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Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts

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Swing Voting

Working Paper No. 2021-24

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To Swing or Not to Swing:

An Assessment of Age and Political Cynicism of Swing Voting

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Abstract:

The empirical question of voting preferences and how these may change (swing) is yet to be answered, as there is little first-hand microeconomic evidence on swing voting. We focus on the interactions between voters' age and political cynicism. Towards this end, we apply a stated and revealed preference framework to assess swing voting, using data from the Dutch Parliamentary Election Survey (DPES) 1989 to 2010. Our results indicate that swing voting is less likely to occur in older age groups and more likely among individuals with higher levels of political cynicism. The age effects tend to be stronger among those with lower political cynicism values.

Key Words: swing voting; age; cynicism; elections

JEL Codes: D72, D79

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1. Introduction

The body of work concerned with the study of democratic outcomes and voting behavior is considerable (for a political economic approach, see Gerber et al., 2009; for a public choice one, Goodman & Porter, 2021 or for a political science one, see Powell & Whitten, 1993). Unfortunately, there are limited *empirical* applications on swing voting behavior, as research remains predominately theoretical (Krasa & Polborn, 2014).

This paper contributes to the literature of swing voting by understanding its empirical interrelation with political cynicism and age. Adriaansen et al. (2012) define “political cynicism as a harsh distrust in the reliability and/or competence of politicians” (p. 155). Political cynicism has been seen as serious threat to democracy (Pattyn et al., 2012) which is explained narratively by its broad effects of policy campaigns, media and opinions (Fu et al., 2011; Lariscy et al., 2011). Research has focused on how news affects political cynicism (see, e.g., de Vreese and Elenbaas 2008, Adriaansen et al., 2010, 2012; Schuck et al., 2013). There is evidence that higher cynicism levels are related to lower support for voting for traditionalist parties and greater support for far-right parties (Van Assche et al. 2019).

We would therefore expect people expressing higher levels of political cynicism have a higher likelihood of changing voting preferences such that they are more likely to engage in swing voting. Voting preferences or choices and cynicism itself may vary across age groups as shown by Pattyn et al. (2012) and Lariscy et al. (2011). As the act of voting is habit forming (Gerber et al., 2003) due to its recurrent manifestation (Coppock & Green, 2016), we would expect that older cohorts have a lower likelihood of swinging in their voting choices. Using information on individual intended and actual votes to analyze individual swing voting behavior via a dataset obtained from the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES) from 1989 to 2010, we find older and more politically cynic individuals have a higher likelihood of swing voting.

2. Data & Methods

2.1 Data

We use all six waves of the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES) dataset from 1989 to 2010 (Aarts et al., 1994; Irwin et al., 2003; Kamp et al., 1998; Kolk et al., 2006; 2010; Thomassen et al., 1989). The DPES contains rich information pertaining to voting behavior, demographics, political and institutional measurements, representing the attitudes of the Dutch populace from 1989 to 2010. It corresponds to a cross-sectional random and representative sample of the Dutch population with the following sample sizes: 1,754 (in 1989); 1,812 (in 1994); 2,101 (in 1998); 1,907 (in 2002); 2,806 (in 2006); 2,621 (in 2010). The beauty of these data is that for each wave participants are surveyed shortly before and after each election, creating a cross-sectional random sample of the population which allows us to identify swing voting behavior.

2.2 Analysis

We draw from the work of Sen (1971) which applies constructs of revealed preference theory when seeking to understand the differences between a stated and revealed preference in economic decision-making. Prior to the election, each participant in the DPES was asked their intended vote (stated preference). After the election, they were surveyed on the actual vote (revealed preference), which allows us to quantify the extent by which voters swing or not by taking the simple difference between their stated preference vote and the revealed preference vote. This approach identifies individuals as either a ‘swing’ (coded as 1) or ‘non-swing’ (0) voter through a dummy variable, which forms our dependent variable. Table 1 reports the

descriptive statistics. The percentage of swing voters is in the range between 11 and 22% depending on the wave explored.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics – Swing v No Swing Voters

	1989	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010
No Swing Vote	990	779	1,040	991	1,204	969
Swing Vote	106	104	149	177	170	212
Share Swing Vote	0.11	0.13	0.14	0.18	0.14	0.22

Our key independent variable of political cynicism is a pre-defined 4-point ordinal scale (“0=low...3=high”). It is an index variable constructed on a Mokken scale, drawing from a battery of categorical predictors and ranging from the opinion of politicians fulfilling promises, whether the agendas of politicians are pro-social or personal, and whether politicians collude to enter the political domain as opposed to their merit of their own abilities.

