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# About time: The narrowing gender wage gap in Austria 

by

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Working Paper No. 1918
October 2019

# About time: The narrowing gender wage gap in Austria* 

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October 2019


#### Abstract

We examine the gender wage gap in Austria from 2005 to 2017 using data from EU-SILC. The raw wage gap declined from $18.6 \log$ points in 2005 to $14.9 \log$ points in 2017. We use standard decomposition techniques that correct for differences in the distributions of human capital, and other variables, between men and women. All calculated decompositions indicate that the unexplained part of the gender wage gap decreased substantially over the last ten years. The decrease of the unexplained gender wage gap between the largest gap in this period (2006) and the most recent gap (2017) ranges from $3.7 \log$ points to $8.5 \log$ points depending on the decomposition approach. Using the approach developed by Neumark (1988), the corrected wage gap shrank from 8.7 (8.8) log points in 2005 (2006) to 5.1 log points in 2017. The main reason for the decline in wage differences is the relative improvement of women's observed and unobserved characteristics.


JEL Classifications: J31, J71
Keywords: gender wage differentials, wage inequality, decomposition, EU-SILC

[^1]
## 1 Introduction

Goldin (2014) recently demonstrated that the US gender wage gap is much smaller than it had once been and she concludes that this decline is the result of increases in the human capital of women relative to men. In contrast, Blau and Kahn (2017), using PSID data for 1980-2010, stress that because US women exceed men in educational attainment by now, traditional human capital factors, although they were essential for the narrowing of the gender wage gap, explain little of the still existing wage gap. In addition, the unexplained component of the US gender wage gap did not fall much between the 1990s and 2010. They conclude that differences in the selection into occupations and industries are the most important aspect of the persistent US gender wage gap.

Böheim, Himpele, Mahringer and Zulehner (2013) summarize several studies of the gender wage gap in Austria and conclude that the gender wage gap hardly changed during the 1990s and that it decreased between 2002 and 2007 (Böheim, Hofer and Zulehner, 2007; Böheim et al., 2013). However, there is no study for Austria that uses a consistent source of data to analyze such development over a longer time. Earlier work used different data or different empirical methods. See, for example, Zweimüller and Winter-Ebmer (1994), Pointner and Stiglbauer (2010), Bundesministerium für Frauen (2010), Grandner and Gstach (2015) or Christl and Köppl-Turyna (2019). This makes an assessment of the gender wage gap's evolution over time difficult.

We provide an analysis of the development of the gender wage gap in Austria for the period 2005 to 2017, using data from the Austrian EU-SILC (Statistik Austria, 2018). The EU-SILC is the only long-term, yearly survey which is currently available for Austria. It provides a range of personal characteristics and job-specific information which allows us to contrast changes over time, using a unified and consistent approach. In our sample of workers from the private and public sector, the wage gap without controlling for any differences between men and women declined from 18.6 (20.7) $\log$ points in 2005 (2006) to 15.0 log points in 2017 . For workers in the private sector, this raw gap declined from 21.6 (23.6) in 2005 (2006) to 13.5 in 2017.

We expect to find a narrowing of the gender wage gap over this period for several reasons. First, women have become more attached to the labor market over the last decades. Women's labor force participation rate in Austria in 2005 was $51.3 \%$ and it was $55.9 \%$ in 2017 (OECD, 2019). In contrast, men's participation rates were $66.4 \%$ in 2005 and $66.8 \%$ in 2017. Second, women's
educational attainment increased over time (Statistik Austria, 2019a). In 2000, $84.9 \%$ of women who were between 20 and 24 years of age had at least upper secondary level education; among men, it was $85.3 \%$. By 2017, $90.2 \%$ of women and $84.7 \%$ of men aged 20 to 24 years of age had at least upper secondary education. Thirdly, the gender wage gap regularly features in political debates and several attempts have been made to address unfair wage discrimination by gender. For example, since 2014, banks have been required to formulate a quota for the board of directors and the executive directors to improve the representation of underrepresented workers (Wieser and Fischeneder, 2019).

However, there are also reasons to expect little change in the gender wage gap over time. Although women's labor market participation increased, much of this increase is due to an increase in part-time work. In 2005, women's part-time rate was $40.4 \%$ and it was $48.3 \%$ in 2017. In contrast, men's part-time rate increased from $5.7 \%$ in 2005 to $11.0 \%$ in 2017. In terms of education, women and men tend to choose different fields and there has been little change over the years. For example, in the winter term of $2005,10.3 \%$ of all male students and $7.9 \%$ of all female students enrolled in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) studies. ${ }^{1}$ In 2017, these numbers were $14.1 \%$ and $11.5 \%$. In 2005, the most popular profession for female apprentices was sales ( $24.9 \%$ ) and it was automotive engineering for male apprentices (8.6\%). ${ }^{2}$ In 2017, $23.5 \%$ of female apprentices trained in sales, which was the most popular profession among women (Wirtschaftskammer Österreich, 2018). Among men, automotive engineering was only the third most popular choice (9.5\%) and metal engineering was the most popular (13.7\%). While there have been political initiatives and legal reforms to reduce the gender wage gap, for example, quotas for the board of directors in large companies, most of these seem to mainly raise awareness as they do not involve penalties or fines.

We decompose the gender wage gap into an explained and into an unexplained part, using standard decomposition methods (Blinder, 1973; Cotton, 1988; Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1991; Neumark, 1988; Oaxaca, 1973; Oaxaca and Ransom, 1995; Reimers, 1983) to analyze which characteristics are associated with the evolution of the gender wage gap over time. In this way, our results contribute to the public debate which usually focuses on the question of how much of this difference

[^2]is based on differences in characteristics, and how much is not based on such differences, perhaps due to unfair treatment of women. (Unequal treatment either due to prevailing gender stereotypes or limited access, e.g. to certain educational tracks or occupations, can, of course, result in observed differences.)

Alternatively, a part of the gender wage gap might be due to other factors not included in analyses. Our results allow an assessment if and how women's improved human capital, such as educational attainment and labor market experience, contribute to a closing of the gender wage gap. All calculated decompositions indicate that the unexplained part of the gender wage gap decreased substantially over the last ten years. The decrease of the unexplained gender wage gap between the largest gap in this period (2006) and the most recent gap (2017) ranges from 3.7 log points to $8.5 \log$ points depending on the decomposition approach. Using the decomposition method by Neumark (1988), we find that the gap corrected for human capital, occupation and other explanatory variables shrank from 8.7 (8.8) log points in 2005 (2006) to $5.1 \log$ points in 2017. In the private sector, the corrected gap declined from 9.9 (9.5) in 2005 (2006) to $5.1 \log$ points in 2017. The main determinant of the decline in both samples is the relative improvement of the women's observed and unobserved characteristics.

## 2 Data

We use data from the Austrian European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EUSILC) covering the years 2005 to 2017 (Statistik Austria, 2018). EU-SILC is an annual survey of about 6,000 households with about 14,000 persons. The survey is a combined cross-sectional and longitudinal survey where each year about a quarter of observations are dropped from the survey, while a similar number of observations is added. Each quarter of the sample remains in the survey for four years. The survey collects data on income, poverty, social exclusion, housing, labor, education, and health at the household and individual levels.

Our empirical analysis uses wage regressions that also control for sample selection using a Heckman procedure (Heckman, 1979). We include persons aged 20-60 years who work in the public or the private sector and analyze the wage of their main job. We repeat some of our analyses also for the private sector separately and show the results in the Appendices A (tables) and B (figures).

EU-SILC does not provide an hourly wage. We calculate the hourly gross wage by dividing the usual monthly earnings (including overtime and bonuses) by the number of usual hours in paid work and deflate all wage data to prices of 2014, using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) (Statistik Austria, 2019b). To control for different probabilities of working in the wage regressions, we add non-working persons to our sample.

Table 1 shows the average gross hourly wages for men and women, 2005-2017. Wages are deflated using the CPI with the base year in 2014 (Statistik Austria, 2019b). During this period, average wages increased moderately. Men's average wages were Euro 15.35 in 2005 and Euro 16.06 in 2017. Women's average wages increased from Euro 13.02 in 2005 to Euro 13.76 in 2017. ${ }^{3}$ Men's average hours fluctuated moderately at around 41 hours/week over the period. Women work on average about $20 \%$ fewer hours per week than men, their hours fluctuated around 33 hours/week. ${ }^{4}$ The summary statistics of all other variables for the years 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017 are shown in Tables A. 2 (personal characteristics) and A. 3 (job characteristics) in Appendix A.

## 3 Empirical Methods

In our empirical analyses, we examine how wage differences between men and women in Austria have evolved over time. We first analyze the wage gap for each year from 2005 until 2017 using Blinder-Oacaxa-type decompositions (Blinder, 1973; Cotton, 1988; Neumark, 1988; Oaxaca, 1973; Oaxaca and Ransom, 1995; Reimers, 1983). The descriptive analysis shows an increase in the wage differential at the beginning of our observation period and a decrease towards the end of the period. As we are particularly interested which variables contribute to the observed changes, we analyze in a second step the change in the wage gap between 2006, when the gender wage gap was the greatest in this period, and 2017, the latest available data, using Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition techniques (Juhn et al., 1991).

We decompose the differences in the mean wages of women and men based on the technique

[^3]Table 1: Average wages and usual weekly hours, 2005-2017, by gender.

| Year | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Men |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Wage | 15.35 | 15.50 | 15.60 | 15.23 | 16.24 | 16.40 | 16.21 | 16.14 | 16.11 | 16.30 | 16.27 | 16.50 | 16.06 |
| Hours | 41.04 | 40.64 | 42.01 | 42.19 | 41.74 | 41.33 | 40.95 | 41.26 | 41.32 | 40.47 | 40.79 | 40.85 | 41.96 |
| Obs. | 2390 | 2691 | 2991 | 2359 | 2303 | 2499 | 2445 | 2263 | 2280 | 2277 | 2276 | 2304 | 2308 |
|  | Women |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Wage | 13.02 | 12.77 | 12.78 | 12.61 | 13.81 | 13.88 | 13.63 | 13.41 | 13.37 | 13.76 | 13.82 | 14.11 | 13.76 |
| Hours | 33.19 | 33.48 | 32.85 | 33.47 | 33.08 | 33.25 | 33.07 | 32.63 | 33.13 | 32.27 | 32.30 | 32.48 | 32.55 |
| Obs. | 1942 | 2255 | 2567 | 2067 | 2094 | 2295 | 2315 | 2227 | 2148 | 2166 | 2218 | 2217 | 2344 |

Notes: Austrian EU-SILC data 2005-2017 (Statistik Austria, 2018). Gross hourly wages in Euros, deflated using the CPI (base year is 2014).
first developed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). We estimate wage equations separately for women $(W)$ and men ( $M$ ) with ordinary least squares,

$$
\begin{equation*}
\ln y_{i g}=\beta_{g} X_{i g}+\epsilon_{i g}, \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $y_{i g}$ is the hourly wage of worker $i, i=1, \ldots, N$, of gender $g, g=M, W ; \beta_{g}$ are the coefficients to be estimated; $X_{i g}$ is a vector of characteristics; and $\epsilon_{i g}$ is an i.i.d. error. Besides indicators for human capital, family structure, occupation, and firm characteristics, we also include a Heckman selection term in $X_{i g}$ to account for different probabilities of working (Heckman, 1979). We use as identifying variables the number of children between 0 and 2 , betwee 3 and 5 , between 6 and 9 , as well as those between 10 and 18 . We also use the health status of the partner as an exclusion restriction. The underlying assumption is that children and chronically sick partners constrain the possibility for paid work, but do not impact on the wage itself. (This assumption might be violated if, for example, persons with children have lower bargaining power over wages.)

