mean absolute standardized difference | 26.7 | 4.3 | 3.9 |
| Median absolute standardized difference | 18.1 | 3.7 | 1.7 |

Source: Authors' compilation based on household survey.

In accordance with the model in equation 8, we conducted the sensitivity analysis of the significance levels because it is the responsibility of a suitable control strategy for hidden bias. We then compared the impact of sensitivity of treatment on access to information, household involvement in politics, economic capability of household heads, and adult youth employment among the three introduced matching algorithms. In all, toughness results produced by Rosenbaum's bounds are quite similar. Further findings of this study assent to Joab-Peterside (2018) in that elections at the national, state and local levels in the Niger Delta are usually accompanied by intricate conflict dynamics. These findings are also in agreement with Edigin & Obakhedo (2010) in that elections in the region are seen as occasions to influence the sharing of public wealth and to access large clienteles of political patronage, creating motivations for intra- and inter-party violence. Early in the process (before or after party primaries), those with a stake in the results may attempt to intimidate, abduct, or even murder aspirations in order to manipulate the electoral result. Once candidates have been chosen, violence may be engaged in to intimidate voters and election officials during electoral activities. In some cases, violence can break out upon the announcement of the results if biased polarization is very high and one group feels upset by the outcome. Communal and criminal violence have also been made worse during the election cycle, as criminals may be employed as political thugs or long-standing communal conflicts may be exacerbated.

Analysis (Table 7) reveals that KM generated more robust treatment effect than NNM and RM in respect to assessments of hidden bias, particularly for economic capability of household heads, adult youth employment access, in addition to access to information. There is a probability that matched pairs may vary by up to 100% in unobservable characteristics; while the effect of CSR on economic capability of household heads, access to information and youth employment access would still be substantial at a level of 5% (p -value = 0.0153 and p -value = 0.0128, and p -value = 0.0314, respectively). The same categories of knowledge score are robust to hidden bias up to an influence of $e^{\beta} = 2$ at a significance level of 10% in line with the radius matching approach.

Table 7. Sensitivity analysis with ROSENBAUM'S bounds on probability values

| | Upper bounds on the significance level for different values of e^r | | | | |
|---|--|--------------|-------------|--------------|-----------|
| | $e^r = 1$ | $e^r = 1.25$ | $e^r = 1.5$ | $e^r = 1.75$ | $e^r = 2$ |
| Nearest neighbor matching | Using single nearest or closest neighbor | | | | |
| Score on access to information | 0.0001 | 0.0052 | 0.0516 | 0.326 | 0.721 |
| Score on household involvement in politics | 0.0001 | 0.0016 | 0.0061 | 0.321 | 0.531 |
| Score on adult youth employment | 0.0001 | 0.0001 | 0.0002 | 0.241 | 0.322 |
| Score on Economic capability of household heads | 0.0001 | 0.0031 | 0.0041 | 0.142 | 0.231 |
| Radius matching | Using all neighbors within a caliper of 0.01 | | | | |
| Score on access to information | 0.0003 | 0.0315 | 0.1364 | 0.268 | 0.072 |
| Score on household involvement in politics | 0.0021 | 0.0014 | 0.0021 | 0.314 | 0.072 |
| Score on adult youth employment | 0.0011 | 0.0017 | 0.0032 | 0.011 | 0.0661 |
| Score on Economic capability of household heads | 0.0002 | 0.0012 | 0.0019 | 0.0180 | 0.0136 |
| Kernel-based matching | Using a bi-weight kernel function and a smoothing parameter of 0.06 | | | | |
| Score on access to information | 0.0001 | 0.0172 | 0.0160 | 0.2485 | 0.0314 |
| Score on household involvement in politics | 0.0001 | 0.0062 | 0.0341 | 0.1113 | 0.0132 |
| Score on adult youth employment | 0.0001 | 0.0031 | 0.0011 | 0.0025 | 0.0128 |
| Score on Economic capability of household heads | 0.0002 | 0.0051 | 0.0031 | 0.0033 | 0.0153 |

Source: Authors' compilation based on household survey.

