

Strijbis, Oliver; Teney, Céline; Helbling, Marc

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## Why Are Elites More Cosmopolitan than Masses?

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# 2

## *Why Are Elites More Cosmopolitan than Masses?*

OLIVER STRIJBIS, CÉLINE TENEY AND MARC  
HELBLING

### 2.1 Introduction

The current analysis of the conflict between cosmopolitans and communitarians focuses strongly on the emergence of new parties and the adaptation of old ones (see Chapter 1). However, the emergence of communitarian parties is only one among several indicators of the existence and strength of such a conflict. Especially in contexts where the entry of new parties is restricted by institutional hurdles or a ‘cartel’ made up of the mainstream parties, the cosmopolitan–communitarian conflict may also exist despite the absence of clearly communitarian parties.<sup>1</sup> There may, in particular, be a conflict between the masses and the elite, with the elite being more cosmopolitan than the masses. If this overrepresentation of cosmopolitans among the elite – understood as the persons holding the highest positions in the most influential organizations within a society – is true, and if parliament is not the sole arena in which delegation and accountability take place, important normative problems arise (see Chapter 8).<sup>2</sup>

We are not the first to investigate mass–elite attitude gaps in relation to cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. However, we are the first

<sup>1</sup> The majoritarian electoral system of the United Kingdom was the major explanation for its lack of a strong Communitarian party (Kriesi and Frey 2008). It remains an important potential explanation for the lack of a Communitarian party in other countries such as the US. However, as recent developments in the United Kingdom and the United States show, the cosmopolitan–communitarian conflict caused a reorientation of some mainstream parties to more communitarian positions. For the cartelization hypothesis in party politics see Katz and Mair (1995).

<sup>2</sup> The literature is strongly divided over the degree to which democratic representation is bound to elections and parliaments. For reviews, see, for instance, Pitkin 1972; Andeweg 2003; Mansbridge 2003; Urbinati and Warren 2008.

to analyse mass–elite gaps on several issues of cosmopolitanism *and* engage in country comparisons. Research on the mass–elite gap in the cosmopolitan–communitarian dimension has so far mostly looked at single issues, such as European integration. These studies have all come to the same conclusion: whereas most European elites largely support the EU project, a large part of the general population remains sceptical about further European integration (Flockhart 2005; Mattila and Raunio 2006; Hooghe and Marks 2009; Best et al. 2012). However, since these studies only focus on the issue of political integration in Europe, they do not allow us to generalize their findings to other issues or world regions.

Teney and Helbling have taken a different route and analysed several issues as well as attachments related to cosmopolitanism in one country, Germany (Teney and Helbling 2014; Helbling and Teney 2015). Among other things, they show a significant elite–mass gap with regard to attitudes on immigration, trade, developmental aid and European integration and that elites across different fields of activity hold fairly consensual positions on these issues. Likewise, being a member of the elite is associated with support for the further opening up of national borders, even when controlling for education and other variables. While Teney and Helbling demonstrate that the mass–elite gap can be generalized beyond single issues towards the entire issue dimension of the cosmopolitan–communitarian divide, they cannot generalize their own results beyond the case of Germany.

Starting out from the literature just cited, this chapter tries to answer the question as to whether the mass–elite gap on European integration observed in many countries can be generalized to other issues – or, to put the same question differently, whether the German experience of a divide between cosmopolitan elites and more communitarian masses with regard to a large number of issues related to globalization can be generalized for more countries and different world regions. The answer that this chapter offers to this question is straightforward: the elite–mass divide on globalization issues can be generalized for the industrialized and industrializing world as a whole. We derive this answer from our analysis of a unique survey among members of top-level elites in Germany, Mexico, Poland, Turkey and the USA, which we combine with mass surveys in the same countries. In this analysis we investigate incongruence in elite–mass opinion on four contested denationalization issues.

The chapter tries to go beyond mere description by testing a cultural and an economic explanation for the gap (see Chapter 1). The cultural

explanation conceptualizes cosmopolitanism as cultural capital that draws symbolic boundaries between elites and mass publics. Among other things, it predicts that the elites will prove to be significantly more cosmopolitan than other socio-demographically similar groups. The economic explanation, in contrast, understands cosmopolitan attitudes as caused by economic incentives to open up boundaries for the movement of humans and commodities. It expects the elite–mass gap to be explained by divergent economic interests in globalization between the lower and the upper classes especially in the highly industrialized countries. Our empirical analyses lend more support to the cultural perspective than the economic one.

## **2.2 Cosmopolitan Attitudes: A Matter of Economic Incentives or Cultural Capital?**

This chapter will generalize the finding from Germany that elites are systematically more cosmopolitan than masses (Teney and Helbling 2014; Helbling and Teney 2015) to a number of markedly different countries. The cosmopolitan–communitarian divide can be interpreted from three theoretical perspectives. First, the mass–elite divide can be interpreted as a matter of economic incentives, which and predict that individuals with mobile capital gain from globalization and therefore support it, while those without (mobile) capital oppose it. Second, it can be argued that cosmopolitanism is about cultural capital, which predicts that individuals with transnational networks and elite status favour globalization, while the mass and state-bound individuals oppose it. Finally, it can be interpreted in light of cognitive mobilization theory, which predicts that the higher educated will support globalization as they have a better understanding of the functional need for collective international problem solving than the less well educated.