The difference in the mean wages, $Y_{g}$, can be decomposed (Oaxaca and Ransom, 1995):

$$
\begin{equation*}
Y_{M}-Y_{W}=\hat{\beta}^{*}\left(\bar{X}_{M}-\bar{X}_{W}\right)+\left(\hat{\beta}_{M}-\hat{\beta}^{*}\right) \bar{X}_{M}+\left(\hat{\beta}^{*}-\hat{\beta}_{W}\right) \bar{X}_{W}, \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $\hat{\beta}^{*}$ is a weighted average of the coefficient vectors, i.e., $\hat{\beta}^{*}=\Omega \hat{\beta}_{M}+(I-\Omega) \hat{\beta}_{W}$, with a weighting matrix $\Omega$ and the identity matrix $I$. The first term on the right-hand side of equation (2) is the difference between men and women in their mean characteristics, evaluated at $\hat{\beta}^{*}$. It is that part of the wage gap that is due to observable differences, for example, proxies for productivity such as educational attainment. The sum of the second and the third term is the part of the wage gap which cannot be ascribed to observed differences. We calculate the decomposition separately for each year in our sample.

The decompositions proposed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) represent special cases of equation (2), where $\Omega$ is either equal to $I$ or the null-matrix. In the first case, equation (2) corresponds to the "male-based" decomposition which assumes that men are paid their marginal product and women are negatively discriminated against. In contrast, when $\Omega$ is the null-matrix, a "female-based" view assumes that women are paid their marginal product and men are positively discriminated against. We first follow Neumark (1988) and Oaxaca and Ransom (1995) and estimate
a pooled model to derive the counterfactual coefficient vector $\hat{\beta}^{*}$. We then also apply Reimers (1983) who assumes $\hat{\beta}^{*}=(1 / 2) \hat{\beta}_{M}+(1 / 2) \hat{\beta}_{W}$. Finally, because the number of men, $n_{M}$, and the number of women, $n_{W}$, are typically different, we use Cotton (1988) who weights the coefficients by the group sizes, $n_{M}$ and $n_{W}$, i.e., $\hat{\beta}^{*}=\left[n_{M} /\left(n_{M}+n_{W}\right)\right] \hat{\beta}_{M}+\left[n_{W} /\left(n_{M}+n_{W}\right)\right] \hat{\beta}_{F}$.

For the second part of our analysis, we decompose the differences in the gender wage gap over time into a portion due to gender-specific factors and a portion due to differences in the overall level of wage inequality (Juhn et al., 1991). ${ }^{5}$ Suppose that wages for worker $i$ of gender $g$ in period $t$ is given by the following equation:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\ln y_{i g t}=\beta_{g t} X_{i g t}+\sigma_{g t} \theta_{i g t}, \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $y_{i g t}$ are gross hourly wages, $X_{i g t}$ is a vector of explanatory variables including a Heckman selection term, $\beta_{g t}$ is a vector of explanatory coefficients, $\theta_{i g t}$ is a standardized residual (i.e., with mean zero and a variance of one for each point in time), and $\sigma_{g t}$ is the period's residual standard deviation of wages (i.e., the unexplained level of wage inequality among men).

The difference in the average wages of men and women at time $t$ is given by:

$$
\begin{equation*}
D_{t}=Y_{M t}-Y_{W t}=\beta_{t}\left(X_{M t}-X_{W t}\right)+\sigma_{t}\left(\theta_{m t}-\theta_{f t}\right)=\beta_{t} \Delta X_{t}+\sigma_{t} \Delta \theta_{t}, \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $Y_{g t}$ refers to average wages of men and women at time $t$, and $\Delta$ is the difference operator. A change in the difference between two periods $t$ and $s$ can be decomposed as:

$$
\begin{align*}
D_{t}-D_{s} & =\beta_{s}\left(\Delta X_{t}-\Delta X_{s}\right)+\left(\beta_{t}-\beta_{s}\right) \Delta X_{s}+\left(\beta_{t}-\beta_{s}\right)\left(\Delta X_{t}-\Delta X_{s}\right) \\
& +\sigma_{s}\left(\Delta \theta_{t}-\Delta \theta_{s}\right)+\left(\sigma_{t}-\sigma_{s}\right) \Delta \theta_{s}+\left(\sigma_{t}-\sigma_{s}\right)\left(\Delta \theta_{t}-\Delta \theta_{s}\right) . \tag{5}
\end{align*}
$$

The first term on the right-hand side measures the change in the differences in observed characteristics $X$ between men and women over time. It describes how differences between men and women in, for example, educational attainment or experience have changed over time. The second term measures how the differences in the observed returns to education or experience have changed over time. A negative change can be interpreted as a reduction in differences in returns to education.

[^4]The third term adjusts for simultaneous changes in quantities and prices (to avoid double-counting). The fourth term measures the effect of differences in the relative residual wage position of men and women over time, i.e., the relative ranking of women within the male residual wage distribution. Such differences in rankings may reflect gender differences in unmeasured characteristics or the impact of labor market discrimination against women. Unmeasured characteristics could be negotiation outcomes (Artz, Goodall and Oswald, 2018) or personality traits as the propensity to compete. Research by, for example, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) has shown that women shy away from competition and men compete too much. With this term we may measure how differences in these characteristics change over time. Again, a negative term may indicate that women have caught up in these characteristics over time. The fifth term measures the part of the wage gap that is due to changes in residual inequality, i.e., how changes in unobserved prices for the unobserved quantities affect the change in the wage gap. This term assesses the changing prices, for example, for the propensity to compete or that the amount of discrimination has changed over time. The last term again adjusts for simultaneous changes in unobserved quantities and unobserved prices.

## 4 Decomposition Results

We start with a presentation of the results of several Blinder-Oaxaca-type decompositions for each year from 2005 until 2017. The raw gender wage gap increased between 2005 and 2006, where it reached a peak. After 2006, the gender wage gap fluctuated around a downward trend. We, therefore, choose 2006 and 2017 as the reference years for our further analyses. In particular, we calculate decompositions for these years adding sets of explanatory variables to the regression model sequentially. We show these results in section 4.2 . Then, in section 4.3 , we show which variables contributed to the changes in the gap between 2006 and 2017. Finally, in section 4.4 , we present the results of Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decompositions for 2006 and 2017 to assess the contribution of variables and prices to the change in the raw gender wage gap. ${ }^{6}$

[^5]Table 2: Gender wage decompositions, 2005-2017.

| Year | Wage <br> Gap | Difference <br> over time | Explained <br> gap | Difference <br> over time | Unexplained <br> gap | Difference <br> over time |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 2005 | 0.1862 |  | 0.0988 |  | 0.0874 |  |
| 2006 | 0.2071 | 0.0210 | 0.1190 | 0.0202 | 0.0881 | 0.0008 |
| 2007 | 0.2040 | -0.0031 | 0.1154 | -0.0036 | 0.0887 | 0.0005 |
| 2008 | 0.1941 | -0.0099 | 0.1109 | -0.0045 | 0.0832 | -0.0054 |
| 2009 | 0.1711 | -0.0230 | 0.1002 | -0.0107 | 0.0709 | -0.0124 |
| 2010 | 0.1605 | -0.0106 | 0.0925 | -0.0077 | 0.0679 | -0.0029 |
| 2011 | 0.1654 | 0.0050 | 0.0999 | 0.0073 | 0.0656 | -0.0024 |
| 2012 | 0.1874 | 0.0220 | 0.1069 | 0.0070 | 0.0806 | 0.0150 |
| 2013 | 0.1870 | -0.0005 | 0.1150 | 0.0081 | 0.0720 | -0.0086 |
| 2014 | 0.1716 | -0.0154 | 0.1003 | -0.0147 | 0.0713 | -0.0007 |
| 2015 | 0.1624 | -0.0092 | 0.0921 | -0.0081 | 0.0702 | -0.0010 |
| 2016 | 0.1574 | -0.0050 | 0.0959 | 0.0038 | 0.0615 | -0.0088 |
| 2017 | 0.1489 | -0.0085 | 0.0982 | 0.0023 | 0.0507 | -0.0108 |
| 2006 | 0.2071 |  | 0.1190 |  | 0.0881 |  |
| 2017 | 0.1489 | -0.0582 | 0.0982 | -0.0207 | 0.0507 | -0.0375 |

Notes: Results from Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions. Dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly gross wages.

### 4.1 Results of Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for all years

In Table 2, we present the results from decompositions of the gender wage gap for the years 2005 until 2017. In each year, we use the year's pooled sample as the reference distribution (Neumark, 1988). In 2005 , the average gender wage gap was $18.62 \log$ points, which increased to 20.71 log points in 2006. This is a difference of about $2.1 \log$ points. After 2006, the gender wage gap shrank over time, fluctuating around a downward trend. It was 16.05 log points in $2010,18.74 \mathrm{log}$ points in $2012,17.16 \log$ points in 2014 and fell to 14.89 in 2017. From 2006 until 2017, the change amounted to $5.8 \log$ points. The decomposition results indicate that over the whole period the unexplained gender wage gap decreased as well. In 2005, the differences in observed characteristics explained $9.88 \log$ points of the total gap, or $53 \%$, the unexplained part was $8.74 \log$ points. The unexplained part was $8.81 \log$ points (42\%) in 2006 and $5.07 \log$ points (34\%) in 2017. From 2006 until 2017, the unexplained part of the wage gap declined by 3.75 log points.

