

Bačo, Tomáš; Baumöhl, Eduard

Working Paper

Socioeconomic factors and shifts in ideological orientation among political parties: Parliamentary elections in Slovakia from 1998 to 2020

Suggested Citation: Bačo, Tomáš; Baumöhl, Eduard (2021) : Socioeconomic factors and shifts in ideological orientation among political parties: Parliamentary elections in Slovakia from 1998 to 2020, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, Kiel, Hamburg

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/246584>

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Terms of use:

Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.

Socioeconomic factors and shifts in ideological orientation among political parties: Parliamentary elections in Slovakia from 1998 to 2020

Tomáš Bačo^a – Eduard Baumöhl^{*b, c, d}

Abstract

We analyze the election results of political parties and ideological blocs in parliamentary elections held in the Slovak Republic from 1998 to 2020 across 79 districts (LAU 1 level). Interestingly, correlations among parties' election results between consecutive elections are very high across all elections from 1998 until 2016, meaning that any increase or decrease in electoral support was almost uniform across all districts from one election to another. The last elections disrupted this trend, and in line with the significantly lower degree of correlation with prior elections for all ideological groups, we observe territorially heterogeneous voting behavior. Especially in districts with left-wing support, the electorate shifted toward what we refer to as ideologically vague parties. Within a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) framework, we show that systematic influence of economic variables on the election results is present only for right-wing parties. For other ideological blocs, age and population density appear to be more influential factors. The “economically rational” right-wing election camp, however, has exhibited a decline in electoral support.

Keywords: Economic voting, Elections, Popularity, Government support, Populism

Statements and Declarations

We would like to thank Jan Fidrmuc, Daniel Kerekes, and Tomáš Výrost for their constructive comments that helped us to improve this paper. The research was supported by the Slovak Grant Agency for Science (VEGA project no. 1/0182/20). The authors have no competing interests to declare that are relevant to the content of this article. All data and code are available from the corresponding author upon request.

JEL codes: D72, E24, E61, P20

^a Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic, Kuzmányho 8, 040 01 Košice, Slovakia.

^b University of Economics in Bratislava, Dolnozemska cesta 1, 852 35 Bratislava, Slovakia.

^c Faculty of Economics, Technical University of Košice, Nemeovej 32, 040 01 Košice, Slovakia.

^d Institute of Financial Complex Systems, Masaryk University, Lipová 41a, 602 00 Brno, Czech Republic.

* Corresponding author. E-mail: eduard.baumohl{ @ }euba.sk.

1. Introduction

After an optimistic postwar period characterized by the development of democracy in Western Europe and its subsequent transmission to parts of Eastern Europe (Fukuyama, 1992; Gill, 2003) at the beginning of the 1990s, the first indications of stagnation in the spread of liberal-democratic regimes and later, after the global financial crisis in 2008, of their backtracking in countries with weaker economic conditions began to appear (Gatt, 2007; Öniş, 2017; Mainwaring and Bizzarro, 2019). Stagnation starts to manifest itself in the declining interest of citizens in the political space, especially in the context of declining interest in expressing their position in the electoral decision-making process (Huntington, 1996; Blais, 2000; Franklin, 2004; Heath, 2007), in particular among young voters (Smets, 2016). Voters often respond with apathy or consent to attempts to seize power (Bermeo, 2016; Dunning et al., 2019). One of the reasons for this development is the opacity of the political space (Park, 2019), associated, among other things, with the penetration of ideologically vague parties.

Ideological uncertainty involves various forms of antisystemic approaches, which are generally perceived as populist. Populism can be understood as a symptom of growing dissatisfaction with democracy, which arises when people stop believing that political institutions are willing or able to respond to their demands (Berman, 2019). In the case of some countries (Turkey, Venezuela, Thailand, among others), populism has been able to turn democratic regimes into autocracies. The greatest enemy of democracy in these countries did not come from outside but was represented by political elites convinced of their privileged position (Dimitrova, 2018; Lopez-Alves, 2021). In other countries, populism causes a significant reduction in the functioning of executive authorities. In any case, populism limits democracy and reduces the performance of the economy. It is also an obstacle to international cooperation (Walter, 2020; Mattozzi et al., 2020).

At the same time, ideologically vague parties deploying populist rhetoric operate within internal party structures in line with the authoritarian principles of the party leaders (Heinisch and Mazzoleni, 2016; Weyland, 2017). It is typical for such leaders to call into question the original democratic structures of a state in the name of fighting for the good of the people. On the premise of fighting for a "greater good", these parties are willing to significantly change the liberal democratic functioning of states. Populists are not against politics but against representative politics (Taggart, 2002).

Therefore, we believe it is necessary to examine the trend of penetration by populist parties and identify socioeconomic indicators capable of predicting their future success. Recognition and identification of these processes should be a warning signal for established

parties with a clear ideological orientation. People's electoral behavior naturally differs under the influence of different political, socioeconomic and cultural characteristics.

Several authors point to the threat of populism to liberal democracy (Soros, 2007; Mounk, 2019; Luce, 2019). According to them, a game premised on false information enters the political competition, so people make electoral decisions based on a misleading image created by populist parties. This creates a spiral that characterizes populism across political parties, which are differentiated by the extent of their political influence. Thus, the question is not whether the party behaves in a populist manner but to what extent populism manifests in party behavior (Meijers and Zaslove, 2021).

At the same time, we do not presume to class any specific political party in Slovakia as populist; although we have a good perspective, there is no clear and direct data-driven evidence. The reason for this gap is that alternative approaches to defining populism remain under debate; Norris (2020) highlights three of them, none of which have attracted a consensus in the subfield: a conception of populism as (i) an ideology, (ii) a looser "set of ideas," or (iii) a form of political rhetoric. Thus, we prefer to classify political blocs with the help of the Chapel Hill data (<https://www.chesdata.eu/>), and we simply refer to populist parties as ideologically vague ones.

We use data from the Slovak Republic, and we examine how socioeconomic factors are reflected by support for political parties, which, in turn, should determine the election results of different ideological parties. We analyze the time period from 1998 to 2020 (7 parliamentary elections).¹ Our results only partially confirm the importance of socioeconomic voting, although such voting has had a strong effect in some cases. The effect magnitude is evident in the conditions of the Slovak Republic, especially in the election results of right-wing parties. However, the importance of the influence of socioeconomic factors on the election results of right-wing parties is also accompanied by an overall decline in these parties' electoral success. This electoral decline of right-wing parties is mainly due to the success of newly emerging political parties, which tend to have an ideologically vague character.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we briefly discuss the related literature, and in Section 3, we provide some insights into the Slovakian political situation around the analyzed parliamentary elections. Section 4 discusses the data and utilized methodology. The main results are presented in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes the paper.

¹ Since its establishment (1993), the Slovak Republic has had a unicameral parliament, the National Council of the Slovak Republic.

2. Related literature

Electoral behavior can be examined at the individual level (Branton, 2003), allowing us to identify specific causes of individual disengagement or electoral behavior in general. However, to understand systemic changes, it is also beneficial to examine the aggregate level of electoral interest (Kramer, 1983). Such systemic changes might determine the behavior of political parties, and these in turn affect voter behavior. In this study, we focus on examining aggregate electoral behavior and changes in the ideological orientation of political parties in the political space of the Slovak Republic.²

At the same time, the results of socioeconomic electoral research need to be differentiated by the electoral system.³ From the perspective of an open society and democracy, majority rule seems appropriate. Proportional representation makes it difficult to form a government, and under such a system, parties may lose a sense of responsibility for their actions. Therefore, even when voters are politically dissatisfied, the strongest party has an opportunity to reform the government with smaller parties, even ones that may be differently ideologically oriented (Popper, 1999). We work with a theory of electoral behavior based on the socioeconomic characteristics of the electorate, premised on the original concept of cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967).⁴

The applicability of original theories of political party typology to practical political environments is often questionable. According to Smith (2005), the main problem with political typologies is that it is impossible to consistently and objectively assign a particular policy to conceptually different categories. That is, these theories cannot overcome obstacles to classification. This problem is also evidenced by the disagreement and different views of the most important classical authors, whose typologies both complement and contrast with each other (Weber, 1958; Duverger, 1959; Sartori, 1976; Katz, 1980; Lijphart, 1981; Giddens, 1994, and others).

In the past, voters found choosing a political party that represented their values and preferences relatively easy to navigate. Such a selection can be facilitated by an ideological

² We acknowledge the possible problem of ecological fallacy. However, as argued by several studies (e.g., Kramer, 1983; Russo, 2017; Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck, 2019), macrolevel analysis might still provide valuable insights, even in terms of voting behavior. Using aggregated electoral data to infer individual-level preferences and expectations about the probabilities of various parties winning elections is, of course, rather problematic (Alvarez and Nagler, 2000).

³ The Slovak Republic has a proportional electoral system in which the above-mentioned tendencies (populism) are more pronounced than in majority electoral systems. A specific party orientation focused only to a narrow circle of "populist" problems would not bring about the same electoral effect in majority electoral systems as in proportional systems.

⁴ Party systems under this scheme reflect four cleavages, namely, center-periphery, state-church, city-countryside, and owners-workers.

focus on the part of parties, which makes it possible to orient the parties in consistent ideological groups along a left-right political spectrum. At the same time, the clarity of party systems facilitated research aimed at determining the effects of socioeconomic factors on electoral decision-making.

From the historical development of different types of political parties (Gunther and Diamond, 2003; Hinnebusch, 2017; Rasulova, 2020), it is clear that new types of political parties gradually began to emerge, seeking to occupy specific positions focused on unrepresented preferences of voters. These parties began to create new platform orientations and ideological directions. This was a response to specific emerging social problems. While in 1850 the parties were exclusively elitist, they later became mass oriented. At the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, various narrowly profiled parties began to emerge. These focused on specific social needs, thus filling free space in the existing political arena.

In the most recent years, we have observed the emergence and development of a new phenomenon: the shift of parties toward an area of uncertain ideological orientation, whereby they primarily respond to current changes in public opinion (Adams, 2004). This is an attempt to represent the broadest mass of society by taking positions on a wide range of topics that are often in ideological conflict. This leads to shorter life cycles of these parties because they lack the strong organizational structure and historical roots of traditional parties (Beyens, 2016).

This process offers a natural space for the emergence of populist parties.⁵ Their work in this wider political space has proved to be unsystematic and counterproductive not only from the perspective of individual states but also from the perspective of regional or international integration. This may lead to instability of the international political environment, which may also affect international security (De Spiegeleire et al., 2017). Unfortunately, populist parties are undoubtedly on the rise in Western democracies (Bergh and Kärnä, 2021).

In the context of research on electoral behavior, three basic directions can be taken. The first is the sociological approach originally introduced by Lazarsfeld et al. (1944). This concept emphasizes the influence of social factors on the formation of political attitudes. The second stream is represented by research focused on psychological characteristics. The work of Campbell et al. (1960) can be considered seminal in this stream of literature. This approach is based on the self-identification of a voter with a political party. The third direction, also referred

⁵ For the sake of brevity, we do not discuss issues of populism in more detail. However, for interested readers, we point out some of the works (not mentioned thus far) that examine populism from different perspectives and in different political systems: Decker (2008), Jaschke (2013), Georgiadou (2013), Painter (2013), Stavrakakis and Katsambekis (2014), Alvares (2016), Mudde (2016), Heinisch et al. (2017), and Bergh and Kärnä (2021), among others.

to as the classical framework, is the theory of rational choice, perceived through the prism of economic voting. The key concepts in this stream were defined by Downs (1957).

A new approach to the explanation of electoral behavior was introduced by Thomassen (2005) and focuses on the existence of factors affecting both voter engagement and electoral choice. His research explains the decline in the importance of linking voters' social positions with politics, which in turn has a direct impact on political parties' behavior. Parties are reconsidering their political orientation along classical lines of conflict. Independent variables related to social structure (religiosity, social class), long-term predispositions (party identification, value orientation, ideological orientation), and short-term factors (topics, retrospective evaluation, political leaders) enter the electoral process and determine election results.

A well-conducted review study (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2013) that analyzed more than 500 research papers confirmed (partially) the hypothesis on the impact of economic and social voting. Based on this study, we can state that state-specific factors (types of elections, electoral and party systems, and political, cultural, social and economic factors) create special political-institutional systems that limit the possibility for generalization.

Most works focused on theories of economic voting assume a connection between movements in the real economy and political support (e.g., Auberger and Dubois, 2005; Martins and Veiga, 2013). Other authors (Kayser and Peress, 2012; Stevenson and Duch, 2013; Campello and Zucco, 2016), on the other hand, state that a connection with real economic results is not as important as voters' subjective perceptions of the economy. These are determined by comparing their subjective economic situation with the environment and over time.

Regardless of the chosen approach, it is safe to assume that a state's economic trends or voters' economic position are significant in the selection of a political party. Research from the 1990s confirmed that the economy in general is a major issue for voters in terms of overall importance (Paldam, 1991, 2004; Anderson, 1995, 2000; Norpoth, 1996).

In countries where it is possible to clearly define responsibility for the state of the economy, the effects of economic voting are more pronounced. The importance of the clarity of the party system is also confirmed by a study by Hellwig and McAllister (2019), which found that in systems with greater polarization, elements of economic voting have a greater influence. This may also be the reason for the efforts of current political parties to break free from clear lines of responsibility and ideology. The validity of the theory of economic voting has also been analyzed in the context of the political system, the age of democracy and democratic

consolidation. Hellwig (2010) examined the extent of economic voting in 77 democracies and confirmed its existence. At the same time, he argued that current incumbents can avoid penalties for worsening economic results by calling early elections.

A strong relationship between economic indicators and electoral behavior was also found in post-communist countries during the transition period. For example, Fidrmuc (2000a) argued that election results reflect voters' experience with economic reforms: those who benefited from the reforms vote for the right-wing pro-reform parties, whereas those who have become worse off vote for the left-wing parties. As an extension, he also considered the impact of growth variables (which directly influence voters' subjective perceptions of their economic situation), incorporating a dynamic dimension into the estimated models. In his other study, Fidrmuc (2000b) found that the voters in transition countries are more likely to be forward looking, not retrospective.

The influence of the state of the political system was confirmed by the research of Trucker et al. (2006),⁶ with the authors concluding based on the referendum voting model that established parties achieve better results in countries with good economic performance. According to transitional voting models, parties associated with the new regime are more successful in a strong economy, while parties associated with the old regime have a better chance of success in countries with poor economic performance.

Research on economic voting often overlaps with that on sociological voting. Although we may encounter a tendency to reject the class approach on which sociological research is based, we must admit that even the most developed countries do not represent homogeneous and classless societies. At the same time, it should be noted that this overlap is necessary, as social classes result from economic positions and are largely determined by economic factors. Understanding how and why social groups differ in their political preferences is crucial for examining behavioral trends of political parties, among which we can observe a tendency toward ideological uncertainty.

⁶ This work examines the so-called referendum and transitional voting models. While the referendum voting model characterizes situations just after the fall of a regime, the transitional model takes into account the fact that a new political order already exists in the country but the country has still not been able to transform toward a new democratic market model. In the referendum voting model, which characterizes the early 1990s in post-socialist countries, the situation is such that elections take place after the fall of a regime and voters do not yet have enough information about political parties and expected results. Therefore, it is significantly more difficult for parties and voters to establish their left-right identification. In the transitional model, which can be considered to characterize the elections between 1994 and 1998, there is already a latent left-right identification of parties, but the democratic electoral system, whereby voters make choices along a well-understood political spectrum, has yet to be established. The difference is therefore in the availability of information available to voters when they choose a party.

Sociologically oriented research has in the past mapped the association between social groups and political preferences, focusing on the analysis of cleavages (Knutsen, 2007; Frenklin, 2009; Potrafke, 2017). These works found that social stratification has a significant impact on the formation of political preferences and electoral actions. Geoffrey and Graaf (2013) found that party choice along the political spectrum is linked to voters' position within the economic dimensions of the left-right ideological scale. They thus foregrounded the element of voter self-identification with the relevant ideological class.

However, for this finding to be valid, we cannot neglect the space of political party behavior. To reflect the value-oriented preferences of individual classes, it is also necessary for parties to take a clear position on specific values (Elff, 2009; Spies, 2013). Therefore, political party behavior is also important (Langsæther, 2019). The value orientation of classes is also influenced by contextual issues (Gifford and Nilsson, 2014). In the case of internally politically and culturally differentiated states, it is necessary to perform a territorially decomposed analysis of the impact of selected factors on election results (Marisa and George, 2017).

3. A brief introduction to the political situation in Slovakia from 1998 to 2020

The 1998 elections were marked by the turbulent political situation that preceded them. In the period from 1994 to 1998, an ideologically heterogeneous three-party coalition (formed by the HZDS, SNS and ZRS⁷) was in power. Under this coalition, Slovakia's international position weakened, resulting in the country's exclusion from the integration processes with international organizations (the EU and NATO). These factors were also reflected in new electoral legislation, which was adapted to reflect the decline in the government's popularity: as the position of the governing parties weakened, they sought to reverse it by adjusting the electoral system. Initially, introduction of a majority system was considered; this would have favored the main governing party (HZDS) over the fragmented opposition. However, HZDS did not succeed in implementing this system because its smaller coalition partners were aware of the possible disadvantages it would pose for their parties in the upcoming elections. As an alternative solution, shortly before the 1998 elections, the governing coalition amended the electoral law, in a clear attempt to disadvantage the opposition. The reform was mainly an attempt to change the approach to coalition formation, as the threshold for parties' entry into parliament was increased. In addition, a ban on electoral campaigning in private media was

⁷ HZDS, SNS, and ZRS election results in 1994 were 34,96%, 5.4%, and 7.34%, respectively. All other election results are presented in Table 1.

introduced, with public media being in the hands of the ruling parties. At the same time, one constituency was introduced in these elections and has survived to the present day (in contrast to four constituencies until the 1994 elections). Further details about the political situation during this period can be found in Bútorá and Bútorová (1999).

After the 1998 elections, the parties forming the first (right-wing) government of Mikuláš Dzurinda made several modifications with respect to the Constitutional Court's ruling to eliminate unjustified penalties on coalitions, removing the requirement that each coalition member individually exceed 5% of the vote. This change returned the electoral system to its original setting, with a minimum 7% vote share required for a two-party coalition and 10% share required for three- or multimember coalitions. Constituency boundaries remained unchanged. In addition to this change in the electoral system, Slovakia returned to the integration processes, and major economic reforms began. This is one of the reasons why some authors have described the governing parties of the time as proreform rather than right-wing. More details are provided by, inter alia, Haughton and Rybář (2008).