These three explanations are not mutually exclusive. All of them emphasize the importance of education in the generation of cosmopolitan attitudes. Also, since economic capital, cultural capital and cognitive abilities correlate with each other to some extent, they do not provide strictly exclusive interpretations.<sup>3</sup> However, as we will try to demonstrate, they do emphasize different processes and observational

<sup>3</sup> For instance, Kriesi et al. (2008) speak of economic and cultural losers under globalization.

implications as regards the variance in mass–elite divides on cosmopolitan and communitarian attitudes and hence do, in the end, generate mutually exclusive hypotheses.

### *2.2.1 The Elite–Mass Divide and Economic Incentives*

Economic (trade) theory assumes that production is based on several factors, in particular capital and labour, which vary in abundance. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem assumes that the scarcity of capital and labour varies and that the price of each depends on its abundance (Stolper and Samuelson 1941). For instance, if labour is abundant and capital scarce, labourers have little power in wage bargaining and have to accept low wages. However, if capital suddenly becomes abundant (and labour relatively scarce), then the price of labour will go up (i.e. wages will increase). With free trade, capital is more mobile than labour and the capitalist can move production to where labour is abundant, with the above-mentioned negative effect on workers' wages. Although lower production costs reduce prices and thus have positive effects on real wages and economic growth, these aggregate positive effects may not compensate the workers for their loss in nominal income. Hence, international trade may have negative consequences for workers in places where labour is abundant.

For theorizing on political conflict formation, it is necessary to assume that the effects of changes in factor endowments structure the political preferences of the actors. Workers have an interest in the scarcity of labour relative to capital, while capitalists have a preference for abundance of labour relative to capital. On the basis of this assumption, Rogowski (1989) argued that in industrialized countries workers tend to have a preference for protectionism while capitalists have a preference for trade liberalization. The reason is that, with trade liberalization, labour gets more abundant (production can be outsourced) and therefore wages decrease.<sup>4</sup>

Since globalization to a large degree consists of freeing trade and investment, Rogowski's argument applies to the current historical context. Capital has clearly become more mobile allowing capitalists

<sup>4</sup> However, capitalists who own production sites that cannot be displaced (e.g., because they work a specific piece of land) and who depend therefore on expensive labour in an industrialized country also have a preference against free trade (i.e., are protectionists).

to produce in those places where labour is abundant. This mobility of capital relative to that of labour has made employment less secure. In particular, the increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational enterprises has increased the elasticity of firms' demand for labour, raising the volatility of wages and employment and consequently tending to make workers feel less secure (Scheve and Slaughter 2004). The logic is the opposite for industrializing countries that have a shortage of capital and abundance of labour. In these countries, economic globalization decreases the abundance of labour relative to capital.

The original argument focused solely on free trade and, hence, the mobility of capital. Globalization, however, not only impacts the mobility of capital but also that of labour. Transportation has become far cheaper, allowing people to travel more often and over larger distances. Countries have also reduced the restrictions on (labour) migration. This is most evident in the context of the European Union where relocation across countries for work reasons has become virtually barrier-free. The increased mobility of labour softens somewhat the different implications for industrialized and industrializing countries because it reduces the scarcity of workers in industrialized countries and makes them scarcer in industrializing countries.

Beyond the fact that globalization generally increases the mobility of labour and, in so doing, makes it (relatively) more abundant in immigration countries and less so in emigration countries, the scarcity strongly depends on the skill level involved. In the economically globalized economy there is a shortage of highly skilled labour. This explains why globalization contributes to the increasing skill premium, the significant decline in the blue-collar payroll share and the increasing gap between nonproduction and production workers in US industries (Brady et al. 2007: 322). We assume that this logic applies both to industrialized and industrializing countries. It follows that the more a worker relies on high skills, the more in favour of economic globalization his or her preferences are likely to be.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Leaving aside skill levels, the literature on varieties of capitalism has shown that coordinated market economies that specialize in specific economic sectors can resist the downward pressures of globalization (Hall and Soskice 2001). Since jobs in these highly specialized economic sectors require highly specific skills, the supply of labour for them is dependent on the educational system. Consequently, production cannot be displaced from countries that provide that quality of education and specialized labour remains equally scarce in a globalized economy. The increase in division of labour through global trade and investment even has

To summarize, the economic incentives perspective emphasizes the different interests in globalization between more and less industrialized countries and between classes. It predicts that unskilled workers in industrialized countries in particular will have no interest in globalization while it is especially the economic elites in these countries that will profit most from it. Hence, if this perspective were true *we should see a stronger mass–elite gap in industrialized countries than in industrializing countries (H1)*.

### 2.2.2 *Cosmopolitan Attitudes as Cultural Capital*

A more cultural understanding of the divide between elites and masses puts a stronger emphasis on its symbolic than its sociostructural dimension. According to this perspective, the divide is primarily the result of strategies used by elites to secure their class position by drawing symbolic boundaries between themselves and the masses. Cosmopolitan attitudes, identities, preferences and tastes are seen as the symbols of belonging to an international upper class. More specifically, some authors have argued that cosmopolitanism can be understood as cultural capital (Weenink 2008; Igarashi and Saito 2014; similarly, Calhoun 2002b). Cosmopolitan attitudes can be understood as *capital* because they allow for (social) mobility in a globalized world.

