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## The Increasing Representativeness of International Organizations' Secretariats: Evidence from the United Nations System, 1997–2015

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## Appendix: The Increasing Representativeness of International Organizations' Secretariats: Evidence from the United Nations System, 1997-2015

### 1. Interviews

For the purpose of this article, we conducted in total 25 semi-structured interviews between November 2017 and December 2018. To obtain interview evidence, we contacted the Geneva-based embassies to the United Nations (and other international organizations) of a sample of countries. The sample consisted of 50 randomly selected countries and all the G20 members. For each embassy, the primary (e-mail) contact was the ambassador, if his or her personal contact was available at the mission website. If not, which was to case in most instances, our inquiry was targeted at the general embassy e-mail address. In case no response was received within two weeks, we sent to the given contact one reminder.

Out of the 25 semi-structured interviews thus obtained, nine were with country ambassadors (permanent representatives to the United Nations), nine with deputy permanent representatives. Three interviews were with other mission staff members. In total four interviews were conducted with members of the staff of UN system bodies. These included one director of human resources of an IO and one deputy director of human resources of another IO, and one highest-level system auditor from the UN Joint Inspection Unit. In terms of country coverage, nine interviews were with representatives of high-income countries, nine with representatives of middle-income countries, and three with representatives of low-income countries and LDCs. In total eleven interviewees represented member states from Europe, five from the Americas, three from Asia, and two from Africa. Table A1 provides a list of interviews, as referred to in the body of the text.

**Table A1: Interviews with senior diplomatic staff, Geneva 2017 and 2018**

Interview #	Type	Rank	Country type	Region
1	state	Deputy head of mission	high income	Americas
2	state	Ambassador, representative to UN and other IOs	middle income	Europe
3	state	Deputy head of mission	low income or LDC	Africa
4	state	Deputy head of mission	middle income	Europe
5	state	Ambassador, representative to UN and other IOs	low income or LDC	Europe
6	state	Secretary	middle income	Americas
7	state	Deputy head of mission	middle income	Asia
8	state	Ambassador, representative to UN and other IOs	middle income	Americas
9	state	Deputy head of mission	high income	Europe
10	state	Ambassador, representative to UN and other IOs	high income	Europe
11	state	Deputy head of mission	middle income	Americas
12	state	Ambassador, representative to UN and other IOs	high income	Europe
13	state	Ambassador, representative to UN and other IOs	middle income	Americas
14	IO	Senior management (HR)		
15	IO	Senior management (HR)		
16	state	Director of unit	high income	Europe
17	state	Ambassador, representative to UN and other IOs	high income	Europe
18	state	Deputy head of mission	low income or LDC	Africa
19	IO	Senior management (HR)		
20	state	Secretary	high income	Asia
21	state	Deputy head of mission	middle income	Asia
22	state	Deputy head of mission	high income	Europe
23	IO	Consultant		
24	state	Ambassador, representative to UN and other IOs	high income	Europe
25	state	Ambassador, representative to UN and other IOs	middle income	Europe

## 2. The sample of IOs and IO characteristics<sup>1</sup>

As explained in the body of the text, our sampling is driven by the availability of a uniquely rich and systematic data source, in the form of the United Nations Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) Personnel Statistics reports for years 1997-2015 (e.g. document CEB/2002/HLCM/3 for 2000, then documents up to CEB/2016/HLCM/HR/20 for year 2015). While technically the data are available for 1996 as well, we deem it very likely that the report for year 1996, as reported at the CEB website, is in fact erroneous and shows data for 1998. As a conservative measure, we thus omit the year 1996 from our analysis.<sup>2</sup>

The data source covers the entire UN system, as defined by the United Nations CEB,<sup>3</sup> with the exception of the World Bank Group, the IMF, and the WTO. In addition, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is included within the figures for the UN Secretariat (documented e.g. in CEB/2016/HLCM/HR/20, pp. ix-x). To achieve a complete description of the entire UN system, we collected separately all the available data pertinent to the three remaining bodies. The data for the WTO come from the WTO Diversity reports, published from 2009 yearly and until 2009 in five-year intervals (e.g. WTO document WT/BFA/W/387). For IMF, the data were extracted from the Diversity Annual Reports, published yearly from 2000 (with a gap in 2005 and 2006). For the World Bank Group, we were not able to identify any data source that could be used even for a basic description of the staff national composition over time.

Table A2 provides an overview of the bodies in the dataset, with their key characteristics. It shows the total number of professional staff of the body (Professional staff 2015), the number and share of general services staff working in the field, outside of the headquarters (GS staff outside HQ 2015; Share of GS staff outside HQ 2015). The table also includes data on the percent rise or decline in the size of the professional staff (column Change (%) of professional staff size, 1997-2015). So, for example, the UN Secretariat

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<sup>1</sup> As we mention in the body of the text, some of the bodies of the UN system are not formally independent IOs, such as the United Nations Development Programme. Yet, as all bodies we cover are parts of IOs, we use both the terms and not just the broader term 'bodies'.

<sup>2</sup> This concerns the report ACC/1998/PER/R.9. Our results remain virtually unchanged if data for 1996 are included. See <https://www.unsystem.org/content/un-system-human-resources-statistics-reports>.

<sup>3</sup> See <http://www.unsystem.org/content/un-system>.

increased its size of professional staff by 111%, i.e. in 2015 it was at 211% of the value from year 1997. All bodies except of UNESCO and UNIDO increased their staff sizes or did not exist in 1997 at all.<sup>4</sup>

In addition, the table includes information on the number of hits based on search on the news aggregator FACTIVA, used for the measure of public visibility of the body (FACTIVA hits 2015), as well as the scores for the binary visibility variable, for year 2015 (Visible 2015). Analogous measures of visibility based on Google hits numbers and coverage in the multilingual Global Databaset of Events, Language and Tone (GDELТ) are also displayed. For Google our data cover the entire period 1997-2015, while for GDELТ we use the earliest data available from 2017. The visibility scores of IOs correlate strongly across the three sources (Factiva, Google News, GDELТ), as we highlight later in this appendix (Figures A6, Table A7).

Using our default Factiva measure, out of the bodies covered, 13 are highly visible throughout the period, in all the 19 years (FAO, IAEA, ICJ, UN, UN Women, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFCCC, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO). ITU is highly visible in all but one year, while ILO and IMO in 70% of the period. In total 16 bodies are marked as lowly visible throughout the period (ICAO, ICSC, IFAD, ITC, ITCILO, PAHO, UNICC, UNIDO, UNITAR, UNJSPF, UNOPS, UNRWA, UNSSC, UNU, UPU, WMO). UNWTO is lowly visible in all but one year. Finally, WIPO and UNFPA are relatively balanced, with WIPO being lowly visible in 10 out of 19 years and UNFPA in 12 out of 19 years.

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<sup>4</sup> For UNOPS, Table A2 reports data from 2014 instead of 2015 in the relevant categories, as the 2015 data in the report are most likely reported erroneously (CEB/2016/HLCM/HR/20, see also p. viii of the report).