Age is classified into seven different age groups (below 26 years (17-25) forming the reference category). As controls we include income, education, marital status, religious denomination, sex, and the degree of urbanisation. When exploring voting behavior it is important to control for political interest (see Appendix for the detailed coding). As we pool all six waves together, we have included wave dummies.

Table 2: Swing Voting Behavior, Age and Cynicism

VARIABLES	(1) Pooled Control	(2) Left Wing	(3) Right Wing	(4) Low Cynicism	(5) High Cynicism
Age					
26-35	0.0193 (0.0195)	0.0135 (0.0301)	0.0112 (0.0274)	0.0258 (0.0240)	0.00754 (0.0322)
36-45	0.0173 (0.0193)	0.00943 (0.0293)	0.00577 (0.0275)	0.0359 (0.0239)	-0.00972 (0.0314)
46-55	-0.0195 (0.0191)	-0.0330 (0.0293)	-0.0293 (0.0271)	-0.00325 (0.0240)	-0.0392 (0.0313)
56-65	-0.0245 (0.0197)	-0.0317 (0.0303)	-0.0328 (0.0275)	-0.00970 (0.0255)	-0.0435 (0.0314)
66-75	-0.0489** (0.0197)	-0.0630** (0.0313)	-0.0455* (0.0270)	-0.0687*** (0.0236)	-0.0440 (0.0323)
76 or Older	-0.0538** (0.0219)	-0.0904*** (0.0338)	-0.0576* (0.0300)	-0.0584** (0.0290)	-0.0626* (0.0336)
Political Cynicism	0.0133*** (0.00485)	0.0176** (0.00728)	0.0112* (0.00674)		
Political Interest	-0.00585 (0.00423)	-0.0102 (0.00633)	0.00172 (0.00568)	-0.00880 (0.00579)	-0.00420 (0.00610)
Degree of Urbanisation	-0.00634** (0.00320)	-0.00188 (0.00476)	-0.00700 (0.00453)	-0.00447 (0.00441)	-0.00918** (0.00463)
Sex (Males)	-0.0211** (0.00858)	-0.0153 (0.0131)	-0.0176 (0.0118)	-0.0260** (0.0117)	-0.0113 (0.0126)
Education	-0.00888** (0.00412)	-0.00329 (0.00595)	-0.0130** (0.00583)	-0.0118** (0.00578)	-0.00718 (0.00585)
Income	0.000424 (0.00103)	0.000828 (0.00158)	0.000873 (0.00143)	0.00102 (0.00139)	-0.00108 (0.00149)
Marital Status	-0.00565 (0.00387)	-0.00348 (0.00575)	-0.00705 (0.00538)	-0.00557 (0.00533)	-0.00488 (0.00561)
Religious Denomination (Yes)	-0.00767 (0.00880)	-0.000526 (0.0132)	-0.0127 (0.0129)	-0.00688 (0.0119)	-0.00986 (0.0129)
Wave Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	6,300	3,000	2,956	3,303	3,060

Notes: * Model specification (1) represents pooled logistic regression estimates of swing voters. Specification (2) includes swing voters which identify as left wing voters. Specification (3) includes swing voters which identify as right wing voters. Specification (4) includes swing voters with a low median split of political cynicism. Specification (5) with a high median split of political cynicism. All estimates are average marginal effects for ease of coefficient interpretation. P-values are denoted by ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Robust standard errors specified in parentheses. See Appendix for robustness analysis and unstandardized regression results.

3. Results

The results of the logistic model are presented in Table 2. For political cynicism we systematically find a statistically significant, robust and positive relationship (in specification (1) at ($p=0.006$); (2) at ($p=0.015$) and (3) at ($p=0.097$)), which means a higher likelihood to swing with increased political cynicism – this is consistent with expectations. Specification (1), for example, indicates that an increase in the political cynicism scale by one unit increases the likelihood to swing by 1.3 percent.

As for the age groups we find a lower likelihood to swing vote from age groups 66-75 ($p=0.010$) and 76 or older ($p=0.017$). Those age groups have a 5 percent lower likelihood to swing than our youngest age cohort group (reference group: age 17-25). In the pooled estimation, coming from a less urbanized environment is correlated with a lower likelihood to swing ($p=0.048$). Males also have a lower likelihood of swinging (but only by around 1 percent; $p=0.048$). A higher level of education is also correlated with a lower likelihood to swing ($p=0.031$).