The cultural capital perspective puts a strong emphasis on primary socialization. A crucial institution for cosmopolitan socialization is the educational system. Weenink (2008) has shown that parents' intention to socialize their children as cosmopolitans by enrolling them in international schools can be understood as an (economically) rational reaction to globalization. At the level of higher education, cosmopolitan cultural and social capital is institutionalized with degrees from international universities (Igarashi and Saito 2014). 'International' does not, however, refer equally to all cultures worldwide, but only to the core of the international world system. Hence, 'international' here primarily means the culture of the Anglo-Saxon upper class.

Cosmopolitanism as cultural capital can also be achieved via secondary socialization through networks of social relationships

the effect that the industries increasingly rely on specific skills in the workforce. This does not only strengthen the bargaining position of labour vis-à-vis capital, but also connects the workers more strongly to their industry than to their class (Hiscox 2001).

characterized by mutual trust and recognition among elites. These personal interactions might be the main reason for their shared values (Putnam 1976; Weßels 1995). Networks of personal communication and friendships help create consensus in values and opinions. These personal interactions are usually not restricted to other influential persons within the same institutions but also encompass elites from other fields. They are based on mutual trust and solidarity and are facilitated by the homogeneity of the elite group in terms of educational and social background, recruitment patterns and ideological affinities. These bonding interactions lead to a mutual cueing effect among elites. This would explain why elites are highly homogeneous in terms of their values and beliefs representing a dominant ideology, and why the elite–mass gap cannot be explained by educational differences alone.

Access to an educational system that socializes cosmopolitanism and social capital that allows people to be part of a network of international elites is structurally unequal. It leads us to the hypothesis that *the elites are homogeneous with regard to their cosmopolitan attitudes both within and across countries* (H2). However, the homogeneity of the elites is not sufficient support for the cultural capital theory because it could be explained by other theories as well. For instance, since most members of the elites are highly educated, it could be their cognitive abilities that make them a homogeneous group. However, the cultural capital perspective expects that the adoption of cosmopolitan attitudes will be fostered not only by education but also by socialization in elite networks. Since the highly educated among the mass publics typically do not form part of these networks, we expect them to hold less cosmopolitan attitudes independent of their level of education. *In other words, we hypothesize that being an elite member has an important effect on cosmopolitan attitudes independent of education* (H3).

## 2.3 Data and Method

### 2.3.1 Elite and Mass Survey Data

In order to analyse mass–elite gaps in cosmopolitanism we made use of mass surveys combined with the WZB International Leaders Survey. The latter survey measures the views and identities of international elites across our five countries of study, different levels of governance, and twelve societal sectors (politics, administration, justice, military



and police, labour unions, lobbyism, finance and economy, research, religious institutions, civil society, culture and media).<sup>6</sup> Elites are defined as persons holding the highest positions in the most influential organizations within societal sectors. The data collection took place between spring 2014 and 2015. In total, 1,604 completed questionnaires were collected. The response rate was 8.4 per cent, which corresponds to a typical mass survey in the USA (Kohut et al. 2012). The response rate varied across sectors between 5.0 per cent (media) and 15.5 per cent (research). It was lowest for the USA (4.8 per cent) and highest for Poland (14.5 per cent). In terms of gender – the only socio-demographic variable for which information is available for the whole population – no response bias is apparent. Variance in the selection bias across countries can affect cross-country comparisons, but not within-country comparisons where the country levels are fixed. Variance in the response rate across sectors can potentially bias mass vs. elite comparisons. If anything, we might expect that cosmopolitan elites are more inclined to answer an international survey and hence that the cosmopolitanism of the elites would be overestimated. However, since our findings for Germany were similar to those of Teney and Helbling (2014; Helbling and Teney 2015), which relied on a similar survey with a higher response rate (37 per cent), we are confident that the effects of selection bias are at worst only modest.

The WZB International Leader Survey is one of the first of its kind. Its major strength is that it allows the diversity of positions on various globalization issues across types of elites and its relation to those of the mass publics to be investigated. This is because the elites have been asked the same questions as the masses in public opinion surveys. For our combination of countries and the four items, the elite survey can be merged with the World Values Survey Waves 5 and 6 as well as the Transatlantic Trend Surveys of 2008 and 2009. However, while the World Value Data is available for all five countries, the Transatlantic Trend Survey was not conducted in Mexico.

The originality of the data does not come without trade-offs. Since there is no mass survey that covers all of our issues, the elite data has to be combined with several different mass datasets. Therefore, we have to analyse each topic separately. Also, there is some variation in the

<sup>6</sup> Because of methodological issues, we dropped the military sector for this analysis. For details, see Teney et al. (2018).

number of items available per topic. While for some topics it is possible to generate scales through factor analyses, for other topics we have had to rely on single items. Also, the elite survey has five-point scales for most items while the Transatlantic Trend Survey has four-point scales. In order to make them comparable we changed them into three-point scales with a broad mid-scale rating ranging from 'rather agree' to 'rather disagree'.

### 2.3.2 Operationalizations

Preferences on the *permeability of borders* were measured based on three different items: immigration, trade and climate change. Preferences on *immigration* were measured with a three-point scale on the question 'When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people of [this country]'. The measurement of preferences with regard to *trade* was based on an additive index from two items, one asking whether respondents agree that it is important for their country to remain open to international trade and the other asking whether citizens should buy more goods from their own country and not worry about economic partners. Preferences on *climate change* were measured as factor scores from a factor analysis in which the three items nicely loaded onto one dimension (see Appendices).

