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## Price-setting in the foreign exchange swap market: Evidence from order flow

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**WORKING PAPER**

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exchange swap market:  
Evidence from order flow**

**NORGES BANK  
RESEARCH**

16 | 2020

OLAV SYRSTAD AND  
GANESH VISWANATH-NATRAJ



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# Price-setting in the Foreign Exchange Swap Market: Evidence from Order Flow

Olav Syrstad and Ganesh Viswanath-Natraj\*

## Abstract

This paper investigates price discovery in foreign exchange (FX) swaps. Using data on inter-dealer transactions, we find that a 1 standard deviation increase in order flow (i.e. net pressure to obtain USD through FX swaps) increases the cost of dollar funding by up to 4 basis points after the 2008 crisis. This is explained by increased dispersion in dollar funding costs and quarter-end periods. We find central bank swap lines reduced the order flow to obtain USD through FX swaps, subsequently affecting the forward rate. In contrast, during quarter-ends and monetary announcements we observe high frequency adjustment of the forward rate.

Keywords: interest rate parity, exchange rates, currency swaps, order flow, dollar funding

JEL Classifications: E43, F31, G15

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# 1 Introduction

Foreign Exchange (FX) swaps allow market participants to hedge exchange rate risk arising from currency mismatch between assets and liabilities. After growing steadily over the past decade, FX swaps are now the most traded foreign exchange instrument worldwide, with a daily turnover of approximately \$3.2 Trillion USD (2019 BIS triennial survey). In theory, the pricing of FX swaps is pinned down by Covered Interest Parity (CIP) - a renowned no-arbitrage relationship in international finance. CIP states that the rate of return on equivalent domestic and foreign assets should equalize after covering exchange rate fluctuations in the FX swap market. However, the FX swap market has been subject to considerable scrutiny since the global financial crisis, as the pricing no longer obeys the iron law of CIP. Since 2008, CIP deviations have been large and persistent, and have implied a systematic premium to swap EUR, CHF and JPY into USD via FX swaps (Figure 1). In this paper we focus on the mechanisms that govern price-setting in the FX swap market.

While much of the recent literature focuses on why CIP deviations exist, and range from explanations that center on limits to the supply of dollars in the FX swap market due to bank regulations (Du et al., 2018; Cenedese et al., 2019; Bräuning and Puria, 2017) and funding constraints (Rime et al., 2017; Liao, 2020), as well as factors that lead to an excess demand for dollars in the FX swap market (Borio et al., 2016; Sushko et al., 2017), less is understood about the role of price-setting in the FX swap market. This paper aims to fill this gap. To this end, we examine order flow - the net of buyer and seller initiated transactions - as a fundamental signal used by dealers to update the forward rate of the FX swap contract. In particular, we investigate the price impact of order flow before and after the financial crisis and how dealers respond to different types of information.

When a no-arbitrage relationship like CIP holds tightly, the role of order flow is confined to correcting short-lived periods of mispricing. In the pre-crisis period, money markets were characterized by low heterogeneity in funding costs where Libor (London interbank offered rate) acted as an accurate representation of banks' marginal cost across currencies. This made price-setting in the FX swap market a straightforward process, where the dealer takes interest rates in respective currencies as given. The dealer then sets the forward rate according to CIP so that the returns are equalized after covering the exchange rate risk. Hence, we hypothesize that the price impact of order flow is small prior to 2008. In contrast, the post-crisis period is characterized by a large dispersion in funding costs, differences in funding availability across currency areas and tighter constraints on banks' balance sheets. This makes it difficult for dealers to determine the equilibrium price. We hypothesize that dealers use order flow in the post-crisis period as a signal to set the forward rate. By exploiting time variation in the dispersion of funding costs and balance sheet constraints we examine how these factors can

account for an increase in the price impact of order flow.

Our order flow measure is based on transaction level data from the Thomson Reuters D2000-2 platform. This platform registers inter-dealer transactions in the FX swap market where each trade is signed as either a buyer or a seller initiated transaction.<sup>1</sup> The daily net of buyer and seller initiated transactions constitutes our order flow measure. In our sign convention, we interpret a positive order flow as net buying pressure to obtain USD through FX swaps. Due to superior market depth, we use 1-week maturity as our preferred tenor and base our empirical analysis on the 1-week FX swap order flow and 1-week deviation from CIP.<sup>2</sup>

We start by developing a microstructural model of the FX swap market. The model has three key agents; customers, arbitrageurs and dealers. Customers are managing the currency exposure on their balance sheets, for example by swapping foreign currency into USD. Arbitrageurs provide funds through the FX swap market when arbitrage opportunities appear. Dealers act as intermediaries and match the flows of customers and arbitrageurs and typically try to keep their positions flat to avoid financing inventories (Lyons, 1995; Bjønnes and Rime, 2005). Dealer aversion to inventory accumulation yields a price-setting condition in which the forward rate is set to correct order imbalances. The model’s primary contribution is to map a linear relationship between order flow and the price-setting of FX swaps. We can use this framework to study how the price impact of order flow is governed by shocks to arbitrageurs. For example, the model predicts that a tightening of funding and balance sheet constraints leads to an inelastic supply of arbitrage capital, with dealers adjusting the price substantially to avoid order flow and balance inventories.

Guided by our model, we first estimate the price impact of order flow, and find it has increased substantially after the global financial crisis in 2008. Since the crisis, a positive 1 standard deviation shock to order flow, i.e. demand to borrow USD through the FX swap market, causes a widening of CIP deviations by up to 4 basis points. That is, when the demand for USD in the FX swap market increases, the cost of obtaining dollars through FX swaps increases as well. We then test why the price impact of order flow is a post-crisis phenomenon by examining potential differences in the price impact of order flow in periods when the heterogeneity in US funding costs is large and when balance sheet expansion is particularly costly for banks.<sup>3</sup> Our estimates reveal that up to three quarters of the increased price impact

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<sup>1</sup>Note that the signing comes directly from the data provider and hence is slightly different from the measure used in Rime et al. (2017) which apply the Ready-Lee algorithm. The main difference is that our measure sign all trades accurately, while the Ready-Lee algorithm may not be able to sign trades conducted at the mid price or in rare occasions even misclassify trades.

<sup>2</sup>Note that our aim is not to precisely measure CIP arbitrage opportunities, but rather price-setting in the FX swap market. We are therefore using 1-week Libor rates as the benchmark rate in our CIP calculation. Importantly, by examining CIP deviations instead of the forward rate directly, we control for movements in the forward rate that relates to changes in the interest rate differential.

<sup>3</sup>We define periods of funding heterogeneity by the daily cross sectional dispersion in 3-month US Libor panel

can be attributed to periods when funding heterogeneity in USD is high and when the FX swap contract crosses regulatory reporting dates at quarter-ends. Higher funding heterogeneity reduces the number of potential arbitrageurs as an increasing share of market participants face funding costs exceeding the threshold necessary to reap arbitrage profit. Similarly, regulatory reporting at quarter-ends give arbitrageurs incentives to reduce their provision of arbitrage capital. Consequently, a larger price adjustment is necessary for dealers to balance inventories.

In addition to the time varying price impact of order flow, we also test whether news is impounded in the price contemporaneously, or through trading (see [Evans and Lyons \(2005\)](#) for analysis on the FX spot market). Our model predicts that *private* information is revealed through order flow meaning that prices adjust as a result of trading activity. For example, suppose in response to a shock to its access to dollar funding, a Euro area bank now obtains dollars via the FX swap market. If the bank's information is private and not known to the dealers before the order appears, these excess demands translate to order flow in the inter-dealer market, which can then be used by dealers to update the forward rate. Alternatively, we hypothesize *public* information is impounded in the price contemporaneously. For example, consider a scheduled monetary announcement of a central bank, where the outcomes of the meeting are conveyed to all market participants simultaneously. If the announcement implies a change in the interest rate differential between two currencies, the dealer can reset the forward rate to match the change in the interest differential. In this setting, the monetary news is impounded in the price, suggestive of efficient price-setting in the FX swap market.

We test whether the public or private information view is relevant in price-setting by studying three different types of events. First, we examine the effect of Federal Reserve Swap lines during the period 2007-2010. The swap lines allowed foreign central banks to provide US dollar funding directly to their own eligible counterparties. By doing so, a larger set of counterparties were able to access USD directly from the central bank rather than via the FX swap market.<sup>4</sup> Although it is publicly announced when these auctions take place, the dealers do not have detailed information on whether individual counterparties would draw on the swap line.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, we expect swap lines will reduce the demand for USD through FX swaps and lower the order flow into USD. Second, we look at dates when the FX swap contract crosses quarter-ends. A large number of banks report quarter-end balance sheet snapshots to regulators. This

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quotes.

<sup>4</sup>Alternatively, the swap line also relaxes arbitrageur balance sheet constraints and increases arbitrageurs' ability to supply dollars in the FX swap market. The effects on both customers and dealers will have an equivalent effect of reducing the relative demand for dollar funding in the FX swap market.

<sup>5</sup>We stress that the private information is not the announcement of the swap line itself, which is known to dealers, but the details of counterparties that use the swap line. For example, only a subset of banks that draw on the swap line may have previously been relying on dollar funding via FX swaps. Similarly, banks may now start using these dollar funds to supply dollars in the FX swap market. Both of these outcomes are unanticipated by dealers until they are revealed as positive order flow.

implies incentives to reduce the size of the balance sheet leading to a more inelastic supply of arbitrage capital and significant price effects over reporting dates, as documented in [Du et al. \(2018\)](#). Given quarter-ends are public information and known to dealers in advance, we hypothesize contemporaneous price adjustment. Third, we identify monetary policy surprises to test whether the adjustment in the forward rate following monetary policy announcements happens through order flow. Following our example of a monetary announcement constituting public information, our theory points towards monetary news being impounded in the forward rate contemporaneously.

Turning to the empirical evidence, we find evidence that the swap lines reduced the order flow into USD which in turn affected the forward rate, supporting the private information hypothesis. In response to quarter-ends, we utilize high frequency data of forward rates to show a large contemporaneous price adjustment exactly at the hour the FX swap contract crosses quarter-ends, with the full price adjustment priced within two hours. Finally, in line with the hypothesis of public information we find no effect on order flow of monetary policy announcements. These results highlight that dealers efficiently adjust the price according to publicly available information.

**Roadmap.** The paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of related literature. In section 3, we outline definitions of covered interest rate parity, FX swaps and order flow and describe the data. In section 4, we develop a model of the microstructure of the FX swap market and derive a price-setting rule that relates the forward rate of the swap to order flow observed in the inter-dealer market. In section 5, we first provide baseline estimates of the price impact of order flow. In section 6, we empirically test the microstructure hypotheses of how prices are determined in response to public and private sources of information, using the response of the FX swap market in response to quarter-end bank regulations and central bank swap lines. In section 7 we conclude.

## 2 Related literature

The literature on post 2008 CIP violations naturally centre on theories of what are the supply and demand fundamentals in the FX swap market that explain persistent violation of deviations. Theories on limits to the supply of dollars in the FX swap market include rising balance sheet costs and regulatory requirements ([Du et al., 2018](#); [Liao, 2020](#); [Bräuning and Puria, 2017](#)), the role of the dollar in constraining leverage ([Avdjiev et al., 2016](#)), and rising bid/ask spreads due to limited dealer capacity ([Pinnington and Shamloo, 2016](#)), costs to leverage such as shareholder risk ([Andersen et al., 2019](#)) and rising counterparty or liquidity risk ([Baba and Packer, 2009](#); [Mancini Griffoli and Ranaldo, 2009](#)). Other factors affecting agents demands for dollars in the FX swap market include declines in bank quality, declines in



short-term funding, unconventional monetary policies, and central bank swap lines (Sushko et al., 2017; Bahaj et al., 2018; Ivashina et al., 2015; Iida et al., 2016). This paper contributes to understanding CIP violations by understanding how constraints on the supply of dollars in the FX swap market can lead to price discovery through order flow. This is a critical component of the FX swap market microstructure and we show empirically that dealers use order flow as a fundamental signal to update the forward rate of the FX swap.