We also dichotomize the sample into left and right voters (see specifications (2) and (3)). Political cynicism matters slightly more for left wing voters than the right. Similar, age effects are stronger for left wing voters than right.

In addition, to understand whether there are differences between voter with lower and higher political cynicism, we split the sample based on the median. When comparing the samples of lower and higher cynicism, we find that the overall age matters more for those voters with lower cynicism (in particular for the age group 66-75).

Results reported in Table 2 remain robust when adding the control variables sequentially into the specification (see Appendix).

With respect to the different subfactors for political cynicism, we observe two key drivers of the likelihood to swing: firstly, the factors around politicians' fulfillment of promises, and secondly, the perception of whether the agendas of politicians are pro-social or personal (see Table 3).

Table 3: Swing Voting Behavior and Individual Cynicism Scales

VARIABLES	(2) Promise	(3) Agenda	(4) Ability
Politician Promise	-0.0125* (0.00698)		
Politician Agenda		-0.0236*** (0.00595)	
Politician Ability			-0.00277 (0.00649)
Wave Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES
Observations	6,832	6,743	6,488

Notes: P-values are denoted by ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Robust standard errors specified in parentheses.

4. Discussion

We introduced an empirical framework to capture swing voting behavior which is underpinned by revealed preference theory. As such, we are able to introduce a means of capturing individual empirical evidence across a battery of socio-demographic factors that may relate attitudes of political cynicism to vote choice. This is new to the literature and pertinent. The current empirical evidence associating the relationship between age and political cynicism was limited.

Our results suggest a lower likelihood for swing voting amongst two of the older age groups, which may indicate that voting is habit driven, and there is an increased likelihood to swing

vote amongst voters with high levels of political cynicism related to higher levels of distrust in the reliability and/or competence of politicians. These results provide an empirical basis for future research to explore institutional aspects of why individual voters may or may not swing vote.

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Appendix

A1. Variable Coding

A1.1 Demographic

We coded a battery of socio-demographic and institutional independent and control variables in each of the six election years as follows. We coded *Age* in ascending categorical order from: (“1=17-25; 2=26-35; 3=36-45; 4=46-55; 5=56-65; 6=66-75; 7=76 or older”). *Income* remained a continuous ascending variable. *Education* was coded as in ascending categorical order from: (“1=Elementary; 2=Lower Vocational; 3=Secondary; 4=Middle level vocational/Higher level secondary; 5=Higher level Vocational/University”). *Marital status* was coded categorically where: (“1=Never married; 2=Widowed; 3=Divorced; 4=Married”). *Religious denomination* was coded as a binary where: (“0=No; 1=Yes”). *Sex* was coded as a binary where: (“0=Female; 1=Male”). We then assessed if voters were either *leftist or rightist* on an ordinal scale coded (1=leftist...10=rightist). We dichotomised the scale at a cut-off of 5, with each respondent below the cut-off being a *left-wing* voter and each above being a *right-wing* voter. This formed an external dummy variable to divide our model specifications.

A1.2 Environmental/Institutional Factors

The most basic institutional predictor; *Degree of urbanisation* was indexed by the DPES on the volume of post-code registrations geographically. We flipped this variable as a descending ordinal where: (“1=Very strongly urban....5=Not urban”). The remaining institutional predictors provided by the DPES contain a number of pre-determined

institutional scores (index) variables available for analysis, including *political cynicism* and *political interest* constructed on a Mokken scale⁵ (see previous discussion for political cynicism). As such, capturing environmental/institutional influence empirically is complex and cannot be reduced to a single phenomenon of measurement.

Political interest was measured on a 5-point ordinal scale from: (“0=low...4=high”). It was constructed from a battery of categorical descending variables pertaining to how often the respondent informs themselves about national news (1=Always, 2=often, 3=now and then, 4=seldom or never, 5=does not read papers); national problems (1=joins conversation, 2=listens with interest, 3=does not listen); foreign news (1=nearly always, 2=often, 3=now and then, 4=seldom or never, 5=does not read papers) and general interest in politics (1=very interested, 2=fairly interested, 3=not interested).