These results indicate that the reduction in the raw gender wage gap was driven by a change in the explained and the unexplained gap. Both a reduction in the difference between men's and

Table 3: Comparison of decompositions from 2005 until 2017.

| Year | Wage difference | Unexplained gap |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | :--- | ---: | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  |  |  | Neumark | Female <br> dummy | Reimers | Cotton | Male <br> based |
| 2005 | 0.1862 | 0.0874 | 0.1430 | 0.1524 | 0.1544 | 0.1332 |  |
| 2006 | 0.2071 |  | 0.0881 | 0.1458 | 0.1524 | 0.1540 | 0.1350 |
| 2007 | 0.2040 | 0.0887 | 0.1477 | 0.1557 | 0.1573 | 0.1348 |  |
| 2008 | 0.1941 | 0.0832 | 0.1358 | 0.1521 | 0.1535 | 0.1306 |  |
| 2009 | 0.1711 | 0.0709 | 0.1181 | 0.1373 | 0.1397 | 0.0862 |  |
| 2010 | 0.1605 | 0.0679 | 0.1112 | 0.1223 | 0.1229 | 0.1090 |  |
| 2011 | 0.1654 | 0.0656 | 0.1040 | 0.1071 | 0.1079 | 0.0761 |  |
| 2012 | 0.1874 | 0.0806 | 0.1329 | 0.1450 | 0.1452 | 0.1183 |  |
| 2013 | 0.1870 | 0.0720 | 0.1201 | 0.1149 | 0.1158 | 0.0837 |  |
| 2014 | 0.1716 | 0.0713 | 0.1199 | 0.1217 | 0.1226 | 0.0873 |  |
| 2015 | 0.1624 | 0.0702 | 0.1193 | 0.1320 | 0.1324 | 0.1034 |  |
| 2016 | 0.1574 | 0.0615 | 0.1018 | 0.1022 | 0.1026 | 0.0852 |  |
| 2017 | 0.1489 | 0.0507 | 0.0820 | 0.0903 | 0.0904 | 0.0499 |  |
| 2006 | 0.2071 | 0.0881 | 0.1458 | 0.1524 | 0.1540 | 0.1350 |  |
| 2017 | 0.1489 | 0.0507 | 0.0820 | 0.0903 | 0.0904 | 0.0499 |  |

Notes: Results from various decompositions. Dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly gross wages.
women's observable characteristics as well as in unobservable characteristics contributed to a lower gap over time. In Appendix A in Table A.6, we also present results of a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition where we use only observations of private-sector workers. We observe the same pattern as in the overall sample. The raw gender wage gap was, however, wider than in the overall sample and declined more pronouncedly.

To assess the robustness of these results, we also calculated the explained and unexplained gap from several other decomposition approaches. In Table 3, we present results from a male-based decomposition (Blinder (1973), Oaxaca (1973)), from a coefficient weighting scheme as proposed by Reimers (1983) and Cotton (1988), and from a decomposition that uses a pooled regression with a group dummy variable. The decrease of the unexplained gender wage gap between 2006 and 2017 ranges from 3.7 log points to 8.5 log points depending on the decomposition approach. While the true counterfactual wage distribution is unknown, all calculated decompositions indicate that the unexplained part of the gender wage gap decreased substantially over the last ten years.

Figure 1 is a graphical representation of Table 3 for selected decompositions. We observe a declining gender wage gap both with and without controlling for differences in characteristics, such
as education, experience, occupation, industry, degree of urbanization, firm size, and hierarchy level. ${ }^{7}$

Figure 1: Gender wage gap in Austria, 2005-2017.


Notes: Austrian EU-SILC data 2005-2017 (Statistik Austria, 2018). Raw gap and residuals from various decompositions.

### 4.2 Results of step-wise Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for 2006 and 2017

To illustrate the effect of human capital variables such as education and experience in comparison to occupation, industry, hierarchy, and other explanatory variables, we estimate Blinder-Oacaxa-type decompositions adding groups of explanatory variables sequentially. We start with a specification that only includes indicators for formal educational attainment. In a next step, we add variables related to experience, followed by occupation, status, and degree of urbanization. Finally, we add firm size and position in the corporate hierarchy. We present the results for 2006 and 2017 in Table 4.

In 2006, the raw wage gap was 20.71 log points. Using Neumark (1988)'s approach, about $14 \%$

[^6]of this difference is attributed to the different educational attainments that men and women have in our sample. The thus corrected gap is about $17.84 \log$ points, i.e., $86.1 \%$ of the wage gap cannot be explained by differences in educational background. Observed characteristics which are related to labor market experience (experience, marital status, and part-time work) reduce the gap further to about $12.08 \log$ points, or $58.3 \%$ of the raw gap. This shows that the difference between men and women in labor market experience explains a substantial part of the gender wage gap. Additional characteristics such as status, occupation, industry, degree of urbanization, and country of origin reduce the gap to $10.39 \log$ points, or about half of the uncorrected gap. Accounting for differences in the size of firms and the hierarchy levels of men and women reduce the gap to $8.81 \log$ points, which leaves $42.5 \%$ of the gender wag gap unexplained.

Comparing these numbers with those from 2017 shows that in 2017 differences between men and women in education contributed less to explaining the gender wage gap. This indicates that men and women differed less in their education in 2017 than in 2006. The gender gap in 2017 was 14.89 and differences in education explain about $3.4 \%$ of the overall wage gap. In other words, accounting for differences in formal education between men and women leaves $96.6 \%$ of the wage gap unexplained. However, differences in labor market experience are related to differences in wages. The wage gap after accounting for differences in education and experience is 9.34 log points, which leaves $62.7 \%$ of the gap unexplained. ${ }^{8}$ Accounting for differences in status, occupation, industry, degree of urbanization, and country of origin reduces the gap to $6.26 \log$ points ( $42 \%$ ). ${ }^{9}$ Accounting for different firm sizes and hierarchy levels lowers the unexplained gap to $5.07 \log$ points $(34 \%) .{ }^{10}$

In Table 4, we also show the results using the approach by Reimers (1983). We observe a similar pattern. However, the share of the unexplained part is larger than for the decomposition by Neumark (1988).

[^7]Table 4: Decomposition of wage differentials, 2006 and 2017.

| Estimated value | $(1)$ | $(2)$ | $(3)$ | $(4)$ | $(5)$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2006 Neumark (1988) | 0.2071 | 0.1784 | 0.1208 | 0.1039 | 0.0881 |
| in \% of the mean wage differential | 100.0 | 86.1 | 58.3 | 50.1 | 42.6 |
| 2006 Reimers (1983) | 0.2071 | 0.2030 | 0.1598 | 0.1736 | 0.1524 |
| in \% of the mean wage differential | 100.0 | 98.0 | 77.2 | 83.8 | 73.6 |
| 2017 Neumark (1988) | 0.1489 | 0.1438 | 0.0934 | 0.0626 | 0.0507 |
| in \% of the mean wage differential | 100.0 | 96.5 | 62.7 | 42.0 | 34.0 |
| 2017 Reimers (1983) | 0.1489 | 0.1539 | 0.1187 | 0.1093 | 0.0903 |
| in \% of the mean wage differential | 100.0 | 103.4 | 79.7 | 73.4 | 60.6 |
| Education |  |  | $\times$ | $\times$ | $\times$ |
| Experience, marital status, part-time |  |  | $\times$ | $\times$ | $\times$ |
| Status, occupation, industry, region, citizenship |  |  |  | $\times$ | $\times$ |
| Firm size, hierarchy |  |  |  |  | $\times$ |

Notes: Results from Blinder-Oaxaca-type decompositions. The dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly gross wages. All regressions include the inverse Mill's ratio to account for different probabilities of working.

### 4.3 Detailed Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for 2006 and 2017

In Table 5, we show detailed decomposition results for the years 2006 and 2017 and the contributions to the explained and the unexplained part. Contrasting the results from 2006 and 2017 in detail, we conclude that on average men and women have become more similar in many observed characteristics. This is illustrated by the estimated coefficients tabulated in the first panel ("explained") of Table 5. Women have acquired notably more labor market experience over time and, on average, have become more similar to men in this respect. This can be seen in the estimated explained contribution to the gender wage, which in 2006 was about $3.1 \log$ points. This estimate implies that because women had less labor market experience than men, they earned on average lower wages than men. By 2017, this difference had become smaller and differences in labor market experience were responsible for about $1.5 \log$ points of the average gender wage gap. For industrial segregation, however, we see an increased divergence, where observed differences between men and women are to a greater extent responsible for observed differences in wages.

In the second panel of Table 5 we detail the contributions to the unexplained part of the gender wage gap. A negative (positive) unexplained contribution factor implies that for similar women and men, the wage gap increased (decreased) for reasons not related to differences in the characteristic. We estimate that, if men and women had exactly the same characteristics, women
would earn on average about $8.8 \log$ points less than men in 2006. For 2017, we estimate this gap at $5.07 \log$ points. This implies that men and women receive different wages for the same observed characteristics, but this difference in wage has reduced over time. For example, married men or men living in a partnership received a wage premium in 2006 of 6.39 log points in comparison to married women or women in a partnership. This premium decreased over time and in 2017 we estimate it at $0.16 \log$ points.

However, there are also observed characteristics where women earned more than comparable men. For example, the gender wage gap of 2006 is estimated to have been lower by $5.3 \log$ points if women had the same educational characteristics as men. In other words, women in 2006 had received higher educational wage premia relative to men. By 2017, however, women did no longer receive educational premia, but instead earned lower wages, which lead to a greater wage gap of about $1.19 \log$ points.

Theoretically, it could be possible that women who are highly productive, and would therefore command a high wage, do not receive a corresponding wage offer. If this were the case, these women are likely to decide against participating in the labor market - and women who actually work are those who are, on average, less productive. Or, in contrast, employed women are those who are on average more productive when the less productive do not receive a sufficiently high wage offer. An observed gender wage gap could be due to such differences in participation due to underlying differences in productivity. We control for such selection and estimate that women who work are, on average, not much different to working men. This can be seen by the relatively low estimated contribution of the explained and unexplained component due to selection, their sum was about $0.08 \log \log$ points in 2006 and about -0.36 log points in 2017.

### 4.4 Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition for 2006 and 2017

In Table 6, we present the decompositions of the change of the gender wage gap over time into three components (Juhn et al., 1991). The three components are calculated separately for the changes in the explained and in the unexplained part of the gender wage gap. The first component attributes changes to changes in the groups' characteristics over time, "quantity effect", the second component to changes in residual inequality, i.e., changes in prices ("price effect"), and the third component to

Table 5: Detailed decomposition of wage differentials in 2006 and 2017.