The last reform of the electoral system dates from 2002 to 2006, when the second Dzurinda government ruled. This right-wing government, in a slightly changed form, continued the reform activities of the previous administration. Although the coalition promised in its electoral manifesto to revert to a greater number of constituencies, this did not occur in practice. Following the approval of the electoral law, preferential voting was strengthened.⁸ Despite considerable international success in the field of integration processes, the popularity of this government gradually declined. Even the visible positive effects on the national economy did not help to reverse this drop. The reason for this was the considerably territorially differentiated development of Slovakia, with the country's macro data characterized by a positive shift but its growth in fact territorially concentrated.⁹ Thus, the right-wing parties lost their majority support in the 2006 elections, and there was a change in favor of the SMER left-wing government.

From 2006 to 2010, the prime minister was Róbert Fico, who headed a government comprising SMER, SNS and HZDS. From the outset, this was a left-wing government, as the strongest party SMER had entered the elections in 2006 with this ideological orientation. That year, voters expressed a desire for change after the two right-wing governments of Mikuláš Dzurinda, but they probably did not associate this change with HZDS, which had entered the

⁸ The 10% threshold valid until then was adjusted to 3%, and this requirement remains in force today.

⁹ Regional disparities also appear in the data on average wages and unemployment rates, which we use in this work. This problem of significant regional differences has characterized the Slovak Republic throughout its existence as an independent state.

2006 elections as a party in decline. This is one of the reasons why it can be said that the left-wing SMER party entered the 2010 elections facing a certain penalty, as people associated it with the HZDS party's participation in the government. In these elections, people basically decided on certain party blocs rather than on individual parties. At that time, the relations between the individual parties were already relatively clearly profiled, so it was possible to anticipate potential coalitions, which also influenced voter decision-making. Probably the greatest impact on voters came from the global financial crisis of 2008, which caused the country's economic indicators to deteriorate. More detail on that period can be found in Haughton et al. (2011) or Deegan-Krause and Haughton (2012).

After the 2010 elections, the right-wing parties managed to form a broad government coalition composed of smaller political parties. Given the number of parties involved, there was a strong presumption that conflict situations would arise under this coalition. The risk of conflicts was also increased by the fact that the coalition included the conservative KDH on the one hand and the liberal SaS on the other. Among the opposition parties, the strongest party was SMER, which managed to attract the voters of HZDS and SNS. This government was in office at the time of the global financial crisis, which hit many Eurozone countries hard. The EU's response was to create the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to help the most affected countries. In the end, this issue proved to be crucial from the point of view of the functioning of the governing coalition. The coalition combined a vote to approve the EFSF/ESM with a vote of confidence in the government, thereby seeking to override the negative opinion of the SaS party of these “rescue mechanisms.” In the end, the SaS party refused to take part in the vote, and so the government did not win the vote of confidence. This led to early parliamentary elections in 2012. The election campaign was marked by a split in the previous government coalition and the “Gorilla file” scandal¹⁰, which discredited some political actors. Similarly, the “Sasanka”¹¹ case resonated with society,

¹⁰ The Gorilla case is a Slovak political case that was overrun by the escape of a secret document with the code name Gorilla from the Slovak Information Service to the public in December 2011. The file published on the internet contains information on the interception of Jaroslav Haščák, head of the Penta investment group, during 2005 and 2006. The file contains transcripts of Haščák's alleged interviews with political and economic leaders about commissions and bribes, in a conspiracy apartment on Vazova Street in Bratislava. The interviews also contain information on the alleged financing of the parties SDKÚ-DS, Smer-SD, KDH and SMK. The essence of the case according to the file is the distribution of loot from privatization among the participants and the planning of further robbery of the state, directly with the participation of its responsible representatives.

¹¹ This is a video from 2012 of a scandalous interview between Richard Sulík (head of SAS and, at that time, the Speaker of the National Council of the Slovak Republic) and Marián Kočner (a controversial businessman who was convicted of counterfeiting bills, was on the so-called mafia list, and is suspected of several fraudulent crimes, as well as ordering the murder of journalist Ján Kuciak). They discussed political and governmental affairs, which indicated that Richard Sulík had tried to replace at that time Prime Minister Iveta Radičová, and also discussed the election of the Attorney General.

shaking voters' trust in political leaders. Electoral platforms moved to the background and became objects of secondary interest for individual voters. As a result, SMER, as the only left-wing party entering the 2012 elections, gained 44.41% and formed a one-color government. No other parties were willing to form a coalition with SMER. The elections of 2012 also represent the entrance of ideologically vague parties into a relevant political space – OĽaNO achieved the third best result, and with 8.55%, they started to harness voters' discontent.

The elections in 2016 witnessed the penetration of new voter behavior phenomena. These elections were characterized by the topic of migration crises and led to the deconstruction of the incumbent party system. This further led to the generation of new political parties without a clear ideological profile. Although in some cases these were not entirely new parties, until then, their political support had been so low that they could not be considered relevant to political struggles. These parties mainly included ĽSNS, Sme Rodina and Siet', which managed to enter parliament and exceed the 5% eligibility threshold. Long-established political parties such as KDH and SMK, which represented certain religious or nationally oriented groups of voters, failed to enter parliament. The elections were held in an antagonistic atmosphere that created two blocs of parties. One bloc was represented by SMER and parties willing to engage in future cooperation with this party. The second was represented by parties that strongly opposed the policies of the previously ruling SMER government. More details on the 2016 elections in Slovakia can be found in Rybář and Spáč (2017) or in Zvada (2018).

One of the themes of the 2020 elections was the unification of the opposition, which was also related to the emergence of new political parties. These parties were referred to as the democratic opposition, with which the KDH party signed a nonaggression pact. The idea was to create a "bloc of change," although this did not materialize. The opposition parties thus entered the elections independently, outside the PS-SPOLU coalition. This coalition was particularly strong in the area of economic policy; it announced the introduction of a new tax, which, however, the KDH party rejected. SaS planned to cancel the doubling of the bank levy. Other parties did not enter the elections with a strong economic policy agenda. A significant breakthrough before these elections was caused by the controversy surrounding the businessman Marián Kočner, who was accused in the case of the murder of journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancé Martina Kušnírová. Many people began to demand the exit from public life of politicians who had a close relationship with the businessman—not only government officials but also representatives of the opposition parties SaS and Sme Rodina. The most prominent proponent of this view was Igor Matovič, chairman of the OĽaNO party, who ran on an anticorruption platform in the campaign. During the electoral campaign, in the context of

this topic, he used unconventional means of presentation, trying to appeal to the emotional side of the electorate. He based his election campaign solely on trying to remove the then-ruling corrupt officials. The entire campaign was conducted almost exclusively in this spirit and in the spirit of a fight against extremist forces. In the end, this emotional anticorruption narrative played well for Igor Matovič, who became the prime minister.¹² Further details about the latest elections in Slovakia are provided by Lysek et al. (2020). Election results for the examined period are presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Election results in Slovakia from 1998 to 2020

Parties	1998	2002	2006	2010	2012	2016	2020
HZDS	27%	19.5%	8.79%	4.32%			
SMK	9.12%						
SOP	8.01%						
SDK	26.33%						
SNS	9.07%	3.32%	11.73%	5.07%	4.55%	8.64%	3.16%
SDE	14.66%						
SDKU		15.09%	18.35%	15.42%	6.09%		
SMER		13.46%	29.14%	34.79%	44.41%	28.28%	18.29%
HZD		3.28%					
KSS		6.32%	3.88%				
SMK		11.16%	11.68%	4.33%	4.28%	4.04%	3.9%
KDH		8.25%	8.31%	8.52%	8.82%	4.94%	4.65%
ANO		8.01%					
PSNS		3.65%					
SF			3.47%				
SaS				12.14%	5.88%	12.1%	6.22%
MOST-HÍD				8.12%	6.89%	6.5%	
OLaNO					8.55%	11.02%	25.02%
Sme Rodina						6.62%	8.24%
LSNS						8.04%	7.97%
Siet'						5.6%	
PS-SPOLU							6.96%
Za ľudí							5.77%
Dobrá voľba							3.06%

Notes: We consider only parties reaching a minimum vote share of 3%, which is why the percentages do not sum to 100.

¹² As it turned out, this strategy did not go well for the rest of the country, and many people realized that populism might not be enough for good governance. The entire 2020 parliamentary elections can be characterized as a win for populists in Slovakia. Parties with solid election platforms were left out in front of the door to the parliament or entered it with very low electoral support.

4. Data and methodology

The subject of our research is the election results of political parties and ideological blocs in the parliamentary elections held in the Slovak Republic from 1998 to 2020. The level at which we examine electoral behavior is level-one local administrative units (LAU 1) or districts. This is the lowest level for which relevant socioeconomic statistics on the electorate are available. At the same time, this regional level provides a relevant sample of observations, as the Slovak Republic is divided into 79 such administrative units. The district level also takes into account the fragmentation of the country's territory into heterogeneous socioeconomic units. We examine the period of elections since 1998 because the 1998 elections were marked by the democratic transition of the Slovak Republic.¹³

We consider only parties reaching the minimum threshold of 3% of the votes obtained. The setting of a minimum threshold was necessary to avoid distorting the results by including a large number of insignificant parties.¹⁴ We concluded that parties above this threshold are relevant based on the fact that they receive a contribution from the state for their activities. This allows them to continue to operate in the political space with some influence even if they remain nonparliamentary parties.

Furthermore, we work with annually published data from the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic.¹⁵ These data have been collected and published since 1998, again at the LAU 1 level to allow a regional breakdown. We selected population density (d), average age (aa), average nominal monthly income (anw) and the unemployment rate (ur) as the basic explanatory variables.¹⁶ These variables capture classical cleavage lines (in the spirit of Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Population density accounts for the city-countryside and center-periphery cleavages. The average nominal monthly income and the unemployment rate indirectly capture

¹³ Because of this context, forces other than socioeconomic indicators were important at that time. Regarding post-communist countries in transition, we refer the reader to the following works: Rose (1994), Janos (2000), McFaul (2005), Outhwaite (2008), Mungiu-Pippidi (2010), and Vachudova (2015), among others.

¹⁴ In each of the elections that we examine, a large number of political parties took part in the electoral competition: 17 in 1998, 26 in 2002, 21 in 2006, 18 in 2010, 26 in 2012, 23 in 2016 and 25 in 2020.

¹⁵ This is the central state administrative body in the field of national statistics and the only one that summarizes and publishes official data sources in accordance with legal regulations and in a reliably standardized manner. All data are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

¹⁶ We also included squared age, as its effect might not be linear. However, our results remained the same, as the average age has only a small variability across districts, i.e., the correlations between age and its squares were almost equal to 1. Higher correlations are also reported in the case of nominal wage and unemployment (the highest correlation was -0.67 in 1998) and between population density and nominal wage (maximal correlation was 0.68 also reported in 1998). After 1998, the correlations of our explanatory variables are smaller and should not represent an issue in our regression models.

the cleavage between owners and workers. Age also indirectly captures the cleavage between church and state, if we assume that older age groups join the church more.¹⁷

In addition to the above static variables, we include dynamic indicators of economic voting in the model. These should express subjective perceptions of economic performance in the form of changes felt by the voter in economic matters. Specifically, we use the rate of change in the average nominal wage in the last year (ch1anw) and the last four years (ch4anw) and rate of change in the unemployment rate in the last year (ch1ur) and the last four years (ch4ur). The growth indicator for the previous four years reflects the election period, and the growth indicator for the previous year reflects the feeling of current changes just before the elections. In the case of the 2012 elections, we replace the growth indicator for the last four years with the growth indicator for the last 2 years (in 2012, early elections were held, which shortened the original term to 2 years). In the case of the 1998 elections, the variable tracking the change over the previous four years is not used because for the period from 1994 to 1997, official data were collected at different regional/administrative levels.

To estimate the impact of socioeconomic variables on the election results, we use the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) model, as it allows the possibility of examining the influence of explanatory variables in a system of equations in which the error terms are correlated.

Our baseline model for the m -th political party (ideological bloc) has the following form (for each election, we have M such equations, depending on the number of analyzed subjects):

$$V_{m,t} = \alpha_{0,m} + \sum_i^4 \beta_i X_{i,t} + \sum_i^4 \varphi_i \Delta X_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{m,t}, \quad (1)$$

where $V_{m,t}$ is the election result of the m -th political party/bloc in the elections held at time t , $X_{i,t}$ represents selected socioeconomic factors at the level of individual districts, $\Delta X_{i,t}$ is the growth indicators of selected socioeconomic factors and $\varepsilon_{m,t}$ denotes the error terms.¹⁸

In this study, we classify political parties according to the classical left-right typology, which we supplement with nationalist parties and ideologically uncertain parties. In an effort to avoid evaluative judgments and to be value neutral, we avoid using terms such as extreme right-wing, left-wing, or populist and instead classify certain parties as ideologically vague, even if

¹⁷ This variable does not capture religiosity but focuses on membership of church institutions, which is smaller among lower age groups. This general premise is also confirmed by Packard and Ferguson (2019).

¹⁸ A limited dependent variable model could be considered as well, but as in-sample predictions are not out of the 0-100% interval, a SUR model offers a reasonable approximation.

they display a rejection of this designation.¹⁹ We classify the parties into groups for each election separately, as the parties underwent natural evolution throughout our study sample period. Our classification takes into account not only what parties declare but also how they manifest themselves in real political activity.

Table 2: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables ($N = 79$)

Var.	Mean	Med.	Std.	Min.	Max.	Var.	Mean	Med.	Std.	Min.	Max.
<i>Average age (aa)</i>						<i>Population density (d)</i>					
aa98	35.40	35.66	2.14	29.52	42.86	d98	267.77	97.75	625.00	29.97	4886.90
aa02	36.48	36.77	2.10	30.35	43.47	d02	259.82	98.14	590.43	29.46	4605.78
aa06	37.68	37.96	2.07	31.43	44.18	d06	256.87	97.51	567.51	28.74	4370.33
aa10	38.71	39.14	2.02	32.49	44.14	d10	257.56	98.08	558.02	28.20	4253.75
aa12	39.32	39.77	2.07	32.94	44.49	d12	252.54	103.96	536.19	28.94	4048.70
aa16	40.42	40.93	2.06	33.84	43.90	d16	255.99	104.62	546.63	28.38	4140.87
aa20	41.37	41.88	2.12	34.66	44.74	d20	258.71	98.01	571.05	11.59	4402.39
<i>Average nominal monthly income (anw)</i>						<i>Unemployment rate (ur)</i>					
anw98	309.77	298.21	51.56	250.28	504.28	ur98	16.65	16.40	7.05	3.60	33.30
anw02	426.34	409.41	83.86	318.96	736.34	ur02	18.40	16.91	8.24	3.16	37.22
anw06	590.43	562.30	131.61	435.54	1117.17	ur06	10.35	8.55	6.21	1.69	28.34
anw10	726.34	692.00	155.22	492.00	1327.00	ur10	13.52	12.23	6.57	3.18	33.64
anw12	788.16	754.00	138.79	604.00	1260.00	ur12	15.65	14.02	7.25	4.15	35.59
anw16	909.24	870.00	170.55	658.00	1486.00	ur16	9.48	7.85	5.22	3.29	24.58
anw20	1200.91	1158.00	184.36	895.00	1797.00	ur20	8.10	6.95	3.97	3.68	20.26
<i>Change of the average nominal wage (over 1 year)</i>						<i>Change of the unemployment rate (over 1 year)</i>					
ch1anw98	8.01	8.01	2.52	0.70	12.81	ch1ur98	27.86	25.42	15.12	4.55	120.00
ch1anw02	10.86	10.49	3.59	0.20	21.39	ch1ur02	-7.57	-6.78	10.49	-32.64	22.95
ch1anw06	9.18	8.55	3.54	3.96	30.39	ch1ur06	-18.05	-18.02	8.30	-34.24	-2.27
ch1anw10	5.54	4.27	6.78	-3.37	35.99	ch1ur10	-2.72	-1.81	9.10	-31.02	18.51
ch1anw12	2.68	3.01	2.87	-17.95	7.06	ch1ur12	7.87	6.88	6.77	-4.35	28.36
ch1anw16	3.66	3.55	2.84	-4.23	9.99	ch1ur16	-18.68	-19.54	10.11	-45.17	13.17
ch1anw20	5.78	5.48	3.89	-2.77	24.26	ch1ur20	61.42	54.94	28.14	21.23	197.21
<i>Change of the average nominal wage (over 4 years)</i>						<i>Change of the unemployment rate (over 4 years)</i>					
ch4anw02	37.17	36.68	5.81	22.97	57.09	ch4ur02	10.58	12.30	19.13	-30.91	66.50
ch4anw06	38.12	37.35	7.22	24.12	70.64	ch4ur06	-46.52	-47.38	11.85	-71.42	-17.57
ch4anw10	23.35	23.14	7.65	4.45	43.36	ch4ur10	45.43	34.35	37.03	0.30	195.92
ch2anw12	9.28	9.83	6.13	-7.73	27.21	ch2ur12	17.50	17.20	9.25	-2.05	46.84
ch4anw16	15.36	15.18	6.69	-8.23	33.33	ch4ur16	-39.86	-40.91	12.62	-62.06	0.64
ch4anw20	32.88	33.04	6.72	14.78	49.12	ch4ur20	-10.05	-13.45	15.38	-37.51	35.56

¹⁹ This group of political parties is the most heterogeneous, but due to the focus of our research, the differentiation of political parties in a given bloc is not important. A common feature in this bloc is the abandonment of the classical left-right political identification. While this group also includes professional parties with a substantive political platform, these are internally polarized from the point of view of classical left-right political values. Therefore, the group includes both parties with relevant political agendas and parties without an identifiably "populist" profile. It also includes extremist or antisystemic parties. Although extremist parties may be on either side of the left-right political spectrum, in the sense of Eysneck's model (1954), they are closer to each other than to other parties on the same side of the political spectrum. Likewise, their ideological focus emphasizes political values not nested neatly within the classical left-right divide.

For objectivity, we use a publication prepared by the Slovak author Mikuš (2018) that deals with the development of individual political parties operating on the Slovak political scene from 1989 to 2018. We supplement this with results from the Chapel Hill project, in which political parties are evaluated by experts at various levels from universities and organizations (see Appendix 1). The project also covers the general ideological and economic orientation of parties along the left-right spectrum. The evaluation results for individual parties are the average of the evaluations of several consulted experts.²⁰ However, these evaluations are not carried out on a regular basis²¹ and do not correspond to election years in Slovakia, so we can only use them as supporting criteria for the party's inclusion in the respective ideological bloc.