The dependent variable measuring preferences with regard to *allocation of authority* was based on the question whether policies in five areas should be decided by state governments (1), by the national government (2), jointly within the European Union / NAFTA / relevant regional organization (3), or jointly at the international level within the United Nations (4). Since the answer options in the WVS deviated slightly from these, the answer categories were coded into dummies: (sub)national vs. regional/UN. We assumed that the dummy variables being roughened continued underlying variables and ran factor analyses with tetrachoric correlations. The factor analysis resulted in one factor with an Eigenvalue of >2.7 (see Appendices).

As independent variables, we were able to rely on a number of socio-demographic variables available in both the elite and the mass surveys, such as education level, gender and age. Additionally we relied on left-right self-placements which were measured on ten-point scales in the WZB International Leaders Survey and the World Value Survey, and

on a seven-point scale in the Transatlantic Trend Survey.<sup>7</sup> Finally, for our analyses, we made use of the distinction between masses and elites and country dummies.

### 2.3.3 *Method*

In the empirical part of the chapter, we will first describe mass–elite gaps on the four issues across countries. We will then run OLS regressions with a variety of independent variables in order to test our hypotheses. The OLS regressions allow us to compare the size of the effects and the share of the variance explained across different models. However, in the case of immigration, where the dependent variable consists of a three-point scale, ordered logistic regression would be more appropriate. Hence, while for reasons of comparability we stick to OLS models for this item too, we report the replication of the analysis based on ordered logistic regression in the Appendices.

There is also the problem of a time gap of a maximum of six years between the elite and mass surveys. In order to check whether this time gap might have had an impact on the results, we replicate the analysis on immigration with data from the World Value Survey for a different time point. While there is only up to a one-year time gap between the Elite Survey and the World Value Survey used for the immigration items in the analysis, we replicate the analysis with data from an earlier wave with a time lag of up to eight years. The analysis generates virtually identical results (see Appendices).<sup>8</sup>

## 2.4 Elite–Mass Divides within Countries

### 2.4.1 *Descriptive Analyses*

The following graphs show the distribution of preferences on immigration, trade, climate change and supranational integration. The graphs

<sup>7</sup> In order to make the left–right variable comparable across the elite and the Transatlantic Trend Survey, we collapsed the two extreme values and the two middle values in the former into one.

<sup>8</sup> The results from regression analyses including WVS have been replicated with a weighting for the stratification between East and West Germany. The results do not change the interpretation (the German mass is slightly more pro-immigration according to the weighted analysis).


show the deviations between the elites' preferences and those of the masses nicely. Figure 2.1 shows that the elite is significantly more pro-immigration than the masses in Germany, Mexico and, to a lesser degree, the USA. In each of the three countries, a much higher proportion of the elites disagrees with the statement 'When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people of [this country]' than the masses. In contrast, there is no gap between masses and elites in Poland and Turkey where both overwhelmingly agree with the statement. In general, the Germans are more pro-immigration than people in other countries.

Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of preferences on international trade among masses and elites. In all countries, the elite is somewhat more pro-trade than the masses. However, although the different scales do not allow for a strict comparison, it seems that for trade the gaps are smaller than for immigration (see Figure 2.1). Among the four countries for which data is available, the gap is largest for Germany and smallest for the USA.


Just as with immigration and trade, the elite in all countries is more in favour of fighting climate change than the masses. Also, these mass-elite gaps are considerable. In all four countries for which data is available, the elites are, to a similar extent, in favour of fighting climate change. In Turkey and Poland the masses are most reluctant to prioritize the fight against climate change.

The elites are also more in favour of allocating authority to the supranational level than the masses. However, in this case there is considerable variance across countries. While the Polish elite are much more integrationist than 'their' masses, the Mexican masses and elites are not divided on this issue. The German, Turkish and American elites are about equally more integrationist than the masses. However, this similarity in gaps is based on different levels. While the Germans are in general strongly integrationist, the Turkish and US Americans are more statist (Chapters 5 and 7 of this volume analyse preferences among elites and masses separately for a larger set of countries).

Elites are more cosmopolitan than masses. This is true for preferences regarding the permeability of borders (to immigration, trade and measures to fight climate change), as well as the allocation of authority and applies to all five countries in the sample. The gap between masses and elites is particularly wide for all cases to do with fighting climate



**Figure 2.1** Histograms on preferences for and against immigration  
Sources: W/ZB International Elite Survey; World Value Survey Wave 6.



**Figure 2.2** Histograms on pro-trade preferences  
Source: WZB International Elite Survey; Transatlantic Trend Survey 2009.





Figure 2.3 Histograms on preferences with respect to fighting climate change  
Source: WZB International Elite Survey; Transatlantic Trend Survey 2008.



**Figure 2.4** Histograms on preferences for and against supranational integration  
Source: WZB International Elite Survey; World Value Survey Wave 5.



change. It is also wide in Germany, Mexico and, to a lesser extent, the USA in the case of immigration. It is somewhat narrower for international trade where it is even minimal in the US American case. With exception of Mexico, the gap between masses and elites is also revealing when it comes to the allocation of authority in the form of delegation of sovereignty to the regional or international level.

The finding that there is little variance in mass–elite gaps across countries, and that these gaps are narrower for trade than for immigration and climate change, speaks against the idea that cosmopolitan attitudes are motivated by economic incentives. In particular, the fact that the cosmopolitan–communitarian divide is less in the highly developed USA than in less-developed Poland and Turkey speaks quite strongly against an economic explanation, as does the fact that in Poland and Turkey the gap between elites and masses with regard to preferences on supranational integration is just as wide as in the USA.