|  |  | 2006 |  | 2017 |  |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  |  | Coef. | Std. Err. | Coef. | Std. Err. |
| Explained | Sum | 0.1190 | 0.0004 | 0.0982 | 0.0004 |
|  | Origin* | -0.0007 | 0.0000 | 0.0004 | 0.0000 |
|  | Urbanization* | -0.0007 | 0.0000 | -0.0001 | 0.0000 |
|  | Education* | -0.0069 | 0.0002 | -0.0117 | 0.0001 |
|  | Experience* | 0.0308 | 0.0001 | 0.0154 | 0.0001 |
|  | Occupation* | 0.0323 | 0.0002 | 0.0281 | 0.0002 |
|  | Industry* | 0.0105 | 0.0002 | 0.0421 | 0.0002 |
|  | Hierarchy* | 0.0218 | 0.0001 | 0.0209 | 0.0001 |
|  | Occ. status* | -0.0100 | 0.0001 | -0.0182 | 0.0001 |
|  | Cohabiting partner | 0.0004 | 0.0000 | -0.0005 | 0.0000 |
|  | Firm size $\geq 10$ | 0.0109 | 0.0001 | 0.0113 | 0.0001 |
|  | Part-time | 0.0175 | 0.0002 | 0.0092 | 0.0002 |
|  | Mills ratio | 0.0131 | 0.0002 | 0.0014 | 0.0001 |
| Unexplained | Sum | 0.0881 | 0.0003 | 0.0507 | 0.0003 |
|  | Origin* | 0.0432 | 0.0010 | 0.0440 | 0.0008 |
|  | Urbanization* | 0.0209 | 0.0005 | 0.0034 | 0.0005 |
|  | Education* | -0.0533 | 0.0011 | 0.0119 | 0.0011 |
|  | Experience* | -0.0025 | 0.0013 | 0.0301 | 0.0011 |
|  | Occupation* | -0.0190 | 0.0008 | -0.0338 | 0.0008 |
|  | Industry* | -0.0449 | 0.0011 | -0.0195 | 0.0010 |
|  | Hierarchy* | -0.0026 | 0.0003 | -0.0120 | 0.0003 |
|  | Occ. status* | -0.0028 | 0.0004 | -0.0049 | 0.0003 |
|  | Cohabiting partner | 0.0639 | 0.0006 | 0.0016 | 0.0005 |
|  | Firm size $\geq 10$ | 0.0223 | 0.0007 | -0.0134 | 0.0006 |
|  | Part-time | -0.0265 | 0.0002 | -0.0277 | 0.0002 |
| Mills ratio | -0.0123 | 0.0005 | -0.0050 | 0.0004 |  |
| Constant | 0.1017 | 0.0027 | 0.0760 | 0.0025 |  |
| Observations | 4,946 |  | 4,628 |  |  |
|  | Observations men | 2,691 |  | 2,308 |  |
| Observations women | 2,255 |  | 2,320 |  |  |

Notes: Results from Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions. The dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly gross wages. The inverse Mill's ratio accounts for differences in participation.
simultaneous changes in characteristics and prices ("interaction effect").
We estimate that the gender wage gap decreased between 2006 and 2017. Using the decomposition based on pooled regressions as reference wage distribution, we find that both the explained and the unexplained components decreased. However, the unexplained part is estimated to have decreased more than the explained part. In line with the Oaxaca-Blinder-type decompositions, we
find that the gender wage gap in hourly gross wages declined between 2006 and 2017 (-5.82 log points). The smaller gap was mainly due to a smaller explained component of the wage gap, which is decreasing from about 11.90 in 2006 to 9.82 log points in 2017, a difference of 2.07 . The unexplained part of the wage gap decreased from 8.81 in 2006 to 5.07 log points in 2017, a difference of 3.75. The change in the explained part of the gender wage gap and the change of the unexplained part were both due to a substantial shift in observed and unobserved characteristics. Men and women became more similar in those characteristics which are valued in the labor market. ${ }^{11}$

The main factor that contributed to a smaller gender wage gap over time was the convergence in observed and unobserved characteristics. This can be seen by the two quantity effects, tabulated in Table 6 , which are $-3.5 \log$ points due to changed observed characteristics and $-3.25 \log$ points due to changes in unobserved characteristics. Reasons for the reduction in unobserved characteristics could have been policies that helped women to catch up with men. For example, the change in the equal treatment law that urged firms to be more open about the wages they pay their workers may have provided better guidance for wage negotiations. Riley-Bowles, Babcock and McGinn (2005), for example, show that women tend to negotiate more effectively when there is less ambiguity about wages. Additionally, the change in parental leave subsidies introduced in 2010 or the increase in childcare facilities that started in 2007, may have increased women's labor market attachment.

Applying Reimers (1983)'s weighting scheme supports the finding that an increase in the similarity of men's and women's characteristics was the main driver for the decline in the gender wage gap. We estimate a change of $-3.0(-5.3)$ log points due to changed observed (unobserved) characteristics. Unlike the results from Neumark (1988)'s approach, the change in the gender wage gap was hardly affected by the changes in the explained part as the increasing similarity between men and women was offset by increasing gender-specific differences in how these characteristics are valued (3.33 log points).

In Table 7, we show how various variables contributed to the reduction in the explained part of the gender wage gap based on Neumark (1988). We observe that women caught up in their educational attainments and labor market experience. Smaller gender-specific differences in occupational segregation and in having a leading position reduced the gender wage gap. Most reductions are driven by the quantity effect, where a negative contribution indicates that men and women became

[^8]Table 6: Decomposition of the change in the gender wage gap between 2006 and 2017.

|  | Neumark (1988) | Reimers (1983) |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| Overall change | -0.0582 | -0.0582 |
| Change in the explained gap | -0.0207 | 0.0039 |
| Quantity effect | -0.0350 | -0.0304 |
| Price effect | 0.0066 | 0.0333 |
| Interaction effect | 0.0077 | 0.0011 |
| Change in the unexplained gap | -0.0375 | -0.0621 |
| Quantity effect | -0.0325 | -0.0532 |
| Price effect | -0.0074 | -0.0132 |
| Interaction effect | 0.0024 | 0.0043 |

Notes: Results from Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decompositions. Dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly gross wages.
more similar. A positive price effect, for example, wage differences associated with wages in economic sectors (industry), widened the wage gap and off-set some gains due to more similarity in observable characteristics. We interpret this as evidence that women receive lower wages when they (increasingly) work in male-dominated industries.

The quantitative most important part of the change in the gender wage gap between 2006 and 2017 was, however, the reduction in the unexplained gap. This reduction is mainly determined by fewer differences in unobservable characteristics, which could include negotiation skills. To a smaller extent, the reduction in the unexplained gap is also caused by a price effect, i.e., a smaller difference in how unobserved characteristics are priced.

## 5 Gap over the business cycle

In the final step of our empirical analysis, we relate the gender wage gap to the business cycle. We use the unemployment rate as a measure of the business cycle and show the correlation with the raw and with the corrected gender wage gap in Figure 2. We observe that the unemployment rate is negatively correlated with both the raw and the corrected gender wage gap. The higher the unemployment rate, the lower the gender wage gap.

To assess this effect in more detail, we also estimate OLS regressions where we use different measures of the gender wage gap (raw, Heckman adjusted, explained, and unexplained) as dependent

Table 7: Gender wage gap decomposition 2006-2017, contribution of characteristics.

|  | Difference in <br> predicted gap | Quantity <br> effect | Price <br> effect | Interaction <br> effect |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Total | -0.0207 | -0.0350 | 0.0066 | 0.0077 |
| Origin* | 0.0011 | 0.0010 | 0.0001 | 0.0001 |
| Urbanization* | 0.0006 | 0.0000 | 0.0007 | -0.0002 |
| Education* | -0.0048 | -0.0054 | -0.0024 | 0.0030 |
| Experience* | -0.0154 | -0.0115 | -0.0023 | -0.0016 |
| Occupation* | -0.0042 | -0.0145 | 0.0084 | 0.0018 |
| Industry* | 0.0316 | -0.0016 | 0.0290 | 0.0042 |
| Leading position* | -0.0009 | 0.0031 | -0.0036 | -0.0005 |
| Occ. Status* | -0.0082 | -0.0009 | -0.0068 | -0.0005 |
| Married | -0.0009 | -0.0006 | 0.0003 | -0.0005 |
| Firm size $\geq 10$ | 0.0003 | -0.0023 | 0.0033 | -0.0007 |
| Part-time | -0.0083 | 0.0054 | -0.0105 | -0.0032 |
| Selection | -0.0117 | -0.0078 | -0.0096 | 0.0057 |

Notes: Results from Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decompositions. The dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly gross wages. Overall effects are reported for specific groups of regressors such as country of origin, degree of urbanization, education, experience, occupation, industry, leading position, and occupational status (* indicates overall effects for sets of binary indicators).
variables and the unemployment rate as the explanatory variable. For three of the four dependent variables, we estimate that the gap is negatively correlated with the unemployment rate. The coefficients are statistically significant from zero at conventional levels and support the view that the gender wage gap is responsive to the business cycle. When we use the corrected wage gap that also controls for selection, we estimate a strong correlation between the two variables. This highlights the necessity to control for selection as job opportunities for men and women change differentially over the business cycle. Of the four dependent variables, the explained gender wage gap is positively correlated, but its correlation is not significantly different from zero. ${ }^{12}$

Increased unemployment may lead to more competition for jobs and this could lead to a lower gender wage gap. An alternative view is that unemployment changes the composition of male and female workers, resulting in a more similar distribution of characteristics which are demanded by firms. Because the correlation between the unemployment rate and the raw wage gap is stronger than with the corrected wage gap, the first explanation seems more plausible. This would be consistent with evidence by Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2007) and Weber and Zulehner (2014).

[^9]Figure 2: Gender wage gap and the business cycle.


Notes: Austrian EU-SILC, 2005-2017 (Statistik Austria, 2018). Diamonds indicate the unadjusted gender wage gap in gross hourly wages. Circles indicate the residuals from decompositions of the wage gap ("unexplained component"), using the same set of characteristics in each year.

Table 8: Estimated correlations.

|  | Raw | HM adjusted | Explained | Unexplained |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Constant | 0.27 | 0.32 | 0.04 | 0.13 |
|  | $(0.03)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.02)$ |
| Unemployment rate | -1.22 | -1.79 | 0.33 | -0.71 |
|  | $(0.39)$ | $(0.48)$ | $(0.48)$ | $(0.26)$ |
| R-squared | 0.466 | 0.554 | 0.041 | 0.413 |
| Observations | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 |

Notes: This table shows OLS regressions. The dependent variable is a measure of the gender wage gap (raw, Heckman adjusted, explained, and unexplained using Neumark (1988)'s approach). The explanatory variable is the unemployment rate.

## 6 Comparison to the literature

We reproduce Böheim et al. (2013) and compare the available estimates of the gender wage gap in Austria in Figure 3. The estimates from earlier studies (Zweimüller and Winter-Ebmer (1994), Böheim et al. (2007), Grünberger and Zulehner (2009), Pointner and Stiglbauer (2010), Bundes-
ministerium für Frauen (2010), Böheim et al. (2013), Grandner and Gstach (2015), Christl and Köppl-Turyna (2019)) are compared with our results presented above. ${ }^{13}$ The earliest study on Austria used data from 1983 (Zweimüller and Winter-Ebmer, 1994) and showed a rather large gap of more than $30 \log$ points. In addition, Zweimüller and Winter-Ebmer (1994) used net wages which usually result in a smaller wage gap due to progressive taxation. Hourly wage data were not regularly collected in Austria and thus there was no further study until the mid-1990s. From then onwards, several studies produced estimates of the gender wage gap. These, however, used different data sets (Mikrozensus, EU-SILC or tax data) or different econometric methods (inclusion of an indicator for women in OLS regressions or different variants of Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions). Despite these differences, it becomes quite apparent that the raw and the corrected gender wage gap declined over time.

Figure 3: Gender wage gap between 1983 and 2017.


Notes: Diamonds indicate the unadjusted gender wage gap in Austria in gross hourly wages, but for 1983, which is based on net hourly wages (Zweimüller and Winter-Ebmer, 1994). Circles indicate the residuals from decompositions of the wage gap ("unexplained component") (Zweimüller and Winter-Ebmer (1994), Böheim et al. (2007), Grünberger and Zulehner (2009), Pointner and Stiglbauer (2010), Bundesministerium für Frauen (2010), Böheim et al. (2013), Grandner and Gstach (2015), Christl and Köppl-Turyna (2019)). Full diamonds and full circles are the estimates presented above. The solid and the dashed lines are linear trends.