Finally, as a robustness measure, we examined our Mokken scale estimates across all pre-existing and constructed institutional indexes from 1989-2010 to ensure each represented a significant scale of a *Loevinger H coefficient* of (H 0.30) or greater, determining a validated prediction (Gillespie et al., 1987). The robustness testing is detailed in Table A1:

Table A1: Mokken Scale Predictions - Loevinger H Coefficients (1989-2010)

	1989	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010
	<i>H</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>H</i>
Political Interest	0.58680	0.55659	0.58427	0.49315	0.50191	0.54800
Political Cynicism	0.44377	0.40333	0.48404	0.43956	0.42263	0.43779

⁵ The original index sensitivity results are available for access upon request within the DPES codebooks. We also include our own Mokken scale analysis to validate scale significance.

A2. Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis

In an attempt to maintain as much validity as possible, we ran several robustness methods across our logistic regression analyses. Table A2 presents the unstandardized estimates instead of the marginal effects.

Table A1: Unstandardized Estimates

VARIABLES	(1) Pooled Control	(2) Left Wing	(3) Right Wing	(4) Low cynicism	(5) High cynicism
Age					
26-35	0.154 (0.158)	0.0982 (0.221)	0.0966 (0.240)	0.226 (0.218)	0.0543 (0.234)
36-45	0.138 (0.158)	0.0691 (0.217)	0.0508 (0.244)	0.306 (0.215)	-0.0730 (0.233)
46-55	-0.173 (0.166)	-0.270 (0.230)	-0.293 (0.260)	-0.0313 (0.230)	-0.319 (0.242)
56-65	-0.222 (0.174)	-0.259 (0.240)	-0.331 (0.268)	-0.0957 (0.250)	-0.359 (0.245)
66-75	-0.488** (0.190)	-0.573** (0.279)	-0.488* (0.276)	-0.921*** (0.319)	-0.364 (0.256)
76 or Older	-0.548** (0.230)	-0.930** (0.386)	-0.658* (0.355)	-0.730* (0.410)	-0.552* (0.292)
Political Cynicism	0.119*** (0.0434)	0.146** (0.0604)	0.114* (0.0686)		
Political Interest	-0.0524 (0.0378)	-0.0849 (0.0525)	0.0175 (0.0580)	-0.0833 (0.0548)	-0.0358 (0.0520)
Degree of Urbanisation	-0.0568** (0.0287)	-0.0156 (0.0395)	-0.0715 (0.0462)	-0.0423 (0.0417)	-0.0782** (0.0394)
Sex (Males)	-0.188** (0.0768)	-0.127 (0.108)	-0.180 (0.121)	-0.246** (0.111)	-0.0959 (0.107)
Education	-0.0795** (0.0368)	-0.0273 (0.0493)	-0.133** (0.0594)	-0.112** (0.0546)	-0.0612 (0.0499)
Income	0.00379 (0.00918)	0.00687 (0.0131)	0.00891 (0.0146)	0.00968 (0.0132)	-0.00924 (0.0127)
Marital Status	-0.0506 (0.0346)	-0.0289 (0.0477)	-0.0719 (0.0549)	-0.0527 (0.0505)	-0.0416 (0.0477)
Religious Denomination (Yes)	-0.0686 (0.0788)	-0.00436 (0.110)	-0.130 (0.132)	-0.0651 (0.113)	-0.0840 (0.110)
Wave Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YESY	YES
Constant	-1.595*** (0.234)	-1.912*** (0.328)	-1.393*** (0.363)	-1.445*** (0.315)	-1.271*** (0.309)
Observations	6,300	3,000	2,956	3,303	3,060

Notes: * Model specification (1) represent pooled logistic regression estimates of swing voters. Specification (2) swing voters which identify as left wing voters. Specification (3) swing voters which identify as right wing voters. Specification (4) swing voters with a low median

split of political cynicism. Specification (5) with a high median split of political cynicism. All estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients. P-values are denoted by ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Robust standard errors specified in parentheses.

Next, we introduced variables in a stepwise method to determine any sensitivity to results as we built our regressions, encompassing each socio-demographic predictor as well as our institutional index measurement for political cynicism. Specifically, when we controlled for socio-demographic variables across each election year, we find no significant difference in coefficient estimation or general significance level magnitude changes – even when introducing our political cynicism as a control in comparison, or controlling solely for the degree of urbanization as a potential for a geographical bias within the dataset. Our results do not change and remain within similar coefficient ranges with no change to the level of significance in our fully specified models even when compared against the pseudo r-squared estimates of models which omit controls (see Tables A3 to A7).