5. Results

Our data confirm the hypothesis that governing parties in Slovakia are penalized. In all analyzed elections, governing parties received fewer total votes than parties out of government (see the bottom panel in Figure 1). Outside the 2010 elections, this difference in favor of nongovernmental parties is striking. Especially in the last three elections (in 2012, 2016 and 2020), the gap in support is more than 30%. In 2020, this difference exceeded 50%. Support for nongovernmental parties still did not automatically lead to replacement of the main party in government. Some nongovernmental parties did not automatically present an alternative for political turnover due to their lack of coalition potential. The smallest difference in support for governmental and nongovernmental parties corresponds to the 2010 elections, when the right-wing parties managed to form a broad government coalition composed of smaller political parties. The trend of support for nongovernmental parties may also be associated with the dissatisfaction of citizens who perceive the Slovak Republic as still economically lagging behind the developed countries of Western Europe. This economic performance is a legacy of the country's post-communist period and will probably last for a long time.

By comparing the electoral support for parliamentary and nonparliamentary parties, we find that in the Slovak Republic, voters tend to support established political entities. Even emerging parties that received relevant voter support were generally formed as spinoffs from establishment parties. Slovak voters are conservative in this respect and are not willing to

²⁰ This study's appendix reports the individual evaluations within the project by evaluation year and each party's final classification in the respective ideological bloc.

²¹ The ratings for Slovak political parties were provided in 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014 and 2019. Parties are assessed on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 expresses the extreme left-wing position and 10 the extreme right-wing position of the party. The evaluation variables used in our research are LRGEN, which expresses the general ideological orientation of the party, and LRECON, which represents the economic orientation of the party.

support parties about which they have no historical knowledge. Nonparliamentary parties were more successful in 2002 and 2016. In recent years, their share has been approximately 20%. Even within this share, a substantial part is drawn by entities that have been active in politics for a long time.

The main part of our research examines the trends in electoral success of the ideological blocs of parties. In the group of national and ethnic parties, electoral support remains at a relatively stable level, ranging from 15% to 20%, which reflects the proportion of national minorities and voters sensitive to national and ethnic issues. An exception is the latest elections in 2020. In this case, there was a significant decline in these parties' electoral gains. This was driven by the penalty imposed on the national and ethnic party MOST-HÍD (mostly supported by the Hungarian minority in Slovakia), which was part of the government in the previous election period. This party—the strongest among its Hungarian nationally-oriented peers—was punished mainly for being part of the government coalition with the SNS (supported mostly by Slovak national voters), which is considered its main opponent. The nationally-oriented SNS was also significantly penalized for the same reason.

It is more interesting to observe the trend of right-wing parties' declining support, which in 2020 fell below 18%. This decrease can also be seen for the left-wing parties in the cases of the last three elections, whose vote share in 2016 was 16.13 percentage-point lower than that in 2012. The trend of declining support for traditional left-right ideological blocs has been accompanied by growing support for ideologically vague parties, which practically did not exist on the Slovak political scene until 2010. An exception is 2002, when a new party (SMER), which presented itself as a “third way” party, joined the elections. However, shortly after its creation, it moved to a left-wing position, from which it operates today.²² In 2020, ideologically vague parties received support of up to 50.06%.²³

²² The SMER party was founded by Róbert Fico, who originally came from the left-wing SDL party. Therefore, it is questionable whether it was truly a party of the third way, as it was presented. Due to its rapid transformation into a leftist party, it is possible that its initial presentation was a marketing move rather than a real attempt by Fico to abandon his original left-wing ideological orientation. If we include SMER in the group of left-wing parties for the 2002 elections, we can talk about the emergence of ideologically vague parties only from 2012.

²³ If we include the coalition of PS-SPOLU parties in this group, then this support would be at the level of 57.02%. In this work, we include this coalition in the right-wing ideological bloc, mainly due to its strongly right-wing economic platform, but some observers may class this coalition in a centrist position.




Figure 1: Election results of political party groups

Notes: The classification of political parties into ideological blocs and the corresponding Chapel Hill values are presented in the appendix (Table A.1). Note also that we consider only parties reaching a minimum vote share of 3%, which is why the percentages in our figures do not sum to 100.

Table 3 shows the development of the degree of explained variability (R-squared) in our estimated models of the influence of socioeconomic factors on the election results of ideological blocs. Naturally, in the case of the national and ethnic parties, socioeconomic characteristics are not likely to be that important for the electorate, and we confirm this: the explained variability of our models is rather low. For ideologically vague parties, it is not possible to draw

a relevant conclusion about the presence of economic voting, as these parties are still a new phenomenon. However, we can see from our sample period that the proportion of explained variability for these parties is low. This characteristic was also reflected in these parties' pre-election campaigning, which most often focused on the anticorruption theme and not on economic issues or future economic development.

Our socioeconomic models are the most relevant in relation to the right-wing parties. The selected variables explain approximately 60% of the support of these parties for elections since 2002, and even for 2012 and 2016, the degree of explained variability reaches 70%. Our results indicate that socioeconomic variables are of most importance for right-wing voters. From this, it can be concluded that in their electoral decision-making, right-wing voters align most closely to the rational sociotropic voting model. The general validity of this voting model has also been confirmed by previous research (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2013). However, in the context of the gradual decline in support for right-wing parties, we can speak of a gradual change in voters' behavior. They have gradually stopped orienting their voting based on rational economic attributes and electoral platforms. The latter cannot be assessed directly from aggregate election results, but as some elected parties in Slovakia had no platforms or, to be more precise, only a platform with three bullet points, we feel confident in this inference.

From our research, no relevant conclusions can be drawn about a causal link between changes in voter behavior and in the ideological orientation of the parties. On the other hand, a comparison of the last two elections shows an increase in support for ideologically vague parties, for which the degree of explained variability across socioeconomic variables is the lowest. Therefore, it can be stated that to espousing ideological vagueness is becoming an effective electoral strategy that can reach broad masses of the electorate.

Table 3: Explained variability for ideological blocs (elections 1998-2020)

Ideological bloc	R² from SUR models						
	1998	2002	2006	2010	2012	2016	2020
Left-wing parties	29%	35%	36%	37%	28%	30%	40%
Right-wing parties	18%	57%	67%	62%	70%	76%	61%
National and ethnic parties	23%	18%	28%	28%	13%	20%	33%
Ideologically vague parties	n/a	14%	n/a	n/a	46%	24%	19%

Notes: The table shows the measures of explained variability. In cases where statistical significance of a model was not confirmed (a joint null of all the coefficients equal to zero via the chi-squared test), we highlight the corresponding R² in bold. This is the case for 2002 for ideologically vague parties and for 2012 for national and ethnic parties.

Our main findings are presented in Tables 4-7, which display the results of the regression models explaining the election results of ideological blocs across districts. For right-wing parties, socioeconomic variables usually have a statistically significant effect on their election results. However, this finding does not hold for our growth variables, which are not statistically significant in most cases. These growth variables capture the impact of subjective assessments of economic performance, and thus, it appears that voters for right-wing parties care most about recent economic development. In other words, right-wing voters reflect more on their current socioeconomic position than on its change over time. The right-wing parties are mostly supported by the urban population, which is expressed by the positive regression coefficient on the population density variable. In other words, support for right-wing parties is territorially differentiated. Positive coefficients also appear for the nominal wage variable, which is naturally complemented by a negative coefficient for the unemployment rate variable. Increases in age have a negative impact on support for right-wing parties, which confirms the well-known assumption that right-wing parties are supported more by the younger population.

For the left-wing parties, the nominal wage has the exact opposite effect as for the right-wing counterparts. A higher nominal wage has a negative effect and a lower nominal wage a positive effect on left-wing parties' results. Unlike right-wing parties, however, this effect does not hold for all the analyzed elections (the exceptions are the elections in 2012 and 2020). This may also be a manifestation of the gradual elimination of the cleavage between workers and owners, which was characterized by large income differences. It is possible that the gradual erasure of differences within middle-income groups eliminates the influence of nominal wages on their electoral decisions, at least for left-wing voters.

In the case of ideologically vague parties, we see no systematic influence of any particular explanatory variable. This unsystematic influence of socioeconomic variables on the election results of ideologically uncertain parties may indicate a certain similarity in these voters' behavior with that of voters for left-wing parties. Therefore, voters who support ideologically vague parties may originate from the left-wing camp, as they are not bound to these parties by any systematic variables that determine their electoral actions. On the other hand, in the case of national and ethnic parties, the systematic impact on their support from the older age group is evident.

Table 4: SUR results for right-wing parties

Variables	Right-wing parties						
	1998	2002	2006	2010	2012	2016	2020
<i>Population density</i>	0.004*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)
<i>Average age</i>	-1.706*** (0.357)	-2.696*** (0.467)	-2.291*** (0.421)	-2.426*** (0.476)	-1.722*** (0.288)	-1.660*** (0.227)	-0.677** (0.273)
<i>Average nominal monthly income</i>	0.090*** (0.022)	0.078*** (0.020)	0.046*** (0.010)	0.039*** (0.009)	0.025*** (0.005)	0.007 (0.004)	0.011*** (0.004)
<i>Unemployment rate</i>	-0.153 (0.125)	-0.322** (0.161)	-0.918*** (0.218)	-0.737*** (0.180)	-0.354*** (0.097)	-1.094*** (0.163)	-0.289 (0.190)
<i>Change in average nominal wage (1 year)</i>	0.957*** (0.282)	0.028 (0.240)	0.315 (0.259)	-0.042 (0.145)	0.231 (0.173)	-0.125 (0.177)	-0.065 (0.155)
<i>Change in average nominal wage (4 years)</i>	n/a	-0.283 (0.197)	-0.219 (0.143)	-0.116 (0.118)	-0.029 (0.097)	-0.136* (0.079)	-0.038 (0.095)
<i>Change in unemployment rate (1 year)</i>	0.054 (0.046)	0.084 (0.130)	0.000 (0.119)	-0.139 (0.107)	-0.007 (0.097)	0.093 (0.088)	-0.028 (0.023)
<i>Change in unemployment rate (4 year)</i>	n/a	0.044 (0.063)	0.256** (0.106)	-0.014 (0.027)	0.014 (0.075)	0.209** (0.070)	0.048 (0.040)
<i>Constant</i>	49.935 (13.664)	110.831 (18.638)	113.778 (16.739)	112.616 (19.287)	71.545 (12.011)	104.317 (11.654)	35.899 (13.344)
R^2	0.18	0.57	0.67	0.62	0.70	0.76	0.61
χ^2 test	137.74***	105.79***	163.56***	127.26***	183.31***	253.04***	123.73***

Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. We use small-sample adjustment to the estimated covariance of the disturbances. The Breusch-Pagan χ^2 test rejects the null of independence of equations (the disturbance covariance matrix is diagonal) in all cases at the 1% significance level.

Table 5: SUR results for left-wing parties

<i>Variables</i>	Left-wing parties						
	1998	2002	2006	2010	2012	2016	2020
<i>Population density</i>	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.002* (0.001)
<i>Average age</i>	-0.600 (0.637)	0.788 (0.581)	0.660 (0.610)	-0.167 (0.672)	0.064 (0.717)	0.906* (0.466)	0.004 (0.316)
<i>Average nominal monthly income</i>	-0.077** (0.039)	-0.100*** (0.025)	-0.041*** (0.014)	-0.024* (0.013)	-0.020 (0.014)	-0.021** (0.009)	-0.008 (0.005)
<i>Unemployment rate</i>	-0.372* (0.223)	-0.525*** (0.200)	-0.451 (0.317)	0.046 (0.254)	-0.117 (0.241)	-0.197 (0.335)	-0.335 (0.220)
<i>Change in average nominal wage (1 year)</i>	-0.549 (0.504)	-0.477 (0.298)	-0.172 (0.375)	-0.071 (0.205)	0.099 (0.431)	0.056 (0.362)	-0.390** (0.180)
<i>Change in average nominal wage (4 years)</i>	n/a	0.531** (0.245)	0.239 (0.207)	0.283* (0.167)	0.261 (0.241)	0.125 (0.162)	0.215* (0.110)
<i>Change in unemployment rate (1 year)</i>	0.145* (0.083)	0.265 (0.162)	-0.621*** (0.173)	-0.618*** (0.151)	0.605** (0.242)	0.323* (0.180)	-0.106*** (0.026)
<i>Change in unemployment rate (4 year)</i>	n/a	-0.097 (0.078)	0.566*** (0.154)	0.033 (0.038)	-0.124 (0.188)	-0.040 (0.144)	-0.028 (0.046)
<i>Constant</i>	104.034 (24.418)	43.923 (23.174)	56.688 (24.252)	56.033 (27.236)	57.590 (29.942)	18.079 (23.906)	33.632 (15.440)
<i>R²</i>	0.29	0.35	0.36	0.37	0.28	0.30	0.40
<i>χ² test</i>	16.14***	41.98***	44.62***	46.48***	29.98***	33.49***	52.90***

Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. We use small-sample adjustment to the estimated covariance of the disturbances. The Breusch-Pagan χ^2 test rejects the null of independence of equations (the disturbance covariance matrix is diagonal) in all cases at the 1% significance level.

Table 6: SUR results for national and ethnic parties

Variables	National and ethnic parties						
	1998	2002	2006	2010	2012	2016	2020
<i>Population density</i>	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)
<i>Average age</i>	2.045*** (0.749)	2.084** (0.916)	1.563* (0.837)	2.769*** (0.858)	2.419*** (0.944)	1.254* (0.697)	0.523 (0.396)
<i>Average nominal monthly income</i>	0.009 (0.046)	0.022 (0.040)	-0.004 (0.019)	-0.050 (0.016)	-0.012 (0.018)	0.011 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.006)
<i>Unemployment rate</i>	0.370 (0.262)	0.914*** (0.315)	1.302*** (0.434)	0.528 (0.324)	0.563* (0.318)	1.796*** (0.501)	0.715*** (0.276)
<i>Change in average nominal wage (1 year)</i>	-0.409 (0.592)	0.516 (0.470)	-0.044 (0.514)	0.113 (0.262)	-0.614 (0.568)	0.134 (0.542)	0.074 (0.225)
<i>Change in average nominal wage (4 years)</i>	n/a n/a	-0.190 (0.386)	-0.065 (0.284)	-0.142 (0.213)	-0.209 (0.317)	0.094 (0.243)	-0.071 (0.138)
<i>Change in unemployment rate (1 year)</i>	-0.206** (0.098)	-0.455* (0.255)	0.631*** (0.237)	0.849*** (0.193)	-0.484 (0.319)	-0.693*** (0.270)	0.173*** (0.033)
<i>Change in unemployment rate (4 year)</i>	n/a n/a	0.089 (0.123)	-0.877*** (0.211)	-0.005 (0.048)	0.134 (0.248)	-0.064 (0.216)	-0.057 (0.058)
<i>Constant</i>	-55.550 (28.691)	-88.806 (36.520)	-74.332 (33.250)	-79.384 (34.768)	-75.123 (39.440)	-77.301 (35.790)	-22.912 (19.313)
<i>R²</i>	0.23	0.18	0.28	0.28	0.13	0.20	0.33
<i>χ² test</i>	12.89**	17.67**	30.09***	30.92***	11.54	20.27***	39.44***

Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. We use small-sample adjustment to the estimated covariance of the disturbances. The Breusch-Pagan χ^2 test rejects the null of independence of equations (the disturbance covariance matrix is diagonal) in all cases at the 1% significance level.

Table 7: SUR results for ideologically vague parties

Variables	Ideologically vague parties						
	1998	2002	2006	2010	2012	2016	2020
Population	n/a	-0.001	n/a	n/a	0.000	0.000	-0.004**
density	n/a	(0.001)	n/a	n/a	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Average age	n/a	0.039	n/a	n/a	-0.525***	-0.681***	-0.009
	n/a	(0.187)	n/a	n/a	(0.162)	(0.255)	(0.344)
Average nominal monthly income	n/a	-0.004	n/a	n/a	0.005	0.006	0.005
	n/a	(0.008)	n/a	n/a	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Unemployment rate	n/a	-0.156**	n/a	n/a	-0.285***	-0.543***	-0.465*
	n/a	(0.064)	n/a	n/a	(0.054)	(0.183)	(0.240)
Change in average nominal wage (1 year)	n/a	-0.030	n/a	n/a	0.146	-0.005	0.316
	n/a	(0.096)	n/a	n/a	(0.097)	(0.198)	(0.195)
Change in average nominal wage (4 years)	n/a	-0.036	n/a	n/a	-0.013	-0.096	-0.074
	n/a	(0.079)	n/a	n/a	(0.054)	(0.089)	(0.120)
Change in unemployment rate (1 year)	n/a	0.035	n/a	n/a	-0.079	0.226**	-0.092***
	n/a	(0.052)	n/a	n/a	(0.055)	(0.099)	(0.029)
Change in unemployment rate (4 year)	n/a	-0.012	n/a	n/a	-0.042	-0.117	0.060
	n/a	(0.025)	n/a	n/a	(0.042)	(0.079)	(0.050)
Constant	n/a	19.338	n/a	n/a	30.683	54.366	56.110
	n/a	(7.448)	n/a	n/a	(6.749)	(13.099)	(16.807)
R ²	n/a	0.14	n/a	n/a	0.46	0.24	0.19
χ ² test	n/a	12.41	n/a	n/a	68.62***	25.21***	18.85**

Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. We use small-sample adjustment to the estimated covariance of the disturbances. The Breusch-Pagan χ^2 test rejects the null of independence of equations (the disturbance covariance matrix is diagonal) in all cases at the 1% significance level.

We expand our analysis by examining the relationship between the election results of selected political parties. For this purpose, we use a simple correlation analysis (see Figure 2). We find that for elections until 2016, there is a very strong correlation in the results of selected parties in consecutive elections across districts. This trend was disrupted by the elections in 2020. Only in the case of the strongly nationally-oriented political party SMK (later MKO) is a strongly positive correlation found at $r_{16/20} = 0.81$. The remaining strong preferences are also found in the case of the classically right-wing party SaS $r_{16/20} = 0.84$. Such a high positive correlation is not found for other political parties. It follows that in the last elections, there was great volatility in the voter bases across the parties and a decrease in the systemic influence of socioeconomic factors on voter decision-making. If we include in our models the previous election results as a new explanatory variable, the coefficient of determination would be significantly higher (approximately 0.9).