[^10]
## 7 Summary and conclusions

We examined the gender wage gap in Austria using EU-SILC data from 2005 to 2017. Using standard decomposition techniques, we decompose the gender wage gap over time. We find that the raw wage gap declined from 18.6 (20.7) log points in 2005 (2006) to $15.0 \log$ points in 2017. Controlling for observed differences between women and men in human capital, occupation, and other explanatory variables, we find that the unexplained part of the gender wage gap decreased substantially over the last ten years. The decrease of the unexplained gender wage gap between the largest gap in this period (2006) and the most recent gap (2017) ranges from 3.7 log points to 8.5 $\log$ points depending on the decomposition approach. Using the method by Neumark (1988), we find that the unexplained gender wage gap shrank from 8.7 (8.8) log points in 2005 (2006) to 5.1 $\log$ points in 2017. We find that differences in the observable characteristics such as educational attainment, experience, occupation or industry have become a more important part fo the gender wage gap between 2006 and 2017. The remaining part of the wage gap between women and men might be caused by differences in unobserved characteristics, e.g., attitude or commitment, or unfair discrimination against women. Using the approach suggested by Juhn et al. (1991), we find that the main determinant of the shrinking wage gap over time is the relative improvement of women's observed and unobserved characteristics.

Men and women became more similar in observed and unobserved characteristics over time, and this contributed substantially to the reduction of the gender wage gap. One reason for the reduction in observed and unobserved characteristics could have been the implementation of policies that helped women to catch up with men. For example, the change in the equal treatment law that urged firms to be more open about the wages they pay their workers may have provided better guidance for wage negotiations. Riley-Bowles et al. (2005), for example, show that women tend to negotiate more effectively when there is less ambiguity about wages. Additionally, the change in child-care allowance introduced in 2010 or the increase in childcare facilities that started in 2007, may have increased women's labor market attachment.

Our results are consistent with earlier research that showed a narrowing of the gender wage gap over time. For example, Böheim et al. (2013) found that wage differences declined moderately between 2002 and 2007. However, the difference in the raw gender wage gap is still large due to
differences in observed and unobserved characteristics between men and women. Labor market experience, occupation and industrial segregation, and labor market attachment are still important aspects where men and women differ, which results in average wage differences.

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A Appendix: Tables
Table A.1: Average wages and usual weekly hours in main job, 2005-2017, by gender in the private sector.

| Year | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Men |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Wage | 14.95 | 15.13 | 15.18 | 14.85 | 15.78 | 15.92 | 15.74 | 15.64 | 15.74 | 15.97 | 15.91 | 16.19 | 15.74 |
| Hours | 40.90 | 40.55 | 42.02 | 41.94 | 41.59 | 41.21 | 40.84 | 41.13 | 41.19 | 40.40 | 40.75 | 40.66 | 41.84 |
| Obs. | 2052 | 2307 | 2551 | 2031 | 1997 | 2176 | 2116 | 1921 | 1956 | 1951 | 1969 | 2005 | 1996 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Women |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Wage | 12.17 | 11.94 | 11.97 | 11.79 | 13.05 | 13.14 | 12.85 | 12.65 | 12.79 | 13.10 | 13.22 | 13.42 | 13.16 |
| Hours | 33.11 | 33.44 | 32.55 | 32.89 | 32.74 | 32.78 | 32.56 | 32.14 | 32.72 | 31.92 | 31.62 | 32.06 | 32.00 |
| Obs. | 1644 | 1925 | 2170 | 1759 | 1819 | 1953 | 1901 | 1867 | 1803 | 1810 | 1843 | 1847 | 1983 |

Notes: Austrian EU-SILC data 2005-2017 (Statistik Austria, 2018). Gross hourly wages in Euros, deflated using the CPI (base year is 2014).
Table A.2: Summary statistics: Personal and household characteristics.

|  | 2007 |  | 2009 |  | 2011 |  | 2013 |  | 2015 |  | 2017 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Age | 38.87 (10.3) | 39.46 (10.0) | 39.49 (10.4) | 40.18 (10.0) | 39.88 (10.6) | 40.43 (10.2) | 39.85 (10.9) | 41.07 (10.4) | 40.31 (11.2) | 40.83 (10.6) | 40.59 (11.1) | 41.15 (10.8) |
| Origin |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Austria | 0.83 (0.4) | 0.85 (0.4) | 0.82 (0.4) | 0.83 (0.4) | 0.82 (0.4) | 0.81 (0.4) | 0.83 (0.4) | 0.79 (0.4) | 0.81 (0.4) | 0.79 (0.4) | 0.79 (0.4) | 0.79 (0.4) |
| EU15 | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.02 (0.2) | 0.04 (0.2) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.04 (0.2) | 0.04 (0.2) | 0.04 (0.2) | 0.04 (0.2) | 0.04 (0.2) | 0.04 (0.2) | 0.05 (0.2) | 0.04 (0.2) |
| Degree of urbanization |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| High | 0.35 (0.5) | 0.36 (0.5) | 0.34 (0.5) | 0.39 (0.5) | 0.32 (0.5) | 0.39 (0.5) | 0.27 (0.4) | 0.30 (0.5) | 0.28 (0.4) | 0.31 (0.5) | 0.28 (0.5) | 0.32 (0.5) |
| Medium | 0.26 (0.4) | 0.25 (0.4) | 0.25 (0.4) | 0.27 (0.4) | 0.29 (0.5) | 0.27 (0.4) | 0.31 (0.5) | 0.31 (0.5) | 0.30 (0.5) | 0.31 (0.5) | 0.31 (0.5) | 0.30 (0.5) |
| Low | 0.39 (0.5) | 0.39 (0.5) | 0.41 (0.5) | 0.35 (0.5) | 0.39 (0.5) | 0.34 (0.5) | 0.42 (0.5) | 0.39 (0.5) | 0.42 (0.5) | 0.38 (0.5) | 0.41 (0.5) | 0.37 (0.5) |
| Formal education |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Compulsory education | 0.09 (0.3) | 0.15 (0.4) | 0.09 (0.3) | 0.15 (0.4) | 0.10 (0.3) | 0.15 (0.4) | 0.09 (0.3) | 0.13 (0.3) | 0.09 (0.3) | 0.12 (0.3) | 0.07 (0.2) | 0.10 (0.3) |
| Apprentices, Craftsmen | 0.51 (0.5) | 0.34 (0.5) | 0.48 (0.5) | 0.29 (0.5) | 0.46 (0.5) | 0.28 (0.5) | 0.48 (0.5) | 0.30 (0.5) | 0.45 (0.5) | 0.28 (0.5) | 0.45 (0.5) | 0.29 (0.5) |
| Intermediate voc. education | 0.06 (0.2) | 0.15 (0.4) | 0.06 (0.2) | 0.18 (0.4) | 0.07 (0.3) | 0.18 (0.4) | 0.07 (0.2) | 0.19 (0.4) | 0.09 (0.3) | 0.20 (0.4) | 0.08 (0.3) | 0.21 (0.4) |
| Upper secondary (academic) | 0.05 (0.2) | 0.07 (0.3) | 0.05 (0.2) | 0.07 (0.3) | 0.05 (0.2) | 0.08 (0.3) | 0.05 (0.2) | 0.05 (0.2) | 0.04 (0.2) | 0.06 (0.2) | 0.05 (0.2) | 0.05 (0.2) |
| Upper secondary (other) | 0.17 (0.4) | 0.15 (0.4) | 0.17 (0.4) | 0.16 (0.4) | 0.18 (0.4) | 0.15 (0.4) | 0.19 (0.4) | 0.17 (0.4) | 0.17 (0.4) | 0.15 (0.4) | 0.18 (0.4) | 0.14 (0.3) |
| Academic degree | 0.11 (0.3) | 0.14 (0.4) | 0.14 (0.3) | 0.15 (0.4) | 0.13 (0.3) | 0.15 (0.4) | 0.13 (0.3) | 0.16 (0.4) | 0.15 (0.4) | 0.20 (0.4) | 0.17 (0.4) | 0.21 (0.4) |
| Enrolled | 0.02 (0.1) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.02 (0.1) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.04 (0.2) | 0.04 (0.2) | 0.04 (0.2) |
| Household (presence of) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cohabiting partner | 0.68 (0.5) | 0.66 (0.5) | 0.65 (0.5) | 0.66 (0.5) | 0.66 (0.5) | 0.66 (0.5) | 0.66 (0.5) | 0.68 (0.5) | 0.67 (0.5) | 0.68 (0.5) | 0.67 (0.5) | 0.69 (0.5) |
| Employed partner | 0.42 (0.5) | 0.54 (0.5) | 0.44 (0.5) | 0.56 (0.5) | 0.45 (0.5) | 0.56 (0.5) | 0.46 (0.5) | 0.57 (0.5) | 0.47 (0.5) | 0.58 (0.5) | 0.49 (0.5) | 0.61 (0.5) |
| Children aged 0-2 y. | 0.11 (0.4) | 0.04 (0.2) | 0.12 (0.4) | 0.04 (0.2) | 0.12 (0.4) | 0.04 (0.2) | 0.12 (0.4) | 0.04 (0.2) | 0.12 (0.4) | 0.05 (0.2) | 0.11 (0.4) | 0.04 (0.2) |
| Children aged 3-5 y. | 0.11 (0.3) | 0.08 (0.3) | 0.10 (0.3) | 0.09 (0.3) | 0.11 (0.3) | 0.08 (0.3) | 0.10 (0.3) | 0.08 (0.3) | 0.10 (0.3) | 0.08 (0.3) | 0.11 (0.4) | 0.10 (0.3) |
| Children aged 6-9 y. | 0.13 (0.4) | 0.13 (0.4) | 0.12 (0.4) | 0.12 (0.4) | 0.12 (0.4) | 0.11 (0.4) | 0.13 (0.4) | 0.13 (0.4) | 0.13 (0.4) | 0.12 (0.4) | 0.13 (0.4) | 0.12 (0.4) |
| Children aged 10-18 y. | 0.22 (0.5) | 0.26 (0.6) | 0.21 (0.5) | 0.23 (0.5) | 0.19 (0.5) | 0.23 (0.5) | 0.18 (0.5) | 0.22 (0.5) | 0.18 (0.5) | 0.22 (0.5) | 0.20 (0.5) | 0.22 (0.5) |
| Health status |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bad general health | 0.02 (0.1) | 0.02 (0.1) | 0.02 (0.2) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.02 (0.2) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.02 (0.1) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.02 (0.1) | 0.02 (0.2) |
| Fair general health | 0.12 (0.3) | 0.12 (0.3) | 0.15 (0.4) | 0.15 (0.4) | 0.15 (0.4) | 0.15 (0.4) | 0.16 (0.4) | 0.17 (0.4) | 0.15 (0.4) | 0.14 (0.3) | 0.16 (0.4) | 0.15 (0.4) |
| Good general health | 0.86 (0.3) | 0.86 (0.3) | 0.83 (0.4) | 0.82 (0.4) | 0.82 (0.4) | 0.82 (0.4) | 0.82 (0.4) | 0.80 (0.4) | 0.83 (0.4) | 0.83 (0.4) | 0.82 (0.4) | 0.82 (0.4) |
| Limit. health problems | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.02 (0.1) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.02 (0.2) | 0.02 (0.2) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.02 (0.1) | 0.02 (0.2) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.02 (0.1) | 0.04 (0.2) |
| Chronic health problems | 0.14 (0.3) | 0.15 (0.4) | 0.21 (0.4) | 0.21 (0.4) | 0.23 (0.4) | 0.25 (0.4) | 0.24 (0.4) | 0.25 (0.4) | 0.24 (0.4) | 0.25 (0.4) | 0.27 (0.4) | 0.30 (0.5) |
| Experience | 20.55 (11.0) | 17.34 (9.9) | 21.48 (11.0) | 18.98 (10.1) | 21.99 (11.3) | 19.15 (10.1) | 21.96 (11.6) | 19.59 (10.4) | 22.53 (11.9) | 19.36 (10.5) | 22.59 (11.9) | 19.91 (10.7) |