The seminal work on market microstructure in FX has typically examined the price impact of order flow on spot foreign exchange markets (Evans and Lyons, 2002, 2005, 2006; Berger et al., 2008; Rime et al., 2010; Ranaldo and Somogyi, 2019). Microstructure models in Evans and Lyons (2002) have typically used simultaneous trade models in which dealers set prices, and use inter-dealer order flow following a trading round as information to reset prices. In developing our model framework of the FX swap market, we share many of the elements in trading, however we note two clear differences in FX swaps. The first is that customers in the FX swap market are trading for hedging purposes. In contrast, investors in the FX spot market are composed of informed and uninformed traders, with informed traders having an information advantage in the price of the spot exchange rate, which is treated as a speculative asset. Second, we add arbitrageurs to the framework as they attempt to make systematic profits from the mispricing of the forward rate. Using our framework, we derive a price-setting relation in which price adjustment of the FX swap, which we denote by the change in the CIP deviation, is linearly related to order flow.

Finally, we relate to a recent interest in understanding the microstructure and impact of order flow in the FX swap market. Krohn and Sushko (2017) examine how the market structure of the FX swap market has led to a reduction in market liquidity and rising bid/ask spreads during quarter-end periods. Cenedese et al. (2019) and Rime et al. (2017) find evidence that order flow has price impact in the post-crisis period. We extend their work in several ways. First, our measure of order flow is based on each trade being marked as buyer or seller initiated within the data from the trading platform, not the Ready-Lee algorithm. This eliminates potential errors and enable us to sign each trade. Second, through a model framework, we derive the price impact of order flow on the FX swap market through an inter-dealer market that sets the forward rate to minimize inventory accumulation. Third, in contrast to the existing literature we provide an explanation on how price impact of order flow has changed after the financial crisis. Our model framework enables us to link two factors, increased dispersion in dollar funding costs, and the tightening of leverage constraints, that explain up to three quarters of increased price impact we observe empirically in the post-crisis period. Fourth, we find that the source of information matters: in response to public announcements, dealers set the forward rate contemporaneously. In contrast, order flow plays a significant role in price-setting of the forward rate in response to private information, and this is substantiated through the allotment

of central bank swap lines by the Federal Reserve in the period 2008-2010.

### 3 Definitions and data

#### Definitions

##### Foreign exchange swaps

Foreign exchange swaps, also known as spot-forward contracts, are used by banks and corporates to hedge balance sheet risk. A bank may hedge the FX exposure due to a mismatch of their currency assets or liabilities, with evidence in [Borio et al. \(2016\)](#) that Japanese banks have significantly higher dollar assets than liabilities, causing them to turn to the FX swap market for dollar funding.<sup>6</sup> We illustrate the legs of a EUR/USD FX swap in [Figure 2](#). In the first leg of the contract, the customer exchanges a principal of  $X$  EUR at the current spot rate  $S$  USD per EUR. The customer receives  $SX$  USD. Both parties then agree to re-exchange the principals at maturity at a specified forward rate, this is known as the forward leg of the contract. The customer receives their  $X$  EUR, and the dealer then receives  $FX$  USD, where  $F$  is the forward rate of the contract.

In the empirical analysis the focus is on short-term FX swaps with maturity of 1-week. We focus on this maturity because the majority of platform trading in FX swaps happens at short maturities. At longer maturities, the use of brokers and telephone-based trading are more common.

##### Covered Interest Rate Parity

Covered interest rate parity (CIP) states that two assets with identical characteristics in terms of credit risk and maturity, but denominated in different currencies, have the same rate of return after accounting for exchange rate risk using a forward contract. To illustrate, let us consider an investor that can borrow at the risk-free rate in USD or EUR. The total cost of borrowing 1 USD directly is  $1 + r_s^f$ . Alternatively, the investor can borrow USD via the FX swap market. To do so, they borrow  $\frac{1}{S}$  EUR, where  $S$  is the quotation in USD per EUR. The total cost in EUR is then  $\frac{1+r_d^f}{S}$ . They exchange the EUR into USD and hedge the exchange rate risk with a forward contract, which gives a synthetic dollar cost of  $\frac{F}{S}(1 + r_d^f)$ . The CIP deviation is defined as the difference between the direct and synthetic dollar borrowing cost, which we formally state in [equation 1](#).

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<sup>6</sup>Similarly, a corporate may hedge the currency mismatch of their cash flows, for example if a European corporate has profits in USD from their offshore activities, they will hedge the foreign exchange risk by swapping their USD receivables with EUR.

$$\Delta = \underbrace{1 + r_{\$}^f}_{\text{direct}} - \underbrace{\frac{F}{S}(1 + r_d^f)}_{\text{synthetic}} \quad (1)$$

Since 2008, the cost of borrowing USD through the FX swap market - the synthetic interest rate in USD - based on EUR, CHF and JPY has been higher than the corresponding direct funding cost in USD. The CIP deviations can therefore be interpreted as a synthetic dollar borrowing premium. We document this in Figure 1, which plots 1 year CIP deviations for the EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD pairs.

In this paper, when we refer to price-setting of the FX swap, we specifically refer to a dealer setting the forward rate, taking interest rates and the spot rate as inputs. We make this distinction in equation 2, where in the pre-crisis period, deviations were rather small,  $\Delta_{pre-crisis} \approx 0$ , and so the forward rate is set by dealers consistent with CIP arbitrage (Akram et al., 2008).

$$\Delta_{pre-crisis} \approx 0 \implies F = S \frac{1 + r_{\$}^f}{1 + r_d^f} \quad (2)$$

In the post-crisis period, significant deviations from parity suggest dealers set the forward rate in response to underlying demand and supply fundamentals in the FX swap market. Price determination is complicated by heterogeneity in funding spreads, leverage constraints and customer quality during this period. As we will outline in our microstructural model of the FX swap market, these factors can cause an inelastic supply of arbitrage capital, increasing the price impact of order flow.

## Data

### CIP deviations

To compute CIP deviations at the 1 week maturity, we use Thomson Reuters tick history which contains historical data on spot and 1 week forward rates of the EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD pairs measure at 6 PM Central European Time. Swap points, also referred to as pips, are used to get the forward exchange rate,  $F = S + \frac{sp}{10^4}$ , where we express  $S$  and  $F$  as dollars per unit of domestic currency, and so the dollar is classified as the quoting currency. The CIP deviation we calculate in equation 3 is expressed as the difference between the local dollar borrowing rate less the synthetic dollar borrowing rate, where  $i_q$  is the US interest rate,  $i_b$  is the base interest rate (denominated in EUR, CHF or JPY),  $S$  is the spot rate and  $F$  is the

forward rate, calculated as the mid-point using bid and ask quotes.<sup>7</sup> A negative  $\Delta$  indicates that synthetic dollar borrowing costs exceed local borrowing costs, and this is indeed the case for the EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD pairs. For a measure of risk-free rates, we use the 1 week Libor in the quoting and base currencies. In constructing the CIP deviation, we convert our forward premium  $\frac{F}{S}$  to annualised percentage points in order to construct a measure of 1 week CIP deviations in annualised terms.<sup>8</sup>

$$\Delta_t = 1 + i_{q,t} - \frac{F_t}{S_t}(1 + i_{b,t}) \quad (3)$$

Summary statistics for the three currency pairs are provided in Table 1, for the EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD pairs respectively. CIP deviations are much wider in the post 2008 period, with an average of 30 basis points for all pairs. Average deviations are negative, suggesting that the US Libor rate is less than a synthetic Libor rate based on borrowing in EUR, CHF or JPY and swapping into USD using a forward contract. The range of CIP deviations also increases significantly with measured spikes of up to -300 basis points. These spikes correspond to quarter-end periods, which we investigate empirically in following sections.

## Order Flow

Order flow is defined as the net of buyer initiated transactions. We define a transaction as buyer initiated if it is initiated by a counterparty swapping EUR, CHF or JPY into USD. Conversely, a transaction is seller initiated if the transaction is swapping USD into foreign currency. To measure order flow at short-term maturities, we use the Reuters D2000-2 trading platform, which contains inter-dealer trades from January 1st 2005 to September 1st 2017 in FX swaps for the EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD pairs. We use the 1 Week maturity as it is the most liquid and traded pair at maturities above 1-day. The dataset has quotes in the inter-dealer market, with columns indicating bid price, ask price, a timestamp of the quote to the nearest second, and a column for the market price when a trade has occurred. Additionally, our data set has a column indicating if the trade was buyer or seller initiated. Using this data, we can construct a measure of order flow. The measure of order flow is then given as the net of buyer initiated transactions, where buyer initiated transactions are signed +1 and seller initiated transactions are signed -1. The order flow for 1 week FX swaps are measured in counts as we do not have trade volume in the TR D2000-2 database.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>To calculate the mid spot rate, we average the spot rates at ask and bid,  $S = \frac{S_a + S_b}{2}$ . Similarly, the forward rate is calculated as the mid point of bid and ask quotes,  $F = \frac{F_a + F_b}{2}$

<sup>8</sup>We account for the exact number of trading days by properly adjusting for bank holidays in the respective currency pairs

<sup>9</sup>Note that the common way of measuring order flow is to follow the algorithm provided in [Lee and Ready \(1991\)](#), which sign transactions as buyer or seller initiated based on bid and ask quotes. In our data we know the direction of the trade (seller or buyer initiated) is already indicated. This means that we are able to sign

$$OF_t^{count} = \sum_{k=t_0}^{k=t} \mathbb{1}[T_k = B] - \mathbb{1}[T_k = S]$$

Summary statistics of order flow using the inter-dealer trades are provided in Table 2. The mean of net buyer initiated trades is close to zero, and the standard deviation of trades ranges from 2-5 net buyer transactions per day. The EUR/USD pair has the highest range of order flow, with a range of [-30,+30]. We provide plots of daily order flow in Figure 3.

### Funding dispersion

We calculate the daily dispersion in the 3-month Libor contributions as a proxy for funding heterogeneity. The measure is computed as the difference between the highest and lowest daily submission by the contributing panel banks. A higher value indicates larger dispersion in funding costs among the panel banks. Data until February 1st 2014 for individual Libor submissions can be obtained from Bloomberg. After this date Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) took over as Libor administrator from British Bankers Association (BBA) and the data can be obtained from ICE. Figure 4 shows the dispersion in 3-month Libor during our sample period ranging from January 1st 2005 to September 1st 2017.

### Bid/ask spreads and price volatility

In the empirical part of the paper we also exploit the high frequency data from the Thomson Reuters tick history to create bid/ask spreads and a measure of intra-day price volatility. The measure of bid/ask spreads is the daily average of the last observation each hour. Figure 5 shows the evolution of the bid/ask spreads during the sample period. As a measure of daily price volatility, we compute the daily standard deviation based on hourly observations. The intra-day price volatility is depicted in Figure 6.

## 4 Model

Before turning to the empirical results, we first develop a model to structure our testable hypotheses. As a starting point, we introduce three types of agents in the model, customers, arbitrageurs, and dealers. Customers include banks, other financial institutions and non-financial institutions that manage currency mismatch between assets and liabilities by hedging their positions via FX swaps. In addition to customers, there are a distinct group of arbitrageurs. The arbitrageurs can step in and supply funds in the FX swap market to earn arbitrage profits from mispricing of the forward rate in response to underlying demand from customer flows. The third group of agents are dealers, who set the forward rate of the FX swap. The objective

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all trades correctly.

of dealers is to match flows as much as possible, both from customers and arbitrageurs. Any unmatched flows are submitted to the inter-dealer market and are observed as order flow. The key assumption in price-setting is that the inter-dealer market sets the forward rate to avoid order imbalances.

The primary contribution of the model is in deriving a relationship between order flow and price-setting of the forward rate. Additional testable implications include an analysis of the factors that affect price impact. We identify two factors, shocks to arbitrageur capital in the form of heterogeneous funding costs and leverage constraints, increase the price impact of order flow.