Table A3: Robustness Testing – Pooled Cross-Sections with Sequential Inclusion

VARIABLES	(1) Pooled	(2) Pooled	(3) Pooled	(4) Pooled	(5) Pooled	(6) Pooled	(7) Pooled	(8) Pooled	(9) Pooled	(10) Pooled
Age										
26-35		0.0946 (0.143)	0.0948 (0.144)	0.0986 (0.144)	0.100 (0.144)	0.0914 (0.144)	0.115 (0.145)	0.115 (0.152)	0.167 (0.158)	0.154 (0.158)
36-45		0.0376 (0.138)	0.0248 (0.139)	0.0469 (0.139)	0.0585 (0.139)	0.0503 (0.139)	0.0611 (0.139)	0.0720 (0.147)	0.147 (0.158)	0.138 (0.158)
46-55		-0.186 (0.143)	-0.210 (0.144)	-0.164 (0.144)	-0.152 (0.145)	-0.160 (0.145)	-0.214 (0.147)	-0.249 (0.155)	-0.175 (0.166)	-0.173 (0.166)
56-65		-0.245* (0.148)	-0.282* (0.149)	-0.227 (0.151)	-0.212 (0.151)	-0.219 (0.151)	-0.291* (0.155)	-0.306* (0.162)	-0.226 (0.174)	-0.222 (0.174)
66-75		-0.519*** (0.167)	-0.559*** (0.167)	-0.505*** (0.167)	-0.496*** (0.167)	-0.511*** (0.168)	-0.579*** (0.172)	-0.576*** (0.180)	-0.499*** (0.189)	-0.488** (0.190)
76 or Older		-0.534*** (0.207)	-0.597*** (0.209)	-0.547*** (0.210)	-0.547*** (0.210)	-0.578*** (0.210)	-0.650*** (0.215)	-0.585*** (0.223)	-0.562** (0.230)	-0.548** (0.230)
Political Cynicism (NO Median Split)			0.119*** (0.0406)	0.112*** (0.0409)	0.113*** (0.0409)	0.121*** (0.0409)	0.107** (0.0419)	0.123*** (0.0432)	0.122*** (0.0433)	0.119*** (0.0434)
Political Interest				-0.0975***	-0.102***	-0.0821**	-0.0552	-0.0552	-0.0526	-0.0524

				(0.0337)	(0.0338)	(0.0345)	(0.0364)	(0.0377)	(0.0378)	(0.0378)
Degree of Urbanisation					-0.0645**	-0.0640**	-0.0690**	-0.0641**	-0.0608**	-0.0568**
					(0.0270)	(0.0270)	(0.0274)	(0.0282)	(0.0283)	(0.0287)
Sex (Males)						-0.197***	-0.202***	-0.191**	-0.183**	-0.188**
						(0.0733)	(0.0746)	(0.0766)	(0.0768)	(0.0768)
Education							-0.0706**	-0.0748**	-0.0790**	-0.0795**
							(0.0345)	(0.0366)	(0.0368)	(0.0368)
Income								0.00150	0.00388	0.00379
								(0.00898)	(0.00917)	(0.00918)
Marital Status									-0.0509	-0.0506
									(0.0345)	(0.0346)
Religious Denom (Yes)										-0.0686
										(0.0788)
Wave Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Constant	-2.234***	-2.143***	-2.302***	-2.137***	-1.908***	-1.850***	-1.659***	-1.713***	-1.633***	-1.595***
	(0.102)	(0.154)	(0.163)	(0.172)	(0.193)	(0.195)	(0.214)	(0.224)	(0.231)	(0.234)
Observations	6,891	6,869	6,805	6,805	6,805	6,805	6,653	6,325	6,312	6,300

Notes: * Models (1-10) represent pooled logistic regression estimates of swing voters. All estimates are unstandardized coefficients. P-values are denoted by ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Robust standard errors specified in parentheses.

Table A4: Robustness Testing – Left Wing Dutch Swing Voters with Sequential Inclusion