Notes: Based on EU-SILC data 2005-2017. Means of personal characteristics for men and women in 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2017. Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table A.3: Summary statistics: Job-related characteristics.

|  | 2007 |  | 2009 |  | 2011 |  | 2013 |  | 2015 |  | 2017 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Occupational status |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Blue-collar worker | 0.44 (0.5) | 0.26 (0.4) | 0.40 (0.5) | 0.22 (0.4) | 0.43 (0.5) | 0.22 (0.4) | 0.43 (0.5) | 0.24 (0.4) | 0.43 (0.5) | 0.22 (0.4) | 0.40 (0.5) | 0.21 (0.4) |
| White-collar worker | 0.43 (0.5) | 0.60 (0.5) | 0.47 (0.5) | 0.65 (0.5) | 0.45 (0.5) | 0.60 (0.5) | 0.44 (0.5) | 0.61 (0.5) | 0.45 (0.5) | 0.63 (0.5) | 0.49 (0.5) | 0.66 (0.5) |
| Civil servant | 0.14 (0.3) | 0.14 (0.3) | 0.12 (0.3) | 0.13 (0.3) | 0.12 (0.3) | 0.18 (0.4) | 0.13 (0.3) | 0.15 (0.4) | 0.12 (0.3) | 0.15 (0.4) | 0.12 (0.3) | 0.14 (0.3) |
| Occupation |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Managers | 0.04 (0.2) | 0.01 (0.1) | 0.06 (0.2) | 0.02 (0.2) | 0.08 (0.3) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.06 (0.2) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.05 (0.2) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.07 (0.2) | 0.03 (0.2) |
| Professionals | 0.06 (0.2) | 0.09 (0.3) | 0.09 (0.3) | 0.12 (0.3) | 0.13 (0.3) | 0.17 (0.4) | 0.14 (0.3) | 0.16 (0.4) | 0.15 (0.4) | 0.19 (0.4) | 0.15 (0.4) | 0.19 (0.4) |
| Technicians | 0.21 (0.4) | 0.12 (0.3) | 0.21 (0.4) | 0.19 (0.4) | 0.19 (0.4) | 0.19 (0.4) | 0.19 (0.4) | 0.21 (0.4) | 0.19 (0.4) | 0.21 (0.4) | 0.20 (0.4) | 0.20 (0.4) |
| Clerical support | 0.12 (0.3) | 0.29 (0.5) | 0.09 (0.3) | 0.25 (0.4) | 0.06 (0.2) | 0.19 (0.4) | 0.06 (0.2) | 0.16 (0.4) | 0.06 (0.2) | 0.15 (0.4) | 0.06 (0.2) | 0.16 (0.4) |
| Service and Sales | 0.13 (0.3) | 0.28 (0.4) | 0.08 (0.3) | 0.22 (0.4) | 0.10 (0.3) | 0.23 (0.4) | 0.10 (0.3) | 0.24 (0.4) | 0.10 (0.3) | 0.24 (0.4) | 0.10 (0.3) | 0.23 (0.4) |
| Skilled agricult. | 0.01 (0.1) | 0.01 (0.1) | 0.01 (0.1) | 0.01 (0.1) | 0.01 (0.1) | 0.01 (0.1) | 0.01 (0.1) | 0.00 (0.1) | 0.01 (0.1) | 0.01 (0.1) | 0.01 (0.1) | 0.00 (0.1) |
| Skilled trades | 0.24 (0.4) | 0.04 (0.2) | 0.22 (0.4) | 0.01 (0.1) | 0.24 (0.4) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.26 (0.4) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.24 (0.4) | 0.02 (0.1) | 0.25 (0.4) | 0.02 (0.2) |
| Plant/machine operatives | 0.09 (0.3) | 0.01 (0.1) | 0.12 (0.3) | 0.01 (0.1) | 0.11 (0.3) | 0.02 (0.1) | 0.11 (0.3) | 0.02 (0.1) | 0.12 (0.3) | 0.02 (0.1) | 0.10 (0.3) | 0.03 (0.2) |
| Elementary | 0.10 (0.3) | 0.16 (0.4) | 0.12 (0.3) | 0.15 (0.4) | 0.08 (0.3) | 0.13 (0.3) | 0.07 (0.3) | 0.14 (0.3) | 0.07 (0.3) | 0.13 (0.3) | 0.07 (0.3) | 0.13 (0.3) |
| Industry |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Primary sector | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.02 (0.1) | 0.01 (0.1) | 0.01 (0.1) | 0.02 (0.1) | 0.01 (0.1) | 0.01 (0.1) | 0.01 (0.1) | 0.02 (0.1) | 0.01 (0.1) | 0.01 (0.1) | 0.01 (0.1) |
| Manufacturing | 0.32 (0.5) | 0.16 (0.4) | 0.24 (0.4) | 0.08 (0.3) | 0.26 (0.4) | 0.10 (0.3) | 0.25 (0.4) | 0.10 (0.3) | 0.26 (0.4) | 0.09 (0.3) | 0.27 (0.4) | 0.09 (0.3) |
| Energy | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.01 (0.1) | 0.02 (0.1) | 0.01 (0.1) | 0.02 (0.1) | 0.01 (0.1) | 0.02 (0.1) | 0.00 (0.1) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.01 (0.1) | 0.02 (0.1) | 0.00 (0.1) |
| Construction | 0.12 (0.3) | 0.02 (0.1) | 0.15 (0.4) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.12 (0.3) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.16 (0.4) | 0.04 (0.2) | 0.13 (0.3) | 0.02 (0.1) | 0.13 (0.3) | 0.02 (0.1) |
| Trade | 0.08 (0.3) | 0.15 (0.4) | 0.15 (0.4) | 0.18 (0.4) | 0.14 (0.3) | 0.18 (0.4) | 0.12 (0.3) | 0.19 (0.4) | 0.11 (0.3) | 0.17 (0.4) | 0.11 (0.3) | 0.17 (0.4) |
| Transport, ICT | 0.06 (0.2) | 0.02 (0.1) | 0.11 (0.3) | 0.04 (0.2) | 0.11 (0.3) | 0.05 (0.2) | 0.13 (0.3) | 0.04 (0.2) | 0.12 (0.3) | 0.04 (0.2) | 0.11 (0.3) | 0.03 (0.2) |
| Accommodation, Food | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.06 (0.2) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.07 (0.3) | 0.04 (0.2) | 0.07 (0.2) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.06 (0.2) | 0.04 (0.2) | 0.07 (0.2) | 0.04 (0.2) | 0.08 (0.3) |
| Finance, Real Estate | 0.04 (0.2) | 0.05 (0.2) | 0.05 (0.2) | 0.06 (0.2) | 0.04 (0.2) | 0.05 (0.2) | 0.04 (0.2) | 0.04 (0.2) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.05 (0.2) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.04 (0.2) |
| Professional services | 0.08 (0.3) | 0.09 (0.3) | 0.06 (0.2) | 0.11 (0.3) | 0.06 (0.2) | 0.10 (0.3) | 0.07 (0.3) | 0.09 (0.3) | 0.07 (0.3) | 0.09 (0.3) | 0.08 (0.3) | 0.09 (0.3) |
| Public services | 0.14 (0.3) | 0.31 (0.5) | 0.16 (0.4) | 0.36 (0.5) | 0.17 (0.4) | 0.37 (0.5) | 0.15 (0.4) | 0.38 (0.5) | 0.18 (0.4) | 0.41 (0.5) | 0.17 (0.4) | 0.38 (0.5) |
| Other services | 0.06 (0.2) | 0.12 (0.3) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.04 (0.2) | 0.03 (0.2) | 0.05 (0.2) | 0.02 (0.1) | 0.04 (0.2) | 0.02 (0.2) | 0.05 (0.2) | 0.02 (0.2) | 0.07 (0.3) |
| Other characteristics |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Managerial position | 0.43 (0.5) | 0.27 (0.4) | 0.53 (0.5) | 0.37 (0.5) | 0.51 (0.5) | 0.37 (0.5) | 0.53 (0.5) | 0.36 (0.5) | 0.52 (0.5) | 0.36 (0.5) | 0.51 (0.5) | 0.37 (0.5) |
| Highly skilled/senior employees | 0.14 (0.3) | 0.07 (0.3) | 0.17 (0.4) | 0.11 (0.3) | 0.22 (0.4) | 0.12 (0.3) | 0.20 (0.4) | 0.12 (0.3) | 0.20 (0.4) | 0.12 (0.3) | 0.21 (0.4) | 0.12 (0.3) |
| Firm size > 10 | 0.81 (0.4) | 0.67 (0.5) | 0.78 (0.4) | 0.63 (0.5) | 0.78 (0.4) | 0.68 (0.5) | 0.78 (0.4) | 0.69 (0.5) | 0.79 (0.4) | 0.70 (0.5) | 0.81 (0.4) | 0.71 (0.5) |
| Part-time | 0.05 (0.2) | 0.41 (0.5) | 0.05 (0.2) | 0.43 (0.5) | 0.06 (0.2) | 0.43 (0.5) | 0.05 (0.2) | 0.44 (0.5) | 0.06 (0.2) | 0.49 (0.5) | 0.07 (0.3) | 0.49 (0.5) |
| Observations | 2991 | 2567 | 2303 | 2094 | 2445 | 2315 | 2280 | 2148 | 2276 | 2218 | 2308 | 2344 | in parentheses.

