

Acemoglu, Daron; Ajzenman, Nicolas; Aksoy, Cevat Giray; Fiszbein, Martin; Molina, Carlos

Working Paper

(Successful) Democracies Breed Their Own Support

IZA Discussion Papers, No. 14691

Provided in Cooperation with:

IZA – Institute of Labor Economics

Suggested Citation: Acemoglu, Daron; Ajzenman, Nicolas; Aksoy, Cevat Giray; Fiszbein, Martin; Molina, Carlos (2021) : (Successful) Democracies Breed Their Own Support, IZA Discussion Papers, No. 14691, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/245742>

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Terms of use:

Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.

DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

IZA DP No. 14691

**(Successful) Democracies Breed Their
Own Support**

Daron Acemoglu
Nicolás Ajzenman
Cevat Giray Aksoy
Martin Fiszbein
Carlos Molina

AUGUST 2021

DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

IZA DP No. 14691

(Successful) Democracies Breed Their Own Support

Daron Acemoglu

*Massachusetts Institute of Technology
and IZA*

Nicolás Ajzenman

*São Paulo School of Economics-FGV
and IZA*

Cevat Giray Aksoy

*European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, King's College London
and IZA*

Martin Fiszbein

Boston University

Carlos Molina

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

AUGUST 2021

Any opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in this series may include views on policy, but IZA takes no institutional policy positions. The IZA research network is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity.

The IZA Institute of Labor Economics is an independent economic research institute that conducts research in labor economics and offers evidence-based policy advice on labor market issues. Supported by the Deutsche Post Foundation, IZA runs the world's largest network of economists, whose research aims to provide answers to the global labor market challenges of our time. Our key objective is to build bridges between academic research, policymakers and society.

IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.

ABSTRACT

(Successful) Democracies Breed Their Own Support*

Using large-scale survey data covering more than 110 countries and exploiting within-country variation across cohorts and surveys, we show that individuals with longer exposure to democracy display stronger support for democratic institutions. We bolster these baseline findings using an instrumental-variables strategy exploiting regional democratization waves and focusing on immigrants' exposure to democracy before migration. In all cases, the timing and nature of the effects are consistent with a causal interpretation. We also establish that democracies breed their own support only when they are successful: all of the effects we estimate work through exposure to democracies that are successful in providing economic growth, peace and political stability, and public goods.

JEL Classification: P16

Keywords: democracy, economic growth, institutions, support for democracy, values

Corresponding author:

Nicolas Ajzenman
FGV EESP - Escola de Economia de São Paulo
474 Rua Itapeva, Bela Vista
01332-000 São Paulo
Brazil
E-mail: nicolas.ajzenman@fgv.br

* Acemoglu and Molina gratefully acknowledge nancial support from the Bradley Foundation.

1 Introduction

“Our nation stands for democracy and proper drains.” John Betjeman (Poet Laureate of the UK, 1972-1984).

With many voters expressing increasing dissatisfaction with the democratic system,¹ misinformation and extremism spreading rapidly (e.g., [Sunstein, 2018](#); [Marantz, 2020](#)), and authoritarian-leaning populist parties on the rise in many Western countries (e.g. [Judis, 2016](#); [Müller, 2017](#); [Edwards, 2019](#); [Gurieff & Papaioannou, 2020](#)), concerns about the future viability of democracy have multiplied.² Freedom House reports that there have now been 14 consecutive years during which democracy has been in retreat globally.³ Are we witnessing the twilight of democratic institutions around the world?

A critical factor that may shape the future of democracy is the support from those who have lived under democratic institutions.⁴ The idea that democracy needs to be defended, if it is to survive, goes back at least to ancient Athens ([Ober, 2015](#)), and in modern times, to Benjamin Franklin’s quip when asked whether the new country had a republic or a monarchy: “A Republic, if you can keep it.” Naturally, if citizens have a good experience with democracy, they should be more willing to support it. This was one of the main arguments for President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal program. In his April 14, 1938 fireside chat, he argued:

“In recommending this program I am thinking not only of the immediate economic needs of the people of the Nation, but also of their personal liberties—the most precious possession of all Americans. I am thinking of our democracy and of the recent trend in other parts of the world away from the democratic ideal.

Democracy has disappeared in several other great nations—not because the people of those nations disliked democracy, but because they had grown tired of unemployment and insecurity, of seeing their children hungry while they sat helpless in the face of government confusion and government weakness through lack of leadership in government.”⁵

¹<https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/04/29/many-across-the-globe-are-dissatisfied-with-how-democracy-is-working/> (last retrieved February 2, 2021).

²Prominent books articulating this concern include: [Applebaum \(2020\)](#), [Levitsky and Ziblatt \(2018\)](#) and [Snyder \(2017\)](#), while others such as [Deneen \(2019\)](#) and [Mishra \(2017\)](#) have come to view the (liberal) democratic project as a failure. Some have even argued that we are in the midst of a fascist revival (e.g., [Stanley, 2018](#)).

³<https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-report-freedom-world-2020-finds-established-democracies-are-decline> (last retrieved February 2, 2021).

⁴[Easton \(1965\)](#), [Lipset \(1959\)](#), [William and Rose \(1999\)](#), [Booth, Seligson, et al. \(2009\)](#) and [Norris \(2011\)](#), among others, discuss the role of people’s attitudes to and support for democracy in the survival of democratic regimes. [Claassen \(2020a\)](#) provides empirical evidence supporting this link. [Bartels \(2020\)](#) points out that there has been no change in attitudes towards democracy in Europe. See also the general discussions in [Acemoglu and Robinson \(2019\)](#) and [Iversen and Soskice \(2019\)](#).

⁵<https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/fireside-chat-15>.

President Joe Biden returned to the same theme recently, motivating his infrastructure and fiscal plans with the arguments that:

“We have to prove democracy still works—that our government still works and we can deliver for our people.

In our first 100 days together, we have acted to restore the people’s faith in our democracy to deliver.”⁶

Despite their long pedigree, these ideas have not been systematically investigated. In this paper, we study whether those who live under democracy support democracy and oppose authoritarian and army rule, and whether these effects are driven by those who have experienced successful democratic periods in terms of GDP growth, relatively high public expenditure and peace and political stability.

Our empirical strategy is to exploit within-country between-age group/cohort variation. Put simply, we will look at whether age groups that have been exposed to longer democratic spells (as well as longer successful democratic spells) express greater support for democracy relative to other age groups in the same country and the same age groups in other countries (who have experienced different timing of democratizations and democratic reversals). We achieve this by controlling for country, year, cohort and age fixed effects, as well as age times subregion or age times country fixed effects in our more demanding specifications.

Though this empirical strategy zeroes in on an attractive source of within-country variation in democratic exposure, it does not dispel all endogeneity and reverse causality concerns. We deal with these concerns in four distinct and complementary ways. First, we document that a country’s democratic experience before an individual is born has no impact on his or her support for democracy or views about autocracy. Second, we show that our democratic exposure variable has no impact on a number of non-political attitudinal questions related to family and neighbors. These two exercises alleviate concerns about our results being driven by broad social changes that affect both democratization and political views. Third, we estimate very similar effects with a two-stage least squares (2SLS) strategy exploiting exposure to regional democratization waves (as in [Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo, & Robinson, 2019](#), but adapted to focus on individual exposure). These 2SLS results are particularly reassuring, since they rely on a very different source of variation and should be immune to the typical reverse causality concerns (whereby it is support for democracy causing democracy, rather than the other way around). We additionally show that the source of variation exploited by our 2SLS strategy affects attitudes towards democracy with the right timing and has no predictive power for non-political views. Finally, we document analogous results in a sample of immigrants whose

⁶<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/04/29/remarks-by-president>

democratic exposure is a function of the age at which they migrate as well as the evolution of democratic institutions in their host country.

Our estimates are broadly similar with each of our six different measures of support for democracy. They are also fairly robust with different measures of democracy, in datasets covering different continents and different survey questions, and across a variety of additional specification checks.

The effects we estimate are not just statistically significant and stable, but quantitatively meaningful as well. For example, in our baseline specification, 20 more years of exposure to democracy increases support for democracy by about 8% of its standard deviation. This gap is approximately the difference in the support for democracy between Hong Kong and mainland China, and more than half of the difference between the US and Argentina.

The second part of the paper explores whether the relationship between exposure to democracy and support for democracy operates via people’s experiences with democracies that work. We do this first by distinguishing between periods of severe economic recessions from normal times. We then look at the effects of democracies living in peace and political stability versus democracies experiencing civil war, and democracies with high versus low levels of public good provision. For example, 20 more years of exposure to economically successful democracy, compared to 20 years of exposure to unsuccessful democracy, increases support for democratic institutions by about 29% of its standard deviation.

Overall, we interpret our results as showing robust evidence that citizens who experience successful workings of democratic institutions tend to support democracy. Whether this greater support for democracy actually helps shield democracy against threats is not a question we can address with our current strategy and remains an important area for future exploration.

Our paper is related to several literatures. First, there is by now a sizable literature on democratic consolidation and coups against democracy. The early theoretical literature in this area is summarized in [Acemoglu and Robinson \(2006\)](#). [Acemoglu and Robinson \(2008\)](#), [Fearon \(2011\)](#), [Bidner and François \(2013\)](#), and [Svolik \(2013\)](#) develop models in which collective action by citizens is critical for the defense of democracy, while [Maeda \(2010\)](#), [Svolik \(2015\)](#) and [Bermeo \(2016\)](#) provide related empirical evidence. Some of the more recent work in this area focuses on the emergence of electoral authoritarianism and hybrid regimes because of democratic failures (e.g. [Geddes, 2005](#); [Schedler, 2006](#); [Gandhi, 2008](#)). We contribute to this literature by highlighting the importance of experience of successful democracy for the population’s support for democratic institutions.

A long-running empirical debate focuses on whether high-education and high-income countries are insulated from coups and democratic collapse. Although the modernization literature spearheaded by [Lipset \(1959\)](#) emphasized the link between economic modernization and democracy, and the subsequent literature, especially [Przeworski et al. \(2000\)](#), claimed that high

income countries do not suffer coups, this conclusion has not withstood the test of time and evidence. The recent literature, cited in footnote 2, starts from the premise that democracies in advanced nations are vulnerable as well,⁷ and [Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared \(2008, 2009\)](#) have documented that the oft-claimed relationship between country income per capita and democracy (or income and lack of coups) is due to a failure to control for country heterogeneity. Indeed, including fixed effects or other types of country-level controls removes any relationship between income per capita or education and democracy (or its survival). In the context of this literature, we provide novel evidence that what matters for support for democracy is not so much the level of income or education, but time spent under democratic institutions that deliver in terms of economic growth, peace and stability, and public goods.

Our paper is also connected to [Buera, Monge-Naranjo, and Primiceri \(2011\)](#), who develop a Bayesian framework in which a representative agent within each country learns from her own experience as well as the experiences of neighboring countries about whether an open or closed economy is better for economic growth. A similar framework applied to democracy would imply that more successful democratic experience may increase support for democracy—one of our main results. We are not aware of other works that develop this perspective in the context of democracy (though [Brender & Drazen, 2009](#), provide a related model). We do not impose an explicit Bayesian framework, since we believe that there are multiple channels at work here and some of the patterns we find, such as fairly constant effects throughout an individual’s life, are not straightforward to reconcile with the Bayesian perspective (which would predict, on average, less learning as an individual accumulates experience under a political regime and thus has less room for updating).

There are only a few works that have investigated the relationship between democratic experience/exposure and support for democracy. This idea is related to [Persson and Tabellini’s \(2009\)](#) notion of “democratic capital”, which they proxy with the number of years a country spends is democratic and argue to be an important factor in the consolidation of democracy. Their empirical work, however, is at the country level and only provides suggestive evidence that a country’s history of democracy is correlated with the persistence of its democracy. Recent papers by [Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln \(2015\)](#), [Brum \(2018\)](#) and [Besley and Persson \(2019\)](#) are closely connected as they report correlations between exposure to democracy and political preferences. We contribute to work in this area by focusing on detailed cohort/age group-specific variation (by including a large number of interactive fixed effects), conducting an extensive set of placebo exercises, estimating IV models isolating exogenous variation in exposure to democracy, and additionally exploring the source of variation coming from immigrants. Most

⁷The recent literature on populism and other anti-democratic movements in industrialized nations, too, embraces the perspective that these countries’ democracies can be fragile, despite their very high levels of income (see, e.g., [Funke, Schularick, & Trebesch, 2016, 2020](#), and [Guriev & Papaioannou, 2020](#)).

importantly, to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper that explains the link between democratic experience and political attitudes via the differential effects of exposure to *successful* democracies.

Finally, the general themes explored in this paper are related to the determinants of civic culture. The more common perspective in the literature emphasizes the role of civic culture in the emergence and functioning of democracy (e.g. [Almond & Verba, 1963](#); [Putnam, 1993](#)). Nevertheless, an argument going back to [Inglehart and Welzel \(2005\)](#) hypothesizes that democratic institutions impact civic culture as well, and several empirical works have found an association between democratic experiences and prosocial preferences ([Bardhan, 2000](#); [Grosjean & Senik, 2011](#); [Rustagi, 2018](#)). We contribute to this literature by providing systematic evidence on the importance of exposure to democracy on one important aspect of political attitudes.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes our main data sources. Section 3 outlines our empirical strategy and describes the construction of our exposure to democracy variable. Section 4 presents our results on the relationship between exposure to democracy and support for democracy. This section also includes several placebo exercises, a battery of robustness checks, and our 2SLS results. Section 5 contains our results showing that it is exposure to successfully-performing democracies that underpins support for democracy. Section 6 concludes, while the (online) Appendix contains several additional robustness checks and estimates.

2 Data

In this section, we describe our main data sources and the construction of our measures of democracy.

2.1 Survey Data on Democratic Values

Our analysis uses individual survey data from eleven waves of the Integrated Value Surveys (IVS), which harmonizes the European Values Study and the World Value Survey. The resulting data set provides nationally representative surveys from 113 countries, covering around 540,000 respondents between 1981 and 2018. Interviews are conducted in the local languages and questions are designed to assess respondents' attitudes on a range of issues, including attitudes toward democracy and social and economic attitudes.

We focus on five measures of support for democracy that are present in multiple waves of the IVS.⁸ The first is the level of agreement of the respondent with the statement “Democracy may

⁸Although there are a few more outcomes measuring support for democracy, these are asked in less than four of the eleven waves of the IVS. Since in some of our key specifications we compare the same age group

have problems but it’s better than any other form of government”. The other four questions are based on the individual’s assessment on how well various types of political systems would work. These are: “Having a democratic political system”, “Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections”, “Having the army rule” and “Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country”. We normalize the respondent’s answers to these questions so that higher values indicate higher support for democratic values and refer to these questions as *Democracy is better*, *Democratic system*, *Opposes strong leader*, *Opposes army ruling* and *Government above experts* respectively (see Appendix Table A-1).⁹ We also combine the latter four measures into an index, which we refer to as *Support for democracy index*.¹⁰

We additionally use information on a range of respondent personal characteristics, including country of birth, country of residence, year of birth, year of interview, and year of migration to construct individual exposure to democracy. We also utilize information on gender, language, size of town as controls, and use variables on educational attainment and the year in which education was (or will be) completed in the last part of the paper.

Finally, we confirm our results using complementary measures from the Asianbarometer, the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and the Latinobarometer. The Asianbarometer covers 14 Asian countries and 70,693 individuals surveyed between 2000 and 2016. LAPOP covers 33 countries from Latin America and 305,838 respondents between 2004 and 2019, and the Latinobarometer covers 19 countries from the same region and 407,945 respondents from 1995 to 2017.

2.2 Data on Democracy

It is a priori unclear whether the intensive or the extensive margin of democracy, or both, matter in shaping support for democracy. For this reason, we present two complementary measures of exposure to democracy, one constructed from a dichotomous index of democracy, thus focusing on the extensive margin, and the other based on a continuous measure of democracy, so that we are exploiting both intensive and extensive margin variation. In an effort to reduce measurement error, our dichotomous variable combines information from several datasets, including Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010), Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013), Acemoglu et al. (2019), Freedom House and Polity IV. We construct an (unbalanced) panel that comprises 185 polities (including all countries with data on the IVS) with information from 1800 to 2018, though the earliest

at different points in time, having sufficiently many waves is important for our empirical strategy. All of the questions we focus on were introduced to the IVS in 1994 or later.

⁹As noted in the Introduction, this question is useful because it contrasts non-elected *technocracy* to democratically-elected governments. This type of “rule by experts” was in the past used as a justification for dictatorships (e.g., in Chile under Pinochet; see Silva, 2009).

¹⁰We do not include the first measure in this index since it is available only for a smaller sample.

date we use is 1891.¹¹ In Appendix A.1, we explain in more detail the construction of this measure.

Our continuous index of democracy comes from Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) dataset, a recent project that has constructed comparable and high-quality measures of the extent of democracy for more than 200 countries for the last two centuries.¹² Compared to other available measures, V-DEM collects information on a wide range of characteristics (≈ 400 indicators), including factual information directly coded from official documents, such as constitutions and government records, and more subjective assessments on topics like political practices and compliance with de jure rules coded from multiple experts.¹³

These indicators are used as input for building five indices, each ranging between zero and one and identifying a distinct dimension of democracy: electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian.¹⁴ We construct our continuous measure of democracy by averaging these five components.

These dichotomous and continuous measures have independent and relevant information on the evolution of democracy around the world. For example, the United States is coded as a democratic country throughout the 20th century according to our dichotomous measure. However, as we show in Appendix Figure A-1, V-DEM captures more fine-grained information about US institutions: its democracy score increases from 59% in 1900 to 84% in 2000. Part of this increase (about 12.4 percentage points) takes place during the late 1960s in conjunction

¹¹Only 4% of the respondents in our sample are exposed to political regimes before 1930. The results are very similar if we exclude this 4% and start the analysis from those exposed to post-1930 democracies.

¹²V-DEM was released in 2014 for 68 countries, and it has gradually expanded to 202 polities (version 10). Despite its recent release, the dataset has been widely used in political science research (Dahlum, Knutsen, & Wig, 2019; Singh, 2019; Claassen, 2020a, 2020b; Lührmann, Marquardt, & Mechkova, 2020).