## Arbitrageurs

Following [Sushko et al. \(2017\)](#), we model an arbitrageur that has expected exponential utility over next period wealth  $W_{t+1}$ . Formally, we define  $U_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ -e^{-\rho W_{t+1}} \right]$ , where  $\rho$  is a measure of risk aversion. The arbitrageur decides to lend  $x_{\$,j,t}$  dollars in the FX swap market. To do so, they first borrow at the dollar risk-free rate  $r_{\$}^f$ . The dealer exchanges principals at a specified spot exchange rate  $s_t$  dollars per unit of domestic currency, with an agreement to re-exchange principals at maturity at the forward rate  $f_t$ . During the contract, they invest the domestic currency, at a risk-free rate  $r_d^f$ . The CIP deviation,  $\Delta_t$ , is the excess of the forward premium over the interest rate differential,  $\Delta_t = f_t - s_t - (r_{\$}^f - r_d^f)$ .<sup>10</sup> In our model, the arbitrageur faces three limits to arbitrage: counterparty risk, funding costs, and leverage constraints. We detail each of these channels below.

### Counterparty risk

The arbitrageur bears counterparty risk. In the event of a default with a given probability  $\theta$ , the arbitrageur does not earn the forward premium  $f_t - s_t$  on the trade, but instead earns a stochastic return based on the realized spot rate exchange rate  $s_{t+1}$ .<sup>11</sup>

### Funding costs

Funding spread heterogeneity is a post-crisis feature and is typically represented as higher credit spreads in dollars, as well as more dispersion in Libor rates for banks ([Rime et al., 2017](#)).

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<sup>10</sup>Note that the definition of the CIP deviation in the model is the negative of the CIP deviation expressed in the empirical evidence. We change the notation for the model as we are taking the perspective of an arbitrageur supplying dollars in the FX swap market.

<sup>11</sup>Our model excludes the market practice of paying margin in FX swaps. This would imply that moves in the underlying spot exchange rate are effectively collateralized by the counterparty. An implication of the margining practice is that the arbitrageur faces liquidity risk instead. However, in short-term FX swaps, the liquidity risk connected to margining is limited. Similarly, an arbitrageur may minimise counterparty risk by conducting the trade with its own dealer, if it is an arm of an investment bank. Therefore, we do not consider counterparty risk as a relevant factor in our empirical analysis.

The dollar funding spread reflects individual arbitrageur funding margins over the risk-free rate.<sup>12</sup> We model this formally, with each arbitrageur  $j$  facing a marginal funding cost  $c_{\$,j,t}$  over the risk-free rate  $r_{\$}^f$ .

### Leverage constraints

As the ratio of debt to total assets increases with more arbitrage capital, so does the marginal cost of obtaining dollars. For example, in Bräuning and Puria (2017) they find evidence that the size of the swap position leads to higher forward premiums charged by dealers, all else equal. This is especially heightened in quarter-end periods when leverage constraints prevent agents from borrowing dollars for arbitrage capital (Du et al., 2018; Cenedese et al., 2019). We capture costs to arbitrageur leverage,  $\phi_t\left(\frac{x}{W}\right)$ , with  $\phi_t(\cdot) > 0$ . This is a stylized way of capturing regulatory factors such as requirements on a minimum level of risk-weighted capital to assets, and other costs of scaling the balance sheet to conduct CIP arbitrage.

We can write the evolution of wealth in the next period as the sum of returns on initial wealth, CIP arbitrage profits and the difference between the actual spot rate at  $t+1$  and the forward rate.

$$W_{t+1} = \underbrace{W_t(1 + r_{\$}^f)}_{\text{return on wealth}} + \underbrace{x_{\$,j,t}\Delta_t}_{\text{cip arbitrage}} + \underbrace{\theta x_{\$,j,t}(s_{t+1} - f_t)}_{\text{counterparty risk}} - \underbrace{x_{\$,j,t}(c_{\$,j,t})}_{\text{funding spreads}} - \underbrace{W_t\phi_t\left(\frac{x_{\$,j,t}}{W_t}\right)}_{\text{leverage constraint}} \quad (4)$$

Assuming  $s_{t+1} \sim N(f_t, \sigma^2)$ , and drawing on the properties of the exponential distribution, maximizing the log of expected utility is equivalent to mean-variance preferences over wealth.

$$\max_{x_{\$,j,t}^*} \rho \left( W_t(1 + r_{\$}^f) + x_{\$,j,t}\Delta_t - x_{\$,j,t}(c_{\$,j,t}) - \frac{1}{2}\rho\theta^2 x_{\$,j,t}^2 \sigma^2 - W_t\phi_t\left(\frac{x_{\$,j,t}}{W_t}\right) \right) \quad (5)$$

The equation for the supply of dollars by the arbitrageur takes the following piece-wise functional form, provided in equation 6. An arbitrageur will only supply dollars if their funding cost is below a threshold  $c_{\$}^*$ . We define the funding cost threshold as the point at which the net arbitrage profits *ex ante*,  $\Delta - c_{\$}^* - \phi_j\left(\frac{x_{\$,j,t}}{W_t}\right) = 0$ . The optimal supply of dollars by an arbitrageur is given by  $x_{\$,j,t}$ .

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<sup>12</sup>Note that we are using the Libor fixing as a proxy for the risk-free rate in the empirical part of the paper. This is strictly speaking not accurate, but our mission in this paper is to investigate the price-setting in FX swaps, not to precisely measure arbitrage opportunities.

$$x_{\$,j,t}^* = \begin{cases} \frac{\Delta_t - c_{\$,j,t} - \phi'_j\left(\frac{x_{\$,j,t}}{W_t}\right)}{\rho\theta^2\sigma^2} & , c_{\$,j,t} < c_{\$}^* \\ 0 & , c_{\$,j,t} \geq c_{\$}^* \end{cases} \quad (6)$$

To summarize, arbitrageur supply of dollars is positively related to the forward premium (and CIP deviation  $\Delta$ ), and negatively related to dollar funding spreads and leverage constraints. Increased heterogeneity in dealer funding spreads, for example, will cause more arbitrageurs to have too high funding spreads  $c_{\$,j,t} \geq c_{\$}^*$ , and to not supply dollars in the FX swap market. We will discuss the implications of funding spread heterogeneity for price-setting in the inter-dealer market in a following section.

## Customers

Customers, typically banks, use the FX swap market to hedge their currency balance sheet mismatch. We capture customer demands by the following stylized function, where banks are in a continuum  $[0,1]$  indexed by bank quality  $\theta_b$  and the CIP deviation  $\Delta$ . Importantly,  $x_{\$,t}^D$  is a measure of the net demand for USD at the spot leg of the FX swap.

$$x_{\$,t}^D = \int_0^1 f(\theta_b, \Delta) db \quad (7)$$

The first determinant of net demand for USD in the FX swap market is  $\theta_b$ , which measures counterparty quality. All else equal, counterparties with higher quality are more likely to obtain dollars directly via commercial paper markets or bank deposits. Therefore, demands for dollar funding via FX swaps is inversely related to counterparty quality. The increase in counterparty risk is a key determinant of the increased demand for dollar constrained banks in the FX swap market in 2008 ([Baba and Packer, 2009](#)). The second determinant of net demand is the CIP deviation  $\Delta$ . All else equal, a higher CIP deviation implies an increase in the net cost of swapping euros, swiss francs and yen into dollars. Evidence in [Eguren Martin et al. \(2018\)](#) suggests that in response to shocks to the CIP deviation, banks' net demand for dollars in the FX swap market declines.

## Inter-Dealer Market

We have defined customers and arbitrageurs. Each of these agents are price-takers, and go to a market-maker to find a counter-party to take the other side of the trade. The market-maker is the dealer in our model. The dealer's objective is to match flows of swapping domestic currency into dollars with opposing flows. This is consistent with theories of market microstructure



where dealers are sufficiently risk averse to holding inventory (see [Lyons \(1995\)](#) and [Bjønnes and Rime \(2005\)](#) for empirical evidence on dealers minimizing inventory). Moreover, all dealers in FX swaps are associated with a bank. Therefore, the dealer faces the same funding costs and constraints as the mother bank that indeed can be part of the group of arbitrageurs. We denote the net dollar demands by customers to dealer  $j$  by  $x_{\$,j}^D$ . Denote the net supply of dollars by arbitrageurs to dealer  $j$  by  $x_{\$,t,j}^*$ . Unmatched flows in dollars are submitted to the inter-dealer market. We illustrate the unmatched flows of a dealer in [Figure 7](#). The dealer submits the excess demand for dollar funding to the inter-dealer market, and this is observed as  $OF_{t,j}$  in the [Figure](#).

Aggregating across all dealers, we obtain an expression for inter-dealer order flow  $OF_t$ , in [equation 8](#). Inter-dealer order flow is equal to the net buying pressure of swapping EUR, CHF or JPY (domestic currency) into USD. Net customer demands for USD at the spot leg of the FX swap is equal to  $x_{\$,t}^D$ . Net supply of dollars by  $N$  symmetric arbitrageurs in the FX swap market is given by  $\sum_{i=1}^N x_{\$,t}^*$ , where we denote  $N$  as the number of arbitrageurs that have sufficiently low funding spreads in order to supply dollars in the FX swap market.

$$OF_t = x_{\$,t}^D - \sum_{i=1}^N x_{\$,t}^* \quad (8)$$

To illustrate the timing of customer-dealer trades and price-setting, [Figure 8](#) depicts a two period model, in which customers and dealers trade at the beginning of each period. Immediately after each period of trading, the inter-dealer market observes order flow. Dealers then set the forward rate of the FX swap, and hence the CIP deviation  $\Delta$ , to set expected order imbalances to zero for the next period of trading.

**Definition [Price setting]:** *The inter-dealer market sets a forward rate to set inter-dealer order flow to be zero, based on an information set that includes information on current and past prices, and customer and arbitrageur fundamentals.*

$$\mathbb{E}_t [OF_t(\Delta_t) | \mathcal{I}_t] = 0 \quad (9)$$

The price-setting condition is implicitly assuming an inter-dealer market that sets a common price for all dealers. This is a reasonable assumption, as if dealers set different prices, this would not be a sustainable equilibrium as other dealers will only execute swap trades with the dealer that sets the most favorable rate.<sup>13</sup> Combining [equations 8 and 9](#), we can rewrite the order flow in period  $t$  as the unanticipated components of customer demand and dealer supply of dollars

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<sup>13</sup>Moreover, inter-dealer trades are secured by daily margining practically eliminating potential differences in counterparty risk across dealers.

in the FX swap market.

$$OF_t = x_{\$,t}^D - \mathbb{E} [x_{\$,t}^D | \mathcal{I}_t] - \sum_{j=1}^N (x_{j,t}^* - \mathbb{E} [x_{j,t}^* | \mathcal{I}_t]) \quad (10)$$

In the model, order flow responds to changes to demand fundamentals that are not forecast by dealers. This provides a simple decomposition of order imbalances into unexpected idiosyncratic shocks to customers and dealers, shown in equation 11. The first term reflects unanticipated shocks to customer type and funding spreads. For example, the inter-dealer market may not directly observe customer types, such as credit ratings and their ability to borrow dollars in alternative markets. The second term reflects unanticipated changes in funding spreads. The third term reflects rises in the cost of leverage.

$$OF_t = \underbrace{\int_0^1 f(\theta_b, \cdot) - \mathbb{E} [f(\theta_b, \cdot) | \mathcal{I}_t] db}_{\text{customer type}} + \frac{1}{\rho\theta^2\sigma^2} \sum_{j=1}^N \left( \underbrace{c_{\$,j,t} - \mathbb{E} [c_{\$,j,t} | \mathcal{I}_t]}_{\text{funding spreads}} + \underbrace{\phi'_{j,t} \left( \frac{x}{W} \right) - \mathbb{E} \left[ \phi'_{j,t} \left( \frac{x}{W} \right) | \mathcal{I}_t \right]}_{\text{leverage constraints}} \right) \quad (11)$$

Finally, we can solve for the equilibrium CIP deviation  $\Delta$ , can be derived from setting expected order flow to zero, in equation 12. Intuitively, an increase in customer demand, an increase in dollar funding spreads, or a tightening of leverage constraints on arbitrageurs, leads to a widening of the CIP deviation.

$$\Delta_t = \mathbb{E} [c_{\$,j,t} | \mathcal{I}_t] + \mathbb{E} \left[ \phi'_{j,t} \left( \frac{x}{W} \right) | \mathcal{I}_t \right] + \frac{\rho\theta^2\sigma^2}{N} \int_0^1 \mathbb{E} [f(\theta_b, \cdot) | \mathcal{I}_t] \quad (12)$$

We can use the framework to study the price impact of order flow, as well as the propagation of shocks to demand and supply on price-setting in the FX swap market.