Figure 2: Correlations among consecutive election results. Left panel: selected parties; right panel: ideological blocs

The disruption of the systemic effect of socioeconomic factors on the electoral support of ideological blocs can also be documented based on the correlation across their previous election results. The correlation results within the ideological blocs show a very strong positive correlation until the 2020 elections; this correlation was apparently disrupted by the rise of ideologically vague parties. Electoral support trends in all of the preceding elections (1998-2016) were very similar in all districts. It follows that the change in electoral support has been relatively homogeneous throughout the territory, so any increase or decrease in support was almost uniform across all districts.

The last elections ruptured this trend, and in line with the significantly lower degree of correlation for all ideological groups, we observe territorially heterogeneous voting behavior. It can also be concluded that in the last elections, the emergence of ideologically vague parties did not manifest itself in the same way in all districts. Especially in districts with left-wing support, the electorate shifted toward ideologically vague parties.

6. Concluding remarks

Our research on the case of the Slovak Republic confirms the validity of the hypothesis about the influence of socioeconomic factors on support for ideological groups of political parties. The influence of individual factors is naturally different. For economic variables, a systematic influence of their dynamics is not confirmed. This result can be explained by the fact that voters do not take past events into account when voting. This is one of the reasons why practical politics reflects the efforts of ruling political parties to implement all popular measures at the end of their term of office. Among the selected factors, social variables such as age and population density appear to be more influential than economic ones.

The difference in the influence of these factors also appears across ideological blocs. Economic factors are most significant for support of right-wing parties. It appears that right-wing voters make decisions when choosing a party more on the basis of rational arguments. This rationality of the right-wing election camp is, however, also accompanied by a decline in electoral support for right-wing parties.

It is possible to observe the onset, especially in the last 10 years, of a new phenomenon in the Slovak Republic, namely, a change in the behavior of political parties, both well established and new. They are trying to abandon classical left-right ideological orientations and are beginning to operate in the field of ideological vagueness, whether in populist, antisystem or centrist manifestations. The parties thus try to reflect public opinion, which has no rational basis. Even parties that remain on the left-right spectrum come up with proposals that do not correspond to their ideological focus.

The factor of rationality thus disappears from the political space and creates increasingly more space for the influence of various marketing activities, either within electoral campaigns or within specific political activities. This is increasingly reflected in irrational and inefficient decision-making. The parties are trying to attract the electorate and gain its support for their governance. However, this creates a spiral, as these decisions do not improve quality of life in the long run, and this further leads to voter apathy and frustration. In such a situation, it is naturally easier for parties that base their focus on promises to take swift and "miraculous" actions to penetrate the political space.

As mentioned earlier, the 2020 parliamentary elections in Slovakia could be characterized as a win for populism. Unfortunately, this shift in political orientation towards populism and vagueness not only represents an academic debate but also has severe practical implications, as demonstrated heavily during the Covid-19 pandemic. Despite the overall scientific disagreement, a unique experiment has been conducted in Slovakia – several rounds of a mass testing for SARS-CoV-2 infection at the end of 2020, followed by continuous weekly testing from the beginning of 2021, all based on the rapid serological tests for antibodies, an idea brought to light and implemented by our Prime Minister. People in Slovakia were hit hard by the pandemic after these scientifically ungrounded experiments and without proper actions from the government. As summarized by Medo et al. (2021): “Hospital admissions started to rise two weeks after the second round of mass testing, followed by a steady increase in excess deaths, eventually resulting in overloaded hospitals, a 4-month lockdown from January 2021, and the world’s foremost position in reported deaths per capita in February 2021”. Due to the vague attitude towards the vaccination from our political representatives, both those in the government

and those in the opposition, as of mid November 2021, we are also one of the least vaccinated populations within the EU. Even though the third wave has not yet manifested its full strength at the time this article is finished, we already know it will be unfortunate for all ordinary citizens of Slovakia.

References

- Adams, J., Clark, M., Ezrow, L., & Glasgow, G. (2004). Understanding change and stability in party ideologies: do parties respond to public opinion or to past election results?. *British Journal of Political Science*, 34(4), 589-610.
- Akkerman, T., de Lange, S. L., & Rooduijn, M. (Eds.). (2016). *Radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe: Into the mainstream?* Routledge, New York.
- Alvares, C., & Dahlgren, P. (2016). Populism, extremism and media: Mapping an uncertain terrain. *European Journal of Communication*, 31(1), 46-57.
- Alvarez, R. M., & Nagler, J. (2000). A new approach for modelling strategic voting in multiparty elections. *British Journal of Political Science*, 30(1), 57-75.
- Anderson, C. (1995). *Blaming the Government: Citizens and the Economy in Five European Democracies*. ME Sharpe, Armonk, New York.
- Anderson, C. J. (2000). Economic voting and political context: a comparative perspective. *Electoral Studies*, 19(2-3), 151-170.
- Auberger, A., & Dubois, E. (2005). The influence of local and national economic conditions on French legislative elections. *Public Choice*, 125(3-4), 363-383.
- Bakker Ryan, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Gary Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Anna Vachudova. (2020). "1999 – 2019 Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File." Version 1.2. Available on chesdata.eu.
- Bergh, A., & Kärnä, A. (2021). Globalization and populism in Europe. *Public Choice*, 189(1), 51-70.
- Berman, S. (2019). Populism is a symptom rather than a cause: democratic disconnect, the decline of the center-left, and the rise of populism in western europe. *Polity*, 51(4), 654-667.
- Bermeo, N. (2016). On democratic backsliding. *Journal of Democracy*, 27(1), 5-19.
- Beyens, S., Lucardie, P., & Deschouwer, K. (2016). The life and death of new political parties in the low countries. *West European Politics*, 39(2), 257-277.
- Blais, A. (2000). *To vote or not to vote? The merits and limits of rational-choice theory*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press
- Branton, R. P. (2003). Examining individual-level voting behavior on state ballot propositions. *Political Research Quarterly*, 56(3), 367-377.
- Bútorá, M., & Bútorová, Z. (1999). Eastern Europe a Decade Later: Slovakia's Democratic Awakening. *Journal of Democracy*, 10(1), 80-95.
- Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., & Stokes, D. E. (1980). *The American Voter*. University of Chicago Press.
- Campello, D., & Zucco Jr, C. (2016). Presidential success and the world economy. *The Journal of Politics*, 78(2), 589-602.
- Dassonneville, R., & Lewis-Beck, M. S. (2019). A changing economic vote in Western Europe? Long-term vs. short-term forces. *European Political Science Review*, 11(1), 91-108.
- De Spiegeleire, S., Skinner, C., & Sweijjs, T. (2017). *The rise of populist sovereignism: What it is, where it comes from, and what it means for international security and defense*. The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies.

- Decker, F. (2008). *Germany: right-wing populist failures and left-wing successes*. In *Twenty-First Century Populism*. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 119-134
- Deegan-Krause, K., & Houghton, T. (2012). The 2010 parliamentary elections in Slovakia. *Electoral Studies*, 31(1), 222-225.
- Dimitrova, A. L. (2018). The uncertain road to sustainable democracy: elite coalitions, citizen protests and the prospects of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. *East European Politics*, 34(3), 257-275.
- Downs, A. et. al. (1957): *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York, Harper and Row.
- Dunning, T., Grossman, G., Humphreys, M., Hyde, S. D., McIntosh, C., & Nellis, G. (Eds.). (2019). *Information, accountability, and cumulative learning: Lessons from Metaketa I*. Cambridge University Press.
- Duverger, M., & Landshut, S. (1959). *Die politischen Parteien*. J.B.C. Mohr, Tubingen.
- Elff, M. (2009). Social divisions, party positions, and electoral behaviour. *Electoral Studies*, 28(2), 297-308.
- Evans, G., & De Graaf, N. D. (Eds.). (2013). *Political choice matters: explaining the strength of class and religious cleavages in cross-national perspective*. OUP Oxford.
- Fidrmuc, J. (2000a). Economics of voting in post-communist countries. *Electoral Studies*, 19(2-3), 199-217.
- Fidrmuc, J. (2000b). Political support for reforms: Economics of voting in transition countries. *European Economic Review*, 44(8), 1491-1513.
- Franklin, M. N. (2004). *Voter turnout and the dynamics of electoral competition in established democracies since 1945*. Cambridge University Press.
- Franklin, M. N., Mackie, T. T., & Valen, H. (2009). *Electoral change: Responses to evolving social and attitudinal structures in Western countries*. ECPR Press.
- Fukuyama, F. (1992). *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press.
- Gat, A. (2007). The return of authoritarian great powers. *Foreign Affairs*, 86(4).
- Georgiadou, V. (2013). Right-wing populism and extremism: The rapid rise of “Golden Dawn” in crisis-ridden Greece. In: Melzer, R., Serafin, S. (Eds.): *Right-wing Extremism in Europe*, Berlin 75-102.
- Giddens, A. (1994). *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics*. Stanford, Stanford University Press, California, Barrister&Principal.
- Gifford, R., & Nilsson, A. (2014). Personal and social factors that influence pro-environmental concern and behaviour: A review. *International journal of psychology*, 49(3), 141-157.
- Gill, G. (2003). *Democracy and post-communism: Political change in the post-communist world*. London: Routledge.
- Gunther, R., & Diamond, L. (2003). Species of political parties: A new typology. *Party Politics*, 9(2), 167-199.
- Houghton, T., & Rybář, M. (2008). A change of direction: the 2006 parliamentary elections and party politics in Slovakia. *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 24(2), 232-255.
- Houghton, T., Novotná, T., & Deegan-Krause, K. (2011). The 2010 Czech and Slovak parliamentary elections: red cards to the ‘Winners’. *West European Politics*, 34(2), 394-402.

- Heath, O. (2007). Explaining turnout decline in Britain, 1964–2005: Party identification and the political context. *Political Behavior*, 29(4), 493-516.
- Heinisch, R., & Mazzoleni, O. (2016). *Understanding populist party organisation*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Heinisch, R., Holtz-Bacha, C., & Mazzoleni, O. (Eds.). (2017). Political populism. Nomos eLibrary.
- Hellwig, T. (2010). *Elections and the economy*. In: L. LeDuc, R.G. Niemi, P. Norris (Eds.), *Comparing democracies 3: elections and voting in the 21st century*, Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications, 85–201.
- Hellwig, T., & McAllister, I. (2019). Party positions, Asset ownership, and economic voting. *Political Studies*, 67(4), 912-931.
- Hinnebusch, R. A. (2017). Political parties in MENA: their functions and development. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 44(2), 159-175.
- Huntington, S. P. (1996). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York, Simon & Schuster.
- Janos, A. C. (2000). *East Central Europe in the modern world: the politics of the borderlands from pre-to postcommunism*. Stanford University Press.
- Jaschke, H. G. (2013). Right-wing extremism and populism in contemporary Germany and Western Europe. In *Right-Wing Radicalism Today* (pp. 36-50). Routledge.
- Katz, R.S. (1980). *A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems*. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
- Kayser, M. A., Peress, M. (2012). Benchmarking across borders: electoral accountability and the necessity of comparison. *American Political Science Review*, 106(3), 661-684.
- Knutsen, O. (2008): *Class voting in Western Europe: A comparative longitudinal study*. Lanham, Lexington Books.
- Kramer, G. H. (1983). The ecological fallacy revisited: Aggregate-versus individual-level findings on economics and elections, and sociotropic voting. *American Political Science Review*, 77(1), 92-111.
- Kramer, G. H. (1983). The ecological fallacy revisited: Aggregate-versus individual-level findings on economics and elections, and sociotropic voting. *American Political Science Review*, 77(1), 92-111.
- Lazarsfeld, P. F., Berelson, B., Gaudet, H. (1944). *The People Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign*. New York, Columbia University Press.
- Lewis-Beck, M. S., & Stegmaier, M. (2000). Economic determinants of electoral outcomes. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 3(1), 183-219.
- Lewis-Beck, M. S., & Stegmaier, M. (2013). The VP-function revisited: a survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after over 40 years. *Public Choice*, 157(3-4), 367-385.
- Lijphart, A. (1981). Political parties: ideologies and programs. *Democracy at the Polls: A comparative study of competitive national elections, Washington and London*, 26-51.
- Lipset, S. M., Rokkan, S., Wallerstein, I. M. (1967). *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross – national Perspectives*. New York, Free Press.
- Lopez-Alves, F. (2021). The Undemocratic Future of 21st Century Liberal Democracy. *Academicus International Scientific Journal*, 12(24), 39-59.

- Luce, E. (2017). *The Retreat of Western Liberalism*. New York, Atlantic Monthly Press.
- Lysek, J., Zvada, L., & Škop, M. (2020). Mapping the 2020 Slovak Parliamentary Election: Analysis of Spatial Support and Voter Transition. *Czech Journal of Political Science*, 2020, 27(3), 278-302.
- Mainwaring, S., & Bizzarro, F. (2019). The fates of third-wave democracies. *Journal of Democracy*, 30(1), 99-113.
- Martins, R., & Veiga, F. J. (2013). Economic voting in Portuguese municipal elections. *Public Choice*, 155(3), 317-334.
- Mattozzi, A., Morelli, M. and Nakaguma, M.Y. (2020). "Populism and Wars." CEPR, Discussion Paper No. DP14501
- McFaul, M. (2005). Transitions from postcommunism. *Journal of Democracy*, 16(3), 5-19.
- Medo, M., Suster, M., Bodova, K., Brazinova, A., Brejova, B., Kollar, R., ... & Vinar, T. (2021). Technical comment on The impact of population-wide rapid antigen testing on SARS-CoV-2 prevalence in Slovakia. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2105.13633*.
- Meijers, M. J., Zaslove, A. (2021). Measuring populism in political parties: Appraisal of a new approach. *Comparative Political Studies*, 54(2), 372-407.
- Mikuš, D., Bardovič, P. J., Onufrák, M. A., & Šramel, J. B. (2018). *Pohľady politických strán na verejnú správu*. Trnava, FSV UCM.
- Mounk, Y. (2018). *The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It*. Harvard University Press.
- Mudde, C. (Ed.). (2016). *The populist radical right: A reader*. Taylor & Francis, New York.
- Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2010). Twenty years of postcommunism: the other transition. *Journal of Democracy*, 21(1), 120-127.
- Nguyen, T. H. A., Laurent, T., Thomas-Agnan, C., & Ruiz-Gazen, A. (2020). Analyzing the impacts of socio-economic factors on French departmental elections with CoDa methods. *Journal of Applied Statistics*, 1-17.
- Norpoth, A. (1996). *The Economy*, In: Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, Pippa Norris (eds.), *Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective*.
- Norris, P. (2020). Measuring populism worldwide. *Party Politics*, 26(6), 697-717.
- Öniş, Z. (2017). The age of anxiety: the crisis of liberal democracy in a post-hegemonic global order. *The International Spectator*, 52(3), 18-35.
- Outhwaite, W., & Ray, L. (2008). *Social theory and postcommunism*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Packard, J., & Ferguson, T. W. (2019). Being done: Why people leave the church, but not their faith. *Sociological Perspectives*, 62(4), 499-517.
- Painter, A. (2013). *Democratic stress, the populist signal and extremist threat*. London, Policy network.
- Paldam, M. (1991). How robust is the vote function? A study of seventeen nations over four decades. *Economics and politics: the calculus of support*, 9-31.
- Paldam, M. (2004). Are vote and popularity functions economically correct?. In *The encyclopedia of public choice* (pp. 49-59). Springer, Boston, MA.
- Park, B. B., Frantzeskakis, N., & Shin, J. (2019). Who is responsible? The effect of clarity of responsibility on voter turnout. *West European Politics*, 42(3), 464-494.
- Polk Jonathan, Jan Rovny, Ryan Bakker, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Jelle Koedam, Filip Kostelka, Gary Marks, Gijs Schumacher, Marco Steenbergen, Milada Anna

- Vachudova and Marko Zilovic. (2017). "Explaining the salience of anti-elitism and reducing political corruption for political parties in Europe with the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey data," *Research & Politics*, 4(1).
- Popper, K. R. (1999). *All Life is Problem Solving*. East Sussex, Psychology Press.
- Potrafke, N. (2017). Partisan politics: The empirical evidence from OECD panel studies. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 45(4), 712-750.
- Rasulova, N. S. (2020). The process of forming political parties (historical analysis). *Asian Journal of Multidimensional Research*, 9(1), 5-11.
- Rose, R. (1994). Rethinking civil society: Postcommunism and the problem of trust. *Journal of Democracy*, 5(3), 18-30.
- Russo, L. (2017). The use of aggregate data in the study of voting behavior: ecological inference, ecological fallacy and other applications. In *The Routledge Handbook of Elections, Voting Behavior and Public Opinion* (pp. 484-495). Routledge.
- Ryan Bakker, Catherine de Vries, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Gary Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Anna Vachudova. 2015. Measuring party positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill expert survey trend file, 1999-2010. *Party Politics*, 21(1), 143-152.
- Rybář, M., & Spáč, P. (2017). The March 2016 parliamentary elections in Slovakia: A political earthquake. *Electoral Studies*, 45, 153-156.
- Sartori, G. (1976). *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, Volume 1*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Reprinted as an ÉCPR Classic in 2005.
- Smets, K. (2016). Revisiting the political life-cycle model: later maturation and turnout decline among young adults. *European Political Science Review*, 8(2), 225-249.
- Smith, K. B. (2005). Typologies, taxonomies, and the benefits of policy classification. *Policy Studies Journal*, 30(3), 379-395.
- Soros, G. (2007). *The Age of Fallibility: Consequences of the War on Terror*. New York, Public Affairs.
- Spies, D. (2013). Explaining working-class support for extreme right parties: A party competition approach. *Acta Politica*, 48(3), 296-325.
- Stavrakakis, Y., & Katsambekis, G. (2014). Left-wing populism in the European periphery: the case of SYRIZA. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 19(2), 119-142.
- Stevenson, R. T., & Duch, R. (2013). The meaning and use of subjective perceptions in studies of economic voting. *Electoral Studies*, 32(2), 305-320.
- Taggart, P. (2002). Populism and the pathology of representative politics. In *Democracies and the populist challenge* (pp. 62-80). Palgrave Macmillan, London.
- Thomassen, J. et al. (2005). *The European voter: a comparative study of modern democracies*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Tucker, J. A., Tucker, J. L. & Martin, R. A. (2006). *Regional Economic Voting: Russia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, 1990-1999*. Princeton, Cambridge University Press.
- Vachudova, M. A. (2015). External actors and regime change: How post-communism transformed comparative politics. *East European Politics and Societies*, 29(02), 519-530.
- Von Fintel, M., Ott, G. (2017). Political Culture and Participation in South Africa: The Role of Socio-Economic Factors. *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*, 13(1).