**Table A2: Overview of IOs (bodies) in the sample**

IGO body	Professional staff 2015	GS staff outside HQ 2015	Share of GS staff outside HQ 2015	Change (%) of professional staff size, 1997-2015	FACTIVA hits 2015	Visible 2015	Google New hits 2015	Visible on Google News 2015	Trans-lingual GDELT hits 2017	Trans-lingual GDELT Visible 2017
UN	11461	22757	74.8	110.8	291266	1	3810000	1	2724581	1
UNICEF	3561	5113	90.7	143.5	52503	1	28900	1	270509	1
UNDP	2484	3466	91.1	126.8	5754	1	62200	1	22741	1
UNHCR	2399	5583	90.5	77.8	33141	1	23500	1	220375	1
WHO	2070	3240	82.7	40.4	40843	1	3730000	1	336117	1
FAO	1496	1511	53.4	9.3	6454	1	103000	1	31390	1
WFP	1409	3258	85.8	142.5	7234	1	47800	1	37578	1
IAEA	1319	1084	3	52.7	14027	1	63300	1	42438	1
ILO	1064	1251	63.4	9.6	1138	0	9380	0	33783	1
UNESCO	931	963	45.4	-8	106606	1	33300	1	693085	1
UNFPA	671	1215	90.7	113.6	2052	1	18800	0	10669	0
WIPO	599	563	0.4	128.1	1130	0	19200	0	5483	0
UNOPS	470	219	60.7	90.1	70	0	914	0		
UNAIDS	405	280	71.8	246	2937	1	8480	0	14930	1
ITU	401	342	7	37.5	2808	1	21000	1	5141	0
ICAO	372	370	21.1	2.2	2	0	22	0	842	0
UN Women	372	289	75.1	0	4080	1	69400	1	26327	1
PAHO	352	300	37.3	51.4	493	0	17700	0	7289	0
IFAD	326	231	7.4	121.8	1195	0	11400	0	4185	0
UNFCCC	282	179	0	0	4904	1	27500	1	15644	1
UNIDO	247	333	21.3	-18.4	655	0	8730	0	2156	0
UNRWA	196	13	15.4	43.1	373	0	1550	0	53660	1
WMO	171	125	4	31.4	1447	0	22600	1	14065	0
ITC	167	94	0	70.3	940	0	15600	0	1973	0

IMO	143	112	2.7	18.9	1716	1	24100	1	8641	0
UNICC	117	104	60.6	0	0	0	104	0	1	0
UNJSPF	97	125	0	0	62	0	739	0	44	0
UPU	79	77	0	12.8	354	0	6860	0	770	0
UNU	72	32	84.4	84.6	587	0	23200	1	3207	0
ITCILO	62	107	0	0	4	0	1400	0	106	0
ICJ	56	53	0	466.7	3850	1	45100	1	47211	1
UNWTO	44	50	0	0	1234	0	16600	0	17975	1
UNITAR	31	6	0	221.2	101	0	2840	0	429	0
ICSC	19	19	0	27.1	9	0	889	0	161	0
UNSSC	15	15	0	0	12	0	1360	0	24	0


### 3. Descriptive insights: UN System and country representation

The extensive coverage of our dataset allows us to draw a number of interesting empirical observations.

#### 3.1 Trends in UN bodies' staffing

Figure A1 describes the overall trend in the number of staff working for the UN system bodies. The total of professional staff (solid line) has risen from around 18,000 in 1997 to around 33,500 in 2015. The general services staff numbers increased from around 33,400 in 1997 to around 53,300 in 2015 (dashed line). This total is further decomposed into headquarters-based general services staff (dot-dashed flat line) and the general services staff working in the individual duty stations outside of the headquarters (dotted line). The number of general services staff in headquarters slightly decreased, from 15,200 to around 13,900. In contrast, the locally stationed general services staff doubled in size, from around 18,100 to around 39,300. A sizable dip is observable in locally stationed general services staff in 2008.

**Figure A1: The development of UN bodies staff size, 1997-2015**



*Note: Full line shows the professional staff. The total of general services staff is shown with the dashed line. This is further decomposed in headquarters-based general services staff (dot-dashed flat line) and locally-based (outside of HQ) general services staff (dotted line).*



### **3.2 Country variation in representation**

Table A3 gives all key staffing-related information for all the individual UN members, covered in our data source. It portrays the number of professional staff members from a particular country in 2015 and in 1997 (Professional staff 2015, Professional staff 1997), as well as the number of professional staff members per million inhabitants (Staff per mil 2015, Staff per mil 1997). Next, it provides a relative score, showing the percent share of individual countries on the staff total (Professional staff share (in %) 2015, Professional staff share (in %) 1997). Finally, it provides information on the magnitude of change in representation of individual members between 2015 and 1997 (Absolute change 2015-1997).

**Table A3: Country representation and changes**

Rank 2015	Country	Professional staff 2015	Professional staff 1997	Staff per mil. 2015	Staff per mil. 1997	Professional staff share (%) 2015	Professional staff share (%) 1997	Absolute change 2015-1997
1	USA	3100	1924	9.65	7.06	9.51	10.74	1176
2	FRA	2032	1237	30.42	20.63	6.23	6.9	795
3	GBR	1655	1032	25.42	17.7	5.08	5.76	623
4	ITA	1427	618	23.47	10.86	4.38	3.45	809
5	CAN	1224	671	34.15	22.38	3.75	3.75	553
6	DEU	1217	726	14.95	8.85	3.73	4.05	491
7	IND	866	379	0.66	0.38	2.66	2.12	487
8	JPN	817	529	6.43	4.2	2.51	2.95	288
9	ESP	810	305	17.45	7.71	2.48	1.7	505
10	KEN	681	127	14.8	4.4	2.09	0.71	554
11	AUS	590	293	24.82	15.82	1.81	1.64	297
12	CHN	569	312	0.42	0.25	1.75	1.74	257
13	NLD	521	606	30.77	38.82	1.6	3.38	-85
14	RUS	518	579	3.6	3.91	1.59	3.23	-61
15	BEL	494	342	43.78	33.59	1.52	1.91	152
16	UGA	378	67	9.7	3.09	1.16	0.37	311
17	PAK	376	132	1.99	1.02	1.15	0.74	244
18	DNK	369	347	65.02	65.66	1.13	1.94	22
19	PHL	352	256	3.5	3.5	1.08	1.43	96
20	ETH	346	169	3.48	2.78	1.06	0.94	177
21	CMR	323	102	13.85	6.93	0.99	0.57	221
22	SWE	316	288	32.26	32.56	0.97	1.61	28
23	NGA	307	132	1.69	1.16	0.94	0.74	175
24	BRA	304	214	1.46	1.27	0.93	1.19	90
25	SEN	304	145	20.12	15.82	0.93	0.81	159
26	IRL	283	141	60.99	38.38	0.87	0.79	142
27	KOR	283	69	5.59	1.5	0.87	0.39	214
28	GHA	279	119	10.19	6.77	0.86	0.66	160
29	EGY	275	200	3.01	3.09	0.84	1.12	75
30	ARG	273	214	6.29	5.97	0.84	1.19	59
31	AUT	250	171	29.04	21.46	0.77	0.95	79
32	JOR	243	96	32.02	21.12	0.75	0.54	147
33	FIN	241	152	43.97	29.57	0.74	0.85	89
34	ZWE	240	51	15.4	4.23	0.74	0.28	189
35	NPL	239	76	8.39	3.39	0.73	0.42	163
36	CIV	229	66	10.1	4.31	0.7	0.37	163