**Proposition 1: price impact of order flow**

*A positive shock to order flow in period  $t$  implies a widening of CIP deviations, with the price sensitivity  $\beta = \frac{\rho\theta^2\sigma^2}{N}$ .*

$$\Delta_t - \Delta_{t-1} = \beta OF_t \quad (13)$$

The price impact of order flow is seen in equation 13 is governed by  $\beta$ , which is related positively to variance of the exchange rate, counterparty risk, and negatively related to the

number of arbitrageurs  $N$ .<sup>14</sup>

We can further decompose price impact of order flow into unanticipated shocks to customer demand and arbitrageur supply in equation 14. An unanticipated change in customer demands for dollars in the FX swap market, due to a change in quality, or an unanticipated change in arbitrageur funding spreads and leverage constraints, has price impact through order flow.

$$\Delta_t - \Delta_{t-1} = \underbrace{\beta \int_0^1 f(\theta_b, \cdot) - \mathbb{E}[f(\theta_b, \cdot) | \mathcal{I}_t]}_{\text{customer type}} db + \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N \left( \underbrace{c_{\$,j,t} - \mathbb{E}[c_{\$,j,t} | \mathcal{I}_t]}_{\text{funding spreads}} + \underbrace{\phi'_{j,t}\left(\frac{x}{W}\right) - \mathbb{E}\left[\phi'_{j,t}\left(\frac{x}{W}\right) | \mathcal{I}_t\right]}_{\text{leverage constraints}} \right) \quad (14)$$

In an efficient market with no limits to arbitrage,  $N \rightarrow \infty$  and there is a zero price impact of order flow. In this case, there is an elastic supply of arbitrage capital to take the other side of customer trades, and dealers are able to minimise inventory and match flows. This leads us to proposition 2, which states that the price impact of order flow is more sensitive in periods of increased dispersion in funding spreads of arbitrageurs.

**Proposition 2: (i) Heterogeneity in funding spreads and (ii) the tightening of leverage constraints, increases the price impact of order flow**

*Assume the distribution of arbitrageur funding costs is given by  $c_{\$,j,t} \sim N(\bar{c}_{\$}, \sigma_c^2)$ . An increased dispersion in funding costs ( $\sigma_c \uparrow$ ) and an increase in the marginal cost of leverage ( $\phi'_j(\frac{x}{W}) \uparrow$ ) leads to a decline in the number of arbitrageurs supplying dollars in the FX swap market ( $N \downarrow$ ) and an increased price impact of order flow,  $\beta \uparrow$ .*

Proof: The number of arbitrageurs supplying dollars in the FX swap market is proportional to the probability that the investor will conduct arbitrage, which is when the funding cost  $c_{\$,j,t}$  is less than the threshold value  $c_{\$}^*$ . Utilizing the fact that the threshold value  $c_{\$}^* = \Delta - \phi'_j(\frac{x}{W})$ , we can write the probability of conducting arbitrage in equation 15.

$$Prob[c_{\$,j,t} < c_{\$}^*] = \Phi\left(\frac{\Delta - \phi'_j(\frac{x}{W}) - \bar{c}_{\$}}{\sigma_c}\right) \quad (15)$$

<sup>14</sup>This contrasts to the  $\beta$  in microstructure models of the spot FX market, which typically measures the relative share of informed traders (Evans and Lyons, 2002). We differentiate our price impact equation in that FX swaps do not feature uninformed traders, and rely on customers that use FX swaps for largely hedging purposes.

The expected price impact of order flow is then given by  $\mathbb{E}[\beta] = \frac{\rho\theta^2\sigma^2}{N \times \Phi\left(\frac{\Delta - \phi'_j(\frac{x}{W}) - \bar{c}_S}{\sigma_c}\right)}$ . An increase in  $\sigma_c$  and an increase in the marginal cost of leverage  $\phi'_j(\frac{x}{W})$  lowers the probability of conducting arbitrage, and increases the expected price impact of order flow.

Heterogeneity of funding spreads is consistent with the empirical findings of [Rime et al. \(2017\)](#). When heterogeneity in funding costs increases, the remaining arbitrageurs that still face arbitrage opportunities have to supply more USD.<sup>15</sup> Limits to arbitrage capital are particularly pronounced during quarter-end regulations, and there is micro level evidence suggesting dealers that are more leveraged are more sensitive to order imbalances and demand a higher forward premium on the contract ([Du et al., 2018](#); [Cenedese et al., 2019](#)). Finally, we can use the framework to decompose shocks to private and public information, that gives rise to our two views of price-setting in the FX swap market in proposition 3.

### Proposition 3: Public versus Private information view

*Consider a shock to customer quality, arbitrageur funding spreads or leverage constraints. Denote these shocks  $\epsilon_t = [\epsilon_{Q,t}, \epsilon_{C,t}, \epsilon_{L,t}]$ . Define the dealer information set  $I_t$ , and private information  $I_t^-$  is the complementary set. The price-setting equation can then be expressed in equation 16, where  $OF_t = \epsilon_{Q,t} + \epsilon_{C,t} + \epsilon_{L,t}|I_t^-$*

$$\Delta_t - \Delta_{t-1} = \beta OF_t + \beta \mathbb{E}[\epsilon_{Q,t} + \epsilon_{C,t} + \epsilon_{L,t}|I_t] \quad (16)$$

Proof: For illustration, let us partition shocks to customer quality into public and private information shocks.  $\epsilon_{Q,t} = \epsilon_{Q,t}|I_t^- + \epsilon_{Q,t}|I_t$ . Order flow is then defined as shocks to customer quality unanticipated by dealers:  $OF = \epsilon_{Q,t} - \epsilon_{Q,t}|I_t$ . Using the price-setting equation, and re-arranging terms, gives us equation 16.

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta_t - \Delta_{t-1} &= \beta \epsilon_{Q,t} \\ &= \beta(\epsilon_{Q,t}|I_t^- + \epsilon_{Q,t}|I_t) \\ &= \beta(\epsilon_{Q,t} - \epsilon_{Q,t}|I_t) + \beta(\epsilon_{Q,t}|I_t) \\ &= \beta \underbrace{OF_t}_{\text{private}} + \beta \underbrace{(\epsilon_{Q,t}|I_t)}_{\text{public}} \end{aligned}$$

Proposition 3 states that the source of information matters for price-setting. Public infor-

<sup>15</sup>Arbitrageurs face higher funding costs when they need to raise large amounts of debt to fund the arbitrage trade. For instance Money Market Funds that lend dollars are limited by regulation not to invest more than 5 per cent of their assets in a single issuer.

mation shocks are impounded in the price contemporaneously. In contrast, order flow reflects private information. We provide examples of public and private information shocks in the context of the model.

**Public information shocks:** Examples include monetary announcements and quarter-end reporting requirements. A testable implication of our framework is that we expect to observe contemporaneous adjustment of the forward rate in response to public announcements.

**Private information shocks:** An example of a shock to bank quality that we test empirically is the introduction of central bank swap lines. Central bank swap lines by the Federal Reserve provide incremental dollar liquidity to sufficiently dollar constrained banks. As banks of low quality are more likely to use central bank swap lines as a way to meet dollar funding, we can interpret this as reducing customer demand for dollars via FX swaps. Crucially, if the swap line auctions to dollar constrained banks are private information, this results in a decline in order flow, causing a decline in the forward premium of the swap trade.

To conclude, the model has provided a framework to show how unanticipated shocks to customer demand, funding spreads and leverage constraints can translate to an increase in inter-dealer order flow. This causes dealers to reset the forward premium of the FX swap to offset order flow, resulting in a widening of the CIP deviation. This is consistent with microstructure theories on inventory control; dealers are sufficiently averse to holding inventory and update the forward rate as a response to avoid inventory accumulation. We test three predictions in our empirical evidence. First, based on proposition 1, we measure the price impact of order imbalances. We then test proposition 2; which states that heterogeneous dollar funding costs and leverage constraints during quarter-ends lead to increased price impact of order flow. In proposition 3, we test the public and private information views with an analysis of central bank swap lines, quarter-ends and monetary announcements.

## 5 Price Impact of Order Flow

### Baseline specification

In this section, we examine the price impact of order flow. In proposition 1 of the model, we concluded that an increase in order flow in the inter-dealer market is consistent with excess demands for swapping other currencies into USD, i.e. borrowing USD through FX swaps. As dealers are averse to holding inventory, the inter-dealer market resets the forward rate to offset order flow. This leads to an increase in the forward premium and a widening of CIP deviations. Our baseline specification for testing the price impact of order flow is outlined in equation 17.

$$\Delta CIP_t = \alpha + \beta_1 OF_t + \beta_j X_{j,t} + \epsilon_t \tag{17}$$

The outcome variable is the daily change in 1-week CIP deviations, where negative values indicate that it is more costly to obtain USD through FX swaps relative to the direct borrowing rate in USD. Our variable of interest,  $\beta_1$ , measures the price impact of order flow (OF).  $X$  is a vector of control variables including the change in the U.S. Libor-OIS spreads for 1-week and 3-month maturities, the VIX index, and the USD Trade weighted exchange rate. We run the specification for all currency pairs as a panel and for the EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD pairs separately, and divide our sample into two periods, a pre 2008 period (January 2005 to December 2007), and a post 2008 period (January 2008 to September 2017).

By dividing our sample into before and after 2008 we are able to uncover potential changes in the price impact of order flow after the global financial crisis. Our justification is that during the pre 2008 period, CIP held tightly, indicating an elastic supply of arbitrage capital. Order flow is not expected to have any significant price impact, as there are relatively short-lived periods of mispricing in the FX swap market (Akram et al., 2008). However, in the post-crisis period, arbitrage capital becomes scarce. We hypothesize that dealers adjust prices more aggressively during this period to attract the necessary arbitrage capital and balance dealer inventories.

Our results are presented in Table 3. In columns (1) through to (4), we test for price impact in the pre-crisis period, and in columns (5) through to (8), we test for price impact in the post-crisis period. We find that order flow has significant price impact in the post 2008 period for all 3 pairs, with a one standard deviation change in order flow widening CIP violations by up to 4 basis points based on the panel specification in column (5). In contrast, there is no significance in the pre 2008 period.

## Dynamic effects

In addition to the contemporaneous price impact of order flow, we test for dynamic effects using a structural vector autoregression (VAR) framework. Following the work of Hasbrouck (1991) and Ranaldo and Somogyi (2019), we estimate the following bivariate VAR, illustrated in equations 18 and 19. In equation 18, a contemporaneous shock to daily order flow is impounded in the price the same day, which is consistent with the price-setting equation derived in our model framework. Conversely, we only allow for shocks to prices to affect order flow with a lag. The identification assumption is consistent with causality running from order flow to price-setting of the FX swap.

$$CIP_t = \alpha_1 + \sum_{k=1}^L \gamma_{1,k} CIP_{t-k} + \sum_{k=0}^L \beta_{1,k} OF_{t-k} + \epsilon_{1,t} \quad (18)$$

$$OF_t = \alpha_2 + \sum_{k=1}^L \gamma_{2,k} CIP_{t-k} + \sum_{k=1}^L \beta_{2,k} OF_{t-k} + \epsilon_{2,t} \quad (19)$$

Based on our specification with 7 lags, we test the effects of a 1 standard deviation shock to order flow on the CIP deviations in Figure 9. On the left panel, we test for effects during the pre 2008 period, and observe no systematic effect of order flow on the CIP deviation for all pairs of the EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD. In the post 2008 period, we find the CIP deviation widens by approximately 4 basis points contemporaneously, with the price impact decaying to zero approximately 3-5 days following the shock. This response is intuitive; order flow has maximum impact contemporaneously, and decays over time as dealers update their information sets. We now turn to two factors that can restrict arbitrage capital, an increase in funding cost heterogeneity and regulatory reporting during quarter-ends, that account for the increase in price impact observed in the post 2008 period.