Elections in Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta region, in sum, are high states affairs. They are regularly characterized by violence and vote rigging. Electoral violence matters, not only because how it influences democracy and governance, but also because it hurts economic and human development in the region. Economically underprivileged persons, especially youths without dependable sources of livelihoods, are regularly used by politicians to carry out violence during elections. In addition, the negative effect of election-related violence in the region goes beyond the electoral cycle and remains even after the elections are concluded, thereby hampering the democratic process and economic development. Therefore, this study has tried to explore the nature of CSR in an African context using Visser (2006) and Amaeshi *et al* (2006), which proposed that the relative priorities of CSR in Africa are likely to vary from the classic Western version. It is no surprise, therefore, that the economic contribution of companies in Africa is highly prized, by government and communities alike. In the Nigeria's Niger Delta, the business of oil extraction is encouraged to redress the inequalities of economic empowerment and employment equity in the host communities through the

GMoUs – CSR model. We determined the significance of cultural context in deciding on the suitable CSR priorities and programmes in the oil producing communities. We suggest the need for suppleness in methods to CSR policy and practice by MOCs operating in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria and other sub-Saharan African countries. As a result, if we are to add to how CSR interventions can alleviate electoral violence in oil host communities, we would dispute that GMoUs of MOCs can play a vital role in alleviating incidents of electoral violence when interventions on clusters is planned out for the complexities of electoral violence in the Niger Delta region. It is our argument that the private sector in general and MOCs specifically are well positioned to handle the problem of electoral violence in the oil host communities, which in turn will create the enabling environment for more extensive and responsible business. The CDBs, membership for preventing electoral violence should be drafted from a range of traditional leaders, women's groups, youths-at-risk (ex-militants), youth groups, the clergy, Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) officials, security officers, civil society organization (CSOs) members, opinion leaders, and community leaders. They should be made to acquire skills on voter's education programme; then, they should be positioned to handle conflict during general elections, and to address post-election violence/discontent in their communities. We conclude that business has an obligation to help in solving problems of public concern. Hence, embracing the GMoU model for dissuading the increasing electoral violence in Nigeria's Niger Delta region should form the foundation of CSR practice of MOCs and assign the highest priority, which in turn will provide the enabling environment for more widespread responsible business in sub-Saharan Africa.

6. Concluding Remarks, Caveats and Future Research Direction

This paper has sought to explore the nature of CSR in an African context, using Visser (2006) CSR in developing countries. Evidence of how CSR is practiced in an African context has also been used to support CSR implementation from an African perspective. Thus, we explored the effect of MOCs GMoUs on cutting down the incidents of electoral violence in Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Results from the use of a combined propensity score matching and logit model revealed that GMoUs of MOCs can play a vital role in alleviating incidents of electoral violence when intervention on electoral violence clusters is planned out for the complexities of electoral violence in the Niger Delta region. The CDBs membership for averting electoral violence should be drafted from a range of traditional leaders, CSOs,

women's groups, youth-at-risk (ex-militants), INECs officials, youth groups, the clergy, opinion leaders and community leaders. They should be exposed to knowledge on voter's education programme and positioned to handle conflict during general elections. They should also address post-election violence/discontent in their respective communities. We conclude that business has an obligation to help in solving problems of public concern. Most critically, it is suggested that the relative priorities of CSR in Africa are likely to be different from the classic, Western ordering. This finding remains speculative and provocative and would therefore benefit from further empirical research. However, if confirmed, this raises several important issues regarding the cross-continental CSR debate, including the importance of cultural context in the determination of appropriate CSR priorities and programmes; and the need for flexibility in approaches to CSR policy and practice by multinationals operating in Africa and globally. It is worth stating that while this study adds to the extant literature on the role of oil from the perspective of CSR in electoral violence prevention in the Niger Delta region, it also makes available policy direction on the relationship. Yet, the main limitation of the study is that it is concerned with oil producing communities in Nigeria. Hence, the findings cannot be generally applied to other developing countries with the same policy challenges. In line with this shortcoming, reproducing the analysis in other countries is valuable in order to look at whether the recognized nexuses withstand empirical examination in the context of different oil producing communities of developing regions of the world.

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