37	COD	227	90			0.7	0.5	137
38	MEX	225	127	1.77	1.3	0.69	0.71	98
39	ZAF	219	30	3.99	0.73	0.67	0.17	189
40	COL	218	142	4.52	3.67	0.67	0.79	76
41	NOR	212	161	40.82	36.55	0.65	0.9	51
42	BGD	210	107	1.3	0.87	0.64	0.6	103
43	LBN	208	92	35.6	29.75	0.64	0.51	116
44	SDN	205	121	5.1	4.63	0.63	0.68	84
45	BEN	185	67	17.02	10.53	0.57	0.37	118
46	TUR	177	77	2.25	1.27	0.54	0.43	100
47	BFA	174	80	9.62	7.5	0.53	0.45	94
48	RWA	166	40	14.31	6.15	0.51	0.22	126
49	NZL	165	63	35.93	16.66	0.51	0.35	102
50	PRT	163	62	15.75	6.13	0.5	0.35	101
51	TUN	157	112	14.14	12.15	0.48	0.63	45
52	MAR	152	61	4.42	2.18	0.47	0.34	91
53	UKR	152	52	3.36	1.03	0.47	0.29	100
54	TZA	149	90	2.79	2.85	0.46	0.5	59
55	PER	144	153	4.59	6.16	0.44	0.85	-9
56	BDI	141	37	12.63	5.76	0.43	0.21	104
57	ROU	141	21			0.43	0.12	120
58	BGR	134	36	18.66	4.33	0.41	0.2	98
59	MLI	134	75	7.62	7.38	0.41	0.42	59
60	SLE	128	71	19.85	18.47	0.39	0.4	57
61	MYS	126	81	4.16	3.71	0.39	0.45	45
62	CHE	123	93	14.84	13.12	0.38	0.52	30
63	POL	116	70	3.05	1.81	0.36	0.39	46
64	URY	116	83	33.81	25.37	0.36	0.46	33
65	GRC	115	67	10.62	6.28	0.35	0.37	48
66	MWI	115	30	6.69	2.92	0.35	0.17	85
67	LKA	114	97	5.44	5.29	0.35	0.54	17
68	CHL	110	180	6.13	12.33	0.34	1	-70
69	BIH	109	9	28.6	2.38	0.33	0.05	100
70	ZMB	108	36	6.67	3.69	0.33	0.2	72
71	GIN	106	43	8.42	5.16	0.33	0.24	63
72	DZA	104	108	2.62	3.61	0.32	0.6	-4
73	THA	103	96	1.52	1.59	0.32	0.54	7
74	NER	102	41	5.13	4.08	0.31	0.23	61
75	HRV	101	24	23.91	5.25	0.31	0.13	77
76	HUN	99	54	10.06	5.25	0.3	0.3	45
77	IRN	98	81	1.24	1.3	0.3	0.45	17


78	AFG	93	20	2.86	1.11	0.29	0.11	73
79	IDN	92	34	0.36	0.17	0.28	0.19	58
80	GMB	90	38	45.26	33.72	0.28	0.21	52
81	IRQ	88	45	2.42	2.09	0.27	0.25	43
82	ECU	87	44	5.39	3.69	0.27	0.25	43
83	TGO	84	56	11.51	12.43	0.26	0.31	28
84	SYR	83	60	4.48	3.96	0.25	0.33	23
85	MDG	76	33	3.14	2.3	0.23	0.18	43
86	VEN	75	64	2.41	2.77	0.23	0.36	11
87	CRI	73	51	15.19	13.85	0.22	0.28	22
88	MDA	72	0	20.26	0	0.22	0	72
89	MRT	72	36	17.72	14.54	0.22	0.2	36
90	BOL	71	49	6.62	6.23	0.22	0.27	22
91	COG	71	0	15.38	0	0.22	0	71
92	ARM	70	8	23.2	2.55	0.21	0.04	62
93	UZB	68	1	2.17	0.04	0.21	0.01	67
94	MKD	63	3	30.31	1.52	0.19	0.02	60
95	ALB	60	5	20.77	1.59	0.18	0.03	55
96	CUB	60	57	5.27	5.18	0.18	0.32	3
97	GTM	59	30	3.61	2.76	0.18	0.17	29
98	HTI	59	29	5.51	3.57	0.18	0.16	30
99	JAM	59	69	21.65	27.23	0.18	0.39	-10
100	LBR	59	33	13.11	13.95	0.18	0.18	26
101	ISR	58	36	6.93	6.17	0.18	0.2	22
102	MMR	57	53	1.06	1.15	0.17	0.3	4
103	TTO	57	60	41.92	47.59	0.17	0.33	-3
104	BLR	55	27	5.78	2.67	0.17	0.15	28
105	FJI	54	17	60.54	21.44	0.17	0.09	37
106	MUS	54	50	42.77	43.54	0.17	0.28	4
107	AZE	53	3	5.49	0.38	0.16	0.02	50
108	CZE	53	33	5.02	3.2	0.16	0.18	20
109	TJK	53	0	6.25	0	0.16	0	53
110	SVK	52	17	9.59	3.16	0.16	0.09	35
111	GEO	50	7	13.58	1.54	0.15	0.04	43
112	SOM	50	57	4.64	8.54	0.15	0.32	-7
113	PAN	49	20	12.48	7.01	0.15	0.11	29
114	MNG	48	8	16.23	3.43	0.15	0.04	40
115	TCD	48	19	3.42	2.54	0.15	0.11	29
116	HND	47	21	5.82	3.59	0.14	0.12	26
117	YEM	47	17	1.75	1.04	0.14	0.09	30
118	ERI	45	12		3.68	0.14	0.07	33