## Dispersion in funding costs and quarter-ends

Proposition 2 of the model in section 4 predicts that the price impact of order flow increases when heterogeneity in U.S. funding costs is large and when banks' balance sheet constraints are more binding. When funding cost dispersion increases in USD less market participants are in the position to conduct the arbitrage trade. The remaining arbitrageurs with favourable funding costs may face limits to the scalability of the arbitrage trade. Important reporting dates, such as quarter-ends, represent an opportunity to test how the price impact of order flow responds to tighter regulatory constraints. An increasing marginal cost of leverage suggests the supply of arbitrage capital becomes less elastic and the price impact of order flow increases.

To jointly test these hypotheses we run the following regression specification in equation 20. The variables *FundingHet* and *Qend* represent dummy variables for funding cost heterogeneity and quarter-ends, respectively. We are interested in the interaction between order flow and these variables to examine if the price impact of order flow changes when dispersion in funding costs increases and the FX swap contract crosses quarter-ends. The dummy *FundingHet* captures days with high cross sectional dispersion among U.S. Libor panel banks in their individual submissions and when the 1-week FX swap contract matures after quarter-ends.<sup>16</sup> The dummy *Qend* captures an increase in balance sheet constraints as regulatory authorities in most jurisdictions rely on quarter-end snapshot of banks' balance sheets. In addition to the control variables mentioned in the baseline specification, we also include the two dummies *FundingHet* and *Qend*.

$$\Delta CIP_t = \alpha + \beta_1 OF_t + \beta_2 OF_t \times FundingHet_t + \beta_3 OF_t \times Qend_t + \beta_j X_{j,t} + \epsilon_t \quad (20)$$

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<sup>16</sup>The dispersion dummy takes value 1 when the cross sectional dispersion (difference between the maximum and the minimum submitted quote) is within the highest quartile of the distribution on the respective day and zero otherwise

Table 4 presents the results. Columns (1) to (4) measure the price impact of order flow during the pre-crisis period, and columns (5) to (8) measure price impact during the post period. Consistent with our theory, we find that the price impact of order flow is significantly higher during periods of high dispersion in Libor quotes in the post crisis period. The results suggest that larger heterogeneity in funding spreads implies that the forward rate has to adjust more aggressively to attract the necessary arbitrage capital to balance the market. Moreover, there is a substantial increase in price impact during quarter-end periods. This is also consistent with our theory of more inelastic supply of arbitrage capital when balance sheet constraints are more binding. Based on the panel regression estimates in column (5), days with high funding cost heterogeneity and quarter-end periods account for approximately three quarters of the increase in price impact after 2008.<sup>17</sup>

### Direction of order flow

We now test for asymmetric price impact of order flow. We expect that the price impact of order flow when it is positive, i.e. there is net pressure for swapping domestic currency into USD in the inter-dealer market. This is because high funding cost heterogeneity in USD leads to a shortage of arbitrage capital in USD. However, for negative shocks to order flow, the availability of arbitrage capital in other currencies is what matters for price impact.

We present our results in Table 5. Columns (1) through to (4) depict the results from regressing positive and negative order flow on changes in CIP deviations and these two variables interacted with a dummy that takes the value of 1 after 2008, and zero otherwise. As expected, neither positive nor negative order flow have any price impact prior to 2008. After 2008, both negative and positive order flow is highly significant across all currencies. This result serves as an indication that insufficient arbitrage capital in USD as an important constraint after 2008.

In addition, we run a similar regression as specified in equation 20 on the panel of currencies, but now with the order flow split between positive and negative order flow. Columns (5) and (6) depict the pre and post 2008 results respectively. In the post 2008 sample, shown in column (6), the price impact of positive order flow is significantly larger than for negative order flow, and during periods when funding heterogeneity is high. This is consistent with our hypothesis that high funding cost heterogeneity in USD leads to a shortage of arbitrage capital in USD, making dealers more sensitive to positive order flow (net demand for swapping domestic currencies into USD) in the FX swap market. During quarter-ends, we find both positive and negative order flow have large price impact. Dealers are aggressively adjusting the price to balance order flow independent of the direction. They are using the order flow as a signal to update the forward

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<sup>17</sup>To arrive at this calculation, we note that the aggregate price impact of a one standard deviation order flow shock is approximately 4 basis points. After controlling for funding heterogeneity and quarter-ends, the coefficient  $\beta_1 \approx 1$ , implying that three quarters of the price impact is explained by these two factors.



rate of the swap in periods when balance sheets are particularly constrained.

### **Bid/ask spreads and price volatility**

To further substantiate the results on the price impact of order flow we examine bid/ask spreads and price volatility, calculated from high frequency quotes in the FX swap market. Bid/ask spreads are a proxy for market liquidity, and constructed as the daily intraday average of 1-week bid and ask for each currency pair. High bid/ask spreads can either indicate inventory risk for the dealer, or asymmetric information in the FX swap market. We calculate the daily standard deviation of price changes from high frequency intraday FX swap quotes as a proxy for price volatility.

We hypothesize that bid-ask spreads and intraday volatility increase during periods of funding heterogeneity and when the FX swap contract trades over quarter-ends. Tables 6 and 7 present results from regressing the bid/ask spread and price volatility on the quarter-end and funding heterogeneity variables used in specification 20. Columns (1) through to (3) test for effects in the pre-crisis period. Columns (4) to (9) test for effects in the post-crisis period, with additional dummies capturing the post 2015 period. First, the constant in the regression indicates that the bid/ask spreads are lowest for EUR/USD and highest for CHF/USD. This is in line with the interpretation that the EUR/USD is the most liquid currency pair while the CHF/USD is the least liquid. Similarly, price volatility increases during periods of large funding cost heterogeneity and during quarter-end periods. This is in line with order flow having stronger price impact and wider bid/ask spreads during these periods.

Most of the increase during quarter-ends have taken place after banks started to report leverage ratio to the public in 2015. In addition to lower market liquidity over quarter-ends, this may be related to leverage ratio increasing the costs of inventory for dealers. Wider bid/ask spreads act as a compensation for higher costs of being a dealer, and is consistent with empirical evidence in Krohn and Sushko (2017) which find bid/ask spreads rise during quarter-end periods.<sup>18</sup>

## **6 Public vs Private Information Shocks**

In this section we empirically test the microstructural hypotheses of public and private information, outlined in proposition 3 of the model in section 4. We examine how price-setting in the FX swap market is determined in response to three different types of announcements, central bank swap lines, quarter-end reporting requirements and monetary policy surprises.

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<sup>18</sup>They make an additional point that market structure matters for dealer pricing. In particular, the role of smaller dealers providing arbitrage capital during quarter-ends leads to an increase in the observed bid/ask spreads

## Central Bank Swap Lines

Central bank swap lines provide incremental dollar liquidity to sufficiently dollar constrained banks. Price effects have been well documented, with the rate at which the Federal Reserve lends to counterparty central banks enforcing a ceiling on CIP deviations (Bahaj et al., 2018). We use the central bank swap lines to test the following microstructure hypotheses of how price-setting is determined in the FX swap market. If swap lines are public information, swap line auctions should be impounded in the price contemporaneously. In contrast, if the details of swap line auctions are private to dealers, price effects are due to the arrival of order flow.

We hypothesise that the swap lines constitute private information. While the date of swap line auctions are publicly known, the details of which banks have access to the swap line are unknown to dealers. Banks that have access to dollars via a central bank swap line will reduce their demand for dollar funding in the FX swap market. Therefore, dealers can update forward rates once they observe a decline in buyer initiated transactions.<sup>19</sup>

To test our hypothesis, we use data on Federal Reserve swap line allotments to counterparty banks during the period of 2008-2010. The data contains a record of every transaction made, with both amounts and maturity listed. The maturity of a swap line can range from one week to 1 month. At a daily frequency, we compute the total stock of allotments as the total amount of all loans made by the Federal Reserve to counterparty central banks, less any loans that have matured. The daily change in stocks provides us a flow measure of allotments. This is the most direct measure of incremental liquidity provided by the Federal Reserve to foreign (non U.S.) banks. We construct a measure of total allotments for the central bank swap line. At the height of the crisis, in October of 2008, allotments peaked at approximately \$250B to the ECB, and approximately \$100B to the BOJ. The sharp rise in allotments was due to a move by the Federal Reserve to raise the ceiling on allotment amounts. To construct a global measure of total loans to banks in the Eurozone, Japan and Switzerland, we add the total amounts outstanding for lines extended to the ECB, BOJ and SNB.

We test for the impact of the constructed measure of swap line allotment flows on the CIP deviations and order flow using the multivariate VAR framework is summarized in equations 21, 22 and 23. We use data on 1 week FX swaps as the majority of swap allotments are of a 1 week maturity. As well as the measure of CIP deviations  $CIP_t$  and order flow  $OF_t$ , we augment the bivariate VAR in section 5 with a measure of swap allotment flows  $A_t$ . The identifying assumption is that shocks to swap line allotments can have contemporaneous effects on the covered interest rate parity deviation and order flow. In contrast, swap line allotments are only affected by lagged order flow and CIP deviations. We hypothesize that a positive shock to

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<sup>19</sup>Alternatively, if the central bank swap lines are instead allocated to arbitrageurs supplying dollars in the swap market, we expect an increase in seller initiated transactions for dollars in the EUR/USD FX swap market. In either case, we predict an increase in allotments to reduce order flow.

swap line allotments causes a decline in order flow, as banks substitute toward the swap line for additional dollar funding. Similarly, banks that now receive dollar funding can use their arbitrage capital by supplying dollars in the FX swap market. The decline in order flow then narrows deviations of covered interest rate parity.

$$CIP_t = \alpha_1 + \sum_{k=1}^L \gamma_{1,k} CIP_{t-k} + \sum_{k=0}^L \beta_{1,k} OF_{t-k} + \sum_{k=0}^L \delta_{1,k} A_{t-k} + \epsilon_{1,t} \quad (21)$$

$$OF_t = \alpha_2 + \sum_{k=1}^L \gamma_{2,k} CIP_{t-k} + \sum_{k=1}^L \beta_{2,k} OF_{t-k} + \sum_{k=0}^L \delta_{2,k} A_{t-k} + \epsilon_{2,t} \quad (22)$$

$$A_t = \alpha_3 + \sum_{k=1}^L \gamma_{3,k} CIP_{t-k} + \sum_{k=1}^L \beta_{3,k} OF_{t-k} + \sum_{k=1}^L \delta_{3,k} A_{t-k} + \epsilon_{3,t} \quad (23)$$

In our baseline specification, we use  $L = 7$  lags. We document the impulse response to a 1 standard deviation shock in swap line allotment flows in Figure 10. Consistent with our hypothesis, there is a contemporaneous decline in order flow for the EUR/USD and JPY/USD pairs. The effect on order flow is strongest for the EUR/USD. This is intuitive, given the majority of swap line allotments were extended to the ECB, which then auctioned funds to European banks that relied on dollar funding in the EUR/USD FX swap market.

Examining price effects, we see that there is a peak narrowing of CIP deviations by 5 basis points for each pair, with the peak effect occurring 2-3 days following the swap line shock. The delayed price adjustment is attributed to the timing of swap line allotments; allotments occur in periods of extreme dislocation in FX swap markets, and are responding to periods of low liquidity, high counterparty risk, and significant dollar shortages.<sup>20</sup> While the effect of swap lines on reducing CIP deviations has been the focus of Bahaj et al. (2018), we contribute to this literature by showing that the price impact of central bank swap lines occurs through the channel of order flow.

### Direct effects on order flow

Adding to the dynamic effects of the swap lines on order flow and CIP, we run a simple regression where we regress order flow on a dummy for the days when the results of the swap line auctions are announced. As in our previous regressions we include the dummies for funding heterogeneity and quarter-ends. The control variables includes changes in Libor-OIS spreads (1w and 3m), VIX and broad USD index. The sample runs from January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2009, the period when the banks actively draw on the swap lines.

Table 8 depicts the results from the regression. In line with the VAR results, the order flow is substantially lower (less pressure to borrow USD in the FX swap market) on the days when

<sup>20</sup>In appendix 3 table 13 we find no effect of the swap lines on the price impact of order flow.

the central banks announces the outcome of the USD auctions.