By contrast, the fact that the elites are systematically more cosmopolitan than the masses and that there is only limited variation across countries is compatible with the cultural capital hypothesis. However, in order to test the explanatory power of these two perspectives, it is not enough to look at the macro level. Hence, in the following multivariate analysis we will analyse some predictors of mass–elite gaps in cosmopolitan values at the individual level.

#### 2.4.2 *Cultural Capital or Economic Incentives?*

How can we establish whether cosmopolitan attitudes form the class consciousness of the elites or whether being part of the elite brings these attitudes with it due to other factors related to being an elite member? According to the cultural capital explanation, what really determines attitudes is the class position of belonging to an elite. As explained above, this is causally related to education. However, from the cultural capital perspective, education is causally prior to being a member of an elite and its impact on values is mediated by forming part of the elite. While education does have a causal effect on whether someone becomes part of the elite or not, the relationship is not deterministic. First, there may be other causes than education for becoming an elite member (e.g., socialization in particular social networks). Second, and more importantly, having a high level of education might not be

sufficient to enable one to become an elite member. Hence, empirically, the relationship between elite status and cosmopolitan attitudes should be relatively independent from education.

The economic incentives perspective, by contrast, does not hypothesize an independent effect of elite membership on cosmopolitan attitudes. Instead it predicts that the less educated are more critical of cosmopolitan ideas than the highly educated. Furthermore, it assumes that the positive relationship between education and cosmopolitanism is stronger in highly industrialized countries, because people with a low standard of education lose more from (economic) globalization in richer than in poorer countries.

In order to test whether elite status is independently related to cosmopolitan attitudes, we ran regression analyses including – apart from socio-demographic control variables and country dummies – levels of education and elite status as independent variables. We also added interactions between education levels and country dummies in order to test the economic incentives hypotheses. In a second model, we added left–right self-placements. The relationship of this variable with cosmopolitan attitudes might indicate to which degree the cosmopolitan–communitarian conflict is part of the dominant political conflict in the five countries under analysis.<sup>9</sup> In this context it is important, however, to note that it need not necessarily be the case that left–right self-placement causes cosmopolitan or communitarian values: the opposite might also be true. Hence, left–right semantics do not necessarily relate to an economic issue dimension that, most importantly, distinguishes

<sup>9</sup> If ‘left’ meant cosmopolitan preferences and ‘right’ meant communitarian preferences, the relationship between the left–right axis and the cosmopolitan–communitarian axis would be linear. By contrast, a non-linear relationship between the cosmopolitan–communitarian dimension and the left–right political axis would show that the cosmopolitan–communitarian conflict is not a dominant part of the left–right semantic. Indeed, such a non-linear relationship would, for instance, highlight on the one hand that cosmopolitan positions are positively associated with centrist positions on the left–right axis and on the other hand that communitarian positions are positively correlated with both far left and far right positions on the left–right axis. When testing for such non-linear relationships by adding a quadratic term in our models, we find varying results according to the issues: we find concave curve–linear relationships with left–right self-placement for the political integration and climate change issues, but less so for immigration.

between those in favour of more from those in favour of less state intervention.<sup>10</sup> The analysis is repeated for all four items.

Let us look first at the relationship between education and preferences with regard to immigration! The first model in Table 2.1 shows that members of the elite are significantly more in favour of immigration than the mass publics. This is independent of their level of education, which is also significantly related to positive attitudes towards trade. This is shown by the fact that within the countries higher levels of education are associated with more positive stances towards immigration. The coefficients of the interaction terms show two additional interesting patterns. First, all significant coefficients for individuals from countries other than Germany are negative, demonstrating that even Germans with a low educational level are more pro-immigration than most citizens of the other countries independent of their education. Second, the positive relationship between levels of education and pro-immigration values holds for Germany and Poland, but not for Turkey, Mexico and the USA. This is surprising since, from an economic incentives perspective, we would expect the less well educated in the most developed countries – Germany and the United States – to be more anti-immigration than those in the other countries.

The second model includes left–right self-placement, which gives an indication of whether, in our countries of analysis, immigration is part of the dominant political conflict dimension as expressed in terms of ‘left’ and ‘right’. The coefficient for left–right positions is significant and negative demonstrating that pro-immigrant attitudes belong to the ‘left’ and anti-immigrant sentiments to the ‘right’. Please note that neither this result nor the previous ones would change in any noteworthy way if an ordered logistic regression were conducted instead of an OLS (see Appendices).

Are the previous findings specific to immigration or are they a more general phenomenon with respect to issues in the cosmopolitan–communitarian dimension? A first answer to that is given in Table 2.2, which reproduces the analysis from Table 2.1 for trade openness. The analysis for preferences for and against trade openness shows a similar picture to the one on immigration. Here, too, both education levels and

<sup>10</sup> For different contexts ‘left’ and ‘right’ have shown to be related to liberal vs. conservative values, materialist vs. post-materialist values or majority vs. minority nationalism (Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990; Knutsen 1995; Dinas 2012; Leonisio and Strijbis 2014).