119	NIC	45	29	7.4	6.06	0.14	0.16	16
120	MOZ	44	19	1.57	1.13	0.13	0.11	25
121	KGZ	42	0	7.06	0	0.13	0	42
122	SGP	40	32	7.23	8.43	0.12	0.18	8
123	SLV	39	22	6.37	3.86	0.12	0.12	17
124	SVN	39	9	18.9	4.53	0.12	0.05	30
125	GUY	38	54	49.55	73.58	0.12	0.3	-16
126	BTN	37	5	47.78	9.6	0.11	0.03	32
127	KAZ	36	4	2.05	0.26	0.11	0.02	32
128	VNM	36	13	0.39	0.17	0.11	0.07	23
129	BWA	34	6	15.04	3.65	0.1	0.03	28
130	LTU	34	7	11.68	1.96	0.1	0.04	27
131	KHM	33	8	2.12	0.71	0.1	0.04	25
132	CAF	32	13	6.54	3.72	0.1	0.07	19
133	LUX	32	16	56.22	38.15	0.1	0.09	16
134	DOM	29	25	2.76	3.06	0.09	0.14	4
135	ISL	28	15	84.67	55.32	0.09	0.08	13
136	DJI	26	8	29.3	11.67	0.08	0.04	18
137	PRK	25	6	0.99	0.27	0.08	0.03	19
138	SRB	25	0	3.52	0	0.08	0	25
139	LVA	24	3	12.13	1.23	0.07	0.02	21
140	CPV	23	10	44.21	24.4	0.07	0.06	13
141	GAB	23	10	13.34	8.74	0.07	0.06	13
142	PRY	22	17	3.32	3.41	0.07	0.09	5
143	TKM	21	0	3.91	0	0.06	0	21
144	AGO	20	11	0.8	0.8	0.06	0.06	9
145	CYP	20	11	17.17	12.35	0.06	0.06	9
146	BRB	19	24	66.86	89.91	0.06	0.13	-5
147	COM	17	6	21.58	11.85	0.05	0.03	11
148	GNB	17	12	9.23	9.73	0.05	0.07	5
149	NAM	17	3	6.92	1.71	0.05	0.02	14
150	EST	16	3	12.19	2.14	0.05	0.02	13
151	KWT	16	3	4.12	1.78	0.05	0.02	13
152	SWZ	16	8	12.44	7.95	0.05	0.04	8
153	MLT	15	16	34.79	42.64	0.05	0.09	-1
154	SAU	15	18	0.48	0.91	0.05	0.1	-3
155	BHS	14	10	36.1	34.85	0.04	0.06	4
156	BLZ	14	51	39	230.14	0.04	0.28	-37
157	LSO	13	12	6.09	6.66	0.04	0.07	1
158	SYC	13	5	140.03	64.67	0.04	0.03	8
159	LAO	12	5	1.77	0.99	0.04	0.03	7

160	LBY	12	20	1.91	3.95	0.04	0.11	-8
161	LCA	12	11	64.88	72.85	0.04	0.06	1
162	MDV	11	4	26.91	15.15	0.03	0.02	7
163	SUR	10	10	18.42	21.67	0.03	0.06	0
164	BHR	9	5	6.54	8.36	0.03	0.03	4
165	KNA	9	9	162.03	205.08	0.03	0.05	0
166	PNG	8	6	1.05	1.21	0.02	0.03	2
167	STP	8	6	42.06	46.11	0.02	0.03	2
168	DMA	7	8	96.33	113.06	0.02	0.04	-1
169	GNQ	7	6	8.29	12.5	0.02	0.03	1
170	GRD	7	9	65.54	89	0.02	0.05	-2
171	ATG	5	3	54.48	41.53	0.02	0.02	2
172	VCT	5	7	45.68	64.81	0.02	0.04	-2
173	WSM	5	4	25.88	23.23	0.02	0.02	1
174	AND	4	1			0.01	0.01	3
175	SLB	4	1	6.86	2.63	0.01	0.01	3
176	SMR	4	0	125.89	0	0.01	0	4
177	BRN	3	1	7.09	3.23	0.01	0.01	2
178	OMN	3	2	0.67	0.9	0.01	0.01	1
179	VUT	3	0	11.35	0	0.01	0	3
180	LIE	2	0	53.31	0	0.01	0	2
181	FSM	1	0	9.58	0	0	0	1
182	MCO	1	2	26.51	64.02	0	0.01	-1
183	QAT	1	2	0.45	3.79	0	0.01	-1
184	ARE	0	1	0	0.39	0	0.01	-1
185	MHL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
186	PLW	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Figure A2 provides a visual depiction of the representation of countries, showing averages across the entire period 1997-2015. The vertical axis depicts the overall staff number, for each country, while the horizontal axis gives the per capita expression (the number of staff per million citizens). Decadic logarithms are depicted on both axes (axes labels show the natural, non-transformed scores).

**Figure A2: Countries' absolute and per million inhabitants representation on staff (average for the period 1997-2015)**



*Note: In the plot, we do not include countries with less than 1 mil. inhabitants and less than 3 staff members across all UN bodies combined.*

## 4. Measurement validity

In the following, we provide several tests of the validity of our measurements. These pertain both to the dependent variable (country representation on professional staff), and to the various predictors.

### 4.1 The dependent variable: Grade-weighted and senior-only grade-weighted staff count

In the main analysis of the article, the dependent variable is defined as the count (logged) of individual countries' nationals on the professional staffs of the individual bodies (or their aggregate). The data source does not contain information on the distribution of staff across nationalities and grades. Nevertheless, we collected additional information on grade-weighted (or seniority-weighted) positions for two of the largest bodies in the sample, the UN secretariat and the WHO, seeking to identify any systematic variance in the patterns across the levels of IO administrations' hierarchies.<sup>5</sup>

Using the more detailed data, we created for each country a grade-weighted degree of representation. The lowest-ranking professional positions at P1 were assigned the weight of 1; P2 have a weight set to 2, etc. At the management level (above P5), we use weights of 6 for D1, of 7 for D2, and 8 for under-secretaries general and assistant-secretaries general. In addition, we created another measure only counting the senior staff, from the highest professional grade P5 upwards. Here the positions are weighted by the same weights as above, but grades P4 and lower are completely disregarded in this count.


Figure A3 shows visually the very strong relationship between the simple count of staff we work with in the main analysis, and grade-weighted counts. The top two charts show results for the UN Secretariat, the bottom two charts for the WHO. The charts on the left show the relationship of simple count with grade-weighted count, while the charts on the right show the relationship with grade-weighted count only considering senior positions (from P5 up). Across these setups, the relationship is remarkably strong.

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<sup>5</sup> The data for the UN are obtained from the UN SG reports to the General Assembly 'Composition of the Secretariat: staff demographics', e.g. document A/71/360 for year 2015. The data for the WHO are obtained from the WHO series Human resources: annual report, submitted by the Secretariat to the World Health Assembly or the Executive Board (e.g. document EB130/26 Add.1 for year 2011, document A57/26 for year 2004, and so on.).



**Figure A3: Staff and weighted staff**



This is clearly visible also in the numerical results of four simple regression (OLS) models, reported in Table A4. In Models 1 and 2, we use grade-weighted (Model 1) and senior-only-grade-weighted count of staff (Model 2) in the UN Secretariat as the predictor of the overall unweighted count of professional staff in the same body. In Models 3 and 4, the analysis is performed for data for the WHO. Country averages across the entire period are used. The models confirm a close match between weighted and un-weighted staff counts. Models excluding all non-senior staff show coefficients of determination of 76% and 87%. Models counting with all grades, and weighting them as described above, show coefficients of determination of 98%. The overlap between un-weighted and weighted counts is almost perfect.