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Left	Left	Left	Left	Left	Left	Left	Left	Left	Left
Age										
26-35		0.0196	0.0313	0.0325	0.0335	0.0364	0.0535	0.0984	0.110	0.0982
		(0.200)	(0.202)	(0.202)	(0.202)	(0.203)	(0.204)	(0.215)	(0.221)	(0.221)
36-45		-0.0283	-0.0345	-0.0141	-0.00955	-0.00812	0.0144	0.0492	0.0754	0.0691
		(0.192)	(0.194)	(0.195)	(0.195)	(0.195)	(0.196)	(0.207)	(0.217)	(0.217)
46-55		-0.354*	-0.350*	-0.302	-0.297	-0.290	-0.305	-0.291	-0.262	-0.270
		(0.200)	(0.202)	(0.203)	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.205)	(0.216)	(0.230)	(0.230)
56-65		-0.350*	-0.388*	-0.328	-0.321	-0.314	-0.342	-0.281	-0.252	-0.259
		(0.207)	(0.209)	(0.211)	(0.212)	(0.213)	(0.217)	(0.226)	(0.240)	(0.240)
66-75		-0.592**	-0.637***	-0.595**	-0.591**	-0.587**	-0.643**	-0.594**	-0.564**	-0.573**
		(0.244)	(0.246)	(0.248)	(0.247)	(0.248)	(0.256)	(0.268)	(0.279)	(0.279)
76 or Older		-0.991***	-1.008***	-0.939***	-0.938***	-0.946***	-0.967***	-0.846**	-0.921**	-0.930**
		(0.354)	(0.356)	(0.357)	(0.357)	(0.356)	(0.360)	(0.367)	(0.386)	(0.386)
Political Cynicism (NO Median Split)			0.143**	0.131**	0.132**	0.137**	0.128**	0.147**	0.148**	0.146**
			(0.0565)	(0.0573)	(0.0574)	(0.0573)	(0.0587)	(0.0602)	(0.0603)	(0.0604)
Political Interest				-0.0995**	-0.101**	-0.0861*	-0.0744	-0.0893*	-0.0840	-0.0849
				(0.0461)	(0.0461)	(0.0474)	(0.0503)	(0.0524)	(0.0526)	(0.0525)
Degree of Urbanisation					-0.0169	-0.0171	-0.0275	-0.0187	-0.0163	-0.0156
					(0.0374)	(0.0375)	(0.0380)	(0.0390)	(0.0393)	(0.0395)

Sex (Males)						-0.154	-0.146	-0.132	-0.123	-0.127
						(0.104)	(0.105)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.108)
Education							-0.0306	-0.0216	-0.0269	-0.0273
							(0.0460)	(0.0490)	(0.0494)	(0.0493)
Income								0.00403	0.00649	0.00687
								(0.0127)	(0.0131)	(0.0131)
Marital Status									-0.0280	-0.0289
									(0.0476)	(0.0477)
Religious Denom (Yes)										-0.00436
										(0.110)
Wave Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Constant	-2.154***	-2.000***	-2.219***	-2.035***	-1.971***	-1.928***	-1.819***	-1.978***	-1.930***	-1.912***
	(0.142)	(0.214)	(0.234)	(0.247)	(0.277)	(0.279)	(0.304)	(0.317)	(0.326)	(0.328)
Observations	3,255	3,241	3,208	3,208	3,208	3,208	3,130	3,016	3,007	3,000

Notes: * Models (1-10) represent logistic regression estimates of swing voters that identify as left wing voters. All estimates are unstandardized coefficients. P-values are denoted by ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Robust standard errors specified in parentheses.

Table A5: Robustness Testing – Right Wing Dutch Swing Voters with Sequential

VARIABLES	(1) Right	(2) Right	(3) Right	(4) Right	(5) Right	(6) Right	(7) Right	(8) Right	(9) Right	(10) Right
Age										
26-35		0.0515	0.0388	0.0440	0.0440	0.0328	0.0615	0.00762	0.110	0.0966
		(0.217)	(0.217)	(0.217)	(0.217)	(0.217)	(0.217)	(0.227)	(0.240)	(0.240)
36-45		-0.0167	-0.0437	-0.0284	-0.0183	-0.0301	-0.0430	-0.0739	0.0615	0.0508
		(0.209)	(0.210)	(0.210)	(0.210)	(0.210)	(0.210)	(0.220)	(0.243)	(0.244)
46-55		-0.164	-0.218	-0.190	-0.179	-0.194	-0.303	-0.432*	-0.308	-0.293
		(0.218)	(0.221)	(0.220)	(0.220)	(0.221)	(0.226)	(0.239)	(0.260)	(0.260)
56-65		-0.200	-0.247	-0.215	-0.199	-0.215	-0.350	-0.491**	-0.354	-0.331
		(0.224)	(0.226)	(0.226)	(0.227)	(0.227)	(0.235)	(0.246)	(0.268)	(0.268)
66-75		-0.490**	-0.544**	-0.506**	-0.497**	-0.526**	-0.600**	-0.648**	-0.522*	-0.488*
		(0.243)	(0.242)	(0.242)	(0.242)	(0.243)	(0.250)	(0.257)	(0.274)	(0.276)
76 or Older		-0.508*	-0.632**	-0.603*	-0.606*	-0.642**	-0.753**	-0.791**	-0.698**	-0.658*
		(0.308)	(0.315)	(0.315)	(0.316)	(0.316)	(0.328)	(0.343)	(0.353)	(0.355)
Political Cynicism (NO Median Split)			0.133**	0.132**	0.130**	0.139**	0.123*	0.124*	0.121*	0.114*
			(0.0642)	(0.0643)	(0.0644)	(0.0645)	(0.0661)	(0.0682)	(0.0685)	(0.0686)
Political Interest				-0.0584	-0.0651	-0.0474	-0.0104	0.0171	0.0167	0.0175
				(0.0528)	(0.0530)	(0.0538)	(0.0564)	(0.0579)	(0.0580)	(0.0580)
Degree of Urbanisation					-0.0991**	-0.0985**	-0.0879**	-0.0835*	-0.0804*	-0.0715
					(0.0433)	(0.0434)	(0.0440)	(0.0453)	(0.0452)	(0.0462)
Sex (Males)						-0.179	-0.195*	-0.176	-0.169	-0.180