Table A.4: Heckman Wage Equation

|  | 2007 |  | 2009 |  | 2011 |  | 2013 |  | 2015 |  | 2017 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Log. gross hourly earnings |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Origin (Ref: Non-EU15) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Austria | $\begin{gathered} 0.09 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.08 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.15 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.12 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.09 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.08 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.14 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.08 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.13 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.05 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.11 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.05 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ |
| EU15 | $\begin{gathered} 0.15 \\ (0.05) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.06 \\ (0.05) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.11 \\ (0.05) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.11 \\ (0.05) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.11 \\ (0.05) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.04 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.15 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.06 \\ (0.05) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.06 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.00 \\ & (0.04) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.07 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.09 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ |
| Degree of urbanization (Ref: dense) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Medium | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.00 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.00 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.03 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.04 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.04 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.03 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.00 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.04 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.00 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ |
| Low | $\begin{gathered} -0.03 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.08 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.06 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.02 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.02 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.05 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.01 \\ & (0.02) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.03 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.01 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.02 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.02 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.01 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ |
| Formal education (Ref: compulsory) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Apprentices, Craftsmen | $\begin{gathered} 0.03 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.05 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.00 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.03 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.04 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.00 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.02 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ |
| Intermediate voc. education | $\begin{gathered} 0.10 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.13 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.04 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.17 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.09 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.07 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.06 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.11 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.09 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.06 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.08 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.06 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ |
| Upper secondary (academic) | $\begin{gathered} 0.20 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.17 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.19 \\ (0.05) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.25 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.26 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.07 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.11 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.16 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.06 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.12 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.07 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ |
| Upper secondary (other) | $\begin{gathered} 0.19 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.15 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.12 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.23 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.11 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.11 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.09 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.13 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.11 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.07 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.11 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.12 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ |
| Academic degree | $\begin{gathered} 0.31 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.29 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.28 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.40 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.23 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.28 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.19 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.24 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.18 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.21 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.19 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.17 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ |
| Experience |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Experience | $\begin{gathered} 0.01 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.01 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.01 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.01 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ |
| Experience sq. | $\begin{aligned} & -0.01 \\ & (0.01) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.02 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.02 \\ & (0.01) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.02 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.02 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.02 \\ & (0.01) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.03 \\ & (0.01) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.02 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.02 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ |
| Occupational status (Ref: White-collar) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Blue-collar worker | $\begin{gathered} -0.06 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.07 \\ & (0.02) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.09 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.05 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.09 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.06 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.07 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.13 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.08 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.06 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.09 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.09 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ |
| Civil servant | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.10 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.07 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.06 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.06 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.07 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.06 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.04 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.05 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.05 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.05 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.09 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ |

Table A. 4 - continued from previous page.

Table A. 4 - continued from previous page.

|  | 2007 |  | 2009 |  | 2011 |  | 2013 |  | 2015 |  | 2017 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Other services | $\begin{gathered} \hline-0.13 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline-0.13 \\ & (0.04) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.09 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.04 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.04 \\ (0.07) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (0.05) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (0.07) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.04 \\ (0.05) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.02 \\ & (0.03) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.08 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.04 \\ & (0.04) \end{aligned}$ |
| Hierarchy |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Managerial position | $\begin{gathered} 0.09 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.08 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.07 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.03 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.09 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.05 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.07 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.04 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.06 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.05 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.06 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.07 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ |
| Highly skilled/senior employees | $\begin{gathered} 0.11 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.09 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.11 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.09 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.12 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.13 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.15 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.13 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.16 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.17 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.10 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.15 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ |
| Other variables |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cohabiting partner | $\begin{gathered} 0.06 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.01 \\ & (0.01) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.07 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.00 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.06 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.02 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.05 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.03 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.03 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ |
| Firm size $>10$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.11 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.05 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.09 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.06 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.09 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.06 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.08 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.12 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.11 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.09 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.09 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.11 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ |
| Part-time | $\begin{gathered} -0.03 \\ (0.05) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.03 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.05 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.03 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.07 \\ & (0.04) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.05 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.01 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.08 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.05 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.03 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ |
| Constant | $\begin{gathered} 2.13 \\ (0.05) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.01 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.01 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.89 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.05 \\ (0.07) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.99 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.06 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.98 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.98 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.01 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.01 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.94 \\ (0.05) \end{gathered}$ |
| $\lambda$ | -0.02 | 0.03 | -0.03 | 0.01 | -0.15 | -0.01 | -0.06 | -0.10 | -0.05 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.01 |
| p -value of $\lambda$ | 0.54 | 0.13 | 0.41 | 0.66 | 0.00 | 0.71 | 0.13 | 0.00 | 0.16 | 0.49 | 0.54 | 0.76 |
| Observations | 3644.00 | 3969.00 | 2907.00 | 3161.00 | 3034.00 | 3342.00 | 2814.00 | 3120.00 | 2819.00 | 3113.00 | 2772.00 | 3090.00 |

[^11]Table A.5: Heckman Participation Equation

|  | 2007 |  | 2009 |  | 2011 |  | 2013 |  | 2015 |  | 2017 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Participation |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Origin (Ref: Non-EU15) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Austria | $\begin{gathered} 0.06 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.08 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.13 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.22 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.19 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.27 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.07 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.11 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.15 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.07 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.10 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ |
| EU15 | $\begin{gathered} 0.05 \\ (0.35) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.11 \\ (0.22) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.46 \\ (0.25) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.05 \\ (0.21) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.20 \\ (0.25) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.05 \\ (0.20) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.27 \\ (0.23) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.15 \\ (0.20) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.09 \\ (0.23) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.06 \\ (0.17) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.26 \\ & (0.20) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.06 \\ (0.22) \end{gathered}$ |
| Degree of urbanization (Ref: dense) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Medium | $\begin{gathered} 0.07 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.09 \\ (0.07) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.16 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.04 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.38 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.04 \\ & (0.08) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.09 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.21 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.31 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.09 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ |
| Low | $\begin{gathered} 0.16 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.07 \\ (0.07) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.14 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.07 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.28 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.15 \\ & (0.08) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.15 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.25 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.41 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.01 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ |
| Formal education (Ref: compulsory) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Apprentices, Craftsmen | $\begin{gathered} 0.24 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.06 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.16 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.11 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.23 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.02 \\ & (0.09) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.24 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.05 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.12 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.00 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.36 \\ (0.15) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.09 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ |
| Intermediate voc. education | $\begin{gathered} 0.66 \\ (0.17) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.21 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.46 \\ (0.18) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.46 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.74 \\ (0.19) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.43 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.77 \\ (0.19) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.33 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.28 \\ (0.16) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.36 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.50 \\ (0.21) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.44 \\ (0.13) \end{gathered}$ |
| Upper secondary (academic) | $\begin{gathered} 0.30 \\ (0.16) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.30 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.14 \\ (0.16) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.24 \\ (0.13) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.10 \\ (0.14) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.23 \\ (0.13) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.20 \\ (0.16) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.17 \\ (0.14) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.44 \\ (0.18) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.48 \\ (0.15) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.38 \\ (0.19) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.39 \\ (0.16) \end{gathered}$ |
| Upper secondary (other) | $\begin{gathered} 0.44 \\ (0.14) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.30 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.35 \\ (0.13) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.57 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.46 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.44 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.49 \\ (0.14) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.46 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.32 \\ (0.13) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.53 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.54 \\ (0.16) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.32 \\ (0.13) \end{gathered}$ |
| Academic degree | $\begin{gathered} 0.63 \\ (0.17) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.67 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.86 \\ (0.17) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.81 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.95 \\ (0.15) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.88 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.66 \\ (0.16) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.67 \\ (0.13) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.73 \\ (0.16) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.86 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.84 \\ (0.18) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.62 \\ (0.13) \end{gathered}$ |
| Experience |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Experience | $\begin{gathered} 0.11 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.17 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.15 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.19 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.15 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.20 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.12 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.18 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.13 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.14 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.12 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.17 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ |
| Experience sq. | $\begin{gathered} -0.12 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.31 \\ & (0.03) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.20 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.32 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.18 \\ & (0.03) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.33 \\ & (0.03) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.10 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.29 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.14 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.22 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.13 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.25 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ |
| Age category (Ref: 20-24 years) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 25-34 years | $\begin{gathered} -0.25 \\ (0.13) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.40 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.19 \\ & (0.14) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.13 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.30 \\ (0.14) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.29 \\ & (0.13) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.19 \\ (0.15) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.30 \\ (0.13) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.23 \\ (0.14) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.07 \\ (0.15) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.26 \\ & (0.15) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.48 \\ (0.14) \end{gathered}$ |
| $35-44$ years | $\begin{aligned} & -0.81 \\ & (0.18) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.90 \\ (0.13) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.91 \\ & (0.22) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.85 \\ & (0.16) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.17 \\ & (0.21) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.08 \\ (0.16) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.80 \\ (0.22) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.91 \\ & (0.16) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.12 \\ (0.20) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.66 \\ (0.17) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.26 \\ & (0.22) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.13 \\ (0.18) \end{gathered}$ |

Table A. 5 - continued from previous page.