**Table 2.1** *OLS regressions on preferences with regard to immigration*

Model	Model 1	Model 2
Elite (ref: mass)	0.2449 0.0403	0.2435 0.0418
<b>Reference: age &gt;65</b>		
Age 15–24	0.2331 0.0336	0.2301 0.0352
Age 25–34	0.2244 0.0346	0.2288 0.0362
Age 35–44	0.1602 0.0335	0.1465 0.0351
Age 45–54	0.1352 0.033	0.1272 0.0345
Age 55–64	0.0654 0.0343	0.0756 0.0358
Male	–0.0419 0.0169	–0.0418 0.0176
<b>Country* education (ref: Germany, low)</b>		
Germany, medium	0.0997 0.0407	0.0892 0.0428
Germany, high	0.5545 0.047	0.5477 0.0488
Poland, low	–0.4777 0.0521	–0.4411 0.0604
Poland, medium	–0.3693 0.0509	–0.3244 0.0553
Poland, high	–0.0226 0.0558	–0.0167 0.0587
Turkey, low	–0.2409 0.0449	–0.1622 0.0481
Turkey, medium	–0.1959 0.0443	–0.1819 0.0466
Turkey, high	–0.2948 0.0519	–0.31 0.0551
Mexico, low	–0.1819 0.0439	–0.1291 0.0464
Mexico, medium	–0.207 0.0414	–0.1628 0.0435

Table 2.1 (*cont.*)

Model	Model 1	Model 2
Mexico, high	<i>-0.3053</i> <i>0.0538</i>	<i>-0.2859</i> <i>0.0556</i>
USA, low	<i>0.4185</i> <i>0.1201</i>	<i>0.4432</i> <i>0.1269</i>
USA, medium	<i>-0.1367</i> <i>0.0379</i>	<i>-0.1096</i> <i>0.0397</i>
USA, high	<i>0.029</i> <i>0.0408</i>	<i>0.0474</i> <i>0.0423</i>
Left-right		<i>-0.0283</i> <i>0.0038</i>
Constant	<i>1.649</i> <i>0.0385</i>	<i>1.7889</i> <i>0.0452</i>
N	9738	9003
R2	0.0813	0.0834

**Notes:** Table shows unstandardized beta-coefficients with standard errors;  $p < 0.05$  in italics.

**Sources:** WZB International Elite Survey; World Value Survey Wave 6.

elite membership show a significant positive relationship with preferences that are in accordance with a cosmopolitan ideology (Model 1). Even more remarkable is the fact that, once again, all significant coefficients for individuals from countries other than Germany are negative, showing that even Germans with a low educational level are more pro-trade than most citizens of the other countries independent of their education. Once again, from an economic incentives perspective, we would expect less educated Germans to be among the least cosmopolitan especially when it comes to trade. In line with the economic incentives perspective, however, we find that in most countries the less educated adopt a more critical attitude towards trade and that the sole exceptions can be found in Turkey – one of the less industrialized countries in our sample. In contrast to attitudes towards immigration, those towards trade are orthogonal to the left-right dimension (Model 2). This is counter-intuitive insofar as traditional left-right positions were closely linked to economic policy including trade. Bearing the analyses of immigration preferences in mind, this suggests that today ‘left’ and ‘right’ primarily relate to cultural issues.

Table 2.2 OLS regressions on preferences with regard to trade openness

Model	Model 1	Model 2
Elite (ref: mass)	0.2112 0.0420	0.2041 0.0443
<b>Reference: age &gt;65</b>		
Age 15–24	0.0764 0.0503	0.0737 0.0553
Age 25–34	0.0262 0.0425	0.0190 0.0468
Age 35–44	0.0088 0.0392	0.0099 0.0427
Age 45–54	0.0095 0.0374	0.0048 0.0403
Age 55–64	0.0171 0.0376	0.0190 0.0404
Male	0.1563 0.0242	0.1577 0.0264
<b>Country* education (ref: Germany, low)</b>		
Germany, medium	0.1046 0.0719	0.0920 0.0747
Germany, high	0.2085 0.0548	0.2026 0.0566
Poland, low	–0.2402 0.0475	–0.1761 0.0603
Poland, medium	–0.1386 0.0505	–0.1209 0.0581
Poland, high	–0.0171 0.0585	–0.0135 0.0626
Turkey, low	–0.1612 0.0448	–0.1646 0.0490
Turkey, medium	–0.3307 0.0659	–0.3509 0.0721
Turkey, high	–0.1309 0.0683	–0.1404 0.0742
USA, low	–0.3031 0.1017	–0.3500 0.1090
USA, medium	–0.3115 0.0531	–0.3220 0.0564
USA, high	–0.0132	–0.0117

Table 2.2 (*cont.*)

Model	Model 1	Model 2
	0.0416	0.0431
Left-right		-0.0016
		0.0088
Constant	2.6437	2.6578
	0.0629	0.0772
N	4075	3503
R2	0.0773	0.0749

*Notes:* Table shows unstandardized beta-coefficients with standard errors;  $p < 0.05$  in italics.

*Sources:* WZB International Elite Survey; Transatlantic Trend Survey 2009.

Table 2.3 depicts the same analyses for preferences with respect to fighting climate change. Again it produces similar results. Being a member of the elite and having a high level of education both have an independent positive effect on cosmopolitan attitudes towards fighting climate change (Model 1). And the Germans are, once again, significantly more in favour of fighting climate change than citizens of the other countries in the sample. It is also true that the only exception to the positive relationship between education and cosmopolitan attitudes can be found in a less developed country, Poland. Finally, with regard to the left-right dimension, fighting climate change is similar to immigration with the more ecologically minded considering themselves to be more on the left (Model 2).