**Table A4: WHO and UN Secretariat staff seniority**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	UN weighted (1)	UN senior weighted (2)	WHO weighted (3)	WHO senior weighted (4)
UN Sec. staff number (log)	1.046*** (0.013)	0.826*** (0.038)		
WHO staff number (log)			1.019*** (0.011)	0.839*** (0.026)
Constant	0.528*** (0.012)	0.407*** (0.039)	0.627*** (0.009)	0.594*** (0.021)
Observations	181	151	177	164
R <sup>2</sup>	0.975	0.764	0.978	0.869
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.975	0.762	0.978	0.868

*Note:* 'p<0.1; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001; standard errors in brackets

#### 4.2 The dependent variable: Contract types

The CEB Personnel Statistics reports we use do not show the decomposition of staff numbers across countries by contract types, in particular across permanent vs. fixed-term contracts. It can be presumed that it is particularly the permanent positions that carry more influence.<sup>6</sup> The professional staff category that we map is defined as including *international*, not *national* professional staff, and only staff appointed for one year or more. It also excludes all persons 'employed under special contractual arrangements' (e.g. CEB/2015/HLCM/HR/19, p. vii, a). But beyond that, it does not distinguish fixed-term and permanent contracts at the country-level measurement.

However, partial evidence from the CEB reports and additional sources sheds some light on this matter. First, Tables 6A in the CEB reports provide the aggregate numbers (and shares) of fixed-term versus permanent positions *across all the* bodies we map. As shown in Table A5 below, the data identify a rise in the share of fixed-term positions, from around 59% in late 1990s to over 70% in early 2010s, as documented in Table A5 (across all UN bodies combined).

<sup>6</sup> We are grateful to anonymous reviewer of ISQ for pointing this out.

**Table A5: Contract types (aggregate across all UN system bodies)**

	Positions without time limit	Fixed term positions	Total positions	Share (%) of fixed term positions
1997	6297	8895	15192	59
1998	6174	8818	14992	59
1996	5994	9223	15217	61
2000	6354	8509	14863	57
2001	5644	10664	16308	65
2002	6526	11815	18341	64
2003	6394	12545	18939	66
2004	6351	13166	19517	67
2005	6391	15037	21428	70
2006	6397	16224	22621	72
2007	6903	17499	24402	72
2008	7122	18108	25230	72
2009	6877	20873	27660	75
2010	8190	20915	29105	72
2011	7597	22586	30183	75
2012	8075	22698	30773	74
2013	9576	21668	31244	69
2014	8905	22657	31562	72
2015	10350	21610	31960	68

Second, we also map in more detail the UN Secretariat, as by far the largest body in our sample. The annual reports on the Secretariat composition (reports by the Secretary General to the UN General Assembly, e.g. report A/70/605, Table 1.A in the Annex, for year 2015) provide also information on decomposition of staff by contract type, across countries (unlike the CEB reports we use to cover the entire UN system). What we observe is that in UN Secretariat, the share of permanent positions declined rapidly (though in absolute terms the number of permanent positions more than doubled). At the same time, as we show in Figure A4, there is no systematic connection between the changing composition of contracts across countries and the UN member countries' characteristics. In both left-hand and right-hand charts, the vertical axes depict the change in the percent share of permanent contracts out of all contracts citizen of the given country hold in the UN Secretariat. For countries towards the top of the charts, above


the horizontal lines, the share of positions with permanent, as opposed to fixed-term positions, increased. Those below the horizontal lines have lost permanent positions to fixed-term positions.

In the left-hand chart in Figure A4, we show the (absence of) a relationship between countries' wealth (GNI per capita, log 10) and the change in the share of permanent positions held by their citizens. A marginal rising trend is visible in the linear model, but the slope is statistically insignificant<sup>7</sup> and appears to be driven primarily by several small countries, such as the Bahamas, Estonia, etc. Virtually all the high-income countries (often the traditional donors) are located in the bottom right part with more or less prominent losses of the share of permanent contracts. The right-hand chart in Figure A4 shows that there is a negative relationship between the share of permanent (as opposed to fixed) positions to the aggregate economic power of countries – their GNI. In other words, the more powerful countries have, on average, lost more permanent positions, relative to fixed term positions, over the nineteen years.

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<sup>7</sup> b= 0.06, std. error of the slope 0.05.

**Figure A4: Change in % share of permanent contracts, related to economic wealth and power**



*Note: On vertical axes we show the change in the share of permanent contracts held by citizens of each country (out of all contract types of citizens of the country) in UN Secretariat between 1996 and 2015. The horizontal axis in the left-hand chart shows countries' GNI per capita (log 10, average across the entire period); the horizontal axis in the right-hand chart shows countries' GNI (log 10, average across the entire period).*

This evidence, though only for the UN Secretariat, shows that the trend of rising prominence of fixed-term positions is not connected with any particular group or type of states. The otherwise plausible expectation that the less powerful or wealthy countries could be those gaining merely the fixed-term positions, while the traditional powers keep the permanent positions, is not supported with the data that we could collect, for the UN Secretariat.

### 4.3 GNI and budgetary contributions

In the main analysis we use countries' general economic size – measured as their GNI – to capture their overall power in the system of IOs. This choice is given by our focus on overall capacities of states, or their power in the system of international politics. In Figure A5 and Table A6 we show that this choice is justified

also from the perspective of their power directly within the UN system bodies. Figure A5 shows the relationship between countries' GNI and their regular (left) and voluntary (right) budgetary contributions.<sup>8</sup>

**Figure A5: GNI and budgetary contributions**




Table A6 shows the numerical expression, in the form of two simple regression (OLS) models – for regular contributions (Model 1) and voluntary contributions (Model 2). The analyses are performed on country level, i.e. on the sums of contributions for each country, across all the bodies in the sample, for year 2015. For regular contributions, the coefficient of determination is 80%; for voluntary contributions it is 62%. It should be noted that when micro-states are excluded, the relationship of contributions and GNI is significantly stronger. For the lack of complete, fully comparable budget data for years 1997-2001, we use GNI in the main analysis.

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<sup>8</sup> Data on budgetary contributions have been extracted from the series of UN SG reports to the General Assembly, 'Budgetary and financial situation of the organizations of the United Nations system', e.g. document A/71/583 for year 2015 (the source covers years 2002-2015).

**Table A6: GNI and budgetary contributions**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	UN regular budget contr. (log) (1)	UN voluntary budget contr. (log) (2)
GNI (log)	0.845*** (0.032)	1.040*** (0.063)
Constant	-5.554*** (0.344)	-7.596*** (0.672)
Observations	170	170
R <sup>2</sup>	0.802	0.617
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.801	0.615

*Note:* 'p<0.1; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001; standard errors in brackets

#### 4.4 Media visibility: Factiva, Google and GDELT as the data sources

Finally, we have used three different sources to measure the public visibility of the IOs. First, in addition to the news aggregator Factiva, which we use throughout the main analysis, we also recorded the number of Google hits for each of the bodies. As with Factiva, the full official name was used, and the hits estimate provided by Google search was recorded.<sup>9</sup> Second, we can also assess the correlation between Factiva-based measure of visibility with one based on the multilingual GDELT database. In particular, we used GDELT's DOC 2.0 API to find out how often each IO was mentioned in the 180 000 online sources across all countries of the world that GDELT traces. Since GDELT automatically translates content into English and runs its search on this translated text, this measure captures also non-English media outlets. The earliest data available in GDELT for this type of search are those from 2017, hence we only use this source to check the degree of (cross-sectional) correlation with Factiva as the main source.