¹³For more information on variable construction, see Coppedge et al. (2020). For a more detailed comparison of V-DEM with other democracy indices (including the ones used for our binary measure) in terms of definition, sources, coverage and reliability, see Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, and Teorell (2017).

¹⁴The *electoral* component incorporates measures of whether leaders are appointed through popular elections, the share of population with suffrage, the absence of electoral irregularities (registration fraud, electoral violence, vote buying), and the extent at which parties (including opposition), press and civil organizations are able to form and operate freely. The *liberal* principle comprises measures of the capability of government agencies (e.g., comptroller general, general prosecutor, judiciary) to exercise oversight over the executive and act independently, the extent of the executive respect for the laws, citizen access to justice, secure property rights, freedoms of religion, forced labor, movement and physical integrity rights, and the number of chambers that the legislature contain. The *participatory* principle measures the involvement of civil society organizations, the decentralization of candidate selection empirical parties and this can nation against women therein, the extent to which the direct popular vote is utilized (e.g., referendums, plebiscites) and whether there exist elected local and regional governments and their degree of freedom from unelected officials. The *deliberative* component combines information on how open public deliberations for important policy changes are, how public and reasoned elite's justifications for their positions are, whether they justify their arguments in terms of the common good and whether they acknowledge and respect counterarguments. The *egalitarian* principle measures the percentage of the population not living in areas where government officials' respect for civil liberties is significantly weaker, whether some social groups are in favorable positions in terms of such liberties or political power, and how universal mean-tested programs, education, healthcare and infrastructural spending are in the national budget.

with the 24th Amendment and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, which removed barriers to the electoral participation of Black Americans in the South. There is also a 6.1 percentage point increase driven by the egalitarian component during the 1930s and early 1940s as *New Deal* reforms reduced inequities in access to public services. The same figure also illustrates granular information in the V-DEM scores of the United Kingdom, Spain and Argentina.

3 Exposure to Democracy and Empirical Strategy

We now describe the construction of our “exposure to democracy” variable and our main empirical strategy.

3.1 Exposure to Democracy

Our key variable Exposure to Democracy_{*c,s,a*} for an individual of age *a* in country *c* observed in (interview) year *s* is defined as:

$$\text{Exposure to Democracy}_{c,s,a} = \sum_{t=s-a+k}^s D_{c,t}, \quad (1)$$

where D_{ct} is either our dichotomous or continuous measure of democracy for country *c* in year *t* (cfr. Section 2.2). The summation is over the lifetime of an individual of age *a*, starting when they were *k* year-old all the way to the present year, *s*. This measure therefore represents an individual’s total time under (exposure to) democracy in their country. In our baseline data, we set $k = 6$ so that democratic exposure starts being measured from the time an individual is six years old and starts schooling.¹⁵

3.2 Empirical Specification

Our empirical strategy is to exploit age group-country-year-level variation in the history of democracy in order to estimate the relationship between exposure to democracy and support for democratic institutions. We accomplish this by estimating equations of the following form:

$$\text{Outcome}_{i,w,c,s,a} = \beta \text{Exposure to Democracy}_{c,s,a} + \gamma' X_{i,w,c,s,a} + \varepsilon_{i,w,c,s,a}, \quad (2)$$

¹⁵The results are very similar if we set $k = 0$, so that an individual is allowed to be influenced by exposure to democracy from the time of his or her birth, or if we set it as $k = 18$ so that it is exposure during an individual’s adult life that matters. We prefer $k = 6$, since exposure during the first years of life is less likely to be understood or internalized by individuals, and our evidence below shows that schooling experience is important. Our results are also robust if we allow exposure to democracy to depreciate as in [Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln \(2015\)](#).

where i , w , c , s and a denote, respectively, individual, wave/survey, country, year of interview and age. *Outcome* is one of the measures of contemporaneous democratic support discussed in the previous section. In addition, $X_{i,w,s,a}$ is a vector of individual controls we always include: a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave/survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city.

The inclusion of country, cohort and age fixed effects implies that we are always comparing a particular age group to individuals from the same age group in other countries, to other age groups from the same country, and to itself over time as its own experience of democracy evolves. This yields what we call our *Specification 1*. The alternative *Specification 2* zeros in on the more specific source of variation by additionally including country \times year of interview fixed effects and age \times subregion fixed effects (and in more demanding specifications by additionally including age \times country or age \times year \times subregion fixed effects).¹⁶ In essence, this specification removes the source of variation coming from comparison to other age groups from the same country (or detailed subregion) and the same age group from other countries, focusing on a given age group’s changes in support for democracy and exposure to democracy over time.

The key identifying restriction for both Specifications 1 and 2 is that, absent differences in exposure to democracy, the same age groups across countries would be on similar trends over time in terms of their support for democracy. Although there is no foolproof way of checking this identifying restriction, we deploy several strategies to probe it further. First, we show that our estimates are very similar across different specifications, regardless of whether we control for interactive fixed effects at the level of age \times year \times subregion or age \times country. Second, we document that pre-birth exposure to democracy of an age group has no correlation with support for democracy, bolstering our confidence that these groups are on parallel trends. Third, we verify that a battery of non-political variables are uncorrelated with our exposure to democracy variable. Fourth, we utilize an instrumental-variables strategy, exploiting individual’s exposure to regional democratizations waves, which leads to very similar estimates. Finally, we also report similar results in the subsample of immigrants, whose exposure to democracy is in their country of birth.

Throughout, we additionally allow the error term in (2) to be correlated among individuals within the same country and within the same year of interview, and compute the standard errors allowing for these two sources of clustering (random effects).

In the next section, we start with estimates of (2). We are equally interested in the mechanisms via which exposure to democracy influences the views about democracy, which we

¹⁶We use 23 subregions as specified by the ISO 3166 classification.

investigate in Section 5 by considering the following variant of this equation:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Outcome}_{i,w,c,s,a} = & \beta^{good} \text{Exposure to Democracy}_{c,s,a}^{good} + \beta^{bad} \text{Exposure to Democracy}_{c,s,a}^{bad} \\ & + \gamma' X_{i,w,c,s,a} + \varepsilon_{i,w,c,s,a}, \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

where $\text{Exposure to Democracy}_{c,s,a}^{good}$ and $\text{Exposure to Democracy}_{c,s,a}^{bad}$ represent, respectively, exposure to successful and unsuccessful years of democracy, based on economic performance, peace and political stability and public good provision. We describe the construction of these variables in greater detail in Section 5.

4 Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy

In this section, we present estimates from equation (2). We start with our baseline OLS models. After documenting the robustness of our results to more demanding specifications, to the inclusion of additional controls and in other data sets, we provide a range of placebo exercises. We then present results from our instrumental-variables strategy and immigrant sample.

4.1 Baseline Estimates

Table 1 reports our baseline estimation for β from equation (2). In this analysis, our sample excludes immigrants, whom we study separately later. The first column of Table 1 is for our *Support for democracy index*, while the second column provides results for the *Democracy is better* measure. The remaining four columns present the results separately for the four components that make up the *Support for democracy index*—which are: *Democratic system*, *Opposes strong leader*, *Opposes army ruling* and *Government above experts* (see Section 2). Panels A and B report the results for Specifications 1 and 2, with exposure to democracy constructed from our dichotomous measure of democracy, while Panels C and D report the same specifications with an exposure to democracy measure constructed from the continuous index of democracy from V-DEM. Throughout, to ease comparison across variables and specifications, we report beta coefficients (computed in standard-deviation units for a one-standard deviation increase in the independent variable).

The pattern revealed by Table 1 is clear: exposure to democracy has a stable and mostly statistically significant effect on all our measures of support for democracy across all panels (the only exceptions are the *Opposes strong leader* variable in Panel A, and the *Opposes army ruling* variable in Panel D). For example, for the *Support for democracy index* in column 1, we have a coefficient of 0.069 (standard error=0.019) in Panel A. This coefficient becomes a

little smaller, 0.064, but also more precise (standard error = 0.017) in Panel B, when we zero in on the within-cohort variation. It is slightly larger, 0.123 (standard error = 0.024) with the continuous measure in Panel C, and again declines a little to 0.131 (standard error = 0.038) when we include the additional interactive fixed effects.

The estimated effects are not just statistically significant and stable, but quantitatively meaningful. For example, focusing on the *Support for democracy index* variable and the estimate in Panel A, a 20-year difference in exposure is predicted to increase this variable by 8% of its standard deviation. This magnitude is similar to the difference in average *Support for democracy index* between Hong Kong (or South Korea) and China (9% and 12% respectively), and more than half of the difference between the US and Argentina (13%).

Our results suggest that both the dichotomous and continuous democracy indices contain useful information. We confirm this point in Appendix Table A-2, where we include exposure to democracy constructed from the dichotomous and continuous measures at the same time, and show that they both matter (and this is regardless of whether we use our baseline dichotomous measure of democracy together with the continuous V-DEM or construct the dichotomous measure from V-DEM as well).

Figure 1 reports binned scatterplots (with 15 bins) of the conditional relationship between each of our main regressors and the measures of support for democracy from Specification 2 (the results are similar for Specification 1). The figure confirms the positive relationship documented in Table 1, and also shows that our results are not explained by outliers. Additionally, the fairly linear progression in the figure clarifies that our estimates are not driven by a comparison of individuals that were never exposed to democracy to those that lived mostly under democracy and that that partial exposure leads to more support for democracy than no exposure but less than full exposure.

Finally, although our sample has a relatively broad coverage (including 108 countries between 1994 and 2018), it is tilted towards European countries because of the inclusion of the European Values Surveys in IVS. To confirm that this sample frame is in not responsible for our results and to underscore their external validity, we estimated similar models on questions related to support for democracy from the Asianbarometer, the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and the Latinobarometer. These estimates, summarized in Table 2, are very similar to our baseline results.

4.2 Robustness of Baseline Estimates

The results reported in Table 1 are robust across a variety of different specifications, different samples and controls, and are not driven by outliers.

Table 3 documents that our results are similar when we focus on even more fine-grained

variation by including either age \times year \times subregion or age \times country fixed effects. Unsurprisingly, some of the estimates are noisier in this case, but they are quite consistent with the results reported in Table 1.¹⁷

Appendix Table A-3 shows that the results are similar if we cap the number of years in democracy to 40, so that there is “saturation” in exposure to democracy after a while. The coefficient are very similar to our baseline specification. Appendix Table A-4, in turn, breaks down the exposure to democracy variable into a number of components representing exposure at different ages and shows that it is not exposure just during “impressionable years” or youth in general, but throughout an individual’s life that matters for support for democracy. This result also implies that, in contrast to the implications of a Bayesian framework as in Buera et al. (2011), there is no evidence of the effects getting smaller as an individual accumulates more information during his or her lifetime.

Appendix Figure A-2 verifies that our results are robust to dropping each subregion one at the time, so that no single subregion is critical for our results.

4.3 Placebo Exercises for Baseline Estimates

In this subsection, we report two sets of placebo exercises, bolstering the case that our results are not driven by failure of cross-cohort parallel trends or because of some other concurrent social changes.

A salient concern with our empirical strategy is that different age groups within the same country are on differential trends in terms of their social and political views, even absent differences in exposure to democracy. We check for this possibility by investigating whether there are “pre-trends”—that is, whether pre-birth “exposure” has an effect on an individual’s support for democracy. Namely, we extend equation (2) by including a variable constructed analogously to our exposure to democracy measure, but from information on the democratic experience of a country during the 10 years before the individual in question is born (the results are very similar if we use a window of 25 years). If our estimates were capturing differential secular trends in the democratic and social views of different age groups across countries, then we would expect to find pre-birth exposure to be correlated with these trends.

Figure 2, reassuringly, shows that this is not the case. It depicts our placebo point estimates (as well as the 95% confidence interval) for each of our left-hand side variables. The left-hand side panel is for the dichotomous measure of democracy, while the right-hand side one is for the continuous index. For comparison, we also plot the point estimates from our main regressions in Table 1. The results are very clear that there are no pre-trends in any of our specifications. All

¹⁷Five out of the 18 coefficients are not distinguishable from zero at the 95% level (*Democracy is better* Panel C, *Democratic system* Panel B, *Opposes strong leader* Panel A, and *Government above experts* Panels A and B), but the estimated effects are positive in all cases.

coefficients associated to pre-birth exposure are non-significant and in all cases the magnitude is much smaller than our estimates in Table 1.¹⁸

Another concern is that what we are estimating is not the causal effect of living under a democracy on support for democracy, but the implications of general social changes, which may be correlated both with transitions to democracy and all sorts of social attitudes. To assuage these concerns, our second placebo exercise turns to a number of non-political attitudinal questions related to neighbors, family and general social attitudes. These include questions on whether individuals dislike their neighbors depending on their characteristics (such as religion, race immigration status, ethnicity, civil status, etc), as well as a group of questions on living arrangements and family relations.¹⁹ We then include these variables on the left-hand side of equation (2). The results reported in Figure 3 confirm that there is no relationship between these variables and exposure to democracy in any of our specifications (corresponding to each one of the panels in Table 1). Out of the 96 estimates, only six are marginally significant at 5% or less, which is consistent with sampling variation. We therefore conclude that the association between exposure to democracy and support for democracy is unlikely to be related to other social changes and is caused by democratic experience.

Since we have several measures of support for democracy in our main analysis and numerous measures of non-political attitudinal questions in our placebo exercise, a valid concern is whether the standard confidence intervals are appropriate for judging the significance or insignificance of the estimates. In Appendix Table A-5 (columns 1-4), we use three different approaches that account for the fact that we are testing a family of hypotheses. Specifically, we look at: (i) the proportion of variables that are statistically significant using conventional p-values; (ii) the proportion of variables that are statistically significant using the sharpened False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values, which follows [Anderson \(2008\)](#) and takes into account the expected fraction of type I errors; and (iii) randomization inference p-values, following [Young \(2019\)](#), which recognizes both type I errors and the potential correlation across outcomes. With all three approaches, exposure to democracy has a robust and statistically significant impact on support for democracy and no statistically significant influence on pre-treatment outcomes and non-political attitudinal questions.

4.4 IV Estimates

Our placebo exercises notwithstanding, the main concern remains that exposure to democracy may be correlated with deeper social changes that are the root cause of changes in democracy.

¹⁸These results also imply that there is limited intergenerational transmission of support for democracy, since pre-birth exposure for an individual is correlated with the exposure of his or her parents and extended family.

¹⁹We did not consider political questions, such as attitudes towards neighbors depending on political alignment, since these could plausibly be impacted by democracy.

As an alternative line of attack against this concern, we exploit a potentially exogenous source of variation in democracy coming from regional democratization waves, as in [Acemoglu et al. \(2019\)](#). We adapt their approach to our setting, generating sources of variation in an age group’s exposure to democracy.

More formally, following [Acemoglu et al. \(2019\)](#), we define $I_c = \{c' : c' \neq c, R_{c'} = R_c, D_{c',t_0} = D_{c,t_0}\}$ as the set of candidate countries to influence democracy of country c , which are defined as those in the same region R_c that share a similar political history D_{c,t_0} . Let $Z_{c,t} = \frac{1}{|I_c|} \sum_{c' \in I_c} D_{c',t}$ be the average level of democracy for this set of countries. Our baseline instrument is constructed as:

$$Z_{c,s,a,j} = \sum_{t=s-a+k}^s Z_{c,t-j}. \quad (4)$$

Intuitively, $Z_{c,s,a,0}$ represents the predicted exposure to democracy that an individual would have had during her life if living in a different country from the same region and with the same political history as her actual country. In our 2SLS model, we estimate (2) using the predicted values of our main regressor from the following first-stage specification:

$$\text{Exposure to Democracy}_{c,s,a} = \sum_{j=1}^p \alpha_j Z_{c,s,a,j} + \pi' X_{i,w,c,s,a} + v_{i,w,c,s,a} \quad (5)$$

This amounts to instrumenting democratic exposure of each individual with the regional democratization waves faced by age groups preceding this individual. The exclusion restriction is that, conditional on our controls, past regional democratization waves among countries with the same political history in the same region do not have a direct impact on an individual’s social attitudes and support for democracy. We provide evidence consistent with this exclusion restriction below. We note too that this is analogous to the exclusion restriction exploited in [Acemoglu et al. \(2019\)](#), for which they also provide various supporting evidence.

The first-stage relationships that underlie our 2SLS estimates are shown in Appendix Table A-6. Since the sample size varies across outcomes, we replicate the first stage for each subsample. The sizable F-statistics for the excluded instruments indicate that the regional waves of former cohorts have a high degree of predictive power for an individual’s exposure to democracy.

Table 4 presents our 2SLS estimates of equation (2) with exposure to democracy instrumented according to equation (5), and also reports the relevant first-stage F-statistics.²⁰ The 2SLS estimates corroborate our OLS results. The coefficient estimates are stable across specifications, across different measures for support for democracy and in different samples, and in all

²⁰We focus on the most parsimonious 2SLS model ’using one lag of the instrument. We also find sizable F-statistics and similar first-stage and second-stage estimates when we include more lags.

cases are comparable to the OLS estimates in Table 1. For example, the estimate in column 1, Panel A of Table 4, for the *Support for democracy index*, is 0.098 (standard error = 0.021), which is slightly larger than the column 1, Panel A estimate in Table 1, 0.069. Correspondingly, the implied quantitative magnitudes are comparable, but a little larger with the 2SLS estimates. The general pattern throughout Table 4 is similar, though the results for the *Opposes strong leader* variable are typically weaker in these IV specifications.

Although we find regional democratization waves to be an attractive source of variation for our purposes, there are several reasons why our exclusion restriction may be violated. Most importantly, different regions may be on differential trends in terms of their social attitudes. Or economic or political developments in neighboring polities may have a direct impact on a country’s democracy and the population’s support for democratic institutions. The placebo exercises for these IV estimates are reassuring in this respect: they indicate that pre-birth exposure to regional democratizations waves have no impact on support for democracy and exposure to regional democratizations waves does not influence non-political social attitudes, and thus they suggest that countries impacted by different regional waves are not on differential social trends. In particular, Appendix Figure A-3 shows no evidence of a systematic relationship between instrumented pre-birth exposure to democracy and support for democracy. For example, none of the 24 estimates using the instrumented pre-birth exposure significantly predict support for democracy, even if some of them are numerically as large as our main estimates. In addition, Appendix Figure A-4 confirms that the vast majority of the non-political social attitudes are unrelated to instrumented exposure to democracy (even if a few of them are imprecise).