## Quarter-end effects

At quarter-ends, there is an incentive for financial institutions to window-dress balance sheets in order to meet leverage requirements imposed by Basel 3. Quarter-ends can impact both customers and arbitrageurs in the FX swap market. First, quarter-ends limit capital to conduct CIP arbitrage trades, reducing the supply of dollars in the FX swap market. Second, there is evidence that a large increase in excess reserves of Euro area, Japan and Swiss banks during the post 2008 period increases the incentive to use FX swaps as an alternative source of dollar funding during quarter-ends.<sup>21</sup>

Quarter-end reporting obligations are known publicly to dealers, and in accordance with our microstructure hypothesis, we find evidence of contemporaneous price-setting. Figure 11 shows the reaction of the 1 week CIP deviation for the EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD pairs in September 2016. Once the quarter-end period ends, the forward rate contemporaneously adjusts back to its pre quarter-end level.

To shed more light on the speed of adjustment of the forward rate over quarter-ends we exploit high frequency tick data from Thomson Reuters Tick History. In Table 9 we consolidate the data to the last quote each hour and identify exactly the timing when the 1 week FX forward contract trades over quarter-end. For each currency pair we look at the 1 hour change in the FX swapped USD rate (the synthetic USD rate swapped from the respective currency 1-week Libor rate) from 5 hours before to 5 hours after the contract crosses quarter-ends. Finally, the data are averaged across all quarter-ends. The data show that the contemporaneous adjustment is strong across all currency pairs, in particular after 2015 when the Leverage ratio was introduced. A large part of the adjustment happens at exactly the hour when the contract first trades over quarter-end. However, for CHF and JPY there is further adjustment in the same direction up to 2 hours following the quarter-end. Moreover, for JPY, the currency where the central bank engaged in various forms of quantitative easing (and hence provided excess reserves to banking system), there is evidence of a large contemporaneous price adjustment over quarter-ends (14 basis points) even prior to the global financial crisis.

In addition to contemporaneous adjustment of the forward rate, we also test for effects on order flow. Given market participants face heterogeneous balance sheet constraints, the contemporaneous adjustment could be too large or too small. In theory, this means that a potential effect on order flow could be in both directions.<sup>22</sup> We test for systematic effects on

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<sup>21</sup>This is due to FX swaps being *off balance sheet*, in contrast to short-term direct USD funding that increases leverage of the bank, see Rime et al. (2017) for more details

<sup>22</sup>For example, if dealers overshoot in their expectations of the tightness of leverage constraints, then this will result in a negative order flow. Conversely, if dealers underestimate the tightening of leverage constraints, this will result in positive order flow.

order flow by simply regressing order flow on our dummy for dates when the 1-week FX swap contract crosses quarter-ends. Table 10 depicts the results.

We find that order flow increases (i.e. more flow into USD) during quarter-end periods for all currency pairs in the post 2008 sample, however for JPY the effect is not statistically significant. Furthermore, we do not find that the effect on order flow changes after the Leverage ratio was introduced in 2015. These results indicate that there is a tendency that the contemporaneous adjustment around quarter-end is not large enough to curb order imbalances. Interestingly, for JPY, where the contemporaneous price adjustment is largest, the effect on order flow is smallest.

## Monetary Announcements

We argue in this section that as central bank announcements are public information, dealers respond by adjusting the forward rate contemporaneously. CIP deviations are decomposed into a forward premium and the interest rate differential. In response to a change in the risk-free rate, we hypothesize that the forward premium reacts in a systematic way to offset the change in the interest rate differential. We illustrate this hypothesis in equation 24, where a decline in the risk-free rate  $r_d^f$  is met by an offsetting increase in the forward premium, preserving the cost of swapping euros into dollars.

$$\Delta = \underbrace{1 + r_s^f}_{\text{direct}} - \underbrace{\frac{F \uparrow}{S} (1 + r_d^f \downarrow)}_{\text{synthetic}} \quad (24)$$

Figure 12 plots the forward premium of the EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD in response to scheduled monetary announcements of the ECB, SNB and BOJ respectively. The ECB announcement we consider is the September 14th, 2014 announcement where the ECB lowered the deposit facility rate by 10 basis points.<sup>23</sup> The SNB policy announcement is on January 15th, 2015, where the interest rate target is lowered by 50 basis points to -0.75%, and the SNB lifts the floor on the CHF/EUR exchange rate.<sup>24</sup> Finally, the BOJ announcement we document is the 29th January, 2016 announcement when the central bank introduces a negative interest rate of 10 basis points on current account that financial institutions hold at the central bank.<sup>25</sup> For each announcement, we observe a widening of the forward premium of approximately a similar magnitude to the surprise change in the interest rate, with most of

<sup>23</sup>See ECB monetary policy decision here: <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr140904.en.html>

<sup>24</sup>see SNB press release here: [https://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/pre\\_20150115/source/pre\\_20150115.en.pdf](https://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/pre_20150115/source/pre_20150115.en.pdf)

<sup>25</sup>For BOJ press release here: [https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release\\_2016/k160129a.pdf](https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2016/k160129a.pdf)

the adjustment occurring within an intra-day window of the announcement. The increase in the forward premium in response to a decline in the risk-free rate is intuitive: dealers offset the change in the risk-free rate with a change in the forward premium, keeping the CIP deviation constant.

We test our hypothesis in equation 24 more concretely through an event study analysis of scheduled monetary announcements. For our measure of monetary surprises, we calculate the high frequency (30 minute window) change in the 1 month overnight index swap (OIS) rate. The surprise rate is a proxy for the surprise component of the interest rate change around monetary announcements based on a measure of the risk-free rate. We run the following event study for days of scheduled announcements, by regressing order flow on the surprise measure of interest rates. Our event study results in Table 11 show that monetary announcements have no statistical effect on order flow.<sup>26</sup> The results are consistent with contemporaneous adjustment of the forward premium as dealers offset changes to the interest rate differential.

## 7 Conclusion

In this paper we detail a new channel for price discovery in FX swap markets. We identify order flow—the net of buyer and seller initiated transactions—as a fundamental signal used by dealers to update the price of the FX swap. Our key finding is that order flow has significant price impact in the post 2008 period, with no effects during the pre-2008 period. We explore two factors that restrict arbitrage capital: the increased heterogeneity of dollar funding costs and periods where the FX swap contract crosses quarter-ends, that account for the increase in price impact.

We first provide a model framework of the FX swap market. Agents supply dollars for CIP arbitrage, and demand dollars to hedge currency risk of their balance sheets. Dealers are the market-maker, and set a forward rate that equates customers net demand for dollars in the FX swap market with the supply of dollars of agents with arbitrage capital. We derive a price-setting rule in which dealers use order flow to update the forward rate of the swap.

We then test the framework empirically. Based on transaction level data for 1 week FX swaps in the inter-dealer market, we document a significant price impact of order flow in the post crisis-period, with a 1 standard deviation OF leading to a 4 basis point widening of CIP deviations. We estimate up to three quarters of the observed price impact is explained by an increase in the heterogeneity of dollar funding costs, and when the FX swap crosses quarter-end periods. Through the lens of the model, these factors lead to a reduction in arbitrage capital,

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<sup>26</sup>In line with this we find no effect of monetary announcements on the price impact of order flow, see table 12 in appendix 3.

and require dealers to increase the forward premium more aggressively to order flow and balance inventories.

Our second empirical contribution is to distinguish between public and private information in the FX swap market. We find evidence of contemporaneous price-setting during quarter-ends and monetary announcements. During quarter-ends, we document a high-frequency jump in the forward premium that corresponds to the hour during which the FX swap contract crosses quarter-ends. This suggests that dealers are pricing the effects of quarter-ends on arbitrage capital, consistent with public information. We also show gradual price adjustment through order flow in response to swap line allotments, consistent with dealers updating the forward rate in response to private information.

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
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
# Figures

Figure 1: 1 Week CIP Deviations for EUR/USD, JPY/USD and CHF/USD pairs




*Note: This figure plots the 1 Week CIP deviation measured in basis points, obtained from Thomson Reuters Tick History. This provides a measure of CIP deviations based on a LIBOR benchmark rate. Negative deviations indicate a dollar borrowing premium for the EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD pairs. Sample period is 01/2005-09/2017.*

Figure 2: Foreign exchange swap




*Note: FX swap is typically for maturities at less than 3m. At the spot leg, domestic currency and dollars are swapped at the prevailing spot rate. At maturity, the principals are then re-exchanged at the forward rate.*

Figure 3: Daily Order Flow measure- EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD




*Note: Daily count order flow for EUR/USD, JPY/USD and CHF/USD pairs using the TR D2000-2, for FX swap maturities at 1 week. Order flow is given as the net of buyer initiated transactions, where buyer initiated transactions are signed +1 and seller initiated transactions are signed -1.  $OF_t^{count} = \sum_{k=t_0}^{k=t} \mathbb{1}[T_k = B] - \mathbb{1}[T_k = S]$  Sample period is 01/2005-09/2017.*

Figure 4: Range of Libor Fixing quotes




*Note: The figure depicts the daily difference in percentage points between the highest and lowest submission among the contributing banks in USD Libor with 3-month maturity. The data are obtained from Bloomberg and Intercontinental Exchange (ICE). Sample period is 01/2005-09/2017.*

Figure 5: Bid/ask spreads for EUR, CHF and JPY 1 Week FX swaps



*Note: The figure shows the daily average between the bid and the ask quotation based on hourly data from Thomson Reuters tick history. The bid/ask spread is expressed in basis points. Sample period is 01/2005-09/2017.*


Figure 6: Intra-day forward rate volatility for EUR, CHF and JPY 1 Week FX swaps



*Note: The figure shows the daily standard deviation in swap points based on hourly data from Thomson Reuters tick history. The standard deviation is expressed in basis points. Sample period is 01/2005-09/2017.*




Figure 7: Schematic of the interactions between customers, dealers and the inter-dealer market




*Note: This schematic illustrates the structure of the dealer-customer and inter-dealer market. Each customer has a net demand for dollar funding in the FX swap market, which we denote  $x_{\$}^D$ . The excess demands for dollar funding that cannot be met by the dealer's supply of dollars, is in turn submitted to the inter-dealer market. Aggregating net orders for swapping domestic currency into dollars gives rise to inter-dealer order flow  $OF$  which is observed as a public signal by the inter-dealer market for setting the forward rate.*

Figure 8: Timing




*Note: This schematic illustrates the timing of the model. The customer-dealer trading is done at the beginning of each period. Following customer-dealer trading, there is an inter-dealer market which sets the forward rate following the customer-dealer trading. Dealers use inter-dealer order flow at the end of the period  $OF_{0+}$  in order to set the forward rate and CIP deviation  $\Delta_1$  in period 1.*

Figure 9: Response of EUR/USD, JPY/USD and CHF/USD 1w CIP deviation to unit shock in count order flow in pre 2008 (left) and post 2008 (right)




Note: This figure plots the impulse response of the change in CIP deviations to a 1 standard deviation shock to order flow for 1 week EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD FX swaps, based on a bivariate VAR following [Hasbrouck \(1991\)](#) and [Rinaldo and Somogyi \(2019\)](#). Standardized order flow  $OF$  is measuring the net buyer transactions of swapping euros, swiss francs and yen into dollars, and is sourced from TR D2000-2 inter-dealer trades, and CIP deviation is calculated using TR tick history quotes on 1 week forward rates. We condition our sample into two periods based on pre 2008 and a post 2008 period. The left panel shows response of EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD in the pre-2008 period, and the right panel shows the response in the post-2008 period. Total sample period is from 01/2005-09/2017. Gray area denotes a standard error band equivalent for statistical significance at the 10% level.