Figure A6 depicts the relationship of the Google search (left-hand chart) and GDELT-based (right-hand chart) measures of visibility with that based on Factiva (all on logged scales). The figure shows a very strong connection between the scores obtained from the three data sources.

<sup>9</sup> The two exceptions to the use of the official UN system body name are UNESCO and UNICEF, for which we used the acronyms. For the UN Secretariat, we used 'United Nations' as the search term.





**Table A7: Factiva, Google, and GDELT as visibility scores sources**

<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
Factiva hits (log)		
	(1)	(2)
Google hits (log)	1.085*** (0.098)	
GDELT hits (log)		0.862*** (0.056)
Constant	-1.505** (0.432)	-0.229 (0.231)
Observations	44	44
R <sup>2</sup>	0.743	0.848
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.737	0.845

*Note:* <sup>†</sup>p<0.1; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001; standard errors in brackets

When comparing the two sources of IO visibility, in 467 cases out of all the 598 IO-years (78%) the visibility scores match. In 131 (22%), the visibility scores do not match. Out of the 131 mismatches, 70 are cases where a body in the given year scores as lowly visible in Factiva and highly visible on Google; in 61 cases Factiva showed high visibility, while Google showed low visibility. Out of the 467 matches, 229 matches are for lowly visible bodies (or body-years, more precisely), and 238 for high visibility.

## 5. Robustness tests: analytical techniques

In the following, we report the results of a series of tests assessing the robustness of our main results from the body of the text. The tests in this section pertain to the choice of the specific analytical technique we adopt in the main empirical analysis. In the subsequent sections, we offer further tests.

Our main analysis in the body of the text in Models 5-7 in Table 1 is based on the ‘within-between’ random effects design (Mundlak 1978; Bell and Jones 2015). In Table A8, we replicate this analysis, but using a pooled model (for limitations, see Wooldridge 2006:chap. 13). That also means we do not use there the ‘within’/‘between’ notation for the variables, as the pooled model is built directly on the yearly observations.

In Model 1, for all IOs combined, all the variables show an effect on staffing in the theorized direction. In line with the results from Model 5 in Table 1, economic power, population size, university enrollment, and

local IO activity all show positive association with a state's representation on staff. The model also shows the expected interaction between a year count variable and population size (positive) and GNI (negative). The results of the model are thus substantively identical to those from Model 5 in Table 1.

Models 2 and 3 provide a comparison between the lowly visible (Model 2) and highly visible bodies (Model 3). The comparison of the models' core results confirms the insights reported in the body of the article. In highly visible IOs (Model 3), population size is by far the strongest predictor, while economic power shows only a much weaker effect on staffing. In lowly visible IOs (Model 2), the reverse is true: economic power of states is the best predictor of their representation, while population shows no significant effect on staffing. Similarly, in highly visible IOs the significant interaction terms between the year count variable and countries' GNI and population sizes confirms the change in the relative salience of these two predictors, over time. Once again, this supports our previous findings. In lowly visible IOs, no such change over time occurs. All three models show very high levels of predictive power, with coefficients of determination between 64% and 68%. Having said that, pooled models face severe limitations for analysis of panel data and we only include them here for the sake of completeness.

**Table A8: Pooled OLS models, replicating results from Models 5-7 from Table 1**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Staff number (log)(std)		
	All IOs (1)	Lowly visible IOs (2)	Highly visible IOs (3)
GNI(log)	0.321*** (0.091)	0.407*** (0.084)	0.282*** (0.083)
Population(log)	0.358*** (0.100)	0.144 (0.112)	0.336*** (0.090)
University enrollment	0.166** (0.055)	0.065 (0.055)	0.149** (0.050)
Local IO activity(log)	0.260*** (0.050)	0.277*** (0.047)	0.212*** (0.048)
Polity	0.032*** (0.007)	0.023** (0.007)	0.027*** (0.006)
UN SC permanent seat	0.418** (0.162)	0.391* (0.171)	0.412** (0.150)
English official lang.	0.385*** (0.088)	0.274*** (0.073)	0.372*** (0.080)
Year count (Yrc)	0.009* (0.003)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.009** (0.003)
GNI(log) * Yrc	-0.014*** (0.004)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.013*** (0.003)
Population(log) * Yrc	0.010* (0.004)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.010* (0.004)
Constant	-0.329*** (0.071)	-0.673*** (0.075)	0.034 (0.067)
Observations	2,667	2,375	2,666
R <sup>2</sup>	0.678	0.644	0.662
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.677	0.643	0.661

*Note:* 'p<0.1; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001; country-clustered robust standard errors in brackets

In Table A9, we again replicate the results from Models 5-7 from Table 1 in the body of the text, but this time with a percent (%) share of individual countries on the total of the professional staff as the dependent variable. Thus, we do not use the count of staff as the outcome variable we seek to model; instead, we measure the relative degree of representation of each state. This alteration suppresses the possible effects of the overall rise of staff size. Once again, our previously identified results are largely supported.

In Model 1, results for all IOs combined are depicted. The results are fully in line with those reported earlier in Table 1, confirming the relevance of all the four theorized predictors of staffing. Also closely in line with Models 5-7 in Table 1, there is a sizable difference in the staffing patterns between lowly visible IOs (Model 2) and highly visible IOs (Model 3), with regard to the effects of economic power (*GNI(log) (between)*) and population size (*Population(log) (between)*). The former only has a clear effect on staffing

in lowly visible IOs; the latter has a significant effect on staffing in highly visible IOs. Model 3 with the significant interaction terms between the year count variable and these two predictors confirms the previous findings as well. In highly visible IOs, economic power grows less important, while population size of a country grows more important as a predictor of staffing.

**Table A9: Percent (%) share on staff as the outcome variable, replicating Models 5-7 from Table 1**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Staff share (%) (log)		
	All IOs (1)	Lowly visible IOs (2)	Highly visible IOs (3)
GNI (log) (within)	0.047' (0.028)	-0.015 (0.029)	0.051' (0.030)
GNI (log) (between)	0.243* (0.109)	0.504*** (0.111)	0.204' (0.116)
Population (log) (within)	-0.080*** (0.021)	-0.046 (0.037)	-0.073*** (0.021)
Population (log) (between)	0.393*** (0.107)	0.136 (0.121)	0.457*** (0.112)
University enrollment (within)	-0.028* (0.014)	-0.002 (0.016)	-0.031* (0.015)
University enrollment (between)	0.204** (0.074)	0.137' (0.073)	0.225** (0.080)
Local IO activity (log) (within)	0.022 (0.014)	0.038** (0.013)	0.029 (0.018)
Local IO activity (log) (between)	0.353*** (0.075)	0.499*** (0.067)	0.338*** (0.091)
Polity (within)	0.006 (0.004)	0.004 (0.005)	0.006 (0.005)
Polity (between)	0.037*** (0.007)	0.032*** (0.008)	0.037*** (0.008)
UN SC permanent seat	0.449** (0.174)	0.275 (0.210)	0.498** (0.183)
English official lang.	0.399*** (0.092)	0.304** (0.102)	0.443*** (0.095)
Year count (Yrc)	0.012** (0.005)	0.012 (0.008)	0.010' (0.005)
GNI (log) (between)* Yrc	-0.015*** (0.003)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.014*** (0.003)
Population (log) (between)* Yrc	0.010** (0.004)	0.003 (0.006)	0.011** (0.004)
Constant	-0.424*** (0.077)	-0.274* (0.108)	-0.654*** (0.100)
Observations	2,667	2,375	2,666
R <sup>2</sup>	0.218	0.161	0.195
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.214	0.156	0.191