To further investigate whether our IV estimates are confounded by changes in political views and attitudes that are correlated within a region or across neighbors, we also separately control for shocks that affect a country’s neighbors, neighbors’ exposure to democracy, and the evolution of neighbors’ support for democracy. Following Acemoglu et al. (2019), in these exercises we look at all of the characteristics and outcomes of neighbors of a country, with inverse-distance weights. Specifically, in Appendix Table A-7 we control for GDP shocks, natural disasters and political shocks in neighboring countries during an individual’s lifetime. In Appendix Table A-8 we control for neighbors’ (inverse distance-weighted) exposure to democracy for the same cohort as the individual in question. Since this “neighbors’ exposure to democracy” variable might itself be endogenous, we also instrument it in the same way as the own exposure to democracy, using regional democratization waves.²¹ Finally, in Table A-9 we additionally control for neighbors’ (inverse distance-weighted) support for democracy, again for the same cohort and again instrumented by regional democratization waves. In each case, the relevant variable for support for democracy is the same one as the dependent variable. In all three tables,

²¹Namely, we use past democratization waves in the region of each neighbor as an instrument for its exposure to democracy, exactly as in equation (4).

including these controls has very little impact on 2SLS estimates of the effect of own exposure to democracy, and in fact, the parameter estimates remain quite similar to those in Table 4. In addition, these controls are themselves insignificant, as shown by the F-statistics reported in Table A-7 and the displayed parameter estimates in the other two tables. We therefore conclude that our 2SLS results are robust to controlling for the direct effect of neighbors' experiences. Moreover, these results also imply that, despite the importance of regional waves of democratization, the experiences of a country's neighbors do not appear to have a major effect on its population's support for democracy.

Additionally, Appendix Table A-10 documents that the 2SLS results are similar when we focus on the more fine-grained variation we exploited in Table 3, by including either $\text{age} \times \text{year} \times \text{subregion}$ or $\text{age} \times \text{country}$ fixed effects.

Finally, columns 5-8 in Appendix Table A-5 confirm that correcting for joint-hypothesis testing has no impact on the significance of instrumented exposure to democracy in our main regressions, or on the lack of statistical significance in our placebo exercises.

4.5 Immigrants

Finally, we report results from a complementary empirical strategy focusing only on immigrants. This strategy is useful for our purposes because it exploits a different source of variation, for a different sample of individuals, generated by differences in the political institutions of their country of birth and their year of migration.

For this exercise, we use information from two waves of the IVS, in which it is possible to identify the country of birth of individuals as well as their year of migration. To isolate the source of variation coming from their home country institutions, we further restrict the sample to individuals who emigrated to a European country that has been a democracy throughout our sample.²² We also restrict the sample to respondents that were at least 12 years old when they moved to the host country to ensure sufficient exposure to the institutions of the country of birth (which we start counting from the age of six as before).

The estimating equation is identical to (2), except that we now additionally control for year of migration, country of birth and language fixed effects (a variable which is exclusively available to these two waves). We additionally allow standard errors to be clustered at the level of country of residence. Exposure to Democracy $_{cb,s,s_m,a}$ is defined analogously, but only from variations in the country of birth of an individual.²³ As in our analysis so far, we consider both

²²This list comprises Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Ireland, Austria, Iceland, Italy, Spain and Portugal.

²³Namely, Exposure to Democracy $_{cb,s,s_m,a} = \sum_{t=s-a+k}^{s_m} D_{cb,t}$, where $D_{cb,t}$ is our measure of democracy in country c_b at year t , and s_m is the year of migration. This implies that we are not including exposure to the democratic institutions of the country of residence. This is without loss of generality when using the dichotomous

the dichotomous and continuous measures of democracy and two regression specifications for each. Specification 1 is again more parsimonious, including only country of residence, country of birth, year of migration and age fixed effects. Specification 2, on the other hand, includes country of residents \times subregion of birth \times year of migration fixed effects, thus again zeroing in on the more fine-grained variation, now coming from the differential evolution of democracy in the country of birth of migrants from the same subregion of the world migrating into the same host country.

Despite the very different sample and the distinct source of variation, the estimates for our immigrant sample in Table 5 are broadly similar to, even if less precise than, those from our baseline specification in Table 1. For example, in Panel A, which focuses on the dichotomous measure of democracy and Specification 1, the coefficient estimate is 0.126 (standard error = 0.061) for the *Support for democracy index*. This estimate implies that a 20-year increase in exposure to democracy is associated with an increase in this variable equivalent to 17% of its standard deviation, which is slightly larger to the estimate in Panel A, column 1 of Table 1.²⁴ Coefficient estimates in other columns are similar, but less precise.

The estimates for the other outcome variables are also quantitatively similar to those in Table 5, even if less precise (and thus statistically significant only in about a third of the specifications).²⁵

5 Successful Democracies Breed Their Own Support

Why does exposure to democracy increase support for democracy? In this section, we explore the idea that support for democratic institutions is closely linked to democracy’s ability to

measure of democracy, since by our sample selection, the democratic institutions of the host country are at their maximal level, and thus conditional on age effects, there is no useful variation coming from exposure to these institutions.

²⁴Note that the mean and the standard deviation of our main regressor are now slightly smaller (12.3 and 11.2 respectively), since in this sample Exposure to Democracy is measured for a shorter sample and for countries of origin of the immigrants, which tend to be less democratic.

²⁵The immigrant results are robust to the same checks we performed. For example, Appendix Figure A-5 shows that no subregion (of birth) can independently explain the effect on exposure on support for democracy. In Appendix Table A-11, we see that the results are also similar when we cap exposure to democracy at 40. Appendix Tables A-12 and A-13 present results using the same IV strategy as in the previous subsection, once again with similar results.

We also carried out the same placebo exercises in the immigrant sample. Appendix Figures A-6 and A-7 document that these tests are generally supportive of our identifying assumption. For example, in Appendix Figure A-6, out of the 24 placebo regressions in the immigrant sample, only two have marginally significant coefficients (in both cases with the opposite sign to the exposure to democracy measure). The results for the non-political attitudinal questions in Appendix Figure A-7 are also similar, though with a few more outcomes than usual showing marginal statistical significance. However, Columns 9-12 in Appendix Table A-5 shows that with some of the procedures that correct for the presence of multiple outcome variables, we cannot reject that the effects on the outcomes of interest and the placebo outcomes are the same in the immigrant sample.

deliver in terms of economic prosperity, peace and stability and public good provision. As we saw in the Introduction, this idea is commonplace among democratic political leaders. Popular accounts of democratic discontent are also consistent with this idea, often pointing to the failure of democratic regimes to deliver on their promises (e.g., [Deneen, 2019](#); [Mishra, 2017](#); [Snyder, 2017](#)) and emphasizing the corrosive role of rising inequality or declining trust in democratic societies ([Fukuyama, 2018](#); [Judis, 2016](#)). There is relatively little empirical evidence on the importance of these factors, however.

We now establish that the relationship between exposure to democracy and support for democracy is almost entirely accounted for by individuals with exposure to democratic institutions that have functioned well and led to economic growth, peace and political stability, and high levels of public good provision. In contrast, exposure to democracies that are unsuccessful in these dimensions does not increase support for democracy.

As explained in equation (3) in Section 2, we study these questions by separating exposure to democracy into two components, one capturing times of democratic success and the other one times of democratic failure, according to the chosen criterion. Specifically, the two variables in equation (3) are computed as:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Exposure to Democracy}_{i,c,s,a}^{\text{good}} &= \sum_{t=s-a+k}^s D_{c,t} \times M_{i,c,t} \\ \text{Exposure to Democracy}_{i,c,s,a}^{\text{bad}} &= \sum_{t=s-a+k}^s D_{c,t} \times (1 - M_{i,c,t}), \end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

where “good” and “bad” are shorthands for successful and unsuccessful, $M_{i,c,t}$ is a dummy variable taking the value of one when according to the chosen criterion, country c is successful at time t (e.g., economic expansion vs. severe recession). In the rest of this section, we report estimates of equation (3), using these two variables with $M_{i,c,t}$ corresponding to economic expansion, peace and stability, high levels of public good provision, or individual schooling. We also control for the main effect of success by separately controlling for exposure to periods of successful performance, regardless of whether a country is democratic or nondemocratic. Analogously to (6), this variable is defined as:

$$\text{Exposure to Successful Performance}_{i,c,s,a} = \sum_{t=s-a+k}^s M_{i,c,t}. \tag{7}$$

Throughout this section, we focus on exposure measures constructed from Our dichotomous index of democracy, which is both for brevity and because the interpretation of the two variables in equation (6) is more straightforward in this case.²⁶

²⁶Results that do not control for exposure to successful performance are reported in Appendix Tables [A-14](#),

5.1 Economic Growth

We start by distinguishing periods of severe economic recessions from normal times. Specifically, we set $M_{i,c,t} = 0$ in equations (6) and (7) if country c 's GDP growth rate at time t is more than one standard deviation below the average growth rate in our sample, and $M_{i,c,t} = 1$. Thus, our first measure captures a contrast between periods of bad economic performance vs. normal times.²⁷

Table 6 presents the results. The coefficient on exposure to successful democracy is positive and statistically significant in all specifications except for the variable *Opposes strong leader* in Panel A. The coefficient on exposure to unsuccessful democracy is much smaller and indistinguishable from zero in all specifications except for the *Democracy is better* variable. The quantitative magnitude of the effects of exposure to successful democracy is sizable. Recall that with our main estimates from Table 1, 20 more years of exposure to democracy increases support for democracy by about 8% of its standard deviation. In comparison, 20 more years of exposure to successful democracy, relative to 20 years of exposure to unsuccessful democracy, increases support for democracy by about 29% of its standard deviation. This sizable effect highlights the importance of experience of successful economic performance under democracy for garnering support for democratic institutions.

Interestingly, exposure to successful performance is insignificant in general, suggesting that economic growth by itself does not make people more pro- or anti-democratic. Rather, it is experience with successful democracy that influences people's political attitudes.

This configuration, which we will see for the other parameterizations of successful and unsuccessful democracy as well, implies that essentially all of the relationship between exposure to democracy in support for democracy is accounted for by exposure to successful democracy (since exposure to unsuccessful democracy does not cultivate positive attitudes towards democracy).

In Appendix Table A-22, we also show that the effects of exposure to successful democracy are fairly uniform during different stages of an one's life. Therefore, individuals become more supportive of democracy, regardless of their age or their past experiences with democracy. This pattern is not easily reconcilable with a Bayesian learning channel (where we would expect learning to slow down after an individual has enough information), but is consistent with stories in which the population becomes more satisfied with and develops more positive attitudes

A-15 and A-16, and are very similar to those reported in the text.

The results are also similar, even if a little noisier, with the continuous measures. They are analogous for the immigrant sample as well. See Appendix Tables A-17, A-18 and A-19. To conserve space, in the text we do not discuss these results in detail.

²⁷This definition introduces a degree of cross-country comparison, since an unsuccessful growth performance is relative to the whole sample. Appendix Table A-20 confirms that the results are similar when $M_{i,e,t}$ is defined relative to each country's own average growth rate in the sample. Appendix Table A-21 shows that they are also broadly similar when we define economic failure as negative growth, growth rate less than -1% or growth rate less than -2%.

towards democratic institutions when democracy performs better.

Overall, these results suggest that successful economic performance under democracy is important for the legitimacy of a democratic regime and has long-lasting effects on citizens' support for democracy. But economic growth is unlikely to be the only thing citizens expect from a democratic regime. We next turn to other dimensions of successful performance.

5.2 Peace and Political Stability

Peace and political stability may be one of the other outcomes citizens expect from a democratic regime. For example, the Philippines is classified as a democracy for most of the last 40 years, but has been mired by an ongoing armed conflict between government forces and Maoist rebels. Even though the Filipino economy has performed well for most of this period, many citizens may have formed an unfavorable opinion of its democracy. Indeed, support for democracy in the Philippines today is one of the lowest in our sample. We now investigate whether in other cases, too, lack of peace and political stability is associated with lower support for democracy.

To investigate this question, we set $M_{i,c,t}$ in equations (6) and (7) to be equal to 1 if country c at time t does not experience a civil war. The estimation results are presented in Table 7 and show the same pattern as in Table 6: all of the coefficients for exposure to successful democracy are positive and statistically significant, while most of the coefficients for exposure to unsuccessful democracy are negative and, with two exceptions, statistically indistinguishable from zero. Therefore, when the relevant metric is peace and political stability, what builds support for democracy once again appears to be the successful functioning of democracy in the past.

5.3 Public Expenditure

Most citizens expect not just economic growth and peace and political stability but also public services and redistribution from a democratic government. Because we do not have access to a comprehensive measure of the quantity and quality of public services a government provides, we focus on whether there is a high level of expenditure and set $M_{i,c,t} = 1$ in equations (6) and (7) when country c has a level of government expenditure at time t above the sample mean, and $M_{i,c,t} = 0$ otherwise.

The results from this exercise are presented in Tables 8 and show another strong contrast between exposure to successful and unsuccessful democracy. Exposure to democracy with high expenditure is always positive and statistically significant, while exposure to democracy with low expenditure is typically small and mostly insignificant (the exceptions are for the *Opposes army ruling* and *Government above experts* questions, and in all cases, the estimates are smaller

than for the exposure to successful democracy variable). Appendix Table A-23 shows analogous results when $M_{i,c,t}$ is defined relative to a country’s own mean of government expenditure, rather than in comparison to the whole sample, and Appendix Table A-24 confirms that the results are also similar when we use the threshold of one standard deviation below the sample mean, rather than being below and above the sample mean.

5.4 Additional Placebos

Appendix Figures A-8 to A-13 report additional placebo exercises, now looking at the relationship between measures of successful and unsuccessful democracies and non-political attitudinal questions, and pre-birth measures of successful and unsuccessful democracies and support for democracy. The results of these placebo exercises are very similar to those reported in Sections 4.3 and 4.4. These exercises show no evidence of any violation of our identifying assumptions and thus further support our identification strategy.

Overall, the results in this section show that most of the statistical association between exposure to democracy and support for democracy documented in the previous section is driven by exposure to *successful* democracy. Put differently, individuals—and only those individuals—who experience a democratic regime that delivers economic growth, peace and political stability and public services (and presumably redistribution) become more positive about democracy and are much more likely to support it.

6 Conclusion

Many commentators view our age as the twilight of democracy (e.g., Deneen, 2019 and Mishra, 2017) and surveys reporting dwindling support for democratic institutions have multiplied recently. This is despite the fact that democracies have performed well both in terms of economic growth and investing in education and health of the general population (see Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo, & Robinson, 2015; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2019). In this paper, we have documented that support for democracy increases significantly when individuals have been exposed to democratic institutions and especially when these democratic institutions have delivered in terms of economic growth, peace and political stability, and public services.

We have built this case by using several different empirical strategies, approaches and datasets. Our baseline approach compares individuals in the same age group that have had different democratic experiences across different countries as well as different age groups within the same country and the same age group across different points in time. In all cases, an increase in exposure to democracy makes an individual more likely to support democracy, oppose

a strong leader, oppose army rule, become more willing to defend the democratic system, and put more trust in the government rather than non-elected experts.

We obtained very similar results using an IV strategy where an individual’s exposure to democracy is driven solely by regional democratization waves. The results are also similar in a sample of immigrants, whose exposure to democracy is a function of their birth country political institutions and time of immigration (thus enabling us to exploit a very different source of variation).

For all of our empirical strategies, we have further documented that the timing of the effects are consistent with a causal interpretation—with pre-birth exposure having no effect on support for democracy. We have additionally shown that exposure to democracy has no impact on non-political social attitudes. These placebo exercises as well as our IV estimates assuage concerns about our results being driven by general social changes that simultaneously impact a country’s democratic status and its citizens’ views about democracy.

Most importantly, our results establish that the association between exposure to democracy and support for democracy is driven almost entirely by people’s experience of *successful* democracy. In particular, it is exposure to democratic regimes that deliver economic growth, peace and political stability and public services that makes people more willing to support democracy. In contrast, greater exposure to democracies that are not hampered by deep recessions, mired in political instability, or unable to provide public services does not appear to increase support for democracy.

We see our paper as a first step in uncovering the impact of political institutions on general political attitudes, values and culture. There are at least three important directions for future research within this broad area. First, our analysis has been silent on whether support for democracy matters for the survival and efficient functioning of democracy. Such a link has been conjectured by many scholars (see, for example, [Easton, 1965](#); [Lipset, 1959](#); [William & Rose, 1999](#); [Booth et al., 2009](#) and [Norris, 2011](#)). Although the earlier literature (e.g., [Welzel, 2007](#)) did not find clear support for this hypothesis, more recent research supports it (see, e.g., [Claassen, 2020a](#)). Much more work on this linkage is necessary to obtain a more holistic understanding of what types of attitudes matter more. One could explore, for example, whether individuals who become more supportive of democracy take actions to actively protect democracy or engage in greater democratic discourse.

Second, the specific mechanisms linking exposure to democracy and support for democracy need to be explored further. Our results suggest that the main channel may be through exposure to successful policies and public good provision by democracies, and the next step may be to investigate these mechanisms using microdata on which individuals and communities benefit more from democratic institutions.

Third, another important research area is to explore whether information about the perfor-

mance of democratic institutions presented by the media and other sources matters for support for democracy, and whether the spread of misinformation by various media outlets and in social media may alter the relationship between successful democratic performance and support for democracy.

Finally, it would be interesting to exploit within-country variation, since in many cases the quality of democratic institutions and their success varies greatly across different parts of the country.