						(0.115)	(0.117)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.121)
Education							-0.0950*	-0.133**	-0.133**	-0.133**
							(0.0558)	(0.0593)	(0.0593)	(0.0594)
Income								0.00870	0.00960	0.00891
								(0.0144)	(0.0145)	(0.0146)
Marital Status									-0.0735	-0.0719
									(0.0545)	(0.0549)
Religious Denom (Yes)										-0.130
										(0.132)
Wave Fixed Effects	YES	YESY	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Constant	-2.301***	-2.174***	-2.325***	-2.235***	-1.900***	-1.842***	-1.627***	-1.573***	-1.466***	-1.393***
	(0.148)	(0.226)	(0.236)	(0.252)	(0.291)	(0.293)	(0.327)	(0.339)	(0.354)	(0.363)
Observations	3,222	3,217	3,191	3,191	3,191	3,191	3,129	2,963	2,959	2,956

Notes: * Models (1-10) represent logistic regression estimates of swing voters that identify as right wing voters. All estimates are unstandardized coefficients. P-values are denoted by ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Robust standard errors specified in parentheses.

Table A6: Robustness Testing – Low Cynicism Median Split with Sequential Inclusion of Variables

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low
Age									
26-35		0.216	0.218	0.220	0.220	0.230	0.199	0.248	0.226
		(0.195)	(0.195)	(0.195)	(0.195)	(0.196)	(0.206)	(0.218)	(0.218)
36-45		0.250	0.279	0.287	0.284	0.283	0.250	0.319	0.306
		(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.186)	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.198)	(0.215)	(0.215)
46-55		-0.0509	0.00364	0.0112	0.0215	-0.0317	-0.104	-0.0282	-0.0313
		(0.197)	(0.198)	(0.197)	(0.198)	(0.200)	(0.212)	(0.230)	(0.230)
56-65		-0.128	-0.0565	-0.0436	-0.0501	-0.121	-0.177	-0.0962	-0.0957
		(0.214)	(0.215)	(0.215)	(0.216)	(0.219)	(0.230)	(0.249)	(0.250)
66-75		-	-	-0.770***	-0.774***	-0.913***	-1.001***	-0.933***	-0.921***
		0.834***	0.773***	(0.277)	(0.276)	(0.286)	(0.304)	(0.316)	(0.319)
		(0.277)	(0.277)	(0.277)	(0.276)	(0.286)	(0.304)	(0.316)	(0.319)
76 or Older		-0.773**	-0.707*	-0.713*	-0.718*	-0.781**	-0.682*	-0.737*	-0.730*
		(0.366)	(0.366)	(0.367)	(0.367)	(0.379)	(0.388)	(0.409)	(0.410)
Political Interest			-0.113**	-0.118**	-0.0875*	-0.0607	-0.0817	-0.0802	-0.0833
			(0.0482)	(0.0484)	(0.0494)	(0.0522)	(0.0546)	(0.0548)	(0.0548)
Degree of Urbanisation				-0.0519	-0.0522	-0.0568	-0.0480	-0.0456	-0.0423
				(0.0389)	(0.0391)	(0.0395)	(0.0408)	(0.0410)	(0.0417)
Sex (Males)					-0.288***	-0.280***	-0.252**	-0.245**	-0.246**
					(0.105)	(0.107)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.111)
Education						-0.0893*	-0.105*	-0.112**	-0.112**
						(0.0519)	(0.0543)	(0.0547)	(0.0546)
Income							0.00611	0.00923	0.00968
							(0.0128)	(0.0131)	(0.0132)
Marital Status								-0.0523	-0.0527
								(0.0504)	(0.0505)