In a final step, we shift our focus from issues relating to the permeability of borders to those that have to do with the allocation of power. Here the latter are operationalized as preferences for supranational integration. The results are again very similar to the previous ones. The first model shows, as expected, that elites are more positive towards supranational integration than mass publics, independent of education. It also shows that the Germans are more in favour of supranational integration than the citizens of the other four countries, again independent of their levels of education. Furthermore, with the exception of Mexico, the positive relationship between a higher level of education and being pro supranational integration holds for all countries. Finally, the second model shows that the more they are in favour of supranational integration, the more individuals place themselves on the 'left'.

**Table 2.3** *OLS regressions on preferences for and against measures to fight climate change*

Model	Model 1	Model 2
Elite (ref: mass)	0.4482 0.0000	0.3522 0.0000
<b>Reference: age &gt;65</b>		
Age 15–24	0.1804 0.0081	0.1359 0.0618
Age 25–34	0.1899 0.0009	0.1351 0.0271
Age 35–44	0.1555 0.0032	0.1260 0.0243
Age 45–54	0.2637 0.0000	0.2472 0.0000
Age 55–64	0.1611 0.0018	0.1422 0.0083
Male	–0.2749 0.0000	–0.2826 0.0000
<b>Country* education (ref: Germany, low)</b>		
Germany, medium	0.2113 0.0239	0.2356 0.0124
Germany, high	0.2263 0.0021	0.2152 0.0037
Poland, low	–0.4243 0.0000	–0.2969 0.0003
Poland, medium	–0.1980 0.0037	–0.0527 0.4922
Poland, high	–0.3157 0.0001	–0.2237 0.0093
Turkey, low	–0.3990 0.0000	–0.2416 0.0001
Turkey, medium	–0.3420 0.0000	–0.2278 0.0103
Turkey, high	–0.0688 0.4083	–0.0363 0.6790
USA, low	–0.4795 0.0007	–0.3272 0.0296
USA, medium	–0.4632	–0.4255



Table 2.3 (*cont.*)

Model	Model 1	Model 2
	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0000</i>
USA, high	<i>-0.1771</i>	<i>-0.1498</i>
	<i>0.0015</i>	<i>0.0077</i>
Left-right		<i>-0.1414</i>
		<i>0.0000</i>
Constant	<i>-0.0868</i>	<i>0.5773</i>
	<i>0.3066</i>	<i>0.0000</i>
N	3618	3123
R2	0.1111	0.1561

**Notes:** Table shows unstandardized beta-coefficients with standard errors;  $p < 0.05$  in italics.

**Source:** WZB International Elite Survey; Transatlantic Trend Survey 2008.

The previous analyses have shown very systematic findings. No matter which issue is under consideration, members of the elite are more cosmopolitan than the masses. Furthermore, the elites are quite homogeneous in their cosmopolitan attitudes across countries. This relationship cannot be entirely explained by the different socio-demography, especially the different levels of education, of the masses and the elite. Being a member of the elite has been shown to be a sizeable and significant predictor of cosmopolitan attitudes in all models. These results are in line with the expectations of the cultural capital theory, and we interpret them as a first piece of evidence for the explanatory power of this perspective.

How do the results relate to the economic incentive perspective? That perspective leads us to expect that it would be the less well educated, in particular in the industrialized countries, who would be less cosmopolitan because they stood to lose most from (economic) globalization. At a general level, this is what we found. Even when controlling for being part of the elite, education has a significant positive effect on cosmopolitan values. However, the country comparison is not in line with expectations from the economic incentives perspective. If the economic incentives perspective were right, people with a lower level of education in Germany and the United States would be less cosmopolitan than those in the other three countries. The empirical results do not confirm that expectation. The less well

**Table 2.4 OLS regressions on preferences towards supranational integration**

Model	Model 1	Model 2
Elite (ref: mass)	0.4184 0.0490	0.4059 0.0508
<b>Reference: age &gt;65</b>		
Age 15–24	0.1090 0.0390	0.0881 0.0412
Age 25–34	0.0871 0.0350	0.0837 0.0370
Age 35–44	0.1092 0.0338	0.0933 0.0356
Age 45–54	0.0593 0.0329	0.0495 0.0347
Age 55–64	0.0212 0.0348	0.0065 0.0366
Male	0.0274 0.0198	0.0165 0.0209
<b>Country* education (ref: Germany, low)</b>		
Germany, medium	0.0052 0.0426	0.0074 0.0445
Germany, high	0.0401 0.0523	0.0519 0.0542
Poland, low	–0.4939 0.0490	–0.4123 0.0569
Poland, medium	–0.3616 0.0504	–0.3448 0.0543
Poland, high	–0.0369 0.0739	–0.0019 0.0774
Turkey, low	–0.5251 0.0478	–0.4536 0.0514
Turkey, medium	–0.4222 0.0506	–0.3777 0.0534
Turkey, high	–0.2587 0.0595	–0.2130 0.0622
Mexico, low	–0.3883 0.0478	–0.3191 0.0520
Mexico, medium	–0.2460	–0.1913

Table 2.4 (*cont.*)

Model	Model 1	Model 2
	<i>0.0468</i>	<i>0.0493</i>
Mexico, high	<i>-0.3879</i>	<i>-0.3340</i>
	<i>0.0591</i>	<i>0.0608</i>
USA, low	<i>-0.5632</i>	<i>-0.5530</i>
	<i>0.0709</i>	<i>0.0718</i>
USA, medium	<i>-0.3413</i>	<i>-0.3172</i>
	<i>0.0410</i>	<i>0.0422</i>
USA, high	<i>-0.2598</i>	<i>-0.2508</i>
	<i>0.0853</i>	<i>0.0860</i>
Left-right		<i>-0.0199</i>
		<i>0.0045</i>
Constant	<i>0.1429</i>	<i>0.2483</i>
	<i>0.0347</i>	<i>0.0426</i>
N	7494	6652
R2	0.0923	0.0911

*Notes:* Table shows unstandardized beta-coefficients with standard errors;  $p > 0.05$  in italics.