References


- Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J. A., & Yared, P. (2008). Income and democracy. *American Economic Review*, 98(3), 808–42.
- Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J. A., & Yared, P. (2009). Reevaluating the modernization hypothesis. *Journal of monetary economics*, 56(8), 1043–1058.
- Acemoglu, D., Naidu, S., Restrepo, P., & Robinson, J. A. (2015). Democracy, redistribution, and inequality. In *Handbook of income distribution* (Vol. 2, pp. 1885–1966). Elsevier.
- Acemoglu, D., Naidu, S., Restrepo, P., & Robinson, J. A. (2019). Democracy does cause growth. *Journal of Political Economy*, 127(1), 47–100.
- Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2006). *Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2008). Persistence of power, elites, and institutions. *American Economic Review*, 98(1), 267–93.
- Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2019). *The narrow corridor: States, societies, and the fate of liberty*. Penguin Books.
- Almond, G., & Verba, S. (1963). *The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five nations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Anderson, M. L. (2008). Multiple inference and gender differences in the effects of early intervention: A reevaluation of the abecedarian, perry preschool, and early training projects. *Journal of the American statistical Association*, 103(484), 1481–1495.
- Applebaum, A. (2020). *Twilight of democracy: The seductive lure of authoritarianism*. Signal.
- Bardhan, P. (2000). Irrigation and cooperation: An empirical analysis of 48 irrigation communities in south india. *Economic Development and cultural change*, 48(4), 847–865.
- Bartels, L. (2020). *Democracy Erodes From the Top: Public Opinion and the Crisis of Democracy in Europe*. Vanderbilt University. (available at https://cdn.vanderbilt.edu/vu-my/wp-content/uploads/sites/402/2020/09/30104904/Democracy_Erodes_From_the_Top.pdf)

- Bermeo, N. (2016). On democratic backsliding. *Journal of Democracy*, 27(1), 5–19.
- Besley, T., & Persson, T. (2019). Democratic values and institutions. *American Economic Review: Insights*, 1(1), 59–76.
- Bidner, C., & François, P. (2013). The emergence of political accountability. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 128(3), 1397–1448.
- Boix, C., Miller, M., & Rosato, S. (2013). A complete data set of political regimes, 1800–2007. *Comparative Political Studies*, 46(12), 1523–1554.
- Boix, C., Miller, M., & Rosato, S. (2018). Boix-miller-rosato dichotomous coding of democracy, 1800–2015. *Harvard Dataverse*, 3.
- Booth, J. A., Seligson, M. A., et al. (2009). *The legitimacy puzzle in latin america: Political support and democracy in eight nations*. Cambridge University Press.
- Brender, A., & Drazen, A. (2009). Consolidation of new democracy, mass attitudes, and clientelism. *American Economic Review*, 99(2), 304–09.
- Brum, M. (2018). Do dictatorships affect people’s long term beliefs and preferences? an empirical assessment of the latin american case. *Serie Documentos de Trabajo*; 18/18.
- Buera, F. J., Monge-Naranjo, A., & Primiceri, G. E. (2011). Learning the wealth of nations. *Econometrica*, 79(1), 1–45.
- Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J., & Vreeland, J. R. (2010). Democracy and dictatorship revisited. *Public choice*, 143(1-2), 67–101.
- Claassen, C. (2020a). Does public support help democracy survive? *American Journal of Political Science*, 64(1), 118–134.
- Claassen, C. (2020b). In the mood for democracy? democratic support as thermostatic opinion. *American Political Science Review*, 114(1), 36–53.
- Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Lindberg, S., Teorell, J., Altman, D., ... Ziblatt, D. (2020). V-dem codebook v10. *Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project*.
- Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Lindberg, S. I., Skaaning, S.-E., & Teorell, J. (2017). V-dem comparisons and contrasts with other measurement projects. *V-Dem working paper*, 45.
- Dahlum, S., Knutsen, C. H., & Wig, T. (2019). Who revolts? empirically revisiting the social origins of democracy. *The Journal of Politics*, 81(4), 1494–1499.
- Deneen, P. J. (2019). *Why liberalism failed*. Yale University Press.
- Easton, D. (1965). *A systems analysis of political life*. New York: Wiley.
- Edwards, S. (2019). On latin american populism, and its echoes around the world. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 33(4), 76–99.
- Fearon, J. D. (2011). Self-enforcing democracy. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 126(4), 1661–1708.
- Fuchs-Schündeln, N., & Schündeln, M. (2015). On the endogeneity of political preferences: Evidence from individual experience with democracy. *Science*, 347(6226), 1145–1148.

- Fukuyama, F. (2018). *Identity: The demand for dignity and the politics of resentment*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Funke, M., Schularick, M., & Trebesch, C. (2016). Going to extremes: Politics after financial crises, 1870–2014. *European Economic Review*, 88, 227–260.
- Funke, M., Schularick, M., & Trebesch, C. (2020). *Populist leaders and the economy* (Tech. Rep.). CEPR Discussion Paper 15405. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
- Gandhi, J. (2008). Political institutions under dictatorship.
- Geddes, B. (2005). Why parties and elections in authoritarian regimes? In *annual meeting of the american political science association* (pp. 456–471).
- Giavazzi, F., & Tabellini, G. (2005). Economic and political liberalizations. *Journal of monetary economics*, 52(7), 1297–1330.
- Grosjean, P., & Senik, C. (2011). Democracy, market liberalization, and political preferences. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 93(1), 365–381.
- Guriev, S., & Papaioannou, E. (2020). The political economy of populism. *Available at SSRN 3542052*.
- Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005). *Modernization, cultural change, and democracy: The human development sequence*. Cambridge university press.
- Iversen, T., & Soskice, D. (2019). *Democracy and prosperity: Reinventing capitalism through a turbulent century*. Princeton University Press.
- Judis, J. B. (2016). *The populist explosion: How the great recession transformed american and european politics*. Columbia Global Reports, New York.
- Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). *How democracies die*. Broadway Books.
- Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy. *The American political science review*, 53(1), 69–105.
- Lührmann, A., Marquardt, K. L., & Mechkova, V. (2020). Constraining governments: New indices of vertical, horizontal, and diagonal accountability. *American Political Science Review*, 114(3), 811–820.
- Maeda, K. (2010). Two modes of democratic breakdown: A competing risks analysis of democratic durability. *The Journal of Politics*, 72(4), 1129–1143.
- Marantz, A. (2020). *Antisocial: Online extremists, techno-utopians, and the hijacking of the american conversation*. Penguin books.
- Mishra, P. (2017). *Age of anger: A history of the present*. Macmillan.
- Müller, J.-W. (2017). *What is populism?* Penguin UK.
- Norris, P. (2011). *Democratic deficit: Critical citizens revisited*. Cambridge University Press.
- Ober, J. (2015). *The rise and fall of classical greece*. Princeton University Press.
- Papaioannou, E., & Siourounis, G. (2008). Democratisation and growth. *The Economic Journal*, 118(532), 1520–1551.


- Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2006). Democracy and development: The devil in the details. *American Economic Review*, 96(2), 319–324.
- Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2009). Democratic capital: The nexus of political and economic change. *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 1(2), 88–126.
- Przeworski, A., Alvarez, R. M., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., Limongi, F., & Neto, F. P. L. (2000). *Democracy and development: Political institutions and well-being in the world, 1950-1990* (Vol. 3). Cambridge University Press.
- Putnam, R. (1993). The prosperous community: Social capital and public life. *The american prospect*, 13(Spring), Vol. 4. Available online: <http://www.prospect.org/print/vol/13> (accessed 7 April 2003).
- Rustagi, D. (2018). Waiting for napoleon: Norms of cooperation and historical democracy.
- Schedler, A. (2006). Electoral authoritarianism: The dynamics of unfree competition.
- Silva, P. (2009). *In the name of reason: Technocrats and politics in chile*. Penn State Press.
- Singh, S. P. (2019). Compulsory voting and parties’ vote-seeking strategies. *American Journal of Political Science*, 63(1), 37–52.
- Snyder, T. (2017). *On tyranny: Twenty lessons from the twentieth century*. Tim Duggan Books.
- Stanley, J. (2018). *The garrison state*. Routledge.
- Sunstein, C. R. (2018). *# republic: Divided democracy in the age of social media*. Princeton University Press.
- Svolik, M. W. (2013). Learning to love democracy: Electoral accountability and the success of democracy. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(3), 685–702.
- Svolik, M. W. (2015). Which democracies will last? coups, incumbent takeovers, and the dynamic of democratic consolidation. *British Journal of Political Science*, 715–738.
- Welzel, C. (2007). Are levels of democracy influenced by mass attitudes? testing a central premise of the political culture approach. *International Political Science Review*, 28(4), 397–424.
- William, M., & Rose, R. (1999). *Five years after the fall: Trajectories of support for democracy in post-communist Europe*. Critical Citizens: Global Support for Governance, Nueva York, ed. Pippa Norris. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 78–102.
- Young, A. (2019). Channeling fisher: Randomization tests and the statistical insignificance of seemingly significant experimental results. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 134(2), 557–598.

Figure 1: Binned Scatterplots of the Relationship between Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy




Note: This figure presents binned scatterplots of the relationship between our various measures for support for democracy and exposure to democracy. Each panel uses one of our five measures of democracy or the index of support for democracy combining four of these measures. Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1) in the text. The left-hand side panels use our binary measure of democracy, while the right-hand side panels use the continuous measure. Each panel's plots the residualised values of the relevant outcome using the set of covariates as in regression equation (2). See text for details on the construction of Exposure to Democracy and sources.

Figure 2: Pre-birth Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy



Note: This figure plots OLS coefficient estimates of pre-birth Exposure to Democracy in equation (2) for each one of our measures of support for democracy. Pre-birth Exposure to Democracy is constructed using a country's democracy score before the relevant cohort's birth, using a variant of equation (1) (see text for details). The left-hand side panel uses the binary democracy score, while the right-hand side panel uses the continuous measure. For each outcome, in each panel, we show estimates from both Specifications 1 (blue triangles) and 2 (red circles) as well as the estimate from our baseline regression for comparison (black crosses). The whiskers indicate the two standard error confidence intervals. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). See text for details.

Figure 3: Exposure to Democracy and Non-political Attitudinal Variables



Note: This figure plots OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Democracy in equation (2) for various non-political attitudinal questions. Exposure to Democracies is defined in equation (1). The left-hand side panel uses the binary democracy score, while the right-hand side panel uses the continuous measure. For each outcome, in each panel, we show estimates from both Specifications 1 (blue triangles) and 2 (red circles). The whiskers indicate the two standard error confidence intervals. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). See text for details.

Table 1: Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army ruling	Government above experts
<i>Panel A. Binary, Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.069 (0.019)	0.097 (0.018)	0.048 (0.017)	0.031 (0.019)	0.037 (0.015)	0.080 (0.016)
Observations	343,115	188,479	390,349	386,476	385,830	377,214
Countries	107	81	107	107	107	107
<i>Panel B. Binary, Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.064 (0.017)	0.070 (0.012)	0.043 (0.013)	0.031 (0.016)	0.038 (0.014)	0.062 (0.016)
Observations	343,090	188,449	390,329	386,454	385,807	377,193
Countries	107	81	107	107	107	107
<i>Panel C. Continuous, Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.123 (0.024)	0.130 (0.022)	0.080 (0.024)	0.055 (0.025)	0.075 (0.018)	0.126 (0.021)
Observations	344,722	187,858	391,990	388,091	387,490	378,934
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104
<i>Panel D. Continuous, Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.131 (0.038)	0.108 (0.025)	0.093 (0.023)	0.067 (0.029)	0.066 (0.035)	0.105 (0.028)
Observations	344,683	187,814	391,957	388,054	387,452	378,900
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Democracy in equation (2) using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys. Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panels A and B use the binary democracy score, while Panels C and D use the continuous democracy score. Panels A and C use Specification 1, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave/survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while Panels B and D report results from Specification 2, which additionally includes fixed effects for each country and year of interview and fixed effects for each age and subregion on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table 2: Effect of Exposure to Democracy on Support for Democracy across Different Surveys
Asianbarometer, Lapop and Latinobarometer

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Asianbarometer			Lapop		Latinobarometer		
	Opposes one man rule	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army ruling	Government above experts	Democracy is better	Opposes strong leader	Democracy is better	Democracy preferable
<i>Panel A. Binary, Specification 1.</i>								
Exposure to Democracy	0.170 (0.035)	0.211 (0.023)	0.238 (0.033)	0.200 (0.015)	0.085 (0.019)	0.028 (0.010)	0.043 (0.013)	0.033 (0.013)
Observations	53,810	49,079	51,939	51,758	272,276	153,143	268,852	357,150
Countries	14	14	14	14	33	26	19	19
<i>Panel B. Binary, Specification 2.</i>								
Exposure to Democracy	0.194 (0.023)	0.236 (0.021)	0.250 (0.000)	0.214 (0.022)	0.057 (0.016)	0.028 (0.012)	0.046 (0.013)	0.028 (0.012)
Observations	53,807	49,076	51,937	51,756	272,276	153,142	268,852	357,150
Countries	14	14	14	14	33	26	19	19
<i>Panel C. Continuous, Specification 1.</i>								
Exposure to Democracy	0.176 (0.047)	0.233 (0.020)	0.255 (0.039)	0.226 (0.027)	0.120 (0.028)	0.028 (0.015)	0.060 (0.017)	0.038 (0.014)
Observations	56,596	51,824	54,746	54,508	271,404	154,919	268,389	356,313
Countries	14	14	14	14	26	25	19	19
<i>Panel D. Continuous, Specification 2.</i>								
Exposure to Democracy	0.196 (0.017)	0.265 (0.018)	0.276 (0.017)	0.242 (0.029)	0.082 (0.025)	0.029 (0.010)	0.061 (0.017)	0.037 (0.013)
Observations	56,594	51,822	54,744	54,506	271,404	154,918	268,389	356,313
Countries	14	14	14	14	26	25	19	19

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Democracy in equation (2) using samples constructed from Asianbarometer, Lapop and Latinobarometer. Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1). Each column corresponds to one of measures of support for democracy available in the indicated data set. Panels A and B use the binary democracy score, while Panels C and D use the continuous democracy score. Panels A and C use Specification 1, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave/survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while Panels B and D report results from Specification 2, which additionally includes fixed effects for each country and year of interview and fixed effects for each age and subregion on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table 3: Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy — Within-Age-Cohort and Within-Country Variation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army ruling	Government above experts
<i>Panel A. Binary, controlling for region×age×year.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.067 (0.022)	0.060 (0.019)	0.038 (0.015)	0.037 (0.020)	0.048 (0.016)	0.051 (0.023)
Observations	342,805	188,312	390,060	386,180	385,542	376,911
Countries	107	81	107	107	107	107
<i>Panel B. Binary, controlling for country×age.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.096 (0.034)	0.121 (0.050)	0.055 (0.036)	0.065 (0.030)	0.124 (0.038)	0.042 (0.039)
Observations	342,947	188,338	390,200	386,319	385,676	377,060
Countries	107	81	107	107	107	107
<i>Panel C. Continuous, controlling for region×age×year.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.171 (0.039)	0.098 (0.050)	0.106 (0.032)	0.097 (0.033)	0.101 (0.036)	0.118 (0.037)
Observations	344,315	187,649	391,603	387,694	387,104	378,538
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104
<i>Panel D. Continuous, controlling for country×age</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.295 (0.058)	0.145 (0.064)	0.106 (0.046)	0.197 (0.048)	0.333 (0.064)	0.142 (0.043)
Observations	344,479	187,677	391,763	387,856	387,256	378,704
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Democracy in equation (2) using our baseline sample from Integrated Values Survey. Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panels A and B use the binary democracy score, while Panels C and D use the continuous democracy score. Panels A and C include region × age × year fixed effects and country × year fixed effects on the right-hand side, while Panels B and D include country × age and country × year. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table 4: Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy — 2SLS Estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army ruling	Government above experts
<i>Panel A. Binary, Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.098 (0.021)	0.137 (0.022)	0.089 (0.023)	0.040 (0.020)	0.049 (0.017)	0.094 (0.021)
Observations	341,921	188,187	389,029	385,201	384,543	375,944
Countries	106	81	106	106	106	106
F-stat excluded instruments	108.91	94.10	98.26	109.30	102.98	111.73
<i>Panel B. Binary, Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.080 (0.025)	0.100 (0.010)	0.079 (0.021)	0.040 (0.022)	0.031 (0.027)	0.065 (0.040)
Observations	341,896	188,157	389,009	385,179	384,520	375,923
Countries	106	81	106	106	106	106
F-stat excluded instruments	211.18	146.61	217.00	203.66	207.05	204.14
<i>Panel C. Continuous, Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.087 (0.029)	0.147 (0.026)	0.084 (0.026)	0.000 (0.025)	0.035 (0.026)	0.121 (0.026)
Observations	342,752	185,373	389,351	385,732	385,021	376,649
Countries	103	78	103	103	103	103
F-stat excluded instruments	94.04	58.35	77.71	93.41	85.81	94.37
<i>Panel D. Continuous, Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.103 (0.045)	0.165 (0.018)	0.095 (0.027)	0.009 (0.036)	0.050 (0.045)	0.122 (0.050)
Observations	342,713	185,329	389,318	385,695	384,983	376,615
Countries	103	78	103	103	103	103
F-stat excluded instruments	29.57	23.34	28.35	28.14	29.25	30.13

Note: This table reports 2SLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Democracy in equation (2). Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panels A and B use the binary democracy score, while Panels C and D use the continuous democracy score. Panels A and C use Specification 1, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave/survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while Panels B and D report results from Specification 2, which additionally includes fixed effects for each country and year of interview and fixed effects for each age and subregion on the right-hand side. The instrument for Exposure to Democracy is constructed as in equation (4), using regional waves of democratization as [Acemoglu et al. \(2019\)](#). The first-stage F-statistic is reported below the coefficient estimates. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table 5: Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy for Immigrants

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army ruling	Government above experts
<i>Panel A. Binary, Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.126 (0.061)	0.045 (0.045)	0.058 (0.061)	0.046 (0.052)	0.015 (0.037)	0.153 (0.043)
Observations	2,908	1,441	3,293	3,176	3,306	3,112
Countries	18	17	18	18	18	18
<i>Panel B. Binary, Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.176 (0.052)	0.022 (0.053)	0.176 (0.050)	0.100 (0.072)	0.038 (0.061)	0.176 (0.052)
Observations	1,726	779	1,989	1,905	2,013	1,872
Countries	17	16	18	17	18	18
<i>Panel C. Continuous, Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.180 (0.073)	0.111 (0.090)	0.068 (0.067)	0.144 (0.069)	0.053 (0.058)	0.142 (0.057)
Observations	2,908	1,450	3,295	3,178	3,307	3,106
Countries	18	17	18	18	18	18
<i>Panel D. Continuous, Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.342 (0.061)	0.076 (0.097)	0.146 (0.100)	0.382 (0.074)	0.153 (0.075)	0.235 (0.115)
Observations	1,706	782	1,969	1,883	1,992	1,850
Countries	17	16	18	17	18	18