- Walter, S. (2020). The mass politics of international disintegration. CIS Working Paper, (105).
- Weber, M. (1958). Politics as a Vocation, in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, New York, Oxford University Press.
- Weyland, K. (2017). *A political-strategic approach*. In C. R. Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. Espejo, & P. Ostiguy (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of populism* (pp. 48–73). Oxford University Press.
- Zakaria, F. (2007). *The Future of Freedom. Illiberal democracy at Home and Abroad*. W.W.Norton Company.
- Zvada, L. (2018). Securitization of the Migration Crisis and Islamophobic Rhetoric: The 2016 Slovak Parliamentary Elections as a Case Study. *Journal of Nationalism, Memory & Language Politics*, 12(2), 216-235.

APPENDIX

Table A.1: Classification of political parties into ideological blocs and the corresponding Chapel Hill values

	1998	2002	2006	2010	2012	2016	2020
HZDS	lp n/a	lp 4.38;4.17	lp 5.54; 4.46	lp 5.00;4.43			
HZD		lp 4.23; 3.91					
SOP	lp n/a						
SDE	lp n/a						
SMER		ivp 3.54; 3.75	lp 3.08; 2.36	lp 3.36; 2.23	lp 3.69; 2.57	lp 3.69; 2.57	lp 4.25; 3.5
DV							ivp n/a
KSS		lp 0.64; 0.67	lp 0.54; 0.50				
SMK	nap n/a	nap 6.57; 5.67	nap 6.08; 6.00	nap 5.92; 5.69	nap 6.77; 5.71	nap 6.77; 5.71	
MKO							nap n/a
MOST				nap 6.08; 6.29	nap 6.21; 6.36	nap 6.21; 6.36	
SNS	nap n/a	nap 8.29; 3.67	nap 8.31; 5.00	nap 7.85; 4.27	nap 8.36; 4.77	nap 8.36; 4.77	nap 7.43; 4.44
PSNS		nap 8.50; 3.75					
ESNS						ivp n/a	ivp 9.31; 3.94
SDK	rp n/a						
SDKÚ-DS		rp 7.07; 7.25	rp 7.31; 8.29	rp 6.64; 7.57	rp 6.86; 7.56		
KDH		rp 7.64; 7.08	rp 7.15; 6.79	rp 6.83; 6.29	rp 6.93; 6.00	rp 6.93; 6.00	rp 6.63; 6.19
SF			rp 5.46; 6.58				
ANO		rp 6.71; 7.5					
SaS				rp 6.79; 8.36	rp 7.29; 8.57	rp 7.29; 8.57	rp 7.00; 8.13
Sme Rodina						ivp n/a	ivp 7.13; 4.86
Sieť						rp 7.08; 7.17	-
OLaNO					ivp 6.50; 6.55	ivp 6.50; 6.55	ivp 6.57; 6.00
Za Ľudí							ivp 6.00; 6.63
PS-Spolu							rp 3.8-5.3; 5-6.1

Notes: “rp” stands for right-wing parties, “lp” for left-wing parties, “nap” for national and ethnic parties and “ivp” for ideologically vague parties. Note that the Chapel Hill values presented in this table are from 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014, and 2019. The parties are assessed on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 expresses the extreme left-wing position and 10 expresses the extreme right-wing position of the party. The evaluation variables used in our research are (in this order) LRGEN, which expresses the general ideological orientation of the party, and LRECON, which represents the economic orientation of the party. The Chapel Hill values for the PS-Spolu coalition are presented for both parties (the first number is for PS and the second one for Spolu).

Online supplementary material

Table S.1: Elections 1998 – results for individual parties

Equation	Obs	R ²	χ^2	p-value					
hzds98	79	0.29	32.50	0.00					
smk98	79	0.18	17.67	0.01					
sop98	79	0.23	23.64	0.00					
sdk98	79	0.64	137.74	0.00					
sns98	79	0.24	25.47	0.00					
sdl98	79	0.07	5.82	0.44					
	Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value		Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value
hzds98					sdk98				
<i>d98</i>	-0.001	0.002	-0.490	0.626	<i>d98</i>	0.004	0.001	2.890	0.004
<i>aa98</i>	-0.246	0.566	-0.430	0.664	<i>aa98</i>	-1.706	0.357	-4.790	0.000
<i>anw98</i>	-0.129	0.035	-3.690	0.000	<i>anw98</i>	0.090	0.022	4.120	0.000
<i>ur98</i>	-0.729	0.198	-3.680	0.000	<i>ur98</i>	-0.153	0.125	-1.220	0.221
<i>chl</i> <i>anw98</i>	-0.255	0.448	-0.570	0.569	<i>chl</i> <i>anw98</i>	0.957	0.282	3.390	0.001
<i>chl</i> <i>ur98</i>	0.115	0.074	1.550	0.121	<i>chl</i> <i>ur98</i>	0.054	0.046	1.160	0.245
<i>_cons</i>	88.976	21.693	4.100	0.000	<i>_cons</i>	49.935	13.664	3.650	0.000
smk98					sns98				
<i>d98</i>	-0.002	0.003	-0.630	0.528	<i>d98</i>	-0.001	0.001	-1.140	0.253
<i>aa98</i>	2.314	0.817	2.830	0.005	<i>aa98</i>	-0.270	0.255	-1.060	0.291
<i>anw98</i>	0.039	0.050	0.770	0.439	<i>anw98</i>	-0.030	0.016	-1.930	0.053
<i>ur98</i>	0.757	0.286	2.650	0.008	<i>ur98</i>	-0.387	0.089	-4.330	0.000
<i>chl</i> <i>anw98</i>	-0.335	0.647	-0.520	0.604	<i>chl</i> <i>anw98</i>	-0.074	0.202	-0.370	0.714
<i>chl</i> <i>ur98</i>	-0.255	0.107	-2.390	0.017	<i>chl</i> <i>ur98</i>	0.049	0.033	1.460	0.144
<i>_cons</i>	-89.792	31.327	-2.870	0.004	<i>_cons</i>	34.242	9.787	3.500	0.000
sop98					sdl98				
<i>d98</i>	0.002	0.001	1.590	0.111	<i>d98</i>	-0.001	0.001	-1.320	0.187
<i>aa98</i>	-0.733	0.289	-2.540	0.011	<i>aa98</i>	0.378	0.253	1.490	0.135
<i>anw98</i>	0.036	0.018	2.050	0.041	<i>anw98</i>	0.015	0.016	0.990	0.324
<i>ur98</i>	0.309	0.101	3.060	0.002	<i>ur98</i>	0.047	0.089	0.540	0.592
<i>chl</i> <i>anw98</i>	-0.142	0.229	-0.620	0.535	<i>chl</i> <i>anw98</i>	-0.152	0.200	-0.760	0.447
<i>chl</i> <i>ur98</i>	0.007	0.038	0.180	0.856	<i>chl</i> <i>ur98</i>	0.023	0.033	0.700	0.481
<i>_cons</i>	18.215	11.071	1.650	0.100	<i>_cons</i>	-3.157	9.707	-0.330	0.745

Breusch-Pagan test of independence $\chi^2(15) = 181.331$, p-value = 0

Table S.2: Elections 1998 – results for parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties

Equation	Obs	R ²	χ ²	p-value					
p98	79	0.13	12.05	0.06					
np98	79	0.11	9.85	0.13					
	Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value		Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value
parliamentary					non-parliamentary				
<i>d98</i>	0.000	0.002	-0.110	0.912	<i>d98</i>	0.001	0.002	0.300	0.764
<i>aa98</i>	0.093	0.491	0.190	0.850	<i>aa98</i>	-0.355	0.422	-0.840	0.401
<i>anw98</i>	-0.030	0.030	-0.980	0.326	<i>anw98</i>	0.052	0.026	1.990	0.046
<i>ur98</i>	-0.511	0.172	-2.980	0.003	<i>ur98</i>	0.356	0.148	2.410	0.016
<i>chl_{anw}98</i>	0.292	0.389	0.750	0.452	<i>chl_{anw}98</i>	-0.294	0.334	-0.880	0.378
<i>chl_{ur}98</i>	-0.038	0.064	-0.590	0.558	<i>chl_{ur}98</i>	0.030	0.055	0.550	0.584
<i>_cons</i>	83.361	18.817	4.430	0.000	<i>_cons</i>	15.058	16.182	0.930	0.352

Breusch-Pagan test of independence chi2 (1) = 72.723, Pr. = 0

Table S.3: Elections 1998 – results for government and non-government parties

Equation	Obs	R ²	χ ²	p-value					
p98	79	0.29	32.54	0.00					
np98	79	0.30	34.36	0.00					
	Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value		Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value
government					non-government				
<i>d98</i>	-0.002	0.003	-0.740	0.459	<i>d98</i>	0.003	0.003	0.790	0.427
<i>aa98</i>	-0.515	0.766	-0.670	0.501	<i>aa98</i>	0.254	0.806	0.310	0.753
<i>anw98</i>	-0.159	0.047	-3.370	0.001	<i>anw98</i>	0.181	0.050	3.650	0.000
<i>ur98</i>	-1.115	0.268	-4.160	0.000	<i>ur98</i>	0.960	0.282	3.410	0.001
<i>chl_{anw}98</i>	-0.329	0.606	-0.540	0.587	<i>chl_{anw}98</i>	0.327	0.638	0.510	0.608
<i>chl_{ur}98</i>	0.163	0.100	1.630	0.102	<i>chl_{ur}98</i>	-0.171	0.105	-1.620	0.104
<i>_cons</i>	123.218	29.358	4.200	0.000	<i>_cons</i>	-24.799	30.884	-0.800	0.422

Breusch-Pagan test of independence chi2 (1) = 76.467, Pr. = 0

Table S.4: Elections 1998 – correlations among the parties' election results

	hzds98	smk98	sop98	sdk98	sns98	sdl98
hzds98	1.00					
smk98	-0.61	1.00				
sop98	-0.36	-0.13	1.00			
sdk98	-0.46	-0.24	0.21	1.00		
sns98	0.73	-0.47	-0.47	-0.29	1.00	
sdl98	-0.01	-0.46	0.13	0.12	-0.06	1.00

Table S.5: Elections 1998 – correlations among the ideological blocks' election results

	lp98	rp98	nap98
lp98	1.00		
rp98	-0.30	1.00	
nap98	-0.75	-0.38	1.00

Table S.6: Elections 2002 – results for individual parties

Equation	Obs	R ²	χ^2	p-value					
sdku02	79	0.75	232.44	0.00					
smer02	79	0.14	12.41	0.13					
hzds02	79	0.33	38.68	0.00					
hzd02	79	0.11	9.67	0.29					
kss02	79	0.31	36.19	0.00					
smk02	79	0.21	21.53	0.01					
kdh02	79	0.41	55.96	0.00					
ano02	79	0.27	29.00	0.00					
sns02	79	0.28	31.47	0.00					
psns02	79	0.18	17.84	0.02					
	Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value		Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value
sdku02					smer02				
<i>d02</i>	0.004	0.001	3.300	0.001	<i>d02</i>	-0.001	0.001	-1.550	0.121
<i>aa02</i>	-0.648	0.270	-2.400	0.017	<i>aa02</i>	0.039	0.187	0.210	0.836
<i>anw02</i>	0.067	0.012	5.710	0.000	<i>anw02</i>	-0.004	0.008	-0.490	0.621
<i>ur02</i>	-0.263	0.093	-2.820	0.005	<i>ur02</i>	-0.156	0.064	-2.420	0.016
<i>ch1anw02</i>	0.102	0.139	0.730	0.464	<i>ch1anw02</i>	-0.030	0.096	-0.310	0.754
<i>ch4anw02</i>	-0.261	0.114	-2.290	0.022	<i>ch4anw02</i>	-0.036	0.079	-0.460	0.647
<i>ch1ur02</i>	0.102	0.075	1.360	0.175	<i>ch1ur02</i>	0.035	0.052	0.680	0.500
<i>ch4ur02</i>	-0.012	0.036	-0.340	0.736	<i>ch4ur02</i>	-0.012	0.025	-0.490	0.627
<i>_cons</i>	22.427	10.783	2.080	0.038	<i>_cons</i>	19.338	7.448	2.600	0.009
hzds02					hzd02				
<i>d02</i>	-0.001	0.002	-0.580	0.562	<i>d02</i>	0.000	0.001	0.010	0.992
<i>aa02</i>	0.137	0.476	0.290	0.773	<i>aa02</i>	0.182	0.157	1.160	0.247
<i>anw02</i>	-0.074	0.021	-3.570	0.000	<i>anw02</i>	-0.015	0.007	-2.180	0.029
<i>ur02</i>	-0.586	0.164	-3.570	0.000	<i>ur02</i>	-0.066	0.054	-1.230	0.219
<i>ch1anw02</i>	-0.357	0.244	-1.460	0.144	<i>ch1anw02</i>	-0.005	0.080	-0.060	0.951
<i>ch4anw02</i>	0.400	0.201	1.990	0.046	<i>ch4anw02</i>	0.137	0.066	2.070	0.039
<i>ch1ur02</i>	0.142	0.132	1.070	0.283	<i>ch1ur02</i>	0.005	0.044	0.120	0.906
<i>ch4ur02</i>	-0.035	0.064	-0.550	0.586	<i>ch4ur02</i>	-0.006	0.021	-0.300	0.767
<i>_cons</i>	48.718	18.991	2.570	0.010	<i>_cons</i>	-0.478	6.252	-0.080	0.939
kss02					smk02				
<i>d02</i>	0.000	0.001	-0.150	0.881	<i>d02</i>	-0.003	0.004	-0.780	0.437
<i>aa02</i>	0.469	0.211	2.220	0.026	<i>aa02</i>	2.184	0.975	2.240	0.025
<i>anw02</i>	-0.011	0.009	-1.240	0.215	<i>anw02</i>	0.044	0.042	1.040	0.299
<i>ur02</i>	0.128	0.073	1.760	0.079	<i>ur02</i>	1.104	0.336	3.290	0.001
<i>ch1anw02</i>	-0.115	0.108	-1.070	0.287	<i>ch1anw02</i>	0.716	0.500	1.430	0.152
<i>ch4anw02</i>	-0.006	0.089	-0.060	0.949	<i>ch4anw02</i>	-0.421	0.411	-1.020	0.306
<i>ch1ur02</i>	0.118	0.059	2.010	0.044	<i>ch1ur02</i>	-0.522	0.271	-1.920	0.054
<i>ch4ur02</i>	-0.056	0.028	-2.000	0.046	<i>ch4ur02</i>	0.079	0.131	0.600	0.547
<i>_cons</i>	-4.316	8.406	-0.510	0.608	<i>_cons</i>	-106.571	38.868	-2.740	0.006
kdh02					ano02				
<i>d02</i>	0.002	0.001	1.660	0.098	<i>d02</i>	0.000	0.001	0.040	0.967

<i>aa02</i>	-1.534	0.238	-6.440	0.000	<i>aa02</i>	-0.515	0.166	-3.100	0.002
<i>anw02</i>	-0.007	0.010	-0.700	0.484	<i>anw02</i>	0.018	0.007	2.550	0.011
<i>ur02</i>	-0.150	0.082	-1.830	0.067	<i>ur02</i>	0.090	0.057	1.580	0.114
<i>ch1anw02</i>	-0.042	0.122	-0.340	0.731	<i>ch1anw02</i>	-0.032	0.085	-0.370	0.708
<i>ch4anw02</i>	0.106	0.100	1.050	0.293	<i>ch4anw02</i>	-0.128	0.070	-1.830	0.068
<i>ch1ur02</i>	-0.002	0.066	-0.030	0.980	<i>ch1ur02</i>	-0.017	0.046	-0.360	0.721
<i>ch4ur02</i>	0.004	0.032	0.130	0.901	<i>ch4ur02</i>	0.052	0.022	2.340	0.020
<i>_cons</i>	66.601	9.503	7.010	0.000	<i>_cons</i>	21.804	6.623	3.290	0.001
sns02					psns02				
<i>d02</i>	0.000	0.000	-0.450	0.651	<i>d02</i>	0.000	0.001	0.070	0.944
<i>aa02</i>	0.192	0.091	2.120	0.034	<i>aa02</i>	-0.292	0.164	-1.790	0.074
<i>anw02</i>	-0.012	0.004	-3.100	0.002	<i>anw02</i>	-0.010	0.007	-1.410	0.158
<i>ur02</i>	-0.101	0.031	-3.230	0.001	<i>ur02</i>	-0.089	0.056	-1.580	0.115
<i>ch1anw02</i>	-0.025	0.047	-0.540	0.587	<i>ch1anw02</i>	-0.174	0.084	-2.070	0.038
<i>ch4anw02</i>	0.107	0.038	2.790	0.005	<i>ch4anw02</i>	0.124	0.069	1.800	0.073
<i>ch1ur02</i>	-0.002	0.025	-0.060	0.951	<i>ch1ur02</i>	0.068	0.045	1.500	0.134
<i>ch4ur02</i>	0.016	0.012	1.280	0.200	<i>ch4ur02</i>	-0.005	0.022	-0.240	0.810
<i>_cons</i>	-0.316	3.623	-0.090	0.931	<i>_cons</i>	18.081	6.520	2.770	0.006

Breusch-Pagan test of independence $\chi^2(45) = 396.858$, Pr. = 0

Table S.7: Elections 2002 – results for parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties

Equation	Obs	R ²	χ^2	p-value					
p02	79.00	0.20	20.12	0.01					
np02	79.00	0.20	20.11	0.01					
	Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value		Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value
parliamentary					non-parliamentary				
<i>d02</i>	-0.001	0.003	-0.280	0.781	<i>d02</i>	0.000	0.002	0.160	0.872
<i>aa02</i>	1.866	0.660	2.830	0.005	<i>aa02</i>	-1.652	0.582	-2.840	0.005
<i>anw02</i>	0.025	0.029	0.870	0.383	<i>anw02</i>	-0.029	0.025	-1.150	0.250
<i>ur02</i>	0.154	0.227	0.680	0.497	<i>ur02</i>	-0.243	0.200	-1.210	0.225
<i>ch1anw02</i>	0.435	0.339	1.280	0.199	<i>ch1anw02</i>	-0.398	0.299	-1.330	0.182
<i>ch4anw02</i>	-0.175	0.278	-0.630	0.530	<i>ch4anw02</i>	0.196	0.245	0.800	0.423
<i>ch1ur02</i>	-0.279	0.184	-1.520	0.129	<i>ch1ur02</i>	0.208	0.162	1.290	0.199
<i>ch4ur02</i>	0.047	0.088	0.530	0.593	<i>ch4ur02</i>	-0.024	0.078	-0.310	0.757
<i>_cons</i>	-35.743	26.321	-1.360	0.174	<i>_cons</i>	121.029	23.195	5.220	0.000