Religious Denom (Yes)									-0.0651 (0.113)
Wave Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Constant	- 2.243*** (0.137)	- 2.293*** (0.208)	- 2.108*** (0.219)	-1.920*** (0.256)	-1.844*** (0.258)	-1.616*** (0.288)	-1.589*** (0.301)	-1.489*** (0.314)	-1.445*** (0.315)
Observations	3,551	3,550	3,550	3,550	3,550	3,491	3,315	3,309	3,303

Notes: * Models (1-10) represent logistic regression estimates of swing voters that are sorted with a low political cynicism median split. All estimates are unstandardized coefficients. P-values are denoted by ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Robust standard errors specified in parentheses.

Table A7: Robustness Testing – High Cynicism Median Split with Sequential Inclusion of Variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
VARIABLES	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High
Age									
26-35		-0.0699 (0.213)	-0.0649 (0.213)	-0.0618 (0.214)	-0.0701 (0.214)	-0.0298 (0.214)	0.0100 (0.226)	0.0619 (0.233)	0.0543 (0.234)
36-45		-0.254 (0.205)	-0.236 (0.206)	-0.218 (0.207)	-0.225 (0.207)	-0.204 (0.207)	-0.138 (0.218)	-0.0636 (0.233)	-0.0730 (0.233)
46-55		-0.403* (0.209)	-0.359* (0.209)	-0.341 (0.211)	-0.351* (0.211)	-0.413* (0.213)	-0.389* (0.225)	-0.325 (0.243)	-0.319 (0.242)
56-65		-0.448** (0.209)	-0.402* (0.211)	-0.381* (0.212)	-0.386* (0.212)	-0.474** (0.218)	-0.439* (0.228)	-0.367 (0.246)	-0.359 (0.245)
66-75		-0.512** (0.222)	-0.461** (0.223)	-0.444** (0.224)	-0.456** (0.224)	-0.507** (0.231)	-0.454* (0.241)	-0.376 (0.257)	-0.364 (0.256)
76 or Older		-0.566** (0.264)	-0.524** (0.265)	-0.518* (0.266)	-0.540** (0.264)	-0.669** (0.272)	-0.624** (0.282)	-0.571* (0.292)	-0.552* (0.292)
Political Interest			-0.0959** (0.0471)	-0.0995** (0.0471)	-0.0912* (0.0479)	-0.0621 (0.0506)	-0.0431 (0.0521)	-0.0394 (0.0521)	-0.0358 (0.0520)
Degree of Urbanisation				-0.0825** (0.0372)	-0.0818** (0.0372)	-0.0893** (0.0380)	-0.0874** (0.0390)	-0.0834** (0.0391)	-0.0782** (0.0394)
Sex (Males)					-0.0879 (0.103)	-0.0955 (0.105)	-0.0946 (0.107)	-0.0849 (0.107)	-0.0959 (0.107)
Education						-0.0715 (0.0460)	-0.0588 (0.0496)	-0.0606 (0.0497)	-0.0612 (0.0499)
Income							-0.0102 (0.0125)	-0.00883 (0.0127)	-0.00924 (0.0127)
Marital Status								-0.0433 (0.0475)	-0.0416 (0.0477)
Religious Denom (Yes)									-0.0840 (0.110)
Wave Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Constant	- 2.223*** (0.154)	-1.919*** (0.230)	-1.774*** (0.239)	-1.484*** (0.267)	-1.444*** (0.271)	-1.269*** (0.288)	-1.342*** (0.298)	-1.299*** (0.305)	-1.271*** (0.309)
Observations	3,340	3,319	3,319	3,319	3,319	3,225	3,073	3,066	3,060

Notes: * Models (1-10) represent logistic regression estimates of swing voters that are sorted with a high political cynicism median split. All estimates are unstandardized coefficients. P-values are denoted by ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Robust standard errors specified in parentheses.

References (Appendix)

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- Gillespie, M., Tenvergert, E. M., & Kingma, J. (1987). Using Mokken scale analysis to develop unidimensional scales. *Quality and Quantity*, 21(4), 393-408.