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Democracy in equation (2) using a sample of immigrants in the Integrated Values Survey. Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1), but exploiting only an individual's exposure to democracy in his or her country of birth. Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panels A and B use the binary democracy score, while Panels C and D use the continuous democracy score. Panels A and C use Specification 1, which includes a full set of country and year of arrival, country of birth, year of interview, age of arrival, cohort, wave/survey, and language fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while Panels B and D report results from Specification 2, which includes which includes a full set of country \times year of arrival \times region of birth, country of birth, year of interview, age of arrival, cohort, wave/survey, and language fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with one-way clustering at the country level and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table 6: Exposure to Successful Democracy and Support for Democracy — Economic Growth

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army ruling	Government above experts
<i>Panel A. Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.062 (0.020)	0.099 (0.019)	0.056 (0.020)	0.029 (0.018)	0.027 (0.015)	0.071 (0.019)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.008 (0.018)	0.011 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.017 (0.017)	0.009 (0.017)	0.000 (0.016)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.075 (0.092)	-0.122 (0.139)	-0.044 (0.079)	-0.026 (0.082)	0.144 (0.103)	0.009 (0.104)
Observations	320,290	185,613	364,126	360,446	360,388	352,021
Countries	106	80	106	106	106	106
<i>Panel B. Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.065 (0.017)	0.070 (0.017)	0.046 (0.012)	0.032 (0.016)	0.040 (0.014)	0.063 (0.016)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.005 (0.011)	0.014 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.010)	0.003 (0.014)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.032 (0.067)	-0.065 (0.093)	-0.047 (0.062)	0.032 (0.058)	0.049 (0.069)	-0.009 (0.051)
Observations	320,276	185,592	364,115	360,433	360,375	352,008
Countries	106	80	106	106	106	106

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful Democracy and Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys. The exposure measures are defined as in equation (6), with the measure of success being GDP growth rate equal or more than one standard deviation below the average growth rate (and the measure of unsuccess being GDP growth rate less than one standard deviation below the average). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. All panels use the binary democracy score. Panels A uses Specification 1, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave/survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while Panel B reports results from Specification 2, which additionally includes fixed effects for each country and year of interview and fixed effects for each age and subregion on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table 7: Exposure to Successful Democracy and Support for Democracy —Peace and Political Stability

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army ruling	Government above experts
<i>Panel A. Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.087 (0.021)	0.088 (0.022)	0.048 (0.017)	0.044 (0.023)	0.037 (0.015)	0.106 (0.019)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.063 (0.056)	-0.087 (0.029)	-0.048 (0.018)	0.033 (0.041)	-0.030 (0.050)	-0.060 (0.053)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.044 (0.112)	-0.496 (0.240)	-0.188 (0.118)	0.110 (0.130)	0.055 (0.117)	-0.054 (0.078)
Observations	305,709	160,147	346,394	342,759	341,494	335,132
Countries	101	79	101	101	101	101
<i>Panel B. Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.069 (0.016)	0.061 (0.014)	0.044 (0.011)	0.034 (0.015)	0.046 (0.014)	0.062 (0.017)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.000 (0.013)	-0.049 (0.026)	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.010)	0.006 (0.017)	0.008 (0.007)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.072 (0.048)	-0.214 (0.090)	0.000 (0.047)	0.031 (0.047)	0.042 (0.057)	0.102 (0.044)
Observations	305,706	160,143	346,391	342,756	341,491	335,129
Countries	101	79	101	101	101	101

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful Democracy and Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys. The exposure measures are defined as in equation (6), with the measure of success defined as no experience of civil war (and the measure of unsuccess defined as experience of civil war). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. All panels use the binary democracy score. Panel A uses Specification 1, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave/survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while Panel B reports results from Specification 2, which additionally includes fixed effects for each country and year of interview and fixed effects for each age and subregion on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table 8: Exposure to Successful Democracy and Support for Democracy —Public Expenditure

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army ruling	Government above experts
<i>Panel A. Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.183 (0.043)	0.125 (0.029)	0.112 (0.032)	0.045 (0.033)	0.111 (0.048)	0.172 (0.027)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.031 (0.020)	0.012 (0.017)	0.021 (0.020)	0.009 (0.020)	0.025 (0.010)	0.042 (0.014)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.002 (0.044)	0.012 (0.025)	0.007 (0.032)	0.043 (0.037)	0.029 (0.050)	-0.020 (0.025)
Observations	123,432	81,001	138,037	136,113	138,338	133,155
Countries	64	52	64	64	64	64
<i>Panel B. Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.168 (0.050)	0.117 (0.033)	0.094 (0.032)	0.083 (0.041)	0.117 (0.027)	0.173 (0.030)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.045 (0.019)	-0.008 (0.024)	0.016 (0.008)	0.044 (0.013)	0.029 (0.016)	0.044 (0.016)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.042 (0.034)	-0.032 (0.047)	0.007 (0.027)	0.094 (0.035)	0.003 (0.029)	0.014 (0.030)
Observations	123,430	80,999	138,035	136,111	138,336	133,154
Countries	64	52	64	64	64	64

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful Democracy and Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys. The exposure measures are defined as in equation (6), with the measure of success defined as government expenditure equal or above the mean (and the measure of unsuccess defined as government expenditure below the mean). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. All panels use the binary democracy score. Panel A uses Specification 1, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave/survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while Panel B reports results from Specification 2, which additionally includes fixed effects for each country and year of interview and fixed effects for each age and subregion on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

A Appendix Additional Results

A.1 Construction of the Dichotomous Democracy Measure

We construct an (unbalanced) panel that comprises 185 polities with information from 1800 to 2018. While we use information from several sources, the bulk of the variation comes from Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2018) (henceforth BMR), which has the largest coverage in our sample, accounting for information in 94% of all polities from 1800 to 2015.²⁸ The long period covered by this source is particularly important for this paper, for it allows us to construct comparable measures of democratic values from 1800 to 2018. BMR classify a country at a given time as a democracy if it meets two criteria: high political contestation (the decisions to govern the state are taken through voting procedures that are free and fair), and high participation (a minimal level of suffrage).²⁹

In cases where data from BMR are not available, we rely on various sources including Cheibub et al. (2010); Acemoglu et al. (2019), Freedom House and Polity IV. Compared to BMR, these sources cover either a shorter time horizon, a smaller number of polities, or both.

Our dichotomous measure of democracy $D_{ct} \in \{0, 1\}$ for country c at time t is coded as follows:

1. In countries/periods where BMR is defined (so that a country is classified either as a democracy or as a nondemocracy), our variable is equal to theirs. In total, 73% of our countries/years are classified in this step, thus generating the bulk of the variation in our democracy measure.
2. Since BMR is only available until 2015, our binary measure of democracy for the period 2016-2019 is constructed in two steps. First, we identify transitions (either from democracy to nondemocracy or from nondemocracy to democracies) during 2016-2019. To do so, we use both the Freedom House score, ranging from 1 to 7, and the Polity IV score, ranging from -10 to 10 (higher values of these indices indicate greater extent of democracy).³⁰ In particular, we use two cutoffs k_{fh} and k_{pol} for Freedom House and Polity IV, respectively, for this classification. We code a country as experiencing a transition from nondemocracy (democracy) to democracy (nondemocracy) at year t if it was a nondemocracy (democracy) at time $t-1$ and both the Freedom House score and the Polity IV scores between years $t-1$ and t increased (decreased) by an amount larger than their respective cutoffs. We choose k_{fh} and k_{pol} , such that they are equal to the average change in the

²⁸This database extends Boix et al. (2013), which was available for 175 polities until 2008.

²⁹BMR thus extend the classic measure of Przeworski et al. (2000), which is based only on the first dimension.

³⁰We recode the Freedom House scores to ensure that higher values mean greater extent of democracy.

respective score during periods of transition (according to BMR) between 1972-2015.³¹ We find that the (absolute) change in any of these scores during periods of transition (as defined by BMR) is at least nine times larger compared to periods of no-transition. Second, we code a country in 2016 as a democracy (nondemocracy) either (i) when the country is classified as a democracy (nondemocracy) in 2015 and no transition took place in 2016, or (ii) when the country is classified as a nondemocracy (democracy) in 2015 and a transition occurred in 2016. We repeat this procedure for subsequent years until 2019. Using these criteria, we find that only three transitions took place between 2016 to 2019: Gambia (from nondemocracy to democracy in 2017), Turkey (from democracy to nondemocracy in 2016), and Nicaragua (from democracy to nondemocracy in 2016). In total, 4% of our country-years are classified in this step.

3. In 9% of the sample BMR is not available but at least one of the complementary sources is. This could be either because BMR does not report information for country c , or because country c is only partially covered in a period of time. In the former case, we simply use information from whichever available source has the largest coverage for this country.³² In the latter case, we use the complementary source (the one with the largest coverage) to differentiate transitions from non-transitions and use this to extend the series to cover the gaps in BMR (similar to the procedure in step 2).
4. The remaining 14% consist of cases where neither BMR nor other source are available. Common cases of this type include non-sovereign territories available in the surveys but not in the sources.³³ We deal with these cases by assigning them the same democratic score as the main territory (i.e., Denmark in the case of Faroe Islands or Greenland). Other common issues include recent dissolutions (e.g., post-Soviet countries, ex-Yugoslavian states, Korea). In cases of dissolutions, such as post-Soviet countries, we impute the value of democracy corresponding to the original country (URSS) during the years in which these countries were part of the union (e.g., Ukraine, Moldova, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Estonia, and Croatia).

Overall, our dichotomous measure is available for 203 countries and covers the period from 1800 to 2019. Out of the 23,269 country/year observations, we code 7,327 periods of democracy and 15,942 periods of nondemocracy. Out of the 203 countries, 34 are always democratic, 52 are

³¹We choose 1972-2015, because this is the largest time window in which BMR, Freedom House and Polity IV are all available.

³²For non-binary indices such as Freedom House and Polity IV, we apply the usual practice in the literature of classifying a country as a democracy when the Freedom House score is greater than three (countries classified as “Free” or “Partly Free”) or when the Polity IV score is positive (see Persson & Tabellini, 2006; Giavazzi & Tabellini, 2005; Papaioannou & Siourounis, 2008; Acemoglu et al., 2019).


³³Examples of these cases include Faroe Islands, Greenland, Isle of Man and Gibraltar.

always nondemocratic, and the rest transition in and out of democracy. We thus have a total of 182 democratizations and 105 reversals, which provide significant within-country variation in our democracy measure.

The correlation between our dichotomous measure and (countries and years of coverage in parenthesis): the continuous measure from V-DEM is 0.79 (176 countries from 1900 to 2019), [Cheibub et al. \(2010\)](#) is 0.92 (184 countries from 1946 to 2008), [Acemoglu et al. \(2019\)](#) is 0.90 (184 countries from 1960 to 2010), Freedom House is 0.75 (199 countries from 1972 to 2019), and Polity IV is 0.77 (167 countries from 1800 to 2018).


A.2 Additional Tables and Figures

Figure A-1: Evolution of Binary and Continuous Measures of Democracy for Selected Countries




Note: This figure plots the evolution over time of the binary and continuous measures of democracy as well as each of the components that make up the later (the electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative and egalitarian components).

Figure A-2: Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy — Robustness to Excluding each Subregion




Note: This figure reports OLS coefficient estimates of the effect of Exposure to Democracy on support for democracy when each subregion is excluded. Each column uses one of our five measures of democracy or the index of support for democracy combining four of these measures. Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1) in the text. Rows 1 and 2 use the binary democracy score, while rows 3 and 4 use the continuous democracy score. Rows 1 and 3 report estimates from Specification 1, which rows 2 and 4 report estimates from Specification 2. The whiskers indicate the two standard error confidence intervals. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). See text for details.

Figure A-3: Pre-birth Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy — 2SLS Estimates




Note: This figure plots 2SLS coefficient estimates of pre-birth Exposure to Democracy in equation (2) for each one of our measures of support for democracy. Pre-birth Exposure to Democracy is constructed using a country's democracy score before the relevant cohort's birth, using a variant of equation (1) (see text for details). The instrument for Exposure to Democracy is constructed as in equation (4), using regional waves of democratization as Acemoglu et al. (2019). The left-hand side panel uses the binary democracy score, while the right-hand side panel uses the continuous measure. For each outcome, in each panel, we show estimates from both Specifications 1 (blue triangles) and 2 (red circles) as well as the estimate from our baseline regression for comparison (black crosses). The whiskers indicate the two standard error confidence intervals. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). See text for details.

Figure A-4: Exposure to Democracy and Non-political Attitudinal Variables — 2SLS Estimates




Note: This figure plots 2SLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Democracy in equation (2) for various non-political attitudinal questions. Exposure to Democracies is defined in equation (1). The instrument for Exposure to Democracy is constructed as in equation (4), using regional waves of democratization as [Acemoglu et al. \(2019\)](#). The left-hand side panel uses the binary democracy score, while the right-hand side panel uses the continuous measure. For each outcome, in each panel, we show estimates from both Specifications 1 (blue triangles) and 2 (red circles). The whiskers indicate the two standard error confidence intervals. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). See text for details.

Figure A-5: Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy – Robustness to Excluding each Subregion for Immigrants




Note: This figure reports OLS coefficient estimates of the effect of Exposure to Democracy on support for democracy when each subregion is excluded using a sample of immigrants. Each column uses one of our five measures of democracy or the index of support for democracy combining four of these measures. Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1) but exploiting only an individual's exposure to democracy in his or her country of birth. Rows 1 and 2 use the binary democracy score, while rows 3 and 4 use the continuous democracy score. Rows 1 and 3 report estimates from Specification 1, which rows 2 and 4 report estimates from Specification 2. The whiskers indicate the two standard error confidence intervals. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). See text for details.

Figure A-6: Pre-birth Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy for Immigrants




Note: This figure plots OLS coefficient estimates of pre-birth Exposure to Democracy in equation (2) for each one of our measures of support for democracy using a sample of immigrants. Pre-birth Exposure to Democracy is constructed using a country's democracy score before the relevant cohort's birth, using a variant of equation (1) but exploiting only an individual's exposure to democracy in his or her country of birth. The left-hand side panel uses the binary democracy score, while the right-hand side panel uses the continuous measure. For each outcome, in each panel, we show estimates from both Specifications 1 (blue triangles) and 2 (red circles) as well as the estimate from our baseline regression for comparison (black crosses). The whiskers indicate the two standard error confidence intervals. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). See text for details.

Figure A-7: Exposure to Democracy and Non-political Attitudinal Variables for Immigrants




Note: This figure plots OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Democracy in equation (2) for various non-political attitudinal questions using a sample of immigrants. Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1) but exploiting only an individual's exposure to democracy in his or her country of birth. The left-hand side panel uses the binary democracy score, while the right-hand side panel uses the continuous measure. For each outcome, in each panel, we show estimates from both Specifications 1 (blue triangles) and 2 (red circles). The whiskers indicate the two standard error confidence intervals. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). See text for details.

Figure A-8: Pre-birth Exposure to Successful Democracy and Support for Democracy — Economic Growth




Note: This figure plots OLS coefficient estimates of pre-birth Exposure to Successful Democracy and pre-birth Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) for each one of our measures of support for democracy. Pre-birth Exposure is constructed using a country's democracy score before the relevant cohort's birth, using a variant of equation (6) (see text for details). The measure of success is a GDP growth rate equal or more than one standard deviation below its average. The left-hand side panel reports the results for Successful Democracy, while the right-hand side reports the results for Unsuccessful Democracy. For each outcome, in each panel, we show estimates from both Specifications 1 (blue triangles) and 2 (red circles) as well as the estimate from our baseline regression for comparison (black crosses). The whiskers indicate the two standard error confidence intervals. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). See text for details.

Figure A-9: Exposure to Successful Democracy and Non-political Attitudinal Variables — Economic Growth




Note: This figure plots OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful Democracy and Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) for each one of our measures of support for democracy. Exposure to Successful Democracy and Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy are constructed in equation (6). The measure of success is a GDP growth rate equal or more than one standard deviation below its average. The left-hand side panel reports the results for Successful Democracy, while the right-hand side reports the results for Unsuccessful Democracy. For each outcome, in each panel, we show estimates from both Specifications 1 (blue triangles) and 2 (red circles). The whiskers indicate the two standard error confidence intervals. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). See text for details.

Figure A-10: Pre-birth Exposure to Successful Democracy and Support for Democracy —
Peace and Political Stability




Note: This figure plots OLS coefficient estimates of pre-birth Exposure to Successful Democracy and pre-birth Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) for each one of our measures of support for democracy. Pre-birth Exposure is constructed using a country's democracy score before the relevant cohort's birth, using a variant of equation (6) (see text for details). The measure of success is defined as no experience of civil war. The left-hand side panel reports the results for Successful Democracy, while the right-hand side reports the results for Unsuccessful Democracy. For each outcome, in each panel, we show estimates from both Specifications 1 (blue triangles) and 2 (red circles) as well as the estimate from our baseline regression for comparison (black crosses). The whiskers indicate the two standard error confidence intervals. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). See text for details.

Figure A-11: Exposure to Successful Democracy and Non-political Attitudinal Variables —
Peace and Political Stability




Note: This figure plots OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful Democracy and Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) for each one of our measures of support for democracy. Exposure to Successful Democracy and Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy are constructed in equation (6). The measure of success is defined as no experience of civil war. The left-hand side panel reports the results for Successful Democracy, while the right-hand side reports the results for Unsuccessful Democracy. For each outcome, in each panel, we show estimates from both Specifications 1 (blue triangles) and 2 (red circles). The whiskers indicate the two standard error confidence intervals. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). See text for details.

Figure A-12: Pre-birth Exposure to Successful Democracy and Support for Democracy —
Public Expenditure



Note: This figure plots OLS coefficient estimates of pre-birth Exposure to Successful Democracy and pre-birth Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) for each one of our measures of support for democracy. Pre-birth Exposure is constructed using a country's democracy score before the relevant cohort's birth, using a variant of equation (6) (see text for details). The measure of success is defined as government expenditure equal or above its mean. The left-hand side panel reports the results for Successful Democracy, while the right-hand side reports the results for Unsuccessful Democracy. For each outcome, in each panel, we show estimates from both Specifications 1 (blue triangles) and 2 (red circles) as well as the estimate from our baseline regression for comparison (black crosses). The whiskers indicate the two standard error confidence intervals. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). See text for details.