Breusch-Pagan test of independence $\chi^2(1) = 73.003$, Pr. = 0

Table S.8: Elections 2002 – results for government and non-government parties

Equation	Obs	R ²	χ^2	p-value					
p02	79	0.26	28.05	0.00					
np02	79	0.29	31.50	0.00					
	Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value		Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value
government					non-government				
<i>d02</i>	0.002	0.004	0.610	0.543	<i>d02</i>	-0.003	0.003	-0.750	0.451
<i>aa02</i>	0.002	0.867	0.000	0.998	<i>aa02</i>	0.212	0.820	0.260	0.796
<i>anw02</i>	0.104	0.038	2.760	0.006	<i>anw02</i>	-0.108	0.036	-3.030	0.002
<i>ur02</i>	0.691	0.299	2.310	0.021	<i>ur02</i>	-0.780	0.282	-2.760	0.006
<i>ch1anw02</i>	0.775	0.445	1.740	0.082	<i>ch1anw02</i>	-0.739	0.421	-1.760	0.079
<i>ch4anw02</i>	-0.576	0.366	-1.570	0.115	<i>ch4anw02</i>	0.598	0.346	1.730	0.084
<i>ch1ur02</i>	-0.421	0.241	-1.750	0.081	<i>ch1ur02</i>	0.350	0.228	1.540	0.124
<i>ch4ur02</i>	0.070	0.116	0.610	0.545	<i>ch4ur02</i>	-0.047	0.110	-0.430	0.666
<i>_cons</i>	-17.544	34.586	-0.510	0.612	<i>_cons</i>	102.830	32.693	3.150	0.002

Breusch-Pagan test of independence $\chi^2(1) = 76.467$, Pr. = 0

Table S.9: Elections 2002 – correlations among the parties' election results

	sdku02	smer02	hzds02	hzd02	kss02	smk02	kdh02	ano02	sns02	psns02
sdku02	1.00									
smer02	0.03	1.00								
hzds02	-0.44	0.48	1.00							
hzd02	-0.18	0.13	0.28	1.00						
kss02	-0.29	0.44	0.09	0.09	1.00					
smk02	-0.19	-0.73	-0.59	-0.30	-0.32	1.00				
kdh02	0.06	0.18	0.28	0.10	-0.08	-0.54	1.00			
ano02	0.32	0.13	-0.38	-0.22	0.31	-0.24	0.02	1.00		
sns02	-0.18	0.37	0.64	0.45	-0.12	-0.43	0.20	-0.33	1.00	
psns02	-0.24	0.01	0.46	0.19	-0.06	-0.32	0.10	-0.04	0.09	1.00

Table S.10: Elections 2002 – correlations among the ideological blocks' election results

	lp02	rp02	nap02	ivp02
lp02	1.00			
rp02	-0.35	1.00		
nap02	-0.59	-0.52	1.00	
ivp02	0.57	0.14	-0.75	1.00

Table S.11: Elections 2006 – results for individual parties

Equation	Obs	R ²	χ^2	p-value					
kdh06	79.00	0.50	78.39	0.00					
smk06	79.00	0.33	39.05	0.00					
sf06	79.00	0.64	138.60	0.00					
hzds06	79.00	0.41	55.84	0.00					
kss06	79.00	0.45	65.14	0.00					
sdku06	79.00	0.72	198.26	0.00					
smer06	79.00	0.31	34.84	0.00					
sns06	79.00	0.34	40.35	0.00					
	Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value		Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value
kdh06					smk06				
<i>d06</i>	0.002	0.001	2.230	0.026	<i>d06</i>	-0.005	0.004	-1.320	0.188
<i>aa06</i>	-1.791	0.219	-8.190	0.000	<i>aa06</i>	1.825	0.925	1.970	0.049
<i>anw06</i>	0.003	0.005	0.540	0.586	<i>anw06</i>	0.005	0.021	0.230	0.815
<i>ur06</i>	-0.246	0.113	-2.170	0.030	<i>ur06</i>	1.617	0.480	3.370	0.001
<i>ch1anw06</i>	0.272	0.134	2.020	0.043	<i>ch1anw06</i>	0.062	0.568	0.110	0.913
<i>ch4anw06</i>	-0.113	0.074	-1.520	0.130	<i>ch4anw06</i>	-0.237	0.314	-0.750	0.451
<i>ch1ur06</i>	-0.115	0.062	-1.860	0.063	<i>ch1ur06</i>	0.938	0.262	3.580	0.000
<i>ch4ur06</i>	0.046	0.055	0.840	0.401	<i>ch4ur06</i>	-1.107	0.234	-4.740	0.000
<i>_cons</i>	78.595	8.684	9.050	0.000	<i>_cons</i>	-104.709	36.758	-2.850	0.004
sf06					hzds06				
<i>d06</i>	0.001	0.000	2.330	0.020	<i>d06</i>	0.000	0.001	-0.470	0.640
<i>aa06</i>	-0.033	0.054	-0.610	0.542	<i>aa06</i>	-0.099	0.169	-0.580	0.559
<i>anw06</i>	0.006	0.001	4.790	0.000	<i>anw06</i>	-0.008	0.004	-2.060	0.039
<i>ur06</i>	-0.090	0.028	-3.250	0.001	<i>ur06</i>	-0.239	0.088	-2.710	0.007
<i>ch1anw06</i>	0.001	0.033	0.030	0.978	<i>ch1anw06</i>	0.142	0.104	1.360	0.174
<i>ch4anw06</i>	-0.028	0.018	-1.550	0.120	<i>ch4anw06</i>	0.086	0.058	1.500	0.134
<i>ch1ur06</i>	-0.005	0.015	-0.330	0.743	<i>ch1ur06</i>	-0.193	0.048	-4.030	0.000
<i>ch4ur06</i>	0.043	0.014	3.190	0.001	<i>ch4ur06</i>	0.128	0.043	2.990	0.003
<i>_cons</i>	4.870	2.129	2.290	0.022	<i>_cons</i>	18.167	6.733	2.700	0.007
kss06					sdku06				
<i>d06</i>	0.000	0.000	-0.710	0.478	<i>d06</i>	0.003	0.001	2.690	0.007
<i>aa06</i>	0.419	0.078	5.390	0.000	<i>aa06</i>	-0.468	0.302	-1.550	0.121
<i>anw06</i>	-0.005	0.002	-2.730	0.006	<i>anw06</i>	0.038	0.007	5.430	0.000
<i>ur06</i>	-0.016	0.040	-0.400	0.691	<i>ur06</i>	-0.582	0.156	-3.720	0.000
<i>ch1anw06</i>	-0.102	0.048	-2.150	0.032	<i>ch1anw06</i>	0.042	0.185	0.230	0.819
<i>ch4anw06</i>	0.034	0.026	1.280	0.201	<i>ch4anw06</i>	-0.079	0.103	-0.770	0.443
<i>ch1ur06</i>	-0.059	0.022	-2.670	0.008	<i>ch1ur06</i>	0.120	0.085	1.400	0.161
<i>ch4ur06</i>	0.090	0.020	4.590	0.000	<i>ch4ur06</i>	0.166	0.076	2.180	0.029
<i>_cons</i>	-5.554	3.084	-1.800	0.072	<i>_cons</i>	30.313	11.987	2.530	0.011
smer06					sns06				
<i>d06</i>	0.000	0.002	0.100	0.924	<i>d06</i>	-0.001	0.001	-0.550	0.584
<i>aa06</i>	0.340	0.458	0.740	0.458	<i>aa06</i>	-0.262	0.274	-0.960	0.339
<i>anw06</i>	-0.028	0.011	-2.700	0.007	<i>anw06</i>	-0.009	0.006	-1.410	0.158

<i>ur06</i>	-0.196	0.238	-0.830	0.408	<i>ur06</i>	-0.314	0.142	-2.210	0.027
<i>ch1anw06</i>	-0.212	0.281	-0.750	0.452	<i>ch1anw06</i>	-0.106	0.168	-0.630	0.528
<i>ch4anw06</i>	0.119	0.156	0.760	0.446	<i>ch4anw06</i>	0.172	0.093	1.850	0.065
<i>ch1ur06</i>	-0.369	0.130	-2.840	0.004	<i>ch1ur06</i>	-0.307	0.077	-3.960	0.000
<i>ch4ur06</i>	0.348	0.116	3.010	0.003	<i>ch4ur06</i>	0.230	0.069	3.330	0.001
<i>_cons</i>	44.076	18.212	2.420	0.016	<i>_cons</i>	30.378	10.877	2.790	0.005

Breusch-Pagan test of independence $\chi^2(28) = 371.337$, Pr. = 0

Table S.12: Elections 2006 – results for parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties

Equation	Obs	R ²	χ^2	p-value					
p06	79.00	0.32	36.60	0.00					
np06	79.00	0.32	37.84	0.00					
	Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value		Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value
parliamentary					non-parliamentary				
<i>d06</i>	0.000	0.001	-0.030	0.977	<i>d06</i>	0.000	0.001	-0.090	0.929
<i>aa06</i>	0.227	0.283	0.800	0.423	<i>aa06</i>	-0.295	0.278	-1.060	0.289
<i>anw06</i>	0.004	0.007	0.620	0.536	<i>anw06</i>	-0.003	0.006	-0.470	0.640
<i>ur06</i>	0.338	0.147	2.300	0.021	<i>ur06</i>	-0.405	0.144	-2.810	0.005
<i>ch1anw06</i>	0.204	0.174	1.170	0.242	<i>ch1anw06</i>	-0.105	0.171	-0.620	0.538
<i>ch4anw06</i>	-0.189	0.096	-1.970	0.049	<i>ch4anw06</i>	0.143	0.094	1.520	0.129
<i>ch1ur06</i>	0.322	0.080	4.010	0.000	<i>ch1ur06</i>	-0.312	0.079	-3.960	0.000
<i>ch4ur06</i>	-0.328	0.071	-4.590	0.000	<i>ch4ur06</i>	0.273	0.070	3.890	0.000
<i>_cons</i>	60.887	11.250	5.410	0.000	<i>_cons</i>	35.248	11.042	3.190	0.001

Breusch-Pagan test of independence $\chi^2(1) = 67.960$, Pr. = 0

Table S.13: Elections 2006 – results for government and non-government parties

Equation	Obs	R ²	χ^2	p-value					
gp06	79	0.41	54.84	0.00					
ngp06	79	0.41	54.58	0.00					
	Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value		Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value
government					non-government				
<i>d06</i>	0.001	0.003	0.270	0.789	<i>d06</i>	-0.001	0.003	-0.320	0.751
<i>aa06</i>	-0.466	0.775	-0.600	0.548	<i>aa06</i>	0.398	0.757	0.530	0.599
<i>anw06</i>	0.051	0.018	2.880	0.004	<i>anw06</i>	-0.050	0.017	-2.890	0.004
<i>ur06</i>	0.699	0.402	1.740	0.082	<i>ur06</i>	-0.766	0.392	-1.950	0.051
<i>ch1anw06</i>	0.377	0.476	0.790	0.428	<i>ch1anw06</i>	-0.279	0.465	-0.600	0.549
<i>ch4anw06</i>	-0.456	0.263	-1.730	0.083	<i>ch4anw06</i>	0.410	0.257	1.600	0.110
<i>ch1ur06</i>	0.938	0.219	4.270	0.000	<i>ch1ur06</i>	-0.928	0.214	-4.330	0.000
<i>ch4ur06</i>	-0.851	0.196	-4.350	0.000	<i>ch4ur06</i>	0.796	0.191	4.160	0.000
<i>_cons</i>	9.069	30.789	0.290	0.768	<i>_cons</i>	87.066	30.069	2.900	0.004

Breusch-Pagan test of independence $\chi^2(1) = 77.511$, Pr. = 0

Table S.14: Elections 2006 – correlations among the parties' election results

	kdh06	smk06	sf06	hzds06	kss06	sdku06	smer06	sns06
kdh06	1.00							
smk06	-0.55	1.00						
sf06	0.04	-0.38	1.00					
hzds06	0.34	-0.60	-0.19	1.00				
kss06	-0.14	-0.48	-0.05	0.24	1.00			
sdku06	0.09	-0.27	0.87	-0.28	-0.21	1.00		
smer06	0.20	-0.69	-0.16	0.50	0.76	-0.33	1.00	
sns06	0.28	-0.56	-0.11	0.71	0.23	-0.30	0.41	1.00

Table S.15: Elections 2006 – correlations among the ideological blocks' election results

	lp06	rp06	nap06
lp06	1.00		
rp06	-0.19	1.00	
nap06	-0.66	-0.60	1.00

Table S.16: Elections 2010 – results for individual parties

Equation	Obs	R ²	χ^2	p-value					
sas10	79.00	0.55	97.16	0.00					
smk10	79.00	0.31	35.84	0.00					
hzds10	79.00	0.37	46.61	0.00					
sns10	79.00	0.25	26.25	0.00					
kdh10	79.00	0.47	68.80	0.00					
sdku10	79.00	0.71	188.87	0.00					
smer10	79.00	0.35	41.79	0.00					
most10	79.00	0.26	28.25	0.00					
	Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value		Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value
sas10					smk10				
<i>d10</i>	-0.001	0.001	-0.880	0.377	<i>d10</i>	-0.001	0.002	-0.740	0.457
<i>aa10</i>	-0.128	0.190	-0.670	0.501	<i>aa10</i>	1.355	0.396	3.420	0.001
<i>anw10</i>	0.015	0.004	4.060	0.000	<i>anw10</i>	-0.010	0.008	-1.350	0.177
<i>ur10</i>	-0.279	0.072	-3.870	0.000	<i>ur10</i>	0.362	0.150	2.410	0.016
<i>ch1anw10</i>	0.049	0.058	0.840	0.399	<i>ch1anw10</i>	0.031	0.121	0.250	0.799
<i>ch4anw10</i>	-0.112	0.047	-2.360	0.018	<i>ch4anw10</i>	-0.083	0.099	-0.840	0.401
<i>ch1ur10</i>	-0.035	0.043	-0.810	0.416	<i>ch1ur10</i>	0.366	0.089	4.100	0.000
<i>ch4ur10</i>	-0.010	0.011	-0.920	0.356	<i>ch4ur10</i>	-0.001	0.022	-0.040	0.971
<i>_cons</i>	12.547	7.719	1.630	0.104	<i>_cons</i>	-43.689	16.060	-2.720	0.007
sns10					hzds10				
<i>d10</i>	-0.001	0.001	-1.990	0.047	<i>d10</i>	0.000	0.001	-0.300	0.762
<i>aa10</i>	0.014	0.145	0.100	0.924	<i>aa10</i>	0.082	0.128	0.640	0.522
<i>anw10</i>	-0.001	0.003	-0.380	0.704	<i>anw10</i>	0.001	0.002	0.360	0.717
<i>ur10</i>	-0.047	0.055	-0.850	0.394	<i>ur10</i>	0.221	0.048	4.580	0.000
<i>ch1anw10</i>	0.147	0.044	3.330	0.001	<i>ch1anw10</i>	-0.021	0.039	-0.530	0.597
<i>ch4anw10</i>	-0.017	0.036	-0.460	0.645	<i>ch4anw10</i>	0.041	0.032	1.280	0.199
<i>ch1ur10</i>	0.002	0.033	0.070	0.941	<i>ch1ur10</i>	-0.086	0.029	-2.990	0.003
<i>ch4ur10</i>	0.015	0.008	1.890	0.058	<i>ch4ur10</i>	0.010	0.007	1.430	0.153
<i>_cons</i>	5.359	5.868	0.910	0.361	<i>_cons</i>	-3.421	5.173	-0.660	0.508
kdh10					sdku10				
<i>d10</i>	0.002	0.001	1.720	0.086	<i>d10</i>	0.002	0.001	2.350	0.019
<i>aa10</i>	-1.937	0.241	-8.050	0.000	<i>aa10</i>	-0.361	0.229	-1.570	0.115
<i>anw10</i>	0.001	0.005	0.120	0.906	<i>anw10</i>	0.024	0.004	5.560	0.000
<i>ur10</i>	-0.199	0.091	-2.190	0.029	<i>ur10</i>	-0.258	0.087	-2.980	0.003
<i>ch1anw10</i>	-0.004	0.073	-0.060	0.952	<i>ch1anw10</i>	-0.086	0.070	-1.230	0.219
<i>ch4anw10</i>	0.078	0.060	1.300	0.194	<i>ch4anw10</i>	-0.082	0.057	-1.440	0.150
<i>ch1ur10</i>	-0.061	0.054	-1.120	0.262	<i>ch1ur10</i>	-0.044	0.052	-0.850	0.396
<i>ch4ur10</i>	0.013	0.014	0.990	0.325	<i>ch4ur10</i>	-0.018	0.013	-1.380	0.168
<i>_cons</i>	83.260	9.759	8.530	0.000	<i>_cons</i>	16.808	9.292	1.810	0.070
smer10					most10				
<i>d10</i>	0.000	0.003	-0.100	0.921	<i>d10</i>	0.000	0.002	-0.040	0.967
<i>aa10</i>	-0.249	0.618	-0.400	0.687	<i>aa10</i>	1.400	0.529	2.650	0.008
<i>anw10</i>	-0.024	0.012	-2.080	0.038	<i>anw10</i>	-0.009	0.010	-0.850	0.396

<i>ur10</i>	-0.175	0.234	-0.750	0.455	<i>ur10</i>	0.213	0.200	1.070	0.286
<i>ch1anw10</i>	-0.051	0.189	-0.270	0.788	<i>ch1anw10</i>	-0.065	0.161	-0.400	0.689
<i>ch4anw10</i>	0.242	0.154	1.570	0.115	<i>ch4anw10</i>	-0.043	0.132	-0.330	0.744
<i>ch1ur10</i>	-0.532	0.139	-3.820	0.000	<i>ch1ur10</i>	0.481	0.119	4.040	0.000
<i>ch4ur10</i>	0.023	0.035	0.660	0.509	<i>ch4ur10</i>	-0.020	0.030	-0.670	0.505
<i>_cons</i>	59.454	25.065	2.370	0.018	<i>_cons</i>	-41.055	21.444	-1.910	0.056

Breusch-Pagan test of independence $\chi^2(3) = 72.027$, Pr. = 0

Table S.17: Elections 2010 – results for parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties

Equation	Obs	R ²	χ^2	p-value					
p10	79.00	0.28	31.14	0.00					
np10	79.00	0.33	38.72	0.00					
	Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value		Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value
parliamentary					non-parliamentary				
<i>d10</i>	0.001	0.002	0.600	0.550	<i>d10</i>	-0.001	0.002	-0.380	0.701
<i>aa10</i>	-1.097	0.454	-2.420	0.016	<i>aa10</i>	1.272	0.494	2.580	0.010
<i>anw10</i>	-0.010	0.009	-1.160	0.248	<i>anw10</i>	0.006	0.009	0.660	0.512
<i>ur10</i>	-0.097	0.172	-0.560	0.572	<i>ur10</i>	-0.065	0.187	-0.350	0.726
<i>ch1anw10</i>	0.016	0.138	0.120	0.908	<i>ch1anw10</i>	-0.016	0.151	-0.100	0.918
<i>ch4anw10</i>	0.179	0.113	1.590	0.112	<i>ch4anw10</i>	-0.155	0.123	-1.260	0.208
<i>ch1ur10</i>	-0.354	0.102	-3.470	0.001	<i>ch1ur10</i>	0.446	0.111	4.010	0.000
<i>ch4ur10</i>	0.043	0.026	1.700	0.089	<i>ch4ur10</i>	-0.030	0.028	-1.070	0.285
<i>_cons</i>	117.772	18.388	6.400	0.000	<i>_cons</i>	-28.508	20.025	-1.420	0.155

Breusch-Pagan test of independence $\chi^2(1) = 74.880$, Pr. = 0

Table S.18: Elections 2010 – results for government and non-government parties

Equation	Obs	R ²	χ^2	p-value					
p10	79	0.35	43.16	0.00					
np10	79	0.38	48.40	0.00					
	Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value		Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value
government					non-government				
<i>d10</i>	-0.002	0.003	-0.510	0.609	<i>d10</i>	0.002	0.003	0.590	0.558
<i>aa10</i>	-0.153	0.757	-0.200	0.839	<i>aa10</i>	0.329	0.800	0.410	0.681
<i>anw10</i>	-0.025	0.014	-1.710	0.088	<i>anw10</i>	0.021	0.015	1.370	0.172
<i>ur10</i>	-0.001	0.286	0.000	0.998	<i>ur10</i>	-0.162	0.303	-0.530	0.593
<i>ch1anw10</i>	0.076	0.231	0.330	0.743	<i>ch1anw10</i>	-0.075	0.244	-0.310	0.758
<i>ch4anw10</i>	0.266	0.188	1.410	0.157	<i>ch4anw10</i>	-0.242	0.199	-1.220	0.224
<i>ch1ur10</i>	-0.615	0.170	-3.610	0.000	<i>ch1ur10</i>	0.707	0.180	3.930	0.000
<i>ch4ur10</i>	0.049	0.043	1.140	0.253	<i>ch4ur10</i>	-0.035	0.045	-0.780	0.437
<i>_cons</i>	61.392	30.683	2.000	0.045	<i>_cons</i>	27.872	32.425	0.860	0.390

Breusch-Pagan test of independence $\chi^2(1) = 77.490$, Pr. = 0

Table S.19: Elections 2010 – correlations among the parties' election results

	sas10	smk10	hzds10	sns10	kdh10	sdku10	smer10	most10
sas10	1.00							
smk10	-0.43	1.00						
hzds10	-0.43	-0.17	1.00					
sns10	0.01	-0.40	0.18	1.00				
kdh10	0.08	-0.52	-0.05	0.13	1.00			
sdku10	0.84	-0.25	-0.47	-0.33	0.02	1.00		
smer10	-0.27	-0.65	0.43	0.51	0.24	-0.47	1.00	
most10	-0.28	0.93	-0.28	-0.48	-0.52	-0.05	-0.78	1.00

Table S.20: Elections 2010 – correlations among the ideological blocks' election results

	lp10	rp10	nap10
lp10	1.00		
rp10	-0.32	1.00	
nap10	-0.67	-0.48	1.00

Table S.21: Elections 2012 – results for individual parties

Equation	Obs	R ²	χ^2	p-value					
kdh12	79.00	0.45	65.11	0.00					
sns12	79.00	0.13	11.86	0.16					
olano12	79.00	0.46	68.62	0.00					
sas12	79.00	0.80	310.24	0.00					
,smer12	79.00	0.28	29.98	0.00					
most12	79.00	0.10	9.19	0.33					
sdku12	79.00	0.75	241.17	0.00					
smk12	79.00	0.16	14.61	0.07					
	Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value		Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value
kdh12					sns12				
<i>d12</i>	0.002	0.001	1.770	0.076	<i>d12</i>	-0.001	0.001	-2.120	0.034
<i>aa12</i>	-1.572	0.200	-7.840	0.000	<i>aa12</i>	0.104	0.142	0.730	0.463
<i>anw12</i>	0.003	0.004	0.880	0.380	<i>anw12</i>	0.000	0.003	-0.090	0.930
<i>ur12</i>	-0.191	0.068	-2.830	0.005	<i>ur12</i>	-0.066	0.048	-1.380	0.169
<i>ch1anw12</i>	0.096	0.121	0.800	0.427	<i>ch1anw12</i>	-0.021	0.086	-0.250	0.802
<i>ch2anw12</i>	0.024	0.067	0.360	0.719	<i>ch2anw12</i>	-0.023	0.048	-0.480	0.634
<i>ch1ur12</i>	0.089	0.068	1.320	0.188	<i>ch1ur12</i>	0.067	0.048	1.390	0.164
<i>ch2ur12</i>	-0.022	0.053	-0.420	0.674	<i>ch2ur12</i>	-0.047	0.037	-1.260	0.207
<i>_cons</i>	70.014	8.373	8.360	0.000	<i>_cons</i>	2.721	5.942	0.460	0.647
olano12					sas12				
<i>d12</i>	0.000	0.001	-0.570	0.571	<i>d12</i>	0.002	0.000	3.760	0.000
<i>aa12</i>	-0.525	0.162	-3.250	0.001	<i>aa12</i>	-0.036	0.096	-0.380	0.704
<i>anw12</i>	0.005	0.003	1.600	0.109	<i>anw12</i>	0.011	0.002	6.060	0.000
<i>ur12</i>	-0.285	0.054	-5.240	0.000	<i>ur12</i>	-0.108	0.032	-3.350	0.001
<i>ch1anw12</i>	0.146	0.097	1.510	0.132	<i>ch1anw12</i>	0.076	0.058	1.310	0.189
<i>ch2anw12</i>	-0.013	0.054	-0.240	0.813	<i>ch2anw12</i>	-0.019	0.032	-0.600	0.546
<i>ch1ur12</i>	-0.079	0.055	-1.450	0.146	<i>ch1ur12</i>	-0.053	0.032	-1.620	0.105
<i>ch2ur12</i>	-0.042	0.042	-0.980	0.325	<i>ch2ur12</i>	0.023	0.025	0.920	0.356
<i>_cons</i>	30.683	6.749	4.550	0.000	<i>_cons</i>	-0.649	4.008	-0.160	0.871
smer12					most12				
<i>d12</i>	-0.005	0.003	-1.470	0.142	<i>d12</i>	0.001	0.002	0.290	0.769
<i>aa12</i>	0.064	0.717	0.090	0.929	<i>aa12</i>	1.045	0.515	2.030	0.042
<i>anw12</i>	-0.020	0.014	-1.430	0.152	<i>anw12</i>	-0.002	0.010	-0.260	0.799
<i>ur12</i>	-0.117	0.241	-0.490	0.627	<i>ur12</i>	0.271	0.174	1.560	0.119
<i>ch1anw12</i>	0.099	0.431	0.230	0.818	<i>ch1anw12</i>	-0.248	0.310	-0.800	0.423
<i>ch2anw12</i>	0.261	0.241	1.090	0.278	<i>ch2anw12</i>	-0.087	0.173	-0.500	0.617
<i>ch1ur12</i>	0.605	0.242	2.500	0.013	<i>ch1ur12</i>	-0.307	0.174	-1.760	0.078
<i>ch2ur12</i>	-0.124	0.188	-0.660	0.508	<i>ch2ur12</i>	0.103	0.135	0.770	0.444
<i>_cons</i>	57.590	29.942	1.920	0.054	<i>_cons</i>	-35.888	21.523	-1.670	0.095
sdku12					most12				
<i>d12</i>	0.002	0.000	4.980	0.000	<i>d12</i>	-0.001	0.002	-0.260	0.797
<i>aa12</i>	-0.113	0.106	-1.060	0.288	<i>aa12</i>	1.269	0.493	2.570	0.010
<i>anw12</i>	0.011	0.002	5.340	0.000	<i>anw12</i>	-0.010	0.009	-1.040	0.298

<i>ur12</i>	-0.055	0.036	-1.540	0.125	<i>ur12</i>	0.359	0.166	2.160	0.031
<i>ch1anw12</i>	0.059	0.064	0.920	0.357	<i>ch1anw12</i>	-0.345	0.297	-1.160	0.246
<i>ch2anw12</i>	-0.034	0.036	-0.960	0.340	<i>ch2anw12</i>	-0.099	0.166	-0.600	0.548
<i>ch1ur12</i>	-0.043	0.036	-1.210	0.227	<i>ch1ur12</i>	-0.243	0.167	-1.460	0.144
<i>ch2ur12</i>	0.013	0.028	0.460	0.643	<i>ch2ur12</i>	0.077	0.130	0.600	0.550
<i>_cons</i>	2.180	4.438	0.490	0.623	<i>_cons</i>	-41.955	20.614	-2.040	0.042

Breusch-Pagan test of independence $\chi^2(28) = 442.208$, Pr. = 0

Table S.22: Elections 2012 – results for parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties

Equation	Obs	R ²	χ^2	p-value					
p12	79.00	0.17	16.26	0.04					
np12	79.00	0.12	10.28	0.25					
	Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value		Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value
parliamentary					non-parliamentary				
<i>d12</i>	0.000	0.002	0.110	0.912	<i>d12</i>	-0.001	0.002	-0.490	0.625
<i>aa12</i>	-0.508	0.387	-1.310	0.190	<i>aa12</i>	0.744	0.447	1.670	0.096
<i>anw12</i>	0.003	0.007	0.390	0.693	<i>anw12</i>	-0.005	0.008	-0.570	0.569
<i>ur12</i>	-0.266	0.130	-2.040	0.041	<i>ur12</i>	0.074	0.150	0.490	0.624
<i>ch1anw12</i>	0.060	0.233	0.260	0.797	<i>ch1anw12</i>	-0.198	0.269	-0.740	0.461
<i>ch2anw12</i>	0.122	0.130	0.940	0.346	<i>ch2anw12</i>	-0.112	0.150	-0.750	0.454
<i>ch1ur12</i>	0.358	0.131	2.730	0.006	<i>ch1ur12</i>	-0.323	0.151	-2.140	0.032
<i>ch2ur12</i>	-0.054	0.102	-0.530	0.594	<i>ch2ur12</i>	0.036	0.117	0.300	0.761
<i>_cons</i>	95.968	16.185	5.930	0.000	<i>_cons</i>	-11.273	18.661	-0.600	0.546

Breusch-Pagan test of independence $\chi^2(1) = 67.951$, Pr. = 0

Table S.23: Elections 2012 – results for government and non-government parties

Equation	Obs	R ²	χ^2	p-value					
p12	79	0.49	74.93	0.00					
np12	79	0.51	81.46	0.00					
	Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value		Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value
government					non-government				
<i>d12</i>	0.006	0.002	3.070	0.002	<i>d12</i>	-0.007	0.002	-3.640	0.000
<i>aa12</i>	-0.676	0.455	-1.490	0.137	<i>aa12</i>	0.912	0.432	2.110	0.035
<i>anw12</i>	0.023	0.009	2.620	0.009	<i>anw12</i>	-0.025	0.008	-3.000	0.003
<i>ur12</i>	-0.083	0.153	-0.540	0.587	<i>ur12</i>	-0.109	0.145	-0.750	0.452
<i>ch1anw12</i>	-0.018	0.274	-0.070	0.948	<i>ch1anw12</i>	-0.120	0.260	-0.460	0.643
<i>ch2anw12</i>	-0.116	0.153	-0.760	0.448	<i>ch2anw12</i>	0.126	0.145	0.870	0.384
<i>ch1ur12</i>	-0.314	0.154	-2.040	0.041	<i>ch1ur12</i>	0.349	0.146	2.390	0.017
<i>ch2ur12</i>	0.117	0.119	0.980	0.325	<i>ch2ur12</i>	-0.136	0.113	-1.200	0.230
<i>_cons</i>	35.657	19.010	1.880	0.061	<i>_cons</i>	49.038	18.028	2.720	0.007

Breusch-Pagan test of independence $\chi^2(1) = 68.109$, Pr. = 0

Table S.24: Elections 2012 – correlations among the parties' election results

	kdh12	sns12	olano12	sas12	smer12	most12	sdku12	smk12
kdh12	1.00							
sns12	-0.04	1.00						
olano12	0.44	0.03	1.00					
sas12	0.06	-0.14	0.51	1.00				
smer12	0.17	0.50	-0.14	-0.44	1.00			
most12	-0.54	-0.43	-0.36	-0.02	-0.79	1.00		
sdku12	0.14	-0.29	0.49	0.95	-0.48	-0.01	1.00	
smk12	-0.54	-0.37	-0.47	-0.24	-0.66	0.93	-0.23	1.00

Table S.25: Elections 2012 – correlations among the ideological blocks' election results

	lp12	rp12	nap12	ivp12
lp12	1.00			
rp12	-0.29	1.00		
nap12	-0.70	-0.44	1.00	
ivp12	-0.14	0.64	-0.44	1.00

Table S.26: Elections 2016 – results for individual parties

Equation	Obs	R ²	χ ²	p-value					
olano16	79.00	0.53	89.63	0.00					
rodina16	79.00	0.37	46.72	0.00					
most16	79.00	0.17	15.76	0.05					
sns16	79.00	0.19	18.97	0.02					
smer16	79.00	0.30	33.49	0.00					
kdh16	79.00	0.50	77.62	0.00					
lsns16	79.00	0.33	39.64	0.00					
siet16	79.00	0.42	57.35	0.00					
smk16	79.00	0.20	20.22	0.01					
sas16	79.00	0.84	426.62	0.00					
	Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value		Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value
olano16					rodina16				
<i>d16</i>	0.001	0.001	1.220	0.222	<i>d16</i>	-0.001	0.000	-1.670	0.096
<i>aa16</i>	-0.602	0.133	-4.530	0.000	<i>aa16</i>	0.064	0.079	0.810	0.416
<i>anw16</i>	0.004	0.003	1.690	0.092	<i>anw16</i>	0.001	0.002	0.690	0.491
<i>ur16</i>	-0.403	0.096	-4.210	0.000	<i>ur16</i>	-0.239	0.057	-4.230	0.000
<i>ch1anw16</i>	-0.055	0.103	-0.540	0.592	<i>ch1anw16</i>	0.016	0.061	0.260	0.792
<i>ch4anw16</i>	-0.045	0.046	-0.970	0.330	<i>ch4anw16</i>	-0.034	0.027	-1.230	0.220
<i>ch1ur16</i>	0.061	0.051	1.180	0.237	<i>ch1ur16</i>	0.075	0.030	2.450	0.014
<i>ch4ur16</i>	0.025	0.041	0.600	0.549	<i>ch4ur16</i>	-0.021	0.024	-0.850	0.396
<i>_cons</i>	37.456	6.823	5.490	0.000	<i>_cons</i>	6.347	4.043	1.570	0.116
most16					sns16				
<i>d16</i>	0.002	0.002	1.050	0.292	<i>d16</i>	-0.001	0.001	-1.710	0.087
<i>aa16</i>	0.448	0.366	1.220	0.221	<i>aa16</i>	0.161	0.176	0.910	0.362
<i>anw16</i>	0.008	0.007	1.160	0.247	<i>anw16</i>	-0.004	0.003	-1.140	0.254
<i>ur16</i>	0.808	0.263	3.070	0.002	<i>ur16</i>	-0.183	0.127	-1.440	0.149
<i>ch1anw16</i>	0.072	0.285	0.250	0.800	<i>ch1anw16</i>	0.044	0.137	0.320	0.749
<i>ch4anw16</i>	-0.026	0.128	-0.200	0.839	<i>ch4anw16</i>	0.033	0.061	0.530	0.593
<i>ch1ur16</i>	-0.364	0.142	-2.570	0.010	<i>ch1ur16</i>	0.124	0.068	1.820	0.069
<i>ch4ur16</i>	0.040	0.114	0.350	0.724	<i>ch4ur16</i>	-0.057	0.055	-1.040	0.300
<i>_cons</i>	-33.377	18.808	-1.770	0.076	<i>_cons</i>	7.810	9.038	0.860	0.388
smer16					kdh16				
<i>d16</i>	-0.004	0.002	-1.640	0.101	<i>d16</i>	0.001	0.001	1.620	0.105
<i>aa16</i>	0.906	0.466	1.950	0.052	<i>aa16</i>	-1.077	0.133	-8.110	0.000
<i>anw16</i>	-0.021	0.009	-2.300	0.021	<i>anw16</i>	-0.005	0.003	-1.800	0.071
<i>ur16</i>	-0.197	0.335	-0.590	0.556	<i>ur16</i>	-0.285	0.095	-2.990	0.003
<i>ch1anw16</i>	0.056	0.362	0.160	0.876	<i>ch1anw16</i>	-0.021	0.103	-0.200	0.841
<i>ch4anw16</i>	0.125	0.162	0.770	0.443	<i>ch4anw16</i>	-0.035	0.046	-0.750	0.453
<i>ch1ur16</i>	0.323	0.180	1.790	0.073	<i>ch1ur16</i>	0.057	0.051	1.110	0.268
<i>ch4ur16</i>	-0.040	0.144	-0.280	0.780	<i>ch4ur16</i>	0.003	0.041	0.080	0.933
<i>_cons</i>	18.079	23.906	0.760	0.449	<i>_cons</i>	57.273	6.820	8.400	0.000
lsns16					siet16				