Figure 10: CIP and OF Response to 1 std change in Swap Line Allotments




*Note: This figure plots the impulse response of the change in CIP deviations and order flow to a 1 standard deviation shock in swap line allotments for 1 week EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD FX swaps, based on a multivariate VAR following [Hasbrouck \(1991\)](#) and [Rinaldo and Somogyi \(2019\)](#). Standardized order flow OF is measuring the net buyer transactions of swapping euros, swiss francs and yen into dollars, and is sourced from TR D2000-2 inter-dealer trades, and CIP deviation is calculated using TR tick history quotes on 1 week forward rates. Swap line allotments measure aggregate flows of dollar loans from the Federal Reserve to counterparty central banks. The left panel shows order flow and the right panel shows the response of cip deviations of EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD respectively. Total sample period is from 01/2007-12/2011. Gray area denotes a standard error band equivalent for statistical significance at the 10% level.*

Figure 11: 1 week EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD CIP deviations during quarter-end in September 2016



*Note: This figure examines 1 week CIP deviations for the EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD pairs around the quarter-end period in September of 2016, with contemporaneous adjustment of the forward premium as the FX swap contract enters the quarter-end period. The CIP deviation is computed using 1 week forward, spot and domestic and dollar LIBOR rates, using intra-day data from Thomson Reuters Tick History*

Figure 12: Response of the forward premium of EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD pairs to scheduled monetary announcements of the ECB, SNB and BOJ



*Note: This figure shows the response of 1 week forward premium in EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD around scheduled monetary announcements of the ECB, SNB and BOJ respectively. Grey area denotes an intra-day window around the scheduled monetary announcement. In each case, the scheduled announcement changed the central bank policy rate and caused dealers to contemporaneously adjust the forward premium. The forward premium is computed using 1 week forward and spot rates, using intra-day data from Thomson Reuters Tick History*

# Tables

Table 1: Summary Statistics 1 Week CIP Deviations.

	Pre 2008				Post 2008			
	mean	sd	min	max	mean	sd	min	max
EUR/USD	-2.33	10.3	-120.0	5.1	-28.5	38.7	-621.9	73.1
CHF/USD	-8.1	17.0	-213.3	10.3	-34.0	42.7	-500.6	54.9
JPY/USD	-11.6	37.5	-347.2	33.7	-31.9	45.4	-705.8	52.7

*Note: This table records summary statistics of CIP deviations in EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD for 1 Week FX swaps. CIP deviations are expressed in basis points. Data on 1 Week Forward and Spot rates are taken from TR Tick History. Interest rates are 1 Week Libor. The full sample period is from 01/2005-09/2019, and is divided into pre and post 2008 periods.*

Table 2: Summary Statistics count Order Flow.

	Pre 2008				Post 2008			
	mean	sd	min	max	mean	sd	min	max
EUR/USD	0.00	3.91	-16	29	-.09	3.25	-24	18
CHF/USD	0.08	1.59	-8	8	0.11	1.01	-10	7
JPY/USD	0.06	1.63	-7	8	0.00	1.41	-9	8

*Note: This table records summary statistics of order flow based on trades in 1 week FX swaps using inter-dealer trades in Thomson Reuters D2000-2 Platform. Order flow is constructed as the net of buyer initiated transactions, where a transaction is signed +1 if it is swapping euros, swiss francs and yen into dollars at the spot leg of the FX swap contract. The sample period is from 01/2005-09/2017.*



Table 3: Price impact of order flow before and after GFC

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Pre 2008				Post 2008			
	$\Delta CIP_{panel}$	$\Delta CIP_{eur}$	$\Delta CIP_{chf}$	$\Delta CIP_{jpy}$	$\Delta CIP_{panel}$	$\Delta CIP_{eur}$	$\Delta CIP_{chf}$	$\Delta CIP_{jpy}$
OF	-0.16	-0.42**	-0.41	-0.01	-3.64***	-3.74***	-2.98***	-4.42***
	(0.33)	(0.18)	(0.41)	(0.96)	(0.55)	(0.89)	(0.85)	(1.05)
Constant	-0.01	-0.10	0.05	0.05	-0.02	-0.22	0.24	-0.13
	(0.35)	(0.24)	(0.50)	(0.93)	(0.27)	(0.45)	(0.48)	(0.47)
Observations	2,084	713	712	659	6,703	2,238	2,234	2,231
R-squared	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.08	0.11	0.04	0.09
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

*Note: This table regresses order flow for 1 week EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD FX swaps on daily changes in 1 week CIP deviations based on Libor rates. Standardized order flow OF is measuring the net buyer transactions of swapping euros, swiss francs and yen into dollars, and is sourced from TR D2000-2 inter-dealer trades for 1 Week FX swaps. The 1 Week CIP deviation is calculated using TR tick history quotes on 1 week spot and forward rates with close at 5 pm London time. Controls include the changes in USD Libor-OIS spreads for 1 week and 3 month maturities, the VIX index, and the USD Trade weighted exchange rate. The full sample from Jan 1, 2005 to Sep 1, 2017 is split into pre and post 2008. Data is daily. \*\*\* denotes significance at the 1 percent level, \*\* at the 5 percent level, and \* at the 10 percent level.*

Table 4: Price impact of order flow; funding constraints and quarter-ends

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Pre 2008				Post 2008			
	$\Delta CIP_{panel}$	$\Delta CIP_{eur}$	$\Delta CIP_{chf}$	$\Delta CIP_{jpy}$	$\Delta CIP_{panel}$	$\Delta CIP_{eur}$	$\Delta CIP_{chf}$	$\Delta CIP_{jpy}$
OF	-0.46 (0.31)	-0.47** (0.20)	-0.50 (0.45)	-0.57 (0.94)	-1.04** (0.48)	-1.20** (0.47)	-2.02* (1.03)	0.06 (0.60)
OF $\times$ FundingHet	6.00 (6.46)	0.91 (4.30)	0.32 (2.30)	37.08 (26.70)	-4.14*** (1.18)	-4.84** (2.17)	-0.34 (1.57)	-6.36*** (1.68)
$Q_{end} \times OF$	1.54 (1.40)	-0.13 (0.57)	0.29 (0.82)	3.16 (3.88)	-9.27*** (3.26)	-2.83 (2.95)	-9.09* (5.32)	-15.97*** (6.06)
Constant	0.13 (0.36)	0.03 (0.25)	-0.04 (0.52)	0.48 (0.96)	0.39* (0.21)	0.24 (0.28)	0.92** (0.41)	0.19 (0.37)
Observations	2,084	713	712	659	6,703	2,238	2,234	2,231
R-squared	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.11	0.13	0.07	0.16
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

*Note: This table regresses order flow for 1 week EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD FX swaps on daily changes in 1 week CIP deviations based on Libor rates. Standardized order flow OF is measuring the net buyer transactions of swapping euros, swiss francs and yen into dollars, and is sourced from TR D2000-2 inter-dealer trades for 1 Week FX swaps. The 1 Week CIP deviation is calculated using TR tick history quotes on 1 week spot and forward rates with close at 5 pm London time. FundingHet is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the daily dispersion in individual panel bank's 3-month Libor quotes is among the 25 per cent largest values, and zero otherwise. Qend is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the 1 week contract is settled prior to quarter-end and matures after quarter-end. Controls include the changes in USD Libor-OIS spreads for 1 week and 3 month maturities, the VIX index, the USD Trade weighted exchange rate. Additionally, the following variables are included in the regression specification but not shown in the Table; Qend and FundingHet. Data is daily. The sample runs from Jan 1, 2005 to Sep 1, 2017. \*\*\* denotes significance at the 1 percent level, \*\* at the 5 percent level, and \* at the 10 percent level.*

Table 5: Price impact of order flow; direction of flow

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	$\Delta CIP_{panel}$	$\Delta CIP_{eur}$	$\Delta CIP_{chf}$	$\Delta CIP_{jpy}$	$\Delta CIP_{panel}$	$\Delta CIP_{panel}$
OF $\times \mathbb{1}[OF > 0]$	-0.12 (0.67)	-1.22* (0.67)	-0.28 (0.35)	0.97 (2.13)	-0.88 (0.60)	-1.42* (0.72)
OF $\times \mathbb{1}[OF < 0]$	0.38 (0.47)	0.02 (0.51)	-0.25 (0.95)	1.26 (0.97)	0.01 (0.47)	-0.86 (0.86)
OF $\times \mathbb{1}[OF > 0] \times \text{post2008}$	-4.39*** (1.23)	-5.07** (2.31)	-2.58* (1.38)	-6.04* (2.77)		
OF $\times \mathbb{1}[OF < 0] \times \text{post2008}$	-3.30*** (1.01)	-1.32 (1.03)	-2.99** (1.51)	-5.32 (2.58)		
OF $\times \mathbb{1}[OF > 0] \times \text{FundingHet}$					11.25* (6.23)	-5.31** (2.20)
OF $\times \mathbb{1}[OF < 0] \times \text{FundingHet}$					5.89 (7.46)	-2.83* (1.65)
OF $\times \mathbb{1}[OF > 0] \times \text{Qend}$					3.43 (2.42)	-6.98* (4.24)
OF $\times \mathbb{1}[OF < 0] \times \text{Qend}$					-0.96 (1.28)	-12.33* (7.48)
Constant	0.10 (0.51)	0.36 (0.50)	-0.02 (0.52)	-0.02 (1.35)	0.41 (0.52)	0.50 (0.34)
Observations	8,787	2,951	2,946	2,890	2,084	6,703
R-squared	0.05	0.10	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.11
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Post2008					No	Yes

*Note: This table regresses order flow for 1 week EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD FX swaps on daily changes in 1 week CIP deviations based on Libor rates. Standardized order flow OF is measuring the net buyer transactions of swapping euros, swiss francs and yen into dollars, and is sourced from TR D2000-2 inter-dealer trades for 1 Week FX swaps. The 1 Week CIP deviation is calculated using TR tick history quotes on 1 week spot and forward rates with close at 5 pm London time.  $\mathbb{1}[OF > 0]$  takes the order flow value if the order flow is positive, zero otherwise. Positive order flow implies a pressure to obtain USD spot and sell USD forward (i.e. borrow USD).  $\mathbb{1}[OF < 0]$  takes the order flow value if the order flow is negative, zero otherwise. FundingHet is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the daily dispersion in individual panel bank's 3-month Libor quotes is among the 25 per cent largest values, and zero otherwise. Qend is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the 1 week contract is settled prior to quarter-end and matures after quarter-end. Post 2008 is a dummy that takes the value 1 after Jan 1 2008, and zero otherwise. The Table only shows the relevant coefficients. Controls include the changes in USD Libor-OIS spreads for 1 week and 3 month maturities, the VIX index, the USD Trade weighted exchange rate. Additionally, the dummies for FundingHet, Qend and Post2008 are included, but not shown. Data is daily. The sample runs from Jan 1, 2005 to Sep 1, 2017. \*\*\* denotes significance at the 1 percent level, \*\* at the 5 percent level, and \* at the 10 percent level.*

Table 6: Bid/ask spreads

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Pre 2008			Post 2008					
	EUR	CHF	JPY	EUR	CHF	JPY	EUR	CHF	JPY
FundingHet	0.02 (0.19)	14.05*** (2.08)	2.21** (1.09)	10.95*** (0.95)	5.07*** (0.89)	13.39*** (1.13)	17.40*** (1.59)	10.13*** (1.32)	18.67*** (1.95)
Qend	0.01 (0.05)	-0.41 (0.53)	0.27 (0.34)	3.64*** (1.33)	3.59** (1.70)	4.81** (1.91)	2.69 (1.63)	0.61 (1.48)	3.25 (2.44)
post2015							-2.16*** (0.28)	10.74*** (1.40)	2.32*** (0.40)
post2015 × Qend							2.57 (2.36)	10.68** (4.97)	5.36* (2.98)
post2015 × FundingHet							-13.53*** (1.63)	-17.89*** (2.01)	-13.50*** (2.01)
Constant	2.51*** (0.01)	9.56*** (0.15)	4.52*** (0.07)	5.61*** (0.18)	16.54*** (0.42)	6.11*** (0.19)	6.06*** (0.22)	14.53*** (0.39)	5.71*** (0.23)
Observations	756	745	691	2,434	2,437	2,438	2,434	2,437	2,438
R-squared	0.00	0.12	0.02	0.10	0.02	0.10	0.17	0.07	0.13