Figure A-13: Exposure to Successful Democracy and Non-political Attitudinal Variables — Public Expenditure



Note: This figure plots OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful Democracy and Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) for each one of our measures of support for democracy. Exposure to Successful Democracy and Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy are constructed in equation (6). The measure of success is defined as government expenditure equal or above its mean. The left-hand side panel reports the results for Successful Democracy, while the right-hand side reports the results for Unsuccessful Democracy. For each outcome, in each panel, we show estimates from both Specifications 1 (blue triangles) and 2 (red circles). The whiskers indicate the two standard error confidence intervals. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). See text for details.

Table A-1: Variable Definition and Sources

Variable	Description
Panel A. Integrated Value Survey	
<i>Main variables</i>	
Support for democracy index	Average of <i>Democratic system</i> , <i>Opposes strong leader</i> , <i>Opposes army ruling</i> and <i>Government above experts</i> . (see definition of these variables below).
Democracy is better	Equals 1 if “Disagree strongly”, 2 if “Disagree”, 3 if “Agree” and 4 if “Agree strongly” to the question “I’m going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I reach each of them? Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government”.
Democratic system	Equals 1 if “Very bad”, 2 if “Fairly bad”, 3 if “Fairly good” and 4 if “Very good” to the question “I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political system”.
Opposes strong leader	Equals 1 if “Very good”, 2 if “Fairly good”, 3 if “Fairly bad” and 4 if “Very bad” to a question with the same framing as in <i>Democratic system</i> but asks instead for “Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections”.
Opposes army ruling	Equals 1 if “Very good”, 2 if “Fairly good”, 3 if “Fairly bad” and 4 if “Very bad” to a question with the same framing as in <i>Democratic system</i> but asks instead for “Having the army rule the country”.
Government above experts	Equals “Disagree strongly”, 2 if “Disagree”, 3 if “Agree” and 4 if “Agree strongly” to a question with the same framing as in <i>Opposes one man rule</i> but asks instead for “We should get rid of elections and parliaments and have experts make decisions on behalf of the people”.
<i>Other variables (in alphabetical order)</i>	
Dislikes...	(1) gypsies neighbors, (2) immigrant neighbors, (3) jews neighbors, (4) neighbors of a different religion, (5) neighbors of different race, (6) unmarried couples neighbors. Equals one if “Mentioned”; zero if “Not mentioned” to the question “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours?...” (1) “...Gypsies”, (2) “...Immigrants”, (3) “...Jews”, (4) “...People with different religion”, (5) “...People of different race” and (6) “...Unmarried couples living together”, respectively.
Panel B. Asianbarometer	
<i>Main variables</i>	
Opposes one man rule	Equals 1 if “Strongly disapprove”, 2 if “Disapprove”, 3 if “Approve” and 4 if “Strongly approve” to the question “There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives? For each statement, would you say you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove? We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things”.
Panel C. Latinobarometer	
<i>Main variables</i>	
Democracy is better	Equals 1 if “Disagree strongly”, 2 if “Disagree”, 3 if “Agree” and 4 if “Agree strongly” to the question “I’m going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I reach each of them? Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government”.
Panel D. Lapop	
<i>Main variables</i>	

Continued on next page

Table A-1 – Variable Definition and Sources (Continues from Previous Page)

Democracy is better	Equals 1 if “Disagree strongly”, 2 if “Disagree”, 3 if “Agree” and 4 if “Agree strongly” to the question “I’m going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I reach each of them? Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government”.
---------------------	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table A-2: Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy — Extensive versus Intensive Margins

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army ruling	Government above experts
<i>Panel A. Binary vs Continuous, Specification 1.</i>						
Binary	-0.054 (0.040)	0.065 (0.044)	-0.023 (0.024)	-0.031 (0.034)	-0.047 (0.039)	-0.019 (0.036)
Continuous	0.190 (0.050)	0.052 (0.051)	0.110 (0.032)	0.094 (0.039)	0.130 (0.046)	0.151 (0.050)
Observations	337,272	184,421	383,748	380,043	379,301	371,033
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104
<i>Panel B. Binary vs Continuous, Specification 2.</i>						
Binary	0.025 (0.024)	0.065 (0.020)	0.014 (0.015)	0.011 (0.020)	0.029 (0.019)	0.027 (0.025)
Continuous	0.100 (0.034)	0.031 (0.037)	0.071 (0.025)	0.052 (0.025)	0.031 (0.035)	0.083 (0.034)
Observations	337,248	184,392	383,729	380,022	379,279	371,013
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104
<i>Panel C. Binary (V-DEM) vs Continuous, Specification 1.</i>						
Binary (V-DEM)	-0.067 (0.081)	0.003 (0.086)	-0.036 (0.061)	-0.053 (0.072)	-0.083 (0.057)	-0.029 (0.062)
Continuous	0.208 (0.098)	0.125 (0.097)	0.126 (0.074)	0.121 (0.090)	0.179 (0.069)	0.162 (0.084)
Observations	344,722	187,858	391,990	388,091	387,490	378,934
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104
<i>Panel D. Binary (V-DEM) vs Continuous, Specification 2.</i>						
Binary (V-DEM)	0.077 (0.068)	0.016 (0.058)	0.053 (0.043)	0.091 (0.050)	0.028 (0.055)	0.035 (0.043)
Continuous	0.045 (0.059)	0.090 (0.069)	0.034 (0.046)	-0.034 (0.047)	0.035 (0.047)	0.066 (0.054)
Observations	344,683	187,814	391,957	388,054	387,452	378,900
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of binary and continuous measures of Exposure to Democracy included simultaneously in equation (2), using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys. Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panels A and B use our baseline binary democracy score, while Panels C and D use a binary democracy score constructed from V-DEM. Panels A and C use Specification 1, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave/survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while Panels B and D report results from Specification 2, which additionally includes fixed effects for each country and year of interview and fixed effects for each age and subregion on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-3: Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy — Capping Exposure to Democracy at 40

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army ruling	Government above experts
<i>Panel A. Binary, Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.050 (0.029)	0.085 (0.030)	0.037 (0.023)	0.027 (0.028)	0.021 (0.024)	0.074 (0.022)
Observations	343,115	188,479	390,349	386,476	385,830	377,214
Countries	107	81	107	107	107	107
<i>Panel B. Binary, Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.073 (0.022)	0.059 (0.016)	0.048 (0.015)	0.033 (0.017)	0.055 (0.018)	0.064 (0.020)
Observations	343,090	188,449	390,329	386,454	385,807	377,193
Countries	107	81	107	107	107	107
<i>Panel C. Continuous, Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.130 (0.036)	0.118 (0.036)	0.083 (0.032)	0.081 (0.033)	0.077 (0.024)	0.126 (0.028)
Observations	344,722	187,858	391,990	388,091	387,490	378,934
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104
<i>Panel D. Continuous, Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.131 (0.042)	0.087 (0.031)	0.096 (0.027)	0.077 (0.030)	0.087 (0.034)	0.080 (0.029)
Observations	344,683	187,814	391,957	388,054	387,452	378,900
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Democracy in equation (2) using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys. Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1) but is capped at 40. Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panels A and B use the binary democracy score, while Panels C and D use the continuous democracy score. Panels A and C use Specification 1, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave/survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while Panels B and D report results from Specification 2, which additionally includes fixed effects for each country and year of interview and fixed effects for each age and subregion on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-4: Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy — Exposure to Democracy at Different Ages

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army ruling	Government above experts
<i>Panel A. Binary, Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy [0, 5]	0.000 (0.006)	0.007 (0.007)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.002 (0.006)	0.003 (0.004)
Exposure to Democracy [6, 17]	0.012 (0.007)	0.024 (0.010)	0.005 (0.009)	0.002 (0.007)	0.005 (0.006)	0.018 (0.009)
Exposure to Democracy [18, 25]	0.013 (0.006)	0.021 (0.008)	0.005 (0.007)	0.007 (0.007)	0.006 (0.005)	0.025 (0.007)
Exposure to Democracy [26, 32]	0.016 (0.009)	0.003 (0.007)	0.013 (0.008)	0.002 (0.008)	0.008 (0.004)	0.009 (0.006)
Exposure to Democracy [33, 40]	0.012 (0.006)	0.012 (0.008)	0.006 (0.007)	0.004 (0.006)	0.010 (0.005)	0.019 (0.007)
Exposure to Democracy [41, 50]	0.008 (0.006)	0.022 (0.008)	0.008 (0.005)	0.006 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)
Exposure to Democracy [51, 60]	0.016 (0.007)	0.011 (0.007)	0.012 (0.007)	0.009 (0.009)	0.015 (0.004)	0.009 (0.007)
Exposure to Democracy [61, 70]	0.024 (0.013)	0.028 (0.012)	0.027 (0.013)	0.029 (0.014)	0.024 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.009)
Exposure to Democracy 71+	0.015 (0.005)	0.024 (0.015)	0.020 (0.009)	0.015 (0.007)	0.011 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.010)
Observations	343,090	188,449	390,329	386,454	385,807	377,193
Countries	107	81	107	107	107	107
<i>Panel B. Continuous, Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy [0, 5]	-0.000 (0.010)	0.005 (0.017)	0.000 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.009)	0.006 (0.008)
Exposure to Democracy [6, 17]	0.007 (0.008)	0.021 (0.014)	0.008 (0.010)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.011 (0.010)	0.022 (0.009)
Exposure to Democracy [18, 25]	0.013 (0.009)	0.021 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.008)	0.002 (0.009)	0.007 (0.007)	0.026 (0.007)
Exposure to Democracy [26, 32]	0.018 (0.011)	0.001 (0.006)	0.008 (0.007)	0.005 (0.012)	0.005 (0.006)	0.018 (0.008)
Exposure to Democracy [33, 40]	0.017 (0.007)	0.005 (0.012)	0.019 (0.009)	0.007 (0.009)	0.005 (0.007)	0.013 (0.008)
Exposure to Democracy [41, 50]	0.002 (0.007)	0.009 (0.011)	0.005 (0.007)	0.002 (0.008)	0.001 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.005)
Exposure to Democracy [51, 60]	0.027 (0.011)	0.010 (0.015)	0.027 (0.008)	0.025 (0.012)	0.009 (0.008)	0.004 (0.010)
Exposure to Democracy [61, 70]	0.016 (0.012)	0.012 (0.007)	0.015 (0.011)	0.023 (0.010)	0.018 (0.014)	-0.004 (0.010)
Exposure to Democracy 71+	0.027 (0.009)	0.028 (0.017)	0.025 (0.015)	0.016 (0.009)	0.021 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.010)
Observations	344,683	187,814	391,957	388,054	387,452	378,900
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Democracy in equation (2) using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys. Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1) but independently constructed for each age interval. Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panels A and B use the binary democracy score, while Panels C and D use the continuous democracy score. Panels A and C use Specification 1, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave/survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while Panels B and D report results from Specification 2, which additionally includes fixed effects for each country and year of interview and fixed effects for each age and subregion on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-5: Multiple Hypothesis Testing

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	<i>Non-immigrants</i>				<i>2SLS</i>				<i>Immigrants</i>			
	<i>Binary</i>		<i>Continuous</i>		<i>Binary</i>		<i>Continuous</i>		<i>Binary</i>		<i>Continuous</i>	
Specification	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
<i>A. OLS main outcomes</i>												
Uncorrected p-value<0.05	0.833	0.833	1.000	1.000	0.833	1.000	0.833	0.833	0.167	0.500	0.333	0.333
Anderson's sharpened q<0.05	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.833	0.167	0.500	0.000	0.333
Young t-omnibus p-value	0.016	0.017	0.008	0.057	0.012	0.011	0.009	0.058	0.012	0.091	0.116	0.007
<i>B. Placebo exposure to democracy before birth</i>												
Uncorrected p-value<0.05	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.167	0.000	0.167	0.167	0.167
Anderson's sharpened q<0.05	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.167	0.000	0.000
Young t-omnibus p-value	0.365	0.553	0.813	0.764	0.365	0.581	0.823	0.735	0.535	0.040	0.237	0.227
<i>C. Placebo exposure to democracy on non-political attitudinal variables</i>												
Uncorrected p-value<0.05	0.000	0.083	0.083	0.000	0.083	0.083	0.125	0.125	0.091	0.157	0.136	0.000
Anderson's sharpened q<0.05	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Young t-omnibus p-value	0.784	0.750	0.515	0.055	0.214	0.519	0.584	0.122	0.284	0.601	0.019	0.801

Note: This table reports summary results statistics from the estimates of exposure to democracy on support for democracy (Panel A), estimates of pre-birth exposure to democracy on support for democracy (Panel B) and estimates of exposure to democracy on various non-political attitudinal questions (Panel C) using three different approaches to account for the fact that we are testing a family of hypotheses. In each panel, we report (i) the proportion of variables that are statistically significant using conventional p-values; (ii) the proportion of variables that are statistically significant using the sharpened False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values (see [Anderson, 2008](#)), which takes into account the expected fraction of type I errors; and (iii) randomization inference p-values, following [Young \(2019\)](#), which recognizes both type I errors and the potential correlation across outcomes. Odd column report results using Specification 1, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave/survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while even columns report results from Specification 2, which additionally includes fixed effects for each country and year of interview and fixed effects for each age and subregion on the right-hand side. Columns 1-4 report results for the OLS specification with the non-immigrants sample, columns 5-8 report results for the 2SLS specification with the non-immigrants sample and columns 9-12 report results for the OLS specification with the immigrants sample. Standard errors are computed with two-way (one-way) clustering at the country and year (country) levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity in columns 1-8 (9-12).

Table A-6: First-Stage Estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Dependent variable is Exposure to Democracy (as defined in the header of the panel)</i>						
<i>Panel A. Binary, Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy Wave $t-1$	0.856 (0.082)	0.849 (0.088)	0.847 (0.085)	0.857 (0.082)	0.854 (0.084)	0.858 (0.081)
Observations	341,921	188,187	389,029	385,201	384,543	375,944
Countries	106	81	106	106	106	106
F-stat excluded instruments	108.91	94.10	98.26	109.30	102.98	111.73
<i>Panel B. Binary, Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy Wave $t-1$	0.805 (0.055)	0.819 (0.068)	0.805 (0.055)	0.799 (0.056)	0.804 (0.056)	0.799 (0.056)
Observations	341,896	188,157	389,009	385,179	384,520	375,923
Countries	106	81	106	106	106	106
F-stat excluded instruments	211.18	146.61	217.00	203.66	207.05	204.14
<i>Panel C. Continuous, Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy Wave $t-1$	0.856 (0.088)	0.837 (0.110)	0.843 (0.096)	0.855 (0.088)	0.853 (0.092)	0.857 (0.088)
Observations	342,752	185,373	389,351	385,732	385,021	376,649
Countries	103	78	103	103	103	103
F-stat excluded instruments	94.04	58.35	77.71	93.41	85.81	94.37
<i>Panel D. Continuous, Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy Wave $t-1$	0.744 (0.137)	0.718 (0.149)	0.736 (0.138)	0.733 (0.138)	0.745 (0.138)	0.749 (0.136)
Observations	342,713	185,329	389,318	385,695	384,983	376,615
Countries	103	78	103	103	103	103
F-stat excluded instruments	29.57	23.34	28.35	28.14	29.25	30.13
Subsample with available information for...	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army ruling	Democratic system	Government above experts

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of the instrument in equation (5) using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys. The instrument for Exposure to Democracy is constructed as in equation (4), using regional waves of democratization as Acemoglu et al. (2019). The Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1). Each column corresponds the subsample for which each of our measures of support for democracy is defined. Panels A and B use the binary democracy score, while Panels C and D use the continuous democracy score. Panels A and C use Specification 1, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave/survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while Panels B and D report results from Specification 2, which additionally includes fixed effects for each country and year of interview and fixed effects for each age and subregion on the right-hand side. The first-stage F-statistic is reported below the coefficient estimates. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-7: Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy 2SLS Estimates Controlling for Other Shocks from Neighboring Countries During Lifetime

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army ruling	Government above experts
<i>Panel A. Binary, Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.128 (0.023)	0.141 (0.023)	0.096 (0.027)	0.079 (0.027)	0.056 (0.022)	0.133 (0.029)
Observations	287,133	158,020	325,127	321,825	320,833	314,785
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104
F-stat excluded instruments	110.34	136.85	102.55	111.40	105.15	113.60
F-stat neighbors	0.55	0.95	0.42	1.88	1.50	0.35
<i>Panel B. Binary, Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.079 (0.028)	0.054 (0.018)	0.065 (0.023)	0.047 (0.028)	0.041 (0.028)	0.068 (0.036)
Observations	287,130	158,015	325,124	321,822	320,830	314,782
Countries	104	79	104	104	104	104
F-stat excluded instruments	259.80	420.94	267.76	262.50	265.43	252.63
F-stat neighbors	6.82	1.72	2.14	1.41	2.54	1.95
<i>Panel C. Continuous, Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.012 (0.003)	0.013 (0.003)	0.008 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)	0.014 (0.003)
Observations	285,048	156,384	322,747	319,551	318,520	312,617
Countries	103	78	103	103	103	103
F-stat excluded instruments	121.64	87.04	105.81	121.34	112.78	123.15
F-stat neighbors	0.59	0.46	0.72	2.24	1.18	0.33
<i>Panel D. Continuous, Specification 2</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.011 (0.004)	0.011 (0.003)	0.008 (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)	0.009 (0.004)	0.011 (0.003)
Observations	285,046	156,380	322,745	319,549	318,518	312,615
Countries	103	78	103	103	103	103
F-stat excluded instruments	24.42	24.23	20.71	20.80	21.55	24.47
F-stat neighbors	9.01	1.76	2.16	1.57	3.82	1.95