|  | 2007 |  | 2009 |  | 2011 |  | 2013 |  | 2015 |  | 2017 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| 45-54 years | $\begin{aligned} & -1.62 \\ & (0.24) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.43 \\ (0.14) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.62 \\ & (0.25) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.34 \\ (0.16) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.83 \\ (0.26) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.58 \\ (0.17) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.83 \\ (0.27) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.58 \\ (0.17) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.91 \\ (0.25) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.08 \\ (0.18) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.85 \\ & (0.28) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.70 \\ (0.19) \end{gathered}$ |
| 55-65 years | $\begin{gathered} -2.80 \\ (0.30) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -2.57 \\ & (0.18) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -2.23 \\ & (0.29) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -2.42 \\ (0.19) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -2.68 \\ & (0.31) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -2.62 \\ & (0.19) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -2.69 \\ (0.32) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -2.43 \\ (0.19) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -2.66 \\ (0.31) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -2.04 \\ (0.20) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -2.46 \\ & (0.33) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -2.50 \\ (0.20) \end{gathered}$ |
| Health status |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Limit. health problems | $\begin{gathered} -0.41 \\ (0.14) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.38 \\ (0.15) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.85 \\ (0.16) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.86 \\ (0.18) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.57 \\ & (0.14) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.77 \\ & (0.15) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.92 \\ (0.15) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.85 \\ (0.16) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.81 \\ (0.15) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.59 \\ (0.15) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.82 \\ & (0.17) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.68 \\ (0.17) \end{gathered}$ |
| Fair general health | $\begin{gathered} 0.69 \\ (0.16) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.41 \\ (0.19) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.45 \\ (0.16) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.08 \\ (0.20) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.53 \\ (0.15) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.63 \\ (0.16) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.41 \\ (0.16) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.36 \\ (0.16) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.56 \\ (0.16) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.30 \\ (0.17) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.51 \\ (0.20) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.73 \\ (0.20) \end{gathered}$ |
| Good general health | $\begin{gathered} 1.15 \\ (0.17) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.75 \\ (0.21) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.84 \\ (0.17) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.24 \\ (0.20) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.93 \\ (0.15) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.96 \\ (0.16) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.68 \\ (0.17) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.58 \\ (0.16) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.02 \\ (0.17) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.68 \\ (0.17) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.88 \\ (0.21) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.78 \\ (0.20) \end{gathered}$ |
| Chronic health problems | $\begin{gathered} -0.11 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.03 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.19 \\ & (0.09) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.31 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.32 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.02 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.37 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.22 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.06 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.17 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.02 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.18 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ |
| Household (presence of) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cohabiting partner | $\begin{gathered} 0.17 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.15 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.08 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.33 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.08 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.19 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.08 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.09 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.23 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.17 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.25 \\ (0.13) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.08 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ |
| Employed partner | $\begin{gathered} 0.18 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.20 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.13 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.34 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.16 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.29 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.34 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.14 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.26 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.33 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.26 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.29 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ |
| Children aged 0-2 y. | $\begin{gathered} -0.04 \\ (0.13) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.97 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.06 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.93 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.14 \\ (0.15) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.76 \\ (0.13) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.25 \\ (0.14) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.80 \\ (0.13) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.16 \\ (0.15) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.77 \\ & (0.13) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.19 \\ & (0.14) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.03 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ |
| Children aged 3-5 y. | $\begin{gathered} 0.13 \\ (0.13) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.41 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.14 \\ (0.15) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.35 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.26 \\ (0.16) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.37 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.01 \\ (0.13) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.50 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.11 \\ (0.16) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.34 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.26 \\ (0.15) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.12 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ |
| Children aged 6-9 y. | $\begin{gathered} -0.04 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.24 \\ (0.07) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.03 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.35 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.05 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.35 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.05 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.11 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.02 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.29 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.07 \\ (0.13) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.27 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ |
| Children aged 10-18 y. | $\begin{gathered} 0.08 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.10 \\ (0.05) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.07 \\ (0.07) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.13 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.00 \\ (0.07) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.02 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.15 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.02 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.03 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.14 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.13 \\ (0.07) \end{gathered}$ |
| Other variables |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Enrolled | $\begin{gathered} -1.56 \\ (0.14) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.46 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.37 \\ & (0.14) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.20 \\ (0.13) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.22 \\ (0.13) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.51 \\ (0.13) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.29 \\ (0.14) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.28 \\ (0.13) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.50 \\ (0.13) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.57 \\ (0.13) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.13 \\ (0.13) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.29 \\ (0.13) \end{gathered}$ |
| Constant | $\begin{gathered} -0.95 \\ (0.22) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.70 \\ (0.25) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.02 \\ (0.24) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.39 \\ (0.25) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.38 \\ (0.21) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.86 \\ (0.21) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.92 \\ (0.24) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.76 \\ (0.21) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.12 \\ & (0.23) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.69 \\ (0.22) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.15 \\ (0.28) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.88 \\ (0.26) \end{gathered}$ |
| $\lambda$ | -0.02 | 0.03 | -0.03 | 0.01 | -0.15 | -0.01 | -0.06 | -0.10 | -0.05 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.01 |
| p -value of $\lambda$ | 0.54 | 0.13 | 0.41 | 0.66 | 0.00 | 0.71 | 0.13 | 0.00 | 0.16 | 0.49 | 0.54 | 0.76 |
| Observations | 3644.00 | 3969.00 | 2907.00 | 3161.00 | 3034.00 | 3342.00 | 2814.00 | 3120.00 | 2819.00 | 3113.00 | 2772.00 | 3090.00 |

[^12]Table A.6: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (pooled) from 2005 until 2017, private sector.

| Year | Wage <br> difference | Difference <br> over time | Explained <br> gap | Difference <br> over time | Unexplained <br> gap | Difference <br> over time |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 2005 | 0.2156 |  | 0.1169 |  | 0.0987 |  |
| 2006 | 0.2366 | 0.0210 | 0.1421 | 0.0252 | 0.0945 | -0.0042 |
| 2007 | 0.2307 | -0.0059 | 0.1361 | -0.0060 | 0.0946 | 0.0001 |
| 2008 | 0.2268 | -0.0040 | 0.1380 | 0.0019 | 0.0888 | -0.0058 |
| 2009 | 0.1893 | -0.0375 | 0.1155 | -0.0225 | 0.0738 | -0.0150 |
| 2010 | 0.1798 | -0.0094 | 0.1182 | 0.0027 | 0.0617 | -0.0121 |
| 2011 | 0.1903 | 0.0105 | 0.1351 | 0.0169 | 0.0552 | -0.0064 |
| 2012 | 0.2071 | 0.0167 | 0.1307 | -0.0045 | 0.0764 | 0.0212 |
| 2013 | 0.2017 | -0.0053 | 0.1326 | 0.0019 | 0.0692 | -0.0072 |
| 2014 | 0.1943 | -0.0074 | 0.1252 | -0.0074 | 0.0692 | -0.0000 |
| 2015 | 0.1795 | -0.0148 | 0.1155 | -0.0097 | 0.0641 | -0.0051 |
| 2016 | 0.1848 | 0.0052 | 0.1232 | 0.0078 | 0.0616 | -0.0025 |
| 2017 | 0.1698 | -0.0149 | 0.1192 | -0.0040 | 0.0506 | -0.0110 |
| 2006 | 0.2366 |  | 0.1421 |  | 0.0945 |  |
| 2017 | 0.1698 | -0.0668 | 0.1192 | -0.0229 | 0.0506 | -0.0439 |

Notes: Results from Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions. Dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly gross wages.

Table A.7: Decomposition of wage differentials (pooled) in 2006 and 2017, private sector.

| Difference in coefficients | $(1)$ | $(2)$ | $(3)$ | $(4)$ | $(5)$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Estimated value 2006 | 0.2366 | 0.1873 | 0.1319 | 0.1097 | 0.0945 |
| in \% of the mean wage differential | 100.0 | 79.2 | 55.8 | 46.4 | 39.9 |
| Estimated value 2017 | 0.1698 | 0.1539 | 0.0982 | 0.0607 | 0.0506 |
| in \% of the mean wage differential | 100.0 | 90.6 | 57.8 | 35.7 | 29.8 |
| Education |  | $\times$ | $\times$ | $\times$ | $\times$ |
| Experience, marital status, part-time |  |  | $\times$ | $\times$ | $\times$ |
| Status, occupation, industry, region, citizenship |  |  |  | $\times$ | $\times$ |
| Firm size, hierarchy |  |  |  |  | $\times$ |

Notes: Results from Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions. Dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly gross wages.

Table A.8: Gender wage gap decompositions (pooled) between 2006 and 2017, private sector.

| Overall change | -0.0668 |
| :--- | ---: |
| Change in the explained gap | -0.0229 |
| Quantity effect | -0.0284 |
| Price effect | -0.0014 |
| Interaction effect | 0.0070 |
| Change in the unexplained gap | -0.0439 |
| Quantity effect | -0.0391 |
| Price effect | -0.0079 |
| Interaction effect | 0.0030 |

Notes: Results from Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decompositions. Dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly gross wages.

Table A.9: Estimated correlations, private sector

|  | Raw | HM adjusted | Explained | Unexplained |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Constant | 0.31 | 0.37 | 0.07 | 0.14 |
|  | $(0.03)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.05)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| Unemployment rate | -1.44 | -2.16 | 0.32 | -0.89 |
|  | $(0.45)$ | $(0.60)$ | $(0.64)$ | $(0.38)$ |
| R-squared | 0.482 | 0.541 | 0.022 | 0.332 |
| Observations | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 |

Notes: This table shows OLS regressions. The dependent variable is a measure of the gender wage gap (raw, Heckman adjusted, explained, and unexplained). The explanatory variable is the unemployment rate.

B Appendix: Figures

Figure B.1: Distribution of Log Wage


Notes: Based on EU-SILC data 2005-2017. The graphs show the distribution of log male and female gross hourly wages in 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2017. Wages deflated using the CPI (base year is 2014).

Figure B.2: Gender wage gap in Austria, 2005-2017, private sector.


Notes: Austrian EU-SILC data 2005-2017 (Statistik Austria, 2018). Diamonds indicate the raw gender wage gap in Austria in gross hourly wages. Circles indicate the residuals from decompositions of the wage gap ("unexplained component"), using the same set of characteristics in each year, using pooled models.

Figure B.3: Gender wage gap and the business cycle, private sector.


Notes: Austrian EU-SILC data 2005-2017 (Statistik Austria, 2018). Diamonds indicate the unadjusted gender wage gap in Austria in gross hourly wages. Circles indicated the residuals from decompositions of the wage gap ("unexplained component"), using the same set of characteristics in each year.


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[^2]:    ${ }^{1}$ The rates are for Austrian nationals only; there were 110,363 male and 123,828 female students in 2005 , and 116,412 male and 127,459 female students in 2017 (Statistik Austria, 2019c).
    ${ }^{2}$ In $2005,74.2 \%$ of all female apprentices trained in the 10 most frequently chosen professions; among men, only $48 \%$ trained in the 10 most popular professions (Wirtschaftskammer Österreich, 2006).

[^3]:    ${ }^{3}$ Figure B. 1 in Appendix B shows the implied distribution of $\log$ hourly earnings by gender in 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013,2015 , and 2017. In all years, we observe that the distribution of women's wages was to the left of the distribution of men's wages. This indicates that women's wages were on average lower than men's wages. We also observe that the gap between female and male wages was rather constant over the wage distribution.
    ${ }^{4}$ In the private sector, men's average wages were Euro 14.96 in 2005 and Euro 15.74 in 2017. Women's average wages increased from Euro 12.17 in 2005 to Euro 13.16 in 2017. See Table A. 1 in Appendix A. Men worked about 41 hours per week, women about 33 hours.

[^4]:    ${ }^{5}$ Our presentation follows Blau and Kahn (1992), Jann (2008), and Böheim et al. (2013). For a more general discussion of this method see Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo (2011).

[^5]:    ${ }^{6}$ Our decompositions are based on regression models which include a Heckman correction. We show the estimation results for the years $2007,2009,2011,2013,2015$, and 2017 in Table A. 4 and the results of the participation equations in Table A. 5 in Appendix A.

[^6]:    ${ }^{7}$ When we restrict our sample to private-sector workers, we observe a similar pattern. See Figure B. 2 in Appendix B.

[^7]:    ${ }^{8}$ Here, we include not only actual labor market experience, but also marital status and a dummy variable that is one if a person is working part-time to proxy for labor market attachment.
    ${ }^{9}$ Differences in occupations could arise from differences in norms and preferences. Controlling for such differences could thus mask wage gaps arising from such differences.
    ${ }^{10}$ When we restrict our sample to private-sector workers, we observe a similar pattern. See Table A. 7 in Appendix A.

[^8]:    ${ }^{11}$ When we restrict our sample to private-sector workers, we observe a similar pattern. See Table A. 8 in Appendix A.

[^9]:    ${ }^{12}$ When we restrict our sample to private-sector workers, we observe a similar pattern. See Table A. 9 in Appendix A.

[^10]:    ${ }^{13}$ Several studies made comparisons over time and provide more than one data point. The other studies are represented by one point in the graph.

[^11]:    Notes: Results from maximum likelihood estimations based on EU-SILC 2005-2017. Dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly gross wages. Standard errors in parentheses.

[^12]:    Notes: Results from probit regressions based on EU-SILC 2005-2017. Dependent variable is a dummy variable for being employed. Standard errors in parentheses.