*Note:* 'p<0.1; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001; country-clustered robust standard errors in brackets

Finally, we also provide a series of further cross-sectional OLS tests. We divided the period into two, 1997-2005 and 2006-2015, and for each calculated, for all variables, the country averages. In Table A10, we replicate the results from Models 3 and 4 in Table 1 in the body of the text. Yet, we disaggregate the picture to model separately the staffing patterns for highly visible and lowly visible IOs. Thus, Model 1 shows the patterns for lowly visible IOs in the first period, Model 2 for highly visible IOs in the first period,

Model 3 for lowly visible IOs in the second period and Model 4 for highly visible IOs in the second period. The comparison confirms the previous (cross-sectional) finding from Models 3 and 4 in Table 1 that the predictive power of GNI declines, or in fact here disappears, as we move from the first to the second period. It also confirms that the predictive power of population size rises, as indicated by the larger coefficient sizes for population for Models 3 and 4, compared to Models 1 and 2.

In this cross-sectional setup, the previously identified differences between highly and lowly visible IOs persist but they are not as clear-cut as in the other analyses. While GNI was a much stronger predictor of staffing in lowly visible IOs than in the highly visible ones in the first decade, in the second decade none of the effects is significantly different from zero (though the coefficient for highly visible IOs is indeed smaller in absolute terms). The significance of population size as a predictor is retained throughout all Models 1-4. At the same time, it is visible that the coefficient sizes are always higher for the highly visible IOs (Models 2 and 4) compared to the lowly visible IOs (Models 1 and 3).

**Table A10: Cross sectional OLS models, replicating results from Table 1**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Staff number(log)(std)			
	Lowly visible IOs, 1997-2005 (1)	Highly visible IOs, 1997-2005 (2)	Lowly visible IOs, 2006-2015 (3)	Highly visible IOs, 2006-2015 (4)
GNI(log)	0.359** (0.111)	0.154 <sup>†</sup> (0.088)	0.124 (0.101)	0.022 (0.108)
Population(log)	0.223* (0.107)	0.284*** (0.073)	0.293*** (0.087)	0.388*** (0.092)
University enrollment	0.070 (0.076)	0.115 <sup>†</sup> (0.066)	0.163* (0.070)	0.151* (0.074)
Local IO activity(log)	0.308*** (0.057)	0.241*** (0.072)	0.314*** (0.053)	0.240* (0.093)
UN SC permanent seat	0.057 (0.199)	0.281* (0.124)	0.353 <sup>†</sup> (0.210)	0.351** (0.134)
English official lang.	0.235* (0.107)	0.306*** (0.063)	0.217* (0.092)	0.291*** (0.072)
Polity	0.025** (0.009)	0.021*** (0.006)	0.036*** (0.007)	0.028*** (0.006)
Constant	-0.487*** (0.067)	0.276*** (0.072)	-0.510*** (0.058)	0.255** (0.089)
Observations	148	148	147	147
R <sup>2</sup>	0.607	0.670	0.658	0.642
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.587	0.653	0.641	0.624

*Note:* <sup>†</sup>p<0.1; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001; robust standard errors in brackets

## 6. Robustness tests: data used and cases analyzed, replicating results from Table 1

In this section, we assess our results with two significant data alterations: considering the role of possibly influential cases in the analysis and then focusing on the measure of IO visibility used.

First, in Models 1-3 in Table A11 we replicate the analysis from Models 5-7 in Table 1 with the exclusion of the three extreme cases on the variables of our core interests: China and India due to extremely large population sizes, and the United States due to its extreme value of GNI size.<sup>10</sup> The results are substantively almost identical to those reported in the main analysis. Model 1 shows the overall significant effects of all the four predictors of interest, and it also shows the significant interaction effects between economic power and population size and the time variable. Models 2 and 3 show that there are the expected differences between the staffing of lowly visible (Model 2) and highly visible (Model 3) bodies. These models show that the results are not influenced by the extreme observations on the predictors of interest, but rather that they reflect overall patterns, across the membership.

Second, in Models 4-6 in Table A11, we replace Factiva news aggregator as the source for our measure of visibility with a simple Google search. The analysis from Models 5-7 (Table 1) from the body of the text is thus replicated here using this alternative source. The results are substantially identical to those reported for the Factiva-based measure of IOs' visibility.

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<sup>10</sup> Note that while China is approaching the US in its GNI size in the most recent years, across the entire nineteen-year time span the US GNI is the largest by a very wide margin.



**Table A11: Google search measure of visibility and exclusion of extreme observations**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Staff number(log)(std)					
	All IOs (1)	Lowly visible IOs (2)	Highly IOs (3)	All IOs (Google) (4)	Lowly visible IOs (Google) (5)	Highly visible IOs (Google) (6)
GNI(log) (within)	0.060* (0.028)	-0.008 (0.025)	0.056* (0.026)	0.057* (0.027)	0.049 <sup>i</sup> (0.029)	0.050 <sup>i</sup> (0.029)
GNI(log) (between)	0.245* (0.107)	0.435*** (0.097)	0.181 <sup>i</sup> (0.099)	0.240* (0.107)	0.354** (0.122)	0.267** (0.099)
Population(log) (within)	-0.083*** (0.021)	-0.039 (0.032)	-0.066*** (0.018)	-0.082*** (0.021)	-0.090** (0.032)	-0.067** (0.020)
Population(log) (between)	0.396*** (0.110)	0.119 (0.113)	0.402*** (0.100)	0.390*** (0.106)	0.307* (0.122)	0.370*** (0.101)
University enrollment (within)	-0.026 <sup>i</sup> (0.014)	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.024 <sup>i</sup> (0.013)	-0.026 <sup>i</sup> (0.014)	0.002 (0.014)	-0.026 <sup>i</sup> (0.015)
University enrollment (between)	0.210** (0.076)	0.127 <sup>i</sup> (0.065)	0.199** (0.072)	0.203** (0.073)	0.135 <sup>i</sup> (0.070)	0.166** (0.062)
Local IO activity(log) (within)	0.030* (0.015)	0.049*** (0.012)	0.035* (0.016)	0.028 <sup>i</sup> (0.014)	0.112*** (0.021)	0.045** (0.016)
Local IO activity(log) (between)	0.365*** (0.077)	0.457*** (0.059)	0.305*** (0.082)	0.351*** (0.074)	0.476*** (0.079)	0.257*** (0.062)
Polity (within)	0.006 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.004 (0.005)	0.006 (0.004)
Polity (between)	0.037*** (0.007)	0.027*** (0.007)	0.032*** (0.007)	0.036*** (0.007)	0.033*** (0.008)	0.033*** (0.007)
UN SC permanent seat	0.564*** (0.145)	0.418* (0.163)	0.544*** (0.143)	0.442* (0.172)	0.281 (0.240)	0.487** (0.157)
English official lang.	0.427*** (0.092)	0.285** (0.087)	0.411*** (0.083)	0.395*** (0.091)	0.356*** (0.097)	0.386*** (0.085)
Year count (Yrc)	0.036*** (0.005)	0.029*** (0.007)	0.031*** (0.004)	0.037*** (0.005)	0.026*** (0.006)	0.036*** (0.005)
GNI(log) (between)* Yrc	-0.015*** (0.003)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.014*** (0.003)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.014*** (0.003)
Population(log) (between)* Yrc	0.010* (0.004)	0.003 (0.006)	0.010** (0.004)	0.010** (0.004)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.012** (0.004)
Constant	-0.674*** (0.076)	-1.044*** (0.095)	-0.284** (0.088)	-0.666*** (0.076)	-1.004*** (0.085)	-0.354*** (0.077)
Observations	2,610	2,318	2,609	2,667	2,510	2,664
R <sup>2</sup>	0.501	0.323	0.477	0.506	0.269	0.512

Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.498	0.319	0.474	0.503	0.265	0.509
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*Note:* 'p<0.1; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001; country-clustered robust standard errors in brackets

## 7. Robustness tests: broader conceptualization IOs' visibility and the cross-IO variation

In this final set of robustness tests we evaluate a possibly broader notion of public visibility of IOs, beyond visibility in media. After all, it is a priori likely that IOs that score high on media visibility will also score similarly high on other factors connected to their overall size and significance.<sup>11</sup> In Figure A7, we provide supporting evidence for this intuitive conjecture. In the left chart, we plot the bodies' professional staff size against their regular budgets. In the right chart, the professional staff size of bodies is plotted against their visibility score based on Factiva. The charts show strong correlations between all these factors. IOs that are highly visible in media are also, mostly, the large ones.

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<sup>11</sup> We are grateful to anonymous ISQ reviewer for highlighting this to us.



significant association with staffing both for GNI and population.<sup>12</sup> However, the more important fact is that we observe the same difference in the trend (H3), as captured in the interaction terms of the year count variable and economy and population sizes. Identically to Models 6 and 7 in Table 1, we see that the trend of significantly rising prominence of population size and declining prominence of economic size is present in more “visible” bodies, in this case in bodies with large budgets and large expansion of staff size. In less “visible” bodies (small budgets, small staff expansion), no such trends are present.

Finally, Models 5 and 6 in Table A12 show that the bodies can be also meaningfully distinguished based on their low or high levels of operational, on-the-ground activity. In other words, we can see whether staffing patterns differ across bodies with primarily program (low operational activity) or operation mandates (Rittberger and Zangl 2006). Once again, the bodies are divided into groups along yearly medians of the share of the general services staff working outside of the bodies’ headquarters. Those bodies with low share of general services staff outside of headquarters are dominantly program IOs; those with high shares of general services staff in the field are operational IOs. Models 5 and 6 show that in bodies with large amount of operational activity, typically highly visible in the field, the trend towards increasing representativeness and declining relevance of economic size of countries is present. In programme bodies, with low presence in the field, no major trends are discernible. In some regards, we can also understand the program or operational nature of IOs as reflecting their visibility, though not in media in general, but rather locally, on the ground. Bodies that work in the field in member states have not only functional reasons to be relatively more representative of their broader membership, but also representative legitimation reasons as such. This is also in line with our broader theoretical framework, whereby bodies that are highly visible to their constituencies are likely to seek to be more representative, in general.

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<sup>12</sup> These effects capture the situation in 1997, when the year count interacting variable is set at 0. So at the beginning of the period, the differences across the groups are not significant, while with the media-based visibility measure indications of such differences were present.

**Table A12: Alternative explanations: budget size, staff expansion, and operational activity**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Staff number (log)(std)					
	Small budget (1)	Large budget (2)	Low staff expansion (3)	High staff expansion (4)	Low operational activity (5)	High operational activity (6)
GNI(log) (within)	0.038 (0.024)	0.050' (0.028)	0.006 (0.020)	0.054* (0.026)	-0.008 (0.022)	0.055* (0.025)
GNI(log) (between)	0.269** (0.103)	0.253** (0.098)	0.235* (0.098)	0.192* (0.098)	0.226** (0.087)	0.202* (0.098)
Population(log) (within)	-0.056* (0.028)	-0.057** (0.020)	-0.035 (0.022)	-0.065** (0.021)	-0.052* (0.023)	-0.065*** (0.019)
Population(log) (between)	0.295** (0.111)	0.389*** (0.099)	0.255** (0.092)	0.420*** (0.099)	0.410*** (0.076)	0.352*** (0.099)
University enrollment (within)	0.006 (0.015)	-0.028* (0.014)	0.004 (0.014)	-0.027' (0.014)	-0.001 (0.014)	-0.023' (0.013)
University enrollment (between)	0.111' (0.061)	0.154* (0.063)	0.168** (0.056)	0.177** (0.067)	0.236*** (0.050)	0.156* (0.065)
Local IO activity(log) (within)	0.118*** (0.020)	0.041* (0.019)	0.025 (0.018)	0.026' (0.016)	0.048** (0.016)	0.035* (0.017)
Local IO activity(log) (between)	0.462*** (0.060)	0.206** (0.065)	0.337*** (0.052)	0.290*** (0.080)	0.357*** (0.052)	0.407*** (0.090)
Polity (within)	0.003 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.0003 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)
Polity (between)	0.034*** (0.007)	0.031*** (0.007)	0.024** (0.007)	0.033*** (0.007)	0.022** (0.007)	0.032*** (0.007)
UN SC permanent seat	0.261 (0.184)	0.524** (0.163)	0.335* (0.153)	0.497** (0.187)	0.366' (0.221)	0.467** (0.166)
English official lang.	0.285*** (0.080)	0.388*** (0.083)	0.251** (0.082)	0.386*** (0.085)	0.312*** (0.070)	0.367*** (0.083)
Year count (Yrc)	0.012* (0.006)	0.034*** (0.005)	0.012* (0.005)	0.036*** (0.005)	0.026*** (0.006)	0.032*** (0.004)
GNI(log) (between)* Yrc	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.006' (0.004)	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.007' (0.004)	-0.011*** (0.003)
Population(log) (between)* Yrc	0.004 (0.005)	0.010** (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.008* (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.008* (0.004)
Constant	-0.859*** (0.080)	-0.274*** (0.081)	-0.715*** (0.075)	-0.307*** (0.092)	-1.028*** (0.088)	-0.427*** (0.102)

Observations	2,451	2,664	2,585	2,665	2,352	2,667
R <sup>2</sup>	0.238	0.511	0.180	0.507	0.355	0.488
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.233	0.508	0.175	0.504	0.351	0.485

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*Note:* 'p<0.1; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001; country-clustered robust standard errors in brackets

## 8. References

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