Note: This table reports 2SLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Democracy in equation (2). Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1). The instrument for Exposure to Democracy is constructed as in equation (4), using regional waves of democratization as Acemoglu et al. (2019). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panels A and B use the binary democracy score, while Panels C and D use the continuous democracy score. Panels A and C use Specification 1, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave/survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while Panels B and D report results from Specification 2, which additionally includes fixed effects for each country and year of interview and fixed effects for each age and subregion on the right-hand side. All regressions additionally include other shocks (crisis, coups and natural disasters) that neighboring countries receive during the respondent lifetime. Both the first-stage F-statistic and the F-statistic of the shocks from neighboring countries face are reported below the coefficient estimates. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-8: Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy Controlling for Neighbors
Exposure to Democracy—2SLS Estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army ruling	Government above experts
<i>Panel A. Binary, Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.106 (0.042)	0.127 (0.024)	0.106 (0.041)	0.065 (0.034)	0.037 (0.028)	0.103 (0.036)
Neighbors' Exposure to Democracy	-0.019 (0.063)	0.019 (0.040)	-0.040 (0.051)	-0.055 (0.052)	0.027 (0.043)	-0.018 (0.052)
Observations	340,993	188,187	387,979	384,198	383,516	374,913
Countries	105	81	105	105	105	105
<i>Panel B. Binary, Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.069 (0.032)	0.088 (0.013)	0.068 (0.026)	0.038 (0.026)	0.020 (0.037)	0.064 (0.043)
Neighbors' Exposure to Democracy	0.089 (0.064)	0.129 (0.067)	0.080 (0.062)	0.017 (0.052)	0.093 (0.061)	0.010 (0.053)
Observations	340,968	188,157	387,959	384,176	383,493	374,892
Countries	105	81	105	105	105	105
<i>Panel C. Continuous, Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.104 (0.049)	0.179 (0.031)	0.122 (0.040)	0.028 (0.040)	0.002 (0.049)	0.138 (0.035)
Neighbors' Exposure to Democracy	-0.073 (0.127)	-0.130 (0.071)	-0.156 (0.085)	-0.115 (0.110)	0.134 (0.128)	-0.070 (0.078)
Observations	341,824	185,373	388,301	384,729	383,994	375,618
Countries	102	78	102	102	102	102
<i>Panel D. Continuous, Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.097 (0.049)	0.161 (0.018)	0.091 (0.029)	0.006 (0.038)	0.044 (0.052)	0.121 (0.051)
Neighbors' Exposure to Democracy	0.156 (0.137)	0.157 (0.087)	0.055 (0.123)	0.079 (0.117)	0.156 (0.131)	0.020 (0.097)
Observations	341,785	185,329	388,268	384,692	383,956	375,584
Countries	102	78	102	102	102	102

Note: This table reports 2SLS coefficient estimates of the individual's Exposure to Democracy and the Exposure to Democracy of its neighbors in equation (2) using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys. Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1), while Neighbors Exposure to Democracy is its spatial lag, this is, the weighted average across countries of the Exposure to Democracy that a person with the same year of birth and date of interview had in a different country, where the weights are a function of the inverse of the distance between countries. Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panels A and B use the binary democracy score, while Panels C and D use the continuous democracy score. Panels A and C use Specification 1, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave/survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while Panels B and D report results from Specification 2, which additionally includes fixed effects for each country and year of interview and fixed effects for each age and subregion on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-9: Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy Controlling for Neighbors
Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy—2SLS Estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army ruling	Government above experts
<i>Panel A. Binary, Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.104 (0.040)	0.120 (0.024)	0.104 (0.040)	0.071 (0.031)	0.038 (0.028)	0.097 (0.031)
Neighbors' Exposure to Democracy	-0.039 (0.062)	-0.004 (0.047)	-0.048 (0.053)	-0.072 (0.048)	0.016 (0.042)	-0.029 (0.047)
Neighbors' Support for Democracy	0.295 (0.221)	0.152 (0.163)	0.134 (0.170)	0.251 (0.124)	0.237 (0.178)	0.269 (0.256)
Observations	340,993	188,187	387,979	384,198	383,516	374,913
Countries	105	81	105	105	105	105
<i>Panel B. Binary, Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.069 (0.032)	0.091 (0.014)	0.077 (0.032)	0.038 (0.026)	0.019 (0.036)	0.059 (0.043)
Neighbors' Exposure to Democracy	0.096 (0.067)	0.175 (0.069)	0.115 (0.078)	0.016 (0.050)	0.094 (0.062)	0.040 (0.069)
Neighbors' Support for Democracy	-0.061 (0.067)	-0.290 (0.187)	-0.389 (0.472)	0.025 (0.145)	-0.009 (0.150)	-0.315 (0.513)
Observations	340,968	188,157	387,959	384,176	383,493	374,892
Countries	105	81	105	105	105	105
<i>Panel C. Continuous, Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.094 (0.049)	0.164 (0.032)	0.119 (0.041)	0.026 (0.037)	-0.001 (0.052)	0.122 (0.030)
Neighbors' Exposure to Democracy	-0.103 (0.115)	-0.165 (0.073)	-0.161 (0.082)	-0.124 (0.092)	0.116 (0.132)	-0.096 (0.071)
Neighbors' Support for Democracy	0.308 (0.214)	0.152 (0.169)	0.081 (0.141)	0.258 (0.128)	0.232 (0.169)	0.291 (0.262)
Observations	341,824	185,373	388,301	384,729	383,994	375,618
Countries	102	78	102	102	102	102
<i>Panel D. Continuous, Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.097 (0.049)	0.165 (0.019)	0.102 (0.034)	0.005 (0.039)	0.044 (0.052)	0.128 (0.057)
Neighbors' Exposure to Democracy	0.159 (0.139)	0.224 (0.087)	0.144 (0.175)	0.073 (0.120)	0.156 (0.130)	0.103 (0.227)
Neighbors' Support for Democracy	-0.014 (0.048)	-0.288 (0.190)	-0.550 (0.650)	0.031 (0.143)	-0.003 (0.161)	-0.258 (0.625)
Observations	341,785	185,329	388,268	384,692	383,956	375,584
Countries	102	78	102	102	102	102

Note: This table reports 2SLS coefficient estimates of the individual's Exposure to Democracy and the Exposure to Democracy of its neighbors in equation (2) using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys. Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1). Neighbors Exposure to Democracy (Neighbors Support for Democracy) is the respective spatial lag, this is, the weighted average across countries of the Exposure to Democracy (Support for Democracy) that a person with the same year of birth and date of interview had in a different country, where the weights are a function of the inverse of the distance between countries. Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panels A and B use the binary democracy score, while Panels C and D use the continuous democracy score. Panels A and C use Specification 1, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave/survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while Panels B and D report results from Specification 2, which additionally includes fixed effects for each country and year of interview and fixed effects for each age and subregion on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-10: Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy — Within-Age-Cohort and Within-Country Variation 2SLS Estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army ruling	Government above experts
<i>Panel A. Binary, controlling for region×age×year.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.093 (0.020)	0.114 (0.018)	0.069 (0.019)	0.039 (0.015)	0.060 (0.021)	0.066 (0.051)
Observations	341,558	188,222	388,658	384,799	384,167	375,538
Countries	107	81	107	107	107	107
<i>Panel B. Binary, controlling for country×age.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.433 (0.121)	0.363 (0.164)	0.177 (0.076)	0.260 (0.100)	0.425 (0.106)	0.210 (0.101)
Observations	341,696	188,249	388,798	384,936	384,301	375,687
Countries	107	81	107	107	107	107
<i>Panel C. Continuous, controlling for region×age×year.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.139 (0.030)	0.220 (0.067)	0.108 (0.036)	0.042 (0.027)	0.078 (0.037)	0.126 (0.064)
Observations	342,796	185,515	389,477	385,834	385,140	376,742
Countries	103	78	103	103	103	103
<i>Panel D. Continuous, controlling for country×age</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.626 (0.114)	0.241 (0.161)	0.227 (0.064)	0.403 (0.095)	0.645 (0.089)	0.295 (0.115)
Observations	342,963	185,543	389,638	386,000	385,294	376,912
Countries	103	78	103	103	103	103

Note: This table reports 2SLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Democracy in equation (2). Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panels A and B use the binary democracy score, while Panels C and D use the continuous democracy score. Panels A and C include region × age × year fixed effects and country × year fixed effects on the right-hand side, while Panels B and D include country × age and country × year. The instrument for Exposure to Democracy is constructed as in equation (4), using regional waves of democratization as [Acemoglu et al. \(2019\)](#). The first-stage F-statistic is reported below the coefficient estimates. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-11: Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy for Immigrants— Capping Exposure to Democracy at 40

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army ruling	Government above experts
<i>Panel A. Binary, Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.120 (0.061)	0.035 (0.047)	0.040 (0.064)	0.046 (0.051)	0.017 (0.038)	0.145 (0.044)
Observations	2,908	1,441	3,293	3,176	3,306	3,112
Countries	18	17	18	18	18	18
<i>Panel B. Binary, Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.161 (0.055)	0.043 (0.050)	0.146 (0.056)	0.092 (0.077)	0.037 (0.065)	0.162 (0.051)
Observations	1,726	779	1,989	1,905	2,013	1,872
Countries	17	16	18	17	18	18
<i>Panel C. Continuous, Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.173 (0.072)	0.105 (0.093)	0.063 (0.068)	0.145 (0.069)	0.049 (0.058)	0.135 (0.057)
Observations	2,908	1,450	3,295	3,178	3,307	3,106
Countries	18	17	18	18	18	18
<i>Panel D. Continuous, Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.340 (0.065)	0.076 (0.097)	0.141 (0.099)	0.385 (0.079)	0.145 (0.074)	0.236 (0.122)
Observations	1,706	782	1,969	1,883	1,992	1,850
Countries	17	16	18	17	18	18

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Democracy in equation (2) using a sample of immigrants in the Integrated Values Survey. Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1) but capped at 40 and exploiting only an individual's exposure to democracy in his or her country of birth. Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panels A and B use the binary democracy score, while Panels C and D use the continuous democracy score. Panels A and C use Specification 1, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave/survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while Panels B and D report results from Specification 2, which additionally includes fixed effects for each country and year of interview and fixed effects for each age and subregion on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with one-way clustering at the country level and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-12: First Stage Estimates for Immigrants

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Dependent variable is Exposure to Democracy (as defined in the header of the panel)</i>						
<i>Panel A. Binary, Specification 1.</i>						
Years Democracy Wave t-1	0.704 (0.057)	0.602 (0.037)	0.714 (0.056)	0.718 (0.059)	0.719 (0.055)	0.698 (0.058)
Observations	2,896	1,432	3,279	3,164	3,292	3,100
Countries	18	17	18	18	18	18
F-stat excluded instruments	154.15	262.15	165.29	150.63	171.32	144.30
<i>Panel B. Binary, Specification 2.</i>						
Years Democracy Wave t-1	0.579 (0.066)	0.415 (0.051)	0.570 (0.052)	0.583 (0.065)	0.571 (0.053)	0.586 (0.055)
Observations	1,722	779	1,985	1,901	2,009	1,868
Countries	17	16	18	17	18	18
F-stat excluded instruments	76.87	65.98	121.36	81.41	116.38	114.02
<i>Panel C. Continuous, Specification 1.</i>						
Years Democracy Wave t-1	0.994 (0.019)	0.988 (0.028)	0.996 (0.020)	1.001 (0.020)	0.995 (0.020)	0.995 (0.021)
Observations	2,724	1,309	3,086	2,969	3,094	2,909
Countries	18	17	18	18	18	18
F-stat excluded instruments	2638.52	1222.43	2589.00	2425.01	2491.61	2170.96
<i>Panel D. Continuous, Specification 2.</i>						
Years Democracy Wave t-1	0.989 (0.020)	1.030 (0.037)	1.004 (0.018)	1.001 (0.018)	0.995 (0.016)	0.993 (0.020)
Observations	1,561	670	1,798	1,715	1,821	1,689
Countries	17	16	18	17	18	18
F-stat excluded instruments	2435.59	755.59	3218.28	3204.29	3828.17	2489.20

Subsample with available information for...	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army ruling	Democratic system	Government above experts
---------------------------------------------	-----------------------------	---------------------	-----------------------	---------------------	-------------------	--------------------------

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of the instrument in equation (5) using a sample of immigrants in the Integrated Value Surveys. The instrument for Exposure to Democracy is constructed as in equation (4), using regional waves of democratization as [Acemoglu et al. \(2019\)](#). Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1). Exposure to Democracy and its instrument exploit variation only from an individual's exposure to democracy in his or her country of birth. Each column corresponds to the subsample for which each of our measures of support for democracy is defined. Panels A and B use the binary democracy score, while Panels C and D use the continuous democracy score. Panels A and C use Specification 1, which includes a full set of country and year of arrival, country of birth, year of interview, age of arrival, cohort, wave/survey, and language fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while Panels B and D report results from Specification 2, which includes which includes a full set of country \times year of arrival \times region of birth, country of birth, year of interview, age of arrival, cohort, wave/survey, and language fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side. The first-stage F-statistic is reported below the coefficient estimates. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with one-way clustering at the country level and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-13: Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy for Immigrants—2SLS Estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army ruling	Government above experts
<i>Panel A. Binary, Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.147 (0.104)	0.254 (0.142)	0.020 (0.110)	0.068 (0.071)	0.063 (0.075)	0.161 (0.078)
Observations	2,896	1,432	3,279	3,164	3,292	3,100
Countries	18	17	18	18	18	18
<i>Panel B. Binary, Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.388 (0.081)	0.841 (0.389)	0.136 (0.124)	0.147 (0.116)	0.304 (0.086)	0.333 (0.091)
Observations	1,722	779	1,985	1,901	2,009	1,868
Countries	17	16	18	17	18	18
<i>Panel C. Continuous, Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.297 (0.099)	0.168 (0.092)	0.108 (0.085)	0.242 (0.084)	0.058 (0.060)	0.226 (0.090)
Observations	2,724	1,309	3,086	2,969	3,094	2,909
Countries	18	17	18	18	18	18
<i>Panel D. Continuous, Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Democracy	0.409 (0.094)	0.187 (0.171)	0.173 (0.108)	0.315 (0.100)	0.193 (0.083)	0.330 (0.112)
Observations	1,561	670	1,798	1,715	1,821	1,689
Countries	17	16	18	17	18	18

Note: This table reports 2SLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Democracy in equation (2) using a sample of immigrants. Exposure to Democracy is defined in equation (1) but exploit variation only from an individual's exposure to democracy in his or her country of birth. Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panels A and B use the binary democracy score, while Panels C and D use the continuous democracy score. Panels A and C use Specification 1, which includes a full set of country and year of arrival, country of birth, year of interview, age of arrival, cohort, wave/survey, and language fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while Panels B and D report results from Specification 2, which includes which includes a full set of country \times year of arrival \times region of birth, country of birth, year of interview, age of arrival, cohort, wave/survey, and language fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side. The instrument for Exposure to Democracy is constructed as in equation (4), using regional waves of democratization as Acemoglu et al. (2019). The first-stage F-statistic is reported below the coefficient estimates. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with one-way clustering at the country level and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-14: Exposure to Successful Democracy and Support for Democracy for
Non-Saturated Model — Economic Growth

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army ruling	Government above experts
<i>Panel A. Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.066 (0.018)	0.093 (0.018)	0.054 (0.019)	0.027 (0.018)	0.035 (0.014)	0.072 (0.016)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.013 (0.016)	0.021 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.002 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.015)
Observations	320,290	185,613	364,126	360,446	360,388	352,021
Countries	106	80	106	106	106	106
<i>Panel B. Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.066 (0.017)	0.067 (0.012)	0.043 (0.012)	0.033 (0.016)	0.042 (0.015)	0.062 (0.015)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.007 (0.009)	0.019 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.009)	-0.010 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.007)	0.004 (0.014)
Observations	320,276	185,592	364,115	360,433	360,375	352,008
Countries	106	80	106	106	106	106

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful Democracy and Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys. The exposure measures are defined as in equation (6), with the measure of success being GDP growth rate equal or more than one standard deviation below its average (and the measure of unsuccess being GDP growth rate less than one standard deviation below its average). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. All panels use the binary democracy score. Panel A uses Specification 1, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave/survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while Panel B reports results from Specification 2, which additionally includes fixed effects for each country and year of interview and fixed effects for each age and subregion on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-15: Exposure to Successful Democracy and Support for Democracy for
Non-Saturated Model — Peace and Political Stability

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army ruling	Government above experts
<i>Panel A. Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.085 (0.021)	0.079 (0.021)	0.043 (0.017)	0.047 (0.022)	0.039 (0.014)	0.104 (0.018)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.058 (0.049)	-0.014 (0.017)	-0.023 (0.011)	0.019 (0.032)	-0.037 (0.041)	-0.053 (0.052)
Observations	305,709	160,147	346,394	342,759	341,494	335,132
Countries	101	79	101	101	101	101
<i>Panel B. Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.070 (0.017)	0.058 (0.015)	0.044 (0.011)	0.034 (0.015)	0.047 (0.014)	0.064 (0.016)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.024 (0.019)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.012 (0.008)	0.000 (0.015)	-0.005 (0.007)
Observations	305,706	160,143	346,391	342,756	341,491	335,129
Countries	101	79	101	101	101	101

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful Democracy and Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys. The exposure measures are defined as in equation (6), with the measure of success defined as no experience of civil war (and the measure of unsuccess defined as experience of civil war). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. All panels use the binary democracy score. Panel A uses Specification 1, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave/survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while Panel B reports results from Specification 2, which additionally includes fixed effects for each country and year of interview and fixed effects for each age and subregion on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-16: Exposure to Successful Democracy and Support for Democracy for
Non-Saturated Model — Public Expenditure

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army ruling	Government above experts
<i>Panel A. Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.181 (0.024)	0.136 (0.021)	0.119 (0.020)	0.083 (0.027)	0.137 (0.021)	0.154 (0.017)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.031 (0.021)	0.011 (0.016)	0.021 (0.021)	0.006 (0.020)	0.023 (0.011)	0.043 (0.014)
Observations	123,432	81,001	138,037	136,113	138,338	133,155
Countries	64	52	64	64	64	64
<i>Panel B. Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.189 (0.049)	0.103 (0.028)	0.097 (0.031)	0.130 (0.043)	0.118 (0.020)	0.180 (0.032)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.035 (0.018)	0.001 (0.023)	0.014 (0.010)	0.021 (0.023)	0.028 (0.012)	0.041 (0.013)
Observations	123,430	80,999	138,035	136,111	138,336	133,154
Countries	64	52	64	64	64	64

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful Democracy and Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys. The exposure measures are defined as in equation (6), with the measure of success defined as government expenditure equal or above its mean (and the measure of unsuccess defined as government expenditure below its mean). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. All panels use the binary democracy score. Panel A uses Specification 1, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave/survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while Panel B reports results from Specification 2, which additionally includes fixed effects for each country and year of interview and fixed effects for each age and subregion on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-17: Exposure to Successful Democracy and Support for Democracy for Immigrants
— Economic Growth