*Note: This table regresses bid/ask spreads for 1 week FX swap quotes based on high frequency data from Thomson Reuters Tick History database on dummies for Funding Heterogeneity (FundingHet) and dates when the 1 week contract crosses quarter-ends (Qends) for three currency pairs (EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD). Column (1) to (3) depict the results from a sample that runs from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2007, while column (4) to (6) are based on a sample period that runs from January 1, 2008 to September 1, 2017. In column (7) to (9) the interaction terms between a dummy that takes the value 1 from January 1, 2005 and onwards (zero otherwise) and funding heterogeneity and quarter-ends are added. \*\*\* denotes significance at the 1 percent level, \*\* at the 5 percent level, and \* at the 10 percent level.*

Table 7: Price volatility

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Pre 2008			Post 2008					
	EUR	CHF	JPY	EUR	CHF	JPY	EUR	CHF	JPY
FundingHet	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.07** (0.03)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.00)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.00)
Qend	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
post2015							-0.01*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.01***
post2015 × Qend							0.08*** (0.03)	0.07*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)
post2015 × FundingHet							-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)
Constant	0.01*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.05*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.05*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)
Observations	756	745	691	2,434	2,437	2,396	2,434	2,437	2,396
R-squared	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.08	0.08	0.05	0.15

*Note: This table regresses daily price volatility for 1 week FX swap quotes based on high frequency data from Thomson Reuters Tick History database on dummies for Funding Heterogeneity (FundingHet) and dates when the 1 week contract crosses quarter-ends (Qends) for three currency pairs (EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD). Column (1) to (3) depict the results from a sample that runs from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2007, while column (4) to (6) are based on a sample period that runs from January 1, 2008 to September 1, 2017. In column (7) to (9) the interaction terms between a dummy that takes the value 1 from January 1, 2005 and onwards (zero otherwise) and funding heterogeneity and quarter-ends are added. \*\*\* denotes significance at the 1 percent level, \*\* at the 5 percent level, and \* at the 10 percent level.*

Table 8: Effect on order flow; Swap Lines

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	OF <sub>panel</sub>	OF <sub>eur</sub>	OF <sub>chf</sub>	OF <sub>jpy</sub>
SwapLines	-0.21** (0.11)	-0.28* (0.15)	-0.04 (0.19)	-0.50* (0.26)
Constant	0.03 (0.04)	-0.14* (0.08)	0.18*** (0.06)	0.07 (0.07)
Observations	1,444	480	482	482
R-squared	0.02	0.06	0.01	0.04
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

*Note: This table illustrates the impact of quarter-end on for 1 week order flow. Standardized order flow OF is measuring the net buyer transactions of swapping euros, swiss francs and yen into dollars, and is sourced from TR D2000-2 inter-dealer trades for 1 Week FX swaps. SwapLine is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 on days when there was initial take up in any of the swap lines between the Fed and foreign central banks, zero otherwise. Controls include the changes in USD Libor-OIS spreads for 1 week and 3 month maturities, the VIX index, the USD Trade weighted exchange rate. Data is daily. The sample runs from Jan 1, 2008 to Dec 31, 2009. \*\*\* denotes significance at the 1 percent level, \*\* at the 5 percent level, and \* at the 10 percent level.*

Table 9: Price adjustment quarter-end for EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD

Hour	EUR/USD				CHF/USD				JPY/USD			
	2005-2007	2008-2013	2013-2015	2015-2017	2005-2007	2008-2013	2013-2015	2015-2017	2005-2007	2008-2013	2013-2015	2015-2017
-5	0	-0.5	0	0.3	-0.1	2.1	-0.2	-1.8	-0.2	0.1	-0.3	-0.3
-4	0.3	1	0	0.2	-0.2	1.8	-0.3	-0.1	0.2	1	-2.1	-0.3
-3	-0.1	-0.8	0.2	0.2	-0.1	-1	0.1	-3.3	-0.8	-0.9	-0.3	-0.5
-2	0.1	-0.2	2.1	1.7	0.2	-4.7	1.3	2.4	-0.8	2.2	-0.4	15.6
-1	0	0.9	0	9	1.3	2.7	-1.4	1.6	0.7	0.1	0.4	2.7
0	0.8	0.8	-1.6	22.7	0.2	2.3	-2.8	22.3	14.3	5.1	16.3	55.2
1	0.5	0	-0.4	6	-3.2	-3.2	2	16.2	-4.3	4.5	10.8	36
2	0.9	2.2	-0.3	0.8	0	1.1	-1.1	5.2	-1.2	4	-2.8	32.9
3	0.2	2.9	-0.2	0	-0.1	3.7	0.2	12.2	1.1	1.3	0.4	0
4	-0.1	0	-0.4	-0.7	0.4	-2	0.5	-2.2	-0.3	1	1.1	0.9
5	0.2	-0.4	0	0.1	-0.1	1.3	-0.7	-6.5	-0.2	0.2	0.7	10.3

*Note: This table illustrates the hourly change in the FX swapped (synthetic) USD rate calculated from Libor from 5 hours before to 5 hours after the 1 week FX swap contract matures after quarter-end. 0 denotes the hour when the contract first matures after quarter-end. The numbers are in basis points and represent the average of all quarter-ends within the sample period.*

Table 10: Effect on order flow; Quarter-end

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Pre 2008				Post 2008					
	OF <sub>panel</sub>	OF <sub>eur</sub>	OF <sub>chf</sub>	OF <sub>jpy</sub>	OF <sub>panel</sub>	OF <sub>eur</sub>	OF <sub>chf</sub>	OF <sub>jpy</sub>	OF <sub>panel</sub>	OF <sub>panel</sub>
Qend	0.14	-0.03	0.61***	-0.17	0.13***	0.15*	0.16**	0.08	0.22***	0.14**
	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)
post2013									0.03	
									(0.03)	
post2013 × Qend									-0.29***	
									(0.10)	
post2015										-0.01
										(0.02)
post2015 × Qend										-0.02
										(0.09)
Constant	0.05**	-0.04	0.11***	0.07*	0.03**	-0.04*	0.11***	0.02	0.02	0.03**
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	2,095	724	712	659	6,723	2,240	2,241	2,242	6,723	6,723
R-squared	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

*Note: This table illustrates the impact of quarter-end on 1 week order flow. Standardized order flow OF is measuring the net buyer transactions of swapping euros, swiss francs and yen into dollars, and is sourced from TR D2000-2 inter-dealer trades for 1 Week FX swaps. Qend is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the 1 week contract is settled prior to quarter-end and matures after quarter-end, zero otherwise. Post2013 and post2015 are dummy variables that are 1 from Jan 2013 and Jan 2015, respectively, zero otherwise. Controls include the changes in USD Libor-OIS spreads for 1 week and 3 month maturities, the VIX index, the USD Trade weighted exchange rate. Data is daily. The sample runs from Jan 1, 2008 to Sep 1, 2017. \*\*\* denotes significance at the 1 percent level, \*\* at the 5 percent level, and \* at the 10 percent level.*



Table 11: Effect on order flow; Monetary Policy surprises

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	OF <sub>panel</sub>	OF <sub>eur</sub>	OF <sub>chf</sub>	OF <sub>jpy</sub>
$\Delta ois$	-1.86 (1.59)	-2.28 (3.84)	-1.18 (1.85)	13.86 (10.07)
Constant	-0.05 (0.05)	0.02 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.11)	-0.09 (0.09)
Observations	363	136	87	122
R-squared	0.01	0.04	0.02	0.09
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Post2008	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

*Note: This table illustrates the impact of monetary policy surprises on 1 week order flow. Standardized order flow OF is measuring the net buyer transactions of swapping euros, swiss francs and yen into dollars, and is sourced from TR D2000-2 inter-dealer trades for 1 Week FX swaps.  $\Delta OIS$  is the 30 min change in the 1-month OIS rate (Overnight Index Swaps - a proxy for the risk free rate) in the respective currency around the central bank policy announcement. Monetary announcements in EUR, CHF, JPY and USD are considered. In the case of US announcements the sign of the change in the OIS is switched so that a positive change in the OIS always proxy an increase in the interest rate differential towards the US (i.e foreign currency rate minus the US rate). Controls include the changes in USD Libor-OIS spreads for 1 week and 3 month maturities, the VIX index, the USD Trade weighted exchange rate. Data is daily. The sample runs from Jan 1, 2008 to Sep 1, 2017. \*\*\* denotes significance at the 1 percent level, \*\* at the 5 percent level, and \* at the 10 percent level.*

# Appendices

## A: Additional Tables

Table 12: Price impact of order flow; Monetary announcements

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	$\Delta CIP_{panel}$	$\Delta CIP_{eur}$	$\Delta CIP_{chf}$	$\Delta CIP_{jpy}$	$\Delta CIP_{panel}$	$\Delta CIP_{eur}$	$\Delta CIP_{chf}$	$\Delta CIP_{jpy}$
OF	-0.34 (0.49)	-0.23 (0.39)	-0.41 (0.72)	0.03 (1.53)	-0.88 (0.54)	-1.26** (0.52)	-2.09* (1.12)	0.57 (0.74)
MP	2.20 (3.72)	6.19* (3.52)	-14.32 (12.09)	2.02 (7.07)	-1.08 (1.53)	1.71 (1.43)	-5.41 (3.79)	-0.74 (2.39)
MP*OF	-3.14 (1.94)	-0.59 (2.12)	-24.40* (13.41)	-3.54 (3.46)	-3.18 (3.87)	3.34 (2.55)	3.11* (1.65)	-7.45 (5.79)
Constant	0.16 (0.60)	-0.20 (0.40)	0.16 (0.85)	0.48 (1.68)	0.44* (0.25)	0.22 (0.34)	1.04** (0.49)	0.25 (0.45)
Observations	2,053	713	706	634	6,675	2,211	2,233	2,231
R-squared	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.11	0.13	0.07	0.16
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Post2008	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

*Note: This table regresses order flow for 1 week EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD FX swaps on daily changes in 1 week CIP deviations based on Libor rates. Standardized order flow OF is measuring the net buyer transactions of swapping euros, swiss francs and yen into dollars, and is sourced from TR D2000-2 inter-dealer trades for 1 Week FX swaps. The 1 Week CIP deviation is calculated using TR tick history quotes on 1 week spot and forward rates with close at 5 pm London time. MP is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 on days when the central bank disseminates its monetary policy decision, and zero otherwise. Controls include the changes in USD Libor-OIS spreads for 1 week and 3 month maturities, the VIX index, the USD Trade weighted exchange rate, FundingHet, OF\*FundingHet, Qend, Qend\*OF. Data is daily. The sample runs from Jan 1, 2008 to Sep 1, 2017. \*\*\* denotes significance at the 1 percent level, \*\* at the 5 percent level, and \* at the 10 percent level.*

Table 13: Price impact of order flow; Swap lines

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	$\Delta CIP_{panel}$	$\Delta CIP_{eur}$	$\Delta CIP_{chf}$	$\Delta CIP_{jpy}$
OF	-0.84 (0.68)	-3.06* (1.75)	-0.75 (0.62)	0.66 (1.05)
SwapLine	-0.42 (2.99)	0.06 (3.88)	-2.07 (5.26)	1.62 (5.95)
OF*SwapLine	2.75 (3.06)	5.25 (6.81)	-3.12 (3.05)	4.86 (4.47)
Constant	-0.39 (0.56)	-0.34 (1.22)	-0.25 (0.78)	-0.92 (0.94)
Observations	1,444	480	482	482
R-squared	0.17	0.16	0.07	0.38
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

*Note: This table regresses order flow for 1 week EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD FX swaps on daily changes in 1 week CIP deviations based on Libor rates. Standardized order flow OF is measuring the net buyer transactions of swapping euros, swiss francs and yen into dollars, and is sourced from TR D2000-2 inter-dealer trades for 1 Week FX swaps. The 1 Week CIP deviation is calculated using TR tick history quotes on 1 week spot and forward rates with close at 5 pm London time. SwapLine is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 on days when there was initial take up in any of the swap lines between the Fed and foreign central banks, zero otherwise. Controls include the changes in USD Libor-OIS spreads for 1 week and 3 month maturities, the VIX index, the USD Trade weighted exchange rate. Data is daily. The sample runs from Jan 1, 2007 to Dec 31, 2009. \*\*\* denotes significance at the 1 percent level, \*\* at the 5 percent level, and \* at the 10 percent level.*