<i>d16</i>	0.000	0.001	-0.690	0.487	<i>d16</i>	0.001	0.000	2.620	0.009
<i>aa16</i>	-0.144	0.141	-1.020	0.308	<i>aa16</i>	-0.503	0.086	-5.830	0.000
<i>anw16</i>	0.000	0.003	0.030	0.975	<i>anw16</i>	0.000	0.002	-0.020	0.980
<i>ur16</i>	0.099	0.102	0.980	0.329	<i>ur16</i>	-0.197	0.062	-3.180	0.001
<i>ch1anw16</i>	0.034	0.110	0.310	0.757	<i>ch1anw16</i>	-0.117	0.067	-1.750	0.081
<i>ch4anw16</i>	-0.017	0.049	-0.340	0.736	<i>ch4anw16</i>	-0.012	0.030	-0.390	0.698
<i>ch1ur16</i>	0.091	0.055	1.660	0.097	<i>ch1ur16</i>	0.050	0.033	1.490	0.135
<i>ch4ur16</i>	-0.121	0.044	-2.760	0.006	<i>ch4ur16</i>	-0.007	0.027	-0.250	0.806
<i>_cons</i>	10.563	7.252	1.460	0.145	<i>_cons</i>	28.731	4.432	6.480	0.000
smk16					sas16				
<i>d16</i>	0.001	0.002	0.270	0.783	<i>d16</i>	0.001	0.001	1.310	0.189
<i>aa16</i>	0.645	0.451	1.430	0.153	<i>aa16</i>	-0.080	0.148	-0.540	0.589
<i>anw16</i>	0.007	0.009	0.730	0.463	<i>anw16</i>	0.012	0.003	4.050	0.000
<i>ur16</i>	1.171	0.325	3.610	0.000	<i>ur16</i>	-0.611	0.106	-5.750	0.000
<i>ch1anw16</i>	0.018	0.351	0.050	0.960	<i>ch1anw16</i>	0.013	0.115	0.120	0.908
<i>ch4anw16</i>	0.087	0.158	0.560	0.579	<i>ch4anw16</i>	-0.089	0.052	-1.730	0.083
<i>ch1ur16</i>	-0.452	0.175	-2.590	0.010	<i>ch1ur16</i>	-0.014	0.057	-0.250	0.803
<i>ch4ur16</i>	-0.048	0.140	-0.340	0.733	<i>ch4ur16</i>	0.212	0.046	4.610	0.000
<i>_cons</i>	-51.734	23.182	-2.230	0.026	<i>_cons</i>	18.313	7.597	2.410	0.016

Breusch-Pagan test of independence $\chi^2(45) = 656.472$, Pr. = 0

Table S.27: Elections 2016 – results for parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties

Equation	Obs	R ²	χ^2	p-value					
p16	79.00	0.25	25.74	0.00					
np16	79.00	0.52	84.64	0.00					
	Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value		Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value
parliamentary					non-parliamentary				
<i>d16</i>	-0.001	0.003	-0.360	0.720	<i>d16</i>	-0.001	0.001	-0.790	0.427
<i>aa16</i>	-0.852	0.534	-1.600	0.110	<i>aa16</i>	0.222	0.226	0.980	0.327
<i>anw16</i>	-0.010	0.011	-0.910	0.361	<i>anw16</i>	0.004	0.004	0.830	0.409
<i>ur16</i>	-1.496	0.384	-3.900	0.000	<i>ur16</i>	0.651	0.163	4.000	0.000
<i>ch1anw16</i>	-0.006	0.415	-0.020	0.988	<i>ch1anw16</i>	-0.006	0.176	-0.030	0.974
<i>ch4anw16</i>	-0.045	0.186	-0.240	0.810	<i>ch4anw16</i>	0.058	0.079	0.740	0.461
<i>ch1ur16</i>	0.427	0.207	2.060	0.039	<i>ch1ur16</i>	-0.113	0.088	-1.290	0.198
<i>ch4ur16</i>	0.200	0.166	1.200	0.228	<i>ch4ur16</i>	-0.252	0.070	-3.590	0.000
<i>_cons</i>	131.121	27.421	4.780	0.000	<i>_cons</i>	1.717	11.626	0.150	0.883

Breusch-Pagan test of independence $\chi^2(1) = 59.382$, Pr. = 0

Table S.28: Elections 2016 – results for government and non-government parties

Equation	Obs	R ²	χ^2	p-value					
p16	79	0.30	33.49	0.00					
np16	79	0.34	40.85	0.00					
	Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value		Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value
government					non-government				
<i>d16</i>	-0.004	0.002	-1.640	0.101	<i>d16</i>	0.004	0.002	1.630	0.103
<i>aa16</i>	0.906	0.466	1.950	0.052	<i>aa16</i>	-1.088	0.478	-2.280	0.023
<i>anw16</i>	-0.021	0.009	-2.300	0.021	<i>anw16</i>	0.024	0.009	2.500	0.012
<i>ur16</i>	-0.197	0.335	-0.590	0.556	<i>ur16</i>	0.159	0.343	0.460	0.643
<i>ch1anw16</i>	0.056	0.362	0.160	0.876	<i>ch1anw16</i>	0.004	0.372	0.010	0.992
<i>ch4anw16</i>	0.125	0.162	0.770	0.443	<i>ch4anw16</i>	-0.137	0.167	-0.820	0.411
<i>ch1ur16</i>	0.323	0.180	1.790	0.073	<i>ch1ur16</i>	-0.374	0.185	-2.020	0.043
<i>ch4ur16</i>	-0.040	0.144	-0.280	0.780	<i>ch4ur16</i>	0.028	0.148	0.190	0.853
<i>_cons</i>	18.079	23.906	0.760	0.449	<i>_cons</i>	81.382	24.528	3.320	0.001

Breusch-Pagan test of independence $\chi^2(1) = 78.263$, Pr. = 0

Table S.29: Elections 2016 – correlations among the parties' election results

	olano16	rodina16	most16	sns16	smer16	kdh16	lsns16	siet16	smk16	sas16
olano16	1.00									
rodina16	0.49	1.00								
most16	-0.28	-0.33	1.00							
sns16	-0.21	0.04	-0.71	1.00						
smer16	-0.38	0.02	-0.72	0.69	1.00					
kdh16	0.36	-0.12	-0.53	0.22	0.19	1.00				
lsns16	-0.12	-0.08	-0.60	0.61	0.51	0.35	1.00			
siet16	0.52	0.12	-0.32	-0.06	-0.15	0.52	-0.04	1.00		
smk16	-0.47	-0.43	0.93	-0.56	-0.55	-0.47	-0.44	-0.42	1.00	
sas16	0.71	0.44	0.01	-0.31	-0.50	-0.15	-0.42	0.33	-0.28	1.00

Table S.30: Elections 2016 – correlations among the ideological blocks' election results

	lp16	rp16	nap16	ivp16
lp16	1.00			
rp16	-0.37	1.00		
nap16	-0.55	-0.52	1.00	
ivp16	0.06	0.55	-0.74	1.00

Table S.31: Elections 2020 – results for individual parties

Equation	Obs	R ²	χ^2	p-value					
dv20	79.00	0.34	40.73	0.00					
sas20	79.00	0.64	139.11	0.00					
rodina20	79.00	0.32	37.47	0.00					
zl20	79.00	0.54	94.45	0.00					
sns20	79.00	0.33	39.67	0.00					
olano20	79.00	0.28	30.70	0.00					
ps20	79.00	0.72	198.34	0.00					
kdh20	79.00	0.14	13.22	0.10					
smer20	79.00	0.40	52.90	0.00					
mko20	79.00	0.33	39.53	0.00					
lsns20	79.00	0.40	52.68	0.00					
	Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value		Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value
dv20					sas20				
<i>d20</i>	0.000	0.000	-2.050	0.040	<i>d20</i>	0.001	0.000	3.210	0.001
<i>aa20</i>	-0.062	0.035	-1.780	0.075	<i>aa20</i>	-0.133	0.111	-1.200	0.231
<i>anw20</i>	0.001	0.001	1.530	0.125	<i>anw20</i>	0.008	0.002	4.390	0.000
<i>ur20</i>	-0.033	0.024	-1.360	0.172	<i>ur20</i>	-0.068	0.078	-0.870	0.385
<i>ch1anw20</i>	-0.019	0.020	-0.990	0.322	<i>ch1anw20</i>	-0.064	0.063	-1.020	0.309
<i>ch4anw20</i>	0.011	0.012	0.940	0.346	<i>ch4anw20</i>	-0.004	0.039	-0.100	0.920
<i>ch1ur20</i>	-0.009	0.003	-3.260	0.001	<i>ch1ur20</i>	-0.001	0.009	-0.060	0.951
<i>ch4ur20</i>	-0.013	0.005	-2.620	0.009	<i>ch4ur20</i>	0.005	0.016	0.310	0.754
<i>_cons</i>	5.203	1.692	3.080	0.002	<i>_cons</i>	2.610	5.442	0.480	0.632
rodina20					zl20				
<i>d20</i>	-0.001	0.000	-3.420	0.001	<i>d20</i>	0.002	0.000	3.890	0.000
<i>aa20</i>	0.179	0.094	1.890	0.058	<i>aa20</i>	-0.225	0.097	-2.310	0.021
<i>anw20</i>	-0.001	0.001	-0.470	0.638	<i>anw20</i>	0.004	0.002	2.590	0.010
<i>ur20</i>	-0.113	0.066	-1.720	0.085	<i>ur20</i>	-0.012	0.068	-0.180	0.856
<i>ch1anw20</i>	-0.051	0.054	-0.950	0.340	<i>ch1anw20</i>	0.122	0.055	2.210	0.027
<i>ch4anw20</i>	0.026	0.033	0.780	0.437	<i>ch4anw20</i>	-0.088	0.034	-2.600	0.009
<i>ch1ur20</i>	-0.021	0.008	-2.640	0.008	<i>ch1ur20</i>	0.003	0.008	0.380	0.706
<i>ch4ur20</i>	-0.009	0.014	-0.660	0.510	<i>ch4ur20</i>	-0.015	0.014	-1.040	0.296
<i>_cons</i>	3.824	4.611	0.830	0.407	<i>_cons</i>	11.450	4.737	2.420	0.016
sns20					olano20				
<i>d20</i>	0.000	0.000	-1.480	0.140	<i>d20</i>	-0.002	0.001	-1.580	0.114
<i>aa20</i>	-0.133	0.071	-1.880	0.060	<i>aa20</i>	-0.201	0.239	-0.840	0.401
<i>anw20</i>	-0.002	0.001	-1.850	0.064	<i>anw20</i>	0.002	0.004	0.520	0.605
<i>ur20</i>	-0.130	0.049	-2.640	0.008	<i>ur20</i>	-0.351	0.167	-2.110	0.035
<i>ch1anw20</i>	-0.067	0.040	-1.660	0.096	<i>ch1anw20</i>	0.327	0.136	2.410	0.016
<i>ch4anw20</i>	0.052	0.025	2.100	0.036	<i>ch4anw20</i>	-0.108	0.084	-1.290	0.197
<i>ch1ur20</i>	-0.018	0.006	-3.080	0.002	<i>ch1ur20</i>	-0.023	0.020	-1.140	0.252
<i>ch4ur20</i>	-0.002	0.010	-0.190	0.847	<i>ch4ur20</i>	0.098	0.035	2.790	0.005
<i>_cons</i>	12.399	3.460	3.580	0.000	<i>_cons</i>	37.592	11.683	3.220	0.001

ps20					kdh20				
<i>d20</i>	0.003	0.001	5.590	0.000	<i>d20</i>	0.001	0.001	0.660	0.509
<i>aa20</i>	-0.114	0.124	-0.920	0.358	<i>aa20</i>	-0.429	0.203	-2.110	0.035
<i>anw20</i>	0.008	0.002	4.070	0.000	<i>anw20</i>	-0.004	0.003	-1.300	0.193
<i>ur20</i>	-0.056	0.086	-0.640	0.521	<i>ur20</i>	-0.166	0.142	-1.170	0.242
<i>ch1anw20</i>	-0.111	0.070	-1.570	0.116	<i>ch1anw20</i>	0.110	0.115	0.950	0.340
<i>ch4anw20</i>	-0.003	0.043	-0.060	0.950	<i>ch4anw20</i>	-0.031	0.071	-0.440	0.658
<i>ch1ur20</i>	0.001	0.010	0.110	0.916	<i>ch1ur20</i>	-0.028	0.017	-1.670	0.094
<i>ch4ur20</i>	0.003	0.018	0.170	0.864	<i>ch4ur20</i>	0.040	0.030	1.340	0.181
<i>_cons</i>	1.883	6.052	0.310	0.756	<i>_cons</i>	31.406	9.928	3.160	0.002
smer20					mko20				
<i>d20</i>	-0.002	0.001	-1.870	0.062	<i>d20</i>	0.001	0.002	0.660	0.512
<i>aa20</i>	0.004	0.316	0.010	0.990	<i>aa20</i>	0.656	0.424	1.550	0.121
<i>anw20</i>	-0.008	0.005	-1.550	0.121	<i>anw20</i>	-0.004	0.007	-0.610	0.542
<i>ur20</i>	-0.335	0.220	-1.520	0.128	<i>ur20</i>	0.845	0.295	2.860	0.004
<i>ch1anw20</i>	-0.390	0.180	-2.170	0.030	<i>ch1anw20</i>	0.141	0.241	0.590	0.557
<i>ch4anw20</i>	0.215	0.110	1.940	0.052	<i>ch4anw20</i>	-0.123	0.148	-0.830	0.405
<i>ch1ur20</i>	-0.106	0.026	-4.050	0.000	<i>ch1ur20</i>	0.192	0.035	5.440	0.000
<i>ch4ur20</i>	-0.028	0.046	-0.600	0.551	<i>ch4ur20</i>	-0.055	0.062	-0.880	0.380
<i>_cons</i>	33.632	15.440	2.180	0.029	<i>_cons</i>	-35.311	20.686	-1.710	0.088
lsns20									
<i>d20</i>	-0.002	0.001	-2.980	0.003					
<i>aa20</i>	0.299	0.153	1.950	0.051					
<i>anw20</i>	-0.001	0.002	-0.460	0.643					
<i>ur20</i>	0.045	0.107	0.420	0.675					
<i>ch1anw20</i>	-0.063	0.087	-0.720	0.473					
<i>ch4anw20</i>	0.085	0.054	1.580	0.114					
<i>ch1ur20</i>	-0.042	0.013	-3.330	0.001					
<i>ch4ur20</i>	0.000	0.022	-0.020	0.984					
<i>_cons</i>	-1.959	7.486	-0.260	0.794					

Breusch-Pagan test of independence $\chi^2(45) = 662.559$, Pr. = 0

Table S.32: Elections 2020 – results for parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties

Equation	Obs	R ²	χ ²	p-value					
p20	79.00	0.37	46.95	0.00					
np20	79.00	0.44	61.09	0.00					
	Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value		Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value
parliamentary					non-parliamentary				
<i>d20</i>	-0.005	0.002	-2.890	0.004	<i>d20</i>	0.006	0.002	3.810	0.000
<i>aa20</i>	-0.164	0.406	-0.410	0.685	<i>aa20</i>	-0.173	0.370	-0.470	0.640
<i>anw20</i>	-0.001	0.006	-0.200	0.845	<i>anw20</i>	0.004	0.006	0.770	0.442
<i>ur20</i>	-0.840	0.283	-2.970	0.003	<i>ur20</i>	0.579	0.258	2.240	0.025
<i>ch1anw20</i>	-0.256	0.230	-1.110	0.266	<i>ch1anw20</i>	0.243	0.210	1.160	0.248
<i>ch4anw20</i>	0.240	0.142	1.690	0.091	<i>ch4anw20</i>	-0.234	0.129	-1.810	0.070
<i>ch1ur20</i>	-0.190	0.034	-5.640	0.000	<i>ch1ur20</i>	0.158	0.031	5.140	0.000
<i>ch4ur20</i>	0.073	0.059	1.230	0.219	<i>ch4ur20</i>	-0.040	0.054	-0.730	0.465
<i>_cons</i>	84.275	19.807	4.250	0.000	<i>_cons</i>	14.630	18.087	0.810	0.419

Breusch-Pagan test of independence chi2 (1) = 70.120, Pr. = 0

Table S.33: Elections 2020 – results for government and non-government parties

Equation	Obs	R ²	χ ²	p-value					
p20	79	0.41	54.75	0.00					
np20	79	0.44	63.05	0.00					
	Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value		Coeff.	S.E.	z-stat	p-value
government					non-government				
<i>d20</i>	-0.003	0.002	-1.900	0.058	<i>d20</i>	0.003	0.001	1.740	0.082
<i>aa20</i>	-0.129	0.367	-0.350	0.725	<i>aa20</i>	-0.030	0.352	-0.080	0.933
<i>anw20</i>	-0.010	0.006	-1.690	0.091	<i>anw20</i>	0.012	0.006	2.220	0.026
<i>ur20</i>	-0.466	0.256	-1.820	0.069	<i>ur20</i>	0.091	0.245	0.370	0.710
<i>ch1anw20</i>	-0.457	0.208	-2.190	0.028	<i>ch1anw20</i>	0.392	0.200	1.970	0.049
<i>ch4anw20</i>	0.267	0.128	2.080	0.038	<i>ch4anw20</i>	-0.236	0.123	-1.920	0.055
<i>ch1ur20</i>	-0.125	0.030	-4.080	0.000	<i>ch1ur20</i>	0.072	0.029	2.450	0.014
<i>ch4ur20</i>	-0.030	0.054	-0.550	0.582	<i>ch4ur20</i>	0.054	0.052	1.050	0.296
<i>_cons</i>	46.031	17.920	2.570	0.010	<i>_cons</i>	56.698	17.169	3.300	0.001

Breusch-Pagan test of independence chi2 (1) = 64.051, Pr. = 0

Table S.34: Elections 2020 – correlations among the parties' election results

	dv20	sas20	rodina20	zl20	sns20	olano20	ps20	kdh20	smer20	mko20	lsns20
dv20	1.00										
sas20	0.01	1.00									
rodina20	0.53	-0.29	1.00								
zl20	-0.03	0.81	-0.41	1.00							
sns20	0.44	-0.48	0.43	-0.58	1.00						
olano20	-0.13	0.32	0.03	0.42	-0.31	1.00					
ps20	-0.04	0.95	-0.37	0.77	-0.46	0.17	1.00				
kdh20	0.02	-0.14	-0.04	0.05	0.36	0.24	-0.15	1.00			
smer20	0.65	-0.49	0.64	-0.60	0.75	-0.43	-0.45	0.02	1.00		
mko20	-0.67	-0.23	-0.52	-0.17	-0.47	-0.28	-0.18	-0.40	-0.50	1.00	
lsns20	0.33	-0.54	0.56	-0.58	0.60	-0.27	-0.52	0.07	0.62	-0.36	1.00

Table S.35: Elections 2020 – correlations among the ideological blocks' election results

	lp20	rp20	nap20	ivp20
lp20	1.00			
rp20	-0.32	1.00		
nap20	-0.40	-0.53	1.00	
ivp20	-0.19	0.53	-0.75	1.00