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army ruling	Government above experts
<i>Panel A. Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.126 (0.063)	0.050 (0.054)	0.063 (0.055)	0.043 (0.051)	0.009 (0.040)	0.156 (0.043)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.011 (0.034)	-0.074 (0.056)	0.051 (0.028)	-0.010 (0.060)	-0.009 (0.043)	-0.005 (0.034)
Observations	2,897	1,434	3,276	3,161	3,292	3,095
Countries	18	17	18	18	18	18
<i>Panel B. Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.186 (0.050)	0.021 (0.051)	0.170 (0.054)	0.101 (0.075)	0.051 (0.055)	0.187 (0.050)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	-0.223 (0.059)	0.088 (0.313)	-0.007 (0.061)	-0.077 (0.073)	-0.260 (0.074)	-0.085 (0.069)
Observations	1,723	779	1,986	1,902	2,010	1,869
Countries	17	16	18	17	18	18

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful Democracy and Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) using a sample of immigrants from Integrated Value Surveys. The exposure measures are defined as in equation (6) but exploit variation only from an individual's exposure to democracy in his or her country of birth. The measure of success is GDP growth rate equal or more than one standard deviation below its average (and the measure of unsuccess being GDP growth rate less than one standard deviation below its average). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. All panels use the binary democracy score. Panel A uses Specification 1, which includes a full set of country and year of arrival, country of birth, year of interview, age of arrival, cohort, wave/survey, and language fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while Panel B reports results from Specification 2, which includes which includes a full set of country \times year of arrival \times region of birth, country of birth, year of interview, age of arrival, cohort, wave/survey, and language fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with one-way clustering at the country level and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-18: Exposure to Successful Democracy and Support for Democracy for Immigrants
— Peace and Political Stability

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army ruling	Government above experts
<i>Panel A. Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.124 (0.062)	0.049 (0.052)	0.038 (0.059)	0.056 (0.050)	0.002 (0.037)	0.165 (0.041)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.017 (0.034)	-0.086 (0.076)	0.005 (0.035)	0.043 (0.044)	0.049 (0.025)	0.001 (0.022)
Observations	2,739	1,335	3,092	2,993	3,105	2,922
Countries	18	17	18	18	18	18
<i>Panel B. Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.179 (0.056)	0.060 (0.060)	0.184 (0.042)	0.106 (0.077)	0.028 (0.057)	0.200 (0.070)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.088 (0.072)	-0.216 (0.213)	-0.008 (0.057)	0.058 (0.050)	0.017 (0.051)	0.077 (0.055)
Observations	1,627	738	1,869	1,795	1,889	1,759
Countries	17	16	18	17	18	18

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful Democracy and Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) using a sample of immigrants from Integrated Value Surveys. The exposure measures are defined as in equation (6) but exploit variation only from an individual's exposure to democracy in his or her country of birth. The measure of success is defined as no experience of civil war (and the measure of unsuccess defined as experience of civil war). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. All panels use the binary democracy score. Panel A uses Specification 1, which includes a full set of country and year of arrival, country of birth, year of interview, age of arrival, cohort, wave/survey, and language fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while Panel B reports results from Specification 2, which includes which includes a full set of country \times year of arrival \times region of birth, country of birth, year of interview, age of arrival, cohort, wave/survey, and language fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with one-way clustering at the country level and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-19: Exposure to Successful Democracy and Support for Democracy for Immigrants
—Public Expenditure

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army ruling	Government above experts
<i>Panel A. Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.179 (0.084)	-0.000 (0.218)	0.178 (0.092)	0.067 (0.088)	0.013 (0.096)	0.167 (0.079)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.221 (0.079)	-0.097 (0.073)	0.060 (0.058)	0.245 (0.069)	-0.029 (0.068)	0.335 (0.059)
Observations	1,352	768	1,510	1,475	1,526	1,425
Countries	16	15	16	16	16	16
<i>Panel B. Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.398 (0.068)	0.311 (0.263)	0.274 (0.154)	0.399 (0.103)	0.233 (0.078)	0.253 (0.089)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.169 (0.063)	-0.092 (0.158)	0.128 (0.036)	0.182 (0.082)	0.002 (0.048)	0.317 (0.048)
Observations	848	499	943	922	968	893
Countries	15	13	15	15	15	15

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful Democracy and Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) using a sample of immigrants from Integrated Value Surveys. The exposure measures are defined as in equation (6) but exploit variation only from an individual's exposure to democracy in his or her country of birth. The measure of success is as government expenditure equal or above its mean (and the measure of unsuccess defined as government expenditure below its mean). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. All panels use the binary democracy score. Panel A uses Specification 1, which includes a full set of country and year of arrival, country of birth, year of interview, age of arrival, cohort, wave/survey, and language fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while Panel B reports results from Specification 2, which includes which includes a full set of country \times year of arrival \times region of birth, country of birth, year of interview, age of arrival, cohort, wave/survey, and language fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with one-way clustering at the country level and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-20: Exposure to Successful Democracy and Support for Democracy — Economic Growth, Successful Performance Defined Relative to a Country's Own Mean

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army ruling	Government above experts
<i>Panel A. Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.052 (0.021)	0.088 (0.017)	0.043 (0.018)	0.020 (0.018)	0.016 (0.018)	0.069 (0.022)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.017 (0.024)	0.023 (0.017)	0.017 (0.014)	0.006 (0.019)	0.032 (0.020)	0.004 (0.021)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.092 (0.112)	-0.141 (0.110)	-0.009 (0.083)	-0.051 (0.087)	0.150 (0.109)	0.105 (0.087)
Observations	320,290	185,613	364,126	360,446	360,388	352,021
Countries	106	80	106	106	106	106
<i>Panel B. Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.058 (0.015)	0.070 (0.015)	0.035 (0.011)	0.025 (0.015)	0.043 (0.013)	0.056 (0.016)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.018 (0.013)	0.011 (0.009)	0.017 (0.009)	0.016 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.010)	0.012 (0.011)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.004 (0.064)	-0.060 (0.071)	0.041 (0.058)	-0.014 (0.057)	-0.077 (0.052)	0.048 (0.047)
Observations	320,276	185,592	364,115	360,433	360,375	352,008
Countries	106	80	106	106	106	106

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful Democracy and Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys. The exposure measures are defined as in equation (6), with the measure of success being GDP growth rate equal or more than one standard deviation below its average growth rate (and the measure of unsuccess being GDP growth rate less than one standard deviation below its average). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. All panels use the binary democracy score. Panels A uses Specification 1, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave/survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while Panel B reports results from Specification 2, which additionally includes fixed effects for each country and year of interview and fixed effects for each age and subregion on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-21: Exposure to Successful Democracy and Support for Democracy — Economic Growth, Alternative Definitions of Successful Performance

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army ruling	Government above experts
<i>Panel A. Specification 1, Successful performance defined as GDP growth above 0%</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.052 (0.026)	0.055 (0.021)	0.027 (0.018)	-0.004 (0.022)	0.020 (0.020)	0.087 (0.032)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.016 (0.024)	0.057 (0.017)	0.035 (0.013)	0.028 (0.018)	0.020 (0.019)	-0.018 (0.026)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.025 (0.053)	-0.008 (0.055)	-0.024 (0.034)	0.043 (0.061)	-0.018 (0.061)	0.007 (0.049)
Observations	320,290	185,613	364,126	360,446	360,388	352,021
Countries	106	80	106	106	106	106
<i>Panel B. Specification 1, Successful performance defined as GDP growth above -1%</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.049 (0.023)	0.060 (0.018)	0.019 (0.018)	0.015 (0.021)	0.020 (0.019)	0.084 (0.028)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.019 (0.026)	0.057 (0.021)	0.045 (0.014)	0.011 (0.018)	0.022 (0.022)	-0.014 (0.024)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.002 (0.050)	0.029 (0.057)	0.027 (0.037)	0.006 (0.048)	-0.009 (0.064)	-0.010 (0.045)
Observations	320,290	185,613	364,126	360,446	360,388	352,021
Countries	106	80	106	106	106	106
<i>Panel C. Specification 1, Successful performance defined as GDP growth above -2%</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.056 (0.021)	0.080 (0.016)	0.037 (0.018)	0.020 (0.019)	0.019 (0.017)	0.077 (0.025)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.011 (0.024)	0.038 (0.017)	0.030 (0.013)	0.006 (0.020)	0.022 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.023)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.022 (0.070)	-0.034 (0.079)	-0.025 (0.056)	-0.009 (0.074)	0.063 (0.069)	0.047 (0.060)
Observations	320,290	185,613	364,126	360,446	360,388	352,021
Countries	106	80	106	106	106	106
<i>Panel D. Specification 2, Successful performance defined as GDP growth above 0%</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.041 (0.016)	0.069 (0.012)	0.025 (0.012)	0.007 (0.014)	0.037 (0.012)	0.049 (0.017)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.029 (0.012)	0.009 (0.010)	0.022 (0.010)	0.028 (0.009)	0.006 (0.014)	0.019 (0.011)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.001 (0.050)	-0.090 (0.039)	-0.036 (0.048)	0.043 (0.029)	0.011 (0.042)	-0.019 (0.033)
Observations	320,276	185,592	364,115	360,433	360,375	352,008
Countries	106	80	106	106	106	106
<i>Panel E. Specification 2, Successful performance defined as GDP growth above -1%</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.047 (0.015)	0.066 (0.013)	0.025 (0.010)	0.018 (0.014)	0.037 (0.012)	0.054 (0.016)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.026 (0.013)	0.012 (0.010)	0.026 (0.010)	0.018 (0.009)	0.006 (0.014)	0.016 (0.010)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.028 (0.056)	0.001 (0.037)	0.026 (0.034)	0.051 (0.040)	0.010 (0.053)	-0.028 (0.039)
Observations	320,276	185,592	364,115	360,433	360,375	352,008
Countries	106	80	106	106	106	106
<i>Panel F. Specification 2, Successful performance defined as GDP growth above -2%</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.050 (0.014)	0.066 (0.016)	0.028 (0.011)	0.019 (0.014)	0.034 (0.012)	0.059 (0.018)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.025 (0.013)	0.014 (0.009)	0.026 (0.010)	0.020 (0.009)	0.009 (0.012)	0.010 (0.012)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.066 (0.054)	-0.029 (0.053)	0.033 (0.045)	0.051 (0.044)	0.063 (0.052)	0.008 (0.038)
Observations	320,276	185,592	364,115	360,433	360,375	352,008
Countries	106	80	106	106	106	106

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful Democracy and Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys. The exposure measures are defined as in equation (6), with the measure of success is GDP growth rate equal or more than 0%, -1% and -2% (panels A and D, B and E, and C and F respectively; as indicated in the panel title). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. All panels use the binary democracy score. Panels A, B and C use Specification 1, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave/survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while Panels D, E and F report results from Specification 2, which additionally includes fixed effects for each country and year of interview and fixed effects for each age and subregion on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-22: Exposure to Democracy and Support for Democracy — Exposure to Successful Democracy at Different Ages

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army ruling	Government above experts
<i>Panel A. Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy [0, 10]	-0.000 (0.012)	0.012 (0.010)	0.005 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.009)	0.008 (0.011)	0.002 (0.010)
Exposure to Successful Democracy [11, 20]	0.003 (0.011)	0.019 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.010)	0.000 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.009)	0.027 (0.008)
Exposure to Successful Democracy [21, 30]	0.023 (0.007)	0.026 (0.008)	0.019 (0.007)	0.009 (0.007)	0.009 (0.006)	0.028 (0.007)
Exposure to Successful Democracy [31, 40]	0.012 (0.007)	0.016 (0.007)	0.008 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.009 (0.007)	0.019 (0.006)
Exposure to Successful Democracy [41, 50]	0.007 (0.007)	0.017 (0.010)	0.006 (0.007)	0.006 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.008)	0.011 (0.008)
Exposure to Successful Democracy [51, 60]	0.007 (0.010)	0.007 (0.008)	0.007 (0.007)	0.005 (0.010)	0.006 (0.008)	0.019 (0.009)
Exposure to Successful Democracy [61, 70]	0.010 (0.015)	0.023 (0.019)	0.021 (0.014)	0.007 (0.015)	0.011 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.009)
Exposure to Successful Democracy 71+	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.010)	0.006 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.008)	-0.015 (0.011)	-0.016 (0.007)
Observations	320,290	185,613	364,126	360,446	360,388	352,021
Countries	106	80	106	106	106	106
<i>Panel B. Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy [0, 10]	0.001 (0.006)	0.005 (0.010)	0.004 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.007)	0.005 (0.006)	0.004 (0.005)
Exposure to Successful Democracy [11, 20]	0.010 (0.007)	0.019 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.007)	0.005 (0.009)	0.001 (0.007)	0.022 (0.007)
Exposure to Successful Democracy [21, 30]	0.019 (0.007)	0.017 (0.008)	0.013 (0.006)	0.005 (0.007)	0.009 (0.005)	0.027 (0.007)
Exposure to Successful Democracy [31, 40]	0.011 (0.006)	0.003 (0.012)	0.006 (0.006)	0.002 (0.007)	0.009 (0.006)	0.017 (0.006)
Exposure to Successful Democracy [41, 50]	0.010 (0.008)	0.009 (0.007)	0.006 (0.005)	0.006 (0.006)	0.000 (0.008)	0.011 (0.007)
Exposure to Successful Democracy [51, 60]	0.027 (0.009)	0.012 (0.010)	0.012 (0.007)	0.018 (0.010)	0.017 (0.007)	0.022 (0.008)
Exposure to Successful Democracy [61, 70]	0.016 (0.015)	0.041 (0.015)	0.035 (0.017)	0.020 (0.016)	0.007 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.012)
Exposure to Successful Democracy 71+	0.011 (0.012)	0.021 (0.011)	0.034 (0.015)	0.010 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.010)	-0.017 (0.011)
Observations	320,276	185,592	364,115	360,433	360,375	352,008
Countries	106	80	106	106	106	106

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful Democracy in equation (3) at different age intervals using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys. The exposure measures are defined as in equation (6), with the measure of success defined as GDP growth rate equal or more than one standard deviation below the average. Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. Panel A uses Specification 1, which includes a full set of country and year of arrival, country of birth, year of interview, age of arrival, cohort, wave/survey, and language fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while Panel B reports results from Specification 2, which includes which includes a full set of country \times year of arrival \times region of birth, country of birth, year of interview, age of arrival, cohort, wave/survey, and language fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-23: Exposure to Successful Democracy and Support for Democracy —Public Expenditure, Successful Performance Defined Relative to a Country's Own Mean

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army ruling	Government above experts
<i>Panel A. Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.167 (0.040)	0.077 (0.048)	0.086 (0.029)	0.066 (0.038)	0.121 (0.043)	0.131 (0.026)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.030 (0.016)	0.033 (0.015)	0.030 (0.010)	0.011 (0.017)	0.025 (0.014)	0.040 (0.012)
Exposure to Successful Performance	0.013 (0.041)	0.042 (0.034)	0.015 (0.028)	0.020 (0.029)	0.014 (0.046)	0.033 (0.026)
Observations	123,432	81,001	138,037	136,113	138,338	133,155
Countries	64	52	64	64	64	64
<i>Panel B. Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.126 (0.028)	0.049 (0.027)	0.059 (0.031)	0.051 (0.021)	0.087 (0.021)	0.128 (0.027)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.041 (0.019)	0.021 (0.026)	0.019 (0.011)	0.039 (0.019)	0.033 (0.008)	0.048 (0.022)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.022 (0.022)	0.011 (0.043)	-0.018 (0.014)	-0.018 (0.005)	0.015 (0.018)	0.004 (0.034)
Observations	123,430	80,999	138,035	136,111	138,336	133,154
Countries	64	52	64	64	64	64

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful Democracy and Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys. The exposure measures are defined as in equation (6), with the measure of success defined as government expenditure equal or above its mean (and the measure of unsuccess defined as government expenditure below its mean). Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. All panels use the binary democracy score. Panel A uses Specification 1, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave/survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while Panel B reports results from Specification 2, which additionally includes fixed effects for each country and year of interview and fixed effects for each age and subregion on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.

Table A-24: Exposure to Successful Democracy and Support for Democracy —Public Expenditure, Successful Performance Defined with Threshold of One Standard Deviation below the Sample Mean

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for democracy index	Democracy is better	Democratic system	Opposes strong leader	Opposes army ruling	Government above experts
<i>Panel A. Specification 1.</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.136 (0.030)	0.091 (0.019)	0.079 (0.025)	0.050 (0.033)	0.089 (0.025)	0.137 (0.020)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.010 (0.016)	0.000 (0.019)	0.008 (0.008)	0.011 (0.017)	0.007 (0.013)	0.005 (0.014)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.024 (0.046)	-0.019 (0.033)	0.007 (0.020)	-0.002 (0.040)	0.012 (0.037)	-0.033 (0.030)
Observations	123,432	81,001	138,037	136,113	138,338	133,155
Countries	64	52	64	64	64	64
<i>Panel B. Specification 2.</i>						
Exposure to Successful Democracy	0.121 (0.034)	0.056 (0.032)	0.068 (0.021)	0.068 (0.037)	0.085 (0.017)	0.120 (0.020)
Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy	0.013 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.030)	-0.008 (0.007)	0.029 (0.009)	0.007 (0.018)	0.022 (0.014)
Exposure to Successful Performance	-0.053 (0.030)	-0.040 (0.039)	-0.050 (0.030)	0.015 (0.021)	-0.027 (0.027)	-0.033 (0.029)
Observations	123,430	80,999	138,035	136,111	138,336	133,154
Countries	64	52	64	64	64	64

Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates of Exposure to Successful Democracy and Exposure to Unsuccessful Democracy in equation (3) using our baseline sample from Integrated Value Surveys. The exposure measures are defined as in equation (6), with the measure of success being government expenditure equal or more than one standard deviation below the average expenditure. Each column corresponds to one of our measures of support for democracy. All panels use the binary democracy score. Panel A uses Specification 1, which includes a full set of country, year of interview, age, cohort and wave/survey fixed effects as well as gender and dummies of categories identifying the size of the city on the right-hand side, while Panel B reports results from Specification 2, which additionally includes fixed effects for each country and year of interview and fixed effects for each age and subregion on the right-hand side. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients). Standard errors are computed with two-way clustering at the country and year levels and are robust against heteroscedasticity.