*Sources:* WZB International Elite Survey; Transatlantic Trend Survey 2009.

educated in Mexico, Poland and Turkey have all been shown to be systematically less cosmopolitan than their German counterparts.

Is the relative high level of cosmopolitanism among the less well educated in Germany a matter of German exceptionalism or is it robust evidence against the economic incentives perspective? A partial answer to this question can be deduced from a comparison of the German results with those from the other highly industrialized country, the USA. People with a lower standard of education in the USA have been shown to be very similar to those in Mexico, Poland and Turkey – not less cosmopolitan as the theory would lead us to expect.<sup>11</sup> Hence, at least when it comes to the *gap* between the masses and elites in cosmopolitan vs. communitarian attitudes, the economic incentive perspective lacks explanatory power.

<sup>11</sup> The replication of the analysis of Table 2.5 with the low educated in the United States as reference category (not shown) shows no statistically significant difference in attitudes for trade and climate change. In the case of immigration, the low educated US citizens are even more cosmopolitan than those from the other countries.

If it is not to do with economic incentives, why is education systematically positively related to cosmopolitan attitudes even when membership of the elite is controlled for? A partial answer might come from cognitive mobilization theory (Inglehart 1970; Dalton 1984). So far, the argument has only been applied to European integration. According to Inglehart (1970), cognitive mobilization can explain preferences for European integration. Cognitive abilities lead people to favour European integration for two reasons (Inglehart et al. 1987; Janssen 1991; Gabel 1998b). First, high cognitive skills enable them to understand information about European integration because this information is often at a high level of abstraction. Second, cognitive skills increase the probability that citizens will receive and process information about European integration because they are more familiar with the issue and hence less threatened by it. Inglehart et al. (1987) provide evidence for the relationship between cognitive mobilization and positive orientations towards European integration based on bivariate analyses. Janssen (1991) and Gabel (1998b), however, find very limited evidence for a positive relationship between cognitive mobilization and European integration in multivariate analyses.

A final finding of this chapter is that attitudes towards cosmopolitanism are strongly linked to left–right semantics with the cosmopolitans more on the ‘left’. This relationship can be explained in two ways. On the one hand, the left–right scale can be understood as measuring issue positions on traditional conflict dimensions relating, for example, to the class cleavage. On the other hand, it can be argued that today the cosmopolitan–communitarian conflict is so important that it has changed the left–right semantics in such a way that their meanings overlap to a large extent. What points to this latter interpretation is the fact that, according to our analysis, the only issue that is orthogonal to left–right placement, and hence not related to it, is trade. If left–right self-placements still primarily referred to the class cleavage rather than to the cosmopolitan–communitarian conflict, we would expect the opposite, namely, trade being more strongly related to ‘left’ and ‘right’ than the other issues.

## 2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has shown that elites are systematically more cosmopolitan than masses in five very different countries. While the attitudes of the masses vary with respect to international trade, immigration,

fighting climate change and supranational integration, the elites strongly converge on positive positions towards these issues. This divide between masses and elites holds even when controlling for structural variables such as education.

How can this cosmopolitan consensus among the elites and the resulting elite–mass divide be explained? A plausible argument is that cosmopolitan attitudes not only reflect substantive interests, but are also part of the elites' cultural capital. Since, from a cultural capital perspective, cosmopolitan attitudes are not bound to structural variables beyond the status of belonging to the elite, that perspective may help to explain why cosmopolitan attitudes are spread among the elites in very different countries and why there is a cosmopolitan consensus among them. But, as our analysis has revealed, that seems not to be the whole story. Beyond producing a status difference between elites and masses, education seems to have an additional, independent impact on the adoption of cosmopolitan vs. communitarian attitudes. In addition, the chapter has shown that the cosmopolitan–communitarian cleavage is integrated into left–right semantics, which suggests that it has become part of the most important political conflict in the countries under study.

Obviously, our empirical analysis has not been an impermeable 'test' of theoretical models. Rather, it has presented the first empirical evidence on conflict formations with respect to contentious issues of globalization in the light of different theoretical perspectives. This means that additional analyses should be done in order to empirically test the explanations for the variance in cosmopolitan vs. communitarian positions across actors, space and levels of governance. For instance, while this chapter has primarily tried to explain variation between masses and elites, country-specific variance remained largely unexplained. Hence, Chapter 3 will focus on variance in cosmopolitan attitudes among the masses while Chapter 5 will do the same for elites. This latter chapter will also fill an additional lacuna in this analysis, namely its exclusive focus on *national* elites. The focus on national elites is insufficient in so far as the prototypical members of a cosmopolitan elite are thought to be no longer attached to one national context but to have an entire region or even the 'global village' as their point of reference. Chapter 5 in this volume will analyse whether European and global elites are equally as cosmopolitan as national ones or